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Being
Being
A Study in Ontology
Preface xi
Introduction xv
Summary of the Text xxv
I. Being and Existence 1
II. Being and Non-Being 40
III. Being and Abstraction 84
IV. Being and Possibility 121
V. Being and Generality 177
VI. Lightweight Platonism: An Ontological Framework 231
Bibliography 255
Index 261
Preface
No one can deny that W. V. Quine wrote many splendidly quotable (and in
consequence much-quoted) sentences. Among them is the first sentence of his
preface to Set Theory and Its Logic: ‘A preface is not, in my book, an introduc-
tion.’¹ I refuse, however, to be simply one more philosopher who has quoted this
sentence. I will not quote it. I will borrow it: A preface is not, in my book, an
introduction.
One of the many introductions that this Preface is not—the Introduction to this
book—follows it.
The intellectual context of Being: A Study in Ontology is this: it is an historical
document, a book of the nineties of the last century. I began work on Being in the
early eighties. The chapter headings of the original plan for the book were much
the same as those of the book that is in your hands (or those of the book one page
of which is on a screen before you), with two exceptions: Chapter VI was added in
response to a suggestion made by a reader for O.U.P., and there was originally to
be a chapter called “Being and Materiality.” I had a year’s research leave (thanks to
the generosity of the National Endowment for the Humanities) and eagerly started
work on the book. I began with the chapter “Being and Materiality” because, at the
time, that was the area in which the ideas were coming. But that chapter took on a
life of its own and eventually became a book—Material Beings. Material Beings
(like An Essay on Free Will before it) took seven or eight years to write. But I was
able to do quite a lot of work (here and there, now and then) on Being even when
the main focus of my attention was on Material Beings. I submitted an incomplete
draft of Being to the Oxford University Press and in 1994 it was—conditionally, of
course—accepted for publication. I took it for granted that—given the time it had
taken to write An Essay on Free Will and Material Beings—I should finish the book
in a few years, certainly before the end of the century.
It was not to be. The pressure of other work—I was in those days the recipient
of a seemingly unending series of invitations to write papers on topics I badly
wanted to write papers on—caused me again and again to put off work on Being,
each time “for a few months.” I found myself unable to do any further work on the
book if I could not devote my undivided attention to it for some considerable
period of time, and no such considerable period of time ever presented itself.
¹ It has, for example, been quoted by John P. Burgess and Gideon Rosen in the preface to their A
Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics (Oxford: at the
Clarendon Press, 1996), p. v.
xii
² A term I invented (or re-invented). “Meta-ontology” was the title of a paper I published in 1998, an
adaptation of the then-current draft of the first chapter of Being. Heidegger had coined the word
‘Metontologie’ in the late twenties, but I did not know of Heidegger’s coinage till I was informed of it by
Dr Franca d’Agostini early in the present century. Heidegger’s word is a better formation than mine,
owing to the fact that ‘μετά’ loses its terminal vowel when prefixed to a word that begins with a vowel.
I have, however, resisted adopting the word ‘metontology’, owing to worries about whether very many
anglophone philosophers would recognize their old friend ‘meta-’ in its abbreviated guise. I do,
however, insist on writing the word with a hyphen between the two vowels: ‘meta-ontology’. (For a
discussion of Heidegger’s use of ‘Metontologie’, see Steven Galt Crowell, “Metaphysics, Metontology,
and the End of Being and Time,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LX (2000), pp. 307–331.)
³ I confess that this is not quite true. Toward the end of the final chapter there is a brief mention of
“ontological grounding.”
⁴ The essays in my 2001 Cambridge collection, Ontology, Identity, and Modality, are all solidly “pre-
new black.”
xiii
Press. Almost nothing in these later essays contradicts anything in the present
book. The rare inconsistencies between the later essays and the material in this
book pertain to minor technical matters.
A reader for the Oxford University Press made two very useful suggestions.
Chapter VI is the result of one of them, and the detailed Summary of the Text
following the table of contents is the result of the other. The Summary is not
meant to be a mechanically accurate outline of the contents of the book. In some
places it verges on the impressionistic. But that is consistent with its sole purpose,
which is to enable readers who have had to put the book down for a week or a
month to find their way back into the argument. (The reviewer assured me that he
or she—who had had occasionally to put the book down for a week or a month—
would have found such a summary very useful.)
Chapter IV contains some comments I wrote, at Derek Parfit’s request, on his
defense of possibilism in a draft of Volume II of On What Matters (Appendix J).
