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Northern Ireland, the BBC, and Censorship in Thatcher's Britain, 1979-1990 Robert J. Savage full chapter instant download
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Northern Ireland, the BBC, and
Censorship in Thatcher’s Britain
Northern Ireland, the
BBC, and Censorship
in Thatcher’s Britain
R O B E RT J. S AVAG E
1
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
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© Robert J. Savage 2022
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2022
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2021948688
ISBN 978–0–19–284974–8
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192849748.001.0001
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Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
For Shane, Nick, Molly and Robin and dedicated to the memory of
Patricia Catherine Savage nee Regan 1928–2020
Acknowledgements
This book would not have been possible without the support of a number of
friends and colleagues. At Boston College the University Provost David Quigley
and the Dean of the Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences Greg Kalscheur SJ
offered support and encouragement. A University Faculty Fellowship in the
spring of 2018 enabled me to take up a visiting professorship at the Long Room
Hub Arts and Humanities Research Institute at Trinity College Dublin. This pro-
vided an ideal environment to write the first draft of this book. Thanks to
Professor Jane Ohlmeyer, Caitriona Curtis, Maureen Burke, and all the staff for
their hospitality.
I was also fortunate to hold a Visiting Research Professorship at Queen’s
University, Belfast during the 2017/2018 academic year. The support of the Pro-
Vice Chancellor, Richard English and the Director of the Institute for Irish
Studies, Peter Gray, proved tremendously beneficial. Spending time at Queen’s
enabled access to archives in Belfast and to a vibrant community of faculty and
graduate students. Boston College has enjoyed a long and fruitful relationship
with Queen’s University and I am grateful to friends and colleagues there includ-
ing Fearghal McGarry, Dominic Bryan, Marie Coleman, Olwen Purdue, Andrew
Holmes, and Sean O’Connell.
Special thanks to my colleagues in Irish Studies at Boston College including
Marjorie Howes, Jim Smith, Joe Nugent, Guy Beiner, Vera Kreilkamp, Oliver
Rafferty SJ, Kevin O’Neill, Richard Kearney, Sheila Gallagher, Philip O’Leary, and
Burns Librarian Christian Dupont. Thanks also to friends at BC Ireland Mike
Cronin, Thea Gillen, and Claire McGowan. Once again Kelly Sullivan proved tre-
mendously helpful by reading a rough draft of the manuscript and offering crit
ical feedback and much appreciated insight. I’d also like to acknowledge the
support of colleagues in the Department of History, especially former chairs
Kevin Kenny, Sarah Ross and current chair Prasannan Parthasarathi.
I owe a debt of gratitude to number of people who supported this book by
offering advice, inviting me to present research or simply listening to ideas as they
developed. Thanks to Alvin Jackson, Roy Foster, Nicholas Canny, Gearóid Ó
Tuathaigh, Marianne Elliott, Mary Daly, Enda Delaney, Ian McBride, Carole
Holohan, Diarmaid Ferriter, Tom Bartlett, Lance Pettitt, Margaret Kelleher, Breen
Ó Conchubhair, Pearse Kearney, Vincent Doherty, Tom O’Grady and Claire Connolly.
Thanks also to archivists and librarians at the BBC Written Archives in Caversham,
viii Acknowledgements
Bournemouth University, the UK and Irish National Archives, the Public Records
Office, and Linen Hall Library in Belfast and the Burns and O’Neill Libraries at
Boston College.
Lastly thanks to Robin, Shane, Nicholas and Molly for their love and support.
