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Fittingness
 Fittingness
Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity

Edited by
C H R I S T O P H E R HOWA R D
AND
R . A . R OW L A N D
 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
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© the several contributors 2022
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2022
Impression: 1
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You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
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Library of Congress Control Number: 2022937555
ISBN 978–0–19–289588–2
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192895882.001.0001
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 Contents

List of Contributors vii

1. Fittingness: A User’s Guide 1
Christopher Howard and R. A. Rowland

SE C T IO N O N E : T H E NAT U R E A N D E P I S T E M O L O G Y
OF FIT TINGNESS
2. The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting 23
Selim Berker
3. Against the Fundamentality of Fit 58
Thomas Hurka
4. What Is Evaluable for Fit? 80
Oded Na’aman
5. Fitting Emotions 105
Justin D’Arms
6. Intuitions of Fittingness 130
Philip Stratton-­Lake

SE C T IO N T WO : F I T T I N G N E S S , R E A S O N S ,
N O R M AT I V I T Y
7. Reasons and Fit 151
Garrett Cullity
8. Value-­First Accounts of Normativity 176
R. A. Rowland
9. Feasibility and Fitting Deliberation 200
Nicholas Southwood
10. In Defence of the Right Kind of Reason 221
Christopher Howard and Stephanie Leary
vi Contents

SE C T IO N T H R E E : F I T T I N G N E S S A N D
VA LU E T H E O RY

11. Value and Idiosyncratic Fitting Attitudes 245

Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way
12. Well-­Being as Fitting Happiness 267
Mauro Rossi and Christine Tappolet
13. The Things We Envy: Fitting Envy and Human Goodness 290
Sara Protasi
14. Response-­Dependence and Aesthetic Theory 309
Alex King

SE C T IO N F O U R : F I T T I N G N E S S A N D
R E SP O N SI B I L I T Y
15. Fittingness as a Pitiful Intellectualist Trinket? 329
Michael McKenna
16. Blame’s Commitment to Its Own Fittingness 356
Rachel Achs
17. Making Amends: How to Alter the Fittingness of Blame 380
Hannah Tierney

Index 405
 List of Contributors

Rachel Achs, University of Oxford

Selim Berker, Harvard University

Garrett Cullity, Australian National University

Justin D’Arms, Ohio State University

Thomas Hurka, University of Toronto

Christopher Howard, McGill University

Alex King, Simon Fraser University

Stephanie Leary, McGill University

Conor McHugh, University of Southampton

Michael McKenna, University of Arizona

Oded Na’aman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Sara Protasi, University of Puget Sound

Mauro Rossi, Université de Montréal

R. A. Rowland, University of Leeds

Nicholas Southwood, Australian National University

Philip Stratton-­Lake, University of Reading

Christine Tappolet, Université de Montréal

Hannah Tierney, University of California, Davis

Jonathan Way, University of Southampton

 1
Fittingness
A User’s Guide
Christopher Howard and R. A. Rowland

1.1 Introduction

This volume explores the nature, roles, and applications of the notion of fitting-
ness in contemporary normative and metanormative theory. The fittingness rela-
tion can be glossed as the relation in which a response stands to a feature of the
world when that feature merits, or is worthy of, that response. It is thus the rela-
tion in which each of our responses stand when I admire an admirable effort, you
laud a laudable performance, Beri believes a credible proposition, and Dhitri
desires a desirable outcome. Likewise, it is the relation that fear stands in when its
object is fearsome, that love stands in when its object is lovable, and that blame
stands in when its object is blameworthy. Across these cases, the relevant attitudes
or responses are merited by, and hence fitting with respect to, their objects.1
In the late nineteenth and mid-­twentieth centuries, this normative notion of
fittingness occupied a prominent place in the theoretical toolkits of the period’s
most influential ethical theorists. Then, up until the early aughts, discussion of
the relation all but disappeared from the discourse of ethical theory. Today, the
notion has regained prominence, promising to enrich the theoretical resources of
contemporary normative theorists and taking centre stage in many debates in
normative and metanormative philosophy. For example, the ‘fitting-­ attitude’
analysis of value is now perhaps the most well-­known and most discussed account
of value and the notorious ‘wrong kind of reason problem’ (WKR problem) has
emerged from discussion of this analysis. And there is now also great momentum
behind the ‘fittingness-­first’ research programme, which tries to understand all of
normativity ultimately in terms of fittingness. Still, despite its historical significance
and the recent revival of interest, there has been no central discussion of the
notion of fittingness to date. The present volume aims to fill this gap.
The chapters to follow cover a range of topics including the nature and epis­
tem­ ol­
ogy of fittingness, the relation(s) between fittingness and reasons, the

1 For a similar gloss on fittingness, see Howard (2018).

Christopher Howard and R. A. Rowland, Fittingness: A User’s Guide In: Fittingness: Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity.
Edited by: Christopher Howard and R. A. Rowland, Oxford University Press. © Christopher Howard and R. A. Rowland 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192895882.003.0001
2 Fittingness

normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness
in theorizing about responsibility. This introduction surveys these issues and
­highlights the chapters in which they’re discussed. We conclude with a brief dis-
cussion of issues to do with fittingness that aren’t covered extensively or at all by
the contributions to the volume in order to indicate avenues for further research.
This highlights our view of the volume as a conversation starter rather than as a
comprehensive guide to, or exhaustive analysis of, all things related to fit. This
volume’s chapters collectively if tacitly support the hypothesis that the notion of
fittingness has great theoretical utility in grappling with a range of normative
matters. We thus think that further study and application of the relation is called
for, and we hope this volume helps to motivate this.

1.2 The Nature and Epistemology of Fittingness

It’s sometimes supposed that the normative domain divides neatly into two broad
kinds of normative categories: deontic ones (e.g. rightness, requiredness, and per-
missibility) and evaluative ones (e.g. goodness, badness, and betterness). The
question of which of these fittingness falls under has been a matter of debate,
though it’s often assumed that the relation is deontic (see, e.g. Rabinowicz and
Rønnow-­Rasmussen 2004). Thus, fitting-­attitude analyses of value are sometimes
held to involve a commitment about the relation of priority between the right and
the good, taking the former to be prior to the latter. In his contribution to the
volume, however, Selim Berker challenges this picture by arguing that fittingness
is neither deontic nor evaluative but of its own normative kind with its own
­distinctive nature (Chapter 2). The result is a call to restructure historically
entrenched thinking about the normative domain itself and our inquiry into it; this
domain has more texture than is often thought, with fittingness occupying a sui
generis and ineliminable place within it. An upshot, according to Berker, is that the
traditional question of priority between the right and the good should be reframed
as a question about the priority between the right, the good, and the fitting.
Although fittingness is often taken to be a deontic category, the idea that the
relation is sui generis within this category, and unanalysable in other normative
terms (whether deontic or evaluative), has strong historical roots. Indeed, starting
with Brentano (1889/1969), there’s a venerable tradition of taking fittingness not
only to be unanalysable in other normative terms, but of holding that all other
normative entities, whether deontic or evaluative, can be analysed in terms of it
(see also Ewing 1947). Within the last decade there’s been a resurgence of interest
in this ‘fittingness-­first’ approach to normativity, with several authors advancing
different versions of it (Chappell 2012; McHugh and Way 2016, forthcoming;
Cullity 2018; Howard 2019). This is partly a response to the rise in the early
aughts of the ‘reasons-­first’ approach to normativity, which holds that normative
 A User ’ s Guide 3

