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 A R IST OT LE ’S ONT OL O G Y OF AR TEF AC TS

It is commonly believed that Aristotle merely uses artefacts as

examples or analogical cases. This book, however, shows that
Aristotle gives a specific, coherent account of artefacts that in various
ways owes much to Plato. Moreover, it proposes a new, definitive
solution to the problem of artefacts’ substantiality, which comprises
two controversial positions: (i) that Aristotle holds a binary view of
substantiality according to which artefacts are not substances at all;
(ii) that artefacts fail to be substances because they exhibit less of
a unity than natural wholes. Finally, responding to the contemporary
debate on ordinary objects, the book identifies the main propositions
for an ontology of artefacts that aspires to use Aristotle as its authority
and can serve as a guideline for current metaphysical discussions.
This title is part of the Flip it Open Programme and may also be
available Open Access. Check our website Cambridge Core for
details.

marilù papandreou is a post-doctoral researcher at the University

of Bergen and the Humboldt University of Berlin.

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Published online by Cambridge University Press
 ARISTOTLE’S ONTOLOGY
OF ARTEFACTS

MARILÙ PAPANDREOU
University of Bergen Humboldt University of Berlin

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doi: 10.1017/9781009340557
© Marilù Papandreou 2024
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place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment.
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 To my parents,
Anna e Giorgio

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Published online by Cambridge University Press
 Contents

List of Figures page x

Acknowledgements xi
List of Abbreviations xiv

Introduction 1
0.1 Artefacts in the Contemporary Debate 2
0.2 Artefacts in Aristotle: Some Preliminary Observations 8
0.3 Aristotelian Scholarship: The Status Quaestionis 15
0.4 A Piecemeal Approach 20
0.5 Aristotle’s Ontology of Artefacts 27

1 The Platonic Heritage 31

1.1 Plato’s Metaphysics of Artefacts 32
1.1.1 Plato’s Ideas of Artefacts in the Cratylus and Republic X 32
1.1.2 The Doubts of the Young Socrates in the Parmenides 36
1.1.3 Divine Craftsmanship in the Timaeus 39
1.2 Building on Plato’s Theoretical Shortcomings 41
1.2.1 Final Causation 41
1.2.2 Models, Likenesses and the Notion of Imitation 42
1.3 Platonic Intuitions as the Source of Aristotle’s Account of Artefacts 46
1.3.1 Ideas and Forms 46
1.3.2 Axiology and Metaphysics 48
1.3.3 Carving Nature at the Joints 52
1.3.4 Parts and Whole 55

2 Using Artefacts against Plato 58

2.1 The Arguments 58
2.1.1 Against the Arguments from the Sciences 58
2.1.2 The Threat of Aporia 61
2.1.3 The Logical or Semantic Argument 66
2.1.4 Aristotle’s Argument from Evidence 67
2.2 The Notion of Separation 70
2.3 Aristotle’s Dialectical Use of Artefacts 71

vii

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 viii Contents
3 Aristotle’s Building Blocks in the Physics 75
3.1 The Theory of the Four Causes and the Art Analogy 76
3.2 The Salient Difference between Artefacts and Natural Beings 81
3.2.1 The Definition of Nature in Phys. 2.1 83
3.2.2 Daedalus’ Statues, Machines, the Olive Tree and the Swallow’s
Nest 87
3.3 Artefacts Will Typically Come-to-Be by Art 88
3.3.1 Art as Principle 89
3.3.2 Other Dependent Objects 92
3.4 Some Artefacts Will Only Come-to-Be by Art and Some Natural Beings
Will Also Come-to-Be by Art 100
3.4.1 Inadvertently Made Objects 100
3.4.2 The Case of Artificial Mixtures 103

4 Artefacts as Hylomorphic Compounds 109

4.1 Artefacts Undergo Unqualified Coming-to-Be 110
4.1.1 Intrinsic Change in the Matter 110
4.1.2 Per Se Unities 121
4.1.3 Nature-Facts and Found-Objects: The Paperweight
and the Strigil 123
4.2 It’s Not Bronze, It’s a Brazen Statue 125
4.2.1 The Eikeininon Rule 125
4.2.2 Actuality-Inducing Action as the Relevant Change in Matter 129
4.3 Synonymy Principle 136
4.3.1 The Synonymy Principle Applied to Artefacts 138
4.3.2 The Form in the Mind of the Artisan as the Form of the Object
in Thought and as in Actuality 141
4.3.3 The Form in the Object in Potentiality: The Artisans’ Tools 143
4.4 Neither Just Matter nor Accidental Beings 147

5 Forms of Artefacts as Inert and Intermittent 150

5.1 Art as the Form in the Mind of the Artisan 151
5.1.1 Art as Efficient Cause of Qualified Coming-to-Be 151
5.1.2 Art as Efficient Cause of Unqualified Coming-to-Be 157
5.2 Against Transmission Theory: How the Form in the Object Is Not
an Efficient Cause Explained through Biology 161
5.2.1 On the Difference between the Semen and the Tools 161
5.2.2 Heartless Artefacts 165
5.3 Autonomy, Life and Substantiality 168
5.4 Eternity and Substantiality 174

