The Eritrian Muslim Intellectuals

"Because God Has Given Us the Power of Reasoning": Intellectuals, the Eritrean Muslim
League, and Nationalist Activism, 1946-1950

Author(s): Joseph L. Venosa
Source: Northeast African Studies , 2012, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2012), pp. 29-62
Published by: Michigan State University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41931313
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"Because God Has Given Us the
Power of Reasoning": Intellectuals,
the Eritrean Muslim League, and
Nationalist Activism, 1946-1950
Joseph L. Venosa, Clayton State University , Georgia, USA
ABSTRACT
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Northeast African Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2012, pp. 29-62. ISSN 0740-9133.
© 2012 Michigan State University Board of Trustees. All rights reserved.

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30 ■ Joseph L. Venosa
Just as the sky does not have a pillar, the Muslim does not have a
nation.1
- Popular joke among members of Eritrea's Unionist Party
In April 1949, Shaykh Ibrahim Sultan Ali, having traveled under threat of
assassination, appeared before the United Nations General Assembly as the
international body commenced its third official session with proceedings
on the future of Italy's former colonies.2 With the issue of Eritrea's indepen-
dence under deliberation, Ibrahim Sultan and his colleagues pleaded their
case as representatives of the Eritrean Muslim League, one of the largest
pro-independence parties to emerge during the late 1940s. The delegation's
arrival represented the culmination of a relatively short period of activism
in which Muslim intellectuals within the organization wielded a tremendous
influence in fostering nationalist sentiment. However, this influence was
also tied to a wider social agenda that the League's leading intellectual
authorities supported throughout post-World War II Eritrea.
This article argues that from the creation of the Eritrean Muslim League
in December 1946 to the UN General Assembly's decision to establish the
Eritrean-Ethiopian Federation in December 1950, the Muslim intelligentsia
within the League formulated much of the early nationalist discourse, which
recognized political autonomy as being compatible with an emerging "Er-
itrean" identity. This examination of nationalist mobilization and the role of
Muslim intellectuals reveals that two principal characteristics defined their
efforts. These were (1) an unprecedented investment in mobilizing Eritreans
at the grassroots level while pushing for dramatic social change; and (2)
a strong pursuit of alliance building with like-minded (mainly Tigrinya)
Christian nationalists. By looking at these broad trends, this article will show
that the political gains of Eritrea's small but influential Muslim intellectual
class were indispensable to the growth of nationalist discourse. Following a
brief overview of the nature of the political fracturing that occurred during
the early 1940s and a discussion of the basic framework used here, this
article argues that Eritrea's Islamic institutions prior to and especially after
the arrival of the British Military Administration (BMA) were strong enough
to nurture this first generation of activists, enabling them to establish their
basic political philosophy within the Muslim League.
This article will also demonstrate that through these developments,

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"Because God Has Given Us the Power of Reasoning" ■ 31
Muslim intellectuals living in British-occupied Eritrea solidified notions of a

vague but palpable Muslim identity by tapping into the considerable degree
of Islamic social capital. Moreover, this analysis will demonstrate that as
an association comprised of "indigenous," Eritrean-born intellectuals, the
Muslim League's commitment to allying with the oppressed and espousing
a moral basis for its political positions places the organization firmly in the
sphere of scholar-activism that some postcolonial theorists have identified
with the phenomenon of the "Third World intellectual."3
The Development of Political Fracturing in

