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MIDDLE EAST TODAY

Civilization and the

Making of the State in
Lebanon and Syria

Andrew Delatolla
 Middle East Today

Series Editors
Fawaz A. Gerges
Department of International Relations
London School of Economics
London, UK

Nader Hashemi
Josef Korbel School of International Studies
Center for Middle East Studies
University of Denver
Denver, CO, USA
The Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the
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include Iran and Turkey as emerging pre-eminent powers in the region,
the former an ‘Islamic Republic’ and the latter an emerging democracy
currently governed by a party with Islamic roots; the Gulf monarchies,
their petrol economies and regional ambitions; potential problems of
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 Andrew Delatolla

Civilization
and the Making
of the State
in Lebanon and Syria
Andrew Delatolla
Lecturer in Middle Eastern Studies
School of Languages, Cultures, and Societies
University of Leeds
Leeds, UK

Middle East Today

ISBN 978-3-030-57689-9 ISBN 978-3-030-57690-5 (eBook)
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 Acknowledgements

This book developed from a specific interest in the politics of Lebanon and
Syria within a global context, and is the result of continuous discussion
and debate with friends and colleagues on issues of statehood, imperi-
alism, colonialism, Orientalism, and race. The extensive group of remark-
able friends and colleagues that have thoughtfully engaged with me in
these discussions include, but are by no means limited to Katerina Dala-
coura, Fawaz Gerges, George Lawson, for their constant mentorship,
as well as Daniel Neep, Charles Tripp, Christine Cheng, Joanne Yao,
Hadi Makarem, Omar al-Ghazzi, Sophie Haspeslagh, Dima Krayem, Till
Spanke, Martin Hearson, Julia Himmrich, Kiran Phull, Annissa Haddadi,
Simone Datzberger, Margaret Ainley, Ida Danewid, Evelyn Pauls, Nicola
Degli Esposti, Shourideh Molavi, Maria Fotou, Terri Ginsberg, Iman
Hamam, Rabab el-Mahdi, and Marco Pinfari for having such great influ-
ence on my scholarship. I am indebted to these scholars, who have directly
and indirectly influenced the direction of the book and arguments, having
been generous in providing me with their insights and critiques. I am also
grateful to have presented various parts of this book at conferences and
workshops, having received terrific feedback at ISA, BISA, BRISMES, and
Millennium.
The project would not have been possible without the institutional
and financial support of the Middle East Centre and Department of
International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political
Science, the Department of Political Science at the American University in

v
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Cairo, the RJ Vincent Memorial Scholarship, and the Middle East Centre
Emirates Ph.D. Scholarship.
The arguments made throughout this book were inspired by extensive
engagement with the Lebanese National Archives, the French Diplomatic
Archives, the French National Archives, the British National Archives, the
UK Parliamentary Archives, and the archives at l’Université Saint-Joseph
in Beirut. Without the generosity and patience of the staff at the archives,
this book would not have been possible.
In addition to the academic and professional support that I have
received over the years, making this endeavour a reality, none of it
would have been possible without the support of friends and family.
Lauren Sexton, Hayat Chedid, Karim Chedid, my parents Darlene and
George Delatolla, my sisters Andrea and Victoria, my brother-in-law,
Harry Williams, my grandparents Wadia and Romeo Shoiry and Catherine
and John Delatolla, for all the love, encouragement, and instilling in me
the importance of history and politics.
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Contemporary State-Building and Development: The
(Re)production of a Civilizational Standard 4
Civilization and the State: Tying Development
and State-Building to Imperialism and Colonialism 15
The Argument: The Modern State as a Standard
of Civilization 19
Chapter Breakdown 22
Works Cited 26

2 The Standards of Civilization and the Production

of Statehood 33
Theories and Histories of State Formation in the Middle East 34
European State Formation: Historicizing the Conceptual
Foundations Modern Statehood 41
Post-colonial Statehood: The Result of a Standard
of Civilization 49
The Civilizing Project and European Colonialism
in the Middle East 56
Conclusion 59
Works Cited 61

vii
viii CONTENTS

3 Equality as a Standard of Civilization: The Opposition

Towards Ottoman Tolerance 69
Equality and Tolerance: Foundations of Governance
in Europe and the Ottoman Empire 71
Equality as a Standard of Civilization 77
The Tanzimat Reforms: The Failure of Equality 82
Conclusion 89
Works Cited 91