reasons are the fundamental normative entities in terms of which all others can be
explained (Scanlon 1998; Schroeder 2007; Skorupski 2010; Parfit 2011; Rowland
2019). Many contemporary fittingness-­firsters have argued that their view has
important advantages over this rival reasons-­first view, particularly given its
fittingness-­based account of value which, unlike a reasons-­based account, seems
to avoid the famous ‘WKR problem’ (more on which below; see also McHugh and
Way’s Chapter 11). However, despite its seeming advantages, the fittingness-­first
approach isn’t without its critics. In his contribution to the volume (Chapter 3),
Thomas Hurka considers and rejects recent arguments in favour of fittingness-­
first and develops new arguments against it. Instead, Hurka defends the view that
there is no single, normatively fundamental entity in terms of which all others
can be accounted for and argues for a ‘two-­concept’ view, according to which
rightness and goodness are equally normatively basic, unable to be explained in
terms of each other or in terms of normative entities of any other kind.
Regardless of whether fittingness is normatively first or constitutes a sui generis
normative kind, other questions about its nature are pressing. One such question
concerns what kinds of things are evaluable for it, i.e. what kinds of things are
assessable as fitting or unfitting. Common to the contemporary and historical lit-
erature is the idea that attitudes, or intentional mental states, are assessable for
fittingness, where this includes states like beliefs, emotions, desires, and inten-
tions. And some have held that actions, too, are assessable for fittingness (see
Section 1.6 below). Oded Na’aman’s contribution to the volume, however, pro-
poses a radically liberal conception of what’s fit-­evaluable, according to which not
only actions and attitudes are fit-­assessable but also physiological conditions such
as headaches and heartrates (Chapter 4). According to Na’aman, this view not
only aligns with our actual evaluative practices but is also supported by powerful
theoretical considerations.
Although the fit-­evaluability of certain types of human response is up for
debate, it’s generally regarded as uncontroversial that emotions, at least, can be
assessed as fitting or unfitting. Equally uncontroversial is the idea that the fitting-
ness of every fitting emotion corresponds (extensionally) to some evaluative qual-
ity as possessed by the emotion’s object. It’s fitting to love someone, for instance,
just in case they’re lovable, to deplore something just in case it’s deplorable, to
contemn someone just in case they’re contemptible, and to adore something just
in case it’s adorable.2 Moreover, it’s widely held that the fitting intensity of an emo-
tion is constrained by the degree of the evaluative quality to which it’s a fitting
response. For instance, how much adoration it’s fitting to feel towards Alan is
constrained by how adorable Alan is (for discussion, see esp. Maguire 2018 and
Berker’s Chapter 1). Thus, in terms made famous by Justin D’Arms and Daniel

2 For discussion, see, e.g. Brandt (1946), Schroeder (2010), Way (2012), and Howard (2018).
4 Fittingness

Jacobson (2000), whether a token emotion is fitting (or how fitting it is) turns not
only on whether it’s fitting in shape, i.e. whether it’s a response to an evaluative
quality that renders emotions of its type fitting, but also on whether it’s fitting in
size, i.e. whether its intensity is proportionate to the degree of the quality in
­question. In his contribution to the volume, Justin D’Arms proposes that the
­connections between the fittingness of certain emotions and the presence of
­certain evaluative qualities can be explained by appeal to the natures of the
relevant emotions themselves (Chapter 5). Further, D’Arms suggests that we
can gain insight into certain evaluative qualities by interrogating the natures of
the emotions whose fittingness those qualities correspond to. For example, we
can learn what sorts of non-­evaluative features make for shamefulness, or
ground our judgements about this evaluative quality, by investigating the nature
of shame.
Turning from issues to do with the nature of fit and its explanatory role within
the normative domain, we might also wish to know how we can know what’s
­fitting to what, or how we can gain knowledge of facts involving fittingness more
generally. In principle, any moral epistemology might be applicable here, though
of course some may be more plausible than others depending on our view about
the metaphysics of fittingness. In his Foundations of Ethics, Ross suggests in sev-
eral places that at least certain fittingness-­involving propositions—­for instance,
that admiration is fitting towards what’s intrinsically good—­are self-­evident and
that our knowledge of such a priori truths (and how we acquire it) is analogous to
our knowledge of a priori truths in other domains, e.g. mathematics. In his con-
tribution to the volume (Chapter 6), Philip Stratton-­Lake explores the prospects
for this epistemology of fit, applying the specific rationalist epistemology of the a
priori that he defends in other work (Stratton-­Lake 2016). Stratton-­Lake argues
that this approach to the epistemology of fittingness is at least as promising in
accounting for our knowledge of facts involving fit as it is in accounting for our
knowledge of other kinds of normative facts, for example, facts about oughts
and values.

1.3 Fittingness, Reasons, Normativity

In the last several decades of normative philosophy, normative reasons have been
all the rage. In What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon famously suggests that the
reason relation can’t be analysed or accounted for in more basic terms, but that it
can only be glossed in terms of ‘favouring’ such that reasons ‘count in favour’ of
what they’re reasons for. Unsurprisingly, Scanlon’s claim that facts about reasons
are unanalysable resulted in many philosophers attempting to analyse them. And
in recent years, several philosophers have attempted to explain facts about ­reasons
in terms of facts about fittingness specifically (see, e.g. Danielsson and Olson
 A User ’ s Guide 5

2007; Chappell 2012; Sharadin 2015; McHugh and Way 2016; Whiting 2022; and
Howard 2019). One motivation for this, beyond the aspiration to analyse a philo-
sophically interesting category, is to explain a putatively necessary connection
between fittingness and reasons, viz. that facts that contribute to the fit of a
response seem also to provide pro tanto reasons for it. For example, facts that
contribute to a person’s admirability, and thus the fittingness of admiring them,
seem also to provide reason to admire them. Likewise, facts that contribute to
something’s fearsomeness, and thus the fittingness of fearing it, seem also to pro-
vide reasons to fear it. The hope is that a fit-­based analysis of reasons could pro-
vide an explanation of this and other interesting links between the two relations.
Of course, a reasons-­based analysis of fit might be similarly explanatory, and
some authors have attempted precisely this (e.g. Schroeder 2010; Rowland 2019).
In his contribution to the volume, however, Garrett Cullity joins the former camp,
advancing a new account of reasons in terms of fit (Chapter 7). Cullity argues that
his fit-­based account of reasons is extensionally and explanatorily superior to
existing accounts of the relationship between the two relations.
An alternative approach to explaining the connections between fittingness and
reasons appeals not to an analysis of one in terms of the other, but rather to ana­
lyses of each in terms of some third factor. One version of this approach appeals
specifically to facts about value, or goodness, in order to explain facts about
­reasons and fit. A virtue of this approach is that it stands to explain not only facts
about the relationship between fittingness and reasons, but also the connections
between each of these and value. And there do seem to be connections here that
call for explanation. For example, something’s being valuable seems both neces-
sary and sufficient for its being fitting to value, and at least sufficient for there
being reasons to value it. And value-­based accounts of each of reasons and fit
might explain these connections. For instance, a value-­based account of fitting-
ness might explain why something has value if and only if it’s fitting to value by
appeal to the hypothesis that a thing’s being fitting to value consists in its being
intrinsically valuable to value, plus the substantive, axiological claim that some-
thing is valuable if and only if it’s intrinsically valuable to value it (Hurka 2001).
A value-­based account of fittingness might thus explain the above connection
between what’s valuable and what’s fitting to value, by explaining fittingness
directly in terms of the value of valuing responses that stand in this relation.
Alternatively, a value-­based approach might explain facts about fittingness and
reasons not in terms of facts about the value of responses that stand in these rela-
tions but rather in terms of facts about the value of the objects of such responses.
For instance, a value-­based account of reasons that explains facts about reasons to
value things fully in terms of facts about the value of those things might explain
why there are always reasons to value valuable things (see, e.g. Orsi 2013b).
Common to these different value-­based views is a commitment to the idea that
facts about reasons and fittingness can be explained directly in terms of facts
6 Fittingness

