Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Destructive Storytelling: Disinformation and the Eurosceptic Myth that Shaped Brexit Imke Henkel full chapter instant download
Destructive Storytelling: Disinformation and the Eurosceptic Myth that Shaped Brexit Imke Henkel full chapter instant download
https://ebookmass.com/product/100-disasters-that-shaped-world-
history-joanne-mattern/
https://ebookmass.com/product/100-disasters-that-shaped-world-
history-joanne-mattern-2/
https://ebookmass.com/product/korea-at-war-conflicts-that-shaped-
the-world-michael-j-seth/
https://ebookmass.com/product/one-hundred-patents-that-shaped-
the-modern-world-1st-edition-david-segal/
Six Ideas That Shaped Physics - All Units 3rd Edition
Thomas A. Moore
https://ebookmass.com/product/six-ideas-that-shaped-physics-all-
units-3rd-edition-thomas-a-moore/
https://ebookmass.com/product/six-ideas-that-shaped-physics-
unit-q-3rd-edition-thomas-a-moore/
https://ebookmass.com/product/six-ideas-that-shaped-physics-
unit-r-3rd-edition-thomas-a-moore/
https://ebookmass.com/product/disinformation-and-fake-news-
shashi-jayakumar/
https://ebookmass.com/product/six-ideas-that-shaped-physics-unit-
c-conservation-laws-constrain-4th-edition-thomas-a-moore/
Destructive
Storytelling
Imke Henkel
Destructive Storytelling
“How come a mature Western democracy suddenly lost its sense of reality? This
superb and timely study shows how insights from discourse analysis and com-
munication studies can be applied to political discourse in the post-truth era. I
know of no better attempt than Henkel’s monograph to lead us through the
swirling knot of lies that British political discourse has been unable to escape.”
—Johannes Angermuller, The Open University
“Imke Henkel has produced an authoritative account of how tens of thousands
of little media lies produced the myth that a sinister European Union was swin-
dling honest Brits. Do not be deceived by the author’s calm tone and academic
rigour. This is the authentically shocking story of how Conservative journalists
and politicians sent Britain down the road to ruin.”
—Nick Cohen, author and Observer columnist
“Imke Henkel constructs with tremendous thoroughness and moral passion a
formidable case against the way Boris Johnson, and other British journalists,
covered the Brussels story. In my next book I shall try to explain why I disagree
with her.”
—Andrew Gimson, author of Boris: The Making
of the Prime Minister (2016)
“This book is both an essential and chilling read for anyone interested in the
ideological origins of the Brexit project. Based on a painstaking analysis of how
British news media helped to spread misleading and false stories about the EU,
the book demonstrates the ability of compelling myths to undermine democracy.”
—Karin Wahl-Jorgensen, Cardiff University, UK, author of
Emotions, Media and Politics (2019)
“Henkel has written a much-needed book on the power of myths and journalis-
tic narratives in fostering disinformation around Brexit. Grounded in Barthes’
ground-breaking work, the analysis dissects myths perpetrated by news organi-
zations that laid the ideological groundwork for anti-EU attitudes and policies.
Henkel admirably shows how news and ideology are intertwined and function
in so-called “post-truth” times.”
—Silvio Waisbord, George Washington University, USA,
author of The Communication Manifesto (2020)
Imke Henkel
Destructive
Storytelling
Disinformation and the Eurosceptic
Myth that Shaped Brexit
Imke Henkel
School of English and Journalism
University of Lincoln
Lincoln, UK
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgements
This book was born out of the deeply felt alarm over the political
discourse during the spring and summer of 2016. Lies not only domi-
nated the campaigns around the EU referendum in Britain and the presi-
dential elections in the US, but—more disturbingly—the usual remedy
against falsehoods, providing evidence for the truth, had turned useless.
Evidence didn’t matter anymore. The liars shrugged and repeated the lie.
When evidence doesn’t matter, politicians become unaccountable. For
democracies, this is a dangerous development. With this book, I attempt
to analyse how the political discourse in Britain, and more specifically
how the Eurosceptic discourse, has rendered factual evidence irrelevant.
As a newcomer to academia after three decades in journalism, I am
profoundly indebted and deeply grateful to what I experienced to be a
welcoming academic community, colleagues who offered inspiration and
encouragement, and generously gave their time to discuss, advice, and
help. Academic conferences and peer reviews are sometimes chided or
ridiculed. I found them a tremendous lifeline and indispensable school in
the transition from writing and thinking as a journalist to writing and
thinking as a scholar.
