ah AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD — ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2000 Reatfirmation of ANSIASA-67.04, Part 1994 Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society ‘ue dun 14135744 2005,ANSIISA-67.04.01-2000 Scipoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation ISBN: 1-55617-719-4 Copyright © 2000 by the instrument Society of America. All rights reserved. Not for resale. Printed in the United States of America, No part ofthis publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise), without the prior written permission of the Publisher ISA 67 Alexander Drive P.O. Box 1227 Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 27709 Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Antomation Secety ‘Tue dun 14 18:58:19 2005,—3- ANSWISA-$67,04.01-2000 Preface This proface, as well as all footnotes and annexes, is included for information purposes and is not part of ANSINSA-67.04.01-2000. ‘This dacument has been prepared as part of the service of ISA, the international society for measurement ‘and control, toward a goal of uniformity in the field of instrumentation. To be of real value, this document should not be static but should be subject to periodic review. Toward this end, the Society welcomes all ‘comments and criticisms and asks that they be addressed to the Secretary, Standards and Practices Board; ISA; 67 Alexander Drive: P. 0. Box 12277, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709; Telephone (319) 1549-8411; Fax (919) 549-8288; E-mail: standards@isa.org, The ISA Standards and Practices Department is aware of the growing need for afention to the metric system of units in general, ac the International System of Units (Si) in particular, inthe preparation of instrumentation standards. The Department is further aware ofthe benefits to USA users of ISA standards ‘of incorporating suitable references to the SI (and the metric system) in their business and professional dealings with other countries. Toward this end, this Depariment will endeavor to introduce Slacceptable metric units in all new and revised standards, recommended practices, and technical reports to the greatest extent possible. Standard for Use of the intemational System of Units (S)): The Modem Metric ‘Systom, publishod by the American Society for Testing & Matorials as IEEE/ASTM SI 10-97, and futuro revisions, will be the reference guide for definitions, symbols, abbreviations, and conversion factors Itis the policy of ISA to encourage and welcome the participation of all concerned individuals and interests in the development of ISA slandards, recommended practices, and technical reports. Participation in the ISA standards-making process by an individual in no way constitutes endorsement by the employer of that individual, of ISA. or of any of the standards, recommended practices, and technical reports that ISA develops Instrument setpoint driftis a problem that has led to numerous abnormal occurrence reports (now referred to as Licensee Event Reports"). Section 50.96, “Technical Specifications,” of Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 1, Part §0, Washington, D.C., 1987, requires that, where a Limiting Safety ‘System Setting (LSSS)} is specified for a variable on which & safety limit has been placed, the setting be so. ‘chosen that automatic protactive action will correct the mast severe abnormal situation anticipated before a safoly limit is oxcooded. Inappropriate soloction of a setpoint that doos not allow sulficiont margin to account for instrument accuracy, the expected environment, and minor calibration variations can result in calculated drift allowances insufficiont for the instrument used. Protective instruments are provided with setpoints where specific actions are either initiated, terminated, or prohibited. Setpoints correspond to certain provisions of Technical Specifications that are incorporated into the facility operation license. ‘The single most prevalent reason for the drift of a setpoint out of compliance with a technical specification has boon the selection of a setpoint that does not allow a sufficient margin between the technical ‘specification limit to account for instrument accuracy, the expected environment, and minor