Falmouth, Massachusetts
July 2021
Contents
Introduction1
1. The Hunger Strikes 9
2. The Image of Northern Ireland: ‘Britain’s Wasteland’? 44
3. Noraid and the Brighton Bomb 63
4. The Edge of the Union? The Anglo-Irish Agreement and
its Aftermath 103
5. Routine Chaos? Enniskillen, Gibraltar, and the Persistence of
‘the Troubles’ 138
6. The Broadcasting Ban 185
7. The End of Censorship? 233
Conclusion272
Bibliography 279
Index 283
Introduction
And we must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker
of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend. In our societies we
do not believe in constraining the media, still less in censorship. But
ought we not to ask the media to agree among themselves a voluntary
code of conduct, a code under which they would not say or show any
thing which could assist the terrorists' morale or their cause . . . ?1
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s iconic July 1985 speech to the American Bar
Association is often quoted as a plea for the broadcast media to behave respon
sibly and not provide armed militants with the publicity they crave. Her call for
broadcasters to adhere to a ‘voluntary code of conduct’ was made in the aftermath
of an infamous TWA hijacking that received widespread publicity from inter
national media. Just weeks before her speech, extremists allegedly belonging to
Hezbollah hijacked TWA flight 847 and killed an American serviceman. Parts of
the ordeal were filmed by television cameras and gained widespread international
publicity as the aircraft was forced to cross the Mediterranean a number of times
before landing in Beirut. It is often forgotten that in her call for media self-control,
the Prime Minister declared that in ‘our societies we do not believe in constrain
ing the media much less censorship’. Three years later Britain’s ‘Iron Lady’ changed
her mind.
Before the ‘Troubles’ erupted in 1969 radio and television broadcasts that
addressed Northern Ireland were subject to an extraordinary, though quiet, form
of censorship in an effort to conceal a society riven by division and plagued by
discrimination. From the early days of radio, the BBC in Northern Ireland proved
incredibly deferential to a unionist establishment that had little time for the
nationalist community. The station avoided any mention of discord, discrimin
ation, or minority grievance. Catholics regarded the BBC as a ‘public service’ that
ignored their interests, politics, and culture. When programming emanating from
London on the national network strayed and addressed an Irish dimension in the
region unionists responded with howls of protest and condemned the national
network for undermining the Britishness of Northern Ireland. Rather than risk
provoking the wrath of the unionist establishment programme-makers in London
1 Speech to the American Bar Association, 1 July 1985, Royal Albert Hall, London, Thatcher
Foundation: <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096>.
Northern Ireland, the BBC, and Censorship in Thatcher’s Britain. Robert J. Savage, Oxford University Press.
© Robert J. Savage 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192849748.003.0001
2 The BBC and Censorship in Thatcher ’ s Britain
ignored Northern Ireland and left the region to its own devices. In 1959 the
c ommercial franchise for television in the region was awarded to a group headed
by ‘Brum’ Henderson. Ulster Television (UTV) fell into the hands of the
Henderson family, owners of the staunchly unionist Belfast News Letter. UTV
was focused on entertainment and making a profit, its news and current affairs
programming was limited, and hardly aggressive in addressing the deep divisions
that defined life in the region.
All of this changed with the start of the civil rights campaign and the subse
quent outbreak of violence in 1969. Northern Ireland became an important story
not just in Britain and Ireland, but throughout the world. Television news reports
critical of the Stormont government helped destabilize and ultimately undermine
a regional parliament that had long governed without consensus. In the 1970s, as
the violence of ‘the Troubles’ escalated, politicians, the security services, and
senior civil servants desperately tried to manage reporting from Northern Ireland.
The unionist-dominated Stormont Parliament and, after 1972, the Northern
Ireland Office (NIO) became increasingly upset with television coverage of the
conflict they regarded as problematic. Throughout the decade officials grew
progressively angry with programming that addressed Catholic alienation or
criticized government initiatives including the tactics of the security services.
Authorities were especially upset with coverage that focused attention on the
Irish Republican Army and infuriated by Sinn Féin’s ability to use the medium to
criticize the government and defend republican violence. After the suspension of
Stormont officials in the NIO prepared detailed documents making the case for
state intervention in the print and broadcast media as violence intensified and
made headlines around the world. These initiatives were supported by the army
and police, who were outraged by media reports that they believed were sympa
thetic to republican paramilitaries and undermined their efforts to restore law
and order.
