Transnational Security Cooperation in

the Mediterranean 1st ed. Edition

Robert Mason
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/transnational-security-cooperation-in-the-mediterrane
an-1st-ed-edition-robert-mason/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Spheres of Transnational Ecoviolence: Environmental

Crime, Human Security, and Justice 1st ed. Edition
Peter Stoett

https://ebookmass.com/product/spheres-of-transnational-
ecoviolence-environmental-crime-human-security-and-justice-1st-
ed-edition-peter-stoett/

An Armenian Mediterranean 1st ed. Edition Kathryn

Babayan

https://ebookmass.com/product/an-armenian-mediterranean-1st-ed-
edition-kathryn-babayan/

Colonialism, Transnationalism, and Anarchism in the

South of the Mediterranean 1st ed. Edition Laura Galián

https://ebookmass.com/product/colonialism-transnationalism-and-
anarchism-in-the-south-of-the-mediterranean-1st-ed-edition-laura-
galian/

China and Africa: Building Peace and Security

Cooperation on the Continent 1st Edition Chris Alden

https://ebookmass.com/product/china-and-africa-building-peace-
and-security-cooperation-on-the-continent-1st-edition-chris-
alden/
Artistic and Cultural Dialogues in the Late Medieval
Mediterranean 1st ed. Edition María Marcos Cobaleda

https://ebookmass.com/product/artistic-and-cultural-dialogues-in-
the-late-medieval-mediterranean-1st-ed-edition-maria-marcos-
cobaleda/

Deltas in the Anthropocene 1st ed. 2020 Edition Robert

J. Nicholls

https://ebookmass.com/product/deltas-in-the-anthropocene-1st-
ed-2020-edition-robert-j-nicholls/

Water Resources in the Mediterranean Region 1st Edition

Mehrez Zribi

https://ebookmass.com/product/water-resources-in-the-
mediterranean-region-1st-edition-mehrez-zribi/

The New Security 1st ed. Edition Helen Forbes-Mewett

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-new-security-1st-ed-edition-
helen-forbes-mewett/

India–Africa Partnerships for Food Security and

Capacity Building : South–South Cooperation 1st Edition
Renu Modi

https://ebookmass.com/product/india-africa-partnerships-for-food-
security-and-capacity-building-south-south-cooperation-1st-
edition-renu-modi/
Transnational Security
Cooperation in
the Mediterranean
Edited by Robert Mason
Transnational Security Cooperation
in the Mediterranean
 Robert Mason
Editor

Transnational Security
Cooperation
in the Mediterranean
Editor
Robert Mason
Middle East Studies Center
The American University in Cairo
Cairo, Egypt

ISBN 978-3-030-54443-0 ISBN 978-3-030-54444-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54444-7

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: JeanUrsala/E+/Getty Image

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Preface

This book came about from a workshop on enhancing Euro-Med secu-

rity cooperation held at the Middle East Studies Center at The Amer-
ican University in Cairo on May 13, 2018. This was one of the actions
under an EU funded project called “promote dialogue between academic
scholars, policy professionals in Egypt and European policymakers,”
ENI/2017/389-834, alongside a public lecture series, a student confer-
ence, a new MA-level course on Mediterranean politics, as well as other
related events and publications. More information about the project can
be found here: https://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/mesc. The contents
of this volume are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), conceived after the 2004
enlargement of the European Union, was not substantive in the face of
divergences within Europe itself, which have been crystallized by the rise
of populism after the 2007/2008 financial crisis and Brexit. EU rela-
tions with the ten states of the Southern Neighborhood (Algeria, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia)
was always going to be problematic due to the latter’s general preoccupa-
tion with regime and national security, domestic politics and addressing
sources of regional instabilty. A lack of convergent political interests,
economic resources and industrial capacity have undermined relations
further. National interests are likely to remain divergent for the foresee-
able future, both within Europe and between the EU and the Southern

v
vi PREFACE

Neighborhood following the public health and economic consequences of

Covid-19. As discussed further in this volume, the EU as a supranational
organization has not dealt with such as threat to unity since its formation.
A decade on from the Arab uprisings of 2010 and following a review
of the ENP in 2015 and the introduction of the EU’s Global Strategy
in 2016, the stability of the wider MENA region remains in peril. The
unique selling points of liberal democracy and multilateralism have not
drawn a pan-Mediterranean consensus on the future of the region or
indeed on a sustainable cooperative formula. Beyond the securitization
of relations apparent on both sides, from the European focus on illegal
migration, to the narrow Middle East and North Africa (MENA) state
focus on authoritarian regime survival and state security, the shift toward
multipolarity in the international environment has raised further questions
on the future of EU–MENA relations. Indeed, while EU external policy
appears to be increasingly impacted by the USA on issues ranging from
Iran, Syria, Israel, and Palestine, its broader mission vis-a-vis the Southern
Neighborhood looks set to be driven by actors as diverse as the Gulf states,
Russia and China.
After the EU–League of Arab States summit in Sharm El-Sheikh from
24 to 25 February 2019, a new official multilateral track has been estab-
lished between the two sides to support the work already undertaken in
the Union for the Mediterranean. But the question remains, what next?
Beyond promises to boost cooperation, reaffirm commitment to defend
multilateralism and a rules based trading system, very little progress has
been made. Certainly there is room for more official and unofficial contact
and brainstorming, especially in light of a new EU leadership team in
Brussels. This volume is one part of that effort to rethink, reframe, and
reconceptualize Euro–Mediterranean relations outside of the dominant
EU academic and policy discourses and platforms in a rapidly shifting
regional, interregional, and global landscape.

Paris, France/Cairo, Egypt Robert Mason

April 2020
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Robert Mason
Evolutions in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 4
EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 6
Conceptual Considerations for Transnational Security
Cooperation in the Mediterranean 7
Structure of the Volume 13
References 14

2 Security Threats from the Southern Mediterranean

as Viewed by Europe: A Comparative Analysis
of the “Long Year” of 1979 and the 2010s 19
Martin Beck
Introduction 19
European Threat Perception of the Mediterranean
in the Long Year of 1979 21
Recent EU Security Challenges Posed by the Southern
Mediterranean 24
Conclusion 34
References 35

vii
viii CONTENTS

3 Governance and Threat Perception in the Southern

Neighborhood 41
Robert Mason
Introduction 41
The Role of the Military in Governmental Affairs 43
Islamists Vying for Political Legitimacy and Influence 45
Economic Forces that Undermine the Status Quo 49
Social Forces and Political Pluralism 51
Disconnects Between the ENP and MENA State Values 53
Conclusion 54
References 55

4 EU CounterTerrorism Cooperation with the MENA:

Optimal or Suboptimal? 59
Annelies Pauwels
Introduction 59
Externalizing the EU’s Counterterrorism Model 60
Injecting Pragmatism into CT Cooperation 62
Enhancing Judicial and Law Enforcement Cooperation 63
Laying the Groundwork for CT Cooperation 66
Revisiting the Need for Change 68
Conclusion 71
References 71

5 Migration and the Mediterranean: The EU’s Response

to the “European Refugee Crisis” 75
Arne Niemann and Julia Blöser
Introduction 75
The Development of the “European Refugee Crisis” 76
The EU’s Response to the Crisis 78
Conclusion 100
References 101

