Reflections on the Three Gorges

Project since Its Operation Shouren

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 Engineering 2 (2016) 389–397
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Engineering
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s e v i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / e n g
News & Highlights
Reflections on the Three Gorges Project since Its Operation
Shouren Zheng
Changjiang Water Resources Commission, Ministry of Water Resources, Wuhan 430010, China
1. Introduction
The initial design of the Three Gorges Project (TGP) planned
for three phases in the impoundment of its reservoir: the power
generation period, with the water retained by a cofferdam; a pre-
liminary operation period; and then a normal operation period.
In 2003, the Three Gorges Reservoir was impounded to elevation
(El.) 135 m, and power generation began with the water being
retained by a cofferdam. In 2007, the reservoir was impounded
to El. 156 m, and preliminary operations began. By 2009, as the
main hydraulic structures were completed, the reservoir was fit
to be impounded to its normal level of El. 175 m. However, it was
still kept at the pool level during the preliminary period. Based
on considerations of the resettlement progress, observed results
of sedimentation at the reservoir tail area, the influence of sed-
imentation on Chongqing Port, and so forth, the duration of the
preliminary operation period was determined at six years. Sub-
sequently, in 2013, the Three Gorges Reservoir was impounded
to its design pool level of El. 175 m; hence, the normal operation
period began.
Preparations for the construction of the TGP began in 1993,
the work commenced in December 1994, and the main river was
closed on November 6, 1997. In 1998, construction of the dam
and powerhouse on the left bank began. In October 2002, water
passed through the diversion bottom outlets at the flood-sluicing
dam, and on November 6 of the same year, the open diversion
channel was completed; the flood-sluicing dam, the powerhouse,
and the non-overflow dam section on the left bank and the head
bay at the ship lift were completed and began retaining water.
In June 2003, the reservoir was impounded to El. 135 m; in July,
the first batch of generating units in the left powerhouse began
generating power and the dual-line five-step continuous shiplock
began operation. In 2004, construction of the dam and power-
house on the right bank began, and by 2005, all 14 generating
units in the left powerhouse commenced operation. In June 2006,
the dam section on the right bank was concreted up to El. 185 m
and the upstream roller-compacted concrete (RCC) cofferdam
was demolished by blasting; thus, the whole dam began retain-
ing water. In October, the reservoir was impounded to El. 156 m,
marking the start of the preliminary operation period one year
ahead of schedule. In 2007, the seven generating units in the
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/J.ENG.2016.04.002
2095-8099/© 2016 THE AUTHORS. Published by Elsevier LTD on behalf of Chinese Academy of Engineering and Higher Education Press Limited Company.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
powerhouse on the right bank began operation. In August 2008,
the dam, powerhouse, and dual-line five-step continuous ship-
lock were all completed; the resettlement of counties and towns
was completed; and programs on resettlement, the reservoir area
clear-up, geological hazard control, water pollution control, eco-
logical environmental protection, and the preservation of cultural
relics were all finished and approved by relevant authorities. At
this point, the reservoir was ready to reach its normal pool level
of El. 175 m. Approved by the TGP Construction Commission of
the State Council, the reservoir began to tentatively impound to
El. 175 m at the end of the 2008 flood season, marking the shift
from its operation at an El. 156 m pool level to its trial operation
at El. 175 m.
2. Changes in hydrological regime in the upper Yangtze
River and the optimized operation of the Three Gorges
Reservoir
2.1. Flood characteristics at the Three Gorges Project (TGP)’s damsite
Flooding at the TGP’s damsite consists of floods from the Jin-
sha River (i.e., the upper trunkstream of the Yangtze River) and
various tributaries. Major floods upstream of the damsite are
caused by extensive and heavy rainfall in the upper regions of the
Yangtze River, mainly from July to September. Since the Minjiang,
Tuojiang, and Jialingjiang Rivers (as shown in Fig. 1) at the north-
ern banks of the Yangtze River flow in a north-to-south direction
through the rainstorm-prone area in western Sichuan Province
and the Daba Mountain, the river flow and the rainfall movement
synchronize. The tributary floods meet with the floods from the
upper trunkstream and the interval flood from the trunkstream,
thereby forming a major flood in the upper trunkstream. A flood
at the damsite is considered in light of the maximum peak dis-
charge (71 100 m3·s–1) observed at the Yichang Hydrometrical
Station since 1877, with an empirical maximum peak discharge
of 105 000 m3·s–1. The dam is designed according to a 1000 year
frequency flood discharge of 98 800 m3·s–1 with its correspond-
ing design flood level of El. 175 m, and checked against a flood
discharge of 124 300 m3·s–1 (i.e., a 10000 year frequency flood
discharge of 113 000 m3·s–1 plus its 10% flood discharge), with its
corresponding checked flood level of El. 180.4 m.
390 S. Zheng / Engineering 2 (2016) 389–397

2.2. Changes in hydrological regime in the upper Yangtze River
Hydrometrical data observed at the Yichang Hydrometrical
Station are used as preliminary design values for the TGP, with
an annual average runoff of 4.51 × 1011 m3 and an annual average
sediment load of 5.21 × 108 t [1]. Since the 1990s, runoff reduction
from the upper Yangtze River has been limited and affected by
rainfall change; while due to the efforts of sediment retention by
hydro projects, sediment reduction by soil and water conserva-
tion, and river sand-mining, incoming sediment was prominently
decreased (as shown in Table 1).
The reduction of incoming sediment into the reservoir is ben-
eficial to its long-term operation. From 2003 to 2015, the annual
average runoff at the damsite was 4.003 × 1011 m3, which reduced
by 5.07 × 1010 m3 (11.24%) when compared to its preliminary design
value. The seasonal change in upstream runoff is similar to that of
rainfall, and is unevenly distributed within a year, i.e., runoff during
the flood season from June to October accounts for 70%‒75% of the
annual total. Over the past 20 years, the runoff during flood season,
and in October to November, has been lower than the preliminary
design value, and it increased from December to May of the follow-
ing year [2].
2.3. Preliminary operation mode for the TGP
The preliminary operation mode designed for the TGP is as fol-
lows. During every flood season from mid-June to late September,
the reservoir is operated at the flood control level of El. 145 m. When
the level rises to El. 145 m, the flow discharged from the reservoir
is 55 000 m3·s–1, so as to ensure that the discharge at the Zhicheng
Hydrometrical Station of the Jingjiang River reach does not exceed
56 700 m3·s–1. In the case of a flood with a discharge of less than
55 000 m3·s–1, water is completely discharged down to El. 145 m.
If a flood has a discharge of more than 55 000 m3·s–1, flood control
operation must be conducted for the downstream reach; that is,
the reservoir impounds this flood and controls the discharged flow.
As the impounded flood will cause the water level to rise, once the
flood process recedes, the water level must be lowered to El. 145 m
again for the purpose of controlling subsequent floods. The oper-
ation mode of “storing clear water and discharging muddy water”
is adopted for the Three Gorges Reservoir; that is, the reservoir im-
pounds water after the flood season (early October) so as to scour
sediment in the Chongqing reach at the tail area of the Three Gorges
Reservoir. Considering the need for navigation in the downstream
reach, the minimum flow discharged from the reservoir during im-
poundment is required to be no less than 53 000–64 600 m3·s–1, cor-
responding to the firm output of the Three Gorges powerhouse; then
the water level gradually rises up to El. 175 m. During the low-water
season, it is generally operated at a higher water level in order to
allow for power generation and navigation in the reservoir area. In
order to meet flood control needs, the water level is required to be
lowered down to El. 145 m at the end of early June before the flood
season. During a flood season, the flood control operation is con-
ducted in a flood control compensation mode for the Jingjiang River
reach, increasing the flood control standard there from controlling a
10 year frequency flood to controlling a 100 year frequency flood. In

Fig. 1. A plan map for the comprehensive utilization of the Yangtze River Basin.

Table 1
Change in runoff and sediment load at the Three Gorges Project (TGP) damsite and flowing into the Three Gorges Reservoir.
Annual average runoff (× 109 m3) Annual average sediment load (× 106 t)
Before impoundment After impoundment Before impoundment After impoundment
Preliminary (1991–2002) (2003–2015) Preliminary (1991–2002) (2003–2015)
Location
design value Compared to Compared to design value Compared to pre- Compared to
(1877–1990) Observed Observed (1877–1990) Observed Observed
preliminary preliminary design liminary design preliminary
value value value value
design value value value design value
TGP damsite 451.0 428.7 –4.94% 400.3 –11.24% 521 391 –25.0% 40.4 –92.2%
Site flowing into 401.5 387.1 –3.59% 369.0 –8.09% 491 357 –27.3% 164.5 –66.5%
the Three Gorges
Reservoir
Note: Cuntan and Wulong Hydrometrical Stations represent the site flowing into the Three Gorges Reservoir.
 S. Zheng / Engineering 2 (2016) 389–397 391

