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PURPOSE AND POWER
Across the full span of the nation’s history, Donald Stoker challenges
our understanding of the purposes and uses of American power. From
the struggle for independence to the era of renewed competition with
China and Russia, he reveals the grand strategies underpinning the
nation’s pursuit of sovereignty, security, expansion, and democracy
abroad. He shows how successive administrations have projected
diplomatic, military, and economic power, and mobilized ideas and
information to preserve American freedoms at home and secure US
aims abroad. He exposes the myth of American isolationism, the good
and ill of America’s quest for democracy overseas, and how too often
its administrations have lacked clear political aims or a concrete vision
for where they want to go. Understanding this history is vital if Amer-
ica is to relearn how to use its power to meet the challenges ahead and
to think more clearly about political aims and grand strategy.
Donald Stoker
National Defense University, Washington, DC
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009257275
DOI: 10.1017/9781009257268
© Donald Stoker 2024
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions
of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take
place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment.
First published 2024
Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ Books Limited, Padstow Cornwall
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Stoker, Donald, author.
Title: Purpose and power : US grand strategy from the revolutionary era to the present
/ Donald Stoker, National Defense University, Washington, DC.
Description: Cambridge ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2024. | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022040999 | ISBN 9781009257275 (hardback)
| ISBN 9781009257268 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: National security – United States – History. | United
States – Military policy. | United States – Foreign relations. | United
States -- Economic policy.
Classification: LCC UA23 .S818 2024 | DDC 355/.033573--dc23/eng/20230206
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022040999
ISBN 978-1-009-25727-5 Hardback
Cambridge University Press & Assessment has no responsibility for the persistence
or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this
publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will
remain, accurate or appropriate.
VII
PA RT III: TH E POST–C OL D W A R W O R LD
PA RT IV : RETREA T A N D D E FE A T
Acknowledgements 704
Notes 705
Index 824
VIII
IX
XI
INTRODUCTION
On February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin’s Russia escalated the war it began
against Ukraine with its 2014 invasion of Crimea. This occurred at a time
when tensions with China had increased as Beijing began openly seeking
regional hegemony and to replace the United States as the world’s most
powerful state. Totalitarian, revisionist states were on the march. “Great-
power competition” was back.
Will the United States emerge victorious from this new contest as it
did during the Cold War? To do so, American leaders need to understand
the purposes for which American power has been used and learn how to
think about utilizing this power effectively. Examining the nation’s past
actions – good and ill – is the best preparation for overcoming today’s chal-
lenges and tomorrow’s.
The advent of America’s post–Second World War rivalry with the Soviet
Union moved “grand strategy” firmly into the US political-military lexicon.
The latest wave of interest arose in the 2010s in the face of revisionist and
expansionist Chinese and Russian regimes.
“What should American grand strategy be?” became a common query
in political, defense, and academic circles.
But this is the wrong question.
Strategy is about the use of power. Grand strategy is the coordinated use
of the various elements of national power. But to use power absent a political
aim – and without understanding the effects of the aim or aims – is to flail,
to expend at times both blood and treasure for no clear purpose. Proper
analysis rests on asking “What is our aim? What do we want to achieve?” The
political aim should be decided first. The wise use of power flows from this.
Few works on grand strategy rest on such a solid foundation.1
The aim is the most important element in proper strategic analysis, but
it is only a part. The first step is to learn how to think about the use of power
and its purpose.
Interests
R A
War for Limited or
e
Unlimited Aims Political Aims Peace s
a s
s e R
s Grand Strategy s i
e s s
s Diplomatic Information Military Economic m k
s Strategy Strategy Strategy Strategy e
m n
e Operations or Operational Art t
n
t
Tactics
but America’s historical challenges are generally too complex for this.3
“Containment” in the Cold War comes the closest, one unsurpassed for
branding success. But even this fails to paint a complete picture, nor was it
meant to as it was initially directed at the Soviet Union. A critical examina-
tion of any topic requires a clear methodology based on solid definitions.
INTERESTS
We begin with interests. These are often issues relating to a state’s survival
or prosperity. Interests depict part of the why and how of the behavior of
state and nonstate actors and are often underpinned by ideas and values.