about the value of either the responses that stand in these relations or the objects
of those responses. Also common to these views is that they seem to face power-
ful criticisms (see, e.g. Way 2013, Howard 2018, Rowland 2019, Kiesewetter 2022,
and McHugh and Way’s Chapter 11). However, as R. A. Rowland argues in their
contribution to the volume, a distinct, indirect value-­based view is also in the off-
ing (Chapter 8). On this view, both facts about reasons and fit are explained by
facts about the value of being guided by certain normative standards. Rowland’s
chapter introduces and explores a version of this view, argues that it seems able to
avoid the problems that direct value-­based views face, and compares the view
against competing ones that would reverse the order of explanation, explaining
facts about value in terms of facts about reasons or fit (more on which in Section
Three of the volume; see esp. McHugh and Way’s Chapter 11).
Discussions concerning the nature of reasons, value, and fittingness, and the
relationships between these normative properties, are by this point familiar in the
normativity literature. And, as was indicated above, it’s increasingly common
today to hold that fittingness plays an important role in accounting for facts about
reasons and value. In his contribution to the volume, Nicholas Southwood puts
fittingness to work in a further, less explored but complementary way, arguing for
a fit-­based account of a property that’s central to normative theorizing, viz. feasi­
bil­ity (Chapter 9). Building on recent work, Southwood develops and defends an
account of feasibility in terms of fitting deliberation specifically.3 On this view,
what makes an action feasible, roughly, is its being a fitting subject of deliberation
about what to do. In addition to providing a novel account of a theoretically and
practically important property, Southwood’s contribution thus demonstrates yet
another way in which fittingness might be profitably appealed to in explaining
properties of clear and central normative significance.
In the wake of Scanlon’s reasons-­based account of value—­the ‘buck-­passing’
account of value—­came the notorious WKR problem (D’Arms and Jacobson
2000; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-­Rasmussen 2004). On the buck-­passing account,
something has value if and only if there are reasons to value it. The WKR problem
is the problem that, in some cases, there seem to be reasons to value things that
have no value—­for example, if a demon threatens to kill me unless I value a sau-
cer of mud (Crisp 2000).4 These reasons are of the ‘wrong kind’ to figure in the
buck-­passing account: they’re reasons to value something that don’t also make the
thing valuable, and hence constitute counter-­examples to the view. ‘Right-­kind’

3 Southwood introduces his fit-­based account of feasibility in Southwood (2022).

4 In addition to there being cases in which there seem to be reasons to value something of no value,
there are also cases in which there seems to be no reason to value something that is of value (see, e.g.
Bykvist 2009 and Reisner 2015). Putative counter-­examples of this second sort are sometimes taken to
be instances of the WKR problem, but are other times characterized as exemplifying the ‘wrong kind
of value’ problem. For critical discussion of this latter problem, see esp. Orsi (2013a), Elliott (2017),
and Rowland (2019: ch. 7).
 A User ’ s Guide 7

reasons to value something are reasons that do make the thing valuable and hence
figure properly in the account. This is the origin of the right-­/wrong-­kind reason
distinction in recent normative philosophy (for more on which, see esp. Gertken
and Kiesewetter 2017).
One response to the WKR problem is to try to distinguish between reasons of
the right and wrong kind in a way that doesn’t make the buck-­passing account
circular, and to revise the account such that it references only right-­kind reasons.
A second response is to reject the counter-­examples that constitute the problem,
i.e. to deny that putative wrong-­kind reasons for attitudes are genuine reasons for
those attitudes. Following Jonathan Way (2012), call this latter response ‘WKR
skepticism’. For a time, WKR skepticism was a dominant view (Skorupski 2010;
Parfit 2011; Way 2012; Rowland 2015). Wrong-­kind reasons make good or bene-
ficial the attitudes they seem to favour. But according to many philosophers, it’s
not sufficient for a fact’s being a reason for an attitude that it makes the attitude
good to have (see, e.g. the long line of skeptics about pragmatic reasons for belief).
However, in recent years, many authors have come not only to reject WKR
­skepticism, but to defend an ethics of attitudes on which wrong-­kind reasons are
the only genuine, authoritative reasons for attitudes there are (see esp. Côté-
Bouchard and Littlejohn 2018; Rinard 2019; and Maguire and Woods 2020).
These philosophers are thus ‘RKR skeptics’: they deny that right-­kind reasons are
genuine ­reasons for attitudes. In their contribution to the volume, Chris Howard
and Stephanie Leary argue that RKR skepticism fails to capture intuitions about
which attitudes we authoritatively ought to (or may) adopt and that existing argu-
ments that right-­kind reasons aren’t reasons, or that they’re at best formally nor-
mative, are unsound; hence, we should accept that right-­kind reasons are genuine
reasons for attitudes, i.e. that they can contribute to determining which attitudes
we authoritatively ought to have (Chapter 10). On the popular and plausible
assumption that right-­kind reasons are facts that contribute to the fittingness of
the attitudes they favour,5 it follows that fittingness itself is an authoritatively
­normative relation. Hence, Howard and Leary’s argument doubles as an argu-
ment for the authoritative normativity of fit.

1.4 Fittingness and Value Theory

The plausible idea that right-­kind reasons for attitudes contribute to the fitting-
ness of the attitudes they favour suggests a promising solution to the WKR prob-
lem. Rather than explaining facts about value in terms of facts about reasons for
valuing, we might instead explain the former facts in terms of facts about the

