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 THE SCIENCE OF VIRTUE

Integrating psychological and philosophical research on virtue and

moral development, this book presents a real-world program for vir-
tue science. Offering empirically testable hypotheses, the chapters
deliver theoretical and methodological guidance that shows how exist-
ing research can become a cohesive and truly interdisciplinary science
of virtue. The authors’ unique “STRIVE-4 Model” defines a unifying
conceptual framework, making the book an indispensable resource for a
new generation of scholars and students. This empirically tested model
provides the much-needed foundation that can put to rest traditional
worries about moral science. While mapping out the relevant areas of
psychology and value-focused inquiry, the book lays out an interdisci-
plinary approach to many questions, including the problem of knowl-
edge about character. Written for those researching virtue, drawing on
personality, developmental, moral, and positive psychology, as well as
moral philosophy and character education, the book demonstrates the
importance and applications of studying virtues empirically.

Bl a ine J. Fow er s is Professor of Counseling Psychology at the

University of Miami, USA. He conducts theoretical and empirical
investigations of virtue, practical wisdom, and flourishing. He has
published five books and over a hundred articles and book chapters.
He is a fellow of the American Psychological Association and a recipi-
ent of the Joseph B. Gittler Award.
Br a dfor d Cok el et is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Kansas, USA. He conducts cross-cultural philosophic
research into different ideals of virtue and cross-disciplinary work on
moral virtues, moral emotions, and how ethics classes can effectively
promote ethical change. He has published widely, including a co-
edited book, The Moral Psychology of Guilt (2019).
Nat h a n D. L eonh a r dt is Assistant Professor of Family Life at
Brigham Young University, USA. He studies virtues and flourishing
in close relationships. He has over fifty academic publications. He
was a Vanier scholar at the University of Toronto, Canada, and a
visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, USA.
T H E S C I E NC E OF V I RT U E
A Framework for Research

BL A I N E J. FOW ER S
University of Miami

BR A DFOR D COK E L ET
University of Kansas

NAT H A N D. L EON H A R DT
Brigham Young University
 Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom
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www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108490054
DOI: 10.1017/9781108779968
© Blaine J. Fowers, Bradford Cokelet, and Nathan D. Leonhardt 2024
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions
of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take
place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment.
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remain, accurate or appropriate.
 Contents

Acknowledgmentspage vii

Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue? 1

Part I Philosophical Resources and Prospects 23

1 Virtue Theory 25
2 A Philosophically Informed Virtue Science 53

Part II Psychological Resources and Prospects 71

3 Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science 73
4 Moral Development and Virtue 95
5 Personality and Virtue 124
6 The Place of Values in Virtue Science 150

Part III Organizing Virtue Research with the

STRIVE-4 Model 175
7 Virtues as Scalar Traits 177
8 The Role Sensitivity of Virtues 202
9 Virtue Trait by Situation Interactions 223
10 Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues 242
11 The Four Components of Virtue 266
v
vi Contents
Part IV The Science and Pr actice of Virtue 289
12 Virtue Science and Moral Philosophy 291
13 Virtue Science and Psychology 310

References 333
Index 374
 Acknowledgments

This book is the product of cross-disciplinary work between two

­psychologists (Fowers and Leonhardt) and a philosopher (Cokelet). It is
also an elaboration of a paper we published with Jason Carroll (Fowers
et al., 2021). Although much of the content is similar to the article, we
were able to elaborate a great deal about developmental and personality
psychology and the influences of situations and roles in virtue expression.
The biggest content difference is in practical wisdom becoming one of the
four elements of virtue in the STRIVE-4 Model instead of dispositions.
Interdisciplinary work is never easy, but we have found it enormously
enriching in bringing the knowledge of separate disciplines together and
allowing ourselves to challenge one another. We hope this will be benefi-
cial to readers as well.
We are grateful to many current and past colleagues and friends for
advice, support, and comments on both the book and its earlier life as an
article. We want to single out a few people who generously helped us to
refine some of our thoughts: Will Fleeson, Eranda Jayawickreme, Kareem
Khalifa, Tobias Krettenauer, Kristján Kristjánsson, Dan McAdams,
Lukas Novak, Josh May. Janka Romero, and Rowan Groat at Cambridge
University Press have earned our thanks for being unreservedly support-
ive of the book project and the many delays throughout its writing. The
patience, support, and encouragement of our partners and families cannot
be adequately appreciated because they must live with us as we struggle
through the writing process (or with the tasks and challenges that keep us
away from writing). Blaine and Brad want especially to offer their thanks
to Susan Green and Sarah Hoadley.

vii
 Introduction
Why Study Moral Virtue?

We are living in a time that has been characterized as “post-truth”

and “post-morality” (Lazer et al., 2018; Pew Research Center, 2017).
As morality has seemed to become increasingly relativized to individ-
ual and narrow group interests, disunity, divisiveness, and prejudicial
conflict have grown apace. The need for convincing moral knowledge
and widely accepted understandings of decency and the common good
has seldom been greater. We might hope that scientific knowledge will
enable us to develop the kind of moral knowledge that can equip us to
bridge these rifts. But in order for science to help us with disunifying
relativism, the first challenge is to confront and significantly rethink
traditional demands to keep science and morality strictly separate. One
way to approach morality scientifically is the study of moral virtue,1
which is the focus of this book. Fortunately, we are in the midst of a
renaissance of philosophical interest in virtue and in a position to learn
from a rapidly expanding set of social scientific studies on virtues or
character strengths.
Thanks to the intelligence and diligence of many researchers, there is
now a growing, interdisciplinary body of work that promises to answer
many questions about morality, decency, and how we can promote moral
progress. But this research is in its early days and the empirical work on
virtue remains a patchwork. In order to fully tackle these vital questions
the emerging science of virtue needs a unifying, cohesive framework. A
primary reason that existing work on virtue and moral development is dis-
unified is that it has been siloed within different disciplines and subdisci-
plines. Moreover, virtue research lacks the kind of systematic, empirically
oriented conceptual framework that can ground and integrate the collage
of empirical studies. This book charts the contours of the two problems

1
We focus on the moral virtues in this book, so we do not address the epistemic virtues or what are
sometimes called the performance virtues.