Ideally, both become involved in issues because their leaders judge it nec-
essary – in the interests, or national interests – of the state or organization.
We must avoid confusing interests with political aims. Interests usually
underpin why nations select certain political aims and drive the actions of
leaders. But this is not an absolute; there are few absolutes in such matters.4
Some things can be both interests and aims, complicating the analytical
problem. For example, it is in the interest of the United States to have secu-
rity, but the security of the nation is also a political aim.
Interests can be subjective because leaders have different views and
prejudices, they can vary over time as the international and domestic sit-
uations are in constant flux, and are sometimes determined by unique
events. Administrations at times don’t see acting in some areas as in the
US interest until a new threat arises. In 1950, fighting a war in Korea
wasn’t viewed as in the American interest until Communist North Korea
invaded non-Communist South Korea and threatened American credibil-
ity. Interests aren’t fixed and change as circumstances change. This can
drive alteration of political aims, which means the grand strategy should be
reassessed and changed where necessary to address the new environment.
How then do we determine what is in the nation’s interests? Interests,
like so many aspects of foreign affairs, remain frustratingly subjective.
Sometimes this is easy: countering a threat to the nation’s survival is clearly
in the national interest. Sometimes this is difficult. Is it in the US interest to
defend Taiwan against aggression from Beijing? Theorist Bernard Brodie
wrote: “A sovereign nation determines for itself what its vital interests are
(freedom to do so is what the term ‘sovereign’ means) and its leaders accom-
plish this exacting task largely by using their highly fallible and inevitably
biased human judgment to interpret the external political environment.”5
Some advise ranking, but this suffers from subjectivism and sometimes poor
judgment.6 As with so many things in politics and war, the answer depends
Political aims provide a foundation for analysis and the point toward which
a nation’s power is directed. Ideally, the aims being sought are rationally
founded upon what is best for the state – or at least what the leaders decide
is best. But there are potentially many aims – in peace and in war – and
these change. Possessing multiple aims often means states need multiple
grand strategies to achieve them, a challenge overlooked in most works on
grand strategy. We see in American history predominant aims in particu-
lar eras. The pursuit of these leads to the formulation of additional aims
(sometimes), which then, ideally, drive the development of different and
multiple grand strategies (coordinated uses of power) for pursuing these
disparate aims. This is not always clear or even systematic. But methodically
examining past aims and related uses of power teaches future leaders and
their advisors how to think critically while providing a historical foundation
for crafting future aims and grand strategy.
From the time of their first settlements, the people who came to be
called “Americans” sought security. For the infant United States, security
became a critical political aim. Until the 1890s, Native American peoples
constituted the most persistent though withering threat. Early settlers also
worried about foreign intrusions, particularly from Spain and France. The
danger of their destroying what became the United States evaporated with
Britain’s victory in the French and Indian War in 1763. They remained a
threat, though Britain became a greater one. The hazards evolved as the
country grew, but the desire to achieve security has remained a dominant
aim driving the creation of US grand strategy.
The second key political aim is sovereignty. Americans were first con-
cerned with achieving sovereignty during their war for independence: they
wanted to control their own affairs without interference from abroad. After
achieving independence in 1783, securing sovereignty against external ene-
mies, particularly the European powers, as well as the neighboring Native
American nations, became important. America has also faced internal
threats to sovereignty such as the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion, the Confederacy,
and domestic organizations using terrorism. In each case, Federal power
was wielded to defeat threats.
A third aim was expansion. Americans were land hungry from the
beginning, and American expansion was dominated by taking land from
Native American nations. This desire to expand underpinned wars against
European powers and their former colonies as Americans enthusiastically
sought British (Canadian), French, Spanish, and Mexican lands.
The American trinity of security, sovereignty, and expansion altered
after President Theodore Roosevelt’s acquisition of what became the
Panama Canal Zone in 1903. Afterward, the US no longer pursued territo-
rial expansion using military force. Instead, the US added a new political
aim toward which it directed power. “Security, Sovereignty, and Expansion”
became “Security, Sovereignty, and Democracy.” The US would go abroad
in search of monsters to slay. There were tinges of this in US foreign rela-
tions dating to Thomas Jefferson, but Woodrow Wilson made it a core polit-
ical aim by weaponizing Progressivism to spread democracy.