Critics of the media focused on television and hoped to develop a means to
control how news and current affairs broadcasting addressed the conflict. In 1976
Frank Cooper, Permanent Undersecretary of the Northern Ireland Office, sub
mitted a detailed proposal to the BBC Director-General and Board of Governors
advocating that targeted censorship be deployed in Northern Ireland and adjusted
as needed in other parts of the United Kingdom.2 Roy Mason, who served as
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland during James Callaghan’s Labour govern
ment, also advocated censorship. He supported the implementation of a compre
hensive ‘D-Notice’ system, a scheme that would enable his office to control how
information about the conflict was disseminated in both the print and broadcast
media. Margaret Thatcher’s political mentor, Airey Neave, had forcefully argued
that Sinn Féin should be banned from the airwaves when he was an opposition
spokesman on Northern Ireland in 1977.3
After the Thatcher government came to power in 1979 a political crisis erupted
when reports emerged that a BBC television crew had filmed the IRA patrolling
the streets of Carrickmore in County Tyrone. Although the footage was never
broadcast, word of the BBC’s filming the IRA provoked tremendous controversy.
When the BBC interviewed a member of the Irish National Liberation Army that
same year, there was outrage, much of it orchestrated by the Thatcher government
and its allies in the print media. These incidents led to the denunciation of the
BBC in Parliament where the Prime Minister told her colleagues that the BBC
needed to ‘get its house in order’. The Attorney-General subsequently warned
broadcasters that journalists could be prosecuted under the Prevention of
Terrorism Act for coming into contact with subversives without immediately
reporting that contact to the authorities. As the unrest continued, hostile remarks
in Parliament and scathing critiques of both the BBC and the Independent
Broadcasting Authority (IBA), the body that oversaw commercial television, by
the right-wing press succeeded in creating a significant degree of self-censorship
that helped contain, if not suppress, aggressive reporting about the conflict.
When he became Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in 1980,
John Hermon proved a determined advocate of censorship and constantly pres
sured the Northern Ireland Office to intervene to suppress Sinn Féin’s access to
the broadcast media. He argued for the implementation of extensive restrictions
that would keep supporters of political violence from the airwaves. Under his
direction the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) put forward a series of proposals
to censor broadcasting beginning in 1980 when it submitted an ambitious plan
only to see it rejected as impractical. By this time the opinion of senior civil ser
vants inside the NIO had evolved and the imposition of censorship was not con
sidered politically viable.
Not to be dissuaded, a year later the RUC repeated its efforts, arguing that it
now had the support of the Garda Síochána in the Irish Republic. Censorship of
the broadcast media had kept Sinn Féin and other targeted groups off radio and
television in the Republic of Ireland since 1972. That year authorities in Dublin
used section 31 of the Irish Broadcasting Act to prevent supporters of political
violence from gaining access to the airwaves. The RUC announced that the Garda
Síochána had joined with them in supporting the introduction of censorship in
Northern Ireland, arguing that their southern colleagues believed that both juris
dictions on the island should work together to silence Sinn Féin. But officials in
the NIO were still not impressed. G. L. Angel, a senior civil servant in the NIO in
London, argued that this latest initiative would not be supported by the Home
3 Savage, The BBC’s Irish Troubles, explores the history of the BBC’s relationship with Northern
Ireland and the development of the regional service in Belfast.
4 The BBC and Censorship in Thatcher ’ s Britain
from the Northern Ireland point of view I think we also have grounds for being
very wary of anything which would appear to involve a lessening of civil
rights . . . Republican propagandists do attack the Irish authorities, but the
Dublin Government is largely immune from criticism in the eyes of the larger
overseas audience because it is Irish. We are not. It is the Government’s Northern
Ireland policy which would take what I believe would be considerable overseas
criticism for the imposition of ‘censorship’ at a time when our civil rights pos
ition is a relatively good one.4
The NIO’s Burns Working Party, set up to examine legislation relating to terror
ism, had also considered the option of imposing censorship in 1980. It was fully
aware that in both the security services and some sections of the civil service
there remained support for state intervention in the broadcast media. It also
understood that many in the unionist community favoured the suppression of
Sinn Féin. However, Lord Burns’s Working Party firmly rejected censorship. It
concluded that ‘the scale of the problem throughout the UK did not merit such a
draconian response’. The Burns group questioned the central thesis of those who
advocated censorship, a belief that intensive media coverage of the conflict was
undermining efforts to defeat terrorism. ‘On the whole it was felt that (even tak
ing into account the minority press) media exposure did much to alert the gen
eral public to the true nature of terrorist organisations and stiffened rather than
sapped the public’s will to resist.’ While senior figures in the NIO were sympa
thetic to the security services, the Burns Working Party concluded that even if
there was proof that controversial coverage of events such as republican funerals
was harmful, it was best to avoid formal censorship. Instead it argued for engaging
in ‘direct discussions with those involved in producing such items’.5 Making quiet
the Law and Order Division of the Northern Ireland Office, the RUC still hoped the government
would intervene to keep Sinn Féin off the air.)