6 The Relation between Matter and Form in Artefacts 181

6.1 Artefact-Kinds as Functions 181
6.2 Diachronic and Synchronic Matter 187
6.2.1 Remote and Proximate Matter 192

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 Contents ix
6.2.2 The Proximate Matter of Artefacts: The Many-to-Many
Relationship 194
6.2.3 The Sources of Hindrances in the Remote Matter of Artefacts 202
6.3 The Synchronic Matter of Artefacts: Functional Matter and the
Homonymy Principle 207
6.4 What Then? Persisting Matter 214
6.5 The Unity of Matter and Form and Substantiality 215

7 The Relation Between Parts and Whole in Artefacts 219

7.1 How to Explain What a Thing Is: The Differentiae in H 2 221
7.2 The Static Picture 227
7.2.1 Unity by Contact 227
7.2.2 Unity by Continuity 229
7.2.3 Unity by Wholeness 230
7.3 Unity and the Substantiality of Artefacts 232
7.3.1 Having a Form, but with Parts in Actuality 232
7.3.2 Failing Met. Z 13’s Substantiality Criterion 237
7.3.3 Hylomorphism and Substantiality Diverge 241
7.3.4 Unqualified Coming-to-Be Reconsidered: Production and
Destruction 243

8 The Physics and Metaphysics of Artefacts 251

8.1 The Dynamic Picture: Maintenance and Performance 251
8.2 Back to the Physics? 261
8.3 Artefacts as Objects of Inquiry 264
8.3.1 The Physicist, the Artisan and the User 265
8.3.2 The Metaphysician 268
8.3.3 The Cheap Coppersmith and the Spit-and-Lampstand 271

Conclusions 276

Bibliography 281
Index Locorum 294
Subject Index 297

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 Figures

4.1 Difference between a matter that is potentially the object page 133
and a matter that is part of the object

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 Acknowledgements

This book began as a doctoral dissertation at the Munich School of Ancient

Philosophy (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich). My primary debt
is to my supervisor and mentor Christof Rapp for his profound and
manifold influence on me as a scholar. I am indebted to my second reader,
Peter Adamson, for his formative feedback, kindness, support and always
prompt advice. I could not wish for a better place than MUSAΦ to
conduct, and learn how to conduct, research in ancient philosophy.
Christian Pfeiffer and Laura Castelli have been particularly generous and
commented on various chapters during my PhD. I also owe them a great
deal of gratitude for inspiring, with their respective work, many of the
decisions I made in reconstructing Aristotle’s ontology of artefacts. I wish
to thank Oliver Primavesi for unerringly sharing his most recent work on
the text of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, thus securing a robust foundation and
philological soundness for my project. Colleagues and friends at MUSAΦ
have been an outstanding source of help too, in particular Andreas
Anagnostopoulos, Jonathan Greig and Melina Vogiatzi.
The University of Milan is where I first became passionate about ancient
philosophy and started rambling over lunch about whether there are Ideas
of artefacts. I truly cannot thank enough Filippo Forcignanò, Mauro
Bonazzi and Franco Trabattoni for instilling in me such a deep affection
for the topic. Back then, I also had the fortune to have my PhD project idea
discussed with Maddalena Bonelli and Simone Seminara, to whom
I would like to show appreciation as well.
During and after having completed my PhD, I have fortunately been
allowed to present part of my research on several occasions. I would like to
offer thanks to the audiences in Berlin, Berkeley, Cambridge, Falconara,
Milan, Pavia and Paris. I wish to express my gratitude to those who took
extra time and showed interest in my research, by challenging it in an
incredibly obliging and always sympathetic manner: Riccardo
Chiaradonna, Nicholas Denyer, Andrea Falcon, Andreas Lammer, Gyula
xi

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 xii Acknowledgements
Klima and David Sedley. One who revealed to me connections I was not
aware of was Thomas Kjeller Johansen, to whom I am exceedingly grateful
for taking the time to meet with me in Oslo. Furthermore, I would like to
extend thanks to Stephen Menn for allowing me to cite his work in progress.
My understanding of the contemporary metaphysics of artefacts owes an
immense debt to Kathrin Koslicki. I wish to thank her for sharing and
discussing with me her chapter on artefacts in Munich in 2017 and for
continuing this conversation in Berlin in 2022. To tell the truth, I would
not have been able to place Aristotle into dialogue with contemporary
metaphysicians without her work.
The book in its final form owes the most gratitude to the anonymous
referees, who provided a wealth of astounding advice. I cannot express how
grateful I am for how thoroughly they engaged with my book and how
attentive and acute their comments were. It is impossible to exhaustively
name the ways their feedback improved my book, but I would like to
especially highlight two major debts I collected towards them. I was guilty
of underestimating the importance of the Platonic heritage and the role of
Aristotle’s Physics. I owe to the reviewers the very structure of the book as
revolving around Aristotle’s response to Plato, as well as the rehabilitation
of the Physics and the emphasis on its significance even concerning
Aristotle’s ontology of artefacts.
Individual chapters were considerably improved thanks to having been
given the opportunity to present their drafts. I wish to thank Pierre-Marie
Morel and Ulysse Chaintreuil for inviting me to Paris to present Chapter 8.
Moreover, I thank Chiara Blengini, Federico Casella and Beatrice Michetti
for inviting me to Pavia to share my thoughts on the very peculiar case of
mixtures (Chapter 3.4.2).
I cannot fail to acknowledge the University of Bergen, where I am
currently a post-doctoral researcher. Without a doubt, they have offered
me the best conditions imaginable to bring the book to publication. I wish
to thank Steinar Bøyum in particular, whose supportive leadership imme-
diately made me feel in the right place. Furthermore, I would like to
express my gratitude to Hallvard Fossheim and Kristian Larsen for their
insightful feedback on the first chapter.
If this book is at all readable, it is thanks to Chad Jorgenson and his
unmatched competence as English language editor. He not only made my
English clearer and more idiomatic, but also acted as an encouraging
teammate along the way. Moreover, if this book is at all a book, it is thanks
to the editor Michael Sharp, with his brilliant guidance and great support
along the way.

