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Regard for Reason
in the
Moral Mind
Joshua May
Oxford University Press
Published in May 2018
[Final draft | 6 December 2017 | 108,718 words]
Abstract: The burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary
moral judgment and motivation, we’re told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and
ultimately driven by unreasoned feelings or emotions—fertile ground for sweeping debunking
arguments. This book counters the current orthodoxy on its own terms by carefully engaging
with the empirical literature. The resulting view, optimistic rationalism, maintains that reason
plays a pervasive role in our moral minds and that ordinary moral reasoning is not particularly
flawed or in need of serious repair. The science does suggest that moral knowledge and virtue
don’t come easily, as we are susceptible to some unsavory influences that lead to rationalizing
bad behavior. Reason can be corrupted in ethics just as in other domains, but the science
warrants cautious optimism, not a special skepticism about morality in particular. Rationality
in ethics is possible not just despite, but in virtue of, the psychological and evolutionary
mechanisms that shape moral cognition.
Keywords: rationalism, optimism, skepticism, debunking arguments, moral judgment, moral

motivation, moral knowledge, virtue, reason, emotion, rationalization
Regard for Reason | J. May
Table of Contents
Table of Contents 2
Preface 5
List of Tables and Figures 7
Introduction 8
Ch. 1: Empirical Pessimism 9
1.1 Introduction 9
1.2 Pessimism about Moral Cognition 10
1.3 Pessimism about Moral Motivation 17
1.4 Optimistic Rationalism 20
1.5 Coda: Appealing to Science 24
PART I: Moral Judgment & Knowledge 26
Ch. 2: The Limits of Emotion 27
2.1 Introduction 27
2.2 Moralizing with Feelings? 28
2.3 Accounting for Slight Amplification 35
2.4 Psychopathology 39
2.5 Conclusion 45
Ch. 3: Reasoning beyond Consequences 47
3.1 Introduction 47
3.2 Consequences 48
3.3 Beyond Consequences 50
3.4 Moral Inference 59
3.5 Conclusion 66
Ch. 4: Defending Moral Judgment 68
4.1 Introduction 68
4.2 Empirical Debunking in Ethics 69
4.3 The Debunker’s Dilemma 70
4.4 Emotions 71
4.5 Framing Effects 73
4.6 Evolutionary Pressures 76
4.7 Automatic Emotional Heuristics 80
4.8 Explaining the Dilemma 84
4.9 Conclusion 85
Ch. 5: The Difficulty of Moral Knowledge 87
5.1 Introduction 87
5.2 The Threat of Selective Debunking 88
5.3 The Threat of Peer Disagreement 94
5.4 Conclusion 102
PART II: Moral Motivation & Virtue 105
Ch. 6: Beyond Self-Interest 106
6.1 Introduction 106
pg. 2 of 206
6.2 The Egoism-Altruism Debate 107

6.3 Empirical Evidence for Altruism 109
6.4 Self-Other Merging 114
6.5 Dividing Self from Other 117
6.6 Conclusion 121
Ch. 7: The Motivational Power of Moral Beliefs 122
7.2 Ante Hoc Rationalization 123
7.3 Rationalizing Immorality 127
7.4 Motivating Virtue 135
7.5 Conclusion 138
Ch. 8: Freeing Reason from Desire 140
8.2 Anti-Humean Moral Integrity 141
8.3 Neurological Disorders 143
8.4 Special Mechanisms 148
8.5 Aspects of Desire 150
8.6 Simplicity 153
8.7 Conclusion 154
Ch. 9: Defending Virtuous Motivation 156
9.2 The Defeater’s Dilemma 157
9.3 The Threat of Egoism 159
9.4 The Threat of Situationism 164
9.5 Containing the Threats 172
9.6 Conclusion 173
Conclusion 175
Ch. 10: Cautious Optimism 176
10.2 Lessons 176
10.3 Enhancing Moral Motivation 178
10.4 Enhancing Moral Cognition 181
10.5 Conclusion 183
References 185
Index 202
pg. 3 of 206
To Jules, my mighty girl,
may you grow up to be righteous.
pg. 4 of 206
Preface
During graduate school in Santa Barbara, I developed a passion for the interdisciplinary study of
ethics. Fortunately for me, the field was just beginning to explode, fueled by fascinating
discoveries in the sciences and renewed interest in their philosophical implications. Both
philosophers and scientists have primarily taken the research to reveal that commonsense moral
deliberation is in need of serious repair. I was energized by this burgeoning area of research and I
too felt the pull toward pessimism about ordinary moral thought and action and particularly
about the role of reason in them. However, as I began to dig into the research and arguments,
many pessimistic conclusions seemed to be based on insufficient evidence. I’ve come to find that
our moral minds are more defensible in light of the science than many have let on.
This book articulates and defends my optimistic rationalism. It argues that our best
science helps to defend moral knowledge and virtue against prominent empirical attacks, such as
debunking arguments and situationist experiments. Being ethical isn’t easy, as our understanding
of the human brain certainly confirms. But our moral minds exhibit a regard for reason that is not
ultimately beholden to blind passions. Although we are heavily influenced by automatic and
unconscious processes that have been shaped by evolutionary pressures, virtue is within reach.
Gratitude: I am grateful to so many people who have aided in the development of this project.
The number is enormous partly because some of the ideas have been in the works for nearly a
decade, since my early years in graduate school. My colleagues have been invaluable at the
University of California at Santa Barbara, then Monash University in Australia, and now at the
University of Alabama at Birmingham. Many have provided incisive feedback and stimulating
discussion that have indirectly helped along the ideas that appear in this book.
So as to avoid a dozen pages of acknowledgments, I think it wise to confine my thanks
here to those who have provided feedback (in oral or written form) on this particular manuscript
or draft papers that have become core elements of it. These individuals are, to the best of my
fallible memory and records: Ron Aboodi, Mark Alfano, C. Daniel Batson, Bradford Cokelet,
Stephen Finlay, Jeanette Kennett, Charlie Kurth, Hyemin Han, Yongming Han, Julia Henke
Haas, Richard Holton, Bryce Huebner, Nageen Jalali, Karen Jones, Matt King, Victor Kumar,
Andy Lamey, Elizabeth Lanphier, Neil Levy, Dustin Locke, Heidi Maibom, John Maier, Colin
Marshall, Kevin McCain, John Mikhail, Christian Miller, Brandon Murphy, Charles Pigden,
François Schroeter, Laura Schroeter, Luke Semrau, Neil Sinhababu (the best “philosophical
nemesis” one could ask for), Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Slote, Jesse Summers, Raluca
Szekely, John J. Tilley, Brynn Welch, Danielle Wylie, and Aaron Zimmerman. My sincere
apologies to anyone I’ve unintentionally left out.
The work on this book, and key papers leading to it, took place at several institutions
outside of my home department at UAB. In 2014, I attended a summer seminar at the Central
European University in Budapest ably directed by Simon Rippon. In 2015, at the Prindle Institute
for Ethics at DePauw University, Andrew Cullison graciously hosted a writing retreat. In 2017, I
attended the fantastic Summer Seminar in Neuroscience and Philosophy at Duke University,
generously supported by the John Templeton Foundation and directed by Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong and Felipe De Brigard. Many thanks to the directors and funders for those
opportunities. Part of these visits, and many others in recent years, have also been made possible
pg. 5 of 206
by my department at UAB. I’m forever grateful to our chair, Gregory Pence, for his considerable
support of research, including many trips to present my work both in the U.S. and abroad.
A handful of people deserve to be singled out for special thanks. Throughout my
philosophical development, one group has provided continuous mentorship and moral support
that has sustained me through the uphill battle that is modern academia. That crew includes Dan
Batson, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Aaron Zimmerman. Special thanks also go to the
reviewers and advisors of the book for Oxford University Press and to the editor, Peter
Momtchiloff. Their guidance, comments, and support made the reviewing and publishing process
a pleasure when it easily could have been demoralizing. Finally, I thank two talented philosophy
majors, Elizabeth Beckman and Samantha Sandefur, who worked as research assistants.
Previous work: Some of this book draws on my previously published work. Little of it is merely
recycled, as I have significantly updated both the presentation (organization and prose), as well
as some of the content. Chapters 2 and 3 draw on “The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment”
(forthcoming in The Many Moral Rationalisms, eds. K. Jones & F. Schroeder, Oxford University
Press). Chapter 2 also draws partly on “Does Disgust Influence Moral Judgment?” (published in
2014 in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92(1): 125–141). Chapter 3 also draws partly
from “Moral Judgment and Deontology: Empirical Developments” (published in 2014 in
Philosophy Compass 9(11): 745-755). Chapters 4 and 5 draw on a paper I’ve co-authored with
Victor Kumar: “How to Debunk Moral Beliefs” (to appear in The New Methods of Ethics, eds. J.
Suikkanen & A. Kauppinen). Chapter 6 is based partly on two articles: “Egoism, Empathy, and
Self-Other Merging” (published in 2011 in the Southern Journal of Philosophy 49(S1): 25–39,
Spindel Supplement: Empathy & Ethics, ed. R. Debes) and “Empathy and Intersubjectivity”
(published in 2017 in the Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy, ed. Heidi Maibom,
Routledge). Chapter 7 draws a little bit from a short commentary piece, “Getting Less Cynical
about Virtue” (published in 2017 in Moral Psychology, Vol. 5: Virtue & Happiness, eds. W.
Sinnott-Armstrong & C. Miller, MIT Press, pp. 45-52). Chapter 8 draws a little bit from
“Because I Believe It’s the Right Thing to Do” (published in 2013 in Ethical Theory & Moral
Practice 16(4): 791–808). For permission to republish portions of these works, I’m grateful to
the publishers and, in one case, to my brilliant co-author, Victor Kumar.
Audience: Given the interdisciplinary nature of the material in this book, I aim for its audience to
include a range of researchers, especially philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists. I have
thus attempted to write in an accessible manner, which sometimes requires explaining concepts
and theories with which some readers will already be quite familiar. Another consequence is that
I sometimes omit certain details that one otherwise might discuss at length. I hope that, all things
considered, such choices actually make for a better read.
Title: Finally, a note on the book’s title. The phrase “regard for reason” came to me
independently (or so it seems) years ago. I later found that over a century ago Henry Sidgwick
used it when describing Kant’s view (see Sidgwick 1874/1907: 515). I also discovered that
Jeanette Kennett uses the similar phrase “reverence for reason” in her account of moral
motivation (2002: 355).
pg. 6 of 206
List of Tables and Figures