I am grateful to Janet Radcliffe-Richards and Jeff McMahan, Parfit’s literary
executors, for permission to publish what amounts to several pages of the draft
of Appendix J—material that sometimes differs from the corresponding material
in Appendix J in the published book. I thank Uwe Meixner and Christopher
Menzel for extremely useful correspondence on possibilism and related matters.
Professor Geach has written, “. . . Tarski once said, inimicus Plato, sed magis
inimica falsitas.”⁵ He gave no citation. I have been unable to verify this statement.
⁶ “Then why is your subtitle not ‘A study in ontology and meta-ontology’ ”? Well, too long, for one
thing, and too busy. But perhaps there is a lesson to be learned from ‘metaphilosophy’. In one sense of
‘philosophy’, in metaphilosophy we attempt to understand what we are doing when we do “philosophy”—
and metaphilosophy is thus something outside philosophy. And yet metaphilosophy is a part of
philosophy. (There is a journal called Metaphilosophy. I can, with a little effort, imagine a philosopher
who denied that Metaphilosophy was a philosophical journal. By no stretch of the imagination can
I imagine a librarian who did.) I would explain this apparent inconsistency by saying that the word
‘philosophy’ has wider and narrower senses—in the wider sense it includes metaphilosophy, and, in the
narrower sense of ‘philosophy’, metaphilosophy is outside philosophy and examines philosophy. And,
I would say, ‘ontology’ has a wide sense and a narrow sense. In the narrower sense, Chapters II, III, and
IV of this book concern ontology, and Chapters I and V are about meta-ontology, the discipline that
studies the discipline I am engaged in Chapters II, III, and IV. In the wider sense of ‘ontology’ (the sense
the word has in the title of the book), all five chapters are about “ontology.”
Being: A Study in Ontology. Peter van Inwagen, Oxford University Press. © Peter van Inwagen 2023.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192883964.001.0001
xvi
come to different ontological conclusions from his, despite the fact that I have
thought about ontological problems in the way (if I may so speak of my relation-
ship to a philosopher who has been my teacher only through the written word) he
has taught me to think about ontological problems.
I will try to give some sense of what I mean by saying that the meta-ontology
I present in this book is “deeply Quinean.” But I do not mean to anticipate the
detailed and technical discussion of meta-ontological questions that comprises
Chapters I and V. I will simply comment on two quotations that represent meta-
ontological views antithetical to Quine’s, and on one quotation that misrepresents
Quine’s views. The first is from Arthur Prior’s Objects of Thought:
The burden—or a good sixty percent of the burden—of Chapters I and V could be
summed up by saying that the ideas on display in this passage are radically
defective.⁸ In this passage—I say—, a philosopher accuses another philosopher
of being wrong-headed and muddled on just those points on which he himself is
wrong-headed and muddled and his target exceptionally insightful and clear-
minded. I will be particularly concerned to commend Quine for “his insistence
that all quantification must govern variable names” (that is, must govern variables
that occupy nominal positions). More exactly, I will commend Quine for his
insistence that there can be no such thing as a variable that does not occupy a
nominal position—for it’s not as if Quine conceded that there were, for example,
sentential variables but held that, for some reason, quantification couldn’t govern
them.
In my view (and Quine’s), “complexes” such as ‘For some p, Paul believes that p
and Elmer does not believe that p’ are concocted indeed—concocted as
nineteenth-century patent medicines were concocted. All the ink that has been
spilled in defense of such concoctions has, in my view, produced no more real
content than can be found on the fancy labels on the bottles in which those
⁷ A. N. Prior, P. T. Geach, and Anthony Kenny, Objects of Thought (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press,
1971), p. 101.
⁸ See Section 3 of Chapter V.
xvii
medicines were dispensed. I mean this accusation to apply not only to sentential
variables but to “predicative variables” (‘For some F, F Paul and it is not the case
that F Elmer’) and to all other sorts of variables that are supposed to occupy non-
nominal positions. If, for example, some philosopher has concocted “complexes”
containing “sentential-connective variables” (‘For some C, Paul is taller than
Elmer C Elmer is shorter than Paul’) my accusation applies to that philosopher
as well.
