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Belief, Agency, and Knowledge: Essays on Epistemic Normativity Matthew Chrisman full chapter instant download
Belief, Agency, and Knowledge: Essays on Epistemic Normativity Matthew Chrisman full chapter instant download
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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/5/2022, SPi
MATTHEW CHRISMAN
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/5/2022, SPi
Preface
When I asked my father to paint a picture for the cover of this book—and hasn’t
he done it beautifully!—he considered the title and said, “Well, I know what belief
and knowledge are, but what are agency and normativity?” His insightful question
captures the central puzzle of this book.
We all intuitively understand what it is to believe something, and it’s easy to
recognize differences between merely or even truly believing something, and
genuinely knowing it. But knowledge is not just different from other kinds of
belief—it’s better. It is something we should, at least sometimes, pursue. And when
we have a knowledgeable belief, we should normally maintain it and stand
prepared to share it with others. Insofar as these ‘should’s pertain to our under-
standing of knowledge, they are a species of what most philosophers would
recognize as “epistemic” norms. (The intended contrast is with ethical norms,
though as we will see there may be an ethical dimension to epistemic normativity.)
Having identified some epistemic norms, we might say that activities such as
inquiring, investigating, observing, recalling, reasoning, integrating, discussing,
and debating are amongst the various ways that people exercise their “doxastic”
agency in accordance with epistemic norms. That is to say, we don’t focus on
bodily action with effects outside of a person’s mind but rather on the various
cognitive activities that pertain to their beliefs (though we needn’t insist on a sharp
line between what’s in the mind and what’s outside the mind). Then, I want to say
that exercising one’s doxastic agency is a central part of what it is to be not only a
fully human person, but also a lover of wisdom, i.e., a philosopher.
To a first approximation, then, this book is about how, in the abstract, all of
these epistemic norms and doxastic activities work to generate and expand
knowledgeable belief amongst lovers of wisdom.
People’s intellectual interests vary, of course. Some of us are interested in
abstract theoretical topics, others in the political history of modern states, others
in the mating patterns of hermaphroditic flatworms, others in the evolution of
NBA defenses, and others still in the plight of Britney Spears. Personally, I love it
all, including knowing about how knowing works across these various domains.
Maybe that’s why I chose a career in philosophy, but I think most people are
philosophers to an extent. And this book pertains to all of us philosophers. In it,
I investigate the nature of human belief in its relation to our exercise of doxastic
agency, the content and force of epistemic norms, and the deeply human practice
of keeping track of how well each other’s beliefs live up to these norms.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/5/2022, SPi
viii
ix
something, but about how people relate intellectually to other members of their
epistemic communities, and how in turn those communities are maintained,
expanded, and diversified by people related intellectually to each other.
Accordingly, in this book, I often address specific debates within what might be
called “individualistic” epistemology, but I always do so with the underlying aim
of showing how examining the relevant issues through the lens of a resolutely
social epistemology has significant promise for enriching our understanding of
these issues.
Just to give one example I touch on briefly in Chapter 7, but hope to pursue in
more detail in future work: Many people are interested in what it takes for people’s
beliefs to be free. To answer this question, the traditional approach would
investigate the conditions of individual cognitive control and rational self-
determination of particular beliefs: What does it take for an individual to have
or lack the ability to make up their own mind about whether some proposition is
true? In contrast, a more social-epistemological approach encourages investiga-
tion into the social and political conditions leading to or protecting against the
dominating influence of other people on interconnected people’s systems of beliefs.
Propaganda, indoctrination, epistemic bubbles, advertising, adaptive preferences,
and class interests can all detract from freedom of belief, whereas good education,
well-organized distribution of and reliance on expertise, open and transparent
channels of communication, and political norms of free speech can all enhance
freedom of belief—how can we explain that? The metaphysics and politics of
doxastic freedom are both valid projects, but they can’t be done in isolation, and
I think epistemologists have spent a lot of effort on the former, without doing
enough to explore the latter.
The role of our social interconnectedness has been all the more salient to me
over the past two years. I completed this book during the global Covid-19
pandemic, which has upended the ways we live together, both epistemically and
medically. Daily bulletins with public health knowledge have become the norm,
and now it isn’t only the epidemiologists who regularly worry about the role of
shared appreciation of scientific expertise and collective knowledge in keeping
people safe and alive. From the political role of the anti-vax movement to the
markedly different responses various governments have taken towards their own
scientific experts, from the statistical basis of r-numbers to the imperfect state of
scientific knowledge about the effectiveness of facemasks—recent conversations
amongst friends and family have taken a distinctively social-epistemological turn.
More personally, it has been an tough couple of years. For months and months,
seeing extended family and gathering in-person with groups of friends was
prohibited, and my wife Jean and I were trying to continue working while being
primary school teachers for our young children with limited support. Plus, I was
supposed to be writing a book!