Tables:
2.1: Example Data from a Disgust Experiment
3.1: Cases Varying Intention and Outcome
3.2: Two Modes of Moral Cognition
4.1: Example Processes Subject to the Debunker’s Dilemma
5.1: Five Moral Foundations
6.1: Proportion of Participants Offering to Help
7.1: Proportion of Later Indulgence by Choosing Cake
7.2: Mean Self-Reported Likelihood to Engage in Behavior
7.3: Mean Responses to Whether a Job was Suited for a Particular Race
7.4: Task Assignment and Moral Ratings of It
9.1: Situational Influences on Classes of Behavior
9.2: Example Factors Subject to the Defeater’s Dilemma
Figures:
1.1: Key Sources of Empirically Grounded Pessimism
3.1: The Switch Case
3.2: The Footbridge Case
3.3: Loop Track vs. Man-in-Front
5.1: Ideological Differences in Foundation Endorsement
8.1: Accounts of Moral Motivation
pg. 7 of 206
Introduction
pg. 8 of 206
Ch. 1: Empirical Pessimism

Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so
active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals.
– David Hume
Word count: 8,971
1.1 Introduction
Moral evaluation permeates human life. We readily praise moral saints, admonish those who
violate ethical norms, and teach children to develop virtues. We appeal to moral reasons to guide
our own choices, to structure social institutions, and even to defend atrocities. But is this a
fundamentally rational enterprise? Can we even rely on our basic modes of moral thought and
motivation to know right from wrong and to act virtuously?
Empirical research may seem to warrant doubt. Many philosophers and scientists argue
that our moral minds are grounded primarily in mere feelings, not rational principles. Emotions,
such as disgust, appear to play a significant role in our propensities toward racism, sexism,
homophobia, and other discriminatory actions and attitudes. Scientists have been increasingly
suggesting that much, if not all, of our ordinary moral thinking is different only in degree, not in
kind. Even rather reflective people are fundamentally driven by emotional reactions, using
reasoning only to concoct illusory justifications after the fact. As Jonathan Haidt has put it, “the
emotions are in fact in charge of the temple of morality” while “moral reasoning is really just a
servant masquerading as the high priest” (2003: 852).
On such influential pictures, ordinary moral thinking seems far from a reasoned pursuit of
truth. Even if some ordinary moral judgments are rational and reliable, brain imaging research
suggests that the intuitive moral judgments that align with commonsense morality are driven
largely by inflexible emotional alarms instilled in us long ago by natural selection. The same
apparently goes for our thinking about even the most pressing of contemporary moral issues,
such as abortion, animal rights, torture, poverty, and climate change. Indeed, some theorists go
so far as to say that we can’t possibly acquire moral knowledge, or even justified belief, because
our brains have been shaped by evolutionary forces that can’t track supposed “moral facts.”
As a result, virtue seems out of reach because most of us don’t know right from wrong.
And it gets worse. Even if commonsense moral judgment is on the right track, distinctively
moral motivation may be impossible or exceedingly rare. When motivated to do what’s right, we
often seem driven ultimately by self-interest or non-rational passions, not our moral beliefs. If
our moral convictions do motivate, they are corrupted by self-interested rationalization or
motivated reasoning. Scientific evidence suggests that people frequently lie and cheat to benefit
themselves whenever they believe they can get away with it. Sure, we can feel empathy for
others, but mostly for our friends and family. Those suffering far away don’t stir our sentiments
and thus don’t motive much concern. When we do behave well, it’s often to gain some reward,
pg. 9 of 206
such as praise, or to avoid punishment. Doing what’s right for the right reasons seems like a
psychological rarity at best.
While theorists disagree over the details, there has certainly been an increase in
scientifically motivated pessimism (a term I borrow from D’Arms & Jacobson 2014). These
pessimists contend that ordinary moral thought and action are ultimately driven by non-rational
processes. Of course, not all empirically informed philosophers and scientists would describe
themselves as “pessimists.” They may view themselves as just being realistic and view the
optimist as a Panglossian Pollyana. But we’ll see that the label of “pessimism” does seem apt for
the growing attempts to debunk ordinary moral psychology or to pull back the curtain and reveal
an unsophisticated patchwork in need of serious repair.
This book aims to defend a more optimistic view of our moral minds in light of our best
science. Knowing right from wrong, and acting accordingly, is indeed difficult for many of us.
But we struggle not because our basic moral beliefs are hopelessly unjustified—debunked by
evolutionary pressures or powerful emotions—or because deep down we are all motivated by
self-interest or are slaves to ultimately non-rational passions. Science can certainly change our
conception of humanity and cause us to confront our biological and cultural limitations. Not all
of commonsense morality can survive, but we should neither oversell the science nor commit
ordinary moral thinking to the flames.
Ultimately, I argue for an optimistic rationalism. Ordinary moral thought and action are
driven by a regard for “reason”—for reasons, reasonableness, or justifiability. Pessimists
commonly point to our tendencies toward irrationality, but perhaps paradoxically it is often our
irrationalities that reveal our deep regard for reason. If ordinary moral cognition had little to do
with reason, then we would not so often rationalize or provide self-deceived justifications for bad
behavior. Driven by this concern to act in ways we can justify to ourselves and to others, moral
knowledge and virtue are possible, despite being heavily influenced by unconscious processes
and despite being sensitive to more than an action’s consequences.
In this chapter, I’ll introduce some key sources of pessimism about two core aspects of
moral psychology. Some theorists are doubtful about the role of reason in ordinary moral
cognition and its ability to rise to knowledge. Others are doubtful about the role of reason in
moral motivation and our ability to act from virtuous motivation. After surveying a diverse range
of opponents, I’ll explain the plan in the coming chapters for defending a cautious optimism
about our moral minds, and one that lies within the rationalist tradition.
1.2 Pessimism about Moral Cognition