6 Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean Energy

Resources 115
Marco Giuli
Introduction 115
Profiling Euro-Mediterranean Oil and Gas Relations 116
 CONTENTS ix

Eastern Mediterranean Gas: Opportunities and Challenges

for Europe 122
Conclusion 137
References 139

7 Russia in Syria and the Middle East: Tactics Disguised

as a Strategy? 147
Robert Mason and Maxim A. Suchkov
Introduction 147
Domestic Issues 149
Russian Military Costs in Syria 150
Russian Post-Syria Planning 151
Russia and the Kurds 154
Russia and Iran/Israel Relations 155
Russia in Libya 156
Russia and the Arab Gulf States 157
Conclusion 158
References 158

8 Turkey’s Quest for Influence in the Mediterranean

in the Post-Arab Uprisings Era 163
Ismail Numan Telci
Introduction: Turkey’s Reorientation Back to the MENA
Region 163
Turkey–Egypt Relations: From Cooperation to Conflict 167
Turkish Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean Versus
Regional and Global Powers 168
Turkey’s Activism in Libya 171
Turkey and the Maghreb 173
Turkey’s Relations with Tunisia 174
Energy Politics in Eastern Mediterranean 175
Conclusion 177
References 178

9 European-North African Security: The Complexity

of Cooperation 183
Yahia H. Zoubir and Djallil Lounnas
Introduction 183
x CONTENTS

Algeria and the EU: A Difficult yet Unescapable

Partnership 184
Morocco: A Privileged Partner 188
Tunisia: A Strong Partnership with Europe 195
Libya: A Major Migration and Security Concern 197
Conclusion 201
References 202

10 International and Gulf State Influence in the Southern

Mediterranean 209
Robert Mason
Introduction 209
US Policies Toward the Mediterranean 210
China’s Engagement in the Mediterranean 215
India’s Engagement in the Mediterranean 219
Japan’s Engagement in the Mediterranean 221
Gulf State Policies in the Southern Mediterranean 223
Economic Actors 226
Non-state Actors 229
The African Union (AU) 230
Conclusion 231
References 232

11 Rethinking the EU Approach 241

Robert Mason
Introduction 241
Addressing the Autocratic—Democratic Divide on Conflict
and Development 244
Reviewing Efficacy of Decision-Making and Policy
Implementation 252
The EU as a Normative Power 254
A Note on Covid-19 255
Conclusion 257
References 258

Index 265
 Notes on Contributors

Martin Beck holds a chair in Modern Middle East Studies at the

University of Southern Denmark (SDU). He previously worked as an
academic teacher, political advisor, and researcher in Germany (Tübingen,
Hamburg, and Bremen), the Middle East (Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon,
and Iraq), and the USA (Denver, Colorado). His research covers inter-
national politics and political economy, in particular regional power rela-
tions, the Arab–Israeli conflict, regional oil politics, and comparative anal-
ysis of rentier states. His most recent publications include “The Aggra-
vated Struggle for Regional Power in the Middle East: American Allies
Saudi Arabia and Israel Versus Iran,” Global Policy 10 (2020), forth-
coming; “On the Continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” in:
Isabel Bramsen, Poul Poder, and Ole Wæver (eds.), Resolving Inter-
national Conflict. Dynamics of Escalation, Continuation, and Trans-
formation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), pp. 200–214; “OPEC+ and
Beyond: How and Why Oil Prices are High,” E-International Rela-
tions (2019), https://www.e-ir.info/2019/01/24/opec-and-beyond-
how-and-why-oil-prices-are-high/; “How to (Not) Walk the Talk: The
Demand for Palestinian Self-determination as a Challenge for the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy,” European Foreign Affairs Review 22
(2017), pp. 59–74; “Israeli Foreign Policy: Securitizing Occupation,” in:
Robert Mason (ed.), Reassessing Order and Disorder in the Middle East.

xi
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Regional Imbalance or Disintegration? (Lanham: Rowman and Little-

field, 2017), pp. 173–193. Website: www.sdu.dk/staff/mbeck. Twitter:
@martinbeck23.
Julia Blöser is a Research Assistant and postgraduate student in Political
Economy and International Relations at Johannes Gutenberg University
Mainz. Having privately engaged with asylum seekers during the evolving
crisis since 2014, she focused her research on migration policy and, in
particular, on EU asylum policy in its internal and external dimensions.
Her Bachelor thesis on the rationales of action behind the EU’s relocation
decisions received the Jean Monnet Award for EU in Global Dialogue
2018.
Marco Giuli is a Researcher at the Institute for European Studies of the
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and an Associate Policy Analyst at the Euro-
pean Policy Centre. He works on the external dimension of the EU
energy policy, the energy security-climate nexus, and the geopolitics of
decarbonization. Prior to this, he coordinated the Climate and Energy
Platform of the EPC, he was a Researcher at the Madariaga-College of
Europe Foundation and a trainee at the Centre for European Policy
Studies. Marco is a regular public speaker, media commentator, and op-ed
contributor on EU energy and climate issues.
Djallil Lounnas is an Assistant Professor of International Relations in Al
Akahwayn University. He is specialized on radicalism and violent extremist
movements in North Africa-Sahel. He has conducted fieldwork on this
topic in the region and published extensively in academic journals. His
latest publication includes his book Le Djihad en Afrique du Nord Sahel:
D’AQMI à Daech (Paris: Les presses de la Fondation pour la Recherche
Strategique/L’Harmattan).
Robert Mason is a Non-Resident Fellow at The Arab Gulf States Insti-
tute in Washington. He was an Associate Professor and Director of
the Middle East Studies Center at The American University in Cairo
2016–2019. He received his D.Phil. from the University of Exeter and
is a Fellow of the Higher Education Academy. His research focuses
on international relations, with a geographical focus on the Gulf, EU,
US, and rising powers. He is author or editor of numerous books,
including New Perspectives on Middle East Politics: Economy, Society and
International Relations (AUC Press, forthcoming), Reassessing Order
and Disorder in the Middle East: Regional Imbalance or Disintegration?
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xiii

(Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), Egypt and the Gulf: A Renewed Regional
Policy Alliance (Gerlach Press, 2016), Muslim Minority—State Relations:
Violence, Integration and Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), Interna-
tional Politics of the Arab Spring: Popular Unrest and Foreign Policy
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) and Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia:
Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 2014). On
Twitter @Dr_Robert_Mason.
Arne Niemann is a Professor of International Politics and a Jean Monnet
Chair of European Integration Studies at the University of Mainz. He
is author of Explaining Decisions in the European Union (Cambridge
University Press 2006) and has published widely on EU topics, including
EU migration policy, in several journals, including the Journal of Common
Market Studies, the Journal of European Public Policy and International
Migration Review. Arne Niemann previously coedited seven special issues,
including “EU Refugee Policies and Politics in Times of Crisis: Theoret-
ical and Empirical Perspectives” (Journal of Common Market Studies 2018,
together with Natascha Zaun).
Annelies Pauwels is a Researcher who specializes in counterterrorism
and radicalization. She has conducted research at prominent EU and
UN research institutes. Her research at the European Union Institute for
Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris covered the external dimension of EU
Justice and Home Affairs. Prior to that she conducted research on crime
prevention and criminal justice at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) and the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Insti-
tute (UNICRI). Annelies holds an LLM in International Criminal Law
and an M.A. in Intercultural Mediation with a specialization in Arabic
and Russian.
Maxim A. Suchkov is Editor of Al-Monitor’s Russia-Mideast coverage
and a Senior Research Fellow at the MGIMO-University. Dr. Suchkov
is also an expert of the Russian International Affairs Council and Asso-
ciate Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International and Polit-
ical Studies (ISPI). Previously, he was a Fulbright Visiting Fellow at
Georgetown University’s Center for Eurasian, Russian and East Euro-
pean Studies and Visiting Fellow at New York University. On Twitter:
@Max_A_Suchkov.
Ismail Numan Telci completed his B.A. from Istanbul University, M.A.
in European Studies at Hochschule Bremen, Germany, and a Ph.D. in
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