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 Acknowledgements xiii
On a more personal note, this book has been written and revised in
numerous locations, all of which have felt like home to me. This feeling
plays no negligible part in the writing process. I cannot but wholeheartedly
thank my parents – to whom I dedicate this book – and my family in Italy,
in particular Alice and Ivan, as well as my friend Benny. Most of the effort
that went into this book, however, was in Munich, where I was surrounded
by great friends. Their presence, encouragement and interest has benefitted
me and this book in ways that are nearly impossible to explain. My sincere
thanks go to Biene, Blake, Brett, Connie, Elena, Felix, Minna and
Tommaso. A special thank you also goes to the Center for Advanced
Studies (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich), and to Annette
Meyer in particular. Nobody taught me to look outside of my own bubble
and allowed me to understand my role, however small, in the wider
academic and research world than Annette did. I was furthermore incred-
ibly fortunate to often be able to revise my book in Norway, particularly in
Bø in Telemark and on the island Jomfruland. I wish to thank Turid and
Halvor for taking care of me and making sure I could work undisturbed in
such wonderful places. It turns out that nothing helps me more as a writer
than Norwegian kos. Finally, I would like to thank Jostein Gåra, for sharing
this journey with me since its beginning and for infallibly being my
compass and dearest human being. I cannot ever hope to repay him.

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 Abbreviations

An. Post. Posterior Analytics

Cael. On the Heavens
Cat. Categories
DA On the Soul (De anima)
EE Eudemian Ethics
GA Generation of Animals
GC Generation and Corruption
HA History of Animals
MA Movements of Animals
Mech. Mechanics
Met. Metaphysics
Meteor. Meteorology
MM Magna Moralia
NE Nicomachean Ethics
PA Parts of Animals
Parm. Parmenides
Phaed. Phaedrus
Phys. Physics
Pol. Politics
Rep. Republic
Symp. Symposium
Theaet. Theaetetus
Top. Topics
All references to Aristotle’s text follow Bekker pagination.
All references to Plato’s text follow Stephanus pagination.
All translations are my own, unless otherwise specified.

xiv

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 Introduction

This book concerns the ontological status of products of art (technê) in

Aristotle, in particular material objects. It makes three main advances with
respect to the existing literature: the first will be of interest to contemporary
metaphysicians, the second to historians of philosophy, and the third to
both contemporary metaphysicians and historians of philosophy. First, the
metaphysics of artefacts is increasingly gaining the attention of contem-
porary metaphysicians, in particular among supporters of hylomorphism,
who all refer to or draw on Aristotle. However, there is no consensus about
the place of artefacts within Aristotle’s ontology; indeed, there is no
consensus as to whether Aristotle articulates a single coherent account of
artefacts in the first place. Hence, the first contribution made by this book
is to offer a complete picture of Aristotle’s account of artefacts that is
sensitive to current issues and that can therefore serve as a guide for the
contemporary (neo-)Aristotelian debate. Second, when it comes to technê,
historians of philosophy have primarily focused on the art analogy and
Aristotle’s use of examples taken from the artificial realm. They have often
concluded that Aristotle’s appeal to artefacts does not leave us with any
positive result about the status of technical objects. To date, little effort has
been invested in demarcating Aristotle’s notion of artefacts in a way that
goes beyond the art analogy and a handful of commonly used examples.
The book’s second contribution is to show that Aristotle gives a specific,
coherent account of artefacts and that he did not merely employ them as
examples or analogical cases. Its third and final contribution is to address
an issue of key interest to both Aristotle scholars and contemporary
metaphysicians concerning the ontological status of artefacts, namely the
question of whether they are substances and, if not, why they fail to attain
this status. No consensus has yet been reached regarding the substantiality
of artefacts: there is agreement neither as to whether artefacts are sub-
stances, at least to some extent, nor as to the ultimate reason why they are
ontologically inferior to living beings. This book proposes a new solution
1

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 2 Introduction
to this problem. I shall now begin by offering some preliminary, founda-
tional remarks on the topic and the method.