4 Race, Religion, and Civilization in Programs

of Governance and Modernization 95
Historic Intersections of Civilization, Race, and Religion 96
The Hatt-ı Şerif: Eradicating Inferior Government 106
Mount Lebanon: Racializing Religion 110
Continuing Civilizational Reform: The Hatt-I
Humayun 1856 115
Racialized Religion and National Consciousness 119
Conclusion 121
Works Cited 124

5 Territory, Identity, and Governance: Creating Order

from Disorder 129
Creating Civilized Boundaries: Territory, Identity,
and Governance 131
Split Authority in Mount Lebanon: Territorialization
and the Division of Greater Syria 136
The Land Code of 1858 144
Settling the Desert 148
Conclusion 151
Works Cited 153

6 Violent Resistance: Interactions with Modernity

and European Interference 155
Violence as Resistance: European Interference and Revolt 156
European Modernization, Modernity, and the Emergence
of Violent Resistance 161
The Aleppo Uprising, 1850 162
The Damascus Massacre, 1860 165
 CONTENTS ix

The Mandate System and Faisal’s Revolt 172

French Colonial Pacification: The Druze Revolt 1925 178
Conclusion 181
Works Cited 182

7 Nationalism as Resistance: Acquiescing to European

Identifiers 185
Nationalism, Resistance, and Response 187
The Young Ottomans 188
The Young Turks, Arab, and Syrian Nationalists 195
Conclusion 210
Works Cited 211

8 Preventing Autonomy: European Interests

and the Application of a Standard of Civilization 215
European Interests in the Ottoman Empire at the Beginning
of the Reform Period 217
Applying the Standard of Civilization: Methods to Attain
Political Interests 223
The Tanzimat: Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) and the Hatt-ı
Hümayun (1856) 223
The French Mandate and Lebanon and Syria 230
French Governance and Political Representation
in Lebanon and Syria 235
Conclusion 242
Works Cited 244

9 Conclusion: Taking Histories of Post-colonial

Statehood Seriously 247
The Standard of Civilization and the Production of the State
in Lebanon and Syria 248
(Re)Thinking Statehood 253
The Standard Lives On 256

Bibliography 257

Index 279
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The modern state in international relations and political science is often

described by a set of generalizable and, at times, abstract criteria. This
is inclusive of qualifications such as territory, government, population,
and international and domestic recognition. The conceptualization of the
state in an abstract manner, however, produces a significant problem for
social scientific research, specifically when attempting to engage in analysis
of modern statehood in the non-West. While some social scientists may
argue that it is necessary to simplify or abstract states as units of study to
develop generalizable theories from which we are better able to under-
stand domestic and global politics, the practice of simplification in the
social sciences can distort reality. Here, simplification and abstraction can
make important differences invisible while highlighting conclusions that
are problematic.1

1 This is most evident in realism, neorealism, liberalism, and, at times, in feminist and
post-colonial literature. Realism, neorealism, and liberalism treat states as units with similar
or the same goals and interests, with the same functions, or functioning in relation to
an accepted set of universal norms (Morgenthau 2005; Waltz 1979; van de Haar 2009;
Doyle 1996). Feminist and post-colonial scholarship, can, treat sources of oppression
and repression as singular objects (Hooper 2001), or constructs the ‘third world’ or
‘developing world’ as a singular actor (Mohanty 1984; Said 1978).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license 1

to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
A. Delatolla, Civilization and the Making of the State
in Lebanon and Syria, Middle East Today,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57690-5_1
2 A. DELATOLLA

Abstraction is a particular problem that occurs in political science and

international relations with regard to the modern state. By engaging
in abstraction, differences between states are often dismissed or simpli-
fied, reduced to regime type, institutions, and culture. The dismissive
or reductive approach towards difference follows from arguments that
the structure of the international state system and the characteristics of
statehood create enough similarity to warrant the development of gener-
alizable theories regarding state interests, relations, and organization.
Based on this notion, political science, international relations, and devel-
opment studies produce the assumption, often implicitly, that states exist
on a linear scale, from strong to weak and failing; hegemonic to passive
and submissive (Morgenthau 2005; Waltz 1979; Bellamy 2008; Clapham
1998; Grant 1999).
Although the state can be viewed as a political system, one that is
now present in every society, Shmuel Eisenstadt argued that ‘different
types of political systems develop and function under specific social condi-
tions, and the continuity of any political system is also related to such
specific conditions’ (1993, p. 3). As such, abstracting and simplifying the
state becomes problematic. While the modern state can be, justifiably,
seen as a global system of social, political, and economic organization,
following from Eisenstadt, it cannot be generalized due to variation in
the historical social and political context from which it emerged. Herein,
a fundamental problem becomes evident: variations in historical social and
political contexts produce difference, yet an abstracted concept of modern
statehood has become a benchmark, or a standard, to be attained.
Investigating the application of this abstracted conceptualization of
modern statehood, this book draws attention to the emergence of the
post-colonial state in Lebanon and Syria and argues that the modern state
in Lebanon and Syria was the result of a standard of civilization. Here, the
standard of civilization is discussed as a political tool of the nineteenth
century to distinguish ‘civilized’ from ‘barbarian’ societies, ‘to gate-keep
membership of international society, and to justify colonialism’ (Buzan
2014, p. 576; Linklater 2016a). Although it can be argued that state-
hood has existed throughout history, not located in a single temporality
or geography, the concept and conceptual framing of the modern state
did not (de Carvalho et al. 2011).
The state, as a concept that frames the legal-political organization
of a society or a country through government and demarcated bound-
aries, began to take form in the fourteenth century, developing from the
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