I turn now to my second quotation. Its author is the late Ernest Gellner. (I am
sorry that the first two of my targets are among the defenseless dead. If I knew of
living philosophers who had said things equally suited to the polemical purposes
of this Introduction, I would instead quote them.⁹) In an article written in the
mid-seventies, Gellner gave a very nice description of Quine’s meta-ontology, and,
having paused briefly to identify himself as a nominalist, went on to say
The dreadful thing is, I haven’t even tried to be a serious, card-carrying nomi-
nalist. I have never tried to eliminate “quantification” over abstract objects from
my discourse. I shamelessly “quantify over” abstractions and deny their exist-
ence! I do not try to put what I say into canonical notation, and do not care what
the notation looks like if someone else does it for me, and do not feel in the very
least bound by whatever ontic commitments such a translation may disclose.¹⁰
An example will make it clear what Gellner is being so intransigent about. Suppose
he has been heard to say things like, ‘There is something that Paul and Silas both
believe and Elmer does not believe’. And suppose he has also been heard to say
that there are no abstract objects. Suppose Miriam, who has heard him say both
these things, says to him,
Gellner, you’ve contradicted yourself. You’ve said, “There is something that Paul
and Silas both believe and Elmer does not believe. But you also say that there are
no abstract objects. And if there is something that Paul and Silas both believe, this
“something” must be an abstract object. (‘Proposition’ is the word customarily
used for abstract objects of this sort, but my point doesn’t depend on what we
choose to call them.)
⁹ Robert M. Adams’s What Is, and What Is in Itself (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021) came
into my hands too late to have any significant effect on the text of this book. (And it is not ruled out by
my decision to publish the present book as “an historical document,” for much of Adams’s book does
not presuppose any acquaintance with twenty-first-century meta-ontology.) And my meta-ontological
disagreements with Adams are far more widespread and profound even than my meta-ontological
disagreements with Prior and Gellner. It’s a superb book—but I do want to take a take a Sharpie and
place a negation sign before each sentence it contains.
¹⁰ Ernest Gellner, “The Last Pragmatist, or the Behaviourist Platonist,” Spectacles and Predicaments:
Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 199–208. The quoted passage is on
p. 203.
xviii
There are a number of ways Gellner—or any nominalist, anyone who denies the
existence of abstract objects—might reply to Miriam’s argument.
You are supposing that all quantification must be into nominal positions. You are
attempting to read my sentence ‘Paul and Silas believe something that Elmer does
not’ this way: ‘For some x, Paul believes x and Silas believes x and Elmer does not
believe x’. I agree that it is hard to see how there could be anything acceptable to a
nominalist like myself that satisfied the open sentence ‘Paul believes x and Silas
believes x and Elmer does not believe x’. But don’t read my sentence that
way. Read it this way: ‘For some p, Paul believes that p and Silas believes that p
and Elmer does not believe that p’. (Note the ‘that’s: ‘p’ is a sentential, not a
nominal, variable.) Without going into the question of the sort of semantical
analysis I would provide for sentential quantification, I will say for the
record that the ‘For some p’ sentence can be true even if nothing satisfies ‘Paul
believes x and Silas believes x and Elmer does not believe x’—as, in my view,
nothing does.
I agree that what I have said has the appearance of a contradiction. But the
appearance is superficial, and—I’m sure you will agree—an apparent contradic-
tion need not be a real contradiction. (A Copernican might utter both these
sentences: ‘It was cooler in the garden after the sun had moved behind the elms’
and ‘The sun does not move’—an apparent, not a real, contradiction.) Don’t think
I’m going to cheat like Prior. Quantification is quantification—that is, there’s only
one kind. But I will show you how to read my sentence ‘Paul and Silas believe
something that Elmer does not’—and how to account for the fact that it follows
logically from what I assert when I utter this sentence both that there is something
that Paul and Silas both believe, and there is something that Elmer doesn’t believe
that other people do—and I will do these things in a way that doesn’t violate my
nominalistic scruples. That is, I’ll show you how to account for all the logical
relations that hold among all the general sentences (sentences whose grammatical
structure turns on the presence in them of ‘all’ and ‘some’) I accept that concern
what people believe (accept, assent to, assert, think, deny . . . ). In doing these
things, moreover, I’ll make use of the only kind of variables there are, nominal
variables. And, I promise you, my effort will not have the following consequence:
for some one-place open sentence F, the existential generalization on F is logically
deducible from the sentences I endorse, and F can be satisfied only by objects
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Major Baddeley, being among the killed. The three battalions of the
126th Brigade should have rejoined the Division on the 5th, but they,
too, had been fiercely attacked, and, though suffering severely, were
upholding the credit of the Lancashire Territorials. As the 29th
Division could not spare any of these three battalions, the Chatham
Battalion of the R.N. Division was attached to the 42nd Division at
noon on the 6th, and held in reserve.