British-Occupied Eritrea
When Italy's East African Empire crumbled under the weight of British-allied
forces in early 1941, questions about the future of the Italian colonies
emerged even before Britain had secured complete control over most of the
former Italian territories. With regard to Eritrea, which included a mainly
urban-based Italian settler population and a well-entrenched colonial
administration, British officialdom did not presume initially that Eritreans
themselves were inclined to participate in the discussions about the colony's
future. Yet following the BMA's establishment in April 1941, activists from
both Eritrea's Muslim and Christian communities entered into the political
dialogue on the former colony's fate. Less than a month after the BMA's
arrival, activists from Eritrea's major cities founded Mahber Fikri Hager
(Party for the Love of Country; MFH), the first sizable political association
to emerge from among the Eritrean intelligentsia.4 From its inception, the
organization's mixed Muslim-Christian composition also featured an equally
diverse political membership that included those who called for union be-
tween Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as members who argued that Eritrea was
an entity distinct from Ethiopia and therefore entitled to its own sovereignty.
Initially, the group of mainly former members of the Italian colonial civil
service that comprised the MFH expressed concern over the fate of their
respective communities and the future role that Eritreans would have in the
new British-controlled administration. At the heart of their concern, par-
ticularly for principal leaders Gäbrä Mäsqäl Wäldu and Abdelkadir Kebire,
was the fact that the BMA continued employing Italian administrators in
the day-to-day operations of government, stoking residents' fears of Italian

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reprisals against residents. In April 1941, approximately 4,000 Eritreans

demonstrated in Asmara against both the British administration and Italian
officials, resulting in the BMA's imposition of a ban on public gatherings of
Eritreans in groups of three or more.5
Although some scholars have argued that the organization espoused
an inherently "unionist" program, the more complicated reality suggests
otherwise. Despite the fact that some activists argued for complete union
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, some Christian members of MFH, including
future nationalist leader Woldeab Woldemariam, supported the idea that
Eritrea could be reunited with the mainly Tigrinya-speaking peoples in the
Tigray province of northern Ethiopia.6 While most of the organization's
Christian members accepted the idea of a "greater Tigray" and others
expressed wholehearted support for unionism, the small group of Muslim
activists within the MFH failed to articulate a cohesive message on Eritrean
independence. Following the end of World War II, as political differences
between unionist and nationalist members intensified, the Ethiopian gov-
ernment also pressed its claims on Eritrea to the international community.
The political fracturing unfolded as the BMA solidified its control over the
region, and the independence question was taken up only as part of the
wider international debate on the future of Italy's former colonies.
Islamic Social Capital- A Framework
Although nationalist political parties first developed in Eritrea more than 60

years ago, scholars continue to debate exactly when and how a legitimate
national "consciousness" first emerged. The most substantive studies to
address the topic, namely, Ruth Iyob's The Eritrean Struggle for Independence,
Alemseged Tesfai's 'Aynfälalä (Let Us Not Be Put Asunder) and Gaim
Kibreab's Critical Reflections on the Eritrean War of Independence, have each
pointed to the emergent political activism among nationalist leaders during
the mid-1 940s as the starting point for a genuine national consciousness.
Gaim Kibreab's 2008 study represents the most thorough analysis of the
development of this identity using a social capital framework. Basing his
analysis on the theory that social capital is reflected in the ability of different
cultural groups to "foster, sustain and consolidate reciprocal cooperation
and social trust," the author emphasized that Eritrean social capital was not

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fully realized until the development of the "associational life" that emerged
throughout civil society during the BMA period.7 However, he omitted the
role of intellectuals in the period before British intervention because, in his
analysis, "the scale of educational opportunities provided by the Italians was
extremely small" and thus minimized the growth of civil society prior to
the early 1940s.8 Yet in light of the fact that Kibreab's study makes mention
of the relationship between Eritrean religious authorities and wider social
capital, it is surprising that the influence of Islamic educational institutions
is not analyzed in greater detail.9 Indeed, many Muslim members of the
intelligentsia facilitated early notions of civil society among a diverse com-
munity composed of several ethno-cultural groups found mainly (but not
exclusively) in western and northern Eritrea and along the Red Sea coast,
including the Tigre, Saho, Afar, Bilen, Haderab, and the Tigrinya-speaking
Jabarti.10
Proceeding from Robert Putnam's broad definition of social capital