calibration variations, In some cases the setpoint selected was numerically equal fo the technical specification limit and stated as an absolute value, thus leaving no apparent margin for uncertainties. In other cases, the ‘setpoint was $0 close to the upper or lower limit ofthe instruments range that instrument drift placed the sselpoint beyond the instrument's range thus nullifying the trp function. Other causes for drift of a setpoint ‘out of conformity with the technical specifications have been instrumentation design inadequacies and questionable calibration procedures, ISA sponsored a review of the setpoint drift problem in April 1975 by establishing the SPG7.4 ‘Subcommittee (now renumbered as SP67.04). The Committee's review indicated that a more thorough ‘consideration of setpoint drift was necessary in the design, test, purchase, installation, and maintenance of nuclear safety-related instrumentation, Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Antomation Secety ‘Tue dun 14 18:58:19 2005,ANSIISA-$67.04.01-2000 ‘The 1987 revision was made to provide clarification and to reflect current industry practice. The term "trip setpoint" was made consistent with the terminology used in the NRC Standard Technical Specifications and reflected what previously was known 2s "upper setpoint limit" Many of the changes provided in the 1994 revision reflect the Improved Technical Specification program (a ‘cooperative effort between industry and the USNRC). With the issuanoa of ISA- RP67.04, Part Il Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation, this document became Part |. Additional changes were made to reflect the inclusion of the Recommended Practice, Part Il to this standard. ‘This document was developed to specifically address the establishment and maintenance for individual safety-related instrument channels, This standard is intended for use primarily by the owners of nuclear power plant facilities or their agents {nuclear steam system suppliers, architectlengineers, etc.) in establishing procedures for determining setpoints, setpoint margins, and test routines in safety-related instrument channels, However, itis equally applicable to large-scale nuclear production reactors. This standard uses statistical nomenclature, which is customary and familiar to personnel responsible for nuclear power plant setpoint calculations and instrument uncertainty evaluation. It should be noted that this nomenclature may have different dafintions in other statistical applications and is not universal, nor is itintonded to be. Furthermore, in keeping with the conservative philosophy employed in nuclear power plant calculations, the combination of uncertainty methodology for both independent and dependent Uncertainty components is intended to be bounding. Thats, the resuttant uncertainty should be correct or ‘overly conservalive to insure safe operation. In cases where more precise estimation of measurement Uncertainty is required, more sophisticated techniques should be employed. Adherence to this standard will net itself sufice to protect the public health and safety because itis the integrated performance of the structures, the mechanical systems, the fluid systems, the instrumentation, _and the electrical systems of the plant that limit the consequences of design: basis events. On the other hand, failure to meet these requirements may be an indication of system inadequacy. Each application for ‘a construction permit or an operating icange for a nucloar power plant is required to devolop these items to ‘comply with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 1, Part §0. Applicants have the responsibilty to assure themselves and others that this integrated performance is adequate. ISA Standards Subcommittee SP67.04 operates under SP67, the Nuclear Power Plant Standards, Committee, W. Sotos, Chairman, ‘CAUTION — ISA ADHERES TO THE POLICY OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS. INSTITUTE WITH REGARD TO PATENTS. IF ISA IS INFORMED OF AN EXISTING PATENT THAT IS REQUIRED FOR USE OF THE STANDARD, IT WILL REQUIRE THE OWNER OF THE PATENT TO. EITHER GRANT A ROYALTY-FREE LICENSE FOR USE OF THE PATENT BY USERS COMPLYING WITH THE STANDARD OR A LICENSE ON REASONABLE TERMS AND CONDITIONS THAT ARE FREE FROM UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION. EVEN IF ISA IS UNAWARE OF ANY PATENT COVERING THIS STANDARD, THE USER IS ‘CAUTIONED THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STANDARD MAY REQUIRE USE OF TECHNIQUES, PROCESSES, OR MATERIALS COVERED BY PATENT RIGHTS. ISA TAKES NO POSITION ON THE EXISTENCE OR VALIDITY OF ANY PATENT RIGHTS THAT MAY BE INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTING ‘THE STANDARD. ISA IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR IDENTIFYING ALL PATENTS THAT MAY REQUIRE A LICENSE BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STANDARD OR FOR INVESTIGATING THE VALIDITY OR SCOPE OF ANY PATENTS BROUGHT TO ITS ATTENTION. THE USER SHOULD (CAREFULLY INVESTIGATE RELEVANT PATENTS BEFORE USING THE STANDARD FOR THE USER'S INTENDED APPLICATION. Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Avtomation Secely ‘ue dun 14 18:5820 2005ANSWISA-$67,04.01-2000 HOWEVER, ISA ASKS THAT ANYONE REVIEWING THIS STANDARD WHO IS AWARE OF ANY PATENTS THAT MAY IMPACT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STANDARD NOTIFY THE ISA STANDARDS AND PRACTICES DEPARTMENT OF THE PATENT AND ITS OWNER, ADDITIONALLY, THE USE OF THIS STANDARD MAY INVOLVE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, ‘OPERATIONS OR EQUIPMENT. THE STANDARD CANNOT ANTICIPATE ALL POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OR ADDRESS ALL POSSIBLE SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH USE IN HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS. THE USER OF THIS STANDARD MUST EXERCISE SOUND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT CONCERNING ITS USE AND APPLICABILITY UNDER THE USER'S PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES. THE USER MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE APPLICABILITY OF ANY ‘GOVERNMENTAL REGULATORY LIMITATIONS AND ESTABLISHED SAFETY AND HEALTH PRACTICES BEFORE IMPLEMENTING THIS STANDARD. The following people served as members of ISA Subcommittee SP67.04, which reaffirmed this standard in 1999, NAME T. Hurst, Chair R. Webb, Managing Director T Albeigo* D. Alexander J-Arpin | Bakiry L Bates F Berto B, Beuchel W. Brown R. Burnham M.Burs* T Burton R.Calvort D. Cottingharn ©.Crstalio T Donat M. Dougherty ©. Doutt” Mi Eidson R. Fredrickson W. Frewin D. Gantt R. Gorge R. Gotcher J. Guider Hakeem D. Harding D. Harris J. Hartman B. Haynes D. Hooten* * One vote per company. Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Avtomation Secely ‘ue dun 14 18:5820 2005 COMPANY Hurst Technologies Corporation ‘tran Corporation Arizona Public Service Company Detroit Edison Company ABB Combustion Engineering Buhler Inc Enstat Inc. Tetra Engineering Group Inc North Allantic Energy Services ISD Corporati Northeast Uti ‘Arizona Public Service Company Florida Power and Light Company Pacific Gas and Electric Company Entergy Operations Consultant Duko Enginooring and Sovicos Inc. Rosemount Nuclear Instruments Inc USS, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ‘Southern Nuclear Operating Company ‘Commonwealth Edison Nebraska Public Power Distt B&W Hanford Company PECO Energy Mtl Rochester Gas and Electric Consultant Proto-Power Corporation Trioonex Corporation Hort Enterprises Inc. Terran Technologies Inc. Carolina Power and LightANSIISA-$67.04.01-2000 J. Hunsicker J. James R. Jarrett S. Kincaid T Kulaga B, Marrow J. Mauck™ ©. McNall J. McQuighan R. Neustadter R.Nuetk* D. Ozarowicz J. Peternel R. Profeta R. Queenan E. Quinn D. Ringland B, Rogers J. Scheetz R. Schwartzbeok T Stavie J. Snelson” ©. Sorensen C. Sossman W. Solos ©. Tuley J. Vandenbroek T Verbout™ J. Voss M. Widmeyer R. Wiegle V. Willems lino’s Power Company Stone and Webster inc. Tennessee Valley Authority K&K Services Consultant Duke Power Company U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Consultant Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Raytheon Engineers and Constructors Northern Stales Power Company ‘Wisconsin Public Service Corporation SOR Ine. Profeta Consulting ‘American Electric Power MOM Engineering Foxboro Company Northern States Powor Company Pacific Engineering Corporation Enercon Services Inc First Enorgy Carolina Power and Light ‘Southern Company MICW Safety Management Solutions STPNOC ‘Westinghouse Electric Company Southern California Edison Company Northern States Powor Company Isys Consuiting Inc EGEG CANUS Corporation Parsons Power The following people sarvad as members of ISA Subcommittees SP67.04 and SP67.15, both of which collaborated on the 1994 revision: NAME, R. George, SP67.04 Chairman B. Beuchel, SP67 15 Charman M. Widmeyer, Managing Director T Hurst, SP67.04 Vice Chairman® W. Adams M. Adler D. Alexander R.Allen” J. Alvis® M. Annon J-Arpin T Banek* * One vote per company. Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Avtomation Secely ‘ue dun 14 18:5820 2005 COMPANY PECO Energy Company NAESCO/Seatook Station The Supply System Hurst Consutting Virginia Electric and Power Company Volan Enterprises Detroit Edison Company ‘ABB Combustion Enginaering, Inc. ABB impel ntemational I&C Enginoering Associates ‘ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc Detroit Edison CompanyB Basu" L. Bates* W. Bejlovec* J. Benjamin D. Besryhill F Berté P Blanch R. Bockhorst” R. Brehm" W. Brown R. Burnham M. Burns” T- Burton G. Butera” J. Carey, J. J. Carolan* J. Cash* R. Chan R. Colombo G. Cooper L. Costellot W. Cottingham ©. Cristallo, Jr, W. Croft” W. Grumbacker J. Das D. Desai T Donat C. Doyel M. Durr M. Eidson N.Eng 'S. Eschbach R Estes" R Fain J. Festa* J. Flaherty J. Fougere B. Fredricksen \V. Fregonese* D. Gantt* ‘8. Ghboin” \W. Gordon* R. Goteher* R. Hakeern* M, Hammer* P. Holzman * One vote per company. Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Avtomation Secely ‘ue dun 14 18:5820 2005 ANSWISA-$67,04.01-2000 Southern California Edison ENSTAT, Inc. Commonwealth Edison - LaSalle Portland Gas & Electric Systems Energy Resources Tetra Engineering Group, Inc. Consultant Southern California Edison Tennessee Valley Authority ISD Corporation Consultant Arizona Public Service INPO Baltimore Gas & Electric Company Salem/Mope Creok Generator Stations ECO Energy Company Control Associates Public Service Electric & Gas Sacramenio Municipal Uiily ‘Commonwealth Edison Carolina Power & Light Company Enteray Operations, Inc. Northeast Utities Westinghouse Electric Corporation Sargent & Lundy Engineers Ebasco Services, Inc Consolidated Edison of New York. nc. Vectra Florida Power Corporation NYPAIPS: ‘Southern Nuclear Operating Company NUTECH B & W Advanced Systems Engineering Hurst Consutting Analysis & Moasuromont Sorvicos Northeast Utilities Nebraska Public Power District Proto-Power Engineering New York Power Authority Public Service Electric & Gas Company Westinghouse Hanford Company The Supply System Bechtel Corporation Weed Instrument Company Entergy Operations, Inc Northern States Power Texas Utilities Electric Northern States Power North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation STAR, IncANSIISA-$67.04.01-2000 E Hubner T Hurst” J damest S. Jannotty W.Jay S. Juravich* 8 Kincaid* W. Kramer T Kulaga LLemons* J. Leong* P Loeser J. Long* XK Lyall J Mauek W. MeBride B, MoMilan ©. MeNal" D. McQuade" J. MoQuighan* D. Millor J Mock” U. Mondial R. Mortison R. Naylor KK Nesmith? R. Neustadter J. 0Connel J. Osborne L Patterson J. Peternel i Pit? R, Plotickt 8. Powell R.Profota 8, Queenan E Quinn T. Quigley’ S. Rabinovich J Redmon” T. Reynolis* B. Ringland S. Roberson D. Sandin® 4} Sandstrom M. Santic J. Scheetz R. Schimpf* E, Schindhelm* FR Schwartzbock * One vote per company. Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Antomation Secety ‘ue dun 14135821 2005 Stone & Webster, Inc Hurst Enginooring ine. Stone & Webster, Inc Public Service Electric & Gas Company Entergy Operations ine. - Waterford 3 New York Power Authority Consultant Betis Atomic Power Lab Ebesco Services, Inc. Pacific Gas & Electric Company General Elecric Corporation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bechtel Corporation Duke Power Company US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Vuginia Power Nebraska Public Power District Tonera ‘ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc. Baltimore Gas & Electtic Company Ohio State University Bechtel Corporation Ontario Hydro TU Electric- CPSES ‘Commonwealth Edison Tennessee Valley Authority Raytheon Engineers & Constructors, Inc. Technicon Enterprises Florida State & Light Company Nuclear Plant Engineering SOR. Inc. ABB Impoll Corporation Stone & Webster Enginzering, Inc Consutant S Lowy Inc. Pacific Nuclear MOM Engineering Northeast Utilities Consultant Southern California Edison Weed instrument Company The Foxboro Company Onsite Enginoering & Management Guif States Utities Fisher » Rosemount, Inc ‘Commonwealth Edison - LaSalle Pacific Engineering Corporation New York Powor Authority ‘Westinghouse Electric Corporation Enercon Services, incJ. Shank T Slavic" P Smith C. Sorensen W. Solos R. Szoch, Jr. B.Sun W. Trenholme” C.Tuley* K. Utsumi* A Vakamudi P Vande Visse T. Verbout J. Voss” R. Webb* R. Weldon* S. Weldon* G. Whitmoro" P. Wicyk™ R. Wiegle* V. Willems D. Wilmer G. Wood B. Woodruff ANSWISA-$67,04.01-2000 Public Service Electric & Gas, NJ Duquesne Light Comoany Engineering Planning & Management Southern Company Services ‘American Electric Power Services Corporation Calvert Ciffs Nuclear Plant Electric Power Research Institute 18 C Consultant Westinghouse Electric Corporation ‘Genoral Electric Corporation Bechtel Corporation Action Engineering, Inc Northern States Power Tenera, LP. Pacific Gas & Electric Company Hurst Engineering, Inc Hurst Consulting Duquesne Light Company ‘Commonwealth Edison Company PECO Energy Company Gilbert Commonseath, Inc General Electric Company Entergy Operations, Inc. - Waterford 3 Florida Power 8 Light Company ‘The following people sarved as members of ISA Committee SP67, which reaffirmed this standard in 1999, NAME, W. Sotos, Chair R. Webb, Managing Director R. Wiagle, Managing Diroctor R.Allen B. Beuchat T. Burton ©. Doutt W. Gordon S, Hedden kK Heenan T Hurst S. Kasturi Li MeNeit G. Minor J.Nay R. Neustadter J. Peternel R. Profeta J. Redmon G. Sensmeier T Stave ote per company. Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Antomation Secety ‘ue dun 14135821 2005 COMPANY STPNOC Altran Corporation CANUS Corporation ABB Combustion Engineering North Atlantic Energy Services Florida Powor and Light Company U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ‘Consultant ‘Commonwealth Ed'son Company Pacific Gas and Electric Company Hurst Technologies Corporation MOS Inc. INPO MHB Tech Assoc Consultant Raytheon Engineers and Constructoss SOR Ine. Profeta Consulting Southern California Edison ‘Sargent and Lundy First EnergyANSIISA-$67.04.01-2000 |. Sturman C.Tuley T Verbout P. Wiyk M. Widmeyer 0 Consultant ‘Westinghouse Electric Company Northern States Power Byron Nuclear Power Station EG&G ‘The following people served as members of ISA Committee SP67 during the 1994 revision: NAME, H. Wiegle, Chairman W, Solos, Vice Chairman M. Widmeyer, Managing Director R.Allen M.Annon B.Basu J. Bauer M. Bolow M. Berkovieh B. Beuchel P Blanch T Burton G. Cooper* N.Dogra AEllist R Estes H. Evans V. Fregonese R. George R Givan W. Gordon* R. Gotcher T. Grochowski S. Heddan* kK Hoeman* RHindia® E, Hubner J. Lipka P. Loeser* A Machiels J. Mauck* B, McMilion L. Mctieit" G. Minor J. Mock* J.Nay* R. Naylor* R. Neustadter R. Phelps. R. Profeta * One vote per company. Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Avtomation Secety ‘ue dun 14135822 2005 COMPANY PECO Energy Company ‘American Electric Power Service Corporation The Supply System ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc. 18 C Engineering Associates Southern California Edison Company Genaral Atomics Company Tennessee Valley Authority Bechtel Power Corporation NAESCO/ Seabrook Station Consultant INPO ‘Commonwealth Edison Impell Corporation Westinghouse Electric Corporation Hurst Engineering Pyoo. Inc Public Service Electric & Gas PECO Energy Company Sargent & Lundy Engineers Bechtel Savannah River, Inc. Weed Instrument Company UNC Engineering Services, Inc. ‘Commonwealth Edison Company Pacilic Gas & Eloctric Company ‘Sargent & Lundy Engineers Stone & Webster Consultant US. Nuciear Regulatory Commission Electric Power Research Institute USS, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nebraske Public Power District INPO. MHB Technical Association Bechtel Corporation ‘Westinghouse Electric Corporation Commonwealth Edison Raytheon Engineers & Constructors, Inc. ‘Omaha Public Power S Levy, Inc.J. Redmon F. Semper T Slavic L Smith |. Sturman W. Trenholme C.Tuley" K. Utsumi P. Wiyk™ R.Webb* G Whitmore F Zikas ne ANSWISA-$67,04.01-2000 Southern California Edison ‘Semper