5 There are too many authors to cite here, but see, inter alia, Danielsson and Olson (2007), Chappell
(2012), D’Arms and Jacobson (2014), Sharadin (2015), McHugh and Way (2016), and Howard (2019).
8 Fittingness

fittingness of valuing. On this fit-­based account of value, for something to be

good or valuable is for it to be fitting to value. As noted above, this view, unlike a
reasons-­based account, doesn’t seem to face the WKR problem. For although the
fact that a demon will kill you unless you value a saucer of mud may give you a
reason to value the mud, this fact doesn’t make the mud fitting to value since it’s
not a fact in virtue of which the mud merits, or is worthy of, a valuing attitude.
Fittingness-­based accounts of value thus look to have an advantage over
reasons-­based accounts in answering the WKR problem (cf. Rowland 2017).
However, reasons-­based views may seem to have an advantage over fit-­based
accounts when it comes to answering a different problem, viz. the problem of par-
tiality (Ewing 1939; Bykvist 2009). Suppose there are two possible outcomes: one
in which your friend is saved and a stranger dies and one in which the reverse
occurs. And suppose also that, beyond this difference, all else is equal. Then
assuming that being valuable or good (simpliciter) is an agent-­neutral evaluative
notion, the two outcomes seem equally good. But intuitively, the balance of
­reasons supports your preferring the former. In addition, and crucially, it can
seem fitting for you to have this preference (cf. Olson 2009). This data rules out a
natural reasons-­based account of betterness on which one outcome’s being better
than another consists in the balance of reasons supporting just anyone’s prefer-
ring it. Likewise, it rules out a fit-­based view on which an outcome’s being better
than another consists in its being fitting for just anyone to prefer it. This is the
problem of partiality.
As Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way make clear in their contribution
(Chapter 11), reasons-­based views have a plausible answer to this problem.
Relying on the well-­founded distinction between agent-­neutral and agent-­relative
reasons, proponents of reasons-­based views might restrict the reasons in terms of
which they analyse facts about what’s better than what to agent-­neutral reasons
specifically, claiming that one outcome’s being better than another consists in the
balance of agent-­neutral reasons supporting just anyone’s preferring it (Stratton-­
Lake and Hooker 2006; Rowland 2019). This revised view is consistent with our
intuitions about cases like the above: since the outcome where your friend lives is
equally as good as the outcome where the stranger does, the balance of agent-­
neutral reasons supports being indifferent, but the balance of all the reasons,
including agent-­ relative ones, supports your preferring the former. Hence,
reasons-­based accounts have an elegant solution to the problem of partiality
which draws on an independently motivated distinction between neutral and
rela­tive reasons; hence, such views may seem to have an advantage over fit-­based
views in answering this problem. However, McHugh and Way argue in their con-
tribution that a broadly similar solution is available for fit-­based views, one which
relies not on distinguishing between types of fittingness—­neutral and relative—­
but rather between types of valuing attitudes. Thus, McHugh and Way argue,
insofar as their solution is equally as plausible as that offered by proponents of
 A User ’ s Guide 9

reasons-­based accounts, reasons-­based views have no advantage over fit-­based

accounts in answering the problem of partiality.
In addition to figuring in an attractive metaphysical account of the nature of
goodness (and betterness), fittingness can also be put to work in first-­order value
theory, as Mauro Rossi and Christine Tappolet demonstrate in their contribution
(Chapter 12). Rossi and Tappolet marshal fittingness specifically to provide a
first-­order account of goodness-­for, or well-­being, according to which what’s
basically good for people is fitting happiness. Rossi and Tappolet argue that this
view avoids the standard objections to more traditional happiness-­based theories,
while maintaining the intuitive, close connection between well-­being and happi-
ness. One important feature of their proposal is a view of happiness as consisting
in a complex of affective states including emotions, moods, and sensory pleas-
ures, which, they claim, can themselves be assessed as fitting or unfitting; hence,
the fit-­evaluability of happiness itself. In addition to contributing to the debate
about what makes lives go well, Rossi and Tappolet thus also take a meaningful
stand on the issue of what kinds of states can be assessed for fit.
In addition to being profitably deployed to investigate different varieties of
goodness, fittingness has also traditionally been appealed to in order to explicate
more specific evaluative properties, such as that of being lovable, despicable,
adorable, pitiful, delightful, and amusing. Indeed, as indicated above, and going
as far back as Brandt (1946), it’s been widely held that such properties are at least
equivalent to, if not analysable in terms of, the fittingness of various types of
human response (see Berker’s Chapter 1 and D’Arms’s Chapter 5). Importantly,
fit-­based analyses of these properties are compatible with the possibility that their
analysanda are never instantiated, and hence that the responses in terms of which
they’re analysed are never fitting. Historically, even realists about various other
evaluative properties have found this thought tempting regarding certain ‘nega-
tive’ evaluative properties—­in particular, that of being enviable. Indeed, it may
seem that envy, no matter the circumstances, could never be a merited response.
However, in her contribution to the volume (Chapter 13), Sara Protasi resists this,
arguing not only that envy can be fitting—­and hence that the property of being
enviable can be instantiated—­but that it often is. Indeed, Protasi argues, envy’s
central concern—­relative positioning—­is connected intimately and sys­tem­at­ic­
al­ly with our flourishing as human beings.
Among the specific evaluative properties that might be explicated by appeal to
fit are aesthetic properties, such as that of being delicious, charming, and beauti-
ful. Fitting attitude theories of various aesthetic properties have been suggested in
recent years by philosophers including, among others, Daniel Jacobson (2011)
and Keren Gorodeisky (2021). Alex King, in her contribution to the volume
(Chapter 14), argues that such theories can be helpfully classified as a kind of
response-­dependence theory, where a response-­dependence theory of a property F
claims that a thing’s F-ness depends on its bearing a certain relationship to a
10 Fittingness

certain sort of human response (see also D’Arms’s Chapter 5; cf. Berker’s
Chapter 1). According to fitting attitude theories, the relevant relationship to
human responses is normative: something has a certain aesthetic property when,
and because, a certain response is merited by—­or fitting with respect to—­the
relevant thing. But on a different kind of response-­
­ dependence theory—
dispositionalism—­the relationship in question is purely descriptive. For example,
a dispositionalist theory of a certain aesthetic property might claim that some-
thing has the property when and because, as a purely descriptive matter,
humans are disposed to respond to it in a certain way. Historically, response-­
dependence views of aesthetic properties have skewed dispositionalist (see, e.g.
Hume 1740/1975 and Kant 1790/2000). However, King argues that, in fact,
­fitting attitude theories have several important advantages over dispositionalist
views. She highlights the versions of fitting attitude theories she takes to be
most promising for explaining aesthetic value, but also raises several new
­challenges for theories of this kind. King’s contribution thus constitutes a
­thoroughgoing assessment of the prospects for response-­dependence views of
aesthetic properties.

1.5 Fittingness and Responsibility

Fittingness has a chequered history in the moral responsibility literature. It fea-

tures prominently and helpfully in Joel Feinberg’s ‘Justice and Personal Desert’,
for example, but is characterized (only a year earlier) as a ‘pitiful intellectualist
trinket’ by P. F. Strawson in his seminal ‘Freedom and Resentment’. In the last
decade, however, fittingness has assumed an increasingly visible and important
role in work on moral responsibility. David Shoemaker (2017), for example, has
recently defended a normative response-­dependence theory of blameworthiness,
according to which someone is blameworthy if and only if, and because, they’re
fitting to blame. This contrasts with (a possible interpretation of) Strawson’s view
that amounts to a dispositionalist response-­dependence account, and with other
normative response-­dependence theories of blameworthiness which specify a
distinct normative relation that blame must stand in to its object for its object to
be blameworthy (see, e.g. Wallace 1994). The final chapters of this volume investi-
gate and discuss this and other ways in which fittingness may be a the­or­et­ic­al­ly
useful concept in theorizing about moral responsibility.
Michael McKenna’s contribution to the volume (Chapter 15) interrogates
Strawson’s belittling remarks about fittingness, argues that a normative in­ter­pret­
ation of Strawson’s view of responsibility is required, and that in fact Strawson
ought to have appealed in his own account to the very notion of fittingness that
he seems to deride. In the course of making this case, McKenna also defends a
Feinberg-­inspired account of desert as a species of fittingness and offers a novel
 A User ’ s Guide 11