as referring to the "features of social organization, such as trust, norms,
and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating
coordinated actions," Islamic social capital can be defined in the Eritrean
context as the motivating force in the formation of broad religious and
political networks within Muslim communities.11 From their positions in
religious and educational institutions, members of the Eritrean intelligentsia
strengthened Islamic social capital by providing the institutional means nec-
essary to support a shared historical identity among Muslim communities.
This achievement has been cited by some as a major reason why so many
of the early Muslim League leaders, despite not having had access to formal
Western education beyond the primary level, emerged as "far-sighted" and
politically astute leaders within their respective communities.12
Islamic Educational Institutions in the 1940s
Eritrean Islamic social capital was rooted in the proliferation of ed

institutions, particularly the several hundred mosques and th
khalwaat (Qur'anic schools) that operated throughout the regio
the early twentieth century.13 Under Italian colonialism, mos
institutions thrived under administrators who, in exchange fo
allegiance, granted "subventions to mosques and monthly sti

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Muslim community leaders and granted shari'a courts autonomy in matters

of personal status, family, and inheritance."14 This was most apparent in
regard to the influence of the Khatmiyya tariqa (brotherhood). Having first
spread to Eritrea from eastern Sudan in the early nineteenth century through
the efforts of Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani, the brotherhood established
centers of Islamic learning throughout the Sahel and the coastal lowlands.
The Khatmiyya's relatively centralized structure, along with its leader-
ship's privileged position as an instrument for legitimizing Italian colonial
influence, remained intact throughout the early twentieth century and
helped the order dominate other Sufi groups in the region.15 The influence
of zawaya (Sufi lodges) as institutions that contained both "social and
educational functions" was enhanced by the proactive Khatmiyya leadership
and members of the al-Mirghani family, who argued for greater involvement
among its members in serving as Quťanic instructors and qadis.16 They were
particularly influential within the zawaya of Eritrea's major Islamic urban
centers, including Keren, Agordat, and Massawa. Teachers and preachers
thus secured their influence through the diffusion of regional Islamic
learning.17 Even beyond the al-Mirghani family's influence, several Muslim
merchant families, particularly in Eritrea's cities, established themselves
as leading authorities and contributed to local education by raising funds
for mosque-building, renovations, the opening of new Qur'anic schools,
the organizing of youth activities, and the subsidizing of Arabic language
instruction.18
Above all, these activities encouraged greater social cohesion, particu-

larly through the proliferation of Arabic instruction for Muslim youths,
which helped guarantee that the language served as a common vernacular
among a multilingual Islamic community that included Tigre, Saho, Bilen,
Beja, Afar, and, to a lesser extent, Tigrinya. By the end of Italian rule,
Eritrea's Muslim communities, particularly those in the major cities, had
the social capital necessary to mobilize for more substantial changes in
Islamic civil society. This was evident especially in the accomplishments
of Eritrea's most prominent Islamic religious official, Grand Mufti Ibrahim
al-Mukhtar Ahmad Umar. The mufti's efforts, with assistance from many
of Eritrea's most prominent Muslim merchants, helped establish numerous
Islamic schools and institutes across the country throughout the early and
mid-1940s.19
Although the mufti acknowledged that upon his initial return to Eritrea

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"Because God Has Given Us the Power of Reasoning" m 35
in 1940 he was shocked and found the religious conditions of Muslims to be

"pathetic," he nevertheless pursued his goal of improving the conditions of
Islamic educational and legal institutions throughout the region. Between
1943 and 1951, the mufti helped establish as well as standardize various
schools in Asmara, Massawa, Keren, Agordat, and other major cities. In his
efforts, he received extensive support from the Muslim leadership and mer-
chant community, especially from Asmara's influential Jabarti community.20
While many of the Asmara Jabarti had already been "instrumental in
funding the construction of mosques and other religious institutions" in
the city and throughout the Hamasien region during the early twentieth
century, the more influential families proved especially supportive of the
mufti's attempts to establish greater uniformity in religious practices during
the early 1940s.21 Beyond providing the bulk of finance for the Asmara
waqf, merchants also promoted the mufti's wider efforts at encouraging
Muslim youth to take advantage of the new push for educational reform.22
The efforts of Shaykh Adem Kusmallah and his brother Shaykh Kusmallah
Muhammad illustrate this kind of urban-based activism. As owners of a suc-
cessful clothing business, they were involved in raising money for mosques
and sponsoring meetings of various community groups on their property.
The Kusmallahs even made their storage facilities in the Geza-Berhanu sec-
tion of the city available to youth groups to help them further their studies
while being encouraged by the brothers to maintain their progress and "be
attentive in their education."23 Others, including members of the prominent
Aberra family, provided needed funds by using revenue raised from their
substantial commercial activities in Asmara to finance Muslim education.24
Some of Asmara's leaders, such as Berhanu Ahmedin, not only involved