1.2.1 Sources of Pessimism
Contemporary moral philosophers have rightly turned their attention to the sciences of the mind
in order to address theoretical and foundational questions about ethics. What is going through
our minds when we condemn others or are motivated to do what’s right? Is moral thinking a
fundamentally inferential process or are sentiments essential? To test proposed answers to such
questions, some philosophers are now even running their own experiments.
Unfortunately, though, philosophers and scientists alike have tended to hastily take this
empirically informed movement to embarrass ordinary moral thinking or the role of reason in it.
pg. 10 of 206
Ethical theories in the tradition of Immanuel Kant, in particular, have taken a serious beating,
largely for their reverence for reason.
To be fair, Kantians do claim that we can arrive at moral judgments by pure reason alone,
absent any sentiments or feelings. Contemporary Kantians likewise ground morality in rational
requirements, not sentiments like resentment or compassion. Thomas Nagel, for example, writes:
“The altruism which in my view underlies ethics is not to be confused with generalized affection
for the human race. It is not a feeling” (1970/1978: 3). Instead, Kantians typically ground
morality in reflective deliberation about what to do (Wallace 2006) or in reflective endorsement
of one’s desires and inclinations. Michael Smith, for example, argues that moral approbation
expresses a belief about “what we would desire ourselves to do if we were fully rational” (1994:
185). Similarly, Christine Korsgaard writes that “the human mind… is essentially reflective”
(1996/2008: 92), and this self-consciousness is required for moral knowledge and virtue, for it
allows us to make reasoned choices that construct our own identities. Morality, according to
Korsgaard (2009), arises out of “the human project of self-constitution” (4), which involves a
“struggle for psychic unity” (7).
Many empirical pessimists contend that reflection and deliberation do not play such a
substantial role in our moral minds. Haidt even speaks of a “rationalist delusion” (2012: 103),
and it’s not difficult to see why. The study of moral development in psychology was dominated
in the 20th century by Lawrence Kohlberg (1973), who was heavily inspired by Kant. However,
that tradition has largely fallen out of favor to make room for psychological theories in which
emotion plays a starring role. Many psychologists and neuroscientists now believe that a
surprising portion of our mental lives is driven by unconscious processes, many of which are
automatic, emotional, and patently irrational or non-rational. Reasoning comes in to justify that
which one’s passions have already led one to accept. As Haidt has put it, “moral reasoning does
not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post-hoc construction, generated
after a judgment has been reached” (2001: 814).
This is the challenge from a brand of sentimentalism which contends that moral cognition
is fundamentally driven by emotion, passion, or sentiment that is distinct from reason (e.g.,
Nichols 2004; Prinz 2007). Many now take the science to vindicate sentimentalism and Hume’s
famous derogation of reason. Frans de Waal, for example, urges us to “anchor morality in the so-
called sentiments, a view that fits well with evolutionary theory, modern neuroscience, and the
behavior of our primate relatives” (2009: 9). Even if reasoning plays some role in ordinary moral
judgment, the idea is that sentiment runs the show (Haidt 2012: 77; Prinz 2016: 65).
Other critics allow that ordinary moral judgment can be driven by reason, but they
attempt to debunk all or large portions of commonsense morality, yielding full or partial
skepticism. Evolutionary debunkers argue that Darwinian pressures prevent our minds from
tracking moral truths. Even if blind evolutionary forces get us to latch onto moral facts, this is an
accident that doesn’t amount to truly knowing right from wrong. As Richard Joyce puts it,
“knowledge of the genealogy of morals (in combination with some philosophizing) should
undermine our confidence in our moral judgments” (2006: 223; see also Ruse 1986; Rosenberg
2011).
Other debunkers align good moral reasoning with highly counter-intuitive intuitions
consistent with utilitarian (or other consequentialist) ethical theories. Peter Singer (2005) and
Joshua Greene (2013), for example, argue that moral thinking is divided into two systems—one
is generally trustworthy but the other dominates and should be regarded with suspicion. The
commonsense moral intuitions supporting non-utilitarian ethics can be debunked since they arise
pg. 11 of 206
from unreliable cognitive machinery. Greene writes that our “anti-utilitarian intuitions seem to
be sensitive to morally irrelevant things, such as the distinction between pushing with one’s
hands and hitting a switch” (328). These pessimists are utilitarian debunkers who argue that the
core elements of ordinary moral judgment should be rejected, largely because they are driven by
automatic emotional heuristics that place moral value on more than the consequences of an
action. While some moral judgments are rational, and can yield knowledge or at least justified
belief, most of our ordinary intuitions are not among them. Such utilitarians are often content
with imputing widespread moral ignorance to the general population, which likewise renders
virtuous action exceedingly rare.
Many debunkers conceive of moral cognition as facing a dilemma in light of the science.
As Singer has put it:
We can take the view that our moral intuitions and judgments are and always will be
emotionally based intuitive responses, and reason can do no more than build the best
possible case for a decision already made on nonrational grounds. […] Alternatively, we
might attempt the ambitious task of separating those moral judgments that we owe to our
evolutionary and cultural history, from those that have a rational basis. (2005: 351)
It seems we can avoid wholesale sentimentalism only by undermining large swaths of ordinary
moral thinking.
Whether by embracing sentimentalism or debunking, a pessimistic picture of ordinary
moral thinking seems to result. The worry is that, if our best science suggests that our moral
minds are driven largely by non-rational passions, then that way of thinking may be indefensible
or in need of serious revision or repair. Now, sentimentalists frequently deny that their view
implies that our moral beliefs are somehow deficient (see, e.g., Kauppinen 2013; D’Arms and
Jacobson 2014), and of course emotions aren’t necessarily illicit influences. However,
sentimentalists do maintain that genuinely moral cognition ultimately requires having certain
feelings, which suggests that it’s fundamentally an arational enterprise in which reason is a slave
to the passions.
At any rate, I aim to provide a defense of ordinary moral cognition that allows reason to
play a foundational role. First, I’ll argue for an empirically informed rationalism: moral
judgment is fundamentally an inferential enterprise that is not ultimately dependent on non-
rational emotions, sentiments, or passions. Second, I’ll advance a form of anti-skepticism against
the debunkers: there are no empirical grounds for debunking core elements of ordinary moral
judgment, including our tendency to place moral significance on more than an action’s
consequences.
1.2.2 Reason vs. Emotion?
Philosophers and scientists increasingly worry that the reason/emotion dichotomy is dubious or
at least fruitless. We of course shouldn’t believe that reason is good and reliable while emotion is
bad and biasing (Jones 2006; Berker 2009). Moreover, as we further understand the human brain,
we find great overlap between areas associated with reasoning and emotional processing with
apparently few differences. Like paradigm emotional processing, reasoning can be rapid and
relatively inaccessible to consciousness. And emotions, like paradigm reasoning, aid both
conscious and unconscious inference, as they provide us with relevant information (Dutton &
pg. 12 of 206
Aron 1974; Schwarz & Clore 1983), often through gut feelings about which of our many options
to take (Damasio 1994).
The position developed in this book is likewise skeptical of the reason/emotion
dichotomy, but this won’t fully emerge until the end. For now, let’s begin by attempting to
articulate a working contrast between reason and emotion.
Reasoning is, roughly, a kind of inference in which beliefs or similar propositional
attitudes are formed on the basis of pre-existing ones. For example, suppose Jerry believes that
Elaine will move into the apartment upstairs only if she has $5000, and he recently learned that
she doesn’t have that kind of money to spare. Jerry then engages in reasoning when, on the basis
of these two other beliefs, he comes to believe that Elaine won’t move into the apartment
upstairs. It’s notoriously difficult to adequately characterize this notion of forming a belief “on
the basis” of other beliefs in the sense relevant to inference (see, e.g., Boghossian 2012). But
such issues needn’t detain us here.
Some philosophers and psychologists define reasoning more narrowly as conscious
inference (e.g., Haidt 2001: 818; Mercier & Sperber 2011: 57; Greene 2013: 136). This may
capture one ordinary sense of the term “reasoning.” The archetype of reasoning is indeed
deliberate, relatively slow, and drawn out in a step-wise fashion. For example, you calculate your
portion of the bill, weight the pros and cons of divorce, or deliberate about where to eat for
lunch.
But there’s no need to be overly restrictive. As Gilbert Harman, Kelby Mason, and
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong point out: “Where philosophers tend to suppose that reasoning is a
conscious process… most psychological studies of reasoning treat it as a largely unconscious
process” (2010: 241). Moreover, ordinary usage and dictionary definitions don’t make conscious
awareness essential to reasoning, presumably because rule-governed transitions between beliefs
can be a rather automatic, unconscious, implicit, and unreflective process. For example:
• You just find yourself concluding that your son is on drugs.
• You automatically infer from your boss’s subtly unusual demeanor that she’s about to
fire you.
• You suddenly realize in the shower the solution to a long-standing problem.
These beliefs seem to pop into one’s head, but they aren’t born of mere feelings or non-
inferential associations. There is plausibly inference on the basis of representations that function
as providing reasons for a new belief. Reasoning occurs; it’s just largely outside of awareness
and more rapid than conscious deliberation.
Indeed, it is now common in moral psychology to distinguish conscious from
unconscious reasoning or inference (e.g., Cushman, Young, & Greene 2010; Harman et al.
2010). The idea is sometimes emphasized by rationalists (e.g., Mikhail 2011), but even
sentimentalists allow for unconscious reasoning, particularly in light of research on unconscious
probabilistic inference (Nichols, Kumar, & Lopez 2016; see also Zimmerman 2013).
No doubt some of one’s beliefs are formed without engaging in reasoning, conscious or
not. Basic perceptual beliefs are perhaps a good example. You believe that the door opening in
front of you retains a rectangular shape, but arguably you don’t form this judgment on the basis
of even tacit beliefs about angles in your field of vision. Rather, your visual system generates
such perceptual constancies by carrying out computational work among mental states that are
relatively inaccessible to introspection and isolated from other patterns of belief-formation (such
states are often called sub-personal, although sub-doxastic [Stich 1978] is probably more apt
[Drayson 2012]). As the visual experience of a rectangular door is generated, you believe that the
pg. 13 of 206
door is rectangular by simply taking your visual experience at face value. So perhaps it’s
inappropriate to posit unconscious reasoning (about angles and the like) at least because the
relevant transitions aren’t among beliefs—not even tacit ones.
Nevertheless, some inferential transitions between genuine beliefs are unconscious.
Within the category of unconscious mental processes, some generate beliefs on the basis of prior
beliefs (e.g., inferring that your son is on drugs). Other belief-generating processes don’t amount
to reasoning or inference (e.g., believing that an opening door is constantly rectangular), at least
because they are “subpersonal” or “subdoxastic.”
What about emotion? There is unfortunately even less consensus here. There are staunch
cognitivist theories on which emotions have cognitive content, much like or even exactly like
beliefs. Martha Nussbaum, for example, argues that our emotions contain “judgments about