other words, in the case of a 100 year frequency flood with a flood
discharge of 83 700 m3·s–1 from the upper Yangtze River, the maxi-
mum discharge at Zhicheng Hydrometrical Station can be controlled
at 56 700 m3·s–1 through the TGP’s flood regulation. If a flood with
a return period of over 100 or 1000 years occurs (including a flood
similar to the 1870 extraordinary flood), the discharge at Zhicheng
Hydrometrical Station can be controlled at less than 80 000 m3·s–1. In
combination with the operation of flood storage and detention are-
as, this discharge can guarantee flood-flowing safety in the Jingjiang
River reach, hence preventing the occurrence of a devastating disas-
ter caused by breaching in main levees along the two sides [3].
2.4. Flood control and impoundment operations during the tentative
impoundment operation period
2.4.1. Flood control operation for the Three Gorges Reservoir and the
Chenglingji reach
An analysis of flood data measured in the upper Yangtze River
for the past 20 years indicates that the maximum peak discharge
during this period was 63 300 m3·s–1 at Yichang Hydrometrical
Station—smaller than the discharge of a 10 year frequency flood.
In the case of a flood similar to the 1998 flood, if the TGP is oper-
ated in terms of flood control compensation for the Chenglingji
reach, the reservoir would impound water with a flood volume of
3 × 109 m3. In such a case, most of the flood control storage capac-
ity would still not be utilized, although the flood control situation
in the downstream Chenglingji reach (450 km from the damsite)
would be tense. It is evident that the flood control effect of the
TGP is not fully used. Therefore, during the trial impoundment
period of the Three Gorges Reservoir, with the approval of com-
petent authorities in October 2009, the TGP’s flood control oper-
ation scheme was optimized. The flood control operation of the
Three Gorges Reservoir and the flood control compensation oper-
ation for the Chenglingji reach were both considered (Table 2).
2.4.2. Operation for detaining medium and small floods during flood
season
The compensation operation for flood control of the Jingjiang
River reach sets the target water level at Shashi Hydrometrical Sta-
tion at no higher than El. 44.5 m, and the flood discharge from the
Three Gorges Reservoir at more than 55 000 m3·s–1. When the flood
discharge is between 45 000–55 000 m3·s–1, the flow discharged
from the Three Gorges Reservoir will make the water level at Shashi
Hydrometrical Station exceed its warning water level, thereby caus-
ing the water level along the middle Yangtze River to correspond-
ingly be higher than the warning water level. There is a 30 000 km
long levee along the middle and lower Yangtze River. The main part
of the levee is about 3900 km long, and all of the levee is built on a
Quaternary alluvial plain, where soils in the levee are badly bond-
ed. When the water level rises, dangerous emergencies can easily
happen, including leakage within the levee and piping through the
levee base. During a flood season, when the water level rises up to
its warning level, a considerable amount of manpower and material
resources are used to check potential levee dangers. According to
statistics, the water level in the Jingjiang River reach has exceeded
its warning level more than three times in one decade. Small and
medium floods of less than 55 000 m3·s–1 are impounded by adopt-
ing the TGP’s flood control capacity, which can reduce the flood
control pressure on the middle and lower Yangtze River. Considering
that the flood composition in the Three Gorges Reservoir is compli-
cated, methods for detaining small and medium floods will increase
the probability of exceeding its flood level limit and the risk of flood
control. Therefore, methods for detaining said floods should be man-
aged according to the following principles: keeping the TGP’s flood
control standard uncompromised; and not adding flood control
pressure onto the lower Yangtze River. Based on the principles, the
water level in the Three Gorges Reservoir is pre-discharged down to
its flood level limit before a major flood flows into the Three Gorges
Reservoir. It is controlled regardless of the flood control situation,
with actual inflows and forecasting results. If it is necessary for the
Three Gorges Reservoir to conduct a flood control compensation
operation for the Jingjiang River and Chenglingji reaches, it can
carry out the operation for detaining small and medium floods and
set the necessary conditions for starting a flood detention oper-
ation. During the flood season in 2009–2015, flood operation for
detaining small and medium floods was carried out, reducing the
flood control pressure on the Jingjiang River reach and the Cheng-
lingji area, making use of some flood resources to increase power
generation benefits, and preventing economic loss caused by ships
passing through the shiplock for a long time and by limiting ships’
navigation due to large flood discharging—thus obtaining excellent
economic and social benefits. During the operation for detaining
small and medium floods, the flow discharged during every flood
season is less than 45 000 m3·s–1, which may cause shrinkage and

Table 2
Flood control operation mode for the TGP’s optimized operation.
Three Gorges Reservoir
Conditions required to use TGP’s flood control storage
Water level upstream Flood control storage Flood control operation mode capacity
of the damsite (m) capacity (× 109 m3)
175–171 3.92 Operation for preventing upstream extraordinary flood: Dis- If a flood with a return period of over 100 or 1000 years
charge at Zhicheng Hydrometrical Station in Jingjiang River (maximum peak discharge of 98 800 m3·s–1) or a flood similar
reach is controlled not in excess of 80 000 m3·s–1; in combina- to the 1870 extraordinary flood (maximum peak discharge at
tion with flood detention and storage measures, water level Yichang Hydrometrical Station of 105 000 m3·s–1) occurs up-
at Shashi Hydrometrical Station is controlled to be not higher stream of the Three Gorges Reservoir
than El. 45 m
171–155 12.58 Flood control compensation operation for Jingjiang River If a 100 year frequency or below 100 year frequency flood
reach: Water level at Shashi Hydrometrical Station is not (maximum peak discharge of 83 700 m3·s–1) occurs upstream
higher than El. 44.5 m after the controlled flow discharged of the Three Gorges Reservoir
from reservoir is superposed with the inflow from between
the damsite and the city of Shashi
155–145 5.65 Flood control compensation operation for the Chenglingji If a flood from upstream of the Three Gorges Reservoir is not
reach is considered at the same time: Compensation regula- great, it is not yet necessary to impound a large volume of
tion is conducted in terms of El. 34.4 m at Chenglingji Hydro- water for meeting the flood control need for the Jingjiang
metrical Station River reach, and the water level at Chenglingji Hydrometrical
Station will exceed the design level for dykes built along the
main Yangtze River, then the Three Gorges Reservoir is re-
quired to retain and impound flood water
392 S. Zheng / Engineering 2 (2016) 389–397

degradation of river channels in the middle and lower Yangtze River.
Therefore, when the necessity exists, a flow of about 55 000 m3·s–1
is discharged every several years in order to fully test the ability of
levees and river channels in the Jingjiang River reach to release the
flood, and in order to prevent shrinkage and degradation of river
channels [4].
2.4.3. Operation of impoundment from the late flood season
Over the past 20 years, the monthly average discharges in
every September and October at Yichang Hydrometrical Sta-
tion are 23 100 m3·s–1 and 14 600 m3·s–1, respectively—11.2% and
22.3% smaller than the preliminary design values. As the Three
Gorges Reservoir is a quarterly-regulated reservoir, if it begins to
impound in early October according to its initial design scheme,
it will not impound up to El. 175 m in most years, which will se-
riously affect the full use of the TGP’s integrated benefits. There-
fore, during its trial impoundment in 2008, water was impounded
ahead of schedule in late September, and the starting impounded
water level was determined at El. 145.3 m. Thereafter, water was
impounded ahead of schedule on September 10–15 every year.
The starting impounded water level is at its actual flood control
operation level in an earlier stage, and water is stored up to about
El. 162 m until late September. Flow discharged in September is
kept at 10 000–8000 m3·s–1, and flow discharged in October is
controlled at no less than 8000–6500 m3·s–1; water is impound-
ed up to El. 175 m from late October to early November. During
impoundment, if a major flood from the upper Yangtze River
occurs and inflow into the Three Gorges Reservoir is more than
30 000 m3·s–1, impoundment action pauses and is operated ac-
cording to the flood control requirement. Table 3 shows impound-
ment data from every year during the TGP’s trial impoundment
and operation at El. 175 m.
environment, and power generation, and was controlled at no
less than 6000 m3·s–1.
2.5.2. Ecological operation
In 2011, ecological operation trials began with the TGP for
breeding four aquacultured fish species (black carp, grass carp,
silver carp, and bighead carp). During the breeding period of the
four fish species from late May to mid-June, the water tempera-
ture in the river course downstream of the damsite was higher
than 18 °C. In combination with requirements for emptying the
storage capacity, and in accordance with the upstream water
regime, 1–2 rising processes (lasting for about 10 days) were
completed throughout the operation. A discharge of 11 000 m3·s–1
in the Yichang Hydrometrical Station was used as its initial dis-
charge; the discharge was increased by 8000 m3·s–1 within six
days, and finally increased to 19 000 m3·s–1, with an average daily
rising amplitude of the water level of no less than 0.4 m. Monitor-
ing results for an ecological operation test show that it promoted
the breeding of the four aquacultured fish species, and increased
the amount of eggs spawned during the operation period.
From February 21 to March 3, 2014, the TGP was utilized to
conduct a “desalinization” operation, and the daily average flow
discharged from the Three Gorges Reservoir was increased from
6000 m3·s–1 to 7000 m3·s–1, with a total added discharged flow of
1.007 × 109 m3. To a certain extent, this operation mitigated the
serious impact caused by salty tide intrusion upstream, and simul-
taneously relieved the water shortages in the middle and lower
Yangtze River.
2.6. Measures for detaining small and medium floods, impoundment
since the late flood season, and reducing sedimentation in the
reservoir

2.5. Water resources regulation and ecological operation during the
tentative impoundment period
2.5.1. Water resources regulation
During the TGP’s tentative impoundment and operation, in the
event of a rapid drawdown of the water level in the trunkstream
of the middle and lower Yangtze River and Dongting and Poyang
Lakes, domestic water supply for urban and rural residents in the
middle and lower reach regions, and household, production, and
ecological water needs were prioritized. During the impound-
ment in 2009, a serious drought occurred in the middle and
lower regions. In order to relieve the drought, after the water was
impounded to El. 171.43 m, the water impoundment was stopped
and the flow discharge was increased. During the drawdown pe-
riod of the water level, the flow discharged was adjusted in light
of requirements for water supply, navigation, water ecology, the
During the flood season, when the operation for detaining small
and medium floods is conducted, the higher water level reduces its
sediment delivery ratio; hence, the reservoir sedimentation rises.
Advancing the impoundment to September 10 in the late flood sea-
son affects the sediment scouring (flowing) in rivercourses of fluctu-
ating backwater at the tail of the Three Gorges Reservoir, and some-
what increases sedimentation in this reach. Due to a great decrease
of sediment into the reservoir, observed data show that from June
2003 to December 2015, 1.6034 × 109 t of sediment was deposited in
the reservoir with an annual average sedimentation of 1.28 × 108 t,
accounting for only 38% of the predicted result. From 2003 to 2015,
the annual sediment delivery ratio was 24.2%, less than its predicted
value in the preliminary design, thereby increasing sedimentation
in the Three Gorges Reservoir [5]. Measured hydrological data from
the Bureau of Hydrology, Changjiang Water Resources Commission
indicate that in the case of a major flood, it takes the flood peak 18–