International Relations at Sakarya University, Turkey. As part of his Ph.D.

field research he spent 10 months at Cairo University from October
2012 to August 2013. Currently, he works as an Associate Professor at
the Department of International Relations and lectures in the Middle
East Institute (ORMER) at Sakarya University. He is also Vice President
and Gulf Studies Coordinator in the Center for Middle Eastern Studies
(ORSAM) in Ankara. His research focuses on Turkey–Qatar relations,
Gulf politics, Egyptian politics, and Arab revolutions. He is editor of
Middle Eastern Studies, a peer-reviewed journal published by ORSAM.
Telci is the author of three books: Dictionary of Egyptian Revolution
(2014), Egypt: Revolution and Counter-Revolution (2017), and Egyptian
Foreign Policy Since the Revolution: From Search for Change to Quest for
Legitimacy (2019).
Yahia H. Zoubir is a Senior Professor of International Relations and
International Management and Director of Research in Geopolitics at
KEDGE Business School, France. He holds a Ph.D. in International Rela-
tions from The American University, Washington, DC. His publications
include books, such as The Politics of Algeria: Domestic Issues and Inter-
national Relations; North African Politics; Building a New Silk Road:
China & the Middle East; Global Security Watch—The Maghreb; and
North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation, and arti-
cles in scholarly journals, such as Third World Quarterly, Mediterranean
Politics, International Affairs, Journal of North African Studies, Middle
East Journal, Journal of Contemporary China, Maghreb-Machrek, Journal
of Contemporary European Studies. He contributed entries and articles to
several Encyclopedias, such as the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Robert Mason

European Union (EU) relations with its self-defined Southern Neighbor-

hood: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine,
Syria and Tunisia, have become an area of increasing study since the Arab
uprisings began in Tunisia in 2010. The uprisings then quickly affected
Egypt, Libya, and Syria in particular and have even spread to other parts
of the Southern Neighborhood once thought to be immune from protests
due to their recent history, such as Algeria. When charting subsequent
events, including North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interven-
tion in Libya from March to October 2014, Russia’s intervention in
Syria starting in September 2015, and rising commitments to counterter-
rorism operations in the Sahel, scholars and policymakers are reminded
that insecurity persists around the Mediterranean. Yet insecurity, like
so many other themes explored in this book such as religiopolitical
challenges, mercenaries and militia, and economic engagement through
infrastructure, have been apparent for millennia. The Romans cultivated
client states around the fringes of the Mediterranean (Gambash 2017).

R. Mason (B)
Middle East Studies Center, The American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt
e-mail: robert.mason@aucegypt.edu

© The Author(s) 2021 1

R. Mason (ed.), Transnational Security
Cooperation in the Mediterranean,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54444-7_1
2 R. MASON

Machiavelli argued that mercenaries were necessary to strengthen polit-

ical power, and Lower (2017) concludes this was the case especially where
religious differences meant they never threatened their employer. Where
the Reformation posed challenges to official state engagement, Pirillo
(2017) finds that diplomatic back channels were used instead.
Chronic insecurity has become a feature of North African politics, yet
insecurity has become a feature in Europe as well. In Cyprus, the ethnic
Greek and Turkish communities have been separated since 1974, and in
the Balkans, the breakup of Yugoslavia followed a series of upheavals and
conflicts in the early 1990s. The Mediterranean refugee crisis from 2015
was a period characterized by the high number of people arriving in the
EU from the Mediterranean Sea and overland from Southeast Europe.
With drivers extending as far as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria in the East,
down to Eritrea and Somalia in Africa, the crisis has exacerbated social
tensions. European state responses have varied from initial accommoda-
tion and negotiation with important transit countries such as Turkey,
to a populist and xenophobic backlash. Political gains have been made
by some European far right groups, especially in Switzerland, Austria,
and Hungary, who have been able to leverage fears of violent Islamist
(inspired) attacks in Europe. The UK referendum to leave the EU (Brexit)
in 2016 hails a new era for Anglo-European relations. This at a time
when European (including British) hard and soft power influence is under
pressure from illiberal states such as Russia as well as the populist, trans-
actional and unilateral politics of the Trump administration. The Trump
administration’s decision to temporarily bar flights from Europe during
the Covid-19 outbreak in March 2020 without prior consultation with
EU counterparts appears to confirm that the transatlantic relationship
is indeed under threat. This is especially damaging as close transatlantic
relations have been a cornerstone of the post-1945 international order.
Polarization in mainstream politics and growing inequality in economies
have fed populism and fuelled discontent even before allegations of
Russian electoral interference are considered.
Changes in the global economy have also put the Mediterranean at
the forefront of EU responses, including a e289 billion bailout to Greece
(the biggest bailout in global financial history) to tackle its sovereign debt
crisis in 2010, brought on by the global financial crisis in 2007/2008.
The rise of China and the implementation of Beijing’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) is attractive not only to Asian and African states in need
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

of new infrastructure projects and financing, but a whole host of devel-

oped countries, including Israel, Greece, and Italy. The fear here is that
eastern and southern neighbors, as well as EU member states themselves,
will fall prey to an increasingly assertive China that could fundamentally
undermine Europe’s identity that is based on liberal democratic values,
closer cooperation and integration. The EU response to China came in
September 2018 when it launched a “Connectivity Strategy” linking the
EU with Asia that put more emphasis on nations rather than states, would
be rules based, and provide alternative sources of financing. Mobilizing
private and multilateral investors could scale up the budget.
Apart from increasing competition in the Eurasian region between
major powers such as the EU, USA, China, and Russia, there are also
growing energy considerations to take into consideration in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Israel discovered a giant gas field, Leviathan block, in
2010. Lebanon has also found deposits. Further discoveries have been
made in the Israeli and Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), while
Italy’s ENI found a large natural gas field, named Zohr, in Egyptian
waters.
In an age of growing insecurity from non-state and transnational
threats, counterterrorism cooperation is an important dimension in Euro–
Mediterranean relations. But full political cooperation remains an over-
the-horizon objective following the first EU–Arab League summit in
Sharm El-Sheikh in 2019. This should not be a surprise given the persis-
tent mismatch of the political philosophies, systems of government, and
body politik of the states involved. During the Age of Enlightenment in
Europe, Thomas Hobbes referred to the “voice of the people” (1660)
while John Locke (1689) wrote about people-driven government and a
separation of powers which has largely informed modern secular politics
in Europe. In premodern entities in the Middle East, while the notion
of sovereignty existed, so did alternative traditions of diplomacy, more
personalized systems of governance, and a changing external environ-
ment, such as colonial encroachment, that helped give agency to officials
in the public domain more than is perhaps the case today. These points
are overlaid with more contemporary issues arising from complications,
threats, and challenges that can obfuscate advances in bilateral relations
and have undermined a comprehensive Mediterranean security system.
The wider Middle East is currently experiencing an escalating rivalry
and series of proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Rather than
mediate, the Trump administration’s rhetoric and policies continue to
4 R. MASON