All aims can produce troubles at home. Politics as a blood sport was
present from the republic’s birth. A myth arising during the Cold War was
“politics stops at the water’s edge,” meaning America’s political parties
unite against a foreign danger. Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg,
perhaps Congress’ foremost internationalist in his day, used the phrase
to illustrate how he and Democratic president Harry Truman worked in
a bipartisan fashion. Their relationship, even at the time, was “an aberra-
tion.”8 Bitter partisanship marked disagreements over the Quasi-War of
1798–1800 with France. American resistance to the War of 1812 reached
full-fledged treason. The American Civil War marked the bloodiest parti-
san discord. Schisms over neutrality and preparedness for war prevented
national political unity at the dawns of both world wars. Disagreement over
the Vietnam War became noxious. In 2007, Democratic Senator Harry Reid
enthused upon how Republican George W. Bush’s errors in Iraq would
help Democrats win Senate seats.9 America’s foreign relations – especially
its wars – have always provoked division.
IF AT WAR…
we must first examine our own political aim and that of the enemy. [It is
important to understand what the foe wants.] We must gauge the strength
and situation of the opposing state. We must gauge the character and abilities
of its government and people and do the same regarding our own. Finally, we
must evaluate the political sympathies of other states and the effect the war
may have on them.12
Clausewitz also had no illusions regarding the difficulty of doing this well.
Ideally, reassessment should occur continuously despite the challenges of
doing so. It should certainly take place whenever there is significant change,
such as a battlefield victory or defeat or the entry of a third party into the war.
Leaders should also decide how to bring the war to a victorious conclusion.
The paths here are innumerable, but Clausewitz marks the dominant routes:
We can now see that in war many roads lead to success, and they do not
all involve the enemy’s outright defeat. They range from the destruction of the
GRAND STRATEGY
The path for tapping American power to accomplish the desired aims –
both in peace and in war – is grand strategy. Grand strategy – as a concept
and a necessity – has its skeptics.14 The term has been with us since the
early 1800s, but no common definition has emerged.15 Grand strategy is
how nations use their power, ideally in a coordinated manner. This should
be directed at specific political aims. Some works on grand strategy mix
the political aim being sought with the strategy being pursued to obtain it,
making the analytical error of not distinguishing between them.16 Others
deem the political aim grand strategy.17 Some discuss the advantages of spe-
cific grand strategies, and then examine the nation’s interests and political
aims.18 This places the grand strategy cart before the political horse.
The elements of national power can be divided into four dominant
realms: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, which are some-
times represented by the acronym DIME. There are numerous additions
made to this, finance, intelligence, and law (FIL) being the most common,
but intelligence is part of the “I,” and other add-ons generally mark tools
for implementing or “operationalizing” the DIME’s respective elements.
Finance, for example, is an economic strategy tool, while law is part of all
four. Grand strategy is not the end being sought but the course for getting
there – the ways – that considers the necessary means.19 “National strategy”
is sometimes used as a synonym.20 “Doctrine” often serves as another, but
this also describes the methods military forces use to implement operations.
Some insist grand strategy must necessarily be for the long term, an
artificial requirement ignoring the reality of changing political aims and
an international environment in perpetual flux. If the aims and situation
change, the grand strategy might need to as well. Other artificial require-
ments include the insistence that grand strategy only applies to wartime
and that small states can’t have one. All countries (and even non-state
actors) can have a grand strategy, or even multiple grand strategies, as
all nations have interests and threats, and these usually generate political
aims. Different aims often require different utilizations of national power.
The reality of the possession of multiple political aims, combined with how
nations variously use their elements of national power, destroys a basic
4.