important things” which involve “appraising an external object as salient for our own well-
being” (2001: 19). Non-cognitivist theories maintain that emotions lack cognitive content. Jesse
Prinz, for example, holds that emotions are “somatic signals… not cognitive states” although
they “represent concerns” (2007: 68). Moreover, while we often think of emotional processes as
rapid and automatic, they can be more drawn out and consciously accessible. One can, for
example, be acutely aware of one’s anxiety and its bodily effects, which may ebb and flow over
the course of days or weeks, as opposed to occurring in rapid episodes typical of fear or anger.
I suspect the concept of emotion is flexible and not amendable to precise definition. I’m
certainly not fond of classical analyses of concepts, which posit necessary and sufficient
conditions (May & Holton 2012; May 2014b). In any case, we can be ecumenical and conceive
of emotions as mental states and processes that have certain characteristic features. Heidi
Maibom provides a useful characterization of emotions as “mental states associated with
feelings, bodily changes, action potentials, and evaluations of the environment” (2010: 1000; cf.
also Haidt 2003: 853).
Suppose I negligently step on your gouty toe, so you become angry with me. Your anger
has an affective element: a characteristic feel. The emotion also has motivational elements that
often appear to activate relevant behavior: e.g., it motivates you to retaliate with verbal and
physical abuse (but see Seligman et al. 2016: ch. 8). Emotions also seem to have physiological
effects—e.g., your anger will lead to a rise in blood pressure, increased heart rate, and other
bodily changes. Finally, feeling angry also typically involves or at least causes cognitive
elements, such as thoughts about my blameworthiness, about the damage to your toe, about how
you could best retaliate, and so on.
I will understand such cognitive elements as, roughly, mental items whose function is to
accurately represent. A cognitive mental state, like a belief, can be contrasted with motivations,
goals, or desires, which arguably function to bring about the state of affairs they represent (Smith
1994). Tim and I may both believe that there is a taco on the table, but only I want to eat it, for he
is stuffed. My longing for the scrumptious taco involves a desire or a mental state whose
function is to bring it about that I eat the taco. Importantly, cognitive elements represent how
things are and can thus play a role in inference. Insofar as emotions can have cognitive elements
or at least effects on cognition, emotions can provide information and facilitate reasoning.
The cognitive elements or effects of emotions make the apparent reason/emotion
dichotomy becomes blurry at best. Despite the similarities between the two, however, at least
one important difference may remain: it’s commonly assumed that feelings are essential to
emotions but not to the process of reasoning. Many researchers use the term “affect” to refer to a
kind of feeling (see, e.g., Seligman et al. 2016: 50), although it is something of a technical term
pg. 14 of 206
with different meanings for some theorists. Perhaps, then, we should just speak of the dichotomy
between inference/affect or cognitive/non-cognitive states. However, sometimes the connection
to rationalism and sentimentalism is clearer if we operate with the working conception of
reasoning and emotion and then contrast their cognitive vs. affective aspects.
So far, the working conception respects the worry that there is no sharp division between
reason and emotion. This overlap view, as we might call it, seems to satisfy many in empirical
moral psychology (e.g., Greene 2008; Maibom 2010; Helion & Pizarro 2014; Huebner 2015).
For others, however, it doesn’t go far enough.
On the total collapse view, there is no difference between reasoning and emotional
processing. Peter Railton, for example, construes the “affective system” quite broadly such that
“affect appears to play a continuously active role in virtually all core psychological processes:
perception, attention, association, memory, cognition, and motivation” (2014: 827; cf. also
Damasio 1994; Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sripada 2016). On this picture, it may seem
that the debate between rationalists and sentimentalists is spurious, since affect and inference are
inextricable. However, what motivates the collapse view is a range of empirical evidence which
suggests that “emotion” turns out to be more like inference than we thought, not that “reason”
turns out to be less like inference than we thought. As James Woodward has put it, areas of the
brain associated with emotion are “involved in calculation, computation, and learning” (2016:
97).
This would be a welcome result for the view to be defended in this book, which aims to
emphasize the role of reasoning and inference in moral psychology. Indeed, the affective system
broadly construed is something humans share with many other animals (Seligman et al. 2016).
The total collapse view suggests that affective processes are necessary for moral judgment
merely because they’re required for inference generally, moral or otherwise. So we give
sentimentalists a better chance if we operate with the overlap view instead. To see this, we need
to consider in more detail the debate between rationalists and sentimentalists.
1.2.3 Rationalism vs. Sentimentalism
Clearly, both reason and emotion play a role in moral judgment. Nevertheless, a traditional
dispute remains between rationalists and sentimentalists over the comparative roles of inference
vs. feelings in distinctively moral cognition (Nichols 2008: n. 2; Maibom 2010: 1000; May &
Kumar forthcoming). The issue is interesting in its own right and we’ll eventually see that it has
important practical implications for how to develop moral knowledge and virtue.
The empirical claim made by those in the rationalist tradition is that reasoning is central
to moral cognition in a way that the affective elements of emotions are not. Such (empirical)
rationalists hold that moral judgment, just like many other kinds of judgment, is fundamentally
“a product of reason” (Nichols 2004: 70) or “derives from our rational capacities” (Kennett
2006: 70). However, as only a psychological thesis, “rational capacities” here is meant to be non-
normative—even poor reasoning counts as deriving from one’s “rational” capacities. We can
more clearly capture this idea by construing rationalism as the thesis that moral judgment is
ultimately “the culmination of a process of reasoning” (Maibom 2010: 999). Emotions can
certainly influence moral cognition, according to rationalists, but primarily insofar as they
facilitate inference; they aren’t essential for making a judgment distinctively moral.
On the sentimentalist picture I’ll resist, mere feeling or the affective component of
emotions is essential for moral cognition and thus moral knowledge (if such knowledge is
pg. 15 of 206
possible). Without emotions, a creature can’t make any moral judgments, because the feelings
constitutive of emotions are in some way essential to having moral concepts. As Hume famously
put it, when we condemn an action or a person’s character:
The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it,
till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation,
which arises in you, towards this action. (1739-40/2000: 3.1.1)
Hume clearly conceives of such sentiments or passions as feelings, and it’s this aspect of
emotions, not their role in inference, that sentimentalists see as distinctive of moral judgment.
Contemporary sentimentalists, such as Shaun Nichols, continue this line of thought, stating that
“moral judgment is grounded in affective response” (2004: 83, emphasis added). Moreover,
sentimentalists don’t merely claim that lacking feelings or affect would hinder moral judgment,
but rather that this would render one incapable of understanding right from wrong. Even when
sentimentalists emphasize the importance of reasoning and reflection in moral judgment, they
remain sentimentalists because they give “the emotions a constitutive role in evaluative
judgment” in particular (D’Arms & Jacobson 2014: 254; cf. also Kauppinen 2013).
Rationalists can agree that emotions are commonly involved in human moral judgment
and that lacking them leads to difficulties in navigating the social world. Humans are
undoubtedly emotional creatures, and sentiments pervade social interactions with others. To
build a moral agent, one might have to endow it with emotions, but only because a finite creature
living in a fast-paced social world requires a mechanism for facilitating rapid reasoning and
quickly directing its attention to relevant information. A creature with unlimited time and
resources needn’t possess emotions in order to make distinctively moral judgments (cf. Jones
2006: 3).
On the rationalist view, the role of emotions in morality is like the role of ubiquitous
technologies: they facilitate information processing and structure our way of life. If the Internet
was somehow broken, for example, our normal way of life would be heavily disrupted, but it’s
not as though the Internet is fundamental to the very idea of communication and business
transactions. Of course, in one sense the Internet is essential, as we rely on it for how we happen
to operate. But a cognitive science of how communication fundamentally works needn’t feature
the ability to use email. No doubt the analogy only goes so far, since emotions are not some
recent invention in human life. They are part of human nature, if there is such a thing. The point
is simply that, for sentimentalists, emotions are more than vehicles for information processing;
they partially define what morality is. Thus, even if emotions aid in reasoning, we still can
conclude that their affective elements aren’t necessary for moral judgment. The sentimentalist
tradition isn’t vindicated if emotions are merely ways of processing information more quickly,
rigidly, and without attentional resources (see Prinz 2006: 31).
Of course, emotions may be required for moral judgment, especially knowledge, merely
because experiencing certain emotions seems necessary for knowing what another is feeling.
Indeed, sentimentalists sometimes draw an analogy between moral judgments and judgments
about color: they are both beliefs typically caused by certain experiences (e.g., Hume 1739-40:
3.1.1; Prinz 2007: 16; Slote 2010; Kauppinen 2013: 370; Sinhababu 2017: ch. 4). The relevant
experience may then be necessary for knowledge, particularly because such experiences are
conscious, or essentially qualitative, mental states. And understanding what a sensation or
experience is like seems impossible without having it oneself (Jackson 1982). In the moral
domain, men in power have historically taken a paternalistic attitude toward women, and yet men
pg. 16 of 206
presumably don’t generally know exactly what it’s like to be a woman or to carry a child to term.
As some liberals are fond of saying: If men were giving birth, there wouldn’t be much discussion
about the right to have an abortion. Perhaps even women don’t know these things either until
they have the relevant experiences (see Paul 2014). Similarly, an emotionless robot may be
ignorant of some moral facts in virtue of lacking feelings of love, grief, pride, or fury.
Even so, this doesn’t show that emotions are essential for making a moral judgment. At
best certain experiences are sometimes required for understanding a phenomenon. A
sophisticated robot could acquire the relevant knowledge by having the requisite experiences. In
fact, this is just an instance of a more general problem of ignorance of morally relevant
information. Suppose I visit my grandmother in the hospital in Mexico. I know what it is to
suffer but I falsely believe that the Spanish word “sufre” refers to, not suffering, but the
vegetarian option at a Chipotle restaurant. Then I won’t know that the nurse did wrong when she
made “mi abuela sufre.” Does this imply that Spanish is essential for moral knowledge? In
certain circumstances, I must know the relevant language, but this is too specific for a general
characterization of what’s psychologically essential for moral judgment. Similarly, suppose one
doesn’t fully understand, say, the anguish of torture or the humiliation of discrimination unless
one experiences them firsthand. Such examples don’t demonstrate that feelings are essential for
making distinctively moral judgments but rather judgments about specific cases. The
theoretically interesting position for sentimentalists to take is the one that many have indeed
taken: emotions are required for understanding right from wrong generally, not merely for
understanding a subset of particular moral claims.
1.3 Pessimism about Moral Motivation

