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 Deutsch and Silber
The focus of this Element is on the idea that choice is
hierarchical so that there exists an order of acquisition of
durable goods and assets as real incomes increase. Two main
approaches to deriving such an order are presented, the
so-called Paroush approach and Item Response Theory. An
empirical illustration follows, based on the 2019 Eurobarometer Development
Survey. The Element ends with two sections showing, first, how
measures of inequality, poverty, and welfare may be derived Economics
from such an order of acquisition and, second, that there is also
an order of curtailment of expenditures when individuals face
financial difficulties. This title is also available as Open Access
on Cambridge Core.

Hierarchy of Needs and the Measurement of Poverty and Standards of Living

Hierarchy of Needs
and the Measurement
of Poverty and
About the Series Series Editor- Standards of Living
Cambridge Elements in Development in-Chief
Economics is led by UNU-WIDER in Kunal Sen
partnership with Cambridge University UNU-WIDER
Press. The series publishes authoritative and University

Joseph Deutsch and

studies on important topics in the field of Manchester
covering both micro and macro aspects
of development economics.
Jacques Silber

This title is also available as Open Access on

Cambridge Core at www.cambridge.org/core

Cover image: Eskay Lim / EyeEm /

EyeEm / Getty images ISSN 2755-1601 (online)
ISSN 2755-1598 (print)
 Elements in Development Economics
Series Editor-in-Chief
Kunal Sen
UNU-WIDER and University of Manchester

HIERARCHY OF NEEDS
AND THE MEASUREMENT
OF POVERTY AND
STANDARDS OF LIVING

Joseph Deutsch
Bar-Ilan University and Ashkelon Academic College
Jacques Silber
Bar-Ilan University
 Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom
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 Hierarchy of Needs and the Measurement
of Poverty and Standards of Living

Elements in Development Economics

DOI: 10.1017/9781009358200
First published online: February 2024

Joseph Deutsch
Bar-Ilan University and Ashkelon Academic College
Jacques Silber
Bar-Ilan University
Author for correspondence: Jacques Silber, jsilber_2000@yahoo.com

Abstract: The focus of this Element is on the idea that choice is

hierarchical so that there exists an order of acquisition of durable goods
and assets as real incomes increase. Two main approaches to deriving
such an order are presented, the so-called Paroush approach and Item
Response Theory. An empirical illustration follows, based on the 2019
Eurobarometer Survey. The Element ends with two sections showing,
first, how measures of inequality, poverty, and welfare may be derived
from such an order of acquisition and, second, that there is also an order
of curtailment of expenditures when individuals face financial difficulties.
This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Keywords: consumption expenditures, durable goods, Eurobarometer,

hierarchical choice, inequality, Item Response Theory, order of acquisition,
order of curtailment, Paroush approach, poverty, welfare

© UNU-WIDER 2024
ISBNs: 9781009485975 (HB), 9781009358170 (PB), 9781009358200 (OC)
ISSNs: 2755-1601 (online), 2755-1598 (print)
 Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 Economics and Hierarchical Choice 3

3 Deriving the Order of Acquisition of Durable Goods

and Assets: Methodologies 19

4 Deriving the Order of Acquisition of Durable Goods

and Assets: Empirical Illustrations 33

5 The Order of Acquisition of Durable Goods and Assets

and the Measurement of Inequality, Poverty, and Welfare 51

6 On the Order of Curtailment of Expenditures 66

7 Concluding Comments 79

References 82

An online Appendix for this publication can be accessed

at www.cambridge.org/deutsch-silber
 Hierarchy of Needs and the Measurement of Poverty 1

1 Introduction
For most economists an important assumption underlying the notion of rational
behavior is that economic agents compare bundles of goods by reducing
everything to a common denominator, called utility. For example, standard
consumer theory assumes that the loss of some units of a given commodity in
one bundle can be compensated by the gain of some units of another commod-
ity. Some economists have, however, questioned such an assumption and
adopted the notion of hierarchical preferences. As stressed by Drakopoulos
(2004), although the concept of hierarchical preferences leads to a reasonable
system of choice, most economists rejected such an approach because they
focused their attention on the notion of lexicographic ordering, which, as is
well-known, violates the axiom of continuity and, thus, in the eyes of these
economists, cannot have a wide application when applied to economic issues.
They cite here an argument emphasized by Debreu (1959), according to which
lexicographic orderings produce nonconvexities and discontinuities, and these
shortcomings tend to prevent the existence of a general equilibrium.
Pasinetti is one of those rare economists who argued in favor of hierarchical
preferences as he wrote: “Although possibilities of substitution among com-
modities are of course relevant at any given level of real income, there exists
a hierarchy of needs. More precisely, there exists a very definite order of priority
in consumers’ wants, and therefore among groups of goods and services, which
manifests itself as real incomes increase” (Pasinetti, 1981, p. 7, cited by Lavoie,
1994).
Lavoie (1994), in fact, argues that most economists put too much emphasis on
substitution effects and tend to neglect income effects. He cites the famous
textbook of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, p. 71), who concluded that, when
working with general categories of consumption expenditures, own-price and
cross-elasticities are very small (not higher than 0.5 in absolute value for the
own-price elasticities of categories such as, for example, food, travel, and
entertainment). The explanation Lavoie provides for such findings is that
these large categories of expenditures are derived from needs that cannot be
substituted. Therefore, variations in the price index of these large categories will
not lead to important changes in consumption patterns. One can expect, how-
ever, that substitution effects may be more substantial within each of these
consumption categories, although some empirical findings of Houthakker and
Taylor (1970) seem to indicate that even in such a case price-elasticities are not
very high.
This emphasis on groups of goods appeared already in the 1940s in an
important article of the French economist René Roy (1943), who wrote that it
2 Development Economics

is possible “to establish among all the goods and services, a classification into
groups such that any consumer has access to a group of a certain order only after
having ensured the satiety of the needs responding to the groups of lower
category.”1 The novelty of Roy’s approach is that, looking at necessities, he
divides the consumers of these goods into two groups: whereas the first one did
not reach satiety, the second one did. He then derives the law of demand as
a function of the distribution of incomes, as will be shown in Section 2.
In Section 2 we discuss the notion of hierarchical choice as it appeared in the
economics literature. Special emphasis is put on the contribution of Roy who is
well known for what is called Roy’s identity (Roy, 1947) which enables one to
derive the ordinary demand curve (not the compensated one) once we know the
indirect utility function. However, Roy, according to Allais (1988), made
another important contribution, which Schultz (1938) considered as fundamen-
tal, namely his analysis of the relationship between the laws of demand and
Pareto’s (1895) law of income distribution.
In section 3 we apply this notion of hierarchical choice to the idea of an order
of acquisition of durable goods and assets. This notion was originally intro-
duced by Paroush (1965), following previous work by Guttman (1944). This
section will therefore describe the methodology suggested by Paroush. It will
then present an alternative approach to deriving the order of acquisition of
durable goods, namely Item Response Theory. The latter approach, though
originally appearing in the psychometric literature, turns out to be also relevant
to find the most common order of acquisition of durable goods or assets. The
section ends with a summary of the so-called Borda approach and of a count
approach derived from the structure of the ownership of durables or assets.
Section 4 is devoted to empirical applications. Using the 2019 Eurobarometer
Survey we first apply the approach of Paroush to this data base and derive the
most common order of acquisition of durable goods for each of the thirty-five
countries for which data were available. We then do a similar analysis using
Item Response Theory and examine to what extent the orders of acquisition
obtained with each approach are similar. We also check whether the rank

1
Our translation. Born in Paris on May 21, 1894, René Roy was admitted to the École
Polytechnique in 1914. On August 15 of the same year he had to join the army and he was
seriously injured on April 14, 1917, during the attack on the Chemin des Dames: he completely
lost his sight. He was only twenty-three . . . However, thanks to his strong will he finally managed
to calmly accept the unacceptable and to pursue, for sixty years, a career as an engineer as well as
economist . . . .René Roy’s ability to analyze very difficult questions and to keep constantly up to
date with the main publications of his time was quite admirable in view of his blindness. René Roy
has shown what unyielding energy combined with remarkable intelligence can give, in the face of
irremediable adversity (translated by us from Allais, 1988)
 Hierarchy of Needs and the Measurement of Poverty 3

correlation between the orders of acquisition observed in two countries is

related to the gap in their per capita GDP.
In Section 5 we derive measures of inequality, poverty and welfare from the
information obtained on the order of acquisition of durable good and assets in
each country. We first give a theoretical background which explains how it is
possible to measure inequality, poverty, and welfare when only ordinal vari-
ables are available, which is the case of the data we analyze. Then we present
empirical illustrations that allow us to estimate for each country, using the
orders of acquisition derived in the previous section, the extent of inequality,
poverty, and welfare.
Finally in Section 6 we apply the approach of Paroush and Item Response
Theory to another type of dataset, namely the Social Survey that was conducted
in Israel in 2013. This is the most recent Israeli social survey where respondents
were asked whether they had to curtail their expenditures because of financial
difficulties, and if they did, which expenditures they reduced or eliminated. In
other words, the focus of this section is on the order of curtailment of expend-
itures, and it should be clear that with this type of information it is also possible
to apply the approach of Paroush or Item Response Theory.
Concluding comments are finally given in Section 7.