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/5/2022, SPi
x
Nevertheless, the past two years have also had their blessings. My daughter
Meryl, who wasn’t even born when I wrote my previous book, has gone from
being a relatively unformed preschooler to reading me books at night, having
definite opinions about how to deejay the car stereo, and shooting a mean fade-
away jumper. And my son Dylan continues to amaze me with his perseverance in
the face of dyslexia, his ability to remember detailed plot twists in Lord of the
Rings, and his extremely detailed knowledge and love of the natural world.
Furthermore, I have been extremely proud to be married to a dedicated frontline
medical worker in Britain’s NHS, and grateful to have a partner who keeps things
real.
So, although I’ve probably said (and definitely thought) a bit too much that
I wish they could leave me alone while I’m working on this book, the intensifying
interconnectedness amongst Jean, Meryl, Dylan, and me as a family unit has been
a positive by-product of the pandemic. And, while that was facilitated by my
seeing friends and colleagues both in Edinburgh and around the world much less,
I’ve been extremely grateful to those who have remained in contact through email,
group messages, and online talks. These things have surely fed my inclination to
see all sorts of philosophical questions through more social lenses.
This book was written while I enjoyed a sabbatical from the University of
Edinburgh and a British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship. Without the support of
these organizations, and their flexibility in the face of homelife challenges during
the pandemic, I would not have been able to complete it. I appreciate this support
and flexibility. I’m also grateful to Peter Momtchiloff and anonymous reviewers
for Oxford University Press for encouraging me to organize the book as a series of
three parts that are individually accessible but also related in a way whose unity is
hopefully apparent. These readers also helpfully pressed me to address a number
of objections and to make various chapters more reader-friendly. So you should be
thankful to them too!
While I was writing the book, I had the pleasure of working with the Young
Academy of Scotland on a project to create a charter for responsible public debate.
This fed into my participation in the Royal Society of Edinburgh’s Post-Covid 19
Futures Commission. I was previously skeptical of the buzzword “knowledge-
exchange” sometimes thrown around contemporary academia to refer to the two-
way interaction between theoretical knowledge created in universities and prac-
tical knowledge created outside of universities. But these opportunities have been
great cases of knowledge exchange with the project of this book. I am especially
grateful for what I have learned in this context with Alice König, Peter McColl,
and John O’Connor.
Much of the material in this book derives from papers published previously,
which I have updated, expanded, and integrated. I am grateful to the publishers
for permission to re-use the previously published material. I hope readers who
have encountered any of the papers in the past will want to see how they have
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/5/2022, SPi
xi
changed and now form a package, but for convenience, here is a description of the
genesis of this package:
xii
Poprawe, Andrés Soria Ruiz, Sebastian Schmidt, Melanie Sarzano, Mona Simion,
Tillmann Vierkant, Sam Wilkinson, Silvan Wittwer and surely a few others who
I am forgetting. Grace Garland swooped in at the last minute and gave the book a
full read, making many helpful editing suggestions.
When I wrote my PhD thesis at the University of North Carolina from 2003 to
2006, I saw myself as working in ethics and epistemology, mining interesting
comparisons and contrasts between these normative domains. In doing this, my
principal guides were Geoffrey Sayre-McCord and Jay Rosenberg. My first book,
The Meaning of ‘Ought’ might be seen as an expression of the meta-ethical side of
this stellar education, and as such it was heavily influenced by ideas I learned with
Geoff. The present book could then be seen as an expression of its meta-epistemology
side, and so I see it as heavily influenced by the ideas I learned with Jay. Jay used to
say that the most important property for a dissertation to have is being done. But
I’m still sad that Jay died before I got a chance to hear if he thinks my dissertation
is finally not just done but also good. My memory of him lives strong in several of
the following chapters.
Matthew Chrisman
October 2021
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/5/2022, SPi
Contents
1. Introduction 1
1.1 Epistemology as a Normative Discipline 1
1.2 The Axiological and Deontological Dimensions of Epistemic
Normativity 2
1.3 Overview and Preview 7
1.4 Inspiration 12
xiv
Bibliography 191
Index 215
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/5/2022, SPi
1
Introduction
Do we really have knowledge of ordinary facts, the nature of reality, the existence
of other minds, or even our own mind? Assuming we do, how exactly do we
acquire such knowledge through processes such as perception, reasoning, testi-
mony, and introspection? What is knowledge, anyway? These questions lead to
questions about epistemic concepts. How is the concept of knowledge related to
the concepts of truth, belief, and justification? What about the concepts of
cognition, certainty, understanding, and wisdom? Developing fully satisfactory
answers to these core questions of epistemology requires a better understanding of
epistemic normativity and, more precisely, of the normative character of epistemic
concepts. That is the topic of this book.
One might propose to understand epistemic normativity simply as those
standards one’s belief must meet in order to count as knowing something.