thirteenth-century Old French ‘estat ’ or ‘estate’ and Latin word ‘status ’.

‘Estat ’ and ‘status ’ were used to describe the position, condition, status,
order, or arrangement of an entity. In a figurative sense, these terms
referred to public order or community organization, sometimes within
a legal context. In the fourteenth century, the term ‘state’ was used in
relation to status rei plublicae or the status or condition or the republic
(Lazzeri 1995). It is this foundation from which the knowledges and
practices of the modern state began to emerge and later, in the late eigh-
teenth century, was deployed as a standard of civilization. By making this
argument, it is possible to consider how the modern state, as a standard
of civilization, was embedded in histories of nineteenth-century global
transformations, altering the social, political, and economic conditions
and contexts of society in Lebanon and Syria. The book focuses empir-
ically on rational state-building, the civilizing project, in Lebanon and
Syria, tracing the developments and immediate consequences of rational
state-building into independence.
The following section of this chapter considers some of the arguments
and discussions concerning contemporary state-building and develop-
ment. It engages in these discussions to make an argument about histor-
ically constituted and embedded knowledges and practices of modern
statehood. Here, the arguments produced in the contemporary scholar-
ship highlight particular aspects of modern statehood as a standard of
civilization which can then be historicized. This includes how the state
or polity is abstracted from its social and political context and measured
against a set of criteria produced in relation to an ideal type. Addition-
ally, what becomes apparent in making this connection is the continuity
of the modern state as a standard of civilization in state-building and
development, which reproduces a practical and intellectual coloniality
regarding statehood. From this engagement, it is possible to historicize
these contemporary deliberations to the global transformations of the
nineteenth century. This follows from Aníbal Quijano, who argued that

the intellectual conceptualization of the process of modernity produced

a perspective of knowledge and a mode of producing knowledge […] it
is […] a specific rationality or perspective of knowledge that was made
globally hegemonic, colonizing and overcoming other previous or different
conceptual formations and their respective concrete knowledges. (Quijano
2000, pp. 549–550)
4 A. DELATOLLA

Emergent from intertwined processes related to colonialism and capi-

talism, the coloniality of knowledge/power, or Eurocentrism, functions
by establishing ‘binary, hierarchical relations between categories of object
and reflects a particular secular, instrumental, and technocratic rational-
ity’ (Tucker 2018, p. 219). Secularity, instrumentality, and rationality
are, as Quijano argues, ‘exclusively European products’, from which
‘intersubjective and cultural relations between Western Europe and the
rest of the world were codified’ in binary and hierarchical relations,
such as ‘East-West, primitive-civilized, magic/mythic-scientific, irrational-
rational, traditional-modern – Europe and not Europe’ (Quijano 2000,
p. 542). Building on this scholarship, Karen Tucker notes how this
coloniality of knowledge ‘refers to historically rooted, racially inflected
practices that routinely elevate the knowledge forms and knowledge-
generating principles of colonizing cultures’ (2018, p. 220). What is
produced from these binaries and hierarchies are benchmarks to be
attained by those exogenous to ‘exclusively European products’. Due to
the racial inflections of these binaries and hierarchies, and in relation to
the modern state, what emerges is a standard of civilization, discussed in
further detail in Chapter 2.
Specifically, and explored below, are discussions on contemporary state-
building and development as practices that are engaged in the abstraction
and simplification of modern statehood based on a European- or Western-
centric conceptualization.2 This, as argued below, produces typologies
and hierarchical measurements that are ‘racially inflected’ and reproduce
the state as a standard of civilization.