The idea for this book dates back to a keynote speech that I was invited
to give at the European Journalism Training Association (EJTA) confer-
ence in Munich in May 2017. I am grateful to Deborah Wilson David,
v
vi Acknowledgements
Nadia Vissers, and Niko Drok, who suggested that I hold the keynote,
and in particular to Deborah, who reminded me of the Euromyths news
stories, which I had first encountered as a UK correspondent for German
news media. Several workshops and conferences have provided invalu-
able opportunities to challenge and improve my developing ideas:
Veronika Koller and Michael Kranert organised a conference on “Political
Discourse” in Edinburgh in June 2018, enabling extensive and stimulat-
ing discussions about critical discourse analysis; Nelson Ribeiro initiated
the Lisbon Winter School at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa in
January 2019, which facilitated wonderful in-depth debates; Astrid Van
Weyenberg and Alvaro Oleart compiled a special edition on “Narrating
Europe” for Politique européenne, for which they organised a workshop in
Brussels in March 2019 and a panel presentation at the 26th International
Conference of Europeanists (CES 2019) in Madrid in June 2019, allow-
ing for many fruitful discussions; Sabina Mihelj, Dan Sage, and César
Jiménez-Martínez organised a workshop in Loughborough in March
2019 on “Promoting the Nation in Troubled Times” that initiated inspir-
ing interdisciplinary exchanges; Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Mervi Pantti
edited a special issue on emotions for Journalism, and provided fantasti-
cally inspiring critique through two versions of my paper, which is
reflected in Chap. 5 of this book. For their invaluable comments and
feedback at these conferences and workshops, and at other occasions, I
would like to thank Johannes Angermüller, Mark Bennister, Jane
Chapman, Andrew Elliott, Gábor Gergely, Darren Kelsey, Peter Maurer,
Christopher Marlow, Andreas Roepstorff, Yannis Stavrakakis, Sabine
Volk, Clemens von Stengel, Silvio Waisbord, Brian Winston, and Ruth
Wodak. I am in particular grateful to my editor Cathy Scott at Palgrave,
who suggested this book to me.
Finally, I would like to say a special and deeply felt thank you to Neil
Thurman, without whom none of my academic writing would have hap-
pened. Neil has been, and is, a tremendous mentor, patient and generous
with his time, rigorous and inspiring with his critique, wonderfully help-
ful and supportive with his advice.
Remains to say that, obviously, all shortcomings, errors, and mistakes
in this book are mine.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
References 5
2 Euromyths 9
2.1 The Data 11
2.2 The Impact 13
2.3 The Fact-checks 15
2.4 The Topics, the Responses 16
2.5 Research Literature on British Media Covering European
Affairs 18
2.5.1 The Eurosceptic Turn 19
2.5.2 Field Studies of EU Correspondents 20
2.5.3 Europhile Press During the 1975 Referendum 21
2.5.4 Eurosceptic Themes 22
2.5.5 Reasons for the Eurosceptic Turn 26
2.5.6 Effects of Eurosceptic Media 28
2.6 Conclusion 30
References 31
5 Eurosceptic Ideology107
5.1 The Eurosceptic Press in the Context of Maastricht 107
5.1.1 The Editorial Context of the Euromyths News
Stories109
5.2 The Euromyths as a Genre 112
5.3 Emotions in Euromyths News Stories 121
5.3.1 Mirth, Pride, and Anger 122
5.3.2 Mirth, Pride, and Anger in the Eurosceptic
Discourse137
5.4 Conclusion 140
References141
Index195
1
Introduction
Politicians lie. And news reports can be false. The lies that riddled the
campaign in the run-up to the British EU-referendum, though, seemed
to be of a different order. The many untruths that were peddled in the
British spring and early summer of 2016 appeared profoundly disturbing
because they were successful against the manifold attempts of fact-
checking. Providing evidence seemed no longer to work as a remedy. One
false claim in particular, painted on the “battle-bus” of the Vote Leave
campaign, became iconic: “We send the EU £350 million a week—let’s
fund our NHS instead,” it read. Twice, Andrew Dilnot, the UK’s head
statistician, refuted the incorrect figure. Still, the £350-million bus toured
the country. And while Vote Leave’s most prominent campaigner, Boris
Johnson, kept repeating the deceitful promise, he had already admitted
on the very day on which he had launched his battle-bus that the figure
painted on it was wrong (itv, 2016, May 11; Henkel, 2020, p. 73). The
principle that lies only succeed until the liar has been found out, appeared
to have turned null and void (Higgins, 2016). Oxford languages named
“post-truth” as “Word of the Year 2016” (Oxford languages, n.d.). The
even more pervasive and unashamed fabrications that presidential candi-
date Donald Trump spread at the same time in the US seemed to confirm
that liberal democracies were in fatal danger (e.g. Bennett & Livingston,
2021; Rose, 2017). The apparent success that the brass neck liars enjoyed
deeply alarmed political commentators:
In this era of post-truth politics, an unhesitating liar can be king. The more
brazen his dishonesty, the less he minds being caught with his pants on fire,
the more he can prosper. (Freedland, 2016, May 13)
Neither lying politicians nor false news reports are new, of course (cf.