Engineering Duquesne Light Company AEA Technology Bechtel Corporation| 18 C Consultant Westinghouse Electric Corporation General Electric Corporation ‘Commonwealth Edison Company Pacific Gas & Electric Company Duquesne Light Company Parker-Hannifin Corporation This standard was approved for reaffirmation by the ISA Standards and Practices Board on 1 January 2000. NAME M. Zielinski D. Bishop P Brott M. Cohen. M. Coppler B. Dumortier W. Holland A. Iverson R. Jones V. Maggioli T. Mcdvinew ‘A. McCauley, Jr. G. McFarland R. Roimor J.Rennie H. Sasajima R Webb W. Weidman J. Weiss J. Whetstone M. Widmeyer R.Wiegle ©. Williams G. Wood Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Antomation Secety ‘ue dun 1415823 2005, COMPANY Fisher-Rosemount Systems, Inc Chevron Petroleum Technology Company Honeywell, nc Senior Flexonies, Inc. “Ametek, Inc ‘Schneider Electric SA Southern Company Ivy Optiks Dow Chemical Company Fetironics Corporation Instrumentation & Control Engineering LLC ‘Chagrin Valley Controls, Inc Honeywell, nc Rockwell Automation Factory Mutual Research Corporation Advanced Architecture and Tachrologies ‘Alan Corporation Parsons Energy & Chemicals Group EPRI National Institute of Standards & Technology EGEG CANUS Corporation Eastman Kodak Company Graeme Wood ConsultingANSIISA-$67.04.01-2000 _— ‘The 1994 revised standard was approved for publication by the ISA Standards and Practices Board in September 1994. NAME, W. Weidman, Vice President H. Baumann D. Bishop W. Calder Ill ©. Gross H. Hopkins Alverson Lindner T. MeAvinew A. McCauley, J. G. McFarland J. Mock E. Montgomery D. Rapley R Reimer R. Webb J. Weiss J. Whetstone M. Widmeyer ©. Williams G. Wood M. Zielinski Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Avtomation Secely ‘ue dun 14185825 2005 COMPANY Gilbert Commonweatth, Inc. H. D, Baumann & Associates, Ltd ‘Chevron USA Production Company Foxboro Company Dow Chemical Company Utility Products of Arizona Lyondell Petrochemical Company Endress + Hauser GmibH + Company Metro Wastewater Reclamation District Chagrin Valley Controls, Inc. ABB Power Plant Controls Bechtel Fluor Danial, Inc, Rapley Engineering Services Allen-Bradley Company Pacific Gas & Electric Company Electric Power Research Institute National institute of Standards & Technology The Supply System Eastman Kodak Company ‘Graeme Wood Consulting FisherRosemount1B ANSWISA-$67,04.01-2000 Contents 1 Purpose 15 2 Scope 15 3. Definitions, 15 4. Establishment of S€1D0INIS...soncsnsninnninennnenaiinninnininnnimannenenninsnsn TT 4A. Safety v7 4.2 Safety analysis ..nnnnnnnnsrnesn 18 4.3. Limiting safety system setting (LESS)... oo 8 4.4 Combination of uncertainties 20 5 Documentation a 6 Maintenance of safoty-related sotpoints, 22. 6.1 Testing 2 6.2 Replacement 22. 7 References 22 8 Informative references 23 Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Avtomation Secely ‘ue dun 14 18:5828 2005,Copyright by the The Instrumentation, systems, and Automation Society ‘ue dun 14135827 2006—15— ANSWISA-$67,04.01-2000 1 Purpose ‘The purpose ofthe standard is to develop a basis for establishing setpoints for nuctear safety-related instrumontation (as defined in clause 3). This standard addresses known contributing erors in the channel from the process (including the primary element and senso.) through and including the final setpoint device. 2 Scope ‘This standard defines the requirements for assuring that setpoints for nuctear safety-related instrumentation (as defined in clause 3), are established and maintained within specified ower plants and nuclear reactor facities, its in nuclear ISA-RP67 04 02-2000 (equivalent to ISA-RPE7.04, Pat I, 1994) of this standard is a recommended Practice that provides guidance forthe implementation of ISA-S67.04 01-2000 (equivalent to ANSVISA 887.04, Part |, 1994). This guidance is in the following areas: 42), Methodologies, including sample equations, to calculate total channel uncertainty b) Common assumptions and practices in instrument uncertainty calculations ¢) Equations for estimating uncertainties for commonly used analog and distal modules 4}, Methodologies to determine the impact of commonly encountered effects on instrument uncertainty 8) Application of instrument channel uncertainty in setpoint determination 4) Sourcas and interpretation of data for uncertainty calculations {9}. Discussion of the interface between setpoint determination and plant-operating procedures, calibration procedures, and accident analysis h) Documentation requirements, 3.1 allowablo value: a limiting value that the trip setpoint may have when tested periodically, beyond which appropriate action shall be taken. 