0.1 Artefacts in the Contemporary Debate

The vast majority of our sensory experience is filled with human-
dependent objects. ‘Other than the sky and some trees, everything I can
see from where I now sit is artificial’, as Henry Petroski (1992) puts it at the
beginning of his The Evolution of Useful Things. Petroski’s book aims to
examine the way in which such objects have come to look the way they do,
by adopting a historical perspective. This perspective is non-philosophical
insofar as it presents a sort of common-sense view of artefacts as, in general,
objects that are designed – that is, objects from our daily lives employed in
specific cultural settings that came-to-be as a result of occasionally rather
complicated design-histories. Artefacts are therefore objects that human
beings have designed, such as forks, paper clips, hammers, nails and spikes.
A similar, yet nonetheless different approach is represented by the arch-
aeological conception of an artefact: something made or given shape by
humans, usually found buried along with a body, among votive offerings,
in hoards, or in a domestic setting or midden. Examples include stone
tools, pottery vessels, metal objects such as weapons, and items of personal
adornment, such as buttons, jewellery and clothing. By contrast, neither
non-portable remains, such as hearths, nor biofacts and manuports are
considered artefacts by archaeologists.1
Within a non-philosophical perspective, we find the frequent common-
sense identification of artefacts with artworks, such as paintings, drawings
and other creative products. Although works of art can, in many respects, be
conceptualised as artefacts, they make up only a small portion of this group.
A simple semantic shift would suffice to invalidate this identification:
common sense does not wholly identify crafted items with works of art.
Indeed, the very word ‘artefact’, in opposition to ‘craftwork’, allows for
a misrepresentation of the class of objects as being artistic products in the
ordinary meaning of the term. This is part of the reason why several
contemporary thinkers prefer to talk about technical artefacts in order to
disambiguate and explicitly exclude artworks from their surveys.2 The
adjective ‘artificial’ exhibits similar ambiguity. The ordinary understanding
1
Biofacts are objects that are merely handled by humans but not made by them. Usually biofacts refer
to the residual material of a formerly living being. Manuports are natural objects that humans have
moved, but not changed.
2
See Baker (2007).

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 0.1 Artefacts in the Contemporary Debate 3
of this term takes it to mean either ‘made according to art’/‘man-made’ or
‘not sincere’. Thus, the replacement of ‘artificial’ by either ‘crafted’ or
‘technical’ helps to avoid ambiguity. In this book, I shall employ the word
‘artefact’ – and, consequently, ‘artificial’ – to refer to a class of human-
dependent objects that are typically brought into existence through a specific
set of skills (i.e. art or craft).
If we define artefacts as both artistic and technical items that are brought
into existence by human agents, why are they interesting? From an ordinary
point of view – without yet entering into philosophical discussion – artefacts
are interesting because nobody can do without them. Of course, one could
very well take the decision to push technology out of one’s life, but technical
items are far more numerous than technological items, such as smartphones,
computers and consoles. The world we live in is filled with roads, beds and
tools. Anyone interested in the world would have to acknowledge the vast
quantities of artefacts present in it. Even when not acknowledged, artefacts
play a major role in shaping societies and people’s lives.3
The omnipresence of artefacts has been widely underestimated by
philosophers and interest in technology is a recent development. Two
branches of philosophy have shown the most interest in artefacts: philoso-
phy of technology and aesthetics. The former emerged as a discipline over
the last two centuries and was primarily associated with questions of
philosophy of science and engineering.4 The latter was specifically engaged
with questions regarding works of art, leaving aside tools and other objects
of this sort that constitute the majority of artefacts.
The metaphysics of artefacts has received comparatively limited interest.5
This is probably due to a tradition that downgrades manifest things6 and
denies the value of artefacts. One contemporary controversy has, in fact,
focused on whether artefacts deserve a place in our ontology at all. The idea
that artefacts might deserve their own ontological position has often been
rejected. Puzzles such as that of Theseus’ Ship7 or the problem of coinciding

3
For a discussion on the ways in which well and badly designed artefacts affect our lives, see, for
instance, Norman 2001; and for a consideration of artefacts as ‘collaborative actions’, see Preston
2012.
4
It is still difficult to understand what the discipline of philosophy of technology consists of and
whether it is a self-contained discipline in the first place. For an overview, see Franssen 2009; Reydon
2012.
5
I shall set aside the treatment of artefacts in semantic, mereology and formal ontology.
6
In the modern discussion, the class of ‘manifest things’ includes macroscopic beings such as artefacts
and living beings.
7
The puzzle of Theseus’ Ship has acquired special notoriety. It is presented by Hobbes in his De
Corpore (1655) and reconsidered by Simons (1987) and Wiggins (2001).

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 4 Introduction
objects8 seem to threaten their identity and existence. The so-called ‘Denial
Thesis’ proposed by Van Inwagen (1990) has been highly influential, accord-
ing to which not only artefacts, but also inanimate material objects do not
exist.9 This scepticism about taking artefacts seriously may also reflect a more
general scepticism towards ordinary things (natural as well as artificial beings
present in our daily experience – such as dogs and chairs) of the sort that we
find, for instance, in Unger’s (1979) article. As Baker (2007, 4–5) states:
Some contemporary metaphysicians reject ordinary things10 because they take
irreducible reality to be exhausted by a completed physics; some reject ordinary
things because they take common sense objects to be too sloppy – they gain and
lose parts; they have no fixed boundaries – to be irreducibly real. Many of
today’s philosophers take concrete reality to be nothing but fundamental
particles and their fusions, or instantaneous temporal parts, and/or a few
universals, and see no ontological significance in ordinary things like trees
and tables.
Baker is therefore part of the minor trend of taking ordinary things to be
irreducibly real and, hence, as deserving a spot in our ontologies.
However, growing interest in artificial objects has also been witnessed
recently in metaphysics, where the main questions are about the kind of
entities they are and whether they exist at all – since their identity condi-
tions seem unclear with respect to both particular objects and artificial
kinds. Metaphysics has mostly focused on works of arts alone, and espe-
cially on the question of the ontological category to which they belong.
Many philosophers have, in fact, defined works of art as events, processes
or actions.11 The metaphysics of technical artefacts, or artefacts in general
(including both technical artefacts and artworks), has certainly received
a limited attention due to widespread scepticism about their metaphysical
value. However, two leading approaches to defending artefacts as serious
objects of philosophical thinking have been promoted in recent years. The
first is to reject the arguments against the ontological value of artefacts.
Thinkers following this first path include Rea (1995, 1998) and Soavi
(2009).12 The second way of securing a place for artefacts within our