e.g. Winston & Winston, 2021). However, the recent experience of dis-
information that appeared immune against evidence has caused deep
confusion and anxiety because it is seen to endanger the very foundations
of democracy (Farkas & Schou, 2020, p. 1). Disinformation has often
been discussed in the light of how it has been facilitated by the affor-
dances of online media (Tucker et al., 2018, March 19). Recent research,
though, has found that mainstream news media play a significant role in
disseminating so-called fake news (Tsfati et al., 2020), be it because they
repeat false claims when reporting or fact-checking them, be it because
falsehoods originate with mainstream news media.
This book investigates how, in Britain, misleading and false news
reports about European institutions shaped the perception of the EU
over decades while they prevailed against fact-checking. It will show how
the false reporting has affected the Eurosceptic discourse in Britain. I
argue that the false news stories, their resistance against persistent rebut-
tals, and their impact on the political discourse can be understood as a
case study for how political communication becomes democratically
dysfunctional.
Since the late 1980s, the British press has published a regular stream of
articles that derided the then still European Community and its institu-
tions with stories about alleged excesses of bureaucratic directives.
Notorious is the claim that European regulators banned bent bananas.
Other stories asserted that the European Community regulated the size
of condoms and imposed dimensions too small for British men; that the
traditional saucy postcards on sale in British seaside resorts were to be
forbidden; that customers in pubs were no longer allowed to call staff
“love”; that powerful British vacuum cleaners would be outlawed by the
1 Introduction 3
EU, and so forth. The mostly trivial claims became known under the
name of “Euromyths,” after the European Commission attempted—in
vain—to counter the incorrect claims with fact-checks published on their
“Euromyths blog.” Instead, the falsehoods survived and re-emerged dur-
ing the Brexit campaign, when they were repeated by the Eurosceptic
press to justify a British exit from the EU.
Euromyths news stories offer an example of false claims that remained
powerful although they were known to be false. Why did they prevail
despite repeated and constant rebuttals? I contend that the answer can be
found when investigating the linguistic strategies that the news stories
employed. I conduct this investigation through a normative lens.
Consequently, the approach chosen in this book is Critical Discourse
Analysis. In the words of Norman Fairclough:
The “social wrong” this book considers is the disinformation that news
stories spread and that went on to impact the political discourse and
influence voters’ decisions.
News stories, as will be discussed in Chap. 3, not only inform; they
also tell stories. I will argue that the Euromyths present a specific kind of
storytelling that made them persuasive and rendered them immune
against fact-checking. The close textual analyses of sample Euromyths
news stories in Chap. 4 will show that they can be understood as myth in
Roland Barthes’ sense. Barthes argued that “myth is depoliticized speech”
(2013 [1957], p. 255) because it naturalises history. As myth, the
Euromyths news stories depoliticised a political argument and naturalised
the claim of antagonistic British-European relations. Thus, they trans-
ported an ideology. I understand ideology, as I will explain in Chap. 3,
following Teun van Dijk’s sociocognitive approach as “mental models”
(2009, p. 195), or, as the American sociologist Gaye Tuchman put it, as
“methods of knowing [which] obscure truth instead of revealing it”
(1978, p. 179). The “mental model” of the Euromyths news stories, I
4 I. Henkel
liberal model and the ideological use of news. It will then consider the
literature about narrative structures in news media and about news media
as myths. It will conclude with introducing Roland Barthes’ mythology
which will be used as a conceptional tool in the analyses of Euromyths
news stories.
Chapter 4 turns to the first set of four sample Euromyths news stories.
Using Critical Discourse Analysis it will establish that the news stories
employ different, conflicting orders of discourse, which opens them up
for mythification. The chapter will apply Barthes’ mythology for the anal-
ysis of the sample news stories and discuss the meaning of Barthes’ asser-
tion that myth is “depoliticised speech.” Chapter 5 will investigate the
historic-political as well as the editorial context of the Euromyths sample.
It will then turn to an analysis of the presentation of emotions in
Euromyths news stories.
