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Strategic Taxation: Fiscal Capacity and
Accountability in African States
 Strategic Taxation
Fiscal Capacity and Accountability in
African States

LU C Y E . S . M A RT I N
 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
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© Oxford University Press 2023
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You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Martin, Lucy (Lucy Elizabeth Semple), author.
Title: Strategic taxation : fiscal capacity and accountability in African
states / Lucy Martin.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2023] | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2023007299 (print) | LCCN 2023007300 (ebook) | ISBN
9780197672631 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197672648 (paperback) | ISBN
9780197672662 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Taxation—Africa. | Finance, Public—Africa. | Government
accountability—Africa. | Public administration—Africa.
Classification: LCC HJ3021 .M37 2023 (print) | LCC HJ3021 (ebook) | DDC
336.20096—dc23/eng/20230216
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023007299
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023007300
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197672631.001.0001
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197672648.001.0001
Marquis, Canada
 Contents

List of Figures ix
List of Tables x
Acknowledgments xi
1. Introduction 1
1.1 What Makes Taxation Special? 2
1.2 A New Theory of Taxation and Statement Development 4
1.2.1 Empirical Approach 7
1.3 Plan of the Book 8
1.4 Implications 11
2. Understanding Fiscal Capacity 14
2.1 Introduction 14
2.2 The Old Story: Taxation and State-Building in Early Europe 15
2.3 The Evolution of Modern Tax Systems in Europe 18
2.4 Taxation in Africa 20
2.4.1 Pre-colonial Taxation 20
2.4.2 Taxation in Colonial Africa 21
2.4.3 Taxation in Modern African States 23
2.5 Comparing Europe and Africa 25
2.5.1 The Nature of Survival Incentives 26
2.5.2 Available Revenue Streams 27
2.5.3 The Sequencing of Democracy and Development 29
2.6 Conclusion 30
3. How Taxation Increases Accountability Demands 32
3.1 A Theory of Accountability 34
3.2 How Do Citizens Set Thresholds? 37
3.3 How Taxation Affects Willingness To Punish 39
3.3.1 Taxation’s Effect on the Punishment Threshold 42
3.3.2 Taxation and Variation in the Propensity for Punishment 44
3.4 Complicating the Model 46
3.4.1 Tax Modality and Scope Conditions 46
3.4.2 Model Extensions 47
3.5 Alternative Mechanisms and Related Issues 50
3.5.1 Is Loss Aversion Real? 50
3.5.2 Increasing Action without Loss Aversion? 52
3.5.3 Alternative Paths to Accountability 53
3.6 Conclusion 55
Appendix 57
vi contents

4. A Model of Taxation and Accountability 66

4.1 Introduction 66
4.2 Why Tax? 68
4.3 How to Tax? 69
4.4 A Note for Readers 71
4.5 Model without Elections 73
4.5.1 Possible Fiscal Institutions 76
4.5.2 Utility in Each Subgame 78
4.5.3 No Taxation and Coercive Taxation 80
4.5.4 Tax Bargaining 81
4.5.5 Equilibria 84
4.5.6 Discussion 85
4.6 Adding Elections 86
4.6.1 Defining the Citizen’s Voting Decision 88
4.6.2 No Taxation and Coercive Taxation with Elections 89
4.6.3 Coercion vs. No Taxation 90
4.6.4 Bargaining under Elections 93
4.6.5 Equilibria of Model with Elections 97
4.6.6 Understanding the Equilibria 100
4.7 Discussion 101
4.7.1 When Will Governments Support Taxation? 102
4.7.2 Taxation’s Effect on Rent-Seeking 105
4.7.3 Bargaining and Coercion 106
4.8 Extensions 107
4.9 Conclusion 108
5. Evidence that Taxation Increases Accountability Demands 109
5.1 Introduction 109
5.2 An Experimental Approach 110
5.2.1 Experimental Design 111
5.2.2 Implementation 113
5.3 Results: Tax and Grant Games 116
5.3.1 Qualitative Evidence 118
5.4 Testing the Mechanism 120
5.4.1 Treatment Heterogeneity 121
5.4.2 Loss Aversion or Fairness? 123
5.4.3 Measuring Losses and Benefits 125
5.4.4 Ownership and Loss Aversion: Complementary Mechanisms 127
5.5 Replications 128
5.6 The Role of Tax Modality 129
5.7 External Validity and Scope Conditions 130
5.7.1 Subgroup Analysis 130
5.7.2 Making Punishment More Difficult 132
5.7.3 Evidence from Outside the Lab 133
 contents vii