1
2 Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue?
and lays the groundwork for possible solutions: a unified, grounded inter-
disciplinary science of virtue that can illuminate human moral life in fresh
and practical ways.
Before tackling questions about how to pursue virtue science effectively,
we address questions about need for virtue science. Why should social
scientists study virtue at all? In this introductory chapter, we explore five
reasons for pursuing empirical virtue research: (1) Humans are moral ani-
mals, (2) moral behavior can be understood as an expression of acquired
traits, (3) it is psychologically realistic to think that ordinary humans can
acquire and express virtue traits, (4) moral education is valuable, and (5)
virtues are often taken to be essential to a good life. After explaining these
five reasons in favor of pursuing empirical virtue research, we address the
three main challenges that virtue scientists must face: (1) the absence of
empirically oriented virtue theory, (2) the overreliance on simple survey
design in psychology, and (3) virtue skeptics.2 Finally, we explain the over-
arching argument of our book, breaking down how each part supports the
overarching argument, and how each chapter contributes to its part.

Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research

Humans as Moral Animals

The first reason to study virtue is that moral behavior is central for human
beings (Fowers, 2015; Tomasello, 2019). Although there is healthy debate
about what moral behavior is, there is virtually no disagreement about
whether humans, throughout history and across cultures, form shared
moral understandings within their cultural groups. Debates about the spe-
cific content of morality often obscure the ubiquity of moral frameworks
in human societies. Two basic facts3 point to more specific ways in which
humans are fundamentally moral creatures.
First, we are profoundly social creatures that are entirely dependent on
one another for everything from basic physical necessities to understand-
ing how to live. For this reason, humans have been termed ultrasocial
animals (Fowers, 2015; Tomasello, 2014). The extent of this interdepen-
dence means that every individual’s welfare is powerfully affected by the

2
One form of skepticism about virtue science is the idea that there should be a dichotomy of facts and
values, with virtues placed in the values category. We discuss our disagreement with this dichotomiz-
ing at length in Chapter 6.
3
Of course, some may disagree about the factual claims we are making here, but the alternatives to
them seem implausible to us.
 Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research 3
ways that she is treated.4 Therefore, the quality of one’s life is due, in no
small part, to whether others treat one fairly or unfairly, respectfully or
disrespectfully, kindly or unkindly. Because of this strong, mutual influ-
ence on one another’s welfare, we are often held accountable to others
for how we act. Both welfare influencing and accountability are constant
features of human experience, from forager bands to modern urban life.
This means that moral questions are ubiquitous for humans because virtu-
ally every action can affect others’ welfare in some way, and we might hold
one another responsible for those effects. The stability and quality of every
human group depends on the answers it has to these moral questions.
Second, it seems possible to live a better or worse life. We take seriously
the ancient idea that ethics is about how well one lives and that the moral
virtues might be needed to live well. The ideal of living well was expressed
in the Greek term “eudaimonia,” which we translate as flourishing,5 and
we recommend, here and elsewhere (e.g., Fowers, Novak, Kiknadze, &
Calder, 2023a), a thorough study of the concept of flourishing, which is
often understood as a person that is fulfilling her potential as a human
being. We have much more to say about what constitutes a good life and
the idea that virtue science can investigate the importance of morality for
flourishing in Chapters 1 and 10.
The idea that to understand morality we need to think about the good
life for individuals is somewhat foreign to most moderns, as we typically
understand morality in terms of right and wrong actions. The most common
contemporary understanding of morality is a “rail guard” formulation in
which morality is guided by rules and motivated by guilt, punishment, and
reward. It is true that these kinds of motivation are important, and that right
and wrong actions are an important component of morality. According to
ancient virtue theories, however, morality and moral motivation are under-
stood much more broadly. There is a focus on virtue traits and not just
actions, and moral motivation is taken to often arise from the positive pur-
suit of goods. That is, moral motivation is often based on attraction to what
is good rather than on respect for rights, duties, or imperatives, or a concern
to avoid bad consequences. Another contrast with common contemporary
views of morality is the idea that morality enhances the welfare of the moral
agent. The basic idea is that human beings will benefit if they develop virtue

4
Rather than use awkward gender-neutral phrasing such as “he or she,” we alternate feminine and
masculine pronouns in the chapters of the book.
5
Eudaimonia is usually translated as happiness, but we avoid that translation because it can connote
an ephemeral emotional state, and the ancient Greeks saw eudaimonia in terms of a whole life, not
just felicitous moments.
4 Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue?
traits that involve positive attraction to the good – a thick form of morality
that goes beyond mere “right action” that embodies respect for the moral
rules or rail guards. We expand on these distinctions in the remainder of
the book and explain how virtue science can test the ancient philosophic
hypothesis that morality is essential to the good human life.
It is important at the beginning to emphasize the hypothetical tone
of this book. We advance a lot of hypotheses, many based on ancient
Aristotelian and Confucian thought, but we see these as hypotheses that
may or may not garner empirical support. This openness to disconfirma-
tion is vital because we are proposing many contentious ideas that should
be empirically examined rather than assumed to be true.
The two central hypotheses about human life – that we are often
accountable for how we treat one another and that a good human life may
well require us to develop moral virtues – support the view that humans
are fundamentally moral creatures. Indeed, morality appears to be central
to typical human lives. If that is the case, what could be a more important
aspect of human life to study? We propose studying morality in terms of
virtues because virtue traits make it possible for people to act consistently
in moral ways, as we discuss in the next section. And the relationships
among the virtues and a flourishing life are some of the important empiri-
cal questions we hope a virtue science will help us to answer (Chapter 10).