Ja Samuli oli itsekseen päättänyt, että nyt kun tulee, niin ottaa hän
puheeksi… Ensiksi kansakouluasian, josta jo ympäri kylää puhuttiin,
ja jos se kuitenkin alkaa olla tosi, rupeaa tuumailemaan uudesta
mökin paikasta. Täällä Takasuon rannalla, Vasuharjun kupeella, olisi
monessakin paikassa hyvää peltomaata. Vanhan miehen
asumapaikaksi olisikin oikein sopiva…
Hiki tippui hänen pitkästä mustasta tukastaan, mutta laihat kasvot
olivat kovin kalpeat. Kun laiha selkä kumartuessa koukistui, pistivät
selkärangan luusolmut ohkaisen paidan läpi näkyviin. Hoikat olivat
kätten ranteet, ja käsivarret lihaksettomat kuin karsitut seipäät. Mutta
silti nousi kiinteä, vettä itkevä savi suurina lapiopaloina ojan
molemmille puolin kookkaiksi röykkiöiksi.
Törmälä hymähti:
»Ei tästä vielä pitäisi tosi sadetta tulla, sillä minua ei ole
painostanut tänään, niinkuin sateen edellä painostaa», virkkoi siihen
Samuli.
Törmälä hymähti.
»Jo minä sitä asiaa olen murehtinut… Kun olen ajatellut, että jos
nyt joutuu pois… eikä ole pirttikään oma eikähän niitä ole tullut
tehdyksi minkäänlaisia torpankirjojakaan meillä…»
»Kyllä tämä oja tällä viikolla valmistuu», sanoi Samuli, kun läksivät
astumaan kylään päin, Vasuharjua kohti.
Hän oli nyt niin hyvällä tuulella, että kaikki asiat tuntuivat olevan
hyvin päin. Lisäksi johtui mieleen, että kukaties sieltä vielä Paavo-
Eemelikin tulee niin ettei kukaan arvaakaan, ja mikä tietää mitä on
matkassa… Pian navetta nousee ja vaikka mitä muutakin…
»Ihmiset puhuvat…»
Mutta ei ottanut Samuli uskoaksensa mitään pahaa Törmälästä.
Nyt varsinkin uskoi kaikkea hyvää ja mietti, mitä Törmälä oikeastaan
olikaan tarkoittanut Takasuolla lausumillaan sanoilla. Saattoivat
sisältää hyvinkin paljon.
Kuolema!
Jos vaan emäntä nytkin elänyt olisi, niin kohta olisi vienyt hänetkin
isännän vuoteen viereen…
Ja Samulille muistui mieleen ensi ilta, kun tähän taloon jäi. Isäntä
ja hän nousivat rannasta pihaan ja tulivat sisälle. Kesäilta oli, heinää
oli jo ruvettu tekemään.
Kuinka käy silloin hänen torpalleen, kun ei ole tullut niitä kirjoja
tehdyksi?
Hänelle tuli siinä niin paha olla, ettei saattanut enää istuakaan, kun
lisäksi muisti sen kansakoulurakennushomman… Serafiinahan oli
ollut sillä kansakouluntarkastajalla kumppanina, kun Varpusmäessä
kävivät.
Hän toivoi, että Liisa jo olisi ehtinyt nukkua eikä rupeaisi mitään
tiedustelemaan… isännän sairaudesta ja niistä torpankirjoista… Ei
tiennyt enää mitä vastata… kun yhdessä sepän kanssa aivan
myötäänsä niistä puhuivat… Itse hän ei oivaltanut niin tärkeiksi koko
kirjoja… Hän oli ymmärtänyt Törmälän puheista, että tällä oli
paremmat kirjat Samulia varten varattuina…
»Olen minä sinun puoltasi muutenkin pitänyt… jonka kerran
nähnet, jos elänet», oli sanonut.
Silloin alkoi Liisa taas vaivata niillä torpankirjoilla. Ja kun kuuli, että
Serafiina oli estellyt isännän luo menemästä, niin melkein huutaen
sanoi:
»Siinä oli nyt joku muu syy Serafiinalla, jonka vuoksi ei tahtonut
sinua päästää.»
6.
»Jos nyt niin on, että talo on Serafiinan, kuten kuuluvat puhuvan,
niin kuinka käy, jos Serafiina alkaa isännöidä? Ei häneen ole
luottamista, ei ole isäänsä tytär…»