By 1 p.m. the situation had improved, and the number of Turks in
and around the nullahs had greatly diminished. The 5th and 7th L.F.
were now ordered to take the offensive; the small redoubt near to the
bifurcation of nullahs, which had been captured by the enemy, was
attacked and retaken. By the evening of the 6th the enemy’s attack,
which had been made in great strength and with much bravery, had
been repulsed. His losses had been considerable, and his only gain
was the small indentation by the Krithia Nullah. For three days the
fight had raged without intermission. Worn-out, hungry, thirsty,
sleepless men had fought and dug and fought again until the line
had been firmly established and held by the physically exhausted
remnants; and the battalions that had suffered most had time to rest
and lick their wounds.
On June 7 counter-operations were undertaken after dark with the
object of straightening the line from the Vineyard towards the nullah.
The attack was divided into three parts, the right being entrusted to
100 men of the 9th Manchesters, and 20 men of the 1st Field
Company; the centre and left each to a company of the Chatham
Battalion. The 9th Manchesters succeeded, but the left and centre
failed to attain their objective. On the night of June 8-9 the 127th
Brigade was withdrawn to Corps Reserve, and its place in the firing-
line taken by the 126th Brigade, the three detached battalions having
rejoined.
The casualties in the 42nd Division during the four weeks
amounted to—
The result was that a tactical point of some importance had been
won and held by the tenacity of the 125th Brigade, and that a large
Turkish force had been pinned down when urgently needed in the
north. The Turks had, indeed, been massing troops in front of the
Division as they had intended to attack our lines in force, on the 6th
or 7th of August. Sir Ian Hamilton telegraphed to the Corps
Commander: “Your operations have been invaluable, and have given
the Northern Corps the greatest possible help by drawing the main
Turkish effort on yourselves. I was sure you were ready for them to-
night. Well done, 8th Corps.”
But though the sacrifice had not been altogether in vain, the
advance from Suvla Bay and Anzac had failed, and the conquest of
the Dardanelles seemed more remote than ever. And yet for one
half-hour it had seemed so near! Of all the many lamentable
tragedies of the campaign surely the most dramatic, the most
appealing, was that on Chunuk Bair, at dawn on the 9th of August,
when companies of the 6th Gurkhas and 6th South Lancashires had
stormed the cliffs and driven the Turks headlong before them. From
the top of the saddle they looked down upon the promised land.
Below them the goal—Maidos, and the Narrows! The way lay open
and victory was in sight—was already achieved!—and the Turkish
Army in the south would be cut off! But these four hundred men
alone of all the Allied troops that landed on the peninsula were
destined to view the promised land. Flushed with triumph, Gurkhas
and Lancastrians intermingled raced down the slopes after the
fleeing Turks. And then the blow fell—truly a bolt out of the blue—a
salvo of heavy shells crashing with infernal accuracy into the midst of
them, mangling and destroying the exulting victors. Where that salvo
came from will probably never be known with certainty, but there can
be little doubt that the shells were British. The remnants of the little
force could only make for shelter; there was no shelter in front, and
the chance had gone, never to return.
To return to the 42nd Division. In and about the The first V.C.
Vineyard held by the 6th and 7th Lancashire
Fusiliers, the fighting surged and swayed for several days. The Turk
fought gamely, with grim determination, and the casualties on both
sides were heavy. The C.O.s of the two battalions had been ordered
to remain at their Headquarters in communication with the Brigadier,
and the Adjutants, Captains Spafford and Gledhill, held on
tenaciously. Spafford was killed, and the order to retire was sent, but
Gledhill’s pertinacity got this order withdrawn, and the Vineyard was
held. A successful and very gallant stand against great odds was
made by “A” Company, 9th Manchesters, on the night of August 7-8,
when the first V.C. awarded to the Division was won by Lieutenant
W. T. Forshaw, who was in temporary command of the company.
Two M.C.s and two D.C.M.s were also won by the company.