8
See Rea 1997.
9
By proposing a theory of composition, Van Inwagen claims that only living beings and their simples
exist.
10
The class of ordinary things is broader than the class of artefacts. Ordinary things also include living
beings. Some philosophers do not merely exclude artefacts from ontology, but they do so by
excluding ordinary things as a whole from their discussion.
11
For an overview of the positions concerning the ontological status of artworks, see Livingston 2011.
12
Soavi (2009), for instance, examines and rejects three arguments against the reality of artefacts:
Wiggins’ argument that artefact kinds are not sortals (Wiggins 2001), Van Inwagen’s composition

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 0.1 Artefacts in the Contemporary Debate 5
ontology is to defend the value of a super-category that includes artefacts,
as well as other things.13 Often, this latter approach is pursued alongside the
rejection of arguments levelled against the super-category in question. For
instance, Elder (2007) includes some – though not all – artefacts in the
class of copied kinds and argues that they ‘have genuine, mind-independent
existence – existence caused by us, to be sure, but not constituted by our
believing what we do about where artifacts are to be found’. Thomasson
(2007a) includes artefacts in the super-category of ordinary objects and
argues in favour of a realist position, by opposing the idea that dependence
on human beliefs and intentions cannot coexist with the reality of artificial
and institutional objects. Baker focuses on the super-category of familiar
things and defends their value: she explains that the everyday world is the
locus of human interest and concern (Baker 2007, 7) and that it figures in
the causal explanations that we make. Also in favour of the reality of
artefacts is Koslicki,14 who declares her willingness to include artefacts in
her discussion, despite being sceptical as to whether they can be counted as
hylomorphic compounds. While still constituting a minority, supporters
of taking artefacts seriously in metaphysical discussions have been growing
in number and strength in recent years. It seems that the complaint made
by Houkes and Vermaas (2009) about analytic philosophers of artefacts
was not unheard: ‘Only those philosophers who aim at a very complete
and/or a very general understanding of the world care, at some point in
their projects, to examine artefacts.’ A prominent, but unwelcome feature
of analytic studies of artefacts is their lack of specificity: they touch upon
artefacts merely because they are dealing with a larger range of beings, if not
all beings. On the one hand, numerous works have associated artefacts with
a range of other beings, so as to create a more general class of beings sharing
a particular metaphysical feature: examples of this include copied kinds
(Elder 2007) and ordinary objects (Van Inwagen 1990). On the other hand,
some works have focused on specific kinds of artefacts, such as artworks, or
have discussed artefacts without drawing a distinction between artefacts
and other human-dependent things, resulting in the wider class of ID-
objects. Analytic metaphysicians of artefacts have mostly addressed them in

argument (Van Inwagen 1990, 90, 98) and Merricks’ argument from causal overdetermination
(Merricks 2001, 56–8). She argues (29–30) that the three accounts suffer from the same fundamental
flaw: none of them establishes a clear-cut distinction between artefacts and natural beings. More
recently, Koslicki (2018), while addressing author-based accounts, points out their difficulties in
dealing with objects that are clearly classifiable neither as natural beings nor as artefacts.
13
Works defending the metaphysical seriousness of artefacts include Rea 1995, 1998; Thomasson 1999,
2007; Elder 2004, 2007.
14
Koslicki 2008, 2018.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009340557.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

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Title: The lucky little stiff

Author: H. P. S. Greene

Release date: April 28, 2024 [eBook #73484]