Table 3
A summary of impoundment data from every year during the TGP’s trial impoundment and operation at El. 175 m.
Starting impoundment date and starting impoundment water level Highest impoundment water level and date
Annual runoff
Year Starting impoundment Starting impoundment Impoundment water level on Highest impoundment
(× 109 m3) Date
date water level (m) September 30 (m) water level (m)
2008 429.0 September 28 145.3 149.1 172.80 November 4
2009 388.1 September 15 145.9 157.1 171.43 November 24
2010 406.7 September 10 160.2 162.6 175.00 November 26
2011 339.5 September 10 152.2 166.1 175.00 November 30
2012 448.1 September 10 158.9 169.0 175.00 November 30
2013 367.8 September 10 156.7 166.9 175.00 November 11
2014 438.0 September 15 164.6 168.5 175.00 October 31
2015 377.7 September 10 156.0 166.4 175.00 October 28
 S. Zheng / Engineering 2 (2016) 389–397
30 h to flow from the Cuntan Hydrometrical Station to the damsite,
and three to seven days for the sediment peak. In July 2012, exper-
iments were carried out with real-time monitoring and forecasting
to reduce sedimentation into the reservoir. While the flood peak
reduction was operated, the time difference between the flood peak
propagation and the sediment peak propagation was utilized. First,
the sediment delivery operation was carried out by controlling the
discharged flow to reduce the flood peak during the rising period,
and the discharged flow was increased to scour sediment during the
recession period. This operation increased the sediment delivery ra-
tio in July to 28%, resulting in a better sediment scouring effect and
breaking through the conventional operational mode of discharging
muddy water to the reservoir. In order to solve sediment scouring
(and/or flowing) problems in the reach of Chongqing main urban
area at the tail of the reservoir, two scouring tests were conduct-
ed in May 7–24 2012 and May 13–20, 2013. The water level at the
reservoir was lowered from El. 161.92 m down to El. 154.5 m, and
from El. 160.16 m down to El. 155.97 m; the drawdown was 7.42 m
and 4.19 m, respectively, with a daily mean drawdown amplitude
of 0.41 m and 0.52 m. This resulted in the terminal of backwater in
the reservoir moving from the reach near Jiulongpo (625 km from
the damsite) in the Chongqing main urban area down to the chan-
nel around Changshou District, downstream of the Tongluo Gorge
(535 km from the damsite). During the drawdown period of the
reservoir water level, the reach at the tail of the Three Gorges Res-
ervoir was scoured streamwise. The scouring sediment in the reach
from Dadukou District to Fuling District of Chongqing Municipality
(including the 169 km long Jialingjiang River reach shown in Fig. 2)
is 2.41 × 106 m3 and 4.413 × 106 m3. Sedimentation operation prac-
tices at the tail of the Three Gorges Reservoir indicate that in May
of every year, in combination with lowering the reservoir level, sed-
imentation operations at the tail of the Three Gorges Reservoir can
scour sediment deposited at the tail of the Three Gorges Reservoir
downstream into the river channel below El. 145 m—thus solving
sediment scouring in the reach of the Chongqing main urban area,
which was influenced by the reservoir’s impoundment ahead of the
late flood season. In combination with the simultaneous sediment
peak scouring operation, this opens up a new way for the Three
Gorges Reservoir to operate by “storing clear water and discharging
muddy water.”
Fig. 2. The Yangtze trunkstream and main tributaries upstream of the Three Gorges Dam.
393
3. Resettlement and ecological environmental protection in
the reservoir area
3.1. Resettlement in the reservoir area
A total of 1 296 400 residents have been relocated in the Three
Gorges Reservoir Area, including 550 700 rural relocatees (with
196 200 residents moving out of the reservoir area). Two cities,
10 counties, and 106 towns were relocated, and 745 700 people
were resettled, including those from industrial and mining es-
tablishments, with a relocated area of 71 427 300 m2. A total of
1128 protection works for cultural relic sites were put in place,
including 364 surface relic sites and 764 underground relic sites,
with an excavation area of 1 753 800 m2. A significant number of
nationally important historical relics have been conserved and
protected, and a large quantity of material data was kept. Re-
building and relocation tasks of special projects in resettlement
areas such as roads, bridges, ports, wharfs, water conservancy
and power facilities, telecommunication lines, and radio and tel-
evision have been completed. Living conditions, infrastructure,
and public service facilities in the relocated establishments have
undergone significant improvement; work start-overs for the
resettled are guaranteed, and supportive measures show positive
effects. Specially rebuilt relocation projects have fully restored
the original functions, and are more reasonable in layout, greater
in scale and grade, and better in function and effect than the pre-
vious settlements, guaranteeing the resettlement of residents as
well as the demand for economic and social development in the
reservoir area. These projects have stood the test of the reservoir’s
operation at El. 175 m, and have established a generally stable and
harmonious society in the reservoir area.
3.2. Control of geological disasters in the reservoir area
The Three Gorges Reservoir Area is historically prone to geo­
logical disasters. After the construction of the TGP began, the
national government set up a special fund to take structural
protection measures against geological disasters in the reservoir
area. Structural treatment of 428 landslides and 302 unstable res-
ervoir banks has eliminated harm from collapses and landslides
394 S. Zheng / Engineering 2 (2016) 389–397
to relocated towns and establishments for rural relocatees; alle-
viated hidden dangers caused by the slipping of landslides down
into the river channel; prevented harm from geological disasters
to ports, wharfs, and roads; and enhanced navigation safety. A
total of 3049 monitoring points for geological disasters in the res-
ervoir area were arranged and 525 relocation projects for evad-
ing geological disasters were conducted, greatly improving the
geological environment in the reservoir area, increasing safety
regarding people’s lives and properties in the reservoir area, and
securing navigation safety in the Yangtze River. Since the Three
Gorges Reservoir was impounded in June 2003, and specifically
since the trial impoundment at El. 175 m in 2008, water has been
impounded up to El. 175 m for nine years in a row. The frequency
of landslides has tended to decrease with time, indicating that
geological disasters caused by reservoir impoundment have shift-
ed from frequent occurrences to a plateau of lower risk. Since the
establishment of the monitoring and early warning network for
geological disasters covering the whole reservoir area, this net-
work has improved its early warning ability, survived from geo-
logical disasters induced by 100 year rarely occurring storm rains
in 2007 and 2014, successfully given early warning and dealt with
over 400 geological disasters, and effectively avoided any casual-
ties. The control of geological disasters in the Three Gorges Reser-
voir Area has assured the safety of relocated towns and establish-
ments for rural residents, and has verified the validity of the idea
of “prevention top, necessary monitoring, hedging and relocating
first, emphasis on project treatment, urban and rural residential
areas” for controlling geological disasters.
3.3. Earthquakes in the reservoir area
The TGP is situated in a crystalline basement zone of the Huang­
ling anticline core—a relatively stable land mass with a low seismic
activity level and a weak seismic environment. No destructive earth-
quakes around the damsite, reservoir area, or the 10 counties and
cities nearby have been recorded in history. Two fault zones situated
17–30 km and 50–110 km downstream of the damsite may cause the
occurrence of stronger earthquakes, and the maximum earthquake
magnitude is estimated to be about M5.5. Analyzed under a worst-
case scenario, an upper limit of M6 is taken as the greatest possible
earthquake magnitude induced by the Three Gorges Reservoir in the
probability risk analysis of a natural earthquake, because even if an
earthquake with this magnitude occurs at the Jiuwanxi fault zone
closest to the damsite (17 km away), the seismic intensity affecting
the damsite area would be no higher than VI degrees.
From June 1, 2003 to December 31, 2015, 6245 earthquakes with
a magnitude of over M0 were recorded in key monitoring zones
in the reservoir area, of which 99.84% were microquakes and ultra
microquakes with an earthquake magnitude of less than M3. This
indicates that the seismic activity is mainly microquakes and ultra
microquakes, primarily distributed within a zone 10 km away from
the two banks around the reservoir area, most of which is located in
the mining area and limestone zone [5]. Although reservoir-induced
earthquakes occur with a relatively high frequency, they are mainly
non-structural microquakes and ultra microquakes induced by ex-
ternal factors. They have a small earthquake magnitude, with M5.1
as a maximum and VII degrees at the highest epicentral intensity.
Since these earthquakes are very small in magnitude, they have not
yet induced secondary geological hazards in the reservoir area. Since
the Three Gorges Reservoir began impoundment, the greatest earth-
quake intensity incurred at the damsite was IV degrees, which is
far less than the VII degrees of seismic fortification intensity for the
Three Gorges Dam, and which did not exert an adverse impact on
the normal and safe operation of the TGP and its primary structures.
3.4. Water environmental protection in the reservoir area
Since the TGP began construction, the government has paid
strict attention to eco-environmental protection in the reservoir
area, and has promulgated the following plans: Water Pollution
Control Planning in the Upper Yangtze River, Implementation Plan-
ning for Environmental Protection in the TGP’s Construction Area,
Construction Planning for a Green Belt around the Three Gorges Res-
ervoir, and so forth. In November 2001, the State Council officially
approved the execution of Water Pollution Control Planning in the
Three Gorges Reservoir Area and the Upper Yangtze River in 2001–
2010, which extended the range of environmental protection
from the Three Gorges Reservoir Area to the Three Gorges Region
(including the reservoir area, affected area, and upstream area).
This directive covers five provinces and municipalities including
the Chongqing Municipality and the Hubei, Sichuan, Guizhou,
and Yunnan Provinces, comprising a total area of 790 000 km2. It
further enhances the ecological construction and water pollution
works in the Three Gorges Area. In the Three Gorges Reservoir
Area, the construction of town sewage and garbage disposal in-
frastructures as supporting facilities has been intensified, and
a series of effective measures have been taken, including the
reduction of the total amount of pollutants, ecological and en-
vironmental protection, algal bloom disposal in tributaries, an
ecological barrier construction along the reservoir bank, and
so forth. Since the Three Gorges Reservoir was impounded, the
trunkstream water quality in the reservoir area has maintained
a good level; except for a few years in individual monitoring
sections, the water quality in most sections has been between
Class II and Class III. Water quality in the non-backwater area of
the 37 main tributaries is mostly at Class II to Class III, which is
better than in the Minjiang, Tuojiang, and Wujiang Rivers. How-
ever, water quality in the backwater area is inferior to that in the
non-backwater area. Eutrophication in the main tributaries in the
reservoir area is aggravated, while eutrophication in the backwa-
ter area develops ever more seriously. The affected areas mainly
cover the Changshou, Fuling, Fengdu, and Wanzhou Districts. To-
tal phosphorus and total nitrogen content in the main tributaries
in the reservoir area is on the rise, and there exists the possibility
of algal bloom outbreaks.
4. Scouring and channel regulation
4.1. Scouring of clear water discharging on the river channel
downstream of the damsite
After the Three Gorges Reservoir is impounded, sediment content
in the discharged flow is reduced; Sediment carried by the clear wa-
ter is in an unsaturated state, scouring the downstream channel [6].
Since the TGP’s operation, scouring of the middle and lower Yang-
tze River tends to develop from upstream to downstream, and has
now intruded on the channel below Hukou, Jiangxi Province. In the
Yichang-Hukou reach, as shown in Fig. 3, the total sediment scoured
along the bankfull channel is 1.6478 × 109 m3 (including sand min-
ing), with an annual average scoured sediment of 1.221 × 108 m3 and
an annual mean scouring intensity of 128 000 m3·km–1. Scouring is
most intense on the low-water channel, contributing to 92% of the
total scoured sediment. The distribution of scouring sediment along
the river channel shows that scouring in the Yichang-Chenglingji
reach is relatively strong. The scouring volume in the bankfull
channel is 9.911 × 108 m3, contributing to 60% of the total; and the
scouring sediment in the Chenglingji-Wuhan reach and the Wuhan-
Hukou reach account for 15% and 25% of the total scouring vol-
ume, respectively. In 2015, the scouring intensity in the Yichang-
 S. Zheng / Engineering 2 (2016) 389–397
Fig. 3. The Yangtze trunkstream and main tributaries downstream of the Three Gorges Dam.
Chenglingji reach was reduced to a certain extent, with the scouring
quantity making up 38.5%; the scouring intensity in the Chenglingji-
Hukou reach was increased, with a scouring quantity accounting for
61.5%, showing that the scouring intensity in the channel obviously
developed downstream.
4.2. Detriment of channel scouring downstream and
countermeasures
Since the TGP’s operation, the impact of discharged clear water
scouring the river channel downstream of the damsite is mixed.
In terms of flood control, the channel goes deeper due to scouring,
and the water level under the same discharge falls, which is good
for flood flowing in the channel on the one hand; on the other
hand, it is detrimental to the near-bank channel as the bank slope
becomes steeper, making it a frequent victim of bank collapses. In
2003–2013, 698 bank collapses in the trunkstream of the middle
and lower Yangtze River occurred, with a total collapsed length of
521.4 km. However, they mainly happened in bank collapses and
risky reaches before the Three Gorges Reservoir was impounded.
Downstream scouring drives the adjustment of the river regime
to a certain extent, causing bank collapses in some locations, but
the river regime remains stable on the whole. Through bank pro-
tection, risky reaches in the main Jingjiang levee and the main
dykes in main tributaries are basically safe and stable. Serious
bank collapses have not yet occurred, and risks have been con-
trolled by strengthening dangerous reaches with bank protection
methods.
In terms of the river-lake relationship, a positive effect is that
the sediment flowing into lakes is reduced, and the sedimenta-
tion and shrinkage of river-connected lakes, especially Dongting
Lake, is slowed. A negative effect is that during the TGP’s im-
poundment period, the flow discharged is reduced, water level
in the river channel downstream of the damsite declines, and the
velocity flowing out of river-connected lakes accelerates, mak-
ing the low-water season begin early and thereby affecting the
utilization of water resources in lake areas, particularly Poyang
Lake and Dongting Lake. As for the TGP’s impact on the Yangtze
Estuary, the good news is that the discharge during the low-water
season rises due to the reservoir regulation, reducing the possi-
bility of salty tide flowing upstream. On a more negative side, the
decrease of sediment into the sea mitigates the tideland reclama-
tion for land. In terms of navigation, the project’s positive influ-
395
ence is that the flow discharged during the low-water season is
over 6000 m3·s–1, which is beneficial to the low-water scouring of
the navigation channel, and which increases the channel depth.
This leads to a negative effect: The clear water discharged from
the TGP undercuts the riverbed and reduces the low-water level
at the city of Yichang, increasing the difficulty of guaranteeing
the lowest navigable level for the Gezhouba Hydraulic Complex
through discharge compensation. In addition, the scouring be-
yond the navigation channel in the middle Yangtze River and the
adjustment in the riffle-pool situation worsens the navigation
conditions in some river channels. Scouring in riffles, develop-
ment in anabranches, and oscillation in the main stream cause
changes in the navigation channel to become uncertain, affecting
navigation. In order to eliminate adverse effects caused after the
TGP’s operation on the stability of the river regime and bank slope
in the middle and lower Yangtze River, the water supply for ripar-
ian towns and agricultural irrigation, and the navigation and eco-
logical environment, measures such as structural treatment, eco-
logical restoration, intensifying monitoring and controlling, and
so forth have been taken in combination with the TGP’s scientific
operation, and can mitigate or remove these adverse effects. Time-
ly dredging and maintenance of navigation-obstructing shoals is
performed, navigation channels in the middle and lower Yangtze
River are kept in an unblocked state, and the minimum dredging
depth in the Yichang-Hukou reach has been somewhat raised.
5. Utilization of flood resources and maximizing the TGP’s
integrated benefits
As a key project to harness, develop, and protect the Yangtze
River under the premise of “guaranteeing flood control safety, re-
ducing sedimentation in the reservoir, and ensuring environmen-
tal protection,” the TGP has made use of part of the flood resourc-
es since its impoundment and operation at El. 175 m in 2008. It
has brought into full play the integrated benefits of flood control,
power generation, navigation, water resources utilization, and so
forth.
5.1. Flood control
Through scientific operation since the TGP’s trial impound-
ment and operation at El. 175 m, its flood control capacity is
utilized during the flood season in order to dam up medium and
396 S. Zheng / Engineering 2 (2016) 389–397
small floods. The TGP also plays a role in flood peak reduction and
peak shifting, effectively avoiding the threat to residents along
the river bank that is induced by the overlapping of the flood
peak from the upper rivers with the flood peak from the middle
and lower rivers. It thus achieves the goals of avoiding or mitigat-
ing flood prevention pressure in the Jingjiang River reach, Poyang
Lake, and areas near Chenglingji, and of greatly relieving the
flood control pressure on the middle and lower Yangtze River (see
Table 4). In 2010 and 2012, the maximum peak discharge into the
reservoir was 70 000 m3·s–1 and 71 200 m3·s–1, respectively, both of
which exceed that observed at the damsite in 1998. Flood volume
impounded by the reservoir was 2.6 × 1010 m3 and 2.005 × 1010 m3,
respectively, and the rate of flood peak reduction was 42.8% and
40%. This lowered the water level in the trunkstream channel of
the middle Yangtze River by 0.9–2.5 m, making the water level at
Shashi Hydrometrical Station in Jingjiang River reach lower than
its warning level, and preventing the water levels at four rivers
to the south of the Jingjiang River and Chenglingji reaches from
exceeding their guaranteed levels. The TGP thus provided a safe-
ty guarantee for residents living along the river bank, as well as
economic and social development. It also provides obvious flood
control and disaster reduction benefits. Since its operation, the
TGP has effectively controlled flooding from the upper Yangtze
River, improved the flood control ability of the middle and lower
Yangtze River, protected the safety of people’s lives and proper-
ties, promoted basin-wide economic and social development, and
allowed people to work and live in peace and contentment.
5.2. Power generation
From 2003, when the TGP’s first generation unit began opera-
tion, until the end of 2015, the TGP’s gross power output has been
8.97795 × 1011 kW·h. The TGP has thus effectively relieved the
pressure of the power supply in Central China, East China, Guang-
dong Province, and other regions; strengthened the hub power
transmission grid in China’s major power networks; promoted
nation-wide grid integration; and enhanced the capability of the
nation-wide energy supply. All the generation units were in oper-
ation by 2012 with an output of 9.812 × 1010 kW·h, accounting for
about 11.4% of total hydropower generation in China and increas-
ing the proportion of hydropower in the power structure by 1.95
percent points. In order to optimize the power structure in China
and increase the proportion of non-fossil energy consumption,
it is necessary to improve China’s ability to supply clean energy.
Since the TGP began operation, it has effectively replaced ther-
mal power generation and has provided great benefits in energy
saving and emission reduction. The Three Gorges Plant has gener-
ated 8.97795 × 1011 kW·h in total power. Compared to total ther-
mal power generation, it saves 3.03 × 108 t of standard coal and
reduces the emission of 7.69 × 108 t of carbon dioxide, 8.261 × 106 t
Table 4
A summary of flood control operation data for the TGP’s trial impoundment and operation at El. 175 m.
Maximum peak Maximum dis-
Year Occurrence date
(m3·s–1) charged flow (m3·s–1)
2009 55 000 August 6 39 600
2010 70 000 July 20 40 900
2011 46 500 September 21 29 100
2012 71 200 July 24 45 800
2013 49 000 July 21 35 300
2014 55 000 September 20 45 000
2015 39 000 July 1 31 000
of sulfur dioxide, and 2.367 × 106 t of nitrogen oxide. It also de-
creases the emission of a large amount of waste water and waste
residues.
5.3. Navigation
Since the TGP’s impoundment, navigation in the reservoir
area has been greatly improved, and navigation in the middle
and lower Yangtze River has also improved. At the same time,
the rapid socioeconomic development in the Yangtze River Basin
has sped up water transport development in the Yangtze River.
From July 2003 to the end of 2015, the Three Gorges Shiplock
has undertaken 115 900 lock-times, sailed 682 000 ship-times,
passed 1.1337 × 107 passengers and shipped 8.6 × 108 t cargos. In
2011, the shiplock’s annual one-way throughput capacity exceed-
ed 5 × 107 t, realizing the goal of planned navigation for the TGP
19 years ahead of schedule. Flow conditions in the navigation
channel of the Three Gorges Reservoir Area have improved as
well, increasing the safety degree of ships’ navigation and oper-
ation, reducing the oil consumed by shipping by 2/3, decreasing
navigation costs by 1/3, and makingthe Yangtze River into a true
golden waterway, with “low cost and large traffic volume.” Water
transport has become a main transportation method in the Three
Gorges Reservoir Area, promoting the quick development of wa-
ter transport in the upper Yangtze River and of riparian economy
and society.
5.4. Water resources utilization
As a reserve of freshwater resources in China, the utilization of
water resources in the Three Gorges Reservoir includes not only
water transport and power generation, but also support for the
water supply in the Yangtze River Basin, ecology conservation,
improvement to water quality during the low-water season in
the middle and lower Yangtze River, and facilitation of south-to-
north water diversion. Meanwhile, when emergencies occur, such
as a 100 year frequency massive drought that occurred in the
middle and lower Yangtze River in 2011, the stranding of oil ships
in the river, and saltwater intrusion in Shanghai in 2014, the flow
discharged from the TGP is increased, and emergent operations
are carried out. Sudden events of this kind have been responded
to successfully. Table 5 provides water resources allocation and
utilization data during the TGP’s operation.
6. Conclusions
Since the TGP started operation, geological hazards such as
landslides and collapses in the Three Gorges Reservoir Area have
been reduced greatly through structural treatment. Water qual-
ity in the trunkstream and main tributaries in the reservoir area
Highest regulating flood
Maximum reduction Times of flood Total flood storage
level from June 10 to before
peak (m3·s–1) storage volume (× 109 m3)
impoundment (m)
16 300 2 5.650 152.89
30 000 7 26.430 161.02
25 500 5 18.760 153.84
28 200 4 22.840 163.11
14 000 5 11.837 156.04
22 900 10 17.512 164.63
8 000 3 7.542 156.01
 S. Zheng / Engineering 2 (2016) 389–397 397