2 Economics and Hierarchical Choice

We consider it essential to link the phenomena of consumption and consequently of
demand to the concept of hierarchy of needs. (Roy, 1943)

2.1 Introduction
The notion of a hierarchy of needs or wants is an old one. Plato in his famous
Republic already wrote2 that “the first and the greatest of our needs is the
provision of food to support existence and life . . . The second the provision of
a dwelling place, and the third of clothing . . . .” Much later on, as stressed by
Drakopoulos (2004), several economists such as Smith, Say, Jevons, Menger,
and Marshall, were also aware of the importance of making a distinction
between basic and nonbasic needs. Some of them even proposed a system of
choice based on this idea. However, the fact that incorporating hierarchy into
the formalistic methodology of the marginalists was not an easy task, explains
probably why such a hierarchical approach to decision making, did not become
very popular.

2
This citation appears in Drakopoulos (2004).
4 Development Economics

The goal of this section is to take a closer look at this notion of hierarchy of
needs and at its implications. After briefly reviewing the way some famous
economists understood the idea of hierarchy of needs, we look at the notion of
wants which for some economists is derived from that of needs while others do
not really make a distinction between these two notions. Particular attention is
then given to the writings of the quite famous French economist René Roy
whose articles on the concept of hierarchy of needs are unfortunately not very
well known because they were published in French. For Roy the notion of
hierarchy of needs applies to broadly defined categories of goods while substi-
tution between goods take place within each of these categories when relative
prices change. The last sections (Sections 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8) are devoted to the
implications of the concept of hierarchical choice for the shape of Engel curves,
the distribution of wealth and poverty and the diversity of expenditures.

2.2 The Notion of Needs

The notion of need has existed for a long time. Smith, for example, explains in
the Wealth of Nations (pp. 869–70) what he means by “necessaries”:

By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispens-

ably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country
renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be
without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of
life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they
had no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe,
a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in publick3 without
a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful
degree of poverty, which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without
extreme bad conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes
a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex
would be ashamed to appear in publick without them.

Almost one hundred years later, as mentioned by Becchio (2014), in the first
edition of his Principles of Economics (1871, 1981), Carl Menger stressed the
fact that there are four prerequisites for a good to be an economic good: “the
presence of a human need; some properties able to render a thing capable of
being brought into a causal connection with the satisfaction of this need; the
human knowledge of this causal connection; a command of the thing sufficient
to direct it to the satisfaction of the need” (Becchio, 2014). Menger’s views
imply first that the existence of a human need is only a necessary condition but
not a sufficient one for a thing to become a good. As stressed by Ruprecht
3
The spelling “publick” is the one which appears in the original work of Adam Smith and this is
why we kept this spelling and did not write “public.”
 Hierarchy of Needs and the Measurement of Poverty 5

(2007) this suggests that the existence of an objective cause–effect relationship

is a necessary condition for a thing to become a good. In addition, an individual
consumer must be aware of this relationship. Ruprecht gives as illustration the
discovery of the impact of citrus fruits on scurvy prevention. Citrus fruits had
been known for a long time for their caloric content, their juiciness, their taste,
but the connection with the prevention of scurvy was something new of which
people became aware only around the middle of the seventeenth century.
Clearly the objective impact of citrus fruit consumption on the prevention of
scurvy does not imply that consumers are aware of this effect. Ruprecht,
however, challenges Menger’s (1953) view, according to which the objective
character of this relationship is a necessary condition for a thing to become
a good. He cites Hayek (1979), for whom subjective beliefs matter if we want to
explain human behavior toward things. For Hayek what is relevant is not what
can be found about things by the objective methods of science, but what
a person thinks about them. “Knowledge, which we may happen to possess
about the true nature of the material thing, but which the people whose action we
want to explain do not possess,” is not relevant to explain the actions of
individuals. Ruprecht then asks how people should take a decision when
consumers face competing cause–effect hypotheses. Following Popper (1959)
he argues that “non-falsification” may be a plausible criterion. But what hap-
pens when consumers need to choose between several hypotheses that have not
yet been falsified but there is no way of testing them? In such a case consumers
will have to decide which hypothesis they trust and whether there is a case
strong enough for them to act.
As far as the fourth condition mentioned by Menger is concerned (“a com-
mand of the thing sufficient to direct it to the satisfaction of the need”), one
could have thought that income is a precondition for getting “personal com-
mand” of something. But the concept of “positional goods,” introduced by
Hirsch (1976), shows that consumers acquire wants via their consumption
experiences as well as when observing the consumption of other people.
Ruprecht mentions then the concept of “emulative consumption” stressed, for
example, by Bourdieu (1984), a behavior often summarized by the expression
“keeping-up-with-the-Joneses.” In short Ruprecht concludes that social imita-
tion provides a strong argument against giving “personal command” the status
of a necessary condition for a thing to become a good.
In fact, Becchio (2014) has argued that in the second edition of Menger’s
Principles (1923), Menger’s views were somewhat different as he then empha-
sized the notion of social needs and social goods. As mentioned by Yamamori
(2020), the second edition of Menger’s Grundsätze (1923) had a new first
chapter whose title was “theory of needs.” In this chapter Menger wrote that
6 Development Economics

“the starting point for any investigation of economic theory is needy human
nature. Without needs, there would be no economy, no national economy, no
economic science” (Menger, 1923, cited by Yamamori, 2020). Yamamori also
stressed that Menger makes a distinction between need (“Bedürfnis” in
German) and “its satisfier-provisions” (“Bedarf” in German), which is defined
as “the quantities of consumption goods a person must have to satisfy his
needs.” The former notion is considered as subjective, the second as objective.
At the same time as Carl Menger published the first edition of his Principles,
Stanley Jevons (1871) published his Theory of Political Economy. Both authors
took a subjective approach to the theory of value, at the difference of the
objective approach of classical economists. Jevons’s analysis is based on the
concept of utility, while Menger uses the word “satisfaction.” As mentioned by
Lagueux (1997), for Jevons, utility is “the abstract quality whereby an object
serves our purposes and becomes entitled to rank a commodity” (Jevons, p. 38),
while for Menger, satisfaction describes a subjective state of mind. Menger
refers “to degrees of satisfaction in relation to various needs which are con-
sidered and draws comparisons only between these different degrees of satis-
faction” (Lagueux, 1997).
Note that in his essay on “Economic possibilities for our grandchildren,”
Keynes (1933, pp. 833–41) considered that there are two types of needs:
absolute and relative. While absolute needs are satiable, relative needs are not
because “they satisfy the desire for superiority” (Keynes, 1933).

2.3 From Needs to Wants

Needs have to be carefully distinguished from wants. As stressed by Lutz and
Lux (1979) needs can be hierarchically classified and determine consumers’
behavior. Wants are derived from needs and may be substituted for each other.
They reflect “the various preferences within a common category or level of
need” (Lutz and Lux, 1979).
For Drakopoulos (1994) a need implies something which is universally
necessary, while a want refers to a personal preference and the latter is a trait
of the individual. This difference explains why there may be an important
degree of substitution between wants, while there is likely to be only a weak
degree of substitution between needs, which are assumed to be universal. Such
a view echoes that of Cosmides and Tooby (1994), who argue that cultural
differences are vastly overstated, “because beneath existing surface variability
all humans share the same set of preference-generating and decision-making
devices.” Such a statement is derived from an evolutionary psychology
approach to human behavior. For Cosmides and Tooby (1994) “natural
 Hierarchy of Needs and the Measurement of Poverty 7

selection’s invisible hand created the structure of the human mind, and the
interaction of these minds is what generates the invisible hand of economics.”
These authors also stress that evolutionary psychology can provide a list of
human universal preferences, and of the “procedures by which additional
preferences are acquired or reordered.” Such an approach would widen the
scope of preferences and not limit the latter to goods and services. Earl and Potts
(2004) have thus proposed a distinction between high- and low-level prefer-
ences. High-level preferences are innate, while low-level preferences refer to
specific preferences that are acquired by learning and specialization. Such
a distinction between high- and low-level preferences is a consequence of
human’s “bounded rationality.” Consumers “have a problem of knowing what
they want and how to get it” (Earl and Potts, 2004). While high-level prefer-
ences define in a way the problems that must be solved, low-level preferences
have to be acquired either by learning or via agents that Earl and Potts call
“preference entrepreneurs,” who are able to adapt products to lifestyles.
Another interesting approach is that of Witt (2001), who asked what wants
people pursue in their daily economic activities, wants they satisfy by consum-
ing resources as direct inputs or as tools for serving these wants. Witt’s main
argument is that there is a biological foundation of certain “basic needs” (e.g.
thirst, hunger, sex) and they are fixed and universally shared. Biological evolu-
tion requires organisms to consume certain things to survive and this explains
why, among the very poor, everyone spends most of his/her money consuming
food. Once the basic needs are satisfied, consumers move on to satisfy other
needs that may be “learnt.” Here Witt makes a distinction between cognitive and
noncognitive learning. The latter concerns acquired wants that emerge as
consumers “form associations between these experiences and the material
environment which surrounds them.”4 Cognitive learning, on the contrary,
refers to a kind of problem-solving sequence where consumers try to find new
solutions to a given problem.

2.4 On the Notion of Hierarchical Choice

This notion of hierarchy has been stressed by Drakopoulos (1994), who presents
a survey of hierarchical choice in economics. He starts by reminding us that this
is an old idea since Plato, as indicated at the beginning of this section, had
a hierarchical view of needs. Drakopoulos then emphasized the fact that the
notion of hierarchical choice appears in a way or another in the works of Jevons

4
Chai (2017) gives here the case of consumers who if “repeatedly exposed to a certain type of bed
sheet when they sleep may acquire a liking for such bed sheets that exists independently of how
tired they are.”
8 Development Economics

(1871, 1957), Marshall (1949), Menger (1871, 1981) but also Fishburn (1974),
Little (1950) and many other economists. Here are some interesting citations.
Georgescu-Roegen (1966), for example, wrote:

It has long since been observed that human needs and wants are hierarchized
Satisfactions of concrete needs have different degrees of importance to us . . .
Despite the fact that the want pattern differs from one individual to another,
most of these patterns have a great deal in common. (1) The hierarchy of
wants seems to be for all men identical up to a certain rank. One may be
almost sure that this refers at least to thirst, hunger, leisure, shelter. (2)
Individuals belonging to the same culture are likely to have in common still
a greater number of wants at the top of the hierarchy than those common to all
men.

