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Conflicts, Crimes and Regulations in Cyberspace
Cybersecurity Set
coordinated by
Daniel Ventre
Volume 2
Edited by
Sébastien-Yves Laurent
First published 2021 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as
permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced,
stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers,
or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the
CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the
undermentioned address:
www.iste.co.uk www.wiley.com
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Sébastien-Yves LAURENT
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Introduction
The nine chapters of this volume provide a global and, therefore, original
dimension of cyberspace. Indeed, it seemed to us to be beneficial to not limit
its content, as is sometimes the case, to an irenic vision that only values the
collaborative dimension or, conversely, to a cynical vision that reduces
cyberspace to a conflictual space. In the spirit of our global perspective, we
chose the title Conflicts, Crimes and Regulations in Cyberspace. This book is
not directly part of the endless debate between the advocates of cyberwar
(Calvo 2014) and those who reject this posture (Gartzke 2013). We note that
there are confrontations in cyberspace, involving civilian and military actors,
toward various ends that are not always short term. Today, the state of our
knowledge strongly exceeds the apocalyptic prognoses of the 1990s and 2000s
and this allows us to relativize the quantity and scope of confrontations between
state actors, most of which are related to data theft activities, that is espionage
(Valeriano and Maness 2018). Thus, we have chosen to describe them as
“crimes” or “conflicts” in order to deliberately avoid the term “war”3, which
seems excessive to us and immediately produces a securitization effect.
References
1.1. Introduction1
The end of the 1990s and the 2000s saw a great debate in international
social sciences, which focused on the effects of globalization on states.
Susan Strange (1996) was the first to write of the irreversible weakening of
the state, while others have emphasized its strong resistance (Krasner 1999)
to the phenomenon of globalization. Yet others have even suggested that the
state is being strengthened (Cohen 2005).
In this chapter, written 20 years later, we would like to revisit this debate,
which does not appear to be outdated, by taking as a point of observation
one of the manifestations of globalization, namely, the development of
information technologies in a global system formerly called the internet, now
more extensive and called “cyberspace”. Halfway through the 2000s, at a
time when the internet was still highly collaborative and barely affected by
“cyber insecurity”, two American international lawyers, Jack Goldsmith and
Tim Wu, put forward the idea of the return of the state to the internet in their
celebrated book, Who Controls the Internet? (Goldsmith and Wu 2006).
Two years earlier, the political scientist Daniel Drezner had indicated that
We will not be revisiting the classic works that have established the
origins of the internet in detail here (Castells 2001; Goldsmith and Wu 2006;
Tréguer 2019); although the origin of the global network was more
cooperative than hierarchical and centralized (Schafer and Thierry 2013), it
mainly stemmed from the desire of the US military to maintain a
technological advantage over the USSR in the field of information
processing (Castells 2001). The idea and origins of the internet were
American. The US Arpanet of the late 1960s, developed in collaboration
with 15 universities, was the matrix of the global internet. Although the
individual contributions of British (Tim Berners-Lee), French (Louis Pouzin)
and Belgian (Robert Cailliau) computer scientists, for example, were
significant, it was the Pentagon’s investments and, above all, the dynamics
of the IT industry in the United States (Carr 2016) that turned the original
military network into a national civilian network, before it was
internationalized in a third phase. The states of the other major technological
powers did not participate in the development of the internet, which was,
until the mid-1990s, a de facto US communication system in which
European and Japanese scientists participated on an ad hoc basis. This
reminder allows us to better interpret President Barack Obama’s pithy
response, during a February 2015 interview: “We have owned the internet.
Our companies have created it, expanded it, perfected it in ways that [the
Europeans] can’t compete.”3 This judgment reflects the dominant view of
the perception of the internet by the federal authorities in the United States
and sheds light on the relative positions on the subject of managing the
internationalization of the internet.
3 See www.recode.net/2015/02/15/white-house-red-chair-obama-meets-swisher.
The United States, States and the False Claims of the End of the Global Internet 5
4 We are critical of the notion of a public core of the internet, adopted in 2018 by the Global
Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) (see www.bit.ly/2DfJN7C). We cannot
indicate here the reasons for this due to lack of space.
5 According to the ITEF website the seven groups are the Applications area and general area,
internet area, operations and management area, routing area, security area, transport area.
6 This includes final Requests for Comment (RFCs) and RFC drafts.
6 Conflicts, Crimes and Regulations in Cyberspace
universities and schools, etc.), with 428 members as of summer 20207. The
cybersphere core is finally completed by the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), created in 1998, which assumes
several major operational roles: the functioning of the identification system
(allocation of domain names and IP addresses, commonly called the IANA
function) (Froomkin 2011) and the management of Domain Name Server
(DNS) root servers. It is a private, nonprofit corporation under California
law with a signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the US
Department of Commerce8. Although both are different, the ICANN and the
IETF are the two main technical infrastructure components of the internet. In
addition, some private US companies play a key role, such as Verisign,
which administers two of the three DNS root servers. Finally, of the 12
organizations that manage DNS servers, nine are American.
Until the 2000s, the units of the sociotechnical system that is cyberspace
thus comprised the United States, the four associations of the cybersphere
core and the private companies (first access providers, then content
providers, but together rapidly dominated economically by the platforms)
that brought the network into the market economy (Castells 2001). Although
the structures constituting the cybersphere core give the impression of being
global organizations, they are, in fact, an assembly of American structures
that have, over time, encouraged a less American and more internationalized
composition of their physical members. This has been made possible by
foreign contributions to the definition of computer-to-computer
communication standards, which has valued the principle of openness
(Russell 2014). However, US computer companies and their members have
been, and remain, central (Raustalia 2016) to the composition of these
various structures, from which states are absent (DeNardis and Raymond
2013). As Laura DeNardis (DeNardis 2016) and Francesca Musiani
(Musiani 2018) have clearly shown, the choices of physical and logical
infrastructures are political choices.
Language: English
WITH NOTES BY
WILLIAM FREDERICK POOLE
BOSTON
PRIVATELY PRINTED
1870
[Reprinted from the New-England Historical and Genealogical Register for October, 1870.]
Introduction.