5.8 Observational Data 134

5.9 Conclusion 137
6. Taxation, Democracy, and Accountability 139
6.1 Democracy and Tax Revenues 141
6.1.1 Summary Statistics 142
6.1.2 Initial Regression Analysis 143
6.1.3 Interaction Effects 146
6.1.4 Democratization 147
6.1.5 Robustness 149
6.2 Democracy and the Tax Net 152
6.2.1 Discussion 154
6.3 Taxation, Accountability, and Rent-Seeking 154
6.3.1 Robustness and Additional Work 158
6.4 Conclusion 160
7. Understanding Taxation in Uganda 162
7.1 Introduction 162
7.2 Why Uganda? 163
7.3 The Graduated Tax 166
7.3.1 Low Electoral Accountability 167
7.3.2 The Fate of the Graduated Tax under Political Competition 170
7.4 Market Fees 173
7.5 Taxing Boda-Bodas 179
7.6 The Social Media Tax 183
7.6.1 Analysis 185
7.7 Indirect Taxation in Uganda 186
7.7.1 Analysis 188
7.8 Discussion 190
8. Conclusion 192
8.1 Scope Conditions 194
8.1.1 Types of Taxes and Taxpayers 194
8.1.2 Types of Governments 195
8.2 Directions for Future Research 197
8.2.1 Understanding Citizen Behavior 197
8.2.2 Understanding Policy Outcomes 198

References 199
Index 209
 List of Figures

2.1. Average tax reliance in sub-Saharan Africa, by year. 24

3.1. Economic utility for taxed and non-taxed citizens. 43
3.2. Heterogeneity in taxation’s effect on punishment. 45
4.1. Equilibria of the model without elections. 85
4.2. Equilibria of the model with elections. 98
5.1. Average punishment thresholds in each round. 117
5.2. Tax vs. Grant treatments: distribution of average Citizen punishment
thresholds. 117
5.3. Estimated quantile effects. 122
6.1. Predicted marginal effect of an increase in Polity on taxation, by
logged GDP. 147
 List of Tables

4.1. The key variables in the model. 79

4.2. Subgame strategies in equilibrium. 84
4.3. Subgame outcomes under elections. 93
5.1. Timing of Tax and Grant games. 112
5.2. Tax and grant game results. 118
5.3. Timing for Tax and Grant games with third-party punishment. 124
5.4. Results from 3PP experiment (OLS). 125
5.5. Treatment heterogeneity in Tax and Grant games (OLS). 131
5.6. Effect of taxation on political engagement. 136
6.1. Average tax-to-GDP ratios, 2013–17. 143
6.2. Relationship between democracy and taxation. 145
6.3. Effect of full Polity score interacted with GDP per capita. 146
6.4. Effect of democratization on taxation. 148
6.5. Fraction of each country required to pay each tax, by democracy. 153
6.6. Effect of tax revenue on political corruption (Vdem). 157
 Acknowledgments

In 2011 I spent two months traveling around Northern Uganda, talking to

NGOs and local leaders for a potential dissertation on foreign aid. Over the
course of those interviews, taxation—and its lack—came up again and again.
It became increasingly evident that taxation in modern developing countries,
and especially in sub-Saharan Africa, had been largely neglected by political
scientists, and that taxation was closely linked to governance more broadly.
This book simply would not exist without the generosity of those who spoke
to me that year, both elected village leaders and community organization
workers, or without the dedication and intelligence of my research assistant
that year, Emmanuel Ogonya.
Turning my intuitions about taxation into a fully formed book took over
ten years, several interstate moves, becoming a parent, and surviving a global
pandemic. I could not have finished it without the support of innumerable
friends, colleagues, mentors, research colleagues, and family.
This project began during my time as a graduate student at Yale University.
Kenneth Scheve, Christopher Blattman, Susan Rose-Ackerman, and Susan
Stokes were an absolute powerhouse of a committee. They spent hours
helping me to refine my ideas, develop research designs, and turn a vague
project into a concrete and polished dissertation. They have also continued
to provide support and advice as I turned the dissertation into the book.
I am also grateful to the many other Yale faculty who generously gave me
feedback and support throughout the dissertation process, including Peter
Aronow, Kate Baldwin, Alexandre Debs, Thad Dunning, Greg Huber, Susan
Hyde, and John Roemer.
During graduate school I received significant help and advice from a
network of colleagues and advisors across universities. These include, Eric
Dickson, Guy Grossman, Macartan Humphreys, David Laitin, Dan Posner,
Michael Ross, Cyrus Samii, Georg Vanberg, and Jeremy Weinstein, all of
whom gave invaluable advice at various stages of the project. I am also thank-
ful for the feedback I received on parts of this project at the Leitner Workshop
at Yale, WGAPE, CAPERS, MPSA, and APSA, as well as conferences at
Princeton University, Duke University, and Harvard University.
xii acknowledgments