6 TNA, Kew, CJ4/5147, memo, ‘PRCC Control of the Media’, P. Coulson to Merifield, 17 August 1983.
7 On 20 July 1982 the IRA set off a bomb in Hyde Park during a Changing of the Guard Ceremony
killing four Guardsmen and injuring twenty-eight others. Images from the bombings including the
dead and injured horses were featured in news reports around the world. Later that day a second
device exploded in Regent’s Park under a bandstand while an army band played a lunchtime concert.
Seven soldiers were killed and thirty-one people injured including tourists who had come to enjoy
music in the park.
8 TNA, Kew, CJ4/5147, memo, ‘PRCC Control of the Media’, 1–2. 9 Ibid.
6 The BBC and Censorship in Thatcher ’ s Britain
services and other critics of the broadcast media. These complaints focused on
reporting that detailed the activities of the IRA, reported on the political initia
tives of Sinn Féin, or criticized the government and security services.
Coulson understood that programmes that provided in-depth analysis and
carried interviews with terrorists might be offensive to some viewers, but he was
sceptical that this type of coverage aided the terrorists’ cause. As an example, he
cited the BBC interview of an Irish National Liberation Army figure who claimed
to be involved in the killing of Airey Neave in 1979. He argued that, although the
broadcast might have boosted the morale of a handful of extremists, the ‘exposure
of their motives and thinking made more enemies than friends for their cause’.
Coulson also thought that clever republican political operatives were not going to
influence public opinion, arguing that in discussion programmes even when
‘articulate Sinn Fein spokesmen such as Danny Morrison wipe the floor with
their less articulate opponents, it would be difficult to argue that they win many to
their side’.10 He believed that ‘having deproscribed Sinn Fein in order to entice the
IRA into participating in more constitutional activities—including “public
debate”—it would be inconsistent and deeply damaging to the Government’s
credibility to try to deny them a public platform merely because our policy had
succeeded so well’.11
Throughout the 1980s the Thatcher government remained suspicious and frus
trated with the broadcast media, especially the BBC, believing it to be dominated
by a leftist bias. When asked about the prospects of censorship in 1985 Margaret
Thatcher told an interviewer on BBC 2’s Newsnight ‘I am never going to put cen
sorship on—we are not that kind of party’.12 Although attracted to the model of
censorship initiated in the Irish Republic, the government opted for a quieter,
more subtle method to influence the broadcast media. When it could, the
Thatcher government appointed political allies to senior posts especially the BBC
Board of Governors in an effort make the organization more accountable to
its wishes.