3.2. analytical limi limit ofa measured or calculated variable established by the safety analysis to ensure that a safety limit is, not exceeded. 3.3. as found: the condition in which a channel, or portion of a channel, is found after a period of operation and before recalibration (if necessary) 3.4 asleft: the concition in which a channel, or portion of a channel, is left after calibration oF final setpoint device setpoint verification. Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Antomation Secety ‘ue Dun 14135828 2005,ANSIISA-$67.04.01-2000 —16— 3.5 design basis: the design basis for protection systems is as defined in Part 4, Safety System Design Basis, of IEEE ‘Standard 603-1980. (See IEEE, Std. 803.) 3.6 drift: an undesired change in output over a pariod of time where change is unrelated to the input, environmant, orload, (See ANSVISA-S51,1-1979 (R1893),) 3.7 error: the algebraic aiference between the indication and the ideal value of the measured signal. (See ANSI/ ISA-51.1-1979 (R1993),) 3.8 final setpoint devics ‘@ component, or assembly of components, that provides input to the process voting logic for actuated. ‘equipment [NOTE — Examples of final seipin: dovieos aro bslabos relays, prossure switches, a fvelsvtchos 3.9 foldove 2 device characteristic exhibited when a further change in the input produces an output signal thet reverses its direction from the specified input-output relationship. 3.10 instrument channel: {an arrangement of components and modules as required to generate a single protective action signal ‘when required by a plant condition. A channal loses its identity whore singlo protective action signals aro combined. (See IEEE, Sid. 603.) 3.11 instrument range: the region between the limits within which a quantity is measured, received, or transmitted and is ‘expressed by slaling the lower and upper renge values. (See ANSVISA-S51.1-1879 (R'1993).) 3.12. limiting safety system setting (LSS): limiting safety system settings for nuclear reactors are settings for automatic protective devices related to those variables having significant safety functions. (See CFR, 60.36{c](‘I114],) 3.13 nuclear safety-related instrumentation: that which is essential tothe following a) Provide emergency reactor shutdown b) Provide containment isolation 6) Provide reactor core cooling 4) Provide fo containment or reactor heat emoval «@) Prevent or mitigate significant release of radioactive material tothe environment or is otherwise essential to provide reasonable assurance that a nuclear power plant can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public 3.14 primary element: {the system element that quantitatively converts the measured variable energy ino a form suitable for measurement (See ANSUISA-S51 1-1978 (R1993} ) 3.15 reference accuracy (also known as Accuracy Rating as defined in ANSVISA-S51.1-1979 (R1993)): ‘a number or quantity that defines a limit thal errors will not exceed when a device is used under specified ‘operating conditions, (See ANSVISA-S51.1-1979 (R1893) ) Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Avtomation Secely ‘Te dun 14 18:5829 20057 ANSWISA-$67,04.01-2000 3.16 safety limit: 4 limit on an important process variable that is necessary to reasonably protect the integrity of physical barriers that guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. (See CFR, 50 36(c](1](J(A]) 3.17 saturation: ‘a device characteristic exhibited when a further change in tha input signal produces no additional change inthe cutout 3.48 sensor: the portion of a channel that responds to changes in a plant variable or condition and converts the measured process variable into a signal, eg. electric or pneumatic. (See IEEE, Std 603.) 3.19 fost intorval: the elapsed time between the initiation (or successful completion) of tests on the same sensor, channel, load group, safety group, safety system, or other specified system or device. (See ANSV/IEEE, Std. 338.) 