make the USA an actor and force for escalation in this dynamic. Israel
remains alert to the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran but also to
patterns of asymmetric warfare from its southern flank in Gaza and
increasingly, from its northern flank in Lebanon, manifest in Hezbollah
which is supported by weapons transfers from Iran. We see many exam-
ples where broadly conceived national security policies include repressive
tendencies against civil society and the retrenchment of the elite into
“bunker states.” While this trend has been evident throughout the region,
it has been most recently apparent in Turkey after the failed military
coup in 2016. The consequences again, are not favorable to transnational
security cooperation.
Finally, the EU leadership itself was in flux in 2019. The new
EU Commission president has been announced as Germany’s Defense
Minister, Ursula von der Leyen. Charles Michel, formerly Prime Minister
of Belgium, will take over as the new Head of the European Council, and
Josep Borrell, a Spanish politician, will be the new Head of External Rela-
tions. Christine Lagarde, former managing director of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, DC, was announced as the new
president of the European Central Bank (ECB) in September 2019.

Evolutions in the European

Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
The Middle East is a contested geographical area, bound up with religious
significance in the holy sites of Mecca and Jerusalem, along with signifi-
cant energy resources in the Gulf region. After the Gulf War in 1991, the
US-sponsored Middle East Peace Process and accompanying diplomatic
activity in the 1990s gave cause for optimism about the prospects for
enhanced regional security. Into this came European efforts, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which was a multilateral approach
launched in Barcelona in 1995. As Del Sarto (2006) asserts, the EMP
relied on a regional-building approach to regional security based on
common interests between the EU and southern neighbors. While the
European interest is to remain free from direct military threats, resolve
conflicts, improve cooperation, and prevent south–south conflicts which
could lead to spillover in the Mediterranean, the EMP was not the instru-
ment to achieve this according to Biscop (2003). The Barcelona Process
had a broad, but not military, agenda in promoting cooperation and a
very different DNA to the specific events and processes that generated
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

the institutions of the EU and NATO. A lack of Mediterranean secu-

rity cooperation could thus initially be chalked up to a poor institutional
toolkit and the failure of Arab–Israeli peacemaking, notably in the break-
down of the Camp David Summit and the onset of the second intifada
in 2000. The EU’s inability to resolve existing or potential conflicts has
been a persistent theme. Included in this is the lack of confidence and
security-building measures with southern neighbors.
Following the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, the ENP
was conceived in order to promote prosperity, stability and security, and
avoid creating new dividing lines between the enlarged EU, candidate
countries, and immediate neighbors in the east and south. Prior to the
Arab uprisings in 2010, the ENP pro-democratization policies were still
judged to be incoherent and weak, although small-scale programs existed
(Youngs 2006). The EU was mindful of failed democratic elections in
Algeria in 1991 and the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, followed
by the battle of Gaza which brought Hamas to power in the Gaza
strip in 2007. Democracy had its downside. The EU was also probably
aware of the broad range of literature on the nature of democratiza-
tion from notable authors such as Huntingdon (1991). Recent analysis
shows that democratization stems not from political leverage but from
longer-term changes taking place involving socioeconomic conditions and
patterns of governance (Levenex and Schimmelpfenig 2011). While the
EU attempted to balance norms and values with other, notably secu-
rity interests, a laissez faire approach effectively gave (and continues to
give) repressive authoritarian regimes the upper hand and insulation they
require to survive and consolidate.
The Barcelona Process was relaunched as the Union for the Mediter-
ranean (UfM) in 2008, including a range of projects from economy and
environment to migration and social affairs, but still put political and
economic ties (prizing security and stability) ahead of democracy and
human rights. Thus, in the lead up to the Arab uprisings, closer ties
were being sought with Gaddafi’s Libya and Ben Ali’s Tunisia. The elite-
centric focus has fundamentally undermined the UfM and has caused
significant difficulties in generating closer political ties between the EU
and some member states such as France and Southern Neighborhood
states in transition, such as Tunisia (Khalaf and Daneshkhu 2011). In
the words of Behr (2014), the ENP has effectively gone “full circle.”
The European Commission (2011) adjusted the ENP following the Arab
uprisings with A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the
6 R. MASON

Southern Mediterranean. It encouraged more reform efforts with addi-

tional support, including financial. The ENP was revised again in line
with the EU’s new Global Strategy (EUGS) which was adopted in June
2016 and focuses on new aspects such as resilience. The revised ENP
launched on November 18, 2015 (notably after the Arab uprisings refo-
cused attention on the Southern Neighborhood) removed many of the
enlargement related tools and reduced EU focus on democracy promo-
tion, good governance, the rule of law and human rights (Delcour 2017,
1). In other words, it has become de-politicized. Bilateral issues appear to
be related to inconsistent use of conditionality, failure to empower civil
society and other change agents, and an unwillingness to offer substitutes
for political accession (ibid.). Systematic upgrades have helped the policy
survive a rapidly changing Europe and Middle East but still the use of
conditionality grinds. The ENP review also focused on the differentiation
approach which had been a feature of the ENP but was not adequately
implemented. It recognizes the regions do not form a coherent bloc in
geographical, political or economic terms and that state responses to the
ENP also vary widely. Whether the ENP can be considered to be a neigh-
borhood policy at all remains to be seen for these reasons and since shared
values and interests remain unclear.

EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty established the European External Action
Service (EEAS) under the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy. This fundamentally altered the context in
which ENP would operate (Delcour 2017, 285). The CFSP puts the
European Council in the lead for identifying EU strategic interests and
broad objectives but voting on decisions must be unanimous with only
aspects eligible for qualified voting. The Council of the EU votes on the
actions or positions to be taken. Although European roots on common
defense go back to the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, including the Western
European Union (WEU) from 1954 to the late 1990s, and NATO, the
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDF) was only created by the
Treaty of Lisbon. EU countries must make civilian and military capabil-
ities available, and the European Defense Agency (EDA) helps member
states improve their military capabilities, but there is no predetermined
level of EU country commitment. EU defense policy is progressive and
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
seas of thought alone”, and another image of a stone rolling
downhill, combined with the words “how different!” Or you may think
of the difference between composing a lecture and eating your
dinner. It is only when you come to expressing your thought in words
that you approach logical precision.
Both in introspection and in external perception, we try to
express what we know in words.
We come here, as in the question of testimony, upon the social
aspect of knowledge. The purpose of words is to give the same kind
of publicity to thought as is claimed for physical objects. A number of
people can hear a spoken word or see a written word, because each
is a physical occurrence. If I say to you, “mind is different from
matter”, there may be only a very slight resemblance between the
thought that I am trying to express and the thought which is aroused
in you, but these two thoughts have just this in common, that they
can be expressed by the same words. Similarly, there may be great
differences between what you and I see when, as we say, we look at
the same chair; nevertheless we can both express our perceptions
by the same words.
A thought and a perception are thus not so very different in their
own nature. If physics is true, they are different in their correlations:
when I see a chair, others have more or less similar perceptions, and
it is thought that these are all connected with light-waves coming
from the chair, whereas, when I think a thought, others may not be
thinking anything similar. But this applies also to feeling a toothache,
which would not usually be regarded as a case of introspection. On
the whole, therefore, there seems no reason to regard introspection
as a different kind of knowledge from external perception. But this
whole question will concern us again at a later stage.
As for the trustworthiness of introspection, there is again a
complete parallelism with the case of external perception. The actual
datum, in each case, is unimpeachable, but the extensions which we
make instinctively are questionable. Instead of saying, “I am
believing that mind is different from matter”, you ought to say,
“certain images are occurring in a certain relation to each other,
accompanied by a certain feeling”. No words exist for describing the
actual occurrence in all its particularity; all words, even proper
names, are general, with the possible exception of “this”, which is
ambiguous. When you translate the occurrence into words, you are
making generalisations and inferences, just as you are when you say
“there is a chair”. There is really no vital difference between the two
cases. In each case, what is really a datum is unutterable, and what
can be put into words involves inferences which may be mistaken.
When I say that “inferences” are involved, I am saying something
not quite accurate unless carefully interpreted. In “seeing a chair”, for
instance, we do not first apprehend a coloured pattern, and then
proceed to infer a chair: belief in the chair arises spontaneously
when we see the coloured pattern. But this belief has causes not
only in the present physical stimulus, but also partly in past
experience, partly in reflexes. In animals, reflexes play a very large
part; in human beings, experience is more important. The infant
learns slowly to correlate touch and sight, and to expect others to
see what he sees. The habits which are thus formed are essential to
our adult notion of an object such as a chair. The perception of a
chair by means of sight has a physical stimulus which affects only
sight directly, but stimulates ideas of solidity and so on through early
experience. The inference might be called “physiological”. An
inference of this sort is evidence of past correlations, for instance
between touch and sight, but may be mistaken in the present
instance; you may, for instance, mistake a reflection in a large mirror
for another room. Similarly in dreams we make mistaken
physiological inferences. We cannot therefore feel certainty in regard
to things which are in this sense inferred, because, when we try to
accept as many of them as possible, we are nevertheless compelled
to reject some for the sake of self-consistency.
We arrived a moment ago at what we called “physiological
inference” as an essential ingredient in the common-sense notion of
a physical object. Physiological inference, in its simplest form,
means this: given a stimulus S, to which, by a reflex, we react by a
bodily movement R, and a stimulus S′ with a reaction R′, if the two
stimuli are frequently experienced together, S will in time produce
 2
R′. That is to say, the body will act as if S′ were present.
Physiological inference is important in theory of knowledge, and I
shall have much to say about it at a later stage. For the present, I
have mentioned it partly to prevent it from being confused with
logical inference, and partly in order to introduce the problem of
induction, about which we must say a few preliminary words at this
stage.

2
E.g. if you hear a sharp noise and see a
bright light simultaneously often, in time the
noise without the light will cause your pupils to
contract.

Induction raises perhaps the most difficult problem in the whole

theory of knowledge. Every scientific law is established by its means,
and yet it is difficult to see why we should believe it to be a valid
logical process. Induction, in its bare essence, consists of the
argument that, because A and B have been often found together and
never found apart, therefore, when A is found again, B will probably
also be found. This exists first as a “physiological inference”, and as
such is practised by animals. When we first begin to reflect, we find
ourselves making inductions in the physiological sense, for instance,
expecting the food we see to have a certain kind of taste. Often we
only become aware of this expectation through having it
disappointed, for instance if we take salt thinking it is sugar. When
mankind took to science, they tried to formulate logical principles
justifying this kind of inference. I shall discuss these attempts in later
chapters; for the present, I will only say that they seem to me very
unsuccessful. I am convinced that induction must have validity of
some kind in some degree, but the problem of showing how or why it
can be valid remains unsolved. Until it is solved, the rational man will
doubt whether his food will nourish him, and whether the sun will rise
tomorrow. I am not a rational man in this sense, but for the moment I
shall pretend to be. And even if we cannot be completely rational, we
should probably all be the better for becoming somewhat more
rational than we are. At the lowest estimate, it will be an interesting
adventure to see whither reason will lead us.
The problems we have been raising are none of them new, but
they suffice to show that our everyday views of the world and of our
relations to it are unsatisfactory. We have been asking whether we
know this or that, but we have not yet asked what “knowing” is.
Perhaps we shall find that we have had wrong ideas as to knowing,
and that our difficulties grow less when we have more correct ideas
on this point. I think we shall do well to begin our philosophical
journey by an attempt to understand knowing considered as part of
the relation of man to his environment, forgetting, for the moment,
the fundamental doubts with which we have been concerned.
Perhaps modern science may enable us to see philosophical
problems in a new light. In that hope, let us examine the relation of
man to his environment with a view to arriving at a scientific view as
to what constitutes knowledge.
 PART I