However, in the autumn of 1988, after a year of extraordinary violence that
received extensive national and international television coverage, the Prime
Minister’s opinion changed. On 19 October 1988 her government announced for
mal restrictions of the broadcast media under the Broadcasting Act of 1987 and
clause 13(4) of the License Agreement. The infamous ‘broadcasting ban’ formally
introduced censorship throughout the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. This censorship also contained an international dimension
because the restrictions impacted the broadcasts of the BBC World Service. In
1988 the World Service broadcast to a massive global audience in over forty lan
guages. When he announced the ban in Parliament, Secretary of State Douglas
Hurd argued that terrorists ‘draw support and sustenance from access to radio
and television’ causing ‘grave offense’, and declared, ‘the Government have decided
that the time has come to deny this easy platform to those who use it to propagate
terrorism’. Hurd told the House of Commons that he had issued a directive to the
BBC and IBA ‘requiring them to refrain from broadcasting direct statements by
representatives of organisations proscribed in Northern Ireland and Great Britain
and by representatives of Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein and the Ulster Defence
Association’.13
What follows is a book about the struggle to control the narrative of the
Northern Ireland conflict. Degrees of censorships had helped define broadcasting
in Northern Ireland from its inception in 1922 although, beginning in 1968, this
was challenged by a number of intrepid broadcasters. Once ‘the Troubles’ arrived,
the passive deference to authorities exercised by the broadcast media ended, and
with more aggressive reporting, the spectre of draconian government interven
tion took root. Throughout the 1970s and especially in the 1980s the threat of
state censorship hung in the air like the sword of Damocles. Labour and
Conservative governments were upset by programmes that delved into grievances
of the minority community or questioned the policies, tactics, and priorities of
the army and police. They were especially unnerved by broadcasts that explored
the motivations of militant republicans and addressed the support they received
from the communities from which they emerged. These same authorities were
also alarmed by cutting-edge investigative reporting that explored the shadowy
links between state security services and loyalist paramilitaries. The infamous
Prevention of Terrorism Act became a weapon used to threaten and intimidate
the BBC and independent commercial companies that were overseen by the
IBA. This helped create an insidious form of self-censorship within British broad
casting and succeeded in marginalizing, but not silencing, militants, especially
Sinn Féin. In spite of its defence of IRA atrocities, Sinn Féin was a legal political
party that enjoyed considerable support in Northern Ireland, especially after the
1981 hunger strikes. By 1988, twenty years after the start of ‘the Troubles’, the
Thatcher government’s ‘broadcasting ban’, a formal legislative initiative, prevented
what was considered unpalatable political opinion from being directly expressed
on television and radio. Although the ban referenced the loyalist UDA it was
focused squarely on Sinn Féin. Audiences in England, Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland together with listeners to the World Service watched or listened
to programming that was subject to direct government censorship. The following
chapters address the relentless skirmishing that characterized the relationship
between the broadcast media and the Thatcher government. The constant wran
gling led to informal self-censorship and finally the direct imposition of state
censorship that undermined the freedom of the press and compromised free
speech in one of the world’s most prominent democracies.
There is no comprehensive history of the broadcast media’s role in the Northern
Ireland conflict. My earlier book, The BBC’s Irish Troubles: Television, Conflict and
Northern Ireland (2015), addresses the history of the BBC’s involvement with
Northern Ireland from 1922 when BBC radio broadcasts were first aired. It then
considers the challenges that confronted the regional and national networks
when violence broke out in 1968. Although it addresses some aspects of the BBC’s
coverage of Northern Ireland in the 1980s this is done briefly and without the
archival support that this book uses.14 There are other admirable publications
that consider the challenges that confronted broadcasters when addressing the
Northern Ireland crisis. Indeed, these have enhanced my own work. David Miller,
Bill Rolston, John Horgan, Liz Curtis, Rex Cathcart, Jonathan Barton, Alan
Parkinson, Lance Pettitt, David Butler, and a number of journalists have produced
excellent studies that address the media, the conflict, and broadcasters’ relations
with the state. Some of these are single-authored books, others are edited collec
tions, but all were written many years ago. None were able to access or fully exploit
the critical archival sources used in this book. Other much broader c onsiderations
of British broadcasting, including books by Asa Briggs, Jean Seaton, Charlotte
Higgins, Gordon Johnson, and Emma Robertson, provide a wider context to this
study. This book is focused on ‘the Troubles’ and the experience of the BBC and
the independent television companies in covering the conflict throughout the
1980s, one of the most turbulent decades in post-war British and Irish history.
I should point out from the start that although I have a healthy respect for media
and cultural studies scholars I write as a historian. My work is informed by a wide
array of archival sources and benefits from a variety of secondary sources to
produce narrative history that I hope enhances an understanding of how ‘the
Troubles’ were presented to regional, national, and international audiences.