account of what differentiates deserved responses from merely fitting ones, drawing
out the implications of this analysis for debates concerning free will and moral
responsibility: although deserved blame might require the satisfaction of a strong
freedom requirement, merely fitting blame does not. Normative response-­
dependence theories of blameworthiness that appeal to desert over and above
mere fittingness may in this way be more metaphysically committal than those
that appeal only to fit.
Beyond the task of elucidating the nature of blameworthiness, a second and
similarly important project, central to discussions of moral responsibility, is to
investigate the nature of blame itself. One question is whether there’s anything
important enough in common to blame responses to justify our theorizing about
blame as such. As Rachel Achs makes clear in her contribution to the volume
(Chapter 16), this question is pressing given the impressive diversity of blame
responses. For example, one might blame by withdrawing care, verbally scolding,
silently stewing, or via a critical subtweet. What, if anything, is distinctive of all
these responses such that they’re worthy of investigation as kinds of blame?
Insofar as our theorizing about blame presupposes a single uniform subject, an
answer to this question seems necessary to vindicate it. And, according to Achs,
the notion of fittingness can be fruitfully appealed to here, in order to provide
such an answer. On Achs’s view, blame essentially involves a kind of reflexive
endorsement, i.e. a commitment to its own fittingness and to its being fitting
directly on the basis of the target’s having done something wrong, and this is why
blame, as such, is worthy of investigation as a unified phenomenon. In addition to
identifying an essential feature of blame, Achs argues that this view also helps to
explain certain other of blame’s marks—­namely, its directedness, and the felt
character of blame common to many of its varied manifestations.
Recent work in the ethics of attitudes has drawn attention to a puzzle concern-
ing the fitting duration of attitudes (see esp. Marušić 2018, 2020; Na’aman 2021).
Roughly: it seems fitting for certain attitudes to fade with time, for example, grief
and regret. But it can seem that, in many cases, the facts that make these attitudes
fitting persist. But if the facts that make an attitude fitting persist, then how can it
be fitting for the attitude to fade? In short: why shouldn’t the attitude stay fitting
forever? This is the puzzle, that of explaining how certain attitudes can fittingly
fade over time. This puzzle applies widely, but can seem especially pressing in the
case of blame (Callard 2018; Hieronymi 2001; Na’aman 2020). According to a
common view, agents are blameworthy when and because they’ve culpably per-
formed a wrongful act. But if an agent culpably performs a wrongful act, then it
will always be true that they did. Hence, if an agent is blameworthy in virtue of
culpably performing a wrongful act, then they’re blameworthy forever. Hence, if
it’s fitting to blame the blameworthy, blame is forever fitting. But this seems
­intuitively false, and so something must give. In her contribution to the volume
(Chapter 17), Hannah Tierney proposes a novel solution to this puzzle,
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
residence.—I took passage with my two mates, & Josiah Crosby, in
a Schooner for Bass River, we reached the river about the suns
setting, & being but about 6 miles from my family, I could not feel
willing to sleep without seeing them—consequently myself, & my 1st.
mate, Mr. Berry each hired a Saddle horse, & started for Brewster,
and I reachd. my dwelling, & gave a knock, at your G. Mothers,
sleeping room window, the same I now occopy, about 12[o:]Clock. x x
x x it may perhaps amuse my dear G. Childen, if I turn back to the
time of my arrival, a prisoner, at St. Johns, a circomstance then took
place, connected with my knocking at the window, as above
Petition to the I learned, on my arrival in St. Johns, that the
Port Admiral Port Admiral, Sir J. T. Duckworth, had given liberty,
to the American Supercargoes & passenger, to
purchase a vessel, & git home at their own expence, & he wou’d give
them a protection from British Cruseirs; & as I had on board, two
Brothers, Josiah & E. C. Crosby, the latter, quite a lad; the Idea
struck me, that posibly, by application, I might obtain liberty to send
the boy home, by this conveyance; for they had already purchased a
small vessell & were then fitting her for sea—I accordingly drafted a
petition; applying pritty strongly to the old Gentlemans feelings, in
behalf of the disconsolate Parents &c &c, and presented it myself—
after perusing the petition; the old Gen” rested his head in his hand,
for a few moments, and looked up very kindly in my face, saying Yes,
Yes, Mr. Cobb, send him home to his Parents & I wish I felt at liberty
to send every American in port home.—This, wou’d give me an
oppertunity of informing my Family of my capture, of sending some
money, spared me by the captors; and grattifiing my relatives by
sending home their beloved son.
I accordinly fixed him away; making a plaid for his
neckhankercheif, with 24 Dubloons in Gold amounting to $384
dollars, which the dear child put round his neck, in my room, in St.
Johns & did not take it off, untill in my house, in the presencs of his
Aunt; and after having delivered my letters &c—This happened, at
about 8 [o:] Clock on the same evening I arrived at Bass revir—well’,
at 12 [o:] Clock, as before stated I knowked at the Winder.
 It appears she had been reperusing my Lengthy letter, Amegining
& revolving in mind all the horrows of my situation in an English
prisin, after she had been in bed, & had not been asleep, when I
know’d at the Window.
Who is there! said she—it is I, said I—well’, what do you want; to
come in; for what said she; before I cou’d answer, I heard my
daughter D., who was in bed with her say, why, Mar it is Par, this was
aneogh, the doors flew open, and the greetings of affection &
consanguinity multiplied upon me rapidly.
End of the Thus, in a moment was I transported to the
Voyage greatest earthly bliss, man can injoy, viz to the
injoyment of the happy family circil.
To fall of 1812—

The foregoing was written by Gen Elijah Cobb during the Year 1843,
with the intention of completing, but the state of his health prevented.
He remained at home from 1812 to 1815 or 1816, when he made
several voyages to Europe in the Ship ‘Paragon’ built for him, and
considered at the time one of the finest ships of her day.
In 1818 & 1819 he made two voyages to Africa in the Ship “Ten
Brothers,” taking with him on the first voyage, his son Freeman.
The second voyage, there was much sickness of a contagious
character, and the ship on her return was sunk at the end of the
wharf to prevent contagion in the city of Boston.[7]
He left the sea in 1820, and after that time remained in Brewster,
Mass. filling the various civil offices of Town Clerk, Treasurer,
Inspector General, Representative and Senator, and Justice of
Peace & Quoram, also the military rank of Brigadier General.
 He was a strong supporter of the Universalist church of the town,
in whose doctrines he took much interest.
He was tall & straight of fine figure his face very pleasant to look
upon. He loved children and was loved by them. Distinguished for
his sterling integrity as well as talent loved and respected by all who
knew him, he died at the age of eighty. “May our end be like his.”
His body & that of his wife lie in the new cemetery, Brewster.
E. W. C.[8]
Brewster June 19, 1857
 LETTERS