This is the reason why

choice aims at satisfying the greatest number of wants, starting with the most
important and going down their hierarchy. Therefore, choice is determined by
the least important want that could be reached . . . . No matter what we choose,
houses, cars, or combinations of commodities, the procedure is the same.
Between two combinations the choice will be made according to the lowest
relevant want that can be reflected in any of the two combinations.

Robinson (1956, p. 354, cited by Lavoie, 1994) argues that, “generally speak-
ing, wants stand in a hierarchy (though with considerable overlaps at each
level), and an increment in a family’s real income is not devoted to buying
a little more of everything at the same level but to stepping down the hierarchy.”
For Pasinetti (1981, p. 73, cited by Lavoie, 1994), although possibilities of
substitution among commodities are, of course, relevant at any given level of
real income, there exists a hierarchy of needs. More precisely, there exists a very
definite order of priority in consumers’ wants, and therefore among groups of
goods and services, which manifests itself as real incomes increase.”
Eichner (1986, pp.159–60, cited by Lavoie, 1994) believes that “in an
economy that is expanding over time, it is the income effect that will predomin-
ate over the relative price, or substitution effects . . . Substitution can take place
only within fairly narrow subcategories. Consumers’ preferences are, in this
sense, lexicographically ordered . . . .”
As emphasized by Lavoie (1994), for those economists, like the so-called
“post-Keynesian economists,” for whom a hierarchy of needs exists, house-
holds whose incomes are relatively similar will satisfy their needs in more or
less the same order. This is so because of convention. In other words, once
physiological needs are fulfilled, there will still be a common hierarchy of needs
for individuals who share a similar culture. Consumers tend to conform to the
 Hierarchy of Needs and the Measurement of Poverty 9

norms of reference groups and they tend to imitate the behavior of those who are
higher in the hierarchy of society. This idea that the relative position of
consumers in society matters very much is not new, as it was already raised
by Duesenberry (1949), Leibenstein (1950) and Veblen (1931).

2.5 Hierarchy of Needs and the Approach of René Roy

The French economist René Roy, famous for introducing what is known as
Roy’s identity (Roy, 1947), introduced the notion of group of goods and
assumed the existence of a hierarchy of goods (Roy, 1930, 1931, 1933, 1943).
More precisely he made a distinction between what he calls “inferior and
superior groups.” In his words5 (Roy, 1931):

Under these conditions, everyone will obtain the quantity of goods necessary
to satisfy the needs corresponding to the lower groups of the classification, to
devote the surplus to the products ranked in the higher groups. Our reasoning
is therefore based on the notion of satiety, itself deriving from the principle of
decreasing utility. Moreover, we assume that the amount of income spent on
meeting the needs of a certain group is the same for every individual, and
therefore does not depend on the value of the income. This is a hypothesis
which may seem paradoxical, but which is nevertheless justified by the
following considerations:

1) For fairly large incomes, the share allocated to the acquisition of objects
belonging to the lower categories of needs represents only a very small
fraction of the individual income.
2) If we refer to the previously mentioned Pareto formula, we can easily see
that the number of people with an income greater than a given value
decreases very rapidly when this value increases.

As will be seen, Roy makes a link between the distribution of incomes and the
general expression of the law of demand. As far as the allocation of one’s
income between the various goods is concerned, Roy (1930, p. 115) writes:

Whatever the importance of the income, there exists, for each individual,
a certain order of priority relative to the allocation of his resources to each
type of article. This classification in individual needs could be highlighted by
a method analogous to that which was used by Dupuit (1844) for the
appreciation of the utility of the various goods; it would be enough, assuming
that all prices remain constant, to imagine that the income of the individual in
question decreases progressively, in such a way that he is obliged to gradually
eliminate the articles which he considers the least indispensable.

5
Roy published several articles in Econometrica, all of them in French. To the best of our
knowledge these articles, at least most of them, have not been translated in English and hence
were cited very seldom. This is why we cite him at length in this section. The translation is ours.
10 Development Economics

For all the people belonging to the community studied, the classification
would obviously not be the same for all individuals, because of differences in
taste, but one can imagine the possibility of forming groups of items such
that, for all individuals, the order of priority is observable, not from one item
to another, but from one group to the other . . .
The categories in question would ultimately reflect the hierarchy of needs,
while within these categories, the selection of items would be made according
to individual tastes; we therefore make a distinction between needs and tastes.

Roy (1930) then derives the following result concerning the price elasticity of
the demand for necessities.
Let P and Q refer to a price and quantity index of the goods of a given group
and pi and qi to the price and quantity of good i which belongs to this group. We
may therefore write that
X
PQ ¼ k i pi q
i

where k is a constant. Let P0 and Q0 refer to the value of the price and quantity
indices at some original time 0.
Roy then defines as r0 the lower limit of individual incomes. He also defines
(Roy, 1930, pp. 121–2) as ql “the maximum value of the quantity index for each
individual.” He then writes:

we have previously admitted that this limit ensuring satiety for the group of
products studied was the same for each individual and that it did not depend in
particular on the amount of individual income. This limit ql is such that if the
price index corresponding to the group studied is equal to P, the individual
income ensuring satiety is represented by the product ql P:
To arrive at the law of demand for basic necessities, we will observe that
the set of payments Q.P relating to this category of objects, can be divided
into two groups:

a) The group of people whose individual consumption is imperfect and

therefore remains below the ql limit.
b) The group of consumers whose individual income is sufficient to allow
the purchase of the quantity limit ql .

For the first group, that is, for individuals whose income is between the lower
limit r0 and the income Pql enabling them to acquire the quantity-limit ql , the
total income is allocated to the acquisition of objects belonging to the group
studied, since they are, by hypothesis, objects of first necessity.
The set of payments for this group of goods will hence be expressed as
ð Pql
rnðrÞdr where r refers to income and nðrÞ to the number of individuals
r0

with an income r.
 Hierarchy of Needs and the Measurement of Poverty 11

For the second category of individuals, those whose income allows sati-
ety, all the payments corresponding to basic necessities are equal to the
product of individual income Pql by the number of people whose income is
higher than this amount; the set of payments in question is therefore repre-
ð∞
sented by the expression Pql nðrÞdr.
Pql
We may therefore write that
ð Pql ð∞
PQ ¼ rnðrÞdr þ Pql nðrÞdr:
r0 Pql

Roy (1930, pp. 127–8) then derives PQ with respect to the price, and this
ð∞
derivative, using the second member of PQ, is equal to ql nðrÞdr = Qs
Pql
where Qs refers to the total consumption of those people whose income is
greater than Pql , that is, to the total consumption of those who are able to ensure
satiety for the products considered.
Roy (1930) then concludes that

d ðQPÞ ¼ PdQ þ QdP ¼ Qs dP

dQ QdP Qs dQ dP Qs dP
↔P þ ¼ dP↔ þ ¼
Q Q Q Q P Q P
   
dQ dP Qs dQ dP Q  Qs
↔ ¼ 1 ↔ ¼
Q P Q Q P Q
 
dQ  
Q Q  Qs
↔  dP ¼ λ ¼
P
Q
 
λ ¼ QQ Q
s
may hence be considered as the price elasticity of the “necessities.”
It is estimated as the ratio of the consumption of necessities of those who do not
reach satiety over the total consumption of necessities in society. This price
elasticity will hence be lower, the higher the percentage of individuals who
reach satiety, as far as necessities are concerned.
It is interesting to note that Lavoie (1994), referring to the work of Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980), concluded that “those who have attempted to estimate the
importance of pure substitution effects on the general categories of consump-
tion expenditures, after having taken into consideration the income effects
through time, have discovered that these substitution effects, own-price elasti-
cities and cross-elasticities, are quite negligible.” Lavoie (1994) added that “the
findings of Houthakker and Taylor (1970) show that even at a much more
12 Development Economics

disaggregated level, that is, with over eighty categories of consumer goods,
consumption expenditures are mainly determined by habits and income effects,
while price substitution effects play a fairly modest role.”
In another paper Roy (1943) repeated his belief in the notion of hierarchy of
needs. Here is what he wrote:

With regard especially to the phenomena of consumption, we finally think

that the notion of urgency in the satisfaction of human needs tends to create
a scale of consumer goods which can thus be classified into groups, while the
notion of taste manifests itself within each group by fixing the choice of each
consumer on the articles corresponding to his personal preferences. Within
these groups, the phenomena of complementarity or substitution also appear,
which thus contribute to fixing the demands of consumers for the various
articles considered separately . . .. (Roy, 1943, p. 14)
We have implicitly assumed that prices are given because, theoretically, the
order of succession of goods for a consumer depends on the relative values of
prices. But the price variations do not affect, in our view, the general arrange-
ment of the scales, because by triggering substitution phenomena they only
move the scales inside each group and only modify their respective positions,
without altering the classification of groups. The notion of hierarchy of needs
and consequently of commodities is in fact governed by motives of
a physiological, moral or psychological order, indifferent to a large extent to
the price movements that one observes in practice. (Roy, 1943, p. 16)
Given the assumption made about the allocation of income, any price
variation concerning a group of rank i will have no influence on the demand
of the groups of lower order, while it will have an impact, not only on the
demand for group i but on those of all groups of higher order. We can also
express this fact by saying that price variations for luxury items have no
influence on the demand for basic necessities or on that of products that
simply provide a degree of comfort that cannot be assimilated to luxury. If we
want to concretize our thought further, we can still say that variations in the
price of champagne wine will not have an influence on the consumption of
table wine, but that conversely a variation in the price of table wine may
indeed act on the demand for champagne wine . . .
By limiting ourselves to two goods, bread and wine for example, and by
admitting that each consumer has free access to all the water he needs, we
come to the following conclusion:

1) Every consumer first allocates his income to the acquisition of bread,

until he obtains the satiety of his need for food, and for a homogeneous
group of consumers this satiety is obtained for a substantially constant
consumption of bread, whoever is the consumer:
2) Once satiety has been obtained for the need for food, every consumer
allocates the surplus of his income to the acquisition of wine.
3) The demand for bread is independent of the price of wine, but the demand
for wine depends on the price of bread. (Roy, 1943, p. 20)
 Hierarchy of Needs and the Measurement of Poverty 13

The notion of groups rests precisely on the hypothesis that the degree of
urgency of the various needs experienced by men is linked to their physio-
logical nature, to their psychological state, to mores, or to the organization of
society, in a word, to a whole set of factors independent of the price level. It is
only within each group that the respective levels of the various prices,
combined with individual tastes, direct the demands towards this or that
article, by the mechanism of substitution. (Roy, 1943, p. 22)

2.6 Implications for Engel Curves

Once choice is assumed to be hierarchical, there are, as stressed by Drakopoulos
(1994), implications concerning the shape of demand and Engel curves. The
notion that for each good there is some satiety level of consumption which is
supposed not to be surpassed, whatever the individual’s income, has been
stressed in several empirical analyses. Prais (1952), for example, suggested
that when selecting a mathematical formula for the Engel curve, one should
make sure that it has such an asymptotic property. An upper asymptote is
certainly desirable for necessities but, as stressed by Aitchison and Brown
(1954), it is less obvious for luxury goods. They, however, argue that “many
commodities begin life as luxuries and eventually become semi-luxuries or
necessities as increasing incomes and falling prices bring consumers nearer to
an ultimate saturation level.”
In what is considered as the first statistical analysis of budgets, Engel (1857,
1895) proposed the following law of consumption (see Stigler, 1954): “The poorer
a family, the greater the proportion of its total expenditure that must be devoted to the
provision of food.” Wright (1875) gave then what Stigler (1954) labeled an “exces-
sive free translation of Engel’s law” since Wright mentioned four propositions:

First, the greater the income, the smaller the relative percentage of outlay on
subsistence. Second, the percentage of outlay on clothing is approximately
the same, whatever the income. Third, the percentage of outlay for lodging, or
rent, and for fuel and light, is invariably the same, whatever the income.
Fourth, as the income increases in amount, the percentage of outlay on
“sundries” becomes greater.

Stigler (1954) mentions that Schwabe (1868, 1966) added the following law:
“The poorer anyone is, the greater the amount relative to his income that he must
spend on housing.” Wright (1875) also suggested the following generalization
(see Stigler, 1954): “The higher the income, generally speaking, the greater the
saving, actually and proportionately.”
Engel, in fact, seems to have borrowed a notion introduced by Smith and
according to which “the ultimate measure of welfare is the degree to which
individuals are able to satisfy what Engel called “Bedürdfnisse” and which Chai
14 Development Economics

and Moneta (2010) translated as “wants.” More precisely Engel (1895, p. 1)

wrote that “every individual directs (out of his own impulse) his highest interest
to the continuous satisfaction of those wants that stem directly from his human
nature, to the expansion of these wants, and also to the attainment of the
necessary means to satisfy the higher, expanded wants.” As stressed by Chai
and Moneta (2010), Engel “shifted the focus of research away from examining
how expenditure is distributed across individual goods consumed, towards
focusing on how it is distributed across wants which goods ultimately satisfy.
Second, Engel made a clear break from the common tendency amongst classical
economists to assume that some “basic” goods are inherently more important to
human welfare than other ‘luxury’ goods.”
This emphasis on wants appears clearly in his empirical work since he did not
really focus his attention on food expenditure but on “nourishment” which also
included expenditure on alcohol and tobacco. According to Chai and Moneta
(2010), Engel believed that his empirical analysis showed that there was
a hierarchy among wants, the most important want being the want for nourish-
ment. Then there was the want for clothing, accommodation, heating, and
lighting. Engel also stressed that when a family is not able to satisfy all its
wants, it is likely to decide not to satisfy “higher-order” wants so that it can
satisfy its basic wants.
The most famous approach to the idea that there exists a hierarchy of needs is
certainly that of Maslow (1970). The first set of need that he identifies is that of
basic needs, which include air, water, food, sleep, and sex. The second group of
needs refers to safety needs, like feeling safe and secure and settled. These are
more psychological than physiological needs. The third set of needs is “belong-
ing needs,” which concern the desire to belong to families, clubs, etc. As
stressed by Clarke (2005) “this level of needs incorporates the need to feel
(nonsexual) love and acceptance of others.” The fourth level of needs covers
self-esteem needs, that is, the need to be admired by those around you. The last
level of needs is labeled “self-actualization,” summarized by Clarke (2005) as
the “self-fulfillment of ones’ own potential,” although one may wonder whether
such a want is universally shared.6
A few papers have attempted to test this notion of hierarchy of needs. Thus
Hagerty (1999) adopted Maslow’s notion of hierarchy of needs as well as his
classification into five categories of needs: physiological, safety, belonging and
love, esteem, and self-actualization. The indicators he used for physiological
needs were the number of daily calories available per person and then GDP per
capita. For safety needs he used safety from war, safety from murder, and high

6
We thank Andreas Chai for having drawn our attention to this point.
Another random document with
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 Una fuit labes: cetera lactis erat.

(cioè più del credibile; segnata di nero in mezzo alle corna; il resto
era latte).
Festo scrive res minimi pretii, cum dicimus non hettæ te facio: e noi,
Non ti stimo un ette [63].
Non si doveano unire due infiniti, eppure abbiamo in Livio (iv. 47)
jussit sibi dare bibere; che è il nostro dar bere, dar mangiare.
Tutto ciò ne fa argomentare che, fra i patrizj latini prevalendo
elementi etruschi e greci, di questi si nutrisse la loro lingua, mentre
gli oschi e sabini dominavano nella rustica, adoperata dai plebei, la
quale noi crediamo sia la stessa che oggi parliamo, colle
modificazioni portate da trenta secoli e da tante vicende.
Oltre i comici, che al vulgo mettono in bocca modi affatto insueti agli
scrittori colti, troviamo direttamente indicata la lingua plebea e
rustica, che doveva essere più analitica, alle desinenze supplendo
colle preposizioni, cogli ausiliarj alle inflessioni de’ verbi; e
determinava meglio le relazioni mediante gli articoli.
Plauto discerne la lingua nobilis dalla plebeja: la prima dicevasi
anche urbana o classica, cioè propria delle prime classi; l’altra
rustica o vernacola dal nome de’ servi domestici (vernæ), e anche
da Vegezio pedestris, da Sidonio usualis, quotidiana da Quintiliano, il
quale muove lamento che «interi teatri e il pieno circo s’odano
spesso gridare voci anzi barbare che romane», e avverte che in
buona lingua non dee dirsi due, tre, cinque, quattordice [64], e geme
che ormai il parlare sia mutato del tutto [65].
Cicerone scriveva a Peto (lib. ix, ep. 21): Veruntamen quid tibi ego in
epistolis videor? Nonne plebejo sermone agere tecum?.. Epistolas
vero quotidianis verbis tenere solemus. Marziale ricorda certe
parole da contado, risibili a delicato lettore,