Parts of this book were completed during a fellowship at Princeton

University’s Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance. This
included hosting a book conference for an earlier version of this manuscript.
Thank you to Helen Milner and Pat Trinity for supporting and organizing
this conference. I am eternally grateful to Guy Grossman, Kimuli Kasara,
Laura Paler, and Michael Ross for carefully reading and considering my
manuscript, and for giving me the insight and advice needed to make it
stronger and more coherent.
This book was completed at UNC–Chapel Hill, which is perhaps the best
place in the country to be an assistant professor. Thank you to my wonderful
colleagues for their support and advice, especially my current and former
department chairs, Mark Crescenzi and Evelyne Huber.
This book draws extensively on data collected in Uganda. This data
collection was possible due to the large team of enumerators and research
assistants at Innovations for Poverty Action in Uganda, as well as the
fantastic support staff. Especial thanks to Esther Aganyira, Dean Buruhan,
Robert Kalule, Vianney Mbonigaba, Joe Ndumia, Ezra Rwakazooba, and
Gyagenda Solomon, without whose hard work and unlimited patience this
project would not have been possible. Other data were collected in collab-
oration with Ignosi Research in Uganda. Thank you to Ivan Senkubuge,
Ezra Rwakazooba, Vivienne Tibaberwa, and Denis Baliddawa for their work
on this project, along with a large team of enumerators, translators, and
support staff.
I am also grateful to my superb UNC research assistants, who worked on
multiple iterations of data analysis and literature reviews. Thanks to Tyler
Ditmore, Simon Hoellerbauer, Eric Parajon, Ayelen Vanegas, and Mitchell
Watkins.
Parts of this book draw on co-authored work. Special thanks to Adam
Dynes, and to Brandon de la Cuesta, Helen Milner, and Daniel Nielson for
allowing me to incorporate our joint work into this book. It has been a true
pleasure working with you all.
Data collection for this book was funded in part by the Leitner Program
at Yale University, the Yale Lindsay Fellowship, the MacMillan Center at
Yale, Princeton University, and a Vanguard Charitable Trust. Thank you for
your support.
At Oxford University Press, I am grateful to my editor, David McBride,
my project editor, Sarah Ebel, and my production manager, Thomas Deva.
Two anonymous reviewers provided incredibly thoughtful, constructive,
 acknowledgments xiii

and detailed feedback that improved the book’s contribution, clarity, and
statistical rigor.
I became a political scientist in large part due to the outstanding teaching
and mentorship I received as an undergraduate at Kenyon College. Fred
Baumann, Pamela Camerra-Rowe, John Elliot, Laurie Finke, Joe Klesner,
Marla Kohlman, David Rowe, and Steve Van Holde helped me to develop
a love of rigorous, thoughtful research. Special thanks are due to Carol
Schumacher, for teaching me how to write proofs.
Finally, I would like to thank my family. My parents for creating a family
environment in which education was valued above all other pursuits; for
loving and raising me. My sister, Violet Martin, for pushing me as siblings are
wont to do. To my husband, Cameron Ballard-Rosa, who has been not only
a loving and equal partner for over 15 years, but has also helped me to think
through knotty problems and develop my ideas. And to my son, Michael, for
bringing unmeasurable joy into my life.
 1
Introduction