1.3.1 Sources of Pessimism
Suppose the previous challenges have been rebutted: ordinary moral cognition is a fundamentally
rational enterprise capable of rising to moral knowledge or at least justified belief. Still, we
might worry that we rarely live up to our scruples, for self-interest and other problematic
passions too frequently get in the way. Even if we do end up doing the right thing, we do it for
the wrong reasons. When we’re honest, fair, kind, and charitable, it’s only to avoid punishment,
to feel better about ourselves, or to curry someone’s favor. Something seems morally lacking in
such actions—let’s say that they’re not fully virtuous. Just as merely true but unjustified belief
doesn’t seem to deserve a certain honorific (e.g., “knowledge”), merely doing the right thing, but
not for the right reasons, doesn’t warrant another moniker (“virtue”).
To be truly virtuous, it seems in particular that moral considerations should more
frequently guide our behavior; reason cannot be a slave to non-rational passions, selfish or
otherwise. Kant (1785/2002) famously thought that only such actions—those done “from
duty”—have moral worth. For example, we’d expect a virtuous merchant not only to charge a
naïve customer the normal price for milk but to do it for more than merely self-interested
reasons—e.g., to avoid a bad reputation.
Many believe the science warrants pessimism: deep down we’re primarily motivated to
do what’s right for the wrong reasons, not morally relevant considerations. Robert Wright, for
example, proclaims that an evolutionary perspective on human psychology reveals that we’re
largely selfish, and yet we ironically despise such egoism:
pg. 17 of 206
[T]he pretense of selflessness is about as much a part of human nature as is its frequent
absence. We dress ourselves up in tony moral language, denying base motives and
stressing our at least minimal consideration for the greater good; and we fiercely and self-
righteously decry selfishness in others. (1994: 344)
This disconcerting account paints us as fundamentally egoistic. On the most extreme version—
psychological egoism—all of one’s actions are ultimately motivated by self-interest. We are
simply incapable of helping others solely out of a concern for their welfare. An ulterior motive
always lurks in the background, even if unconsciously.
There is a wealth of rigorous research that seems to suggest that altruism is possible
particularly when we empathize with others. However, compassion can be rather biased,
parochial, and myopic. We are more concerned for victims who are similar to ourselves, or part
of our in-group, or vividly represented to tug at our heartstrings, rather than a mere abstract
statistic (Cialdini et al. 1997; Jenni & Loewenstein 1997; Batson 2011). Moreover, studies of
dishonesty suggest that most people will rationalize promoting their self-interest instead of moral
principles (Ariely 2012). Even if we’re not universally egoistic, we may not be far from it
(Batson 2016).
A related source of pessimism draws on the vast research demonstrating the situationist
thesis that unexpected features of one’s circumstances have a powerful influence on behavior.
Many have taken this literature to undermine the existence of robust character traits or
conceptions of agency and responsibility that require accurate reflection. However, even if we
jettison commitments to character traits and reflective agency, results in the situationist literature
pose a further challenge. If our morally relevant actions are often significantly influenced by the
mere smell of fresh cookies, the color of a person’s skin, an image of watchful eyes, and the like,
then we are motivated by ethically arbitrary factors (see, e.g., Nelkin 2005; Nahmias 2007;
Vargas 2013; Doris 2015). A certain brand of situationism, then, may reveal that we’re
chronically incapable of acting for the right reasons.
Suppose we do often do what’s right for more than self-interested or arbitrary reasons.
Proponents of Humeanism would argue that, even when we behave morally, we are beholden to
our unreasoned passions or desires (e.g., Sinhababu 2009; Schroeder, Roskies, & Nichols 2010).
If Humeans are right, our actions are always traceable to some ultimate or intrinsic motive that
we have independent of any reasoning or beliefs. Bernard Williams famously discusses an
example in which a callous man beats his wife and doesn’t care at all about how badly this
affects her (1989/1995: 39). On the Humean view, we can only motivate this man to stop his
despicable behavior by getting him to believe that being more kind will promote something he
already cares about. We must try to show him that he’ll eventually be unhappy with himself or
that his treasured marriage will fall apart. Pointing out that he’s being immoral will only
motivate if he happens to care, and care enough, about that. If, however, refraining from physical
abuse will not promote anything this man already wants, then the Humean says there is nothing
that could motivate him to stop except a change in his concerns.
The Humean theory can be conceived as a kind of pessimism if acting for the right
reasons requires ultimately acting on the basis of recognizing the relevant reasons, not an
antecedent desire. Some, like Thomas Reid, seem to think so:
It appears evident… that those actions only can truly be called virtuous, and deserving of
moral approbation, which the agent believed to be right, and to which he was influenced,
more or less, by that belief. (1788/2010: 293)
pg. 18 of 206
We do often describe one another’s actions this way—e.g., “She did it because she knew it was
the right thing to do”—without appealing to an antecedent desire to be moral.
However, Humeans might retort that acting for the right reasons requires only being
motivated by specific moral considerations (e.g., kindness, fairness, loyalty), not the bare belief
that something is right per se (cf., e.g., Arpaly 2003: ch. 3). Perhaps, for example, a father
shouldn’t have “one thought too many” about whether he should save his own drowning
daughter over a stranger’s (Williams 1976/1981). In general, the virtuous person presumably
wouldn’t “fetishize” morality but rather be ultimately concerned with the welfare of others,
fidelity to one’s commitments, and so on (Smith 1994), and a moral belief might still be
problematic in this way (Markovits 2010). We’ll grapple with this issue later (Chapters 7-8), but
for now suffice it to say that a certain kind of pessimism about the role of reason in moral
motivation remains if Humeanism is right.
For a variety of reasons, pessimists conclude that the aim of doing what’s right for the
right reasons is practically unattainable. On a common account of what’s required for virtuous
motivation, it’s practically out of reach for most of us. I aim to show that we are capable of
genuinely altruistic motivation and that our beliefs about what we ought to do can motivate
action without merely serving or furthering some antecedent desire. Moreover, while features of
the situation certainly influence what we do, the ethically suspect influences do not
systematically conflict with virtuous motivation. I ultimately argue that humans are capable of
acting from duty or doing the right thing for the right reasons. Morally good motives are not
rarities.
1.3.2 Non-cognitivism & Relativism
The discussion so far has assumed that we can have moral beliefs, conceived as distinct from
emotions, desires, or other passions. A complete defense of anti-Humeanism and rationalism
requires showing that moral judgments don’t just express non-cognitive states. Consider, for
example, the sentence “Slavery is immoral.” It seems such sentences don’t always merely
express one’s negative feelings toward slavery. That is, it seems that non-cognitivism about
moral judgment is false. Unlike beliefs, mere feelings and desires arguably can’t be evaluated for
truth or accuracy, which makes it difficult to see how they can be part of a process of reasoning
or inference.
Importantly, rejecting non-cognitivism needn’t commit one to denying relativism, the
view that moral statements are only true relative to some framework, such as the norms of one’s
culture. I don’t assume that moral judgments are robustly objective but rather that they can be
cognitive, similar to other beliefs. When I say “Lebron is tall,” this may be true only relative to a
certain contrast class (ordinary people, not basketball players), but it is nonetheless assessable for
truth or falsity in a certain context. In a somewhat similar fashion, moral truths are nonetheless
truths even if they are in some sense relative to a culture, species, or kind of creature. So we
needn’t assume that moral truths are objectively true—a core element of moral realism (Shafer-
Landau 2003)—in order to defend moral knowledge, conceived as justified true belief.
I don’t intend to argue at length against non-cognitivism. The view has largely already
fallen out of favor among many researchers. A survey of philosophers conducted in 2009 reveals
that only 17% lean toward or accept it (Bourget & Chalmers 2014: 476). There is good reason
for this. The famous Frege-Geach problem, which I won’t rehearse here, shows that non-
cognitivists struggle to make sense of moral language without drastically revising our best
pg. 19 of 206
conception of logic and semantics (Schroeder 2010). Non-cognitivism is not exactly a live
empirical theory either, as psychologists and neuroscientists appear to assume that moral
judgments express beliefs. For example, rather than simply identify moral judgments with
emotions or desires, researchers look to whether emotions are a cause or consequence of the
moral judgment. In fact, the vast majority of “pessimists” I’ll target assume cognitivism as well.
Moreover, we needn’t accept non-cognitivism to account for the various uses to which
moral judgment can be put. For example, hybrid theories can capture the idea that we sometimes
use sentences like “That’s just wrong” to express a negative reaction, like a feeling or desire, or
to express a belief that an action or policy is wrong. Compare statements containing a pejorative,
such as “Yolanda’s a Yankee,” which in some countries is used to express both a belief (Yolanda
is American) and a distaste for her and other Americans (Copp 2001: 16). I favor something like
this model (May 2014a), according to which moral judgments can express both cognitive and
non-cognitive states (cf. also Kumar 2016a). However, I assume here only the falsity of non-
cognitivism, which is compatible with either a hybrid view or a strong cognitivist theory on
which moral judgments only or chiefly express beliefs.
1.4 Optimistic Rationalism