From Messrs. Joshua Wall, John Baxter,

Jacob Tidd and William Hayden
Boston Nov 27th 1801.
Capt E Cobb,
Sir,
We expect that Peace in Europe, will make considerable
difference both in the price, of the articles, with which you were to
load, and also in the demand for them, in this Country; by the time
you could return; from these considerations we think it best for you to
sell the Ship Monsoon, if you can get from Eight to Ten Thousand
dollars, clear of the Mates and People, and all other expences: if you
cannot sell the Vessel and the prices of goods ordered have not
considerably fallen you will please take a freight to any part of
America or elsewhere if to be obtain’d on terms that you think will
answer, in either of the above mentioned Cases you will place the
proceeds of your outward Cargo, (and Ship if sold) in the hands of
some safe House in London, say Thos Dickerson & Co if they still
remain good—in addition to the above we have only to say that
feeling much confidence in your judgment, we leave it to you to do
as you think will be most for our Interests.—If the Peace continues
we think the following articles will not be worth more in Boston next
spring than say,—
Iron—100$, to 110$.
Hemp 200$ to 230$.
Tumblers 40 Cents pr Straw.
Glass 8$, pr. Box, to 9$.—
Platillas[9] no Sale unless very low.—

we are with much regard

Yours—
Joshua Wall
John Baxter
Jacob Tidd
William Hayden
Orders for the From Bixby, Valentine & Company, and
Voyage Humphrey & Clark
Boston February 11th 1811.
Capt Elijah Cobb
Sir,
you being Master of the Ship William Tell, we wish you as soon as
you get your cargo on board to proceed the first fair wind for Lisbon
on your arrival at Lisbon you will apply to Messrs Gould, Brothers &
Co and if you with them think it for our interest you will dispose of
your cargo to the best advantage or proceed to Cadiz or Gibralter as
you may think best. Should you proceed to Cadiz we should
recommend the house of the Widow of Morace Roberts & Co to you
to do your business if you should proceed to Gibralter we should
recommend the Hous of George Allardyce & Co but in all cases
should you think best you will value on any other houses you may
think most for our interest, after discharging your cargo you will remit
the proceeds of our goods and the amount of your freight to Samuel
Williams Esqr London payable to the order of Bixby Valentine & Co in
favour of Humphrey & Clark except such amount as you may think
proper to invest for a return cargo on our accounts after discharging
your cargo you will in case it is at Lisbon or Cadiz ballast your ship
with Salt and proceed to the Havana if at Gibralter you will ballast
with Stone or Sand as you may be able to obtain, and, if any cheap
Red Wine or Malaga Wine can be obtained or any freight you will
take and proceed to the Havana with all possible dispatch, In case
you get a part of a cargo at any place before mentioned you will
have it shipped as the property of Messrs Drake & Murdock,
merchants of Havana, in the name of some Spanish House, On your
arrival at the Havana you will call on Messrs Drake & Murdock where
you will find our instructions how to proceed, our object is to get a
freight home from the Havana for the Ship with laying out what funds
you may have for a return cargo in Molasses or Sugar on our Accts.
as we may think most for our interest on your Arrival

Account of Belem Port Charges of the

American Ship Wm. Tell Captain Elija Cobb
Pilotage inwards 6·400
Entry-autos and Pratique 1·100
Pratique Officers and Boathire 1·700
Provedor of the Health ·200
Doctor & Surgeon 1·200
Sending the health clearance to Lisbon ·200
 Second visit of the Health ·
Petition and diligence & Extra Services 3·600
Waiter of the health day a 300 ·
reis each per day ·
2 Waiters of the costomhouse at Belem ·
4 days a 600 reis each perday 4·800
Belem Certificate ·240
Officers of the Castle 3·820
Vice Consul for [TN: illegible handwriting] 3·000
[TN: illegible handwriting] $320
[TN: illegible handwriting] $240
[TN: illegible handwriting] 2$970
N. 29 $790
Received amount hereof in full Lisbon
the 12th of Dec.mr 1811
[TN: illegible handwriting]
Port Charges in 1811.

Should you at your port of discharge be able to procure to the

amount of 3 or 4000 dollars in Undoubted Bills on the Havana at 30
or 60 days sight at a handsome discount, guarenteed by either of the
houses we have recommended you to, we think it adviseable for you
to take them and invest the proceeds in the Havana as we may think
best on your arrival there—
We should not confine the destination of the Ship after her
discharge in Europe but think it so unlikely for you to get employ
either at, Lisbon, Cadiz or Gibralter for the Ship it will be best to fix
her destination that we may be able with what we shall load
ourselves to obtain freight sufficient to fill her up in the Havana
without loss of time—
Remuneration The voyage being different from our
expectations when you left Boston, we agee to give
you for your services Thirty dollars pr month, Two pecent on the nett
Sales of your Cargo and half pr Cent on your remitting Bills to
England or returned Cargo and five pr Ct primage on your Cargo
from the Havana to the United States, We believe all the Shippers
except Mr G. Snow consign their goods to you and allow you the
same commissions and we understand Mr Snow consigns to you in
case you should not sell at Lisbon—
Should the terms before mentioned meet your approbation you
will acknowledge this agreement to be the terms on which you
proceed the voyage—
Should you not be satisfied with the Compensation we offer, you
will proceed the voyage and we will give you as much as any Master
has out of this port on Such a voyage—
Wishing you a pleasant voyage and Safe return
We are yours with respects
Bixby Valentine & Co
Humphrey & Clark

Elijah Cobb to his Wife

Prince’s Island 4th Feb. 1819
My Dear Freind
We are here; & all well, thanks to the controler of every event, but
under circomstances, must remain here two months longer, as we
have a considerable part of our cargo still on hand, business is
astonishingly altered since last voyage, the coast is crouded with
vessells & goods of every discription, & the natives have nothing to
buy with. This circomstance is owing to the late interior war, which
has recently raged with great violence & prevented the natives from
procuring Gold dust & Ivory as formally.—my object for waiting is to
git clear of the Perishable part of my cargo for coffee, when their
Crop comes in, which is now commin[c]ing but will not be at its
height untill the last of March or first april—I also calculate to touch at
one of the windward W. India Islands (on my passage home) in order
to s[ell][10] my Tobacco, Flour, Tea, & salmon; which I cannot sell
here for an[y thin]g [10]—& some Corn, which I shall receive here in
barter, so [that][10] you need not be antious if we dont git home untill
[the la]st[10] of July. we may sooner, but I think it douptfull;—What I
have sold of the cargo, has been at about as good profit as last
voyage, the deficulty is not so much in the price, as in finding people
able to purchase, Scarcity of produce is the great complaint. This
comes by Esq. Clark, via the W. Indies, he will sail to morrow; Capt
Nickerson is very sick on shore, he will leave him to come with us if
he git well, but I have hardly a hope, he is however in the hands of a
mercifull God, may his will be done, & the submission of the creture
sincier…. I expect our people will all write to their freinds, another
oppertunity will offer in about 15 or 20 days direct for Boston. I will
then write again.
Hard Times Pars love to all his children, he earnestly pray
that his life may be spared, & he permitted, once
more to greet his little flock in health & hapiness.
Docter will have all the perticulars respecting the Schooners
Voyage by the Esq: it is consequently unnecesary for me to write—.
They have not managed matters quite to my mind, but so it is, &
prehaps for the best.
Love & respects to all freinds
Your Affectionate Freind
Elijah Cobb
Feby 7th Since the a[bove][11] to the astonishment of us all Capt
Nickerson has so far reco[vere]d[11] that we have taken him on board
the ship,—Esqr C[lar]k[11] is very sick, the Boy young Kimbal is dead.
Feby 14th He is gone—. Nickerson does not gain any Strength
wishes to go to sea & try a change of air, he is sildom himself we
have as yet kept the Esqrs death from him,—such senes of distress
& death, is severely trying to me, May God preserve me—We all
continue well except Capt Mayo, he has had a slight fever, but is
apperrently doing well; I have had a smart attact of the Nervous
head ake, but have got over it,
A schooner will sail for Boston in a day or two, will write more fully
Your as ever
Elijah Cobb