MAN FROM WITHOUT

 CHAPTER II
MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT

If our scientific knowledge were full and complete, we should

understand ourselves and the world and our relation to the world. As
it is, our understanding of all three is fragmentary. For the present, it
is the third question, that of our relation to the world, that I wish to
consider, because this brings us nearest to the problems of
philosophy. We shall find that it will lead us back to the other two
questions, as to the world and as to ourselves, but that we shall
understand both these better if we have considered first how the
world acts upon us and how we act upon the world.
There are a number of sciences which deal with Man. We may
deal with him in natural history, as one among the animals, having a
certain place in evolution, and related to other animals in
ascertainable ways. We may deal with him in physiology, as a
structure capable of performing certain functions, and reacting to the
environment in ways of which some, at least, can be explained by
chemistry. We may study him in sociology, as a unit in various
organisms, such as the family and the state. And we may study him,
in psychology, as he appears to himself. This last gives what we may
call an internal view of man, as opposed to the other three, which
give an external view. That is to say, in psychology we use data
which can only be obtained when the observer and the observed are
the same person, whereas in the other ways of studying Man all our
data can be obtained by observing other people. There are different
ways of interpreting this distinction, and different views of its
importance, but there can be no doubt that there is such a
distinction. We can remember our own dreams, whereas we cannot
know the dreams of others unless they tell us about them. We know
when we have toothache, when our food tastes too salty, when we
are remembering some past occurrence, and so on. All these events
in our lives other people cannot know in the same direct way. In this
sense, we all have an inner life, open to our own inspection but to no
one else’s. This is no doubt the source of the traditional distinction of
mind and body: the body was supposed to be that part of us which
others could observe, and the mind that part which was private to
ourselves. The importance of the distinction has been called in
question in recent times, and I do not myself believe that it has any
fundamental philosophical significance. But historically it has played
a dominant part in determining the conceptions from which men set
out when they began to philosophise, and on this account, if on no
other, it deserves to be borne in mind.
Knowledge, traditionally, has been viewed from within, as
something which we observe in ourselves rather than as something
which we can see others displaying. When I say that it has been so
viewed, I mean that this has been the practice of philosophers; in
ordinary life, people have been more objective. In ordinary life,
knowledge is something which can be tested by examinations, that is
to say, it consists in a certain kind of response to a certain kind of
stimulus. This objective way of viewing knowledge is, to my mind,
much more fruitful than the way which has been customary in
philosophy. I mean that, if we wish to give a definition of “knowing”,
we ought to define it as a manner of reacting to the environment, not
as involving something (a “state of mind”) which only the person who
has the knowledge can observe. It is because I hold this view that I
think it best to begin with Man and his environment, rather than with
those matters in which the observer and the observed must be the
same person. Knowing, as I view it, is a characteristic which may be
displayed in our reactions to our environment; it is therefore
necessary first of all to consider the nature of these reactions as they
appear in science.
Let us take some everyday situation. Suppose you are watching
a race, and at the appropriate moment you say, “they’re off”. This
exclamation is a reaction to the environment, and is taken to show
knowledge if it is made at the same time as others make it. Now let
us consider what has been really happening, according to science.
The complication of what has happened is almost incredible. It may
conveniently be divided into four stages: first, what happened in the
outside world between the runners and your eyes; secondly, what
happened in your body from your eyes to your brain; thirdly, what
happened in your brain; fourthly, what happened in your body from
your brain to the movements of your throat and tongue which
constituted your exclamation. Of these four stages, the first belongs
to physics, and is dealt with in the main by the theory of light; the
second and fourth belong to physiology; the third, though it should
theoretically also belong to physiology, belongs in fact rather to
psychology, owing to our lack of knowledge as to the brain. The third
stage embodies the results of experience and learning. It is
responsible for the fact that you speak, which an animal would not
do, and that you speak English, which a Frenchman would not do.
This immensely complicated occurrence is, nevertheless, about the
simplest example of knowledge that could possibly be given.
For the moment, let us leave on one side the part of this process
which happens in the outside world and belongs to physics. I shall
have much to say about it later, but what has to be said is not
altogether easy, and we will take less abstruse matters first. I will
merely observe that the event which we are said to perceive, namely
the runners starting, is separated by a longer or shorter chain of
events from the event which happens at the surface of our eyes. It is
this last that is what is called the “stimulus”. Thus the event that we
are said to perceive when we see is not the stimulus, but an anterior
event related to it in a way that requires investigation. The same
applies to hearing and smell, but not to touch or to perception of
states of our own body. In these cases, the first of the above four
stages is absent. It is clear that, in the case of sight, hearing and
smell, there must be a certain relation between the stimulus and the
event said to be perceived, but we will not now consider what this
relation must be. We will consider, rather, the second, third, and
fourth stages in an act of perceptive knowledge. This is the more
legitimate as these stages always exist, whereas the first is confined
to certain senses.
The second stage is that which proceeds from the sense-organ
to the brain. It is not necessary for our purposes to consider exactly
what goes on during this journey. A purely physical event—the
stimulus—happens at the boundary of the body, and has a series of
effects which travel along the afferent nerves to the brain. If the
stimulus is light, it must fall on the eye to produce the characteristic
effects; no doubt light falling on other parts of the body has effects,
but they are not those that distinguish vision. Similarly, if the stimulus
is sound, it must fall on the ear. A sense-organ, like a photographic
plate, is responsive to stimuli of a certain sort: light falling on the eye
has effects which are different for different wave-lengths, intensities,
and directions. When the events in the eye due to incident light have
taken place, they are followed by events in the optic nerve, leading
at last to some occurrence in the brain—an occurrence which varies
with the stimulus. The occurrence in the brain must be different for
different stimuli in all cases where we can perceive differences. Red
and yellow, for instance, are distinguishable in perception; therefore
the occurrences along the optic nerve and in the brain must have a
different character when caused by red light from what they have
when caused by yellow light. But when two shades of colour are so
similar that they can only be distinguished by delicate instruments,
not by perception, we cannot be sure that they cause occurrences of
different characters in the optic nerve and brain.
When the disturbance has reached the brain, it may or may not
cause a characteristic set of events in the brain. If it does not, we
shall not be what is called “conscious” of it. For to be “conscious” of
seeing yellow, whatever else it may be, must certainly involve some
kind of cerebral reaction to the message brought by the optic nerve.
It may be assumed that the great majority of messages brought to
the brain by the afferent nerves never secure any attention at all—
they are like letters to a government office which remain
unanswered. The things in the margin of the field of vision, unless
they are in some way interesting, are usually unnoticed; if they are
noticed, they are brought into the centre of the field of vision unless
we make a deliberate effort to prevent this from occurring. These
things are visible, in the sense that we could be aware of them if we
chose, without any change in our physical environment or in our
sense-organs; that is to say, only a cerebral change is required to
enable them to cause a reaction. But usually they do not provoke
any reaction; life would be altogether too wearing if we had to be
always reacting to everything in the field of vision. Where there is no
reaction, the second stage completes the process, and the third and
fourth stages do not arise. In that case, there has been nothing that
could be called “perception” connected with the stimulus in question.
To us, however, the interesting case is that in which the process
continues. In this case there is first a process in the brain, of which
the nature is as yet conjectural, which travels from the centre
appropriate to the sense in question to a motor centre. From these
there is a process which travels along an efferent nerve, and finally
results in a muscular event causing some bodily movement. In our
illustration of the man watching the beginning of a race, a process
travels from the part of the brain concerned with sight to the part
concerned with speech; this is what we called the third stage. Then a
process travels along the efferent nerves and brings about the
movements which constitute saying “they’re off”; this is what we
called the fourth stage.
Unless all four stages exist, there is nothing that can be called
“knowledge”. And even when they are all present, various further
conditions must be satisfied if there is to be “knowledge”. But these
observations are premature, and we must return to the analysis of
our third and fourth stages.
The third stage is of two sorts, according as we are concerned
with a reflex or with a “learned reaction”, as Dr. Watson calls it. In the
case of a reflex, if it is complete at birth, a new-born infant or animal
has a brain so constituted that, without the need of any previous
experience, there is a connection between a certain process in the
afferent nerves and a certain other process in the efferent nerves. A
good example of a reflex is sneezing. A certain kind of tickling in the
nose produces a fairly violent movement having a very definite
character, and this connection exists already in the youngest infants.
Learned reactions, on the other hand, are such as only occur
because of the effect of previous occurrences in the brain. One
might illustrate by an analogy which, however, would be misleading if
pressed. Imagine a desert in which no rain has ever fallen, and
suppose that at last a thunderstorm occurs in it; then the course
taken by the water will correspond to a reflex. But if rain continues to
fall frequently, it will form watercourses and river valleys; when this
has occurred, the water runs away along pre-formed channels,
which are attributable to the past “experience” of the region. This
corresponds to “learned reactions”. One of the most notable
examples of learned reactions is speech: we speak because we
have learned a certain language, not because our brain had
originally any tendency to react in just that way. Perhaps all
knowledge, certainly nearly all, is dependent upon learned reactions,
i.e., upon connections in the brain which are not part of man’s
congenital equipment but are the result of events which have
happened to him.
To distinguish between learned and unlearned responses is not
always an easy task. It cannot be assumed that responses which are
absent during the first weeks of life are all learned. To take the most
obvious instance; sexual responses change their character to a
greater or less extent at puberty, as a result of changes in the
ductless glands, not as a result of experience. But this instance does
not stand alone: as the body grows and develops, new modes of
response come into play, modified, no doubt, by experience, but not
wholly due to it. For example: a new-born baby cannot run, and
therefore does not run away from what is terrifying, as an older child
does. The older child has learned to run, but has not necessarily
learned to run away; the stimulus in learning to run may have never
been a terrifying object. It would therefore be a fallacy to suppose
that we can distinguish between learned and unlearned responses