By almost any metric, Africa is booming. Average GDP per capita, which
was largely stagnant in the 1980s and 1990s, has grown from $2,100 in 2000
to over $4,000 today.1 In 2000, only 15 African countries had reached lower-
or upper-middle income status; by 2019 this had increased to 39. While
the COVID-19 crisis has reduced some of these gains, there are hopes for
a rebound. Politically, too, there has been progress. Eleven countries have
instituted multi-party elections since 2000, and elections have become more
free and fair in many countries. Citizens have successfully fought election-
fixing, as happened in Malawi, or forced long-term autocrats out of office, as
in Burkina Faso.
Yet, in some areas of state development African countries show little
improvement. In contrast to the progress cited above, some countries, like
Uganda, have seen an increase in repression and more authoritarian rule.
More generally, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index
shows no improvement for African countries, on average, between 2000 and
2021. State bureaucracies are weak and understaffed. Crucially, government
revenues are lagging. The fraction of GDP African governments collect
in taxes has increased only slightly in 40 years. It hovered around 11%
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, then saw slow and intermittent progress
to 14% or 15% in recent years (ICTD/UNU-WIDER 2020).2
Without more taxation, it will be difficult for African countries to con-
tinue to grow. Improving health and education systems will be needed to
support a healthy, educated workforce. There is a critical need for more
investment, too, in infrastructure like roads, electricity, and internet, to
support growing economies. Foreign aid is simply not sufficient to fill the
financing gap. Rising debt burdens in the wake of COVID-19 make domestic
revenues even more important for avoiding defaults like the recent one
in Ghana. Ultimately, sustainable development will require more domestic
revenue from taxation.

1 Numbers are taken from the World Bank (2020), PPP measure. In contrast, average GDP per
capita increased by only US$90 between 1980 and 2000.
2 Numbers from recent years are hard to interpret due to the significant economic shock of the
COVID-19 pandemic.

Strategic Taxation: Fiscal Capacity and Accountability in African States. Lucy E. S. Martin.
Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197672648.003.0001
2 introduction

Higher fiscal capacity could potentially help solve many African countries’
governance problems, as well. European state development, including the
development of representative institutions, was driven in part by rulers’
revenue demands (Tilly 1992). The need to raise taxes forced monarchs
to bargain with wealthy elites, granting policy concessions or political
representation in return for paying taxes (North and Weingast 1989;
Bates and Lien 1985). Revenue demands also led to the development of
a professional bureaucracy, with positive benefits for overall levels of state
capacity and professionalization (Moore 2004). This suggests that, if African
governments expanded taxation, it could have positive spillovers for other
areas of state development.
So, why does fiscal capacity remain low in so many African countries?
Standard theories of taxation tend to view governments as revenue-
maximizing, so as countries become richer, why are governments not taking
more of this new wealth for their budgets? In this book, I argue that existing
theories of state development—especially those based on the European
experience—are insufficient to explain the dynamics of taxation and fiscal
capacity in modern developing states. In early modern Europe, the exigen-
cies of war and national defense created a pressing need for revenue, and
states that survived were those that could develop steady sources of revenue
and strong bureaucracies. Taxes, and strong states, developed because the
alternative was oblivion. State development looks very different today, espe-
cially in the post-colonial states of sub-Saharan Africa. This book develops a
new theory to explain why modern developing countries may systematically
under-invest in fiscal capacity, and what will be needed to change this.

1.1 What Makes Taxation Special?

Governments can raise revenue from a number of sources. These are typi-
cally divided into “unearned” revenues—like natural resources and foreign
aid—and “earned” resources, namely taxation. Borrowing provides a third
route. This book follows a long line of research arguing that taxation plays a
special, outsized role in the functioning of the state. As Schumpeter famously
wrote (quoting Rudolf Goldscheid), “the budget is the skeleton of the state,
stripped of all misleading ideologies” (Schumpeter 1991).
Relative to other revenues sources, taxation differs along two dimensions
that grant it its special status. First, collecting taxes typically requires more
 1.1 what makes taxation special? 3

state capacity than collecting other types of revenue. Receiving foreign aid
requires almost no state capacity—in fact, it is countries with low capacity
who typically receive the most aid money. Donors typically require some
kinds of systems in place to monitor and audit how funds are spent, but
these require little information about actual citizens. Natural resource rents
may require slightly more capacity in order to monitor extraction, but
is still possible when state capacity is low. Even rebel groups are able to
extract significant resource rents (Sánchez De La Sierra 2020). In contrast,
governments need detailed information on citizens, and their sources of
income, in order to implement many forms of taxation. Once governments
have this information, it can have positive effects on other areas of the
bureaucracy, as detailed economic and demographic data can be used to
plan public services or professionalize other areas of the bureaucracy (Moore
2004; Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008).
Second, taxation differs in the extent to which it is earned. While aid
and resource rents are often considered “windfalls,” mass taxation creates a
sustained point of contact between citizens and their governments. As I show
in this book, this has significant implications for the demands these citizens
will place on their leaders. Taxed citizens will require more public goods and
services, and potentially even more democratic forms of government, and
this has the potential to drastically reshape the state.
Combined, these differences suggest that taxation should advance state
development, while non-earned revenues like aid and oil will have much
smaller or even negative effects—even when aid is expressly directed towards
such development. A vast political economy literature backs this up. Work
on the resource curse suggests that access to oil and other natural resources
is associated with poor governance (Ross 1999, 2001; Mehlum, Moene, and
Torvik 2006; Ross 2012; Sandbu 2012). Much of the research on foreign
aid suggests that it too may lead to higher corruption or hurt the quality
of democracy (Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Morrison 2009, 2015; Djankov
et al. 2008). However, this view is not universal: other scholars have argued
that, especially in the post-Cold War period, aid is not subject to the resource
curse (Bermeo 2015; Dunning 2005).
In contrast, taxation is associated with higher levels of democracy (Ross
2004) and lower corruption (Baskaran and Bigsten 2013). Prichard (2015)
finds similar patterns for a broader set of countries using updated data.
Timmons (2005) finds links between the tax base and who benefits from
public policy. At the subnational level, local governments that rely on own
4 introduction