Table 5
A summary of water resources allocation and utilization data during the TGP’s operation.
Power generation by saving water
Impoundment Days of making- Total volume of making- Average rising navi-
Period Increasing rate of hydro Power generation by saving
period up water up water (× 109 m3) gable depth (m) Year
energy utilization (%) water (× 109 kW·h)
Power generation 2003–2004 11 0.879 0.74 2003 — 0.08
period with water
2004–2005 Since inflow is high during low-water season, no making-up water 2004 4.60 1.72
retained by coffer-
operation was conducted
dam
2005–2006 Since inflow is high during low-water season, no making-up water 2005 4.00 1.87
operation was conducted
Initial operation 2006–2007 80 3.580 0.38 2006 4.30 2.03
period
2007–2008 63 2.250 0.33 2007 4.50 2.68
Trial impoundment 2008–2009 190 21.600 1.03 2008 4.96 3.78
and operation
2009–2010 181 20.020 1.00 2009 5.23 3.96
period
2010–2011 194 24.331 1.13 2010 5.09 4.08
2011–2012 181 26.143 1.31 2011 5.17 3.79
2012–2013 178 25.410 1.29 2012 6.97 6.53
2013–2014 182 25.280 1.26 2013 5.45 4.43
2014–2015 82 6.100 1.26 2014 5.47 5.11
2015–2016 170 21.760 1.26 2015 6.00 5.02
Total 1501 177.474 — — — 45.08