Non tam rustica, dilicate lector,

Rides nomina?
A Virgilio fu apposto d’usare voci da villa, e nominatamente il cujum
pecus e il tegmen [66]. Che v’avesse maestri del ben parlare latino
l’accerta Cicerone, aggiungendo che non è tanto gloria il sapere il
latino, quanto vergogna l’ignorarlo [67]; ed esortando, giacchè s’ha il
linguaggio di Roma corretto e sicuro, a seguir questo, ed evitare non
solo la rustica asprezza, ma anche l’insolito forestierume [68], Ovidio
raccomanda ai fanciulli romani d’imparare linguas duas, cioè il latino
e il greco, e di scrivere agli amanti in lingua pura e usitata [69]. Che
se la passionata imitazione del greco diede al latino una consistenza
che lo preservava almeno dalle profonde e repentine alterazioni, al
popolo non importarono questi raffinamenti, e perseverò
nell’abitudine di ciò che aveano detto il nonno e la nonna [70].
Abbiamo uno strano libro, sul quale forse non fu ancora detta l’ultima
parola, il Satiricon di Petronio. Leggendolo, sentesi un parlare
disforme dal consueto; composizioni insolite di parole, come:
pietaticultrix, gracilipes, choraula, præfiscini, fulcipedia e gallinæ
altiles, e periscelides tortæ, e domefacta per domita; frequenti
diminutivi: taurulus, alicula, amasiunculus, manuciolum, palliolus,
tunicula, vernaculæ meliusculæ; frasi insolite: non sum de gloriosis;
Capuæ exierat; invado pectus amplexibus; defunctorio ictu; e parole
che per avventura trovansi anche altrove, ma qui colpiscono per
essere in tanto numero: come lautitia, tristimonium, barbatoria;
ingurgitare; vicinia, gingillum, catillum, candelabrum, camella,
bisaccium, capistrum; plane matus sum: vinum mihi in cerebrum
abiit.
Altre sue frasi di schiavi s’accostano alle nostre moderne: — «Non
potei trovare una boccata di pane. — Quello era vivere! — Come un
di noi — Mi sono mangiato i panni». (Non hodie buccam panis
invenire potui. — Illud erat vivere! — Tamquam unus de nobis —
Jam comedi pannos meos).
Catone, che scriveva pei campagnuoli, dice, Arundinem prende.
Nell’Asino d’oro, un soldato domanda a un giardiniere quorsum
vacuum duceret asinum? Quegli non comprende, onde l’interrogante
replica: Ubi ducis asinum istum? e l’altro capisce e risponde. Ciò
significa che la voce quorsum non avea corso tra il popolo. Avea
corso invece quella di boricco per cavallo di vettura, non usata negli
scritti; onde san Girolamo (in Eccles., x) Mannibus, quos vulgo
buricos appellant. Il popolo, ne’ migliori tempi, dicea scopare, stopa,
basium, bellus, caballus, bigletum, bramosus, brodium, dove gli
aristocratici usavano verrere, linum, osculum, pulcher, equus,
schedula, cupidus, jusculum.
Maggior colpo mi fa Varrone, dove attesta che i Latini usarono il solo
ablativo, e la inflessione fu introdotta soltanto per utile e
necessità [71]. Non stiamo ad appuntargli che un sì importante
elemento non può intromettersi per proposito; ma consideriamo che
le parole nostre italiane sono, la più parte, l’ablativo delle latine. A.
Gellio menziona un libro di T. Lavinio de sordibus verbis, il quale
sarebbe prezioso al caso nostro [72], ma è perduto; ed egli stesso
dice che arboretum ignobilius est verbum, arbusta celebratius; e
mette fra i verba obsoleta et maculantia ex sordidiore vulgi usu,
botulus, voce che è in Marziale, e da cui il nostro budello [73]: e così
dice che sermonari rusticius videtur sed rectius: sermocinare
crebrius est sed corruptius [74]: taxare pressius crebriusque est quam
tangere [75], donde il nostro tastare [76].
I legionarj nelle colonie e ne’ campi esteri adottarono parole
germaniche, e in Vegezio abbiamo, Castellum parvulum, quem
burgum vocant. Poichè la lingua scritta era diversa dalla parlata e
doveasi impararla, tanto valea studiare quella o la greca [77]. Onde
usavasi indistintamente il greco; fin i primi cristiani se ne valsero, e
Giustino e Taziano, che pur pubblicavano le loro apologie a Roma: e
Tertulliano fu il primo cristiano che scrivesse in latino, benchè il
facesse anche in greco: lo stesso Giuseppe Ebreo, onde presentare
la sua storia all’imperatore romano, la fece tradurre dall’ebraico in
greco: greche sono spesso le iscrizioni anche mortuarie, e con
caratteri greci.

§ 8º
 Della pronunzia.

Occorre dimostrazione per far convinti che la pronunzia volgare

fosse diversa da quella delle persone colte? È essa un accidente
sfuggevole, per modo che non si conosce se non per congetture; ma
abbiamo qualche notizia certa di alterazioni fonetiche. In essa
elidevano spesso la m, la c, la s finali. Oltre l’uso dei poeti antichi
che, per esempio, finiscono l’esametro con Ælius sextus, ovvero
optimus longe, questo detrimento è attestato da Vittorino (De
orthogr.): Scribere quidem omnibus literis oportet, enuntiando autem
quasdam literas elidere. Quintiliano (ix. 4) dice che la m appena
pronunziavasi: Atqui eadem illa litera, quoties ultima est, et vocalem
verbi sequentis ita contingit, ut in eam transire possit, etiam si
scribitur, tamen parum exprimitur, ut multum ille et quantum erat,
adeo ut pene cujusdam novæ literæ sonum reddat. Neque enim
eximitur, sed obscuratur, et tantum aliqua inter duas vocales velut
nota est, ne ipsæ coeant. Cassiodoro [78] cita un passo di Cornuto,
ove dice che il pronunziare la m avanti a vocale durum ac barbarum
sonat; par enim atque idem est vitium, ita cum vocali sicut cum
consonanti m literam exprimere. Era questa una fina distinzione che
al volgo dovea sfuggire. E però la m è taciuta in molte epigrafi [79],
come per esempio ante ora positu est. La m finale dovea dare alla
sillaba un suono nasale, simile all’on, en francese, conservatosi in
alcuni dialetti italiani, dove pure non toglie l’elisione colla vocale
susseguente. Infatti il cum diede origine a confondere, constantia,
conquero; e in italiano originò e il come e il con.
Anche mutavano l’u in o (servom, voltis); pronunziavano o invece di
e o di au (vostris, olla per aulla), e il v pel b (vellum per bellum); col
che da culpa, mundus, fides, tres, aurum, scribere, sic, per hoc,
escono colpa, mondo, fede, tre, oro, scrivere, sì, però. Onde
Festo [80] scrive: Orata genus piscis appellatur a colore auri, quod
rustici orum dicebant, ut auricolas oricolas.
È dell’indole dell’italiano l’omettere la nasale avanti la sibilante,
sicchè da mensis, impensa femmo mese, spesa. Ora questo usava
già fra gli antichi, e Cicerone pronunziava foresia, hortesia,
megalesia, e nelle lapide ricorrono albanesis, alliesis, ariminesis,
africesis, ateniesis, castresis, miseniesis, narbonesis, ostiesis,
picenesis; come anche clemes, pares, potes per clemens, parens,
potens.
Sembra poi che gli Umbri trascurassero regolarmente le finali,
massime le nasali, poichè nelle loro iscrizioni troviamo vinu, vutu,
nome, tota jovina per vinum, vultum, nomen, totam jovinam
(civitatem iguvinam); e anche dagli Osci abbiamo scritto via
pompaiiana teremnattens per viam pompejanam terminaverunt.
Negli Umbri ancora riscontriamo fuia, habia, habe, portaja, mugatu
per fuat, habeat, habet, portet, mugiatur, e fasia per faciat, che
ricorre nel volsco.
La terminazione culo dagli Osci e dagli Umbri contraevasi in clo, e lo
facevano pure i Romani, sicchè ne nascevano apicla, oricla, circlus,
cornicia, oclus, panucla, pediclus, masclus,... che facilmente
convertivansi ne’ nostri pecchia, orecchia, cerchio, occhio,
cornacchia, pannocchia, pidocchio, maschio.
È presumibile che nella parlata de’ Latini già usassero certi scambj
di lettere che troviamo tuttodì nelle nostre, e massime nella toscana.
In planus, plenus, glacies e simili, la l fu cambiata in i, come tuttodì
fa il volgo dicendo i — padre — voi fare — ai campo — moito — aito.
Già Catullo beffava un Arrio, che aspirava le vocali, dicendo
hinsidias, hionios, e fu chi quell’Arrio suppose toscano, per indurre
che già allora adopravasi in quel paese l’aspirazione, che ora ne è
quasi caratteristica. Certamente l’aspirazione del c doveva essere
abbastanza usata, se alterò alcune voci greche, come camus in
amus, chortos in hortus, cheimon in hiems. Il c confondeasi col t,
dicendo indifferentemente condicio, nuncius, servicium, e conditio,
nuntius, servitium, come oggi si dice schiantare, schietto, maschio,
al par di stiantare, stietto, mastio, e nel volgo andache, ho dacho.
Il v talvolta è soppresso, come in facea, fuggìa, e tra i volgari in arò,
arei, laoro, faorire; e forse già diceasi caulis e cavolis, come oggi
caolo e cavolo, manualis e manovalis.
Molte volte al semplice o latino è sostituito nell’italiano l’uo, come
vuole, duolo, suolo, e probabilmente già faceasi dal volgo, che
anche da noi usa ancora pote, vole, dolo.
Inclina anche oggi il volgo a trarre tutti i verbi alla prima
conjugazione; e fa vedano, leggano, sentano all’indicativo, e al
congiuntivo vedino, legghino, sentino.
Molto si studiò recentemente sopra gli accenti, e se non si saprebbe
alla prima indicare come da dixerunt, fecerunt derivassero gli
sdruccioli dissero e fecero, non sarebbe difficile provare che
vecchiamente si usava disserono, fecerono: da cui disseno, feceno
per sincope. Quella desinenza no è caratteristica del plurale,
talmente che il popolo talvolta l’applicò anche ad altre voci che ai
verbi, come ad eglino ed elleno. Del resto il popolo dice andàvamo,
volèvamo dove i colti fanno piana la voce, cioè mantiene l’accento
sulla radicale, come fanno costantemente i Tedeschi [81].
Molte voci contraevansi, come populus, circulus, soldum, lardum,
sartor, posti, del che è qualche vestigio pur nello scritto; e Quintiliano
(i. 6) dice che Augusto pronunziava calda invece di calida. Meus
dovette dirsi mius, del che è restato il vocativo mi: e in Ennio
abbiamo debil homo.
E che veramente il modo di pronunziare s’accostasse più che lo
scritto a questo che usiam noi, ce ne sono argomento i tanti errori
delle iscrizioni. Un vaso trovato a Pompei porta scritto, Presta mi
sincerum (vinum). Le bizzarre iscrizioni, ivi graffite da mani plebee e
soldatesche, oltre le scorrezioni ortografiche, hanno anche errori
grammaticali e modi plebei. Per esempio: Saturninus cum discentes
rogat. Cosmus nequitiæ est magnissimæ — O felice me [82].
Crescono tali errori nelle epigrafi de’ primi tempi cristiani, errori che
ravvicinano le parole alle nostre italiane. Nei recenti scavi a Ostia:
Loc. Aphrodisiaes cum deus permicerit. — Cœlius hic dormit et
Decria quando Deus boluerit. Dal cimitero di Sant’Elena in Roma fu
scavata questa del terzo o quarto secolo:

Tersu decimu calendas febraras

 decessit in pace quintus annoro
octo mensorum dece in pace.