revenues as opposed to central transfers are have lower corruption and

provide more public goods (Gadenne 2017; Brollo et al. 2013; Fisman and
Gatti 2002).
Thus, understanding taxation is critical to understanding state devel-
opment. And yet we still lack a strong understanding of why so many
developing countries are reluctant to increase taxation despite a desperate
need for revenue. Saying simply that many African countries’ citizens are
too poor to pay taxes doesn’t hold up. While formal levels of poverty do
remain high in many African states, it does not follow that there is no tax
base. When one talks (as I have done in both Uganda and Malawi) with small
business owners and average citizens, many express a strong willingness to
pay more in taxes, provided that the government spends the money wisely.
Even among poorer countries, there is significant variation in the ability
and willingness of governments to tax citizens. Poverty is not a compelling
explanation. Similarly, arguments that the post-colonial borders of African
states, combined with a lack of interstate war, makes low state capacity
forordained (Herbst 2000) are likewise insufficient. As I discuss more in
subsequent chapters, countries can face existential threats and a strong need
for taxation even when borders are fixed. Patterns of taxation also do not
reflect the type of geography. Even states with similar geographies have a
wide range of tax extraction.

1.2 A New Theory of Taxation and Statement Development

How, then, should we think about taxation and state development in modern
developing countries? To answer this question, I separate this book’s theory
into two parts. First, I argue that taxation fundamentally changes citizen-
state relations, leading citizens to make more demands on their government.
Second, I examine how this affects the willingness of governments to tax.
I show that in some cases the accountability effects of taxation result in a
paradox: if taxation increases accountability, governments will avoid taxing
citizens in order to minimize the citizen pressures they face.
The first part of the theory examines how the act of paying taxes affects
citizens’ ability and willingness to hold leaders accountable by punishing
poor performance. I argue that taxation, by removing earned income from
citizens, induces a sense of loss in taxpayers. Eager to recover the lost income,
citizens care more about government spending and increase the demands
1.2 a new theory of taxation and statement development 5

they place on leaders. This makes them more upset when demands are not
met, and therefore more likely to punish leaders through voting, protests,
and other forms of political action. Extensions to the theory show that this
logic holds even when citizens face barriers to holding officials accountable,
or when citizens and governments interact over many periods. The key
implication of the theory is that, when citizens are taxed, they will be more
willing to punish wrongdoing by leaders. This wrongdoing could take the
form of poor public services, or high levels of rent-seeking. Fundamentally,
taxation increases the demands citizens make of their leaders.
The second part of the theory takes as given that taxation increases cit-
izens’ demands, and examines how this will affect when and how gov-
ernments tax citizens. As a starting point, I assume that governments are
rent maximizing. This is subtly different than the standard assumption that
governments are revenue maximizing (Levi 1989). The key difference is
that a rent-maximizing government wishes to extract as much revenue as
possible only to the extent that it allows them to increase spending for their
own priorities and consumption. Rulers may, in this formulation, not wish
to increase revenue if it does not either increase their short-term rents or
prolong their tenure in office (thus securing long-term access to rents). This
can occur if leaders do not get much (or any!) direct utility from revenues
they must spend on citizens’ priorities, instead having their own preferences.
These could be spending on private consumption through embezzlement,
or spending in ways that maintain their political support in the medium- or
long-term.
While the rent-seeking assumption may seem intuitive for autocrats, it is
not a standard assumption for democratic governments, which are typically
assumed to represent citizens’ preferences (see e.g. (Acemoglu and Robinson
2006)). However, many new democracies simply do not fit this approach. In
a number of cases, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, formal transitions to
multi-party elections have not resulted in changes to the executive. President
Museveni of Uganda has survived the onset of multi-party politics, as has
Paul Biya in Cameroon and executives in a number of other countries.
Even when there has been regime change and a theoretical shift to more
democracy, the new rulers are often former members of the ruling party,
and it is not clear that they have preferences that are actually more in line
with citizens than the incumbents they defeated or ousted. For example, after
Robert Mugabe was ousted in a coup, a former member of his ruling coali-
tion became president of Zimbabwe. In Burkina Faso, the main opposition
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fear lest the child should slip away from life through sheer
exhaustion. She needed the utmost care; and now it was
that Miss Burton's capacity as a nurse was fully tested. But
for her constant watching and unwearying devotion, Beryl's
illness might have ended otherwise than it did. But her
governess was ever at hand to administer medicine or
nourishment just when they were needed, ready, too, with
wise and loving words to soothe the nervous depression
which troubled the child, to whom weakness and weariness
were such strange experiences.