My primary aim is to resist the predominant pessimism about ordinary moral psychology that has
developed in light of scientific research on the human mind. I will offer a more optimistic
defense of ordinary moral thought and action in which reason plays a fundamental role—
optimistic rationalism, if you will.
Since pessimism comes in many forms, an optimistic view must be multi-faceted, with
various components in opposition to the variety of pessimistic arguments. In particular, I aim to
undermine some popular sources of empirically grounded pessimism (see Figure 1.1). I thus
contend that moral judgments are generated by fundamentally cognitive and rational processes
(rationalism), which are not subject to wide-ranging empirical debunking arguments (anti-
skepticism). Moreover, moral motivation is not always ultimately egoistic (psychological
altruism), is heavily driven by a concern to do what’s right, and is not always a slave to
unreasoned passions (anti-Humeanism). All of this casts doubt on the idea that virtuous
motivation is rare among ordinary individuals (anti-skepticism).
Figure 1.1: Key Sources of Empirically Grounded Pessimism
pg. 20 of 206
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unfold themselves in his civilized condition. Every class of animals
and plants, which man renders subservient to his use by cultivation
and due care, exhibits beyond comparison greater differences in the
same species, more varieties, more families, than those which
remain in their native state, remote from and unaided by his fostering
care:—it would appear as if Providence had thus meant to
encourage and reward activity and labour.
Jack.—But, father, you left off with the apples too soon; do pray
resume their history: I wish you may tell us they are of Swiss or
German origin; they are so useful as a fruit, keep so well through the
winter, and may be eaten raw as well as dressed.
Father.—This refreshing fruit, my apple-eating boy, is not a native
of Switzerland or Germany, as you desire it should be, but comes to
us from more favoured climates; at least this is the case with the
best sorts of them. We have a number of wild pear and apple trees,
the fruit of which is crabbed, harsh, and scarcely eatable; whether
they were so originally, or have degenerated, remains to be
determined. As I have said, none of these valuable fruits are
indigenous or native in the colder parts of Europe: yet this ungrateful
and rough climate it is that operates on the European so as to
distinguish him from the inhabitants of the other parts of the world,
by his intelligence, his fitness for toil, and his skill in agriculture.
There exist abundant means and facilities for rendering man
effeminate and indolent, but necessity and want stimulate him to
industry and useful inventions; and by these blessings the
inconveniences of climate are amply compensated.
Jack.—I dare say you are quite right, father;—but tell me where
then do apples come from?
Father.—From the eastern countries, my son; and it is to the
victories of the Romans we are indebted for some of the best kinds,
which have been diversified by experiments, ingrafting, or in other
words the influence of soil and labour and intelligence.
Fritz.—Quince and mulberry-trees are the last we have to inquire
about; and then, father, we will cease our importunities for the
present.
Father.—It is almost time, I must confess. Mulberry-trees are in
general from Asia; they have, I presume, been cultivated more for
the sake of their leaves, on which silkworms feed, than for their fruit:
however, it cannot be denied that the juicy berry of the dark-coloured
mulberry-tree merits to be held in some estimation, and the white-
coloured, whose fruit is small and indifferent, contributes to the
production of the finest silk. The quince-tribe must have taken its
name from the town of Cydonia in the isle of Crete; the Romans
called them pyrus Cydonæ. On the quince-tree may be most
successfully grafted pear-trees designed to be afterwards planted as
espaliers.
Fritz.—But why is it thought right to stunt the growth of a fine tree,
and force it to remain diminutive?
Father.—This, in several respects, is useful; wall-trees, being
sheltered on one side, bear earlier and more choice fruits; it is easier
to defend them from insects; their fruits are more conveniently
gathered. The tree, giving less shade, is not so injurious to the
culinary plants that are near it.—Are not these substantial reasons?
Jack.—Then I must ask, why are not all trees set in this way?
That would not be a judicious plan by any means; an espalier
takes up too much ground; besides, trees with high stems produce
more fruit, they form orchards; a crop of hay too may be raised under
them, whereas espaliers serve in general as fences or boundaries in
gardens.
This is a compendium of our morning’s conversation, in the course
of which we finished our work in the completest manner. Towards
noon, a keen appetite hastened our return to Falcon’s Stream, where
we found an excellent and plentiful dinner prepared by our good and
patient steward, of which the palm-tree cabbage was the chief dish.
We all agreed that to eat of a better or more delicate food was
impossible; and Ernest, who had procured it, received the thanks of
all the board.
When the sharpness of hunger was appeased, a new subject was
introduced which I and my wife had been seriously revolving for
some time; she found it difficult and even dangerous to ascend and
descend our tree with a rope ladder: we never went there but on
going to-bed, and each time felt an apprehension that one of the
children, who scrambled up like cats, might make a false step and
perhaps be lamed for ever. Bad weather might come on and compel
us for a long time together to seek an asylum in our aërial apartment,
and consequently to ascend and descend oftener.
My wife addressed me constantly on the subject, incessantly
asking whether my inventive genius could not suggest some easier
and less perilous mode of getting to our dwelling. I smiled at her
implicit confidence that I could accomplish wonders: I assured her
that if I were an enchanter or magician no desire of hers should
remain ungratified, and that with a single touch of my wand I would
instantly produce for her a commodious firm stair-case of perfect
workmanship; but that not being the case, I acknowledged myself at
a loss for the means to effect such an accommodation for her: still
her reiterated appeals and my own anxiety had often made me
reflect if the thing were really possible? A stair-case on the outside
was not to be thought of, the considerable height of the tree
rendered that impracticable, as I had nothing to rest it on, and should
be at a loss to find beams to sustain it; but I had for some time
formed the idea of constructing winding stairs within the immense
trunk of the tree, if it should happen to be hollow, or I could contrive
to make it so: Francis had excited this idea in speaking of the bees.
Did you not tell me, dear wife, said I, that there is a hole in the
trunk of this enormous tree of ours, in which a swarm of bees is
lodged?
Without doubt, answered she; it was there little Francis was so
severely stung in attempting to thrust in a stick; look at it yourself,
you will see the bees go in and come out in throngs.
Then, replied I, we have only to examine how far this excavation
goes, whether it extends to the roots, and what the circumference of
it is; this done, we shall have gained the first difficult step in favour of
our stair-case.
All my children seized the idea with ardour; they sprang up, and
prepared themselves to climb the tops of the roots like squirrels, to
succeed in striking at the trunk with axes, and to judge from the
sound how far it was hollow; but they soon paid dearly for their
attempt: the whole swarm of bees, alarmed at the noise made
against their dwelling, issued forth, buzzing with fury, attacked the
little disturbers, began to sting them, stuck to their hair and clothes,
and soon put them to flight, bearing along with them their enemies,
and uttering lamentable cries. My wife and I had some trouble to
stop the course of this uproar, and cover their little wounds with fresh
earth to allay the smart. Jack, whose temper was on all occasions
rash, had struck exactly upon the bees’ nest, and was more severely
attacked by them than the rest; it was necessary, so serious was the
injury, to cover the whole of his face with linen. The less active
Ernest got up the last, and was the first to run off when he saw the
consequences, and thus avoided any further injury than a sting or
two; but some hours elapsed before the other boys could open their
eyes or be in the least relieved from the acute pain that had been
inflicted. When they grew a little better, the desire of being avenged
of the insects that had so roughly used them had the ascendant in
their minds: they teased me to hasten the measures for getting every
thing in readiness for obtaining possession of their honey. The bees
in the mean time were still buzzing furiously round the tree. I
prepared tobacco, a pipe, some clay, chisels, hammers, &c. I took
the large gourd long intended for a hive, and I fitted a place for it by
nailing a piece of board on a branch of the tree; I made a straw roof
for the top to screen it from the sun and rain; and as all this took up
more time than I was aware of, we deferred the attack of the fortress
to the following day, and got ready for a sound sleep, which
completed the cure of my little wounded patients.
CHAPTER XXIX.
Victory over the bees;—winding stair-case; training of
various animals; divers manufactures; fountain, &c.
Next morning almost before dawn all were up and in motion; the
bees had returned to their cells, and I stopped the passages with
clay, leaving only a sufficient aperture for the tube of my pipe. I then
smoked as much as was requisite to stupefy without killing the little
warlike creatures. Not having a cap with a mask, such as bee-
catchers usually wear, nor even gloves, this precaution was
necessary. At first a humming was heard in the hollow of the tree,
and a noise like a gathering tempest, which died away by degrees.
All was become calm, and I withdrew my tube without the
appearance of a single bee. Fritz had got up by me: we then began
with a chisel and a small axe to cut out of the tree, under the bees’
hole of entrance, a piece three feet square. Before it was entirely
separated, I repeated the fumigation, lest the stupefaction produced
by the first smoking should have ceased, or the noise we had been
just making revived the bees. As soon as I supposed them quite
lulled again, I separated from the trunk the piece I had cut out,
producing as it were the aspect of a window, through which the
inside of the tree was laid entirely open to view; and we were filled at
once with joy and astonishment on beholding the immense and
wonderful work of this colony of insects. There was such a stock of
wax and honey, that we feared our vessels would be insufficient to
contain it. The whole interior of the tree was lined with fine honey-
combs: I cut them off with care, and put them in the gourds the boys
constantly supplied me with. When I had somewhat cleared the
cavity, I put the upper combs, in which the bees had assembled in
clusters and swarms, into the gourd which was to serve as a hive,
and placed it on the plank I had purposely raised. I came down,
bringing with me the rest of the honey-combs, with which I filled a
small cask, previously well washed in the stream. Some I kept out for
a treat at dinner; and had the barrel carefully covered with cloths and
planks, that the bees, when attracted by the smell, might be unable
to get at it. We then sat round the table, and regaled ourselves
plentifully with the delicious and odoriferous treat of the honey.
Having finished our meal, my wife put by the remainder; and I
proposed to my sons to go back to the tree, in order to prevent the
bees from swarming again there on being roused from their stupor,
as they would not have failed to do, but for the precaution I took of
passing a board at the aperture, and burning a few handfuls of
tobacco on it, the smell and smoke of which drove them back from
their old abode, whenever they attempted to return to it. At length
they desisted from approaching it, and became gradually reconciled
to their new residence, where their queen no doubt had settled
herself. I took this opportunity to relate to my children all I had read
in the interesting work by Mr. Huber of Geneva17 of the queen-bee,
this beloved and respected mother of her subjects, who are all her
children, and who take care of and guard her, work for her, nourish
the rising swarms, make the cells in which they are to lodge, prepare
others of a different structure, as well as nutriment for the young
queens destined to lead forth the fresh colonies: and I entered into
all those details which celebrated observers, and particularly the one
we have just mentioned, have described so interestingly. These
accounts highly entertained my youthful auditory, who almost
regretted having molested by their depredation the repose of a fine
peaceable kingdom that had flourished so long without interruption in
the huge trunk. As to me, it so well suited my intended stair-case,
that I readily adopted the prevailing moral amongst conquerors, who
dispense with scruples when the seizing a country is convenient to
their policy, and I resolved to take full possession next day. In the
mean time I advised all to watch during the night, over the whole
provision of honey obtained while the bees were torpid, who when
recovered would not fail to be troublesome, and come in legions to
get back to their property. That we might not be ourselves injured by
so much fatigue, we went and threw ourselves on our beds, and in
our clothes, to take a short doze before the hour of retreat; we were
lulled to sleep with their buzzing, which had quite ceased when we
awoke at the coming on of night; they had remained quiet in the
gourd or suspended in clusters from some branches: without
concerning ourselves about them, we went promptly to business; the
cask of honey was emptied into a kettle, except a few prime combs
which we kept for daily consumption; the remainder mixed with a
little water was set over a gentle fire and reduced to a liquid
consistence, strained and squeezed through a bag, and afterwards
poured back into the cask, which was left upright and uncovered all
night to cool. In the morning the wax was entirely separated, and had
risen to the surface in a compact and solid cake that was easily
removed; beneath was the purest, most beautiful and delicate honey
that could be seen: the cask was then carefully headed again, and
put into cool ground near our wine vessels; and now we promised
ourselves an abundant supply of an agreeable article for desserts.
This task accomplished, I mounted to revisit the hive, and found
every thing in order; the bees going forth in swarms and returning
loaded with wax, from which I judged they were forming fresh
edifices in their new dwelling place. I was surprised to see the
numbers that had occupied the trunk of the tree find room in the
gourd; but on looking round me, I perceived a part of them collected
in a cluster upon a branch, and I thence concluded a young queen
was amongst them.
On perceiving this, I procured another gourd, into which I shook
them and placed it by the former: thus I had the satisfaction of
obtaining at an easy rate two fine hives of bees in activity.
We soon after these operations proceeded to examine the inside
of the tree. I sounded it with a pole from the opening I had made
towards the top; and a stone fastened to a string served us to sound
the bottom, and thus to ascertain the height and depth of the cavity.
To my great surprise the pole penetrated without any resistance to
the branches on which our dwelling rested, and the stone descended
to the roots. The trunk, it appeared, had wholly lost its pith, and most
of its wood internally; nothing therefore was more practicable than to
fix winding stairs in this capacious hollow, that should reach from top
to bottom. It seems that this species of tree, like the willow in our
climates, receives nourishment through the bark; for it did not look
decayed, and its far-extended branches were luxuriant and beautiful
in the extreme. I determined to begin our construction that very day.
The undertaking appeared at first beyond our powers; but
intelligence, patience, time, and a firm resolution vanquished all
obstacles. We were not disposed to relax in any of these requisites;
and I was pleased to find opportunities to keep my sons in continual
action, and their minds and bodies were all the better for exertion.
They grew tall, strong, and were too much engaged to regret, in
ignoble leisure, any of their past enjoyments in Europe.
We began to cut into the side of the tree, towards the sea, a door-
way equal in dimensions to the door of the captain’s cabin, which we