by observing what a new-born infant does, since reflexes may come
into play at a later stage. Conversely, some things which a child does
at birth may have been learned, when they are such as it could have
done in the womb—for example, a certain amount of kicking and
stretching. The whole distinction between learned and unlearned
responses, therefore, is not so definite as we could wish. At the two
extremes we get clear cases, such as sneezing on the one hand and
speaking on the other; but there are intermediate forms of behaviour
which are more difficult to classify.
This is not denied even by those who attach most importance to
the distinction between learned and unlearned responses. In Dr.
Watson’s Behaviorism (p. 103) there is a “Summary of Unlearned
Equipment”, which ends with the following paragraph:
“Other activities appear at a later stage—such as blinking,
reaching, handling, handedness, crawling, standing, sitting-up,
walking, running, jumping. In the great majority of these later
activities it is difficult to say how much of the act as a whole is due to
training or conditioning. A considerable part is unquestionably due to
the growth changes in structure, and the remainder is due to training
and conditioning.” (Watson’s italics.)
It is not possible to make a logically sharp distinction in this
matter; in certain cases we have to be satisfied with something less
exact. For example, we might say that those developments which
are merely due to normal growth are to count as unlearned, while
those which depend upon special circumstances in the individual
biography are to count as learned. But take, say, muscular
development: this will not take place normally unless the muscles
are used, and if they are used they are bound to learn some of the
skill which is appropriate to them. And some things which must
certainly count as learned, such as focussing with the eyes, depend
upon circumstances which are normal and must be present in the
case of every child who is not blind. The whole distinction, therefore,
is one of degree rather than of kind; nevertheless it is valuable.
The value of the distinction between learned and unlearned
reactions is connected with the laws of learning, to which we shall
come in the next chapter. Experience modifies behaviour according
to certain laws, and we may say that a learned reaction is one in the
formation of which these laws have played a part. For example:
children are frightened of loud noises from birth, but are not at first
frightened of dogs; after they have heard a dog barking loudly, they
may become frightened of dogs, which is a learned reaction. If we
knew enough about the brain, we could make the distinction precise,
by saying that learned reactions are those depending upon
modifications of the brain other than mere growth. But as it is, we
have to judge by observations of bodily behaviour, and the
accompanying modifications in the brain are assumed on a basis of
theory rather than actually observed.
 The essential points, for our purposes, are comparatively simple.
Man or any other animal, at birth, is such as to respond to certain
stimuli in certain specific ways, i.e. by certain kinds of bodily
movements; as he grows, these ways of responding change, partly
as the mere result of developing structure, partly in consequence of
events in his biography. The latter influence proceeds according to
certain laws, which we shall consider, since they have much to do
with the genesis of “knowledge”.
But—the indignant reader may be exclaiming—knowing
something is not a bodily movement, but a state of mind, and yet you
talk to us about sneezing and such matters. I must ask the indignant
reader’s patience. He “knows” that he has states of mind, and that
his knowing is itself a state of mind. I do not deny that he has states
of mind, but I ask two questions: First, what sort of thing are they?
Secondly, what evidence can he give me that he knows about them?
The first question he may find very difficult; and if he wants, in his
answer, to show that states of mind are something of a sort totally
different from bodily movements, he will have to tell me also what
bodily movements are, which will plunge him into the most abstruse
part of physics. All this I propose to consider later on, and then I
hope the indignant reader will be appeased. As to the second
question, namely, what evidence of his knowledge another man can
give me, it is clear that he must depend upon speech or writing, i.e.
in either case upon bodily movements. Therefore whatever
knowledge may be to the knower, as a social phenomenon it is
something displayed in bodily movements. For the present I am
deliberately postponing the question of what knowledge is to the
knower, and confining myself to what it is for the external observer.
And for him, necessarily, it is something shown by bodily movements
made in answer to stimuli—more specifically, to examination
questions. What else it may be I shall consider at a later stage.
However we may subsequently add to our present account by
considering how knowledge appears to the knower, that will not
invalidate anything that we may arrive at by considering how
knowledge appears to the external observer. And there is something
which it is important to realise, namely, that we are concerned with a
process in which the environment first acts upon a man, and then he
reacts upon the environment. This process has to be considered as
a whole if we are to discuss what knowledge is. The older view
would have been that the effect of the environment upon us might
constitute a certain kind of knowledge (perception), while our
reaction to the environment constituted volition. These were, in each
case, “mental” occurrences, and their connection with nerves and
brain remained entirely mysterious. I think the mystery can be
eliminated, and the subject removed from the realm of guesswork,
by starting with the whole cycle from stimulus to bodily movement. In
this way, knowing becomes something active, not something
contemplative. Knowing and willing, in fact, are merely aspects of the
one cycle, which must be considered in its entirety if it is to be rightly
understood.
A few words must be said about the human body as a
mechanism. It is an inconceivably complicated mechanism, and
some men of science think that it is not explicable in terms of physics
and chemistry, but is regulated by some “vital principle” which makes
its laws different from those of dead matter. These men are called
“vitalists”. I do not myself see any reason to accept their view, but at
the same time our knowledge is not sufficient to enable us to reject it
definitely. What we can say is that their case is not proved, and that
the opposite view is, scientifically, a more fruitful working hypothesis.
It is better to look for physical and chemical explanations where we
can, since we know of many processes in the human body which
can be accounted for in this way, and of none which certainly cannot.
To invoke a “vital principle” is to give an excuse for laziness, when
perhaps more diligent research would have enabled us to do without
it. I shall therefore assume, as a working hypothesis, that the human
body acts according to the same laws of physics and chemistry as
those which govern dead matter, and that it differs from dead matter,
not by its laws, but by the extraordinary complexity of its structure.
The movements of the human body may, none the less, be
divided into two classes, which we may call respectively
“mechanical” and “vital”. As an example of the former, I should give
the movement of a man falling from a cliff into the sea. To explain
this, in its broad features, it is not necessary to take account of the
fact that the man is alive; his centre of gravity moves exactly as that
of a stone would move. But when a man climbs up a cliff, he does
something that dead matter of the same shape and weight would
never do; this is a “vital” movement. There is in the human body a lot
of stored chemical energy in more or less unstable equilibrium; a
very small stimulus can release this energy, and cause a
considerable amount of bodily movement. The situation is analogous
to that of a large rock delicately balanced on the top of a conical
mountain; a tiny shove may send it thundering down into the valley,
in one direction or another according to the direction of the shove.
So if you say to a man “your house is on fire”, he will start running;
although the stimulus contained very little energy, his expenditure of
energy may be tremendous. He increases the available energy by
panting, which makes his body burn up faster and increases the
energy due to combustion; this is just like opening the draft in a
furnace. “Vital” movements are those that use up this energy which
is in unstable equilibrium. It is they alone that concern the bio-
chemist, the physiologist, and the psychologist. The others, being
just like the movements of dead matter, may be ignored when we are
specially concerned with the study of Man.
Vital movements have a stimulus which may be inside or outside
the body, or both at once. Hunger is a stimulus inside the body, but
hunger combined with the sight of good food is a double stimulus,
both internal and external. The effect of a stimulus may be, in theory,
according to the laws of physics and chemistry, but in most cases
this is, at present, no more than a pious opinion. What we know from
observation is that behaviour is modified by experience, that is to
say, that if similar stimuli are repeated at intervals they produce
gradually changing reactions. When a bus conductor says, “Fares,
please”, a very young child has no reaction, an older child gradually
learns to look for pennies, and, if a male, ultimately acquires the
power of producing the requisite sum on demand without conscious
effort. The way in which our reactions change with experience is a
distinctive characteristic of animals; moreover it is more marked in
the higher than in the lower animals, and most marked of all in Man.
It is a matter intimately connected with “intelligence”, and must be
investigated before we can understand what constitutes knowledge
from the standpoint of the external observer; we shall be concerned
with it at length in the next chapter.
Speaking broadly, the actions of all living things are such as tend
to biological survival, i.e. to the leaving of a numerous progeny. But
when we descend to the lowest organisms, which have hardly
anything that can be called individuality, and reproduce themselves
by fission, it is possible to take a simpler view. Living matter, within
limits, has the chemical peculiarity of being self-perpetuating, and of
conferring its own chemical composition upon other matter
composed of the right elements. One spore falling into a stagnant
pond may produce millions of minute vegetable organisms; these, in
turn, enable one small animal to have myriads of descendants living
on the small plants; these, in turn, provide life for larger animals,
newts, tadpoles, fishes, etc. In the end there is enormously more
protoplasm in that region than there was to begin with. This is no
doubt explicable as a result of the chemical constitution of living
matter. But this purely chemical self-preservation and collective
growth is at the bottom of everything else that characterises the
behaviour of living things. Every living thing is a sort of imperialist,
seeking to transform as much as possible of its environment into
itself and its seed. The distinction between self and posterity is one
which does not exist in a developed form in asexual unicellular
organisms; many things, even in human life, can only be completely
understood by forgetting it. We may regard the whole of evolution as
flowing from this “chemical imperialism” of living matter. Of this, Man
is only the last example (so far). He transforms the surface of the
globe by irrigation, cultivation, mining, quarrying, making canals and
railways, breeding certain animals, and destroying others; and when
we ask ourselves, from the standpoint of an outside observer, what
is the end achieved by all these activities, we find that it can be
summed up in one very simple formula: to transform as much as
possible of the matter on the earth’s surface into human bodies.
Domestication of animals, agriculture, commerce, industrialism have
been stages in this process. When we compare the human
population of the globe with that of other large animals and also with
that of former times, we see that “chemical imperialism” has been, in
fact, the main end to which human intelligence has been devoted.
Perhaps intelligence is reaching the point where it can conceive
worthier ends, concerned with the quality rather than the quantity of
human life. But as yet such intelligence is confined to minorities, and
does not control the great movements of human affairs. Whether this
will ever be changed I do not venture to predict. And in pursuing the
simple purpose of maximising the amount of human life, we have at
any rate the consolation of feeling at one with the whole movement
of living things from their earliest origin on this planet.
 CHAPTER III
THE PROCESS OF LEARNING IN ANIMALS
AND INFANTS