Language: English

Original publication: United States: The Butterick Publishing

Company, 1927

Credits: Roger Frank and Sue Clark

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE LUCKY

LITTLE STIFF ***
 An air pilot and the field of broken wings

THE LUCKY LITTLE STIFF

By H. P. S. Greene

France. Mud. A khaki-clad column of fours slogging along to the

rhythm of their own muttered but heart-felt blasphemy—a common
enough sight in the winter of 1917-1918.
But in one particular this procession of sufferers was unique. On
the shoulders of each performer shone bright silver bars, and their
more or less manly chests were spanned by Sam Browne belts. A
casual observer would have taken them for officers. But no, on each
breast was a pair of silver wings, and their uniforms were of well-
fitting but variously designed whipcord. The pot-bellied little person in
the indecently short yellow serge blouse who led them was an
officer; his followers were flying lieutenants.
They were a part of the personnel-in-training of the great
American aviation field of Issy-la-Boue, the advance guard of the ten
thousand American bombing planes which publicity agents said were
going to blast the Huns out of Berlin.
The column passed between two long barracks, one of which,
filled to capacity with double-decker bunks, yawned thru an
unfinished open end.
“Squads right!” shrilled the pot-bellied one with the captain’s bars
in a startling tremolo. “Heh!”
 The men behind squads-righted in a dispirited fashion and came
to a halt in straggling lines. The squawky voice continued:
“I want to say that you are the most undisciplined body of men I
ever saw. That—er—mélée you staged when you were unwittingly
marched into—er—contact with a body of enlisted men was the most
disgraceful exhibition on the part of officers so-called I ever saw in
my life. I—er—want to say you are a disgrace to the service. That’s
all I want to say. Oh, I—er—believe Lieutenant Crosby has
something to say to you.”
Flying-Lieutenant Crosby stepped forward and cleared his throat.
He was a born Babbitt, a destined getter-together.
“Men,” he began, and then hesitated. Perhaps he should have
said “officers,” but that wouldn’t have sounded right either. He rushed
on, “I want to remind you that Happy’s and Sam’s funeral is this
afternoon. All flying is called off as usual. There wasn’t much of a
crowd out for poor old Bill yesterday. I know it’s a long walk and all
that but we want to get a good crowd out this afternoon. The cadets
are going to try to get a good crowd out for their fellow who got
bumped, and we want to get a good crowd out too. That’s all I
wanted to say.”
He retired to the ranks. The fat officer shouted “Dismissed!” Then
he changed his mind.
“As you were. The commanding officer wanted me to announce
that quarantine to the post is on again until the perpetrator of the
outrage of stopping the Paris Express has been discovered and
punished. Dismissed!”
The half-broken ranks scattered in the direction of their barracks.
Toward the one with the unfinished end went three oddly dissimilar
figures. They were always together, and of course some one had
already thought of calling them “The Three Musketeers.”
One was short, dark and slim, with pathetic eyes and a dispirited
mustache. Another was tall and lathy, with a long lugubrious
countenance. The third was blond and almost corpulent.
“I knew it, Tommy, I knew it,” said the tall man. “How come you
and ‘Fat’ to pull such a stunt, anyway? Ain’t such a joke now, is it?
What’re you going to do about it?”
 The three entered their barrack and sat down on a bunk near the
open end, well away from the crowd huddled around the stove in the
middle. The little man gazed sadly before him.
His mustache drooped dolefully. Some observant person had
remarked that he could read Tommy by his mustache. When it was
freshly waxed and pert, he was just going on a party. When it was
sorry and unkempt, he had just been on one.
“You know we didn’t mean any harm,” he said. “All that stuff the
frogs put out about our trying to wreck the train was a dish of prunes.
As if it wasn’t bad enough to miss the truck and walk out here twelve
miles from town without having all this on top of it. When the
quarantine for the itch was taken off, and Fat and I got those “thirty-
six hours on condition you don’t go to Paris” passes, we got by the
M. P.’s at the gare in Paris all right.
“We went out through the baggage-room. I wasn’t in the
Ambulance for nothing. We came back into the station the same
way, and once we got on the train we went right to sleep. They sure
do put up a good champagne cocktail at Henry’s, and then all those
beers at the Follies!
“Well, when I woke up we were at a station. I looked out and the
sign on it said Chateauroux. I knew where we were all right because
I’ve flown over the place. We’d passed Issy. So I woke Fat up and
pulled him off the train. There was another train standing in the
station, and I asked a frog where it went to and he said it was the
Paris Express. So I knew it would take us back to Issy again, and we
hopped on.
“We got into a third class compartment with a lot of poilus, and
they had beaucoup red wine, and we drank to la belle France, and
les-Êtats-Unis, and when I woke up again the train was just leaving a
station, and the sign said Issy-la-Boue. By the time I realized what it
all meant we were going too fast to jump off, so I pulled that handle
on the wall, and the train stopped.
“When we saw how wrought up the frogs were, we beat it. No
wonder we had to come over and help them win the war, if they’re all
as bum shots as those birds were! Guess they thought we were
bandits or spies or something. Well, we had to walk home to keep
from being A. W. O. Loose from roll-call this morning, and never got
home till four o’clock. Suppose after flying, I’ll have to go over and
’fess up to Herman, or you birds will never get any more passes. But
I know I’ll never get one if I stay here for the duration of the war.”
“No pass ain’t nothin’ to what you’ll get, boy!” said “Long John.”
“Shot at sunrise, is my bet. But I admire your self-sacrificin’ spirit.”
“Never mind, we’ll take our medicine, won’t we, Fat? And if I don’t
mention you, maybe he won’t say anything about it.”
Fat grunted dolefully. Outside a bugle blew. The three rose to go.
“It’s me and Tommy to fly the eighteen meters,” said Long John.
“Where do you go, Fat?”
“Machine-gun,” was the answer.
“Hum, too bad. I heard the guy they shot there last week croaked.
The bullet went right thru his leg, and the quack dressed the place
where it went in all right, but forgot to see if it came out. Gangrene
set in and his leg rotted off, and they had to shoot him. Now a feller
your build— say, it wouldn’t go through at all. Just stay there and
fester—”
But his victim was gone.