14 A limited amount of material from The BBC’s Irish Troubles is featured when addressing the
hungers strikes and the BBC documentary ‘Real Lives’. This has been greatly augmented by recently
released archival material from a variety of sources.
1
The Hunger Strikes
Northern Ireland, the BBC, and Censorship in Thatcher’s Britain. Robert J. Savage, Oxford University Press.
© Robert J. Savage 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192849748.003.0002
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These with the streams from Colombia drain the northwest part of
the Amazon Basin and are capable of adding much to the economic
value of the region. The few white settlements existing are as
nothing in this vast wilderness.
[6] See Geographical Journal, October, 1920
The Chinchipe River rises in southern Loja and after receiving
many tributaries flows into the Marañón a little below where that river
runs northeast. The lower part of the Chinchipe is navigable.
The Santiago River rises near the town of Loja between the two
Cordilleras. Several of its important tributaries rise in Loja, or in the
Cuenca basin farther north. One of these, the Pauta, has a branch
rising only 30 miles from the Gulf of Guayaquil, a source nearer the
Pacific than that of any other river flowing into the Atlantic unless it
be in the very south of Chile. The Santiago enters the Marañón a
little above the rapids of the Pongo Manseriche. At the mouth of the
stream was once a town, Santiago, which like Borja below the Pongo
was destroyed by savages.
The Morona River. Two of the many tributaries of the Morona rise
in the East Cordillera at heights above 13,000 and 14,000 feet north
of the Apuay knot. At high water the Morona is navigable for 300
miles, at low water for 200, for steamers drawing from 2 to 4 feet,
and also two of its tributaries; but due to the tortuous course of the
river the 300 miles equals but 120 in a straight line. Earlier many
flourishing missions existed in this section, but in the last century the
Huambisa Indians inhabiting the upper reaches of the Santiago and
the Morona almost exterminated the Indians who had been civilized.
So recently as February, 1913, members of the same tribe
massacred the soldiers of a Peruvian outpost. This, notwithstanding,
was later re-established by Peru.
The Pastaza River, rising in the basin of Riobamba at a height of
nearly 15,000 feet, flows through a little known district receiving
many tributaries. The lower part is navigable for steamers at high
water to the Huasaga branch, 120 miles, and 200 miles farther by
canoe. This fluvial system drains the basins of Latacunga, Ambato,
and Riobamba, the snows of Chimborazo, Cotopaxi, and other
peaks contributing to its waters. A spot where the unified river at an
altitude of about 6000 feet in one leap makes a splendid fall of 190
feet is said to be one of the most picturesque scenes in the Andes.
The River Tigre belongs to the region of the plains, though some
of its affluents rise in the East Cordillera. Although in volume not to
be compared to the Pastaza or the Napo it is quite as important,
being navigable for steamers of 4 to 8 feet draught at high water for
over 400 miles, and in low water for steamers drawing 2 to 4 feet;
100 miles more on the Corriente branch and 40 on the Pucasuro,
with an additional 1260 miles by canoe on its various tributaries. The
region traversed is rich in natural products and with over 100
tributaries the river deserves remembrance. It enters the Marañón 40
miles above the Ucayali.
The Nanay, a much smaller plains river with a slow current, yet
with a high bank and a healthful climate, may be ascended for 105
miles and has some importance.
The Napo River, formerly part of the boundary line between
Colombia and Ecuador but now given over to Ecuador, has sources
among the Ecuadorian volcanoes, Cotopaxi, Antisana, and others. At
first the descent is rapid. At the foot of the Cordillera 100 miles from
the source, and but 1500 feet above the sea, canoe navigation
begins at the village of Napo. Sixty miles below, the Coca River
comes in. This section includes the Napo missions, a beautiful
region long known and visited by botanists and geologists. Here
ends the influence of the Roman Church and the land of the salvajes
or infieles begins. It was down the Coca valley that Gonzales Pizarro
and Orellana came in 1540. From this point the Napo runs in
forested plains, receiving many more tributaries, the large Aguarico,
and the Curaray. The Napo is called navigable in high water for
steamers from the Amazon about 200 miles up to the Curaray, some
say to the Aguarico, 560 miles, and little less at low water. At one
point the Napo is but 50 or 60 miles from the Putumayo, with which
communication by canoe is possible, and often made. The route
from the Putumayo to Iquitos by way of the Napo is much shorter for
the rubber gatherers, as the Napo flows into the Amazon not far
below that city, while the Putumayo enters it several hundred miles
farther down.