has been kept between Class II and Class III, and overall water
quality in the middle and lower Yangtze River has not changed
significantly before and after impoundment, and has been kept
between Class II and Class III in general. It needs to be noted that
the influence of the TGP on ecology and the environment is a long
and slow process, so it is necessary to maintain continuous moni-
toring. Water pollution control in the Three Gorges Reservoir still
presents a severe challenge, so it is important to further improve
environmental management and protection; enhance the man-
agement of the ecological environment in the Yangtze River sys-
tem; improve the water quality in the reservoir, especially in the
reservoir bays and tributaries; mitigate the frequent occurrence
of algal bloom outbreaks; and protect high-quality water sources
in the Yangtze River. At present, the TGP and completed cascade
reservoirs and those in the pipeline in the upper trunkstream and
tributaries provide a sound basis for completely utilizing water
resources in the Yangtze River. The scientific control of water
resources in the Yangtze River, the maximum mitigation of flood
and drought disasters in the Yangtze River Basin, the improve-
ment in water quality and the ecological environment, and the
full utilization of water resources will play important roles in
guaranteeing water safety and supporting sustainable develop-
ment in China. As soon as possible, the TGP should establish and
perfect a united operation mechanism and strengthen the joint
operation of the Three Gorges Reservoir with cascade reservoirs
in the trunkstream and tributaries of the upper and middle Yang-
tze River, so as to realize the maximization of the benefits pro-
duced by water resources utilization. The TGP is characterized as
being great in scale and remarkable in its benefits, and presents
numerous advantages and a few disadvantages. Even so, prob-
lems occurring in the TGP’s operation process need to be studied
seriously one by one, prevented, and treated. Maximizing the
TGP’s advantages and minimizing its disadvantages will contrib-
ute greatly to sustainable development in the Yangtze River Eco-
nomic Zone and to people’s wellbeing in the Yangtze River Basin.
References
[1] Project Team for TGP’s Staged Assessment of Chinese Academy of Engineer-
ing. TGP’s staged assessment report. Beijing: China Water & Power Press;
2010. Chinese.
[2] Project Team for TGP Assessment during Trial Impoundment Period of Chi-
nese Academy of Engineering. Assessment report on TGP assessment during
trial impoundment period. Beijing: China Water & Power Press; 2014. Chi-
nese.
[3] China Three Gorges Corporation. Report on construction quality of TGP and
project operation in 2014. 2015. Chinese.
[4] Zheng S. Discussion on TGP’s flood resources utilization and exerting inte-
grated benefit. Yangtze River 2013;44(15):1−6. Chinese.
[5] China Three Gorges Corporation. Report on construction quality of TGP and
project operation in 2015. 2016. Chinese.
[6] Zheng S. Discussion on hydropower resources development and environmen-
tal & ecological protection in China. Eng Sci 2006;8(6):1–6. Chinese.
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installed, ammunition stored, lookout stations built, ample quantities
of life boats, life rafts and life preservers provided.
Work upon the big German liners in American ports that had been
seized upon our declaration of war to repair and refit them for use as
transports was undertaken by the navy and carried forward with
speed and zeal. Under orders from the German Government their
officers and crews had injured them in many ingenious ways to such
an extent that they did not believe the ships could be made
seaworthy again in less than a year and a half, at the least. Cylinders
had been ruined, valves wrenched apart, engine shafts cracked,
boilers injured, pipes stopped up, ground glass put into oil cups, acid
poured upon ropes and into machinery, bolts sawed through and all
manner of mischief done that would injure without destroying the
seaworthiness of the ships.
For all of this reconstruction and refitting work there was
insufficient skilled labor, indeed, insufficient labor of any sort,
because the needs of the fighting forces were drawing men by the
hundred thousand into the training camps and the equally urgent
needs of the ship-building program, the munitions manufacture, the
coal mines, the hundreds of factories that were turning their attention
to the vital necessities of warfare, were draining the labor supply.
There were insufficient numbers also of trained personnel to officer
and man the huge transport service that would be necessary.
Training for this work was carried on in schools on shore and on
ships at sea, and civilian officers and crews were taken into the
service. Sailors from the navy yards turned to with a will for
mechanical labor in the repairing and refitting of ships, their zeal
compensating, in some measure, for their lack of skill.
The British Government gathered up all the ships it could spare,
taking risks with its own supply of food and raw materials, and sent
them to take part in this enterprise upon whose success depended
the fate of the Allied cause. The seized liners were ready for service
long ahead of the time in which any one had thought they could be
repaired, the first of them taking their trial trips within five months of
the declaration of war and the remainder becoming ready for service
at various times within the next four months. So much more efficient
had the engineers of the navy made them that the utmost speed the
Germans had been able to get out of several of them was increased
by two or three knots. The French and Italian Governments supplied
a few ships, and the United States Shipping Board furnished scores
of merchant ships, as they became available under its program of
ship-building and taking over of sea-going vessels. Later in the war
period a number of vessels were obtained from Holland.
It was agreed between the War and Navy Departments that the
Army should take charge of the work of operating docks and
providing and loading cargoes and that in the hands of the Navy
should lie the responsibility of providing more tonnage when
necessary and of equipping, keeping in repair, operating and
escorting the transports. To the Navy therefore belongs the credit of
having operated with marvelous success for a year and a half an
ocean ferry service of enormous proportions across 3,000 miles of
submarine infested seas. To call it a ferry service is no exaggeration.
For the convoys started so promptly from American shores, moved
with such precision across the Atlantic, discharged their passengers
and left upon the homeward trip in such good time that the ships
came and went upon almost as sure a schedule as that of a ferry
across a river. In all, seventy-six groups of transports sailed with
troops, the size of a group ranging all the way from a single
unescorted ship to as many as fifteen troop ships escorted by from
one to four or five cruisers, destroyers and converted yachts. The
famous Leviathan, with her capacity for carrying from 9,000 to
11,000 men, made ten such trips, most of them unescorted, her own
guns, the skill of her gun crews, the care with which watch was kept
and her speed and maneuvering ability being thought to give her
ample protection. Trip after trip the Leviathan took with the greatest
regularity, steaming down New York Bay with her decks brown with
khaki-clad men, speeding across the Atlantic, unloading on the other
side and returning to her dock in the New York port promptly in
sixteen days. And in eight days more, just as promptly, would she be
ready for another trip.
From a beginning that was next to nothing, for it lacked merchant
ships, organization, officers, crews, there was developed a cruiser
and transport fleet of 42 transports and 24 cruisers with a personnel
of 3,000 officers and 42,000 men. There was a fleet of cargo
carrying ships in steady service numbering 321 and aggregating
2,800,000 tonnage, nearly one-third of which were supplied by the
United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation and
officered and manned by the efforts of the Navy Department. At the
end of hostilities there had been transported across the Atlantic in
the seventeen months from the first sailing over 2,000,000 troops, of
which 911,000 had been carried by U. S. naval transports and
41,500 by other United States ships, while British and British leased
ships had carried 1,075,000 and French and Italian ships 52,000. In
the summer of 1918 as many as 300,000 per month were carried
overseas. Of the entire army of 2,079,880 men American ships
carried 46¹⁄₄ per cent and British ships 51¹⁄₄ per cent, while 2¹⁄₂ per
cent sailed in French and Italian ships. Of the total strength of the
naval escort guarding these 2,000,000 troops 82³⁄₄ per cent was
furnished by the United States, 14¹⁄₈ per cent by Great Britain and
3¹⁄₈ per cent by France. All the troops carried in American ships were
escorted by American warships, cruisers, destroyers and converted
yachts, and American destroyers gave a large part of the safe
conduct through the danger zone to the troops that were carried by
British, French and Italian ships.
The enemy had counted confidently upon being able to paralyze
American transport of troops and supplies by submarine activity and
his undersea vipers were constantly speeding back and forth and up
and down through the eastern waters of the Atlantic and even as far
as its western shores. But no troop transport on its heavily laden
eastward trip was ever lost and none at all under American escort.
Only three troop ships, all told, were sunk by submarines, and these
were westward bound and the loss of life was very small. The first
convoy of troop ships twice battled with submarines and many others
were attacked, while the naval officers who did convoy duty saw the
undersea boats upon almost every voyage. By submarines and
raiders there were lost during our war period 130 cargo carrying
ships but under the guarded convoy system these losses steadily
decreased.
In a convoy the troop or merchant vessels sailed in echelon
formation with destroyers or cruisers steaming in front and at the
rear while a destroyer ranged in zig-zag course along each side.
Naval gun crews manned each ship and on each one, in addition to
the watches kept on board the escorting vessels, keen eyes
constantly swept the surrounding waters, every moment of the day
and night. At night all lights were dimmed, so that not a ray of even a
lighted match on deck was ever visible, and the great black hulks
rushed onward through the darkness, never knowing at what
moment they might collide with one another or with one of the
escorting vessels. But so skillfully navigated were they that all such
dangers, though they were very real, were escaped.
No greater feat was achieved by our fighting forces than this of
ferrying across the Atlantic an army of 2,000,000 troops, with their
food, equipment, and munitions, and the material necessary in
enormous amounts for the creating and carrying on of the Service of
Supply. It was an arresting achievement not only because of its
unparalleled bigness and its audacity and success but also because
of its vital importance. Without it the war could not have been won.
And the credit for the achievement belongs to the American Navy.
Our co-belligerents gave vitally important aid. But the American Navy
suggested, developed, organized, supervised, operated and was
responsible for the entire huge system. Into its success went many
factors, not the least of them the foresight and watchfulness and
careful planning of the officials of the Navy, from the Secretary down
to the junior officers on the troop ships. There was constant study of
the submarine peril and of means to lessen it, and it was, by autumn
of 1918, almost eliminated by the combined efforts of the associated
nations. There were the zeal and diligence of officers and crew alike
and the consequent high morale, the skill of the gun crews, who
never ceased from the effort to make it better still by daily target
practice, and that constant attention to detail which leaves no
loophole anywhere through which success might dribble and slide
away. And finally there were the skill, courage, devotion and
audacious spirit of the naval officers whose ships escorted the
convoys back and forth across the ocean. All these and other factors
combined to make possible an achievement that stands out
commandingly even in a war compact of big things and huge
achievements.