themselves in supporting the institutional reform but also used their sub-
stantial contacts with Jabarti residing outside Eritrea to assist in attracting
new teachers and Arabic instructors to the city.25 Some leading intellectuals,
such as Shaykh Abdelkadir Kebire, made a point of regularly visiting the new
schools, observing the progress of students, and making their own recom-
mendations for institutional improvement.26 Kebire's well-known zeal for
supporting education initiatives also reflected his contributions in organizing
donation drives among other Muslim leaders in Asmara and Massawa and
helping to plan the construction of several trade and polytechnic schools
for Muslim youth.27 The push for greater standardization and organization
in religious institutions contributed to a substantial mobilization of Islamic

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civil society. Moreover, the growing self-awareness within Eritrea's Muslim

communities occurred at almost exactly the time at which the independence
issue began to be debated increasingly along religious lines, especially as
political fracturing increased following the end of World War II.
The Eritrean Muslim League and National Consciousness
In late November 1946, Eritrea's political factions came together in Asmara,

in the hope of finding a workable solution to the independence question, at
the infamous conference at Bet Ghiorgis on the outskirts of Asmara. Instead
of a solution being found, perceived attacks by the predominantly Christian
unionist factions resulted in a walkout by Ibrahim Sultan and several other
Muslim attendees. Citing opposition to the "humiliation and disdain" that
unionists had displayed toward the Muslim delegations, Ibrahim Sultan
decried the "Christian conspiracy" at Bet Ghiorgis as designed to "sell Eritrea
to the wolf."28 Soon afterward, he and other Muslim leaders began to make
plans to form a separate political organization.
On 3 December, the region's most prominent Muslim activists came
together in the city of Keren and formed the Eritrean Muslim League.
Attendees elected their colleagues to positions in the League's Executive
Council.29 Although League leaders later guarded against being labeled
a purely "Islamic" organization, the founding conference illustrated that
activists sought to build upon their basic strengths as a political outlet
for all Eritrean Muslims. With Ibrahim Sultan elected to the position of
secretary general and wielding much of the executive authority, officials
elected Sayyid Muhammad Abu Bakr al-Mirghani as League president. Even
though al-Mirghani himself did not carry much official power within the
organization, his symbolic position and informal influence as the head of
the Eritrean branch of the Khatmiyya illustrated how the new organization
worked to build the broadest possible support under the banner of Islam.30
Although the League's first meeting did not constitute a mass gathering
of all of Eritrea's Muslim groups, those in attendance established three main
objectives that they later presented to their respective communities in order
to gain support. The basic points included the mission (1) to preserve the
"territorial unity of Eritrea" as demarcated by Italian officials before 1935;
(2) to support and pursue the unconditional independence of Eritrea - if