Tommy flew badly that morning. He was all in, his head ached and,
besides, he was worrying about that interview with Major Herman
Krause. And then he had to practise landings—nervous work at best
in an unfamiliar ship. Finally he blew a tire and was bawled out
unmercifully by the instructor.
Luckily it was on his tenth and last trip, and he breathed a sigh of
relief when the lecture was over and he could go. He went to the
barracks and policed up. Shave, shine, but no shampoo. There was
hardly enough water for drinking and shaving, and that was brought
many miles in tank wagons. Bathing was something one went
without at Issy—and felt not much the worse unless the scabbies set
in.
Once militarily clean, Tommy dragged himself to headquarters,
entirely ruining the new shine so painfully acquired. He entered the
presence of the adjutant feeling like a whipped schoolboy. He
saluted and stood at attention.
 “Sir, Lieutenant Lang to speak to the commanding officer.”
The adjutant kept on writing for about five minutes at a desk
stacked with piles of reports. Then he looked up savagely and spoke
with a slight accent:
“What? Oh, yes. What for?”
“About the Paris Express.”
“Go right in. He’s waiting.”
Tommy went in and stood with trembling knees before the C. O.
He was a large florid man with beetling brows and his manner was
not encouraging.
“You? Well? What about it?”
Tommy explained as well as he could, stressing his innocence.
He thought his plea must have softened an executioner, but Major
Krause was uncompromising in attitude and words.
“Young man,” he said, “you are a disgrace, sir! A disgrace to the
United States Army!” Tommy thought he had heard those words
before. “We have been having considerable trouble with the guard.
Those cadets are the worst disciplined body of men I ever saw.”
Again a familiar note.
“As for you—you seem to have trouble keeping awake. A
permanent assignment as commander of the guard ought to give
you beneficial practise at it. Of course, after keeping awake all night,
you will need to sleep in the day-time. You are therefore relieved
from flying duty. Report at guard mount this evening and every
evening until further orders. That will do.”
Tommy saluted and went out, his heart sinking. There were only
three known ways of getting out of Issy-la-Boue. The first was to
break your neck. The second was to fly so well that you were
graduated. The third was to fly so poorly that you were sent to
Blooey for reclassification, probably as an armament officer. Which
was generally considered the lowest form of life so far discovered in
the air service.
All these methods were dependent on flying. Once a man was
taken off flying duty, it took an act of Congress to get him away from
the place.
 The little man wended his way back to the barracks. His
comrades were sitting on their bunks, and he poured his tale of woe
into their receptive ears. Being beyond words, they accorded him
silent sympathy. Finally Fat spoke:
“Well, I’m lucky to be out of it. Say, did you hear the news? Brock
was washed out on the fifteens this morning.”
“That makes seven in a week,” said Tommy after a pause. “How’d
it happen?”
“Same old thing. Wings came off.”
A bugle called. Most of the flying lieutenants went outside and,
joining others from near-by barracks, formed in line. A few
commands, and they were in one of the rivers of mud which served
as roads at the field. Presently they were halted behind three long
two-wheeled pushcarts; each cart bore a long box covered with an
American flag. The mourners stood in the mud for half an hour
waiting, and then a dispirited looking band appeared. Its bass drum
echoed boom-boom-boom-boom-boom, and the procession started.
Through the gate of the camp it went, and out on to the main
road, while the drum kept up its sad, hollow sound. Yard after yard,
rod after rod, until the cortège had walked two miles. Then it turned
into a young but flourishing cemetery, with red, raw mounds in
orderly lines.
The men were formed around three fresh graves. A pale-faced Y.
M. C. A. man stumbled through the burial service. A red-faced Knight
of Columbus did likewise. A Frenchman flew over and dropped some
dessicated roses. Then they all marched away again; only the boxes
and a small burial party remained behind.
The band struggled with its one tune, a lively quickstep, according
to regulations. Two old peasants drew their cart to one side of the
road to let them pass.
“Comme ils sont trists, les ’tits Americains!” said the woman.
“Quelle musique!” answered her spouse.

The three chums went back to their bunks.

 “Do you birds know anything about being the commander of the
guard?” asked Tommy with some concern.
“No,” replied Fat.
“Sure,” answered Long John. “I was chucked out of the first
training camp. First, you have to have a gun.”
“A rifle?” asked Tommy.
“No, you little sap. Officers don’t carry rifles, or flying lieutenants
either. A pistol.”
“But I ain’t got a pistol.”
“Borrow one then. Do you know the general orders?”
“I don’t know any generals, orders or debility either.”
“Never mind trying to be funny. You may find out it ain’t no joke
about generals. The Old Boy himself and the Silly Civilian are going
to inspect the post tomorrow. I saw the orders over at the operations
office for every machine to be up that can get off the ground. I
suppose that means a lot more long walks. But it’s most time for
guard mount; you’d better run along and find a gun.”
Tommy disappeared and finally returned with a regulation web
belt and holster in one hand, and a .25 caliber automatic in the other.
“What are you going to do with that popgun, you idiot?” asked
Long John disgustedly. “Are you going hunting canary birds, or
what?”
“I couldn’t find a regular gun, and a cadet loaned me this. He said
officers had taken it before and put a dirty sock or something in the
holster so the butt would just show, and got by all right.”
“Very well, then, take one of Fat’s socks. The smell may keep you
awake. Is the blamed thing loaded? Look out you don’t shoot
yourself. There’s the call, now. Put on your belt. You fool! How many
belts are you going to wear? What do you think you are, a past
grand master of the Holy Jumpers? Take off your Sam Browne.
There—get going, now.
“Well, away he goes, and he doesn’t know whether Julius Cesar
was stabbed or shot off horseback. Did you ever see the like, Fat?
But I bet he comes out all right some way, the lucky little stiff. I never
knew it to fail. Well, let’s go up by the stove.”
 But Tommy wasn’t such a complete fool as he appeared. He
knew the old Army advice for shavetails, “Find a good sergeant and
stick to him.” The sergeant of the guard was a grizzled old sufferer
who had been through it all many, many times. He engineered the
guard mount and posted the guard. Then Tommy drew him to one
side.
“What do I do now, Sergeant?” he asked.
“Well, the lieutenant has to inspect the guard three times, once
between midnight and six o’clock in the morning. First ask them for
their special orders, and then for their general orders. If they make a
mistake, I’ll nudge you and you say, ‘Correct him, Sergeant,’ and I’ll
fix him up. It’s getting dark now. Would the Lieutenant like to make
his first inspection before supper?”
Inspection was a hectic affair. The guard was composed of
cadets who had joined the Army to fly and remained in it to mount
guard, and it was their intention to make it as interesting as possible
for all concerned, especially their superiors. But the old sergeant was
equal to the occasion. He steered Tommy by the traps planted for
him, and then showed him the guardhouse.
There the commander of the guard ate his slum and then
returned to his barrack. Long John grabbed him by the arm as he
entered.
“That frog was around again today, and he brought a lot of stuff,”
he whispered. “You’re in on it. Doc is goin’ to make punch. Be
around at nine o’clock.”