By Permission of Mid-Week Pictorial, New York Times Co.

Mine Barrage Across the North Sea
 CHAPTER XI
WORKING WITH THE ALLIED NAVIES

The American Navy was the first section of the American fighting
forces to take part in the war. It was ready to begin operations at
once upon our declaration of war, it lost no time in sending its first
contingent across the ocean and the importance of its coöperation
with the navies of our co-belligerents constantly increased until the
end of hostilities. Aside from the vital consequence of its
achievement in operating an Atlantic ferry, one of the capital
performances of the entire war, its chief work was done in
coöperation with the British, French and Italian navies in European
waters from the Mediterranean to the White Sea.
Upon our entrance into the war a patrol force was at once
organized charged with the protection of the western waters of the
Atlantic and the shores of America, from the Bay of Fundy to
Colombia, including the West Indies and all the region west of the
50th degree of longitude. But within a few months it became
apparent that the enemy would confine his efforts mainly to
European waters and accordingly most of our naval forces were sent
overseas. For the protection of our own coasts and coastwise
shipping when, during the second summer, enemy submarines
appeared along our own shores, submarines, sub-chasers,
destroyers, mine sweepers and other small craft of offense and
defense were ready to be put into action and prevented the enemy
from doing any considerable damage.
At the end of hostilities we had in European waters 364 vessels of
all classes, of which 304 were warships, and serving there were
5,000 officers and 70,000 enlisted men of our Navy, a total greater
than its full strength when we entered the war. Our destroyers had
been steaming an average of 275,000 miles per month and our ships
of all classes, including only those actively engaged in naval duties
and excluding those operating as escorts, had steamed a total
monthly average of 626,000 miles. Individual destroyers steamed a
total, during the first year of service overseas, of from 60,000 to
64,000 miles. The Navy established bases at the Azores, Gibraltar,
Corfu, at many places along the French coast, at English Channel
ports, on the Irish coast, in the North Sea, at Murmansk and at
Archangel, fifteen in all. Our 14-inch naval guns mounted on British
monitors did their share in the attack on Zeebrugge, and smaller
naval guns mounted on floats and manned by Italian crews gave
much aid in the defense of Venice.
The bases at the Azores and at Gibraltar, where we maintained a
considerable naval force, were provided with all the necessities for
our cruisers, destroyers, submarines, chasers and other small craft
which joined the Allied navies in the policing of the Mediterranean
and the adjacent Atlantic waters where we coöperated in the hunting
of the undersea enemy and the protecting of transport and merchant
craft. Several of our battleships and cruisers worked with the Italian
Navy in Mediterranean waters. American sub-chasers gave
important aid in the battle of Durazzo, in which they were given the
advance post of honor and, preceding the Allied fleet, went forward
picking a way of safety for the larger vessels through the thickly
strewn mine field. Inside the harbor they shared in the battle, aiding
in the attacking and sinking of Austrian steamers, destroyers and
submarines. Assisting in mining operations and in the construction of
a mine barrage was another of the important works of this group of
submarine chasers in the Adriatic Sea.
Several naval bases were established along the coast of France
and through the last year of the war seventy vessels, of which half
were destroyers, operated in these waters, their chief duty being to
meet the convoys of American troop and cargo ships and escort
them through the danger zone. They also worked up and down the
French shores, hunting enemy submarines and escorting coastwise
shipping. At all these repair and supply bases it was necessary to
provide extensive facilities; a number of huge fuel oil tanks were
built, most of the new destroyers and many other ships being oil-
burners; several naval hospitals were constructed; a dozen naval
port offices were established, from Cherbourg to Marseilles, to
expedite the movements of American shipping through as many
ports; naval aviation stations were built; rescue tugs and a wrecking
steamer watched for and assisted damaged vessels; minesweepers
kept open the approaches to the ports.
The principal bases from which our destroyers operated were
Gibraltar, Brest and Queenstown, of which the last named was the
largest; the submarine chaser bases were at Queenstown, Plymouth
and Corfu; and those for our submarines were at the Azores and at
Berehaven on the Irish coast. The flotilla of destroyers that was
dispatched from the United States a few days after our declaration of
war reached Queenstown, part of it within four and the rest within
five weeks after that date, and the whole flotilla was at work in
coöperation with the British forces within eight weeks after our
entrance into the war. In the latter part of 1917 a squadron of six
American battleships was sent to strengthen and coöperate with the
British Grand Fleet that was on watch in the North Sea to give battle
to the German ships if they should come out from their hiding place
behind the defenses of Heligoland. It was this vigilant watch of the
Grand Fleet, assisted by our battleships, that kept the German navy
off the high seas, where it would have raided commerce, made far
more difficult the transporting of our troops and war material to
France, fought our own and the Allied warships and greatly
prolonged the war and made it even more bloody and destructive.
Our craft constituted twelve per cent of the fleet that kept the
German navy thus bottled up and rendered it incapable of harm.
The American squadron worked in entire harmony with the Grand
Fleet, and was assigned to one of the two places of honor and
importance in line of battle, the head or rear of the battleship force.
So vigilantly did the Grand Fleet keep its watch and so persistently
did it go after the enemy whenever he dared to appear, whether in a
single ship, a squadron or his entire fleet, and so vigorously chase
him back that he ventured out less and less frequently and toward
the end rarely came more than a few miles from his base. All manner
of temptations were used to induce him to come out into the open
where battle could be joined—a few ships apparently detached
venturing into the Heligoland Bight, merchant ships apparently
without protection passing near the entrance to the Bight, and other
devices. When the German fleet did emerge and a battle seemed
imminent, the American division of battleships headed the line and
would have led the attack if the enemy had not slipped quickly back.
The plan of laying a mine barrage across the North Sea, from the
Scottish coast to the Norwegian shore waters, originated with the
Ordnance Bureau of the American Navy. For some time the British
Admiralty insisted that it was not practicable, but after much
discussion they finally consented and the details of the operation of
the scheme were worked out together. A new type of mine was
demanded, because of the depth of the water, and this and a new
firing device had already been developed by the Ordnance Bureau of
the Navy. The number of mines required to lay a barrage 245 miles
long and 20 miles wide was so enormous and the need to have them
ready at the earliest possible moment so urgent that it was
impossible to provide them by the usual methods of manufacture.
Therefore the mine was divided into its many component parts and
these were separately produced in as many as four hundred
industrial factories. The parts were partially brought together in sub-
assemblies in this country, and were thus shipped to Europe, where
the complete assembling was done just prior to issue to the mine
planters. There were manufactured 100,000 of these mines, of which
about 85,000 were shipped abroad, some of them being used in
similar mine barrages elsewhere. For this purpose a fleet of over fifty
merchant ships was taken over by the navy and fitted out for the
carrying of all this mine material overseas. Out of the entire fleet only
one was lost by enemy action. Mine bases were established on the
coast of Scotland, many mine layers and auxiliary vessels were fitted
out and the work was carried on at a high rate of speed, sometimes
as many as a thousand mines a day being laid. The American Navy
furnished all the mines and laid 80 per cent of them for this huge
barrage, of a greater length and in deeper water than had ever
before been thought possible. The barrage was fatal to at least ten
submarines within a short time after it was finished, and had the war
continued would have reduced the submarine danger to little
consequence.
Immense quantities of oil were needed on the east coast of
Scotland for the British and American ships of the Grand Fleet and
other purposes and the practice had been to send it on its journey
from the United States in tankers around the north coast of Scotland.
But enemy submarines took a heavy toll of the precious liquid and
the Navy Department suggested the laying of a pipe line across
Scotland. The work of laying the line was mainly done by the
American Navy, which furnished the pipe for the work. The line could
deliver 100 tons per hour and was the longest in Europe. The entire
work was completed in six months and was finished on the day when
firing ceased.
The relations of the American Navy with the Allied fleets were in
every case cordial and harmonious. The close and friendly
coöperation was especially noteworthy with the British fleet, because
the major portion of American operations was with it and the
association was closer and more constant. American vessels
operated under British command and British under American
command effectively and without friction and the ability, skill and
seamanlike qualities of each, officers and men alike, won hearty
praise from the other. The British Admiralty sent a commission to the
American squadron of the Grand Fleet to inquire how the ships were
kept in such a state of readiness and high efficiency without sending
them to the dockyards.
American naval forces in European waters engaged in 500 battles
with submarines, in which it was known that at least ten undersea
boats were sunk by them and thirty-six others damaged. Deaths in
the Navy from war causes totaled 1,200 and at the close of hostilities
there were 15,000 patients in naval hospitals.
In both European and American waters a total of 48 naval vessels
of all classes was lost during the war, of which the armored cruiser,
San Diego, which struck a mine off the coast of New York, was the
most important. The losses were occasioned by submarines, mines,
collisions and miscellaneous causes.
 CHAPTER XII
THE NAVY ON LAND