Can Moral Behavior Be Understood in Terms of Acquired Traits?

The second important reason to study virtues empirically is to investigate
the claim that moral behavior, especially virtue, can be seen as a trait-
like characteristic of individuals (Brewer, 2009; Cokelet & Fowers, 2019;
Fleeson et al., 2014; Fowers, 2005a; Jayawickreme & Fleeson, 2017a; Kim,
2016; Mower, 2013; Russell, 2009; Snow, 2010).6 The renaissance of inter-
est in ancient Greek and Chinese moral philosophy has suggested the
hypothesis that moral behavior can be understood in terms of acquired
traits (Chapter 5). These philosophies focus on the complete moral life
which reflects a person’s character or agency, and this presumably involves
having traits that produce reliable and spontaneous actions that promote
what is good. Ancient philosophers, East and West, discussed this reliably
moral behavior in terms of virtues such as courage, fairness, generosity, and
honesty.

6
We are aware that the concept of a trait is fraught. We discuss many of the interpretations of that
term and trait theories in Chapter 5.
 Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research 5
The idea that moral behavior can be based on acquired traits is excit-
ing and attractive, partially because it takes us beyond the idea of traits as
inherited temperaments. The allure of virtue is also apparent in its promi-
nence in many cultures, including such diverse groups as ancient Greeks,
Confucians, Buddhists, Christians, and Lakotas (Sioux). Importantly, this
concept of virtue suggests that no group of people is ruled out when it
comes to acquiring virtues. We suggest that virtues can be acquired by vir-
tually anyone regardless of gender, race, or similar characteristics.7 Seeing
virtues as traits also emphasizes the idea that individuals with virtue traits
will reliably and spontaneously express that trait through virtuous behav-
ior in appropriate circumstances. In Chapter 1, we discuss how virtuous
traits motivate individuals to act morally.
Psychologists have begun to study virtues as acquired traits as well.
Positive psychology provided a strong impetus for this research (e.g.,
Bleidorn & Denisson, 2015; Peterson & Seligman, 2004), but psycholo-
gists interested in empirical studies of virtue extend well beyond that move-
ment (e.g., Lefevor & Fowers, 2016; Meindl et al., 2013; Morgan et al.,
2017). Although there is accumulating evidence for virtues as acquired
traits (Bleidorn & Denisson, 2015; Fowers et al., 2019; Meindl et al., 2013),
the “traitness” of virtues remains an open question.
We see the qualifier “acquired” as important theoretically and empiri-
cally, and we suggest some hypotheses to test that idea (Chapters 1–5). By
focusing on acquired traits, we differentiate virtue traits from inherited,
temperament-based traits and from traits that are conceived in essential-
ist terms. Aristotle did not give a very fulsome account of the acquisi-
tion of virtue, but he suggested that virtues are acquired through example
and practice. There are many other possibilities, including ritual practice
(Hutton, 2021; Olberding, 2016), and through friendship (Kristjánsson,
2020). In the end, identifying and clarifying the pathway(s) toward virtue
acquisition are the empirical questions we discuss in Chapter 4. In addi-
tion, in Chapter 5, we present moral virtues as traits that are chosen and
cultivated because the individual sees them as worthy characteristics.
The important point we suggest here is that consistently acting morally
can be conceptualized in terms of virtue traits. If people can cultivate traits
that make it possible to act reliably and spontaneously for their own and
others’ welfare, the question of whether humans can acquire and practice

7
Of course, it may turn out that evidence shows that cultivating virtues may not be possible for some
groups (e.g., psychopaths) or without certain contextual features (e.g., the absence of civil war), but
such traits and situations are thankfully unusual.
6 Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue?
virtues is among the most important sets of questions there are for under-
standing humans.