Typically, these standards are thought to relate to, but exceed, truth, and to involve
things such as justification, reliability, competence, warrant, and reason. One
might then study epistemic normativity by seeking to better understand these
concepts.
Unsurprisingly, then, these concepts have been at the core of epistemology for
centuries, and philosophers have often regarded them as normative concepts.
However, that way of thinking about the normative character of epistemic con-
cepts is too thin to capture what I aim to discuss in this book, and it doesn’t seem
to warrant calling epistemology a normative discipline. After all, though there are
standards for the correct application of every concept, we don’t always think of
those standards as rules or norms constituting a distinctive normative topic for
investigation, or conceive of those concepts as normative in any distinctive or
interesting sense. To be a football, for instance, something must be a ball, be
inflatable, and satisfy other standards. But that doesn’t mean that we recognize a
distinctive category of football normativity, or treat the concept of a football as
normative in some interesting sense meriting philosophical investigation.
Moreover, epistemologists ask normative questions that don’t have clear ana-
logs in other areas—questions such as: Are there constitutive norms of belief?
Does assertion have an epistemic aim? How do epistemic and non-epistemic
values figure in scientific inquiry? What distinguishes epistemic from practical
Belief, Agency, and Knowledge: Essays on Epistemic Normativity. Matthew Chrisman, Oxford University Press.
© Matthew Chrisman 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898852.003.0001
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/5/2022, SPi
reasons? Why do we prize knowledge over true belief? Do the rules of theoretical
rationality have categorically binding normative force? How should a subject’s
credence update diachronically in light of new evidence? What are the intellectual
virtues? When are we allowed to bootstrap into justifications for our beliefs? Is
testimony a sui generis source of knowledge? How does epistemic credit distribute
across a community of knowers? When and how are people blameworthy
for believing falsehoods? Is there a distinctively epistemic form of injustice? Are
there specifically epistemic reasons to prefer democracy over other forms of
governance?
It is these sorts of questions that lead me to think that epistemic concepts are
distinctively normative in a way that merits further philosophical investigation
into the topic of epistemic normativity. I will touch on the issues involved in many
of these questions throughout this book, yet my interest is not in answering them
here, but rather in better understanding the broader topic of epistemic normativ-
ity. To that end, and by way of specifying further the topic of this book, in the next
section I distinguish two dimensions of recent discussions of normativity in
epistemology.
3
5
(cioè più del credibile; segnata di nero in mezzo alle corna; il resto
era latte).
Festo scrive res minimi pretii, cum dicimus non hettæ te facio: e noi,
Non ti stimo un ette [63].
Non si doveano unire due infiniti, eppure abbiamo in Livio (iv. 47)
jussit sibi dare bibere; che è il nostro dar bere, dar mangiare.
Tutto ciò ne fa argomentare che, fra i patrizj latini prevalendo
elementi etruschi e greci, di questi si nutrisse la loro lingua, mentre
gli oschi e sabini dominavano nella rustica, adoperata dai plebei, la
quale noi crediamo sia la stessa che oggi parliamo, colle
modificazioni portate da trenta secoli e da tante vicende.
Oltre i comici, che al vulgo mettono in bocca modi affatto insueti agli
scrittori colti, troviamo direttamente indicata la lingua plebea e
rustica, che doveva essere più analitica, alle desinenze supplendo
colle preposizioni, cogli ausiliarj alle inflessioni de’ verbi; e
determinava meglio le relazioni mediante gli articoli.
Plauto discerne la lingua nobilis dalla plebeja: la prima dicevasi
anche urbana o classica, cioè propria delle prime classi; l’altra
rustica o vernacola dal nome de’ servi domestici (vernæ), e anche
da Vegezio pedestris, da Sidonio usualis, quotidiana da Quintiliano, il
quale muove lamento che «interi teatri e il pieno circo s’odano
spesso gridare voci anzi barbare che romane», e avverte che in
buona lingua non dee dirsi due, tre, cinque, quattordice [64], e geme
che ormai il parlare sia mutato del tutto [65].
Cicerone scriveva a Peto (lib. ix, ep. 21): Veruntamen quid tibi ego in
epistolis videor? Nonne plebejo sermone agere tecum?.. Epistolas
vero quotidianis verbis tenere solemus. Marziale ricorda certe
parole da contado, risibili a delicato lettore,
§ 8º
Della pronunzia.
In un’altra sta:
§ 9º
La traduzione della Bibbia.
§ 10º
La lingua latina si sfascia. Età del ferro.
§ 11º
Differenze del latino dall’italiano.
propter e per
magis e plus
jubere e mandare
utinam e sic
coram e in præsentia
sumo e prehendo
cogitare e pensare
nequeo e non possum
cras e de mane
vespere e sero
cogitare e pensare
intelligere e capere.