Tommy was there at the appointed time. At the far end a crowd was
gathered. Men were perched as closely as possible on the double-
deck bunks. In their midst Bacchanalian rites were in progress.
“Doc,” a stout man with a red, satyr-like countenance, was beating a
huge bowl of eggs. Before him within easy reach and frequently
applied, was an assorted row of bottles. Tommy read some of the
labels—Cherry Brandy, Martell, D. O. M., Absinthe.
“My God,” he muttered to himself, “everything but nitroglycerine.”
The party was undoubtedly a success. There were songs and
dances and stories. Finally it got to the speechmaking stage. An
interruption in the form of a volley of shots was welcome to every
one except the current performer. A trampling of feet, and then more
shots followed. A voice at the other end of the barrack shouted
“Attention!” as Major Krause stumbled in. He had evidently been
running, but he tried to stalk around in a dignified manner.
Somebody whispered—
“Those damn cadets have been shooting off their guns and
raising hell again, and he’s been trying to catch them.”
The major approached the end of the barrack where the party
had been in progress. He sniffed suspiciously, but the punch-bowl
had been shoved under a bunk and the bottles into boots, and there
was no evidence in sight. Finally he asked—
“Are there any guns in this barrack?”
“No,” Tommy spoke up. “I know, because I was trying to borrow
one this afternoon to mount guard with.”
A partially suppressed titter rose and fell again. The C. O.
wheeled around furiously.
“So it’s you again, is it?” he thundered. “Carousing in here while
your superiors attend to your duties. Get out to your guard and put a
stop to that indiscriminate shooting. I swear if I see you again tonight
I’ll prefer charges and have you broke!”
Tommy stumbled out into the darkness and headed in what he
thought was the direction of the guardhouse. His head was buzzing
painfully. A volley of shots sounded somewhere in front of him. He
felt vaguely that he ought to do something about it, and ran in that
direction, only to fall over the guy-rope of a hangar and fall heavily.
More shots behind him. He got up and staggered on. Suddenly there
was a flash and a report right before him. Then a voice yelled—
“Halt.”
“Commander of the guard,” bawled Tommy.
A dark figure loomed up vaguely in the murk. He struck a match
and saw a grinning cadet working the bolt of his rifle and waving the
muzzle around dangerously. Suddenly it exploded and Tommy felt
mud splatter over him.
“I thought I saw something moving and halted it, and it wouldn’t
halt, so I fired, but I don’t understand this gun very well, sir,” said the
cadet, still working at the bolt.
The commander of the guard turned and fled. He was getting
dizzier every minute. Finally he tripped over another guy-rope and
fell, to rise no more.
When he woke, it was with the consciousness of having been
annoyed for a long time by a rasping noise which was still going on.
He tried to pull himself together and think. He could vaguely discern
the bulk of a hangar. There was a queer, unexplained rasping. Filed
wires—Wings coming off—Funerals—
The noise stopped, and presently a dark figure crept out through
the hangar door and started to steal away. Tommy drew the little
automatic from its holster and fired. The next thing he realized was
that there were flashlights and men everywhere. The sergeant of the
guard. Major Krause. Calls for explanation. Tommy tried to explain. A
voice said—
“You fool, you’ve shot the adjutant!” Strong hands seized him and
hustled him away.

Next morning, when a detail came to the guardhouse, Tommy was

still in a daze. The leader told him to police up, as he was to go
before the C. O. He was still confused when he was led into the
office at headquarters.
The commanding officer was there, and Captain La Croix, the
French officer who advised as to instruction. Also a large, fierce man
with stars on his shoulders, and a little civilian with glasses and a
trench coat several sizes too large for him. Tommy’s legs seemed to
be made of butter.
Major Krause was speaking, and strange to say, his voice was
not unkind.
“Lieutenant Lang,” he said, “I revoke everything I said yesterday.
You have done a great service for your country. I regret to say that a
small file was found on the body of the adjutant, and that some of the
ships were found to have been tampered with—so skillfully that
detection was very unlikely. Inspection of the adjutant’s papers
brought out evidence that he was an Austrian citizen. Tell the general
and the secretary how you came to discover what was going on.”
 “Well,” blurted Tommy, “it was this way. I was dizzy and fell down
two or three times and finally I decided to go to sleep. Then some
guy kept making a filing noise and waking me up, so I shot him.”

That evening three flying lieutenants were finishing an illicit meal of

chicken and champagne at a little French inn about three miles from
the field, and the smallest of the trio was finishing a story.
“There was a long argument,” he said, “and the general and the
major were all for preferring charges, but Captain La Croix stood up
for me and said I was a good pilot, and finally they agreed to let him
get me transferred to a French observation squadron at the front.”
The tall man and the fat one looked at each other and at their little
companion. Then they ejaculated as one—
“You lucky little stiff!”

THE END

Transcriber’s Note: This story appeared in the October 1, 1927

issue of Adventure magazine.
 *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE LUCKY
LITTLE STIFF ***

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