In un’altra sta:

Gaudentius in pace qui vixit annis xx

et VIII mesis cinque dies biginti
apet depossone x kal. octobres.

Il Muratori [83] adduce epitafj del cimitero di Santa Cecilia in Roma,

d’età certo antica, che dicono:

Qui jacet Antoni

Dio te guardi
et Jacoba sua uxor.
Madoña Joaña
uxor de Cecho
della Sidia

e in San Biagio sotto al Campidoglio:

Ite della dicta echiesa.

In più d’un sigillo antico è scolpito vivat in Dio o in Diu [84].

In altre iscrizioni l’apostrofe sta spesso in luogo della m, onde
clarissimu’, multo’, annoro’: Zulia per Julia è citato da Celso
Cittadini [85], in una lapide presso il Bosio; Olympios bixit annos tres,
meses undeci, dies dodeci in pace; in altre bresciane si ha Asinone,
Caballaccio, Marione, Musone, Paulacius.
In alcune incontri perfino l’i efelcustico, che sembra singolarità del
nostro vulgare, leggendosi in una iscrizione delle Grotte vaticane AB
ISPECIOSA. In una pittura delle Catacombe è figurata un’agape, e vi
si legge Irene da calda — Agape miscemi [86]. E in un’altra iscrizione:
Bellica fedelissima virgo impace.
Quello che Quintiliano dice che «ciò che mal si scrive, di necessità
mal si pronunzia», può anche voltarsi a dire che mal si scrive ciò che
mal si pronunzia: e l’essere le iscrizioni per lo più di cristiani, cioè di
gente ineducata e affettuosa, appoggia sempre meglio il mio
assunto, che il parlare nostro odierno sia il vulgare medesimo di
Roma antica.
Questo accadeva nelle vicinanze di Roma; ora che doveva essere
nelle provincie, discoste dal luogo dove meglio si parlava e proferiva,
e dove sopravviveano i prischi dialetti? Racconta Erasmo che,
essendo venuti ambasciatori d’ogni gente d’Europa per congratularsi
con Massimiliano d’Austria fatto imperatore, recitarono un’orazione,
tutti in latino, ma pronunziandola ciascuno a modo del suo paese,
sicchè fu creduto si fosse ognuno espresso nella lingua materna [87].
Argomentatene come dovesse alterarsi il romano idioma su bocche
sì diverse, e come soffrirne l’ortografia, attesochè, quando più la
coltura scemava, gli scrivani s’attenevano mentosto al letterario che
all’uso della pronunzia.

§ 9º
La traduzione della Bibbia.

Se dunque si avesse a scrivere un libro, non più per la classe eletta

e letterata, ma pel popolo, sarebbe dovuto riuscire pieno di que’
modi, che noi asseriamo correnti fra il vulgo, e inusati alla raffinata
letteratura. Or questo libro c’è, non fatto dopo già sfasciato il latino,
ma ai tempi di Tacito e di Svetonio, quando appena l’età dell’oro
cedeva a quella d’argento, quando Barbari non erano intervenuti
ancora a mescolare elementi eterogenei. Alludiamo alla versione
della Bibbia, che risale al primo secolo; e fu poi riformata da san
Girolamo, il quale pure viveva prima dell’invasione dei Barbari [88].
Ora, in essa abbondano gl’idiotismi, che sono sentenziati per errori e
barbarismi, sebbene molti abbiano riscontro nei classici. Quell’in
sæculum sæculi ripetuto, è in Plauto: Perpetuo vivunt ab sæculo ad
sæculum: (Miles glor., iv. 2). «Viderunt Ægyptii mulierem quod esset
pulchra nimis» (Genesi, xii. 14) risponde al plautino Legiones
educunt suas nimis pulchris armis præditas (Amphitr., i, 1). Il
Servitutem qua servivi tibi (Gen., xxx. 26) all’Amanti hero servitutem
servit (Aulul., iv. 4): l’Ignoro vos (Deut. xxxiii. 9) al Ne te ignores
(Captiv., ii. 3): il Feci omnia verba hæc (iii Reg., xviii. 36) al Feci ego
isthæc dicta quæ vos dicitis (Casina, v. 4). Bonum est confidere in
Domino quam confidere in homine, dice il Salmo cxii. 8; e Plauto:
Tacita bona est semper quam loquens (Rudens, iv. 4). Il Miscui
vinum de’ Proverbj, (ix. 5) è sostenuto dal Commisce mustum della
Persa, i. 3; il Tibi dico surge di san Marco, v. 41, dall’Heus tu, tibi
dico, mulier del Pœnul., v. 5; il Dispersit superbos mente cordis sui
di san Luca, i. 51, dal Pavor territat mentem animi dell’Epidic., iv.
1 [89]. Anzi io credo che i siffatti fossero forme popolari, già vive al
tempo di Nerone, e sopravvissute ne’ vulgari odierni, come tant’altri
di cui diamo un saggio:

Mensuram bonam... et supereffluentem dabunt in sinum

vestrum. Luca, vii. 38.
Repone in unam partem molestissima tibi cogitamenta. iv
Esdra, xiv. 14.
Et nemo mittit vinum novum in utres veteres. Luca, v. 37.
Populus suspensus erat audiens illum, xix. 48.
Quærebant mittere in illum manus, xx. 19.
Sed meno misit super eum manus. Giov., vii. 44.
Quasi absconditus vultus ejus et despectus, unde nec
reputavimus eum. Isaia, liii. 3.
Non est dicere, quid est hoc, aut quid est istud. Eccl., xxxiv.
26.
In electis meis mitte radices. Eccl., 24.
In tempore redditionis postulabit tempus, xxxix. 6.
 Habebat Judam semper charum in animo, et erat viro
inclinatus, ii Macab., xiv. 24.
Ipsi diligunt vinacia uvarum. Osea, iii. 1.
Sed rex, accepto gustu audaciæ Judaeorum, iv Macab., xiii.
18.
Etiam rogo et te, germane compar, adjuva illas. Paolo ad
Philip., iv. 3.
Moyses grandis factus. Paolo ad Hebr., xi. 24.
Cum dixerint omne malum adversum vos. Matteo, v. 11.
Et omnes male habentes curavit, viii. 16.
Mulier, quae sanguinis fluxum patiebatur. ix. 20.
Corripe eum inter te et ipsum solum. xviii. 15.
Apud te facio pascha. xxvi. 18.
Par turturum. Luca, ii. 24.
Spero os ad os loqui. ii Giov., 12.
Oblatus est... et non aperuit os suum. Isaia, liii. 7.

Voi ci vedete i nostri modi «dar la buona misura, metter radice,

mettere da una banda, essere inclinato ad uno, prenderci gusto,
compare, diventar grande, dire tutti i mali, aver male, patir un male,
tra sè e lui, far pasqua, bocca a bocca, non aprir bocca, stare
sospeso, mettere le mani addosso, non crederlo lui, ecc.». Notiamo
per ultimo questo di san Luca, vii. 40: Simon, habeo tibi aliquid
dicere. E in illa hora, come diciamo in allora.
Mentre i precettori sentenziano la versione della Bibbia di corruzione
e barbarie, il buon critico in quei salmi sente l’idioma del Lazio
prendere un vigore inusato, e, per secondare la sublimità de’
concetti e l’idea dell’infinito, ripigliare la nobile altezza che dovette
avere nei sacerdotali suoi primordj, un’armonia diversa da quella che
i prosatori cercavano nel periodeggiare e i poeti nell’imitazione dei
metri greci, e che pure è tanta, da farla ai maestri di canto preferire
persino all’italiano.
Questo rifarsi della favella plebea, questo ritorno verso l’Oriente
dond’era l’origine sua, avrebbe potuto ringiovanire il latino,
infondendogli l’ispirato vigore delle belle lingue aramee e la semplice
costruzione del greco; ma troppo violenti casi sconvolsero
quell’andar di cose; e quando l’Impero cadeva a fasci, era egli a
promettersi un ristoramento della letteratura?

§ 10º
La lingua latina si sfascia. Età del ferro.