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not immediately, then after a period of trusteeship; and (3) to refuse the
union or annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia or any other country.31 Because
the Executive Council included many of Eritrea's most influential religious
and community leaders, the inclusion of "important personalities" gave
added credibility to the organization and enabled its membership to swell
during its first few months.32
Initially, the League's organizational structure reflected the way in
which its founders promoted their association as a bastion of intellectual
leadership within the Muslim community. Through the Executive Council
and later the Shuban al-rabita (Youth Association), League members presented
the organization as an instrument for promoting democratic ideals through
the education of all Eritreans. Representatives later noted that the League's
creation was a decision among all "Muslim delegations, religious leaders,
intellectuals and community leaders" to ensure that Eritreans were given the
resources needed to reject all forms of cultural dependency and incorporation
with Ethiopia.33 League officials also promoted the idea that the "learned and
wise" members of the community be given the responsibility for debating the
independence question and working toward a political solution.34
The Executive Council directed the League's day-to-day operations.
Shaykhs and qadis on the Council were responsible for overseeing key
aspects of the organization, including "ratifying budgets and expenditures,
summoning meetings and selecting the time and place of meetings, ensuring
the execution of laws and resolutions," and "coordinating the affairs of the
party and determining its internal organization and operation."35 Other
leaders, particularly Khatmiyya authorities from Eritrea's Western Province,
also served in high-profile positions in the League.36 The League established
its own publication, Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya , in late February 1947.
The Asmara-based editors, Shaykh Yasin Ba Tuq and Shaykh Muhammad
Uthman Hayuti, established the weekly Arabic newsletter as a means of
developing the national "Muslim consciousness" and to serve as an outlet
for the League's emerging intellectual activism.37
Sawt al-rabita and Muslim Intellectual Activism
In an editorial that appeared in the newsletter's first edition on 25

ary, Muhammad Uthman Hayuti welcomed the participation of

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of all faiths and viewpoints who wished to contribute their opinions. He

remarked that the organization supported such participation in part because
the League's ideology and political decisions were not based "solely on
considering Muslims' benefits" and that the organization wished to take
into account Christian citizens' concerns to support a "common national
interest."38 In its inaugural issue, the newspaper included commentaries
from many of Eritrea's most prominent Muslim figures. Within the paper,
Asmara-based leaders such as Shaykh Hussein Alamin, Dagyat Hassan Ali,
and Ibrahim al-Mukhtar each contributed pieces that addressed concerns
within the Eritrean Muslim community. Echoing Hayuti's spirit of solidarity
with Eritreans of all faiths, Dagyat Hassan Ali wrote that besides building
solidarity with "Muslims around the world," the paper would be used for
"strengthening the bilateral understanding between [us and] our Christian
brothers with whom we are connected in our national interest and economic
and social responsibilities."39

Many league officials used the paper to demonstrate the tangible nature
of nationalist support in the country. The intelligentsia thus established the
basic discourse on how to achieve sovereignty and the terms on which an
independent Eritrean society should be based:
Eritrea can manage its affairs economically, but the essentials of

ultimate independence have to be founded with the cultural, social
and ethical requirements that without them cannot exist. It is essential
that the children of this country are capable and possess the qualities
that reflect the ripeness of a political conscience so that they can take
responsibility for administering the nation by themselves.40
Other contributors emphasized that Eritrean independence depended on

the ability of all Muslims to strengthen civic activism. Muhammad Uthman
Hayuti warned that without establishing an autonomous government that
included the "participation of all elements," Eritrean leaders would not
be able to manage the complex "matters of the age." He claimed that the
League had assumed a major responsibility in trying to guarantee the rights,
livelihood, and happiness of "every Muslim who is faithful to his homeland"
and that the "momentum of the national feeling" needed to be supported
by a serious commitment among the Muslim leadership.41
Consequently, many prominent Muslim leaders, even those living in