Psychologically Realistic Virtues

Third, many moral philosophers (e.g., Flanagan, 1991; Miller, 2014; Snow,
2010) have become increasingly interested in psychologically realistic por-
trayals of and empirical evidence for virtues. One important reason for seek-
ing a realistic portrayal of virtues is that this can make it possible to study
them with the methods of science. These philosophers have been clear in
calling for a science of virtue, although, as philosophers, they are generally
not equipped to explain how that science can be conducted. Some recent
interdisciplinary collaborations have shown promise for helpfully illumi-
nating virtue (e.g., Carr et al., 2017; Miller et al., 2015; Snow & Narvaez,
2019; Vittersø, 2016), and we hope the same can be said of this book.
Philosophers’ interest in a science of virtue is one key reason we have
written this book. We believe that philosophical contributions to our
understanding of virtue have been enormously enlightening and useful.
Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend how the concept of virtue could
have been revived without its philosophical renaissance. Unfortunately
for those interested in virtue science, however, philosophical accounts of
­virtue are often formulated in psychologically unrealistic terms (Cokelet
& Fowers, 2019; Flanagan, 1991). We describe in Chapter 2 how this
­problem can be dealt with and how philosophers can fruitfully contribute
to ­interdisciplinary research.
For a theory of virtue to be psychologically realistic means that it
can describe and explain how ordinary human beings can acquire and
practice virtues in everyday life. When a theory is unrealistic, it offers
us an overly abstract or demanding picture of the virtues that may well
represent an admirable ethical ideal, but not one that we can use to
understand and explain the moral traits and behavior of ordinary folk.
One way that social scientists can contribute to virtue theory and ethics
more broadly is to complement abstract and sometimes psychologically
unrealistic philosophical work on virtue with psychological theories that
focus on virtues as characteristics that ordinary people implicitly recog-
nize and care about. This book addresses that need through the creation
of a psychologically realistic, empirically testable model of virtue. We
examine the contributions that developmental and personality psychol-
ogy can make to this project in Chapters 4–6 and then formulate our
model in Part III.
 Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research 7
Our model differs from philosophical theories of virtues in that it is
more concretely descriptive and heuristically productive for empirical
research. Theories offer abstract, general accounts of what makes a trait a
virtue, the kinds of values that virtues have, the ways in which virtue traits
relate to right and wrong actions, and how we should conceive of ideal vir-
tues. These topics are important but the theories designed to answer them
cannot be counted on to fruitfully inform empirical studies. The model we
formulate in this book (termed the STRIVE-4 Model) provides a concep-
tual model that describes the general features of ordinary virtue traits that
ordinary people ascribe to one another. This model also offers concrete,
heuristic guidance for future virtue research, and we offer many hypoth-
eses in this book that we think will be useful in guiding the empirical study
of virtues. These hypotheses are numbered by the chapter in which they
are discussed and a complete list of the hypotheses is available in Figure 1.

I-1: Virtue expression will vary across cultures.