Contemporary State-Building and Development:

The (Re)production of a Civilizational Standard
The state is often depicted as being a standard and universal object,
framed by the idea of centralized authority with a particular set of

2 The use of the terms European and Western are used to discuss the real consequences
regarding international power dynamics, material flows, and exclusions that produce and
reproduce global hierarchies that ascertain a group of ‘European’ or ‘Western’ civilized
states, norms, and ideals in contrast to the ‘other’ (Said 1978; Fanon 2001). While Europe
and the West are constructed, as is its ‘other’, this book does not aim to deconstruct the
binary, but explore how its construction has had real effects, highlighting the normative
and cultural transnational links that are made evident by the discussions of the standards
of civilization (Gong 1984; Donnelly 1998; Fidler 2001).
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

government institutions. The central purpose of the state is argued to

be the successful and legitimate governance of a delineated territory and
population (Weber 1946, p. 77). From this definition, an ideal type3 is
produced. This ideal type facilitates the measurement of the state through
an analysis of capability and capacity, where the capability and capacity to
govern a population and territory without fault, external intervention,
or internal challenges exogenous to governing institutions is perceived as
strength. As such, the strongest states in the international state system are
often considered to be those that are the closest to the ideal type.
Measuring the state in this manner, however, creates a linear scale of
incapability to capability, from failure and weakness to strength. In this
regard, incapability, state weakness, and failure requires determined devel-
opment and state-building projects to re-establish domestic order and
legitimate governance. By engaging in such practices, the assumption of
what a strong state is and is not is reproduced, simplifying statehood to
the core institutions of governance. As such, the primary engagement of
state-building and development projects are to rebuild or fix deficiencies
in institutions. The strategies employed in state-building and develop-
ment are based on the notion that states, as objects, can be improved,
and that there is a single logic and practice of statehood that must be
followed to facilitate progress. This gives little-to-no attention to the
negative social, political, and economic consequences of external inter-
vention; or the impact of pre-existing logics and prejudices by individuals
and parties engaged in development and state-building.
To determine which states require interventions, in the form of
state-building or development, assessments of capacity and strength
are developed. The indicators that measure strength for contemporary
state-building and development projects are used to label states with
a typology: strong, weak, failing, failed. Robert Rotberg and Stewart
Patrick describe state failure and weakness as the inability or unwilling-
ness of governing bodies to provide the elements that are required for
statehood such as, legitimate political institutions that provide a frame-
work for economic management, social welfare, and physical security

3 The ideal-type is an abstract and hypothetical framing that establishes a generalized

conceptual benchmark. In this case, the ideal type with regards to the concept of the
state is a focus on its associated institutional characteristics and functions, which do not
correspond to any single case, but that are reproduced in scholarship and measurements
of statehood (Weber 1997, p. 90).
6 A. DELATOLLA

(Rotberg 2004; Patrick 2006, p. 29). Rotberg argues that indicators

of state failure include: enduring violence, victimization of citizens by
the state, loss of control over peripheral territory, growth of criminal
violence, flawed institutions, deteriorating infrastructure, lacking provi-
sions of basic services, uneven economic opportunity, and widespread
corruption (Rotberg 2004). Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick have devel-
oped a similar set of indicators as Rotberg to employ when examining
state capacity. In addition to the chosen indicators of state failure or
weakness, Rice and Patrick also propose a set of practical policies that
focus on the development of institutions with the aim to limit damage
and steer the state away from collapse.4 Regardless of whether measuring
states against an abstract set of criteria is unintentional, this practice places
the state on hierarchy, or scale, of effectiveness and efficiency that support
assumptions regarding the ability to ‘fix’ perceived deficiencies. Although
this may seem justified, developed with good intentions, the indicators
exclude further qualitative analysis that would often point to sociological
issues including customary political, economic, and social hierarchies that
can be in contention with official state institutions.
Despite the often overlooked sociological factors that either contra-
dict or become intertwined—in unpredictable and sometimes problematic
ways—with institutions of statehood, the concern of development and
state-building is focused on the end goal of such projects. The aim,
according to Amartya Sen, is to provide populations with new freedoms.
This references the Hegelian notion that the state is an environment that
provides freedoms which would otherwise not be enjoyed (Patten 1999).
Specifically, Sen argues that

Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty

as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social
deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity
of repressive states. (Sen 1999, p. 3)