The American Navy did work important and memorable on land as

well as upon the sea. Its Marine Corps fought in decisive battles with
unsurpassed courage, daring, endurance and aggressiveness and
some of its big guns were instrumental in more quickly bringing to
pass, unexpectedly early, the order to “cease firing.”
The Marine Corps, the landing and fighting force of the Navy,
added glowing pages to its already splendid record. As with every
other fighting force of the United States, it had first to increase its
numbers and train its new members. It had a total, when we entered
the war, of 14,000 officers and men. At the end of the war it had
70,000, the new members having come, mainly by enlistment, from
all classes of the community and including business, professional,
working and college men. In one instance a whole college battalion
enlisted together. Marine Corps service has always attracted young
men of the highest quality and these new members were especially
notable for their intelligence, spirit and fine soldierly character,
qualities that shone brilliantly in their action in the lines of battle.
More democratic than any other fighting force of the nation, the
Marine Corps officers are mainly promoted from its rank. Several
officers’ training camps were held at which intensive, practical and
competitive work gave thorough training in quick time and yielded a
plentiful supply of officers chosen in accordance with the work and
character of the men. Certain quotas of the Students’ Army Training
Corps, which was hard at work when the armistice was signed, were
designated for Marine Corps service. Recruiting and training stations
for the Corps were increased and enlarged and intensive training of
the recruits went on steadily, with such especial attention to rifle
practice that when the Marines drove the enemy back at Belleau
Wood over 90 per cent of the men in line had qualified as marksmen,
sharp shooters or expert riflemen.
When the German Army, in its steady drive toward Paris in the last
days of May, 1918, had reached its nearest point to the capital city
and the Allied armies were facing a serious crisis. General Pershing
offered to Marshal Foch whatever he had in men and material that
the French Generalissimo could use and a division composed of
regiments of Marines and of the Regular Army was thrown forward to
block the German advance, which had been rolling steadily onward
and driving everything before it at the rate of six or seven miles per
day. The Marines blocked the advance in an engagement on June
2nd. Calmly setting their rifle sights and aiming with precision, they
met the German attack and under their deadly fire, supported by
machine guns and artillery, the enemy lines wavered, stopped, and
broke for cover.
Then followed, a few days later, the fierce and stubborn attacks of
the Marines upon the defenses which the Germans had set up and
which they held with determination. Belleau Wood, a jungle of
underbrush, heavy foliage and piles of boulders, they had filled with
machine gun nests. The Marines attacked in wave formation,
rushing, halting, rushing again, the rear waves plunging forward over
the dead and wounded bodies of those who had fallen. It was almost
a month before the Americans reached their final objectives and
completely routed the Germans from Belleau Wood, to be known
ever after as the Wood of the American Marines because of the valor
and heroism with which it was won. They fought day and night, day
after day, much of the time without sleep or water or hot food. Their
officers sent back messages that the men were exhausted and must
be relieved and were told that the lines must hold and if possible
continue to attack. And the lines again went forward. They fought
from tree to tree, they charged machine gun nests with the bayonet,
wiped them out and turned the guns against the retreating foe. Some
companies lost every commissioned officer, some that had entered
the battle 250 strong dwindled to fifty or sixty. The Germans threw in
fresh troops, their best Prussian Guards, with orders to retake the
lost positions at whatever cost. But the Marines and their fellows of
the Regular Army held on, repulsed the fresh attacks, and slowly
advanced their positions. And at last, toward the end of June, with
some reënforcements and following an artillery barrage that tore the
woods into fragments, the Marines made their final successful
rushes and with rifle and bayonet cleaned out all the remaining
machine gun nests. The enemy had been turned back, Paris had
been saved, the morale of the best German troops had been
undermined and the Allied commanders and armies had been shown
what raw American troops could do. After the battle of Belleau Wood
neither British nor French commanders had any doubt about sending
American troops anywhere, no matter whether they had had much or
little training and little or no experience.
At Soissons, in July, the Marines again showed their valor and at
the battle of St. Mihiel, in mid-September, they took over a portion of
the line and, attacking with two days’ objectives ahead of them, won
them all by mid-afternoon of the first day. And early in October the
Second Division, brigaded with the French and still composed of
Marines and Regulars, swept forward in an attack on Blanc Mont
Ridge, east of Rheims, the keystone of the German main position,
for the possession of which German and Allied Armies had fought
many bitter battles. The Marines and their companions attacked the
rugged and wooded Blanc Mont, rushed the enemy before them
across its summit and pushed him down the slope, repulsed counter
attacks and forced the Germans to fall back from before Rheims and
yield positions they had held for four years.
The casualty list of the Marine Corps amounted to about 6,000, of
whom only 57 were captured by the enemy. They lost approximately
half of their numbers who entered battle. But they took more
prisoners than they lost, all told, of their own men, and they inflicted
more casualties than they received.
The big guns sent by the Navy to France for land warfare played
an important part in the decisive battles of the last few weeks of the
war. These huge, 14-inch guns, 66 feet long, had been intended
originally for the new battle cruisers, but a change of ship design had
made them available for other uses and the Navy Bureau of
Ordnance suggested that they be put on railway mounts and used
on land. They were first offered to the British authorities for use
behind their lines, but they doubted the effectiveness of the guns and
delayed final answer until General Pershing asked for them. At the
end of December, 1917, not a drawing for the mounts had been
started. Four months later one of the guns was rolling on the wheels
of a completed mount for long range tests at the Sandy Hook
Proving Ground. At the end of hostilities forty-four guns and mounts
had been sent over in various steps of preparation for the front and
six of the monsters had been in action, throwing their destructive
shells far behind the German lines.
The railway mounts, designed for this particular purpose, were
built and covered with armor plate by the Navy according to plans
and designs prepared by its Ordnance Bureau, while the locomotives
and the twelve cars for the operating forces of each gun, including
berth and kitchen cars, armored ammunition cars, machine shop
cars containing everything from a forge and anvil to a handsaw,
crane and wireless cars, were all built and equipped especially for
the purposes of these land batteries of naval guns. Intensive training
was given to the men, all of them taken from naval forces, who
would operate the huge batteries in France and serve the guns in
action. The whole battery was so mobile that even if it were in action
when the order came to move, the gun, personnel and entire train of
cars could be put under way in an hour.
The first gun to be sent landed in France in the latter part of June
but did not go into action against the enemy until mid-September,
when, placed near Soissons, it fired on the railroads entering Laon. It
had been intended for use against the German “Big Bertha” that had
been dropping shells upon Paris from a distance of over seventy
miles, but on the day in August when the American gun was ready to
begin action “Big Bertha” retired and was heard of no more.
The German long range guns which bombarded Paris and Dunkirk
and other places were set on permanent steel and concrete
foundations, and therefore were immobile, and the military efficiency
of their shells was reduced by the fact that they were small and
made for long flight. The enormous shells of the American guns had
a range of thirty miles, weighed 400 pounds each, seven times as
much as the German, and could penetrate eight feet of solid
concrete. Each gun, without its mount, weighed more than a hundred
tons. They fired heavier projectiles and had a greater range than any
mobile land artillery that had previously been used. Their chief
usefulness was in the destruction of ammunition dumps and of
railroad yards and rolling stock and the consequent demoralization of
the enemy’s transportation system. When the shells from one of the
guns were directed upon the railroad stations and yards of
Montmedy and Longuyon they stopped all traffic there and one
which struck the German headquarters killed twenty-eight members
of the general’s staff.
Cruising through France like battleships on wheels, demonstrating
their perfect mobility and proving their usefulness by cutting the
enemy’s lines of communication and seriously obstructing his
transportation, these big naval guns on railway mounts proved their
value so triumphantly that the Navy had been requested, when the
end came, to provide as many more as it could rush quickly to the
front.
The Navy also removed a number of 7-inch guns from battleships,
the changed conditions of warfare demanding a lighter and quicker
firing gun, and devised for them, at General Pershing’s request, a
new type of mount, utilizing the principle of the caterpillar belt and
thus making it possible for them to travel directly over any kind of
ground. So satisfactory were the first tests that the Army asked the
Navy to furnish 36 such guns and mounts as quickly as possible and
these were being rushed to completion when the armistice was
signed.
The Navy maintained a large personnel and carried on
considerable operations on shore both in Great Britain and France.
On the coast of each of these countries was a series of bases for the
repair and upkeep of escorting and patrolling ships, from cruisers to
converted yachts. In many cases it was necessary to construct
complete repair plants. At every naval base overseas there was a
fully equipped hospital. In Scotland the Navy took over an entire
watering place whose hotels, bath-houses and other structures were
converted into large hospital buildings wherein were cared for many
British as well as our own sick and wounded.
 CHAPTER XIII
THE WINGS OF THE NAVY