Forshaw was holding the northern corner of this small oblong with a
bombing party when he was attacked by a swarm of Turks who
converged from three trenches. For the greater part of two days he
kept them at bay, and even threw back, before they had time to
explode, the bombs they threw at him. In the words of the Official
Report—
“He held his own, not only directing his men and
encouraging them by exposing himself with the utmost
disregard of danger, but personally throwing bombs
continuously for forty-one hours. When his detachment was
relieved after twenty-four hours, he volunteered to continue
the direction of operations. Three times during the night of
August 8-9 he was again heavily attacked, and once the
Turks got over the barricade; but after shooting three with his
revolver he led his men forward and recaptured it. When he
rejoined his battalion he was choked and sickened by bomb
fumes, badly bruised by a fragment of shrapnel, and could
barely lift his arm from continuous bomb throwing.”
On the 8th and 9th the 126th Brigade relieved the 125th and
continued the struggle, and Lieutenant S. Collier, 6th Manchesters,
gained the M.C. for a good bit of work on the right of the Vineyard. A
trench held by a group of men of the 126th Brigade was fiercely
attacked by enemy bombers, and its capture appeared certain.
Collier, however, organized and led the defence, and though he had
never before handled a bomb, he displayed much aptitude with this
weapon; and in spite of persistent attacks, continued throughout the
night, the Turks were beaten off. On the night of the 12th the enemy
attacked in mass and captured the Vineyard, but the next day were
bombed out of it, and it was finally consolidated and held.
Throughout the operations the Divisional Engineers had worked and
exposed themselves as fearlessly as ever. Their services were
continuously in demand, and they had never been found wanting.
The bulk of the work on this occasion had fallen on the 1st Field
Company. The Signal Company, too, had proved how competent all
its branches were. Much of its work is not done in the limelight, and it
may be mentioned that the average number of messages passing
through the Signal Office daily had been about three hundred. In
times of stress this number was greatly increased.
On August 13 the 42nd Division was relieved in the trenches and
went into Corps Reserve. The following 8th Army Corps Special
Order was issued next day—
In the new area, which had previously been held New Ground
by the 29th Division, now at Suvla, there were
many changes, on the whole for the better. The men were not sorry
to see the last of Krithia and Achi Baba Nullahs, of the Vineyard and
other scenes of carnage. Yet the names conjure up other memories,
not wholly painful—of heroic attempt and gallant performance, of
courage, self-sacrifice, and devotion to duty unsurpassed in any
theatre of war, of cheerfulness in adversity, of enduring friendships,
of doggedness and determination, of great pride in the comrades
who had fallen, whose graves, marked by biscuit-box crosses, lay
thick in the Krithia Nullah beyond Clapham Junction. The Eski,
Australian and Redoubt Lines, Wigan, Stretford, and Oldham Roads,
Burlington Street, Greenheys Lane, Ardwick Green, Clapham
Junction, Cooney’s corner (where it was wise to make good speed),
Romani’s Well, which could always be relied upon for a supply of
deliciously cool water, the olive-grove beside it, most peaceful and
popular of bivouacs—these were seen for the last time, but the
memories that cluster about them will never be wiped out. The
mention of the names brings back the scene, the sounds, the smells
—the gullies thronged with men and animals, the R.A.M.C. carrying
the wounded down to the dressing stations, the transport toiling up
with rations, the linesmen of the Signal Company coolly and
efficiently laying lines and repairing wires under shell and machine-
gun fire, the despatch riders driving furiously over ground that no
motor-cycle was ever meant to negotiate, those good men of the
Zion Mule Corps, the Hindus driving their well-cared for, well-trained
and (to them) docile mules, or at rest making chupatties, the smell of
wood-fires—and of manure incinerators—the lines of animals,
neighing or braying, the dumps, the incessant crack of rifles, and,
above all, the flies and the mud.
A new nomenclature had now to be learnt and to be created.
Fusilier Bluff, Geoghegan’s Bluff, the Gridiron, the Birdcages, Border,
Essex, Hampshire, Lancashire, Douglas, Frith, Ashton, Burnley
Streets or Roads soon became familiar signs. The derivation of most
of the names is sufficiently obvious, but the “Eski Line” puzzled the
men until some genius among them propounded the brilliant theory
that “it’s the pet name of one of the Staff-officer’s wives.” As it was
understood that he meant “of the wife of one of the Staff-officers,”
the illuminating suggestion was adopted as satisfactory, and men
were heard to murmur the name Eski ecstatically. Gully Ravine took
the place of Krithia Nullah as the main road to the firing-line. The bed
of the gully in September and October was deep in loose red sand
which made very heavy going for tired troops, but when the mud
came one sighed for the vanished sand. The transport was
frequently thigh-deep in liquid mud in those evil days. On both sides
stretched the horse and mule lines, and stores and dumps were
placed at suitable spots. At the last bend of the gully a wag erected a
cairn and labelled it Third Tower. This was hailed with delight by
parties changing over, as all men who had trained on the Cairo—
Suez Road understood that the end of their journey was close at
hand. A thirty-yard rifle-range was constructed in the ravine for the
training of the reinforcements from the third line, who had had little or
no experience of the service rifle, and the modest beginning of a
Divisional School came into being in one of the small offshoot gullies
where Major Fawcus held his bombing-class.