Nell’età che intitolarono del ferro, la crescente adulazione trovò

qualificazioni enfatiche a lusingare i fortissimi e felicissimi ed incliti e
provvidentissimi e vittoriosissimi monarchi, e quella serie di illustri e
magnifici conti, patrizj, maestri ed altri. Gl’imperatori, man mano che
scadevano di grandezza e potenza, si puntellavano con titoli
ampollosi, parlando in nome della loro serenitas, tranquillitas,
lenitudo, clementia, pietas, mansuetudo, magnificentia, sublimitas,
perfino æternitas come fece Costanzo. Al greco si ricorse non solo
dagli scienziati, ma anche negli uffizj civili e domestici, massime
dopo trasferita la capitale a Costantinopoli [90]. Partita allora la gente
meglio stante colla Corte, ringhiera e senato a Roma ammutoliti, nè
corpo di scrittori o impero di tradizioni conserva l’aristocratica
castigatezza; sicchè il latino, come uno stromento complicato in
mani inesperte, dovette alterarsi viepiù quanto più sintetico, e perchè
non procede per mezzi semplici secondo il rigoroso bisogno delle
idee, ma con tanti casi e conjugazioni e artificiosa inversione di
sintassi.
Sottentra allora il pieno arbitrio dell’uso, cui stromenti sono il tempo e
il popolo, operanti nel senso medesimo. Il popolo vuole speditezza, e
purchè il pensiero sia espresso, non sta a curarsi d’esattamente
articolare la parola o di valersi di tutti gli elementi, lusso
grammaticale. Alla finezza di declinazioni e conjugazioni sostituì la
generalità delle proposizioni e degli ausiliarj, specificò gli oggetti
coll’articolo, mozzò le desinenze. Pei quali modi la lingua latina non
imbarbariva come suol dirsi, ma tornava verso i principj suoi,
riducendosi in una più semplice, poco o nulla distante dalla nostra
odierna; la lingua scritta accolse in maggior copia voci e forme della
parlata, modificate secondo i paesi: donde quel lamento di san
Girolamo, che la latinità ogni giorno mutasse e di paese e di
tempo [91].
Ajutarono siffatta evoluzione gli scrittori ecclesiastici, che più non
dirigendosi a corrompere ricchi e ingraziante letterati, ma recando al
vulgo le parole della vita e della speranza, non assunsero la lingua
eletta, ma la comune, la vernacola. Essi mostrano sprezzare
l’eleganza e persino la correzione; sant’Agostino dice che Dio
intende anche l’idiota, il quale proferisca inter hominibus; san
Girolamo professa voler abusare del parlar comune per facilità di chi
legge [92]. Gregorio Magno era uno degli uomini più colti del suo
tempo, amava le belle arti, come provano e gli edifizj che procurò e
l’innovamento della musica; a’ suoi giorni ancora nel Foro Trajano si
tenevano circoli per leggere Omero e Virgilio, come oggi a Napoli e a
Roma si legge l’Ariosto. Eppure Gregorio sentenziava di affettazione
il voler ridestare le tradizioni della grammatica classica; e guidato dal
senso pratico, vide che quei che diceansi barbarismi non erano che
trasformazione, e non esitava a dichiarare che non evitava il
barbarismo e il solecismo. Or quando esso ed altri santi Padri
professavano non volersi attenere alla grammatica, nessuno li
supporrà così bizzarri da far errori di proposito; bensì scrivevano
come si parlava dal popolo pel quale scrivevano, e farsi capire da
questo premeva a loro ben più che l’evitare gli appunti dei
grammatici.
A torto però si attribuisce ai soli scrittori ecclesiastici [93] il
peggioramento del latino. Anche gli scrittori profani rifuggivano al
rancidume, adoprando fortivile, interibi e postibi, obaudire per
obedire, penitudo, pigrare e repigrare, prolubium, rancescere,
repedere per reddere, rhetoricare, sublimare, usio per usus. Quali
abbandonavansi a incondite novità di parole, di composti [94], di
desinenze, di significato: crebbero gli astratti [95]; formaronsi nuovi
aggettivi [96], nuovi verbi [97].
Di desinenze cambiate offrono esempio i nomi adoptatio, ædifex,
agrarium per ager; albedo, altarium, alternamentum, baptismum,
cautela, colludium, concinnatio, ecc. [98] e i verbi effigiare,
exhereditare, honorificare, magnificare, obviare, significare,
resplenduit, ecc.
Diez (Grammatik der romanischen Sprache. Bonn 1836) fa ricche e
metodiche comparazioni di tutti gli idiomi romanzi, donde appajono
le trasformazioni del latino, sia successive in uno stesso paese, sia
contemporanee in paesi diversi. Poi dagli scrittori della bassa latinità
Gellio, Palladio, Tertulliano, Petronio, Celio Aureliano, Arnobio, Giulio
Firmico Materno, Lampridio e gli altri della Storia Augusta, Ausonio,
Ammiano Marcellino, Vegezio, Sulpicio Severo, i santi Gerolamo e
Agostino, Marciano Capella, Macrobio, Sidonio, trae una quantità di
voci, inusate dai classici, e passate nelle sei lingue romanze.
Trascegliamone qualcuna, attinente all’italiano:

acredo (Palladio) acredine.

æramen (Teod. prisc.) rame.
acicula e acucula (Cod. Theodos., iii. xvi. 1) agucchia.
albedo (Sulpicio, ecc. ecc.) albedine.
ambrex (Festo) embrice.
astur (Firm. Mat.) astore.
augmentare (Id.) aumentare.
bacar (Festo) bicchiere, che suol trarsi dal tedesco beker.
baceolus (s. Agost.) baggeo, che già notammo.
badius (Varrone) bajo.
battualia, quae vulgo dicuntur, e
battalia (Cassiodoro) battaglia.
bisaccium (Petronio) bisaccia.
burgus (Vegezio, castellum parvum quem burgum vocant).
caballarius (Giulio Firmico) cavaliero.
cambire (Apulejo) cambiare.
capsa (ploxinum capsam dixerunt. Festo) cassa.
carricare (s. Girol.) caricare.
carruca (Sparziano, Vopisco, ecc.) piccol carro, carrozza.
compassio (Tert., s. Agost., ecc.) compassione.
confortare (Lattanz., s. Cipriano) confortare.
coopertorium (Pandette) copertoio.
coquina (Arnob., ecc. ecc.) cucina.
falco (F. Materno) falcone.
falsare (s. Gir.) falsare.
fanicosus (Festo) fangoso.
filiaster (in una iscrizione e in Isidoro di Siviglia) figliastro.
gluto (Festo) ghiottone.
grossus (Sulp. Severo).
hereditare (Salviano).
hortulanus (Macrob.)
jejunare (Tert.)
juramentum (Pandette e altrove).
lanceare (Tert.)
meliorare (Pandette).
mensurare (Vegezio).
minorare (Tert.)
molestare (Petronio)
molina (Amm.) mulino.
papilio (Lampridio) padiglione.
pausare (Vegez. e altri).
pejorare (Cel. Aurel.)
pilare (Ammiano) pigliare e sacheggiare, piller, pillar.
pipio (Lamprid.) pippione, piccione.
plagare (s. Agost.) piagare.
populosus (Apul. e altri) popoloso.
pullicenus (Lampr.) pulcino.
rancor (s. Gir.) rancore.
refrigerium (Tert., ecc.)
regimentum (Festo) reggimento.
 repatriare (Solin.)
somnolentus (Apul.)
species (Macrob., Pallad., ecc.) spezierie.
strata (Eutrop.)
summitas (Pallad. e altri) sommità.
testa (Prud. e altri).
tribulare (Tert.) tribolare [99].