Chapter 6 looks at the type of disinformation which the Euromyths
news stories spread. It also discusses recent literature that suggests shifting
the focus from the false content of disinformation to the ideology it con-
veys. This is precisely the focus this book favours. Finally, the chapter will
turn to investigate the narrative structures of the Brexit campaign and
whether they mirror the narrative structures found in Euromyths news
stories. The concluding chapter returns to the main argument: why
Euromyths news stories represent an example of democratically dysfunc-
tional storytelling in news media.
References
Barthes, R. (2013 [1957]). Mythologies (R. Howard & A. Lavers, Trans.).
New York: Hill and Wang.
Bennett, W. L., & Livingston, S. (2021). The coordinated attack on authorita-
tive institutions: Defending democracy in the disinformation age. In
W. Lance Bennett & S. Livingston (Eds.), The disinformation age: Politics,
technology, and disruptive communication in the United States (pp. 261–293).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6 I. Henkel
Tucker, J. A., Guess, A., Barberá, P., Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal,
D., & Nyhan, B. (2018, March 19). Social media, political polarization, and
political disinformation: A review of the scientific literature. Retrieved from
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144139
Van Dijk, T. A. (2009). News, discourse, and ideology. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen &
T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), The handbook of journalism studies (pp. 191–204).
New York: Routledge.
Winston, B., & Winston, M. (2021). The roots of fake news. Objecting to objective
journalism. London: Routledge.
2
Euromyths
The photocopied press cutting, found in a black carton box among other
cuttings, photocopies, and official letters from the 1990s, carries the
byline and headshot of a man, who was to become British prime minister
two decades later. The piece starts with a biblical image and an insult
against European parliamentarians: “Not since the waters have retired
from the face of Earth has Strasbourg witnessed such a profusion of
spineless live forms,” thundered Boris Johnson, then assistant editor and
chief political correspondent at the Daily Telegraph (Purnell, 2011,
p. 161), in a sketch that reviled the legislators for failing to vote against
Jacques Santer’s European Commission. Santer’s Commission had been
accused of mismanagement. It was also criticised for not censuring two
particularly controversial Commissioners, Edith Cresson and Manuel
Marin (Johnson, 1999). The box, which holds Johnson’s article that sup-
ports these accusations with rhetorical flourish, is part of an archive that
documents a bitter feud between the European Commission and the
British media, running over more than three decades. The issue of the
feud is the veracity and fairness of reporting.
It has been fought since 1992. Why the European Commission lost
and how the disinformation it failed to thwart shaped and ultimately
harmed the political communication in Britain is the topic of this book.
Noticeably, the incorrect stories, which the Commission came to call
“Euromyths,” mostly concern trivial matters, often bordering on silliness.
In Johnson’s sketch it was not his polemic against members of the
European Parliament to which the Commission objected. The dispute
circled around a subclause which identified the European Commissioner
Martin Bangemann as “the 18stone German who attempted to abolish
the prawn cocktail crisp and promulgated the Euro condom.” Neither
was true, the European Commission insisted. No law banning prawn
cocktail crisps or regulating the size of condoms was ever passed.
To publish their refutations of these and other Euromyths, the
European Commission created their own dedicated weblog (Euromyths,
1992–2018). Concerning the prawn cocktail flavour crisp, there was no
attempt, the weblog claims, to put an end to it. Instead, as the respective
entry on the website contends, British officials were to blame. When a
new “directive to reconcile different national rules on the amounts of
sweeteners and flavourings in different foods” was drawn up, it was the
British side who failed its crisp producers. At least that is what the
European Commission claimed as they pointed out on the “Euromyths
blog” that “UK negotiators overlooked the effect on the production of
specially flavoured crisps” (EC to ban prawn cocktail crisps, 1993).
However, the Commission’s view didn’t go unchallenged. In fact, their
own archive preserves a contrasting perspective. A letter dating from 18
April 1995, which can be found in the black carton box next to Johnson’s
article, is signed by Keith Nightingale, Director General of the Snack
Nut and Crisp Manufacturer Association Ltd. (SNACMA), and addresses
Robert Elphick, then spokesman of the European Commission in
London. The Director General writes to complain that Elphick was
“gravely misinformed by Brussels,” when he briefed the Daily Telegraph
reporter about the prawn crisp story. The lobbyist for British food manu-
facturers points to his own files which, he writes, contained “numerous
representations” made “over a prolonged period” by the snack industry to
EU institutions in protest against the planned directive, amounting to a
“campaign to save the Prawn Cocktail flavour Crisps.” Yet, the European
2 Euromyths 11
Hayley.