The Fever Elijah Cobb to his Wife

Princes Island 18th Feby 1819
My Dear freind
I wrote you 4 days ago by the Schooner Hope which I sent away
under the care of John Dillingham 3d he being the only one willing to
undertake, … you may posibly git this letter first, it is therefore
necessary to repeat that Esq. Clark has paid the dept of nature, it
was my task to close his Eyes the 11th Inst after a sickness of 8 days
—Young Kimbal died 4 days before, Capt Nickerson was very sick
on board this ship, but his fever having turned, it was the advice of
Every One to send him to sea, that a change of air would have a
good effect; I accordingly did, but fear he never will reach America;
we must however commit him & ourselves to a mercifull just God,
who always acts for the good of his Creaturs & happy would it be for
us; if we could always bow with humble submission to his righteous
dispensations.
Capt Mayo has been very sick; his fever turned two days since, &
the people here who are no doupt better judges than strangers say
he is out of danger, he also has great currage, but he is very weak. &
it will be a long time before he gits [his][12] strength, he is on shore, I
am something unwell, & [takin]g[12] Medicine that I cannot see him to
day—
 Feby 20th Alas Alas, Capt Mayo is gone; an unfavourable turn in
his disorder was his passport to (I trust) realms of blessedness—I
have ordered the ship amediately to sea; shall work up to the
windward of these islands & pass away 3 or 4 weeks, untill the sickly
season passes of.—I must then return & git pay for 3 or 4000 Dollars
of goods trusted out to A. B. C. &c &c, in orders for coffee—and had
I have foreseen the consequence; I would not have put it out of my
power to have left altogether at pleasure altho we should have brot
home half our cargo, but circomstancd as I am, we must take all
reasonable precaution, and trust our lives & healths, to an alwise,
aljust, & mercifull God, who cannot err.
The scenes of distress, together with anciety of mind, which I
have had to encounter within the last 15 days, have nearly unmaned
me, I wou’d write to Mrs Mayo but am not able, do afford her all the
consolation in your power, & oh, may God of his infinite mercy pour
the balm of consolation into her afflicted Bosom—
The crew will all write; they are well as yit, but quite alamed,
which induces me to put to sea, where we shall git good air, & I
hope, fresh sperits
I had, (previous to this last shock) written a few lines to Mrs Clark,
I do not feel able to put in order by copying, I inclose it, you’l deliver
it, or not, as you think proper.
My love to our little ones & all freinds—dont give yourself too
much anciety, put your whole trust in God, he can releive in the
greatest distress or most [imm]inent[12] danger.
Your affectionate friend
Elijah Cobb
Puts to Sea 21. Feby We meant to have got out yesterday,
but we had our ship to rig almost as well as sails to
bend & Ballast to git—the Vessell which brings this, will sail
amediately, we shall go in the course of the day—I feel nicely this
morn” as to health. Mr Thatcher & Mr Crosby are both hearty, thank
God. Myrick & Bates, complained yesterday, we gave them both a
smart purge, they are nicely this morning & no appearance of a
fever, the sea air will make them harty again; as I before observd
Amigination in this country works wonders; As to myself I feel a sort
of pleasing confidence that I am again, to be permited to visit my
beloved family—to offer a word of consolation, to the afflicted freind
of those entoomb’d in this foreign land, but in every instance, I trust I
shall be anable to say in sincerety thy will be done.
Your
E. C

Elijah Cobb to his Son, Elijah Cobb, 2nd

Prince’s Island 24th April 1819
My dear Son
This will accompay a letter directed to you or Mr Haven (should
you be absent) containing a Bill of exchange for 300 Dollars, with
perticular instructions relative therto. should you receive it before I
return, you may send it to yr Mar, or keep it in your hands (as you
like).
We are all well, shall tarry here a few days longer & the[n]
proceed for St Thomases, where I hope to procure a considerable
quantity of coffee. & then proceed as bifore mentioned, hope yet to
reach Boston in all the month of July.
 Ivory, Coffee and Palm Oil: a Typical Bill of Lading.

The Rainy I expect before this, my letters (by the two

Season schooners) filled with heart rending tidings to our
Brewster freind have been received, my mental, as
well as bodily distress, has been such, that I hardly know what I
wrote in those letters (probably much incoherency) as they were
dictated by the feelings of the moment, but I trust those scenes are
not to return upon us this voyage, the place is healthy, frequent
turnardoes, with thunder lightning & copeous showers purifies the
air, all nature smiles, & the human form wears a cheerfull
countenance in place of the gastly visage, which so recently
presented itself at all points.—What abundant cause of greatfull
praise to the supreem controler of every event both of time &
eternity, more especially to us the living monuments of His mercy
who for wise purposes (tho” hidden from our veiw) have been spared
while so many have fallen around us, May we express our gratitude
by keeping his commands.
I have written to your mar by this conveyance hope it will not be
long (after you receive this) before I shall be permitted to see my
little flock in health.
 Your Affectionate Father
Elijah Cobb

Samuel Swan, Jr., to Mrs. Elijah Cobb

[Ship] Belvidere—Quarantine—
June 27th 1819
Mrs. Cobb—
Madam—
I arrived here last evening 84 Days from Africa—I left the Ten
Brothers at Princes Island April 4th—After the loss of Capt Mayo, the
ship proceeded to sea in a very sickly state—The change of air soon
produced a favourable effect; and on the Ships return to Princes in
March they were all quite recovered, though still m[uc]h[13]
debilitated—One man only was any ways ill during my stay, & he
was again on duty when we sail’d—The ship had been on her return
to port thoroughly clensed by washing with vinegar, & limejuice, and
twenty four hour’s fumigation with strong charcoal fires in the hold, &
between decks—During this time I was honoured with Capt Cobb’s
company on board the Belvidere—
I believe, Madam, you may rest perfectly free from any
apprehensions of the sickness again appearing on board the Ten
Brothers—Every precaution has been taken to purify the ship—& the
more immediate cause of their sickness was also removed—It is
during the few weeks interval between the closing of the Dry, &
setting in of the Rainy season, that the Islands are most unhealthy—
The atmosphere is then heavy, & the Harbor is so situated that the
little air that is in motion during the day is intirely secluded from the
shipping, while a vertical sun produces an intensity of heat that
operates powerfully to render the place unhealthy—After the rains
commence, the frequent tornadoes which accompany that season, &
always blow from the eastward, directly into the harbor, so purify the
air that there is little danger of sickness with the usual precautions
which all strangers should observe for preservation of health in warm
climates—
Good News As I was in daily communication with Capt Cobb,
I can assure you of his intire restoration to health,
except the debility incident to a severe attack of fever—
It was Capt Cobb’s intention to close all business with the utmost
dispatch, & he thought to be able to sail in all April to a certainty—He
will touch at Martinique on his passage to America—
I am fully aware, Madam, that the charge of presumption may be
alledged against me—Indeed (reasoning from analogy) I offer no
other apology for writting, than the satisfaction I believe my own
family would recieve by any communication from a person who had
seen me abroad, at a time when a variety of reports respecting my
safety would render any news highly gratifying—
I cannot close without most respectfully offering, thro’ your family,
the tribute of my consolation to the family of the late Henry Clarke
Esqr of your t[ow]n[14]—On my first arrival at Princes, in Decr, I found
him there; & our constant intercourse, during the short stay I there
made, gave me abundant cause to honour & admire him—on my
leaving the place he accompanied me out of the harbor, & our last
resolve, when he quited me, was, to visit each others families when
both should be at home—Nothing could exceed the shock on my
feelings, on again visiting the Island, to learn his lamented death—If
the respect of a stranger can be acceptable to his family, I beg,
Madam, you will mention my name, as one who feels proud to
acknowledge an acquaintance, & friendship, with him abroad—
With regard, I remain,
Madam, respectfully your
Most Humble servant—
Saml Swan Jr—
Mrs Elijah Cobb—Brewster—
NB. Letters from Capt Cobb, have been sent to his Son in Boston—
others from people on board, will be forwarded by post office on my
arrival to town.
S. S.