had removed with all its frame-work and windows; by means of
which we should at once be guarded against every attack on that
side. We next cleared away from the cavity all the rotten wood, and
rendered the interior even and smooth, leaving sufficient thickness
for cutting out resting-places for the winding stairs, without injuring
the bark. I then fixed in the centre, the trunk of a tree ten or twelve
feet high and a foot thick, completely stripped of its branches, in
order to carry my winding staircase round it: on the outside of this
trunk, and the inside of the cavity of our own tree, we formed
grooves, so calculated as to correspond with the distances at which
the boards were to be placed to form the stairs. These were
continued till I had got to the height of the trunk round which they
turned. The window I had opened at the top to take out the honey
gave light enough. I made a second aperture below, and a third
above it, and thus completely lighted the whole ascent. I also
effected an opening near our room, that I might more conveniently
finish the upper part of the stair-case. A second trunk was fixed upon
the first, and firmly sustained with screws and transverse beams. It
was surrounded like the other with stairs cut slopingly; and thus we
happily effected the stupendous undertaking of conducting it to the
level of our bed-chamber. Here I made another door directly into it;
and I then found I could add nothing further to my design. If my
staircase was not in strict conformity to the rules of architecture, it at
least answered the purpose it was built for, that of conducting us with
safety and shelter to our nocturnal residence. To render it more solid
and agreeable, I closed the spaces between the stairs with plank. I
then fastened two strong ropes, the one descending the length of the
little tree, the other along the side of the large one, to assist in case
of slipping. I fixed the sash-windows taken from the captain’s cabin
in the apertures we had made to give light to the stairs; and when
the whole was complete, it was so pretty, solid, and convenient, that
we were never tired of going up and coming down it; and I fear I
must add, for the sake of truth, with no small admiration of our united
talents. I must, however, candidly own, that we succeeded in this
arduous attempt by mere dint of efforts, patience, industry, and time;
for it occupied us for several weeks together with no intermission. It
more than once reminded me of the wise system of education of the
philosopher of Geneva, J. J. Rousseau; and particularly where he
recommends that boys of all classes in society should learn a trade,
and especially that of a carpenter. How happy should I have been in
our circumstances to have known this trade myself, and to have
taught it to my eldest son! I cannot too earnestly exhort all fathers to
put their sons in early possession of a resource which, though it may
not become of the first necessity, has, at all events, the advantage of
making a young man stronger, and more dexterous; of filling up
many of the dangerous idle hours of ardent youth; and of being able,
in maturer age, if it be unnecessary to work ourselves, at least to
overlook the workmen we employ. I am not an enthusiast for the
system of Rousseau, though I admire his style and genius; yet if
humanity were indebted to him for no more than this sagacious
counsel, and the felicity conferred by his maxims on early childhood,
it would still suffice to make us love and consider him as a
benefactor.
But our new acquisition of a handsome staircase did not
exclusively occupy the whole of our time; as in our solitude we had
nothing to consider but our own pleasure or convenience, and our
daily wants were not subject to the occurrence of other social duties,
we saw no occasion for tormenting ourselves with a greater degree
of labour in every day than was wholesome for our bodily health. We
had no harsh surveyor, no inquisitive examiners; no troublesome
neighbours nor counsellors. If we occasionally regretted not being
members of a large society under just laws and agreements
established between societies of men, we more frequently
complimented ourselves on not being subjected to this restraint and
the inconveniences that arise from it. If we happened now and then
to feel the want of some of the high-wrought pleasures of social
existence, we were speedily solaced by reflecting that we did not
stand in need of money; that we had no uneasy care about the
acquisition of it; that we excited neither envy, pity, nor censure; while
the imperfection of our achievements, and the trouble they cost us,
were richly compensated by the freedom and cheerfulness with
which they were executed, ever without altercation, and with united
hearts and souls.
I will briefly narrate the few remarkable occurrences that took
place during the construction of our staircase.
A few days after the commencement of our stair-case, the two
she-goats gave us two kids, and our ewes five lambs; so that we
now saw ourselves in possession of a pretty flock: but lest the
domestic animals should follow the example of the ass, and run
away from us, I tied a bell to the neck of each. We had found a
sufficient number of bells in the vessel, which had been shipped for
trading with the savages; it being one of the articles they most value.
We could now immediately trace a deserter by the sound, and bring
it back to the fold.
Next to the winding stairs, my chief occupation was the
management of the young buffalo, whose wound in the nose was
quite healed, so that I could lead it at will with a cord or stick passed
through the orifice, as the Caffrarians do. I preferred the latter, which
answered the purpose of a bit; and I resolved to break-in this spirited
beast for riding as well as drawing. It was already used to the shafts,
and very tractable in them; but I had more trouble in inuring him to
the rider, and to wear a girth, having made one out of the old
buffalo’s hide. I formed a sort of saddle with sail-cloth, and tacked it
to the girth. Upon this I fixed a burthen, which I increased
progressively. I was indefatigable in the training of the animal, and
soon brought it to carry, without fear or repugnance, large bags full of
potatoes, salt, and other articles, such as the ass had patiently borne
to be loaded with. The monkey was his first rider, who stuck so close
to the saddle, that in spite of the plunging and kicking of the buffalo,
it was not thrown. Francis was then tried, as the lightest of the family;
but throughout his excursion I led the beast with a halter, that it might
not throw the child off. Jack now showed some impatience to mount
the animal in his turn. Some restraint was requisite:—I passed the
appropriate piece of wood through the buffalo’s nose, and tied strong
packthread at each end of the stick, bringing them together over the
neck of the animal; and I then put this new-fashioned bridle into the
hands of the young rider, directing him how to use it. For a time the
lad kept his saddle, notwithstanding the repeated jumps of the
horned steed; at length a side jolt threw him on the sand, without his
receiving much injury. Ernest, Fritz, and lastly myself, got on
successively, with more or less effect. His trotting shook us to the
very centre, the rapidity of his gallop turned us giddy, and our
lessons in horsemanship were reiterated many days before the
animal was tamed, and could be rode with either safety or pleasure.
At last, however, we succeeded without any serious accident; and
the strength and swiftness of our saddled buffalo were prodigious. It
seemed to sport with the heaviest loads. My three eldest boys
mounted it together now and then, and it ran with them with the
swiftness of lightning. By continued attentions it at length became
extremely docile: it was not in the least apt to start; and I really felt
satisfaction in being thus enabled to make my sons expert riders, so
that if they should ever have horses, they might get on the most
restive and fiery without any fear:—none could be compared to our
young buffalo; and the ass which I had intended to employ in the
same way was far surpassed by this new member of our family. Fritz
and Jack, with my instructions, amused themselves in training the
animal as horses are exercised in a riding-house; and by means of
the little stick through the nose, they were able to do what they
pleased with him.
In the midst of all this Fritz did not neglect his eagle; he daily shot
some small birds which he gave it to eat, placing them sometimes
betwixt the buffalo’s horns, sometimes on the back of one of the
hens, or of a flamingo, or on a shelf, or at the end of a stick, in order
to teach it to pounce like a falcon upon other birds. He taught it to
perch on his wrist whenever he called or whistled to it; but some time
elapsed before he could trust it to soar without securing its return by
a long string, apprehending its bold and wild nature would prompt it
to take a distant and farewell flight from us.
Our whole company, including even the inert Ernest, was infected
with the passion of becoming instructors. Ernest tried his talents in
this way with his monkey; who, it must be confessed, seldom failed
to furnish him with work. It was no poor specimen of the ludicrous to
see the lad; he whose movements were habitually slow and studied,
now constrained to skip, and jump, and play a thousand antics with
his pupil during training hours, and all the time deeply interested in
carrying forward the lesson the grotesque mimic was condemned to
learn, of carrying small loads, climbing the cocoa-trees, and to fetch
and bring the nuts. He and Jack made a little hamper of rushes, very
light: they put three straps to it, two of which passed under the fore,
and one between the hind legs of the animal, and were then
fastened to a belt in front, to keep the hamper steady on the back of
the mischievous urchin. This apparatus was at first intolerable to
poor Knips: he gnashed his teeth, rolled on the ground, jumping like
a mad creature, and did every thing to get rid of it; but all in vain, for
education was the standing order, and he soon found he must
submit. The hamper was left on day and night; its sole food was
what was thrown into it; and in a short time pug was so much
accustomed to the burden, that he began to spit and growl whenever
we attempted to take it off, and every thing given to the creature to
hold was instantly thrown into it. Knips became at length a useful
member of our society; but he would only obey Ernest, whom he at
once loved and feared, thus affording a proof of at least one of the
great ends of all instruction. Jack was less successful with his little
jackal, which he had named Hunter, hoping that its qualities would
justify the name. He made continual attempts to induce the animal to
go after game; but for the first six months he advanced no further in
the lesson than teaching him to bring what was thrown to it: and
when it was dead game, Hunter was sure to devour it on the way,
and to bring home the skin alone: but it was nevertheless so pretty
and tractable a creature, that I intreated the boy not to relinquish a
task that would prove so beneficial to us; and he persevered with
considerable zeal.
These different occupations filled up several hours of the day;
when, after working at our stairs, we assembled in the evening round
our never-failing constant friend, the good mother, to rest ourselves:
and forming a little circle, every individual of which was affectionate
and cheerful, it was her turn to give us some agreeable and less
fatiguing occupation in the domestic concerns of Falcon Stream:
such, for example, as endeavouring to improve our candle-
manufactory, by blending the berry and the bees-wax, and
employing the reed-moulds invented by Jack: but having found some
difficulty in taking out the candles when cold, I adopted the plan of
dividing the moulds, cleaning the inside, and rubbing it over with a
little butter, to prevent the wax from adhering to it; then to rejoin both
halves with a band that could be loosened at pleasure, to facilitate
the extraction of the tapers. The wicks gave us most trouble, as we
had no cotton. We tried with moderate success the fibrous threads of
the karatta, and those of the algava or flame-wood; but each had the
inconvenience of becoming a sort of coal or cinder. The production
which gave us the most satisfaction was the pith of a species of
elder; but it did not, however, lessen our desire to discover the only
appropriate ingredient, the cotton-tree. I likewise contrived a method
of rendering our candles even and shining, by rolling them between
two boards; they now were only distinguishable from those of Europe
by a greenish hue. On my observing to my sons that wax was
bleached like linen, by spreading it on cloths, and exposing it to the
dew and sun, they wished to try the process; but as our green tapers
burned remarkably well, bleaching the wax would have been a
useless luxury and loss of time, which I could turn to more account in
manufacturing our impenetrable boots without seams, of the
caoutchouc or elastic gum.
I began with a pair for myself; and I encouraged my children to
afford a specimen of their industry, by trying to form some flasks and
cups that could not break. They commenced by making some clay
moulds, which they covered with layers of gum, agreeably to the
instructions I had given them.
In the meanwhile I compactly filled a pair of stockings with sand,
and covered them with a layer of clay, which I first dried in the shade,
and afterwards in the sun. I then took a sole of buffalo-leather, well
beaten, and studded round with tacks, which served me to fix it
under the foot of the stocking; and after this I poured the liquid gum
into all the interstices, which on drying produced a close adhesion
between the leather and stocking sole. I next proceeded to smear
the whole with a coat of resin of a tolerable thickness; and as soon
as this layer was dried on, I put on another, and so on till I had
spread on a sufficiency with my brush. After which I emptied the
sand, drew out the stocking, removed the hardened clay, shook off
the dust, and thus obtained a pair of seamless boots, as finished as
if made by the best English workman; being pliant, warm, soft,
smooth, and completely water-proof.
I hung them up directly, that they might dry without shrinking. They
fitted uncommonly well; and my four lads were so highly pleased
with their appearance, that they skipped about with joy in requesting
me to make each of them a pair. I refrained from any promise,
because I wished to ascertain their strength previously, and to
compare them with boots made out of mere buffalo-leather. Of these
I at once began a pair for Fritz, with a piece of the slaughtered
buffalo’s skin. They gave far more trouble than those manufactured
with the caoutchouc, which I used to cover the seams and render
them less pervious to water. The work turned out very imperfect, and
so inferior to my incomparable boots, that Fritz wore them
reluctantly; and the more so, as his brothers shouted with laughter at
the difficulty he had to run in them. My boys had succeeded tolerably
well with their new ware, though still imperfect; but as a first essay
performed by tyro artists, I was satisfied with their productions.
We had also been engaged in the construction of our fountain,
which afforded a perpetual source of pleasure to my wife, and
indeed to all of us. In the upper part of the stream we built with
stakes and stones a kind of dam, that raised the water sufficiently to
convey it into the palm-tree troughs; and afterwards, by means of a
gentle slope, to glide on contiguous to our habitation, where it fell
into the tortoise-shell bason, which we had elevated on stones to a
certain height for our convenience; and it was so contrived that the
redundant water passed off through a cane pipe fitted to it. I placed
two sticks athwart each other for the gourds, that served as pails, to
rest on; and we thus produced, close to our abode, an agreeable
fountain, delighting with its rill, and supplying us with a pure crystal
fluid, and such as we frequently could not get when we drew our
water from the bed of the river, which was often blended with the
leaves and earth fallen into it, or rendered turbid by our water-fowls.
The only inconvenience was, that the water flowing in this open state
through narrow channels in a slender stream, was heated, and not
refreshing when it reached us. I resolved to obviate this
inconvenience at my future leisure, by employing, instead of the
uncovered conduits, large bamboo-canes fixed deep enough in the
ground to keep the water cool. In waiting the execution of this
design, we felt pleasure in the new acquisition; and Fritz, who had
suggested the notion, received his tribute of praise from all.
CHAPTER XXX.
The wild ass;—difficulty in breaking it;—the heath-
fowl’s nest.
We were scarcely up one morning, and had got to work in putting