Contro i solecismi non aveasi più per salvaguardia la schiettezza

della favella corrente, onde dicevasi: pacem alicui tribuere; vilissime
natum esse; bona opera facere; peccata remittere; homo pleraque
haud indulgens, per in plerisque; vita interficere; contemplatione
alicujus; affectionem habere per habere in animo; profugere villam
per e villa; in pendenti esse; insuper habere; erat in sermone per
rumor erat; urinam facere; trahere sanguinem per genus ducere. Nè
si schivavano inusati reggimenti de’ verbi; benedicere, fungi, frui,
erudire coll’accusativo; incumbere, queri, renunciare, contrahere,
petere col dativo; amare in aliquo, privare a re, ambire ad aliquid.
Come avviene quando la lingua e la letteratura si staccano dal
supremo canone del senso comune, si sbizzarrì a segno, che un tal
Virgilio Marone a Tolosa insegnava a’ suoi discepoli dodici latinità
«per circondare l’eloquenza di un nuovo lustro, e non comunicare ai
profani le alte dottrine che devono essere privilegio di pochi». L’una
chiamavasi usitata ch’era la lingua comune; poi l’assena o
abbreviata, la semedìa tra il parlar volgare e il dotto; la numerìa che
alterava il numero dei nomi; la lumbrosa che allungava il discorso,
adoprando quattro vocaboli invece di uno; la syncolla che invece ne
abbreviava quattro in una; seguivano la metrofia, la belsabia, la
bresina, la militena, la spela, la polema; tutte producendo alterazioni,
di cui non conosciamo la ragione. E, per un esempio, invece di ignis,
il fuoco era chiamato ardor, calax, quoquevihabis, spiridon, rusin,
fragon, fumaton, ustrax, vitius, saluseus, ænon; e con questo gergo
scriveansi opere di sistematica barbarie.
Un tal fatto, nuovo nella storia della letteratura latina, raccogliamo
dai Classicorum auctorum fragmenta, pubblicati dal Maj, e vaglia
questo esempio: Bis senos exploro vechros, qui ausonicam lacerant
palatham. Ex his gemella astant facinora, quæ verbalem sauciant
vipereo tactu struem. Alterum barbarico auctu loquelarem inficit
tramitem, ac gemello stabilitat modello, quaternaque nectit
specimina: inclytos literaturæ addit assiduæ apices: statutum toxico
rapit scripturæ dampno; literales urbanæ movet characteres
facundiæ; stabilem picturæ venenoso obice trasmutat tenorem. Alius
clarifero ortus est vechrus solo, quo hispericum reguloso ortu violatur
eologium, sensibiles partimi num corrodit domescas. Cetera notentur
piacula, qua italicum lecti faminis sauciant obrizum, quod ex his
propriferum loquelosi in hac assertione affigis facinus [100].
Un singolare documento ci rimane nei comandi, onde i tribuni
dirigevano l’esercizio militare: Silentio mandata implete — Non vos
turbatis — Ordinem servate — Bandum sequite — Nemo dimittat
bandum — Inimicos seque [101]. Quel bandum per vexillum, quel
sequite e seque e turbatis, imperativi insoliti, corrispondono alle
contorsioni, che in ogni parlare si fanno pel comando delle milizie.
Dell’anno 38 di Giustiniano conservasi un istromento sopra papiro,
fatto in Ravenna e già pieno di modi all’italiana, come domo quæ est
ad sancta Agata; intra civitate Ravenna; valentes solido uno; tina
clusa, buticella, orciolo, scotella, bracile, bandilos [102]. Ammiano
Marcellino dice che i Romani del suo tempo giacevansi in carruccis
solito altioribus [103]; e carroccia per carrozza dice oggi il vulgo
lombardo. La Storia Miscella riferisce, al 583, che, mentre
Commentiolo generale guerreggiava gli Unni, un mulo gittò il carico,
ed i soldati gridarono al lontano mulattiere nella favella natia, Torna,
torna, fratre; onde gli altri lo credettero un ordine di tornare indietro,
e fuggirono [104]. Ajmonio racconta che Giustiniano ebbe prigioniero
il re di certi barbari, e fattoselo sedere a lato, gli comandò di
restituire le provincie conquistate, e poichè quegli rispose Non dabo,
l’imperatore replicò, Daras; forma nostrale del verbo dare al
futuro [105]. Il Maj pubblicò una glossa del grammatico Placido, che
dice: Mu adhuc consuetudine est; e tuttora usiamo mo. Il De Rossi
nel Bullettino Archeologico reca un epitafio anteriore a Costantino,
ove è detto Spiritum Maximi refrigeri Januarius, forma ottativa per
refrigeret, quale l’usiamo oggi [106].
Nell’Historia Augusta si trova vos ipse: ad fratre suo: ad bellum
Parthis inferre: in Cassiodoro abbiamo pretiare per estimare; in
Sidonio cassare, cervicositas, papa, serietas.
Dopo altri, il Muratori [107] adduce iscrizioni del 260, e fino del 155
dopo Cristo, cioè del tempo degli Antonini, che potrebbero credersi
di età barbara, eppure contengono atti ufficiali. Un istromento
ravennate del 540 è poco men rustico che uno dell’800. Per non
esser troppo lunghi noi torremo solo dal lib. vi, p. 546 delle
Miscellanee del Baluzio una formola del 422, che può stare con
qualsivoglia de’ secoli barbari: Ob hoc igitur ego ille, et conjux mea
illa, commanens orbe Arvernis in pago illo, in villa illa. Dum non est
incognitum, qualiter cartolas nostras, per hostilitatem Francorum, in
ipsa villa illa, manso nostro, ubi visi sum manere, ibidem perdimus;
et petimus, vel cognitum faciemus, ut qui per ipsas stromentas et
tempora habere noscuntur possessio nostra, per hanc occasionem
nostrorum pater inter epistolas illas de mansos in ipsa villa illa, de
qua ipso atraximus in integrum, ut et vindedit ista omnia superiu
conscripta, vel quod memorare minime possimus judicibus brevis
nostras spondiis incolcacionibus, vel alias stromentas tam nostris,
quam et qui nobis commendatas fuerunt, hoc inter ipsas villas
suprascriptas, vel de ipsas turbas ibidem perdimus. Et petimus, ut
hanc contestaciuncula, seu planetaria, per hanc cartolas in nostro
nomine collegere vel adfirmare deberemus. Quo ita et fecimus ista,
principium Honorio et Theodosio consulibus eorum ab hostio sancto
illo castro Claremunte per triduum habendi, et custodivimus, seu in
mercato publico, in quo ordo curiæ duxerunt, aut regalis, vel
manuensis vester, aut personarum ipsius castri, ut cum hanc
contestaciuncula seu plancturia, juxta legum consuetudinem, in
præsentia vestra relata fuerit, nostris subscriptionibus signaculis
subroborare faciatis; ut quocumque perdiciones nostras de supra
scripta per vestra adfirmatione justa auctoritas remedia consequatur,
ut nostra firmitas legum auctoritas revocent in propinquietas [108]. Il
Marini adduce una carta del 564, dove leggesi uno orciolo aureo,
uno butte, una cuppa, uno runcilione [109].
A questa età ritroviamo dichiaratamente il nome di lingua italiana;
poichè verso il 560, Venanzio Fortunato, poeta trevisano, cantava:
Ast ego sensus inops, italæ quota portio linguæ.
Importerebbe di colmare la lacuna che resta fra il lessico del
Forcellini e quello del Ducange. L’uno dà il latino classico, l’altro il
latino barbaro: ma realmente nei tempi di decadenza, nel iv, v e vi
secolo, si usarono molte voci, che il Ducange non appoggia che ad
autorità del ix e x secolo. Il vocabolario dunque di que’ secoli
toglierebbe ogni soluzione di continuità. Un buon avviamento vi
diede Quicherat (Addenda lexicis latinis investigavit, collegit. Parigi
1862) aggiugnendo al Forcellini circa 7000 articoli, tolti da autori
della decadenza.

§ 11º
Differenze del latino dall’italiano.

In quel parlare comune, se non ce ne restasse così poco, io penso

troveremmo già l’italiano nelle sue maniere e lessiche e
grammaticali.
Quanto al fondo, una lingua è l’altra, giacchè quasi tutte le parole
nostre son latine. Ma troppo difficile sarebbe l’indovinare perchè, di
due parole viventi nel latino, l’una fosse preferita; così:

propter e per
magis e plus
jubere e mandare
utinam e sic
coram e in præsentia
sumo e prehendo
cogitare e pensare
 nequeo e non possum
cras e de mane
vespere e sero
cogitare e pensare
intelligere e capere.

Possiamo credere avvenisse così di altre voci che ora usiamo

diverse affatto, ma che forse avevano un sinonimo, non mai usato
dagli scrittori che possediamo, ma passato nella lingua, come enim,
nunquam, etiam, igitur, ergo, ideo.
Abbiamo mora e remora, forse v’era demora, donde il nostro dimora.
Potea esservi sucursus, come cursus e recursus. Fatigare ci lascia
presumere vi fosse fatica, come litigare, fustigare, navigare, da lis,
fustis, navis. Talvolta il nome si formò da un aggettivo, come annales
e diarii sottintendendo libri; come ficatum jecur il fegato che
mangiavasi coi fichi.
Dedotta una parola dal latino, se ne derivarono altre; come da obblio
obbliare, da pettine pettinare, da prezzo prezzare e i suoi figliuoli; da
scimia scimiottare. Talvolta la derivazione è diversa da quel che
parrebbe: e p. es. posare e riposare derivano il primo da ponere, il
secondo da pausare.
In alcune voci variò l’accento, come in ardere, movere, ridere,
rilucere, mordere, mungere, nuocere, rispondere, ora abbreviate e
più di rado allungate, come in sapere, cadere, e principalmente in
nomi, quali filiolus, linteolus, cristallinus.
Il nostro avverbio in mente viene spontaneo da forme latine, avendo
in Ovidio celeri mente e insistam forti mente, in Quintiliano bona
mente factum, in Claudiano devota mente, e già in Virgilio Manet alta
mente repostum [110].
Nella negazione punto, mica, fiore, negotta ci rimase solo la cosa a
cui si paragonava; onde Plauto (Pseudolus, i. 4) neque guttam boni
consilii: e Festo dice: rem nullius pretii dicimus non hecte te facio. E
già nel basso latino troviamo quel vezzo nostro di unire due
negative; Petronio ha nemini nihil boni facere; poi nelle formole del
Mabillon: nec per meum nullum ingenium nunquam perdedit; e nel
Berquigny (Diplomata, t. i. 1086) nullus non praesumat de his
speciebus nihil abstraere. Il modo era greco: οὐκ ἐποίησε τοῦτο
ὀυδᾶμον ὀυδείς.
Talvolta una parola cambiò senso: ammazzare non significò più
uccidere colla mazza; necare fu ristretto all’annegare; tropus del
basso latino ci diede troppo; via dovea dirsi per volta, rimastoci in
tuttavia, e un via uno.
Quanto alla forma, alla grammatica, le principali differenze
consistono,
1. nell’indicare la relazione con preposizioni, anzichè col variare le
desinenze; ossia surrogare le pre-posizioni alle post-posizioni degli
idiomi agglomeranti;
2. nel premettere ai nomi l’articolo determinato o indeterminato;
3. nel formare coll’ausiliario molti tempi del verbo attivo e tutti quelli
del passivo: smettendo cioè il verbo che esprime la passione in atto
(legor), per prendere quello dell’azione in effetto (ho letto) [111].
Lasciam via alcune varietà particolari, come i comparativi, come il
neutro [112], come il verbo deponente, che non falsarono l’analogia
ma l’estesero, e che del resto sono sporadiche, e derivanti esse
pure, per vie indicate dai filologi, da un tipo anteriore e comune [113].
Gli usi grammaticali che accenniamo si riscontrano anche in altri
idiomi del ceppo indo-europeo; fra gli altri nel persiano e nel tedesco;
il che autorizza a credere esistessero già nella lingua parlata a
Roma [114]. Ce lo conferma il vedere come talvolta scivolassero
anche nello scritto.
E prima le declinazioni sembra che, col tempo, si riducessero tutte
alla II, col plurale in i quale passò nell’italiano; nel quale del resto
sopravvive qualche traccia di declinazioni in io e me, egli e lui, che e
cui; sicchè non può dirsi un sistema innovato di grammatica [115].
Già anticamente, per esprimere le relazioni, ricorrevasi, oltre le
cadenze, spesso alle preposizioni, quando per ragioni di chiarezza,