3-1: There will be more compatibility among virtues than competition
and exclusivity.
3-2: The strength of one virtue trait will correlate positively with the
strength of other virtue traits.
4-1: Virtue development will be positively associated with greater
ownership of behavior by the developing agent.
4-2: Virtue development will be positively associated with greater
caregiver responsiveness and synchrony between caregiver and child.
4-3: Virtue development will be positively associated with stronger
conscience development in the developing agent.
4-4: Virtue development will be positively associated with
responsiveness to moral expectations in the developing agent.
4-5: Virtue development will be positively associated with stronger
capacity for self-direction in the developing agent.
4-6: Collective identity will be positively related to virtue development
in children.
4-7: The capacity for joint attention, an element of collective
intentionality, will be a prerequisite for virtue development.
4-8: The capacity for taking an intersubjective perspective, an
element of collective intentionality, will be a prerequisite for virtue
development.
Figure 1 STRIVE-4 Model hypotheses.
8 Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue?
4-9: Normative sensitivity in children will be a prerequisite for virtue
development.
4-10: Recognition of mutual obligation toward completing joint tasks
will be a prerequisite for virtue development.
4-11: Reason giving for actions will be a prerequisite for virtue
development.
4-12: Recognition of the equal rewards principle will be a prerequisite
for virtue development.
4-13: When people observe moral exemplars, it can enhance virtue
development.
4-14: The integration of self-interested and other-interested values will
contribute to virtue development.
4-15: Specific virtues will increase in strength among some individuals
over time.
4-16: Virtue traits may be acquired intentionally through training and
practice.
4-17: Increased practice of a virtue will lead to it being practiced in
more diverse situations.
4-18: The rudiments of virtue can develop over time into mature virtue.
4-19: Children’s role adoption will influence virtue development.
4-20: Children over six can perceive human goods.
4-21: Children over six can act in the service of the goods they
perceive.
5-1: Virtue measures will be only moderately related to personality
dimensions.
5-2: Virtue measures will have incremental validity above and beyond
traditionally defined personality traits.
5-3: Agency is present in the cultivation of virtues.
6-1: Virtues are generally and explicitly understood as choiceworthy
characteristics because they contribute to a flourishing life.
6-2: Individuals cultivate virtues for the sake of living well.
6-3: The expression of virtues includes substantial other-benefiting.
6-4: The expression of virtues includes substantial self-benefiting.
6-5: Virtues are moderate expressions of a strength that contrast with
the excesses and deficiencies associated with those strengths.
7-1: Virtues are scalar or measurable and can be assessed quantitatively.
7-2: Virtue traits will have incremental validity regarding criterion
variables beyond social desirability.
Figure 1 (cont.)
 Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research 9
7-3: Lay informants can provide valid and meaningful reports on a
target person’s virtuous behavior.
7-4: Individuals will cultivate virtue intentionally as an approach to
crafting a good life.
7-5: Virtue assessments will demonstrate significant between-person
variability.
7-6: Virtue assessments will demonstrate significant within-person
consistency over time.
7-7: There will be within-person variability in virtue trait expression.
8-1: Virtue trait expression will be contextualized to fit situations, roles,
and relationships.
8-2: Individuals’ virtue expression will vary with respect to their
acknowledged roles.
8-3: Virtue trait expression will vary within persons across personal,
professional, and civic roles.
8-4: Virtue trait expression will vary between-persons based on the
social role context.
8-5: The degree of practical wisdom will be negatively correlated with
the degree of role conflict.
8-6: Appropriate virtues will be more strongly related to a given role
enactment than will personality dimensions between-persons.
8-7: Appropriate virtues will be more strongly related to a given role
enactment than will personality dimensions within-persons.
8-8: There will be between-person differences in virtue possession
depending on the individuals’ social roles.
8-9: Observed parenting quality will be positively correlated with
commitment to the parenting role.
8-10: Observed parenting quality will be positively correlated with
investment in the child’s welfare
8-11: Observed parenting quality will be positively correlated with the
virtue of patience.
8-12: Changes in parenting quality will be positively correlated with
personal growth.
8-13: Observed parenting quality will be positively related to loyalty.
8-14: Observed parenting quality will be positively related to
kindness.
8-15: Observed parenting quality will be positively associated with the
virtue of compassion.
Figure 1 (cont.)
10 Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue?
8-16: Observed teaching quality will be positively related to the virtue
of loyalty.
8-17: Excellence in law enforcement among police officers will be
positively correlated with the virtue of courage.
8-18: Excellence in law enforcement among police officers will be
positively correlated with the virtue of fairness.
8-19: The degree of compassion will be positively correlated to the
observed expertise of healing professionals.
8-20: The degree of trustworthiness will be positively correlated to the
observed expertise of healing professionals.
8-21: The degree of honesty will be positively correlated to the observed
expertise of healing professionals.
9-1: Virtue traits will also predict differences in the types of situations
that individuals encounter.
9-2: Differences in encountered situations will be more acutely
perceived based on the strength of the virtue trait.
9-3: Individuals with stronger virtue traits will evoke desirable alterations
in situation perception and action for participants in the situation.
9-4: Situation perception will vary appropriately with the strength of
individuals’ virtue traits.
9-5: Virtue traits and relevant situational factors will interact to
influence agents’ behavior.
9-6: People with stronger virtue traits can recognize and transform
situations in ways conducive to virtuous actions.
9-7: Adeptness in recognizing the morality in situations will be
positively correlated with practical wisdom.
9-8: The greater an individual’s phronesis the more the individual will
perceive the possibilities for moral action excellently.
9-9: Situation perception guided by phronesis will enable better moral
action possibilities.
10-1: Eudaimonia will be positively related to indicators of shared
meaning.
10-2: Participating in shared meaning means being willing to act
together.
10-3: Eudaimonia will be positively related to the quality of an
individual’s friendships.
10-4: Eudaimonia will be positively related to indicators of character
friendship.
Figure 1 (cont.)
 Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research 11
10-5: Eudaimonia will be positively related to indicators of the quality
of the individual’s belonging to choiceworthy social groups.
10-6: Progress in achieving goals related to mid-level human goods will
be positively related to eudaimonia.
10-7: The virtues (e.g., honesty, patience) related to a good (e.g.,
knowledge production) will be positively related to various
indicators of success in pursuing that good.
10-8: The virtues related to knowledge acquisition will be positively
related to various indicators of success in knowledge acquisition.
10-9: The virtue of loyalty will be positively related to an individual’s
group-favoring actions.
10-10: The virtue of loyalty will be positively related to the individual’s
perception of belonging to the group.
10-11: The virtue of loyalty will be positively related to the group
members’ acknowledgement of the individual’s group membership.
10-12: The virtue of loyalty will be positively related to the degree of
coordinated actions among group members.
10-13: Virtuous activities will contribute to well-functioning
communities.
10-14: Trait virtues will be more strongly related to goods and their
associated goals than state versions of similar characteristics.
10-15: An individual can successfully pursue a specific good to the degree
that that individual expresses the virtues associated with that good.
10-16: The assessments of flourishing from various perspectives
(including subjective and observable perspectives) will overlap
significantly.
10-17: There will be unique variance in flourishing assessments from
various perspectives.
10-18: Longitudinal measurement of flourishing will be more
stable and will provide more information than single-timepoint
assessments of flourishing.
10-19: Perceived belonging (both by the target individual and other
members of the group) to groups will be positively related to
indicators of eudaimonia.
10-20: Perceived belonging is necessary for eudaimonia.
10-21: Relevant virtues (e.g., loyalty, forgiveness) will be positively
related to perceived group belonging (both by the target individual
and other members of the group).
Figure 1 (cont.)
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 James Patch
Paymaster.—Robert Harman
Adjutant.—William Hackett
Quartermaster.—Thomas Carson
Surgeon.—Alexander Young
Asst.-Surgeons.—John Lorimer
Eugene M’Swiney
Vet. Surgeon.—Edward Coleman

1816

Colonel.—Oliver de Lancey
Lieut.-Cols.—Evan Lloyd
William Carden
Hon. Lincoln Stanhope
Majors.—Oswald Werge
Nathan Wilson
Captains.—David Supple
Jonathan Willington
George John Sale
Daniel M’Neale
Hon. Leicester Stanhope
John Atkins
T. Perrouet Thompson
Benjamin Adams
Malcolm M’Neill
Lieutenants.—John Brackenbury
John D’Arcy
Joseph Budden
William H. Robinson
Charles Byrne Sale
F. W. Hutchinson
Robert Coulthard
Francis Curtayne
William Daniel
H. Bond
Francis Haworth
I id Bl k
 Isidore Blake
H. Carew
William M’Farlane
Samuel Ward Watson
William Hackett
John Tomlinson
Charles Greville
Cornets.—Richard Willington
Thomas Hurring
Oliver de Lancey
William Potts
George Clarke
James Patch
N. Raven
Thomas M’Kenzie
Peter Backhouse
Paymaster.—Robert Harman
Adjutant.—William Hackett
Quartermaster.—James Cockburn
Surgeon.—W. Wybrow
Asst.-Surgeons.—John Lorimer
Eugene M’Swiney
Vet. Surgeon.—Edward Coleman