3.20 trip setpoint: € prodetermined value for actuation of the final setpoint device to initiate a protective action 3.21 uncertainty: the amount to which an instrument channol’s output is in doubt (or the allowance made therefore) dus to possible errors, either random or systematic, that have not been corrected. The uncertainty is generally identified within a probability and confidence level ‘Additional definitions relaled to instrumentation terminology and uncertainty may be found in ANSWISA- $51.1-1979 (R193) and ANSVISA-S37.1-1975 (R1982), 4 Establishment of setpoints Trip setpoints in nuclear safety-related instruments shall be selected to provide sufficient allowance between the trip setpoint and the safety limit to account for uncertainties. Detailed requirements for safety- rolated instrument setpoint rlationships are given in the following ciauses, 2s illustrated in figure 4. ‘Tho importance of the various typos of safoty-rolatod sotpoints diffor, and as such it may be appropriate to apply different setpoint determination requirements, For automatic setpoints that have a significant importance to safety, for example, those required by the plant safety analyses and directly ralatad to Reactor Protection System, Emergency Core-Cooiing Systems, Containment Isolation, and Containment Heat Removal, a stringent setpoint methodology should consider all of the items noted in 4.1 - 4.4.2. However, for setpoints that may not have the same level of stringent requirements, for example, those that are not credited in the safely analyses or that do not have limiting values, the setpoint determination methodology could be less rigaraus. In general, ell uncertainty torms for a particular setpoint methodology may not be required for all setpoint calculations. The methodologies utilized shall be documented and appropriate justfication shal be provided, 41 Safety Physical barriers are designed to prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. Safety limits are chosen ‘to maintain the integrity of these physical barriers. For this standard, design limits for engineered safety features are treated the same as safety mits. Safety limits can be defined in terms of directly measured process variables such as pressure of temperature. Safety limits can also be defined in terms of a calculated variable involving two or more measured process variables. An example of a calculated variable is the departure from nucleate boiling ratio. Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Avtomation Secety ‘Tue dun 14 1835830 2005,ANSIISA-$67.04.01-2000 —18— 4.2 Safety analysis The safety analysis establishes (1) an analylical limit in terms of measured or calculated variable and (2) {a spocifc time after that value is reached to begin protective action. Satisfying these two constraints will ‘ensure that the safely limit of 4.1 will not be exceeded during anticipated operational occurrences and Figure 1 — Nuclear safety-related setpoint relationships Copyright by the The Instrumentation, ystems, and Antomation Secely ‘edu 14135837 2005Copyright by the The Instrumentation, systems, and Automation Society ‘edu 14135837 2005Copyright by the The Instrumentation, systems, and Automation Society ‘edu 14135837 2005Developing and promulgating technically sound consensus standards, recommended practices, and. technical reports is one of ISA's primary goals. To achieve this goal, the Standards and Practices Depariment relies on the technical expedise and efforts of voluniger committee members, chairmen, and reviewers, ISA is an American National Standards Institute (ANSI) accredited organization. ISA ad United States Technical Advisory Groups (USTAGs) and provides secretariat support for International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and International Organization for Standardization (ISO) committees that develop process measurement and control standards. To obtain additional formation on the Society's standards program, please write: ister. Isa Attn: Standards Department 67 Alexander Drive P.O. Box 12277 Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 ISBN 1-55617-719-4 Copyright by the The Instrumentation, Systems, and Avtomation Secety ‘Tue dun 14 13:5838 2005