The wings of the Navy, that had barely begun to sprout when the
United States became a belligerent, grew in a year and a half as if
under a conjurer’s wand. Previous to that time the appropriations
that had been granted for the development of naval aeronautics had
been so small that little could be done. Upon our declaration of war
the Navy had 22 low powered seaplanes of no value except for
training purposes, five kite and two free balloons and one dirigible
balloon, and the Naval Aviation Service had three stations, but no
adequate training field, while its personnel consisted of 45 naval
aviators and less than 200 enlisted men.
When the armistice was signed the Aviation Service of the
American Navy had 1,656 trained airplane pilots, of whom half were
in service over European waters; 1,349 ground, or executive,
officers; 3,912 student officers at training fields at home or abroad
who would soon have been ready for service; an enlisted personnel
numbering almost 37,000; approximately 8,000 trained mechanics
and 6,000 more in training; in France, sixteen naval aviation stations
besides others for training and supply work; two stations in England
and four in Ireland; three stations in Italy and the Azores; two
stations in Canada; one station in the Canal Zone; eleven stations in
the United States; 759 seaplanes and flying boats in service for
patrol and bombing work and 140 airplanes or land machines for
land service, with 491 seaplanes and 100 land airplanes for training
purposes, while a dozen planes of new and experimental types were
being tried out; 282 kite and seven free balloons and 11 dirigible
balloons. Many hundreds of seaplanes, flying boats and balloons of
various kinds were on order for early delivery. All this development of
material and personnel, of systems of training for pilots, ground
officers and mechanics, of stations and service, and of the big and
smoothly working organization that produced important results in the
work of the naval aviators was the growth of but eighteen months.
 To ensure the rapid production of planes a naval aircraft factory
was erected at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. The contract for its
construction was signed in August, 1917, and in the following March,
228 days after the breaking of the ground, the first machine had
been completed and was given its trial flight. And a few days later
this machine and another which had followed it to completion and
trial were on their way to Europe. In the meantime, in order to meet
the expansion which was foreseen to be necessary in naval aviation
plans, the naval aircraft building was greatly enlarged. Included in
the extension was a huge assembly plant for the assembling of
airplane parts separately built in a large number and variety of
private manufacturing plants whose work for the aircraft factory was
directed by its management. By this means team work was secured,
resulting in quick deliveries and an ample supply of craft for both
service and training purposes. By September of 1918 enough naval
aircraft had been shipped overseas to meet the needs of its
assembly bases there for several months. The big rubber plants
which had almost ceased the manufacturing of balloons renewed
and expanded that phase of their activities and balloon fields and
schools were created or enlarged and newly equipped. The
completion of the Liberty motor brought the later development of the
flying boat, used especially for coastal patrol work.
 By Permission of New York Times Co.
Naval Gun on Railway Mount
Candidates for flying commissions were sent to technical
institutions for special courses and afterward to flying stations for
instruction in flying. The most difficult part of the problem of seaplane
construction was that of finding skilled workmen and personnel for
their direction acquainted with the making of aircraft. The same
difficulty handicapped the procuring of trained officers and enlisted
men for work at the supply and repair stations, which were
constantly busy with the assembling and upkeep of the machines. To
meet this difficulty half a score or more of schools for naval aviation
mechanics were established in different parts of the country, with a
force of instructors, who volunteered for the work, composed of
professors in technical schools and colleges. From these schools
came the trained mechanics and ground officers who filled the roster
of the Naval Aviation Service at the end of hostilities.
The Navy Department saw at once that the most important aid its
Aviation Service could give would be coast-wise work directed
against the submarine menace. With that end in view it located its
stations at strategic and important points all down the eastern coast
of the United States, eleven in all, from Cape Cod to Key West, with
another in the Canal Zone. Similarly its patrol stations were dotted
up and down the shores of France, the British Isles and the Azores.
On both shores of the Atlantic its dirigibles and seaplanes helped to
escort outgoing convoys and went far out to sea to meet those
coming in, eagle eyes sweeping the waters to watch for and warn
against the sea vipers. The dirigibles were especially useful in this
convoy work, as they were able to keep pace with the ships.
In addition to this assistance in the convoy service the naval
aviators ranged above the waters far out from shore, hunting
submarines, looking for disabled vessels and for boats and
wreckage carrying shipwrecked passengers and crews sent adrift on
the ocean by submarine officers, and locating mines, and they
carried on bombing operations by sea and land.
The first United States forces to land in France for service against
the enemy belonged to the Air Service of the Navy, which set ashore
there within a month after our declaration of war five naval air pilots
and 100 enlisted men. From this beginning grew the nine seaplane,
one training, three dirigible and three kite stations that dotted the
French shores from Dunkirk almost to the Spanish border. Most of
these stations were used for convoy work, for submarine hunting and
for searching for mines and wrecks. But at Dunkirk was a station for
bombing operations which made day and night attacks on the
German naval bases and supply depots along the Flanders coast,
with especial attention to Zeebrugge and Ostend. After the British
blockaded the entrances to those places the naval aviators,
American, British and Belgian, coöperating in the work, dropped
such a steady rain of bombs by day and night that the Germans
were prevented from clearing away the obstructions. Two stations
that were completed and in operation within ten months included a
large aviation school and flying field at a lake near the coast, which
specialized in bombing practice, and an aviation assembly and repair
base with large machine shops and accommodations for the housing
of their 5,000 men. The naval aviation stations along the French
shores were so spaced that the entire coast line could be kept
constantly under the observation of seaplanes and dirigibles. Some
of the stations were located on uninhabited islets and others in tiny
fishing villages on bleak peninsulas. This naval aviation force with its
dirigibles and seaplanes coöperated so well with the sea patrol that
between them they kept the whole of the French coast, for fifty miles
from shore, safe from submarines through the last six months of the
war.
The two naval aviation stations in Italy and that on the Islands of
the Azores coöperated with the British and the Italian air patrols in
the never ceasing hunt for submarines, the locating of mines, the
watching for wrecks and the convoy of troop and merchant ships.
Especially harmonious and cordial was the teamwork of the men of
our six naval air stations in England and Ireland with the men of the
British naval air service. The aviators flew together, they used each
other’s planes, coöperated in the guarding of the coasts and the
convoy of incoming and outgoing groups of troop transports and
cargo vessels, worked together upon perilous enterprises. Some of
the most moving tales of daring adventure and heroic endurance of
the whole war narrate the deeds of these American boys who guided
the wings of the navy over the coasts and waters of England, Ireland
and France.
In the United States alone naval aircraft flew a distance of over
6,000,000 miles. On the other side, seaplanes and dirigibles aided in
the convoying and protecting of 75,000 ships. Submarine hunting,
which had a greater development than any other line of naval air
work, reached a notable point of scientific exactness in its methods.
Each patrol as it started out had mapped for it designated areas of
the air of certain sizes and shapes and locations which it covered by
following the directed courses by means of the compass. It is certain
that many submarine attacks upon our shipping were thus prevented
and that, by the dropping of bombs, several undersea boats were
sunk. At the time of the signing of the armistice the plans of the Navy
for its Air Service had not nearly reached the peak of development.
But its effect upon submarine activities was already evident and it is
probable that it saved in values of shipping that would have been
destroyed but for its protection more than its development cost the
Navy Department, which had expended upon it $100,000,000.