A Birthday Elijah and Mary Cobb to their Son,

Letter Elijah Cobb, 2nd
Brewster, 27th June 1820
Dear Son
Your affectionate parents fondly recolect that This Day, compleats
the full time of 21 years, since the Supreem doner of every thing,
was pleased to gladen the parential heart in the birth of a Son; Who
has since continued his existance thro” Infancy; thro” Youth, & brot
him to the commincment of manhood, without suffering any action
(of their childs) to wound their hearts; What abundant cause of
greatfull Praise for those inestimable favours,—May He enable them
to suplicate with fervency & effect, to continue His Mercies to them &
their children, & may it laden all their hearts with a greatfull song of
Thankgiving & Praise,—We recieved your letter by Mr Copeland &
noted your observations upon Mr H’s enquiries, we think it wou’d be
as well, to continue where you are a while, (at least) untill the Fall,—
But altho” I wou’d not inculcate the Idea of taking the advantage of
any ones necesity; I think as Mr H. has contributed so very sparringly
to yr support during the long time you have remained with him, He
ought now to give you a full support at least untill you see your way
clear to commince business for yourself, which time we look forward
to with pleasure, mixed with a degree of anciety, naturel to parential
feelings always antious for the wellfare of their ospring. prehaps the
old edage will apply, that effection is blind, but we feel confident
(from your former & present deportment) that propriety, entigrity,
virtue & piety will govern all your actions,—Those virtues exercised
by a finite being will receive an infinite approbation & blessing—
Every advice, & every assistanc from your Parents, will at all
times be cheerfully bestowed, & it is (we presume) unnecesary to
ask, who is so suitable to advise a child as its fond doating parents—
We will close for the present, by supplicating Our Heavenly Father,
to take you into His holy keeping; to direct each gardian Angel to
watch over you, that no improper action may ever sully a good name
or wound yr parents feelings
Affectionately Yours
E. & M. Cobb
NB. Debby is favourably convalessent. wish you to inform me, if you
hear any thing from Capt Tycross, or Mr Hathaway—
We hope Mrs Haven will come with Lincoln (expect him the next
tide) we shall be highly pleased with a visit from her, & think it can be
made pleasant to her.

To His Son Elijah Cobb to his Son, Elijah Cobb, 2nd

Brewster 2d Jany 1836
Dear Son
As our representitive will leave in the morn” I avial myself of the
oppertunity to forward by him the small paper Package, which I
found snugly laceed up, in the branch part, of your last package of
trees. I found the mice had made a hole thro” the paper, among
some small seed, when, or where it was done I cannot say, I found
no other traces of them either about the package or ground where
they were—I put the inverlope around them again, but shall have an
eye to them frequently.
The Lyceum appear to be in successfull opperation, Mr Williams
gave the introductory address, his remarks were bassed upon the
word curiosity, it was good; the best production ever I heard from
him, the followg officers were chosen—George Copeland esqr,
President, Joseph Sampson Esq. Vice P.—John P. Washburn,
Secretary, my humble self, Treasurer, and Franklin Hopkins Libran—
24 became members, by signing the constitution, & paying from 50cs
to 2.00—the members were then, formed into 6 Sections of 4 each,
for discussions, by the board of managers, (the 5 officers as above)
and the followg subject assigned, for the next wednesday eve” viz,
which exarts the greatest influance, in a country Town, wealth or
knowledge—the discussion was assigned to the 1st & 2d Sections,
under the managements of the Revd messrs Conant, & Williams, the
former advocating wealth, & the latter knowledge—the subject was
ably & ingenously managed on both sides, but the decision was in
favour of wealth. an addition of 17 became member, making now 41.
The next Wednesday Eve” we are to have an address by the
Revd Mr Simpkins—the subject for discussion is, which injoys the
greatest satisfaction, the Rich man, or poor man—assigned to
Sections 3d & 5th Revd Mr Pratt, & Father—I expect a powerfull
opponent, but cannot feel any fear upon the subject. He cannot
expect much assistance from his Section, except what he gits from
our bror Jo. & I have Mr Washburn in my Section, which I think will
match Docter.—There appears an interest in the cause, among our
young men, the older ones must begin, but they will soon come
forward.
Local Affairs Our high School goes on well, it is as full, as
they can accommodate 46—there appears perfect
satisfaction with Mr Washburn, the instructor—he appears to be wide
awake, & master of his business.
We are looking hourly for the Fayette, think she will be here in the
morn”—she no doubt came unexpectedly to you, but she must have
had a fine time, and our shore is now clear of Ice for her return.
My eyes are somthing better, but very weak, I am obliged to deny
myself the pleasure of reading, altogether, and I am in agony with
writing thus much, altho” I have had 5 or 6 spells at it.
Grandfather wishes the children all, a happy new year, not as the
compliment of the season, which is in the mouths of the multitude,
but in sencerity of heart.
 Father

Elijah Cobb to his Son, Elijah Cobb, 2nd

Brewster April 3d 1837
Dear Son
Your last pr Patriot, gave general directions about placeing
manure &c &c, all which, Father thinks, manifests agriculturel
judiciousness. Freeman commenced work March 27th, but
anticipating your injuntion, relative to sea-weed, & a fine oppertunity
presenting last week, he did very little else—we shall have, by night,
anough up by my salt works, to replenish your Barn Yard—a noble
lot, of excellt seaweed came on shore, directly below my landing,
while the other parts of the shore was quite distitute—I hireed an
extra team, & extra man to pitch one day & we have secured, a fine
lot of it. F. & Joshua are at it to day, I have tried to git another team,
but have not succeeded, there is still abundanc on the shore, & I
shall keep the boys at it, as such a fine chance, sildom offers, of so
good a quality.
I expect you intend to lay down, the peice of land you planted,
back of the barn, if so, you’l want grass seed for it,—I shou’d put on
it, ½ bushl herds grass, ½ bushl red top, & 8 lbs of red clover—Oats,
we shall have anough, between us—you have not many, but I have a
plenty.
Townsman and The Patriot will go Wednesday Eve”—I hope
Farmer you’l be able to return with her, abt Saturday night
—I am writing now, (morn”) as I shall be engaged
thro” the remainder of the day—the Towns committee are coming to
settle the accounts of the Treasury for last year; & in the afternoon a
Town meeting of importance—a Poor house in agitation, herring
fishery to be new moddleed, suplus revenue, &c &c.
in haste