4 Rice and Patrick (2008) provide indicators that place states on a scale depending
on their capacity to fulfil necessary criteria. This includes GNI per capita, GDP growth,
income inequality, inflation, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, voice
and accountability, control of corruption, freedom ratings, conflict intensity, political inten-
sity, political stability and absence of violence, incidence of coups, gross human rights
abuses, territory affected by conflict, child mortality, primary school completion, under-
nourishment, percent population with access to improved water sources and with access
to improved sanitation facilities, life expectancy.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

Similarly, Rotberg asserts that, notwithstanding the elements that may be

inducing failure and weakness, states can be revived through the devel-
opment of a stabilized environment by driving forward notions of law
and order. Once a relative peace has been established, three goals should
be pursued concurrently: economic development, rejuvenation of civil
society, and the reintroduction of rule of law (Rotberg 2004). The goals
outlined by Rotberg are commensurate with establishing effective control,
from which new freedoms are derived. However, the legitimate economic
development, rejuvenation of civil society, and the reintroduction of rule
of law are narrowly understood by those pursuing these goals. They do
not reflect the political, economic, and social customs of the society where
the projects are being developed, but those of the modern state as an ideal
type (Muppidi 2004).
By conceiving the modern state as an entity that is universal and objec-
tive, it gives credence to understanding rights and freedoms as being
universal standards that reflect global human progress (Sen 1999, p. 229).
Although poverty, tyranny, social deprivation, social neglect, and socio-
political intolerance are problems that require engagement, the methods
of engagement to alleviate these problems should be carefully considered.
By placing emphasis on state capacity and institutional reform to alleviate
sources of ‘unfreedom’, an international reproduction of paternalistic rela-
tions between the global north and the global south,5 the west and the
east, is (re)developed. It assumes that human progress is linear, ongoing,
and direct; that it follows a particular and unique experience of devel-
opment located in Western society and civilization. Here, divergence is
akin to moving backwards, reasserting binary and hierarchical relations
(Quijano 2000; Tucker 2018).
By engaging in state-building and development as a way to fix deficien-
cies, emphasis is placed on establishing political rituals that mimic those
present in the strongest states, specifically Western states. The goal of
intervention in state-building and development, whether such projects
include, or are limited to, institution building, capacity building, or

5 The global south as a concept can be critiqued due to its reproduction of an ordered
world that divides the ‘developed’ north from the ‘underdeveloped’ south, as had been
done with such conceptual framings of the ‘third world’. However, the global south is
a useful concept that reflects the core-periphery ordering of the world that developed in
the nineteenth century and that persists into the twenty-first century (see Levander and
Mignolo 2011; Dryzek 2006; Wallerstein 2007; Rosenberg 2010).
8 A. DELATOLLA

economic aid, is to pacify populations and governments that are deemed

subversive, unstable, and which pose an implicit or explicit threat domes-
tically or internationally. The aim, as with colonial endeavours, has been
to ‘fight war in the “social milieu”’ by engaging in practices to ensure
the ‘rise of social forms of governance [that are] distinctly modern and
capitalist variant on the science and practice of household rule’ (Owens
2015, p. 279). By encouraging the development of new political rituals
to replace those that are viewed as illegitimate, regressive, and uncivilized,
a set of supposed universal moral and ethical codes are also deployed.
State-building and development projects are, then, sustained strategies
to replace knowledges and practices that are perceived as backward, or
unruly, in an effort to reorder society within a rational design that is ‘com-
mensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws’ (Scott 1998,
pp. 4–5). By pacifying and stabilizing states that are considered under-
developed, underperforming, failed, or weak, economic growth can be
encouraged and the threat of violence is decreased, facilitating the estab-
lishment of new practices that are considered legitimate by the strongest
states in the international state system.
The assumption that engagement in state-building and development
can produce effective change to the benefit of the targeted state and
society is based on good intentions but, as argued by Raja Menon, it
‘can never become an ethically driven pursuit disentangled from power
and interests’ (2016, p. 11). Highlighted by Menon, the decision to
engage in state-building and development, targeting specific states, is
always, explicitly or implicitly, driven by power and interests. In making
the argument that state-building and development practices are entan-
gled in the pursuit of power and interests, Menon highlights the case
of the Kurdish population in Iraq. He argues that the U.S. had only
developed an interest in the Kurdish population following the Iran–Iraq
War (1980–1988), having ignored their plight throughout the period of
conflict with Iran (Menon 2016, pp. 11–12). Following the war, however,
and after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990–1991), the U.S. began to
further engage with the Kurds. U.S. policy in Iraq became concerned
with ensuring the safety of the Kurds, but also provided further justi-
fication for the isolation of Saddam Hussein as part of the policy of
containment (Zanger 2002). The U.S. decision to intervene and provide
support for autonomous and democratic development was not a decision
of moral or ethical selflessness. Rather, it produced favourable outcomes
for U.S. strategy and interests in the Middle East. Although state-building
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