1817

Colonel.—Oliver de Lancey
Lieut.-Cols.—Evan Lloyd
William Carden
Hon. Lincoln Stanhope
Majors.—Oswald Werge
Nathan Wilson
Captains.—David Supple
Jonathan Willington
George John Sale
Daniel M’Neale
John Atkins
Ed dB
 Edward Byne
T. Perrouet Thompson
Benjamin Adams
Malcolm M’Neill
Lieutenants.—John Brackenbury
John D’Arcy
Joseph Budden
W. H. Robinson
Charles Byrne Sale
F. W. Hutchinson
Robert Coulthard
Francis Curtayne
William Daniel
Henry Bond
Francis Haworth
Isidore Blake
H. Carew
W. M’Farlane
Samuel Ward Watson
Richard Willington
Ambrose de L’Etang
John Tomlinson
Henry Court Amiel
Charles Greville
T. L. Stuart Menteath
Cornets.—Thomas Hurring
Oliver de Lancey
William Potts
George Clarke
T. Ellman
J. Patch
N. Raven
P. Backhouse
Thomas Carey
Thomas Nicholson
Paymaster.—Robert Harman
Adjutant.—Thomas Carey
Quartermaster.—James Cockburn
Quartermaster. James Cockburn
Surgeon.—William Wybrow
Asst.-Surgeons.—John Lorimer
Thomas Price
Vet. Surgeon.—Edmund Price

1818

Colonel.—Oliver de Lancey
Lieut.-Cols.—Evan Lloyd
William Carden
Hon. Lincoln Stanhope
Majors.—Oswald Werge
Nathan Wilson
Captains.—David Supple
Jonathan Willington
George John Sale
Daniel M’Neale
John Atkins
Edward Byne
T. Perrouet Thompson
Benjamin Adams
Malcolm M’Neill
Charles Wayth
Lieutenants.—John Brackenbury
John D’Arcy
Joseph Budden
W. Henry Robinson
Charles Byrne Sale
F. W. Hutchinson
Robert Coulthard
Francis Curtayne
William Daniel
Henry Bond
Isidore Blake
H. Carew
William M’Farlane
Samuel Ward Watson
 Samuel Ward Watson
Richard Willington
Ambrose de L’Etang
John Tomlinson
Henry Court Amiel
T. L. Stuart Menteath
Thomas Hurring
Oliver de Lancey
Cornets.—William Potts
George Clarke
T. Ellman
James Patch
N. Raven
Peter Backhouse
Thomas Nicholson
James Byrne Smith
J. B. Nixon
Paymaster.—Robert Harman
Adjutant.—James Byrne Smith
Quartermaster.—James Cockburn
Surgeon.—William Wybrow
Asst.-Surgeons.—John Lorimer
Thomas Price
Vet. Surgeon.—Edmund Price

1819

Colonel.—Oliver de Lancey
Lieut.-Cols.—Evan Lloyd
Hon. L. Stanhope
Oswald Werge
Majors.—Nathan Wilson
Jonathan Willington
Captains.—George John Sale
Daniel M’Neale
John Atkins
Edward Byne
T Perrouet Thompson
 T. Perrouet Thompson
Benjamin Adams
Malcolm M’Neill
Charles Wayth
John Brackenbury
Lieutenants.—John D’Arcy
Joseph Budden
W. Henry Robinson
F. W. Hutchinson
Francis Curtayne
William Daniel
Henry Bond
Isidore Blake
H. Carew
William M’Farlane
Samuel Ward Watson
Richard Willington
Ambrose de L’Etang
John Tomlinson
Henry Court Amiel
T. L. Stuart Menteath
Thomas Hurring
Oliver de Lancey
W. T. H. Fisk
Cornets.—William Potts
George Clarke
T. Ellman
N. Raven
Peter Backhouse
Thomas Nicholson
John Byrne Smith
J. B. Nixon
William Marriott
Paymaster.—Robert Harman
Adjutant.—J. R. Smith
Quartermaster.—James Cockburn
Surgeon.—W. Wybrow
Asst.-Surgeons.—John Lorimer
Th Pi
 Thomas Price
Vet. Surgeon.—Edmund Price

1820

Colonel.—Oliver de Lancey
Lieut.-Colonels.—Evan Lloyd
Hon. L. Stanhope
Oswald Werge
Majors.—Nathan Wilson
Jonathan Willington
Captains.—George John Sale
Dan. M’Neale
John Atkins
Edward Byne
Thomas P. Thompson
Benjamin Adams
Malcolm M’Neill
Charles Wayth
John Brackenbury
Lieutenants.—John D’Arcy
Joseph Budden
W. H. Robinson
Charles Byrne Sale
F. W. Hutchinson
Francis Curtayne
William Daniel
Henry Bond
Isidore Blake
H. Carew
Wm. M’Farlane
Richard Willington
Ambrose de L’Etang
H. Court Amiel
T. L. Stuart Menteath
Thomas Hurring
William T. H. Fisk
G F Cl k
 George F. Clarke
George G. Shaw
Cornets.—William Potts
N. Raven
Peter Backhouse
Thomas Nicholson
James Byrne Smith
William Marriott
Charles St. John Fancourt
Frederick Loftus
Paymaster.—Robert Harman
Adjutant.—James Byrne Smith
Quartermaster.—James Cockburn
Surgeon.—William Wybrow
Assistant-Surgeons.—John Lorimer
Thomas Price
Veterinary Surgeon.—Edmund Price