"Do you think I am really getting better, Miss Burton?" Beryl

asked one day. "I feel just as weak as ever. You don't think I
shall die, do you? I hope it's not wicked of me, but I don't
want to die. I would so much rather get well and live with
papa."

Mr. Hollys, who was sitting at the further side of the bed,
half-hidden by the curtain, leaned forward and looked
anxiously at his child as she said this, but Miss Burton
replied cheerfully, "It is not wicked, dear; but only right that
you should wish to get well. You are stronger, although you
may not feel it yet. You have a better pulse, and there is a
tinge of colour stealing back into your cheeks. Yes, you are
getting on."

"I am so glad," said Beryl with a smile. "I have been trying
to think about the kingdom; but my head is so stupid that I
cannot remember anything properly. I can't even say that
text, 'Suffer little children to come unto Me.'"

"'Suffer little children to come unto Me, and forbid them

not; for of such is the kingdom of God,'" said Hattie Burton.
"Don't be surprised that you forget things, dear; it is always
so after such an illness as yours, and you will soon get the
better of it, and find everything coming back to you."

"'Of such is the kingdom of God,'" repeated Beryl. "That

does not mean that the kingdom is for children only, does it,
Miss Burton?"

"No, dear; that would be a sad thing for most of us," she
replied with a smile; "it means that it is a kingdom of
childlike, true, and loving spirits, and it is only by becoming
like a little child that any one can enter therein."

"Miss Burton," said Beryl softly, forgetful of her father's

presence, "I wish papa were in the kingdom. Do you think
he ever will be?"

There was a sudden uneasy movement behind the curtain.

Miss Burton coloured, and felt herself painfully embarrassed

by the child's question; but Beryl was looking at her
wonderingly, so she replied in a low voice, "I hope so, dear."

Mr. Hollys rose hastily, and quitted the room without a

word.

Beryl turned in astonishment to Miss Burton.

"Papa here! I did not know it. I wish I had not spoken so.
Will he be angry with me, do you think?"
"I do not think so, dear; no, I am sure he cannot be angry
with you," replied her governess.

There was indeed no anger in Mr. Holly's mind as he went

away. Beryl's words had pricked himself sharply; but he
could not feel cross with the sweet young daughter whose
life was so precious to him.

He went downstairs to the library, and began to pace to and

fro the room in painful thought. Yes, the child was right—he
had no place in the kingdom; his life lay outside it, and till
lately he had preferred that it should be thus. And yet he
was not an unbeliever; he had not fallen under the blight of
scepticism; he professed to believe the truths of
Christianity, and his intellect did hold them true. He could
admire the influence of religious faith in the lives of others.
The memory of his young wife's beautiful life of faith and
love was still fragrant in his mind. He had taken pains to
secure for Beryl religious training; for her sake, he had
rejoiced in the grace and consistency of Miss Burton's
character, and he had heartily approved of the good works
in which she had interested the children.

Yet all the while he had had no heart religion; he had been
satisfied to worship God coldly and formally, and had felt no
desire to draw near to Him as His Father, and claim the
divine sonship which was his inheritance in Christ.

But now, it was different. Of late, the depths of his spirit

had been stirred by sorrow and disappointment, followed
swiftly by the sudden, appalling dread of losing the child of
his love. When in the anguish of suspense, he had tried to
ask God to spare Beryl's life, he had found it impossible to
pray. What right had he to expect that he would be heard,
when he had never cared to pray before, but had fancied
himself sufficient to meet unaided all that life might bring
forth?