the last hand to our winding stair-case, when we heard at a distance
two strange peculiar kind of voices, that resembled the howlings of
wild beasts, mixed with hissings and sounds of some creature at its
last gasp, which I was at a loss to explain, and I was not without
uneasiness; our dogs too pricked up their ears, and seemed to whet
their teeth for a sanguinary combat with a dangerous enemy.
From their looks we judged it prudent to put ourselves in a state of
defence; we loaded our guns and pistols, placed them together
within our castle in the tree, and prepared to repel vigourously any
hostile attack from that quarter. The howlings having ceased an
instant, I descended from our citadel, well armed, and put on our two
faithful guardians their spiked collars and side-guards: I assembled
our cattle about the tree to have them in sight, and I reascended to
look around for the enemy’s approach. Jack wished they might be
lions—I should like, said he, to have a near view of the king of
beasts, and should not be in the least afraid of him, for lions are
deemed generous!
I do not advise you, answered I, to trust the report, though you
may not fear a lion when elevated as you are forty feet above them:
but these are not lions; their roarings are more lengthened, majestic,
and fill all other animals that hear them with fear and trembling; I do
not observe this effect amongst ours.
Fritz.—I rather surmise they are a troop of jackals, disposed to
avenge the death of their comrades.
Ernest.—It is not the jackal’s cry: I am more inclined to fear they
are hyenas, whose howling must, one would think, be as frightful as
their looks.
Francis.—Now I think they are savages come to eat their prisoners
on our island; I wish we could save them, and get a good Man Friday
as Robinson Crusoe did.
Whatever it is, children, let us not yield to fear or imagination; we
are in safety here...
At this very instant the howlings were renewed and quite close to
us. Fritz got as near the spot as he could, listened attentively and
with eager looks, then threw down his gun and burst into a loud
laughter, exclaiming: Father, it is our ass—the deserter comes back
to us, chanting the hymn of return: listen! do you not hear his
melodious brayings in all the varieties of the gamut?—We lent an
ear; our doubts ceased, and we felt somewhat mortified at our
premature alarms and preparations of defence against such an
ignoble foe.
I on my part, however, was soon reconciled to the offence against
our pride, since it also insured our safety: and a fresh roar, in sounds
unquestionable, raised loud peals of laughter among us; and then
followed the usual train of jests and mutual banter at the alarm we
had one and all betrayed. Shortly after, we had the satisfaction of
seeing among the trees our old friend Grizzle, moving towards us
leisurely, and stopping now and then to browse; but to our great joy
we perceived in his train one of the same species of very superior
beauty, and when it was nearer I knew it to be a fine onagra18 or wild
ass, which I conceived a strong desire to possess, though at the
same time aware of the extreme difficulty there would be in taming
and rendering him subject to the use of man. Some writers who have
described it under the name of the Œigitai, (or long-eared horse,)
given it by the Tartars, affirm that the taming it has been ever found
absolutely impracticable; but my mind furnished an idea on the
subject which I was resolved to act on, if I got possession of the
handsome creature. Without delay I descended the ladder with Fritz,
desiring his brothers to keep still; and I consulted my privy-counsellor
on the means of surprising and taking the stranger captive. I got
ready, as soon as possible, a long cord with a running knot, one end
of which I tied fast to the root of a tree; the noose was kept open with
a little stick slightly fixed in the opening so as to fall of itself on the
cord being thrown round the neck of the animal, whose efforts to
escape would draw the knot closer. I also prepared a piece of
bamboo about two feet long, which I split at the bottom, and tied fast
at top, to serve as nippers. Fritz attentively examined my
contrivance, without seeing the use of it. Prompted by the impatience
of youth, he took the ball-sling and proposed aiming at the wild ass
with it, which he said was the shortest way of proceeding. I declined
adopting this Patagonian method, fearing the attempt might fail, and
the beautiful creature avail itself of its natural velocity to evade us
beyond recovery: I therefore told him my project of catching it in the
noose, which I gave him to manage, as being nimbler and more
expert than myself. The two asses drew nearer and nearer to us.
Fritz, holding in his hand the open noose, moved softly on from
behind the tree where we were concealed, and advanced as far as
the length of the rope allowed him: the onagra was extremely
startled on perceiving a human figure; it sprung some paces
backward, then stopped as if to examine the unknown form; but as
Fritz now remained quite still, the animal resumed its composure and
continued to browse. Soon after he approached the old ass, hoping
that the confidence that would be shown by it, would raise a similar
feeling in the stranger: he held out a handful of oats mixed with salt;
our ass instantly ran up to take its favourite food, and greedily
devoured it; this was quickly perceived by the other. It drew near,
raised its head, breathed strongly and came up so close, that Fritz,
seizing the opportunity, succeeded in throwing the rope round its
neck; but the motion and stroke so affrighted the beast that it
instantly sprang off; it was soon checked by the cord, which in
compressing the neck almost stopped its breath: it could go no
further, and after many exhausting efforts, it sunk panting for breath
upon the ground. I hastened to loosen the cord and prevent its being
strangled. I then quickly threw our ass’s halter over its head; I fixed
the nose in my split cane, which I secured at the bottom with
packthread. Thus I succeeded in subduing the first alarm of this wild
animal, as farriers shoe a horse for the first time. I wholly removed
the noose that seemed to bring the creature into a dangerous
situation; I fastened the halter with two long ropes to two roots near
us, on the right and left, and let the animal recover itself, noticing its
actions, and devising the best way to tame it in the completest
manner.
The rest of my family had by this time come down from the tree
and beheld the fine creature with admiration, its graceful shape and
well-turned limbs, which placed it so much above the ass, and nearly
raised it to the noble structure of the horse! In a few moments the
onagra got up again, struck furiously with its foot, and seemed
resolved to free itself from all bonds: but the pain of its nose, which
was grasped and violently squeezed in the bamboo, forced it to lie
down again. My eldest son and I now gently undid the cords, and
half led, half dragged it between two roots closely connected, to
which we fastened it afresh so as to give the least scope for motion,
and thus, render its escape impracticable, whilst it enabled us to
approach securely and examine the valuable capture we had made.
We also guarded against master Grizzle playing truant again, and
tied him fast with a new halter, confining its fore legs with a rope. I
then fastened it and the wild ass side by side, and put before both
plenty of good provender to solace their impatience of captivity.
We had now the additional occupation of training the onagra for
our service or our pleasure as might turn out to be most practicable:
my boys exulted in the idea of riding it, and we repeatedly
congratulated each other on the good fortune which had thus
resulted from the flight of our ass. Yet I did not conceal that we
should have many difficulties to encounter in taming it, though it
seemed very young and not even to have reached its full growth. But
I was inclined to think proper means had not been hitherto adopted,
and that the hunters, almost as savage as the animals themselves,
had not employed sufficient art and patience, being probably
unconscious of the advantages of either. I therefore determined to
resort to all possible measures: I let the nippers remain on its nose,
which appeared to distress him greatly, though we could plainly
perceive their good effect in subduing the creature, for without them
no one could have ventured to approach him; I took them off
however at times when I gave it food, to render eating easier, and I
began, as with the buffalo, by placing a bundle of sail-cloth on its
back to inure it to carry. When accustomed to the load, I strove to
render the beast still by degrees more docile, by hunger and thirst;
and I observed with pleasure that when it had fasted a little and I
supplied it with food, its look and actions were less wild. I also
compelled the animal to keep erect on its four legs, by drawing the
cords closer that fastened it to the roots, in order to subdue gradually
by fatigue its natural ferocity. The children came in turns to play with
it and scratch its ears gently, which were remarkably tender; and it
was on these I resolved to make my last trial if all other endeavours
failed. For a long time we despaired of success; the onagra made
furious starts and leaps when any of us went near it, kicked with its
hind feet, and even attempted to bite those who touched it. This
obliged me to have recourse to a muzzle, which I managed with
rushes, and put on when it was not feeding. To avoid being struck by
its hind feet, I partially confined them by fastening them to the fore
feet with cords, which however I left moderately loose, that we might
not encroach too much upon the motion necessary for its health. It
was at length familiarized to this discipline, and was no longer in a
rage when we approached, but grew less impatient daily, and bore to
be handled and stroked.
At last we ventured to free it by degrees from its restraints and to
ride it as we had done with the buffalo, still keeping the fore feet tied;
but notwithstanding this precaution and every preceding means, it
proved as fierce and unruly as ever for the moment. The monkey,
who was first put on its back, held on pretty well by clinging to its
mane, from which it was suspended as often as the onagra furiously
reared and plunged; it was therefore for the present impracticable for
either of my sons to get upon it. The perverse beast baffled all our
efforts, and the perilous task of breaking it was still to be persevered
in with terror and apprehension. In the stable it seemed tolerably
quiet and gentle; but the moment it was in any degree unshackled, it
became wholly ferocious and unmanageable.
I was at length reduced to my last expedient, but not without much
regret, as I resolved, if it did not answer, to restore the animal to full

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Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind

Neuroethics: Agency in the Age of Brain Science Joshua

Explorations in Analytic Ecclesiology: That They May be

Kant's Reason: The Unity of Reason and the Limits of

Three Streams: Confucian Reflections on Learning and

A Better Ape: The Evolution of the Moral Mind and How

The Architectonic of Reason: Purposiveness and

Philosophical Mechanics in the Age of Reason Katherine

Duck à l’Orange for Breakfast Karina May

Oxford University Press

Published in May 2018

[Final draft | 6 December 2017 | 108,718 words]

Keywords: rationalism, optimism, skepticism, debunking arguments, moral judgment, moral

6.2 The Egoism-Altruism Debate 107

To Jules, my mighty girl,

may you grow up to be righteous.

List of Tables and Figures

Ch. 1: Empirical Pessimism

Word count: 8,971

1.2 Pessimism about Moral Cognition

1.2.2 Reason vs. Emotion?

1.2.3 Rationalism vs. Sentimentalism

1.3 Pessimism about Moral Motivation

1.3.2 Non-cognitivism & Relativism

1.4 Optimistic Rationalism

Figure 1.1: Key Sources of Empirically Grounded Pessimism

We were scarcely up one morning, and had got to work in putting

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