A “rest” was more of a reality in the new area, and it was
comparatively safe, but in Gallipoli the word rest held a very different
significance from that attached to it at home. It had now become too
closely associated with hard work to be really popular, and the dolce
far niente illusion had been quite dispelled. It meant heavy fatigues
day and night, much digging, the unloading of lighters and the
carrying of heavy loads; but a Beach Fatigue had its compensations,
for it was possible at times to get a bathe if one was not too
fastidious to object to coal-dust and refuse from lighters, nor to the
close companionship of the dead horses and mules that floated
around. These were constantly being towed out to sea, but the
homing instinct, or the current, brought them back again. “W” Beach
even boasted a canteen (run by enterprising Greeks), and men who
had time to spare and were possessed of patience might, after
waiting for hours in a queue, come back with a bit of chocolate and a
tin of fruit—rare and precious luxuries. One day would-be purchasers
found the military police in possession. The Greeks had been
arrested as spies, and were not seen again. In due course the
Division ran its own popular canteen on Gully Beach.
As a rest-bivouac Gully Beach was a great improvement upon all
previous resorts, and its attractions read like a holiday
advertisement. A sea front, excellent bathing in the Mediterranean,
superior accommodation on ledges cut in the cliff face—not unlike a
colony of sea-birds—and those who applied early enough even got
first-class quarters in a hole in the rock. Inside the ravine, where the
bends gave complete protection from shell-fire, caves had been dug
in the cliff sides, one above the other up to forty feet, and even more
in places, above the bed of the gully. By night the illuminations in
these irregular tiers of dug-outs, with the black outline of the cliff-tops
beyond the highest tier of lights standing out distinct against the star-
lit sky, gave the ravine an effect of glamour and romance—almost of
sentimental prettiness—that contrasted strangely with the grim
reality of day. “Doesn’t it remind you of Belle Vue?” was a comment
frequently made by the men, all of whom were familiar with the chief
attraction which Manchester provides for strangers. It was possible
to walk upright along the coast road (or Marine Parade) past the little
colony of the Greek Labour Corps to Lancashire Landing, but this
shore road could not be used for wheeled traffic. The sunsets seen
from the beach, or, better still, lying among the heather on the cliffs
above, were at times gorgeous. Perhaps it was the peace of twilight,
the red sun sinking behind the hills of Imbros or snow-capped
Samothrace, that turned one’s thoughts and conversation
homewards at the evening gatherings, and sharpened the longing for
the good times that must surely be coming. Prime favourite of all
items at the jolly sing-songs arranged by the various units was “Keep
the Home Fires Burning,” and this was generally kept back for the
closing chorus. These entertainments were excellent and they did
good. Much hidden genius was brought to light, and a store of
original and topical humour tapped.
In October a start was made with the Gully Ravine
construction of winter quarters, in the lower end of
the ravine, for the Brigade in reserve, the R.A.M.C., etc. The supply
of sandbags had improved and a minute quantity of corrugated iron
sheets was rationed out to units.
The Divisional Commander naturally took an interest in the
construction of his own quarters, and, among other questions to the
sapper employed thereon, he rashly asked about the composition of
the mortar used. It is here necessary to disclose a trade secret and
state that the mortar depended upon the horse-lines for one of its
components. This secret was revealed without any attempt at
concealment, and thenceforward the sapper worked unhindered,
while the General in the distance wondered what other horrid secrets
had been hidden from him.
A certain corporal of the R.E. who was engaged on D.H.Q., had
achieved an enviable reputation as one who could deal effectively
with both officers and men. To him infantry officers—not merely
second-lieutenants, but even field officers—were as clay in the
hands of the potter, but when confronted with the Divisional Staff he
met his Waterloo. He found that the Staff Officers’ Union demanded
—
(a) That each officer’s hut should be completely rebuilt without
any inconvenience to the officer concerned.
(b) That each officer should be treated better than any other
officer.
(c) That every one’s hut should be begun at once and finished
forthwith.