1821

Colonel.—Oliver de Lancey
Lieut.-Colonels.—Evan Lloyd
Hon. L. Stanhope
Nathan Wilson
Majors.—Jonathan Willington
George John Sale
Captains.—Daniel M’Neale
John Atkins
Edward Byne
Thomas P. Thompson
Benjamin Adams
Malcolm M’Neill
Charles Wayth
John Brackenbury
William H. Robinson
Lieutenants.—John D’Arcy
Joseph Budden
 Charles Byrne Sale
Francis Curtayne
William Daniel
Henry Bond
Isidore Blake
H. Carew
William M’Farlane
Richard Willington
Ambrose de L’Etang
Henry Court Amiel
T. L. S. Menteath
Thomas Hurring
W. T. Hawley Fisk
George F. Clarke
George G. Shaw
W. H. B. Lindsay
N. Raven
Cornets.—W. Potts
Peter Backhouse
Thomas Nicholson
Robert Lewis
Charles St. John Fancourt
Frederick Loftus
Arch. Edmund Bromwich
Hon. Nat. Hen. Chas. Massey
Paymaster.—Robert Harman
Quartermaster.—James Cockburn
Surgeon.—William Wybrow
Assistant-Surgeons.—John Lorimer
Samuel Holmes
Veterinary Surgeon.—Edmund Price

1822

Colonel.—Oliver de Lancey
Lieut.-Colonels.—Evan Lloyd
Hon. L. Stanhope
 Nathan Wilson
Majors.—Jonathan Willington
Norcliffe Norcliffe
Captains.—Daniel M’Neale
John Atkins
Edward Byne
Thomas P. Thompson
Benjamin Adams
Malcolm M’Neill
Charles Wayth
John Brackenbury
William H. Robinson
Lieutenants.—John D’Arcy
Joseph Budden
Charles Byrne Sale
Francis Curtayne
William Daniel
Henry Bond
Isidore Blake
H. Carew
William M’Farlane
Richard Willington
Henry Court Amiel
T. L. S. Menteath
Thomas Hurring
W. T. Hawley Fisk
George G. Shaw
N. Raven
W. Potts
Cornets.—Peter Backhouse
Thomas Nicholson
Robert Lewis
C. St. John Fancourt
Frederick Loftus
Arch. E. Bromwich
William Penn
Hon. Nat. Hen. Chas. Massey
Paymaster —Robert Harman
Paymaster. Robert Harman
Adjutant.—W. T. Hawley Fisk
Quartermaster.—James Cockburn
Surgeon.—William Wybrow
Assistant-Surgeons.—John Lorimer
Sam. Holmes
Veterinary Surgeon.—Edmund Price

1823

Colonel.—Lord R. E. H. Somerset, K.C.B.

Lieut.-Colonels.—Evan Lloyd
Hon. L. Stanhope
Majors.—Jonathan Willington
Norcliffe Norcliffe
Captains.—Daniel M’Neale
John Atkins
Edward Byne
Thomas P. Thompson
Benjamin Adams
Malcolm M’Neill
John Brackenbury
William H. Robinson
W. T. Cockburn
Lieutenants.—John D’Arcy
Joseph Budden
Charles Byrne Sale
Francis Curtayne
Henry Bond
Isidore Blake
H. Carew
William M’Farlane
Rich. Willington
Henry Court Amiel
Thomas Hurring
W. T. Hawley Fisk
George G. Shaw
N Raven
 N. Raven
William Potts
William Graham
Cornets.—Peter Backhouse
Thomas Nicholson
Robert Lewis
Frederick Loftus
Arch. Edmund Bromwich
William Penn
Hon. Nat. H. C. Massey
Lewis Shedden
Paymaster.—Robert Harman
Adjutant.—W. T. Hawley Fisk
Quartermaster.—James Cockburn
Surgeon.—William Wybrow
Asst.-Surgeons.—John Lorimer, M.D.
Sam. Holmes, M.D.
Veterinary Surgeon.—Edmund Price

1824
Colonel.—Lord R. E. H. Somerset, K.C.B.
Lieut.-Colonels.—Evan Lloyd
Hon. L. Stanhope
Majors.—J. Willington
George Luard
Captains.—Daniel M’Neale
Thomas P. Thompson
Benjamin Adams
Malcolm M’Neill
John Brackenbury
John Scott
Lieutenants.—John D’Arcy
Joseph Budden
Harry Bond
W. T. Hawley Fisk
George F. Clarke
George Robbins
William Dungan
Thomas Nicholson
Cornets.—Robert Lewis
Frederick Loftus
William Penn
Hon. N. H. C. Massey
Samuel Pole
R. J. Elton
Paymaster.—Robert Harman
Adjutant.—W. T. H. Fisk
Quartermaster.—James Cockburn
Surgeon.—William Wybrow
Assistant-Surgeon.—John Lorimer
Veterinary Surgeon.—Edmund Price
Agents.—Hopkinson & Sons

1825
Colonel.—Lord R. E. H. Somerset, K.C.B.
Lieut.-Colonels.—Evan Lloyd
Hon. L. Stanhope
Majors.—J. Willington
George Luard
Captains.—T. P. Thompson
Benjamin Adams
J. Brackenbury
John Scott
William Locke
Frederick Johnston
Lieutenants.—John D’Arcy
Joseph Budden
W. T. Hawley Fisk
George F. Clarke
George Robbins
William Dungan
George T. Greenland
M. C. D. St. Quintin
Cornets.—Frederick Loftus
Hon. N. H. C. Massey
Samuel Pole
R. J. Elton
John Barron
Hon. R. F. Greville
Paymaster.—Robert Harman
Adjutant.—W. T. H. Fisk
Quartermaster.—T. Nicholson
Surgeon.—William Wybrow
Assistant-Surgeon.—John Lorimer
Veterinary Surgeon.—Henry Smith