As he walked up and down the library, Guy Hollys owned to

himself that he would gladly share his child's simple faith,
and gain an entrance into that kingdom of which his child
loved to think. But could he enter there? Was it for such as
he, this kingdom of God?

As he thought thus, his eyes fell on a book high up on one

of the bookshelves. It was his wife's Bible, which he kept
sacredly for her sake, but which he seldom opened. Now,
however, he lifted it down, wiped the dust from its gilt
edges, and began to turn over the leaves.

As he did so, he looked eagerly for words concerning the

kingdom of God. Verses on this subject were easily found
when he began to search for them.

"The kingdom of God is not in word, but in

power."

"Know ye not that the unrighteous shall not

inherit the kingdom of God?"

"The kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but

righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy
Ghost."

"The kingdom of God cometh not with

observation; neither shall they say, 'Lo here!' or,
'Lo there!' for behold! the kingdom of God is
within you.'"

"Jesus answered, 'My kingdom is not of this

 world: if My kingdom were of this world, then
would My servants fight, that I should not be
delivered to the Jews: but now is My kingdom
not from hence.' Pilate therefore said unto Him,
'Art Thou a king then?' Jesus answered, 'Thou
sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born,
and for this cause came I into the world, that I
should bear witness to the truth. Every one that
is of the truth heareth My voice.'"

"'Verily I say unto you, except ye be converted,

and become as little children, ye shall not enter
into the kingdom of heaven.'"

The meaning of these passages was dark to Guy Hollys as

he read them, yet he caught some glimpses of the grandeur
and beauty of the spiritual life they set forth. The last verse
he pondered long. How could he, Guy Hollys, become as a
little child? That would indeed be a conversion. He knew
that he was in spirit far from the kingdom of God. All his
past life rose before him, visible now in its true light, his
love of ease and pleasure, his pride and worldly ambition,
his utter selfishness of heart and barrenness of life. Oh, to
begin a higher, nobler life! But how, how?

A flash of light came from the Word. The leaves had opened
at the first chapter of Matthew, and there were the words:
"'Thou shalt call His name Jesus, for He shall save His
people from their sins.'"

Here was his need met, here was a Saviour who could
deliver him from the power of his sins. And as Guy Hollys
bowed his head on his hands in unwonted humility, and
breathed the most earnest prayer he had ever offered, he
was conscious of the presence of One mighty to save, and
felt that a Hand was stretched out to him, the hand of the
strong Son of God, ready to uphold him in the new life he
desired to begin. With the faith of a little child, he yielded
himself utterly to the Saviour, and the angels of God
rejoiced because another son was born into the kingdom.

CHAPTER XXX
A GRAND SURPRISE FOR BERYL

SIX weeks of the New Year had come and gone, and already
there were tokens of the coming of spring. Sickness and
sadness no longer reigned at Egloshayle House. Beryl's fine
constitution had asserted itself and shaken off all ill effects
of the fever which had brought her so low. She had added
some inches to her height during the weeks that she lay in
bed, and now looked inelegantly gaunt and thin, but
declared herself quite well, except when Miss Burton talked
of returning to London, at which suggestion Beryl would
change her tone, and say that she really was not strong
enough yet to do without Miss Burton's care.

So Hettie Burton stayed on from week to week at

Egloshayle, and found it impossible to fix a day for her
departure in opposition to the warm entreaties which the
mere mention of her going evoked. Mr. Hollys was as urgent
for her remaining longer as his daughter, and Miss Hollys,
whose nerves had been terribly shaken by recent events,
put in a piteous appeal to the same effect.
One bright afternoon, when the air was so mild and the sun
so warm that it seemed as if winter had already yielded the
sceptre to smiling spring, Beryl, having just returned from a
walk, was resting, with her long limbs comfortably curled
up, on the sofa in the drawing-room. She was often glad to
rest thus, for, not having yet regained full strength, she
soon grew weary—a trying experience to her, who in former
days had scarcely known what fatigue meant.

Beryl had found a letter awaiting her from Coral, which she
was now eagerly reading. Coral wrote in good spirits. Her
uncle had taken a beautiful house a few miles out of
Melbourne. There was a large garden with lovely flowers
and delicious fruit, very different from anything to be seen
at Egloshayle. Her uncle had given her a pretty bay pony,
and she often rode for many hours. He had also given her a
fine dog, a monkey, one of the cleverest of his tribe, and a
green parrot, which she had already taught to call her
"Coral," and was now trying to persuade to say "Beryl." Her
uncle had engaged a governess for her, who was very kind,
but, of course, not so nice as Miss Burton.