The Capital
Provinces
Territories
Ports
Railways
Aside from the few railways, water ways and mule trails are the
means of communication. The rivers, and the estuaries, tide water
channels, are of great importance, even streams practicable only for
canoes. On the Ecuador littoral 600 miles altogether are deemed
navigable, these at present of greater use than the Amazon
tributaries, which in the future will have a development of assured
value.
On the water ways of the Pacific system the steamboat, the flat
boat or chata, the raft, and the canoe, all have their place.
Steamboats of from 25 to 125 tons serve the Guayas River System
above Guayaquil, this including nearly a dozen streams or estuaries,
in winter penetrating to the foot of the Cordilleras. If the natural water
ways were properly developed and a few artificial canals were
opened, a much larger field of the richest territory would be
accessible. The chatas, boats without sails carrying from 4 to 50
tons, are of lighter draught, the rafts too are important. Made of
bamboo and balsa wood they are very light, a single log 40 feet long
being able to support 2 tons. Rafts of 20 or 30 logs, in part roofed
over, carry the entire family as well as heavy freight. Thanks to the
strong tide on the rivers they float down stream very rapidly,
returning with a load up stream at turn of tide, more slowly, but
without additional propulsion, far above Guayaquil. In this way 48
miles a day may be covered. Canoes of course have the same
advantage and steamboats also, these being often delayed at Puná
or Guayaquil to have the benefit of the tide which runs 8 miles an
hour. The canoes, which are able to carry from 500 to 50,000
pounds of freight, bring from remote places valuable cargoes of
cacao or other stuff and return laden with supplies. Few roads or
trails exist in this section, but there are some, available in the dry
season, especially in the better populated districts of Guayas. A trail
through the jungle called a trocha, made with axe and machete, is
soon overgrown again.
In the Andine section there is one good cart road leading from
Quito 115 miles south. The trails to the east are five in number; the
most frequented, the one from the Pichincha Province (Quito) to the
pueblos or villages of the Napo (a high road is now being
constructed), one from Tungurahua farther south through Baños to
Canelas; one from Chimborazo to Macas; one from Azuay to
Gualaquiza; one from Loja to Zumba and Chita, and on to Jaen in
Peru.
Between the plateau region and the coast, at the north, practically
no communication exists, but farther down there are a number of
trails. Thus there are roads to Latacunga and Ambato from the lower
valleys west, several extend to points above from Babahoya or
Bodegas, the capital of Los Rios and the chief port of the interior on
the river which also enjoys the two names. Bodegas is 36 miles up
from Guayaquil and is reached by a strong tide so that river
steamers come up on the flood in 8 hours and even go higher in
winter when the rivers are full. It is from Bodegas that interior traffic
begins to points not easily accessible from the railway.
From Naranjal and Machala, coastal towns of El Oro at the
extreme south, roads lead to Cuenca and other interior towns; other
roads farther south go to Loja, and to Tumbes in Peru. All of these
roads are merely mule or bridle trails, no wagon roads existing. In
the Andine region there are naturally additional trails from one point
to another, many reaching altitudes of 13,000 or 14,000 feet,
crossing chasms or rivers on swinging bridges three feet wide, with
no more guard than a single wire if any, and passing along slippery
dangerous slopes, where the meeting of a loaded mule train may
well excite terror; a rock wall on one side and a precipice on the
other, often leaving small space for passage. Scenes of beauty may
repay some persons for the discomforts and risks endured, but not
the average tourist, nor will sufficient business reward the
commercial traveler.
The Leonard Exploration Company is to make caminos and later
cart roads into the Oriente, where its oil wells may be located.
CHAPTER XVIII
ECUADOR: RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES
Agriculture
Forestry
Mining
Industries