1826
Colonel.—Lord R. E. H. Somerset, K.C.B.
Lieut.-Colonels.—Evan Lloyd
Hon. L. Stanhope
Majors.—George Luard
Lord Bingham
Captains.—Benjamin Adams
John Scott
Frederick Johnston
W. N. Burrows
George F. Clarke
Alan Chambre
Lieutenants.—W. T. H. Fisk
George Robbins
William Dungan
G. T. Greenland
M. C. D. St. Quintin
Frederick Loftus
Hon. Nat. Hen. Chas. Massey
Samuel Pole
Cornets.—R. J. Elton
John Barron
Hon. R. F. Greville
Charles Forbes
Henry Witham
S. J. W. F. Welch
Paymaster.—Robert Harman
Adjutant.—W. T. H. Fisk
Quartermaster.—T. Nicholson
Surgeon.—William Wybrow
Assistant-Surgeon.—Sam. Holmes
Veterinary Surgeon.—Henry Smith

1827
Colonel.—Lord R. E. H. Somerset, K.C.B.
Lt.-Cols.—Evan Lloyd
George, Lord Bingham
Majors.—Anthony Bacon
John Scott
Captains.—William N. Burrowes
George F. Clarke
George Robbins
George T. Greenland
M. C. D. St. Quintin
George M. Keane
Lieutenants.—Robert James Elton
John Barron
Charles Forbes
Henry Witham
S. J. W. F. Welch
Cornets.—Nat. B. F. Shawe
Samuel W. Need
W. C. Douglas
William Murray Percy
William Henry Tonge
Lionel Ames
Paymaster.—W. T. Hawley Fisk
Adjutant.—John Barron
Quartermaster.—T. Nicholson
Surgeon.—William Wybrow
Assistant-Surgeon.—H. G. Parken, M.D.
Vet. Surgeon.—John Wilkinson

1828
Colonel.—Lord R. E. H. Somerset, K.C.B.
Lt.-Cols.—Evan Lloyd
George, Lord Bingham
Majors.—John Scott
William N. Burrowes
Captains.—George F. Clarke
George Robbins
M. C. D. St. Quintin
John Lawrenson
Robert James Elton
Lieutenants.—John Barron
Charles Forbes
Henry Witham
Nat. B. F. Shawe
W. C. Douglas
Samuel Need
William M. Percy
Cornets.—William H. T. Tonge
Lionel Ames
A. H. Mitchelson
Denis Hanson
William Wentworth
William L. Shedden
Paymaster.—W. T. Hawley Fisk
Adjutant.—Denis Hanson
Quartermaster.—T. Nicholson
Surgeon.—William Wybrow
Asst.-Surgeon.—H. G. Parken, M.D.
Vet. Surgeon.—John Wilkinson

1829
Colonel.—Lord R. E. H. Somerset, K.C.B.
Lt.-Cols.—Evan Lloyd
George, Lord Bingham
Majors.—John Scott
W. N. Burrowes
Captains.—George F. Clarke
George Robbins
M. C. D. St. Quintin
George M. Keane
John Lawrenson
Robert James Elton
Lieutenants.—John Barron
Charles Forbes
Harry Witham
N. B. F. Shawe
William C. Douglas
Samuel W. Need
William M. Percy
Cornets.—William H. Tonge
Lionel Ames
A. H. Michelson
Denis Hanson
William Wentworth
W. L. Shedden
Paymaster.—G. Chandler
Adjutant.—Denis Hanson
Quartermaster.—T. Nicholson
Surgeon.—James G. Elkington
Assistant-Surgeon.—H. G. Parken
Vet. Surgeon.—John Wilkinson
Agent.—Mr. Hopkinson

1830
Colonel.—Sir J. Elley, K.C.B.
Lt.-Cols.—Evan Lloyd
George, Lord Bingham
Majors.—John Scott
W. N. Burrowes
Captains.—George F. Clarke
George Robbins
M. C. D. St. Quintin
George M. Keane
John Lawrenson
Robert K. Trotter
Lieutenants.—John Barron
Charles Forbes
N. B. F. Shawe
Samuel W. Need
William C. Douglas
William M. Percy
William H. Tonge
Cornets.—Lionel Ames
Denis Hanson
W. L. Shedden
H. F. Walker
Walter Williams
Philip J. West
Paymaster.—G. Chandler
Adjutant.—Denis Hanson
Quartermaster.—Thos. Nicholson
Surgeon.—James G. Elkington
Asst.-Surgeon.—H. G. Parken
Vet. Surgeon.—John Wilkinson
Agent.—Mr. Hopkinson

1831
Colonel.—Sir J. Elley, K.C.B.
Lt.-Cols.—Sir Evan Lloyd
George, Lord Bingham
Major.—W. N. Burrowes
Captains.—George F. Clarke
George Robbins
M. C. D. St. Quintin
George M. Keane
John Lawrenson
Robert R. Trotter
Lieutenants.—John Barron
Charles Forbes
N. B. F. Shawe
Samuel W. Need
W. C. Douglas
W. M. Percy
W. H. Tonge
Cornets.—Lionel Ames
Denis Hanson
W. L. Shedden
H. F. Walker
Walter Williams
Philip J. West
Paymaster.—G. Chandler
Adjutant.—Denis Hanson
Surgeon.—J. G. Elkington
Asst.-Surgeon.—H. G. Parken
Vet. Surgeon.—John Wilkinson
Quartermaster.—Thos. Nicholson

1832