In the present chapter I wish to consider the processes by which,

and the laws according to which, an animal’s original repertoire of
reflexes is changed into a quite different set of habits as a result of
events that happen to it. A dog learns to follow his master in
preference to anyone else; a horse learns to know his own stall in
the stable; a cow learns to come to the cow-shed at milking time. All
these are acquired habits, not reflexes; they depend upon the
circumstances of the animals concerned, not merely upon the
congenital characteristics of the species. When I speak of an animal
“learning” something, I shall include all cases of acquired habits,
whether or not they are useful to the animal. I have known horses in
Italy “learn” to drink wine, which I cannot believe to have been a
desirable habit. A dog may “learn” to fly at a man who has ill-treated
it, and may do so with such regularity and ferocity as to lead to its
being killed. I do not use learning in any sense involving praise, but
merely to denote modification of behaviour as the result of
experience.
The manner in which animals learn has been much studied in
recent years, with a great deal of patient observation and
experiment. Certain results have been obtained as regards the kinds
of problems that have been investigated, but on general principles
there is still much controversy. One may say broadly that all the
animals that have been carefully observed have behaved so as to
confirm the philosophy in which the observer believed before his
observations began. Nay, more, they have all displayed the national
characteristics of the observer. Animals studied by Americans rush
about frantically, with an incredible display of hustle and pep, and at
last achieve the desired result by chance. Animals observed by
Germans sit still and think, and at last evolve the solution out of their
inner consciousness. To the plain man, such as the present writer,
this situation is discouraging. I observe, however, that the type of
problem which a man naturally sets to an animal depends upon his
own philosophy, and that this probably accounts for the differences
in the results. The animal responds to one type of problem in one
way and to another in another; therefore the results obtained by
different investigators, though different, are not incompatible. But it
remains necessary to remember that no one investigator is to be
trusted to give a survey of the whole field.
The matters with which we shall be concerned in this chapter
belong to behaviourist psychology, and in part to pure physiology.
Nevertheless, they seem to me vital to a proper understanding of
philosophy, since they are necessary for an objective study of
knowledge and inference. I mean by an “objective” study one in
which the observer and the observed need not be the same person;
when they must be identical, I call the study “subjective.” For the
present we are concerned with what is required for understanding
“knowledge” as an objective phenomenon. We shall take up the
question of the subjective study of knowledge at a later stage.
The scientific study of learning in animals is a very recent
growth; it may almost be regarded as beginning with Thorndike’s
Animal Intelligence, which was published in 1911. Thorndike
invented the method which has been adopted by practically all
subsequent American investigators. In this method an animal is
separated from food, which he can see or smell, by an obstacle
which he may overcome by chance. A cat, say, is put in a cage
having a door with a handle which he may by chance push open with
his nose. At first the cat makes entirely random movements, until he
gets his result by a mere fluke. On the second occasion, in the same
cage, he still makes some random movements, but not so many as
on the first occasion. On the third occasion he does still better, and
before long he makes no useless movements. Nowadays it has
become customary to employ rats instead of cats, and to put them in