It was clear that Coral was well pleased with her new life,
and she declared that she should be perfectly happy, if only
she had Beryl with her.

Beryl laid down the letter at last with a sigh. "Coral is quite
gone from me," was her thought. "I shall never see her
again. Well, she is happy enough without me. She does not
really want me now she has that pony, and dog, and
monkey, and parrot."

And, for a few moments, Beryl actually felt injured because

Coral appeared to be enjoying her new life so much. But
she soon was ashamed of the feeling.
"What a horrid, mean thing I am!" she said to herself. "To
think that I should be cross because Coral is happy. As if
her being unhappy could make my life any happier! I ought
to be glad, and I am glad."

But the dreary feeling which had crept over Beryl could not
at once be shaken off. The remarkable mildness of the day
was making her feel very languid, and with languor came
sadness.

"What shall I do when Miss Burton goes away?" she began

to think. "I shall be miserable by myself. I suppose papa will
send me to school when I am strong enough, and that will
be horrid, I know. Oh dear! Oh dear!"

At this moment, a tap at the window attracted her

attention. She started up, and saw her father and Miss
Burton standing outside. Miss Burton had been gathering
some snowdrops and violets, and held them up smilingly to
Beryl's view. Then she and Mr. Hollys turned towards the
hall door, and in a few moments appeared in the drawing-
room.

They came forward with smiling, radiant faces to the sofa

on which Beryl was resting. But if there was any special
significance in their looks, Beryl was not in a mood to
observe it. She sighed heavily as Miss Burton came to her
side.

"I have brought some flowers to cheer you," said Miss

Burton brightly. "You looked very disconsolate when I
peered at you through the window. Is anything the matter?"

"Oh no," said Beryl, "only I'm tired and in the dumps. How
lovely these snowdrops are! And oh, there are some violets
too! Where did you find them?"
"At the bottom of the garden; I smelt them before I could
see them," said Miss Burton. "So you have had a letter from
Coral; how is she?"

"Oh, very well, and having such nice times," said Beryl.
"Her uncle has given her a pony, a dog, a monkey, and a
parrot. It's good to be Coral now."

"What a menagerie!" said Mr. Hollys, sitting down at the end

of the sofa. "I hope you won't want me to get you a monkey
or a parrot, for I dislike both of the creatures, and would
rather not introduce them into the house."

"What would be the good of my having them? I could not

take them to school with me, I suppose?" said Beryl
drearily. "Oh dear, I wish Miss Burton would stay with me
and teach me again."

"Whether she will take the trouble to teach you or not I

cannot say," remarked Mr. Hollys, with peculiar meaning in
his tones; "but, Beryl, I have good news for you. Miss
Burton has promised to stay with us."

"Has she? Oh, I am glad! How good of you!" cried Beryl

joyously, as she turned to look at her governess.

Hettie bent over the sofa, put her arms round Beryl and
kissed her more than once. Perhaps she was glad thus to
hide the blushes that had risen in her cheeks.

"How long will you stay?" said Beryl. "Till Easter."

"Longer than that," returned her father with a smile; "she is

going away for a little while, and then she is coming to stay
with us always."
"Always!" repeated Beryl, in a tone of wonder. "Do you
really mean always? How will your mother like that, Miss
Burton?"

Covered with confusion, Hettie looked appealingly at Mr.

Hollys. "You must tell her all; she will not be so pleased
then, I fear," she said.

Beryl looked from one to the other in utter bewilderment.

"Beryl," said her father, "you told me once that you could
never be happy with a stepmother; but now, dear, you will
have to make the experiment. I am going to marry again."

"Papa!" exclaimed Beryl, looking half frightened, "what do

you mean?"

"Just this, darling—that Hettie Burton has made me very

happy by promising to become my wife, so you see she will
live with us always, and be a mother to you. You will be
glad of that, will you not, Beryl?"

"Papa, is that it?" cried Beryl in excited tones. "Are you

going to marry Miss Burton? I am surprised; I never
dreamed of such a thing. Why, that is quite different. If I
had thought Miss Burton would be my stepmother, I should
not have said that I could not be happy with one. Oh, I am
so glad, so very glad!"

And she threw her arms round Hettie Burton's neck, and
kissed her again and again in an ecstasy of delight.

Surely no stepmother ever had a warmer welcome or a

better prospect of happiness!
 THE END

Printed by MORRISON & GIBB LIMITED, Edinburgh

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