and development are often framed by narratives of good intentions, self-

lessness, and moral impetus, intervening states make gains by nurturing
alliances with domestic partners, gaining access to new economic markets
and resources, and by ensuring beneficial regional stability and influence;
as discussed in Chapter 8 in relation to histories of European intervention
and interference.
Discussed thus far are two aspects of state-building and development
that follow from a single assumption about human social and political
development and progress. This single assumption holds that human
social and political development and progress occur on a linear trajec-
tory with the most powerful states in the international state system being
at the forefront of development and progress. From this assumption, two
arguments are developed. First, that state-building and development are
practices that are constructed on good intentions aimed at ‘helping’ back-
wards, weaker states and societies. Second, that these assumptions lead
to opportunities that allow the most powerful states in the international
system to pursue interests and power; shaping the targeted states to their
benefit.
Regardless of intent, whether it is to help other societies progress and
develop, or if state-building and development are tools in the pursuit of
power and interests, the focus on the modern state is an heir to historic
practices of imperial and colonial governance. The practices of state-
building and development, as well as imperial governance and colonialism,
are formed by the interactions between state-building and development
practitioners or imperial and colonial administrators and the populations
that are being engaged in programs of social re-engineering. In these
interactions, and related to differences in power, emerges a coloniality
of knowledge, as discussed above. While Quijano (2000) outlined these
dynamics in reference to the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries,
state-building and development represent its continuation, albeit under
new—seemingly benign—categories that appear detached from imperi-
alism and colonialism.
The practices of social re-engineering based on coloniality of knowl-
edge has continuously (re)produced a civilizing project, one that facili-
tates an ongoing link between Western or European imperialism, colo-
nialism and state-building and development. The civilizing project, or
mission, can be described as being conceived of as ‘a “benign” vision
of imperialism’, a liberal project, shrouded in moral reasoning, inflected
with—implicit and explicit—racist hierarchies. This project, or mission,
10 A. DELATOLLA

developed with the view that ‘Western rational institutions and norms’
were—and continue to be—the pinnacle of development, and sought to
insure a cultural conversion or assimilation of non-European societies into
these institutions and norms (Hobson 2012, p. 122). In other words,
the civilizing project was centred on a particular set of knowledges and
practices that were mobilized to ensure the expansion and replication
of European progress, modernity, and civilization. Unlike the logics of
imperialism and colonialism, which were justified based on a ‘moral voca-
tion’ that attempted to save brown and black men from the state of
nature, a ‘backward hereditary condition’ (Hobson 2012, p. 123), state-
building, and development forego the use of a direct and explicit racist
logic. Instead, state-building and development, in the production of a
civilizing mission, engage in an implicit racism, one that ‘locates “dif-
ference” through cultural, institutional and environmental criteria rather
than genetic properties’ (Hobson 2004, p. 220). This is not to say that
explicit and implicit racisms are separate, rather they often overlap and
function together; as is evident in the context of European imperialism
and colonialism of the nineteenth century.
Reflecting imperial and colonial justifications, as well as the moral voca-
tion of the nineteenth-century civilizing project, contemporary practices
of state-building and development, maintains that there is a cultural,
institutional, or environmental inability to engage with the structures,
norms, and institutions of the modern state. This is particularly evident
with regard to the typologies of states, with weak, failing, or failed states
requiring strategies to alleviate societies from their conditions of under-
development (Scott 1998, pp. 4–5). K. Adalbert Hampel critiques the
contemporary measurement of state capacity and the production of state
typologies as being ahistorical, reproducing narratives that the modern
state is analogous to the organic polity, reinforced by global hegemony.
Hampel correctly points to the modern state, in terms of its conceptual
formulation as well its practical development, being the unique conse-
quences of European political history. Despite its particular origin, it has,
nevertheless, been used to measure and test the development, progress,
and civilization of other societies and polities (2015, pp. 1632–1638).
In a similar vein, Branwen Gruffydd Jones argues that the language of
state weakness and failure in the post-colonial world conjures notions of
‘a general lack of capacity to develop, to rule or to be peaceful’ (2013,
p. 49). By categorizing states into typologies, a hierarchy is created that
reproduces the language of colonial and imperial governance, echoing
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