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"Because God Has Given Us the Power of Reasoning" m 39
the towns and villages outside the major cities, took on important roles
within the new organization as fundraisers and conference organizers. Not
surprisingly, both the mosques and private homes of League supporters
usually served as the central places in which to discuss the Party's activi-
ties.42 According to Mehmedin Ahmed Se'id, Umardin Abdelkadir Mahmud
Muhammad, and Idris Ibrahim Hussein, all former League members from the
village of Qohaito, religious authorities encouraged political discussion as a
component of daily public life. They noted how "preaching was conducted
on various occasions such as public meetings, weddings, funerals and
other places where people gathered." They recalled that most of the public
lectures included lessons about Eritrea's past history of "foreign occupation"
and the argument that Ethiopia, like other past powers, did not have the
interests of the Eritrean people at heart.43 One of the strongest early voices
to emerge came from Qadi Ali Umar Uthman, the president of the League's
Akkele Guzay branch. A judge on Asmara's shari'a court of appeals and
confidant of the mufti, Qadi Uthman served as a powerful orator for the
League's cause by appearing within mosques to disseminate information on
the League's positions.44
Ibrahim al-Mukhtar also contributed to the organization's efforts.
Although "he was a very passionate nationalist, who was probably among
the most knowledgeable on the intricacies of Eritrean politics," his position
as mufti put him in a delicate situation, in which his religious duties did
not allow him to take a public stance on politics. Nevertheless, Ibrahim
al-Mukhtar contributed to both the political aims of the League and the
intellectual foundations of Eritrean nationalism more broadly. In addition
to his religious publications and proclamations, he authored several works
detailing the social and political history of Eritrea's various Muslim peoples,
often as articles in Sawt al-rabita. 45 He was also a personal confidant of and
informal advisor to several high-level officials within the League, including
Abdelkadir Kebire, Dagyat Hassan Ali, and Hajj Suleiman Ahmad Umar.46
Ismael Ibrahim al-Mukhtar recalled that the mufti, largely because of his
unique position and exceptional knowledge of Islamic sciences, helped
solidify the League's basic intellectual foundations:
The mufti had a strong relationship with the intellectuals of his time,
particularly those who spoke Arabic. They naturally gravitated towards
him as he was a leading authority. The mufti was well versed not only

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in Islamic subjects but also Arabic literature, history, politics and that
appealed to intellectuals of his time. The mufti through his articles,
speeches and one to one engagement was instrumental in shaping many
of these intellectuals and promoting their causes.47
According to Jonathan Miran, the mufti also displayed a "remarkable

sensitivity to writing history" that served as a major catalyst in the forma-
tion of a more tangible "Eritrean Muslim consciousness" that developed
in conjunction with the growth of Eritrean media. In the transformations
that were taking place, Ibrahim al-Mukhtar represented one of the "early
and rare intellectuals of his time" to make the distinction between Eritrean
and Ethiopian identity.48 Consequently, Sawt al-rabita served a central

academic function for the League intelligentsia; the newsletter relied on the
commentaries of Muslim leaders to incite nationalist sentiment. Between
February 1947 and December 1950, the newsletter published various articles
documenting the wide range of support that Eritrea's nationalist cause was
receiving throughout the Islamic world, and its writers used political events
in Egypt, Pakistan, and elsewhere to build support for their national cause.
The newsletter also promoted the activities of new civic organizations
such as the Society for Cultural Cooperation to illustrate the growing cultural
mobilization on a local level.49 Through all of these initiatives, League activ-
ists developed a nationalist platform while articulating the need for drastic
social reform in the process of achieving political independence. In this
heightened climate of political activism, League leaders contributed to the
movement by addressing these cultural issues in the pages of Sawt al-rabita
and organizing League meetings, public demonstrations, and rallies in an
attempt to guarantee that the emerging generation of Eritrean Muslims was
being "brought up with mature intellectual discussions and debates" about
its own identity and place in society.50 Within these debates, the emphasis
on providing justice to the oppressed and promoting social change became
two of the organization's most common rallying points. This was largely
due to the efforts of Muslim League leader Shaykh Ibrahim Sultan.

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Ibrahim Sultan and Articulations of Social Justice
Ibrahim Sultan was the most active League leader in framing Eritrean
independence as a movement against perceived injustice and aggression.
A product of Keren's Islamic schools and a former Arabic translator for the
Italian colonial government, he had been one of the most prominent figures
to address the plight of the tigre "serf' communities in western Eritrea living
under the authority of the šmagla (landowners).51 During the early 1940s,
he and other activists came to the defense of several tigre clans that had
refused to pay the customary dues to their šmagla. He continued his support
for tigre emancipation from the traditional land system and later involved
himself in resolving the "serf uprising" that erupted throughout Eritrea's
Western Province after the BMA's arrival.52 Consequently, Ibrahim Sultan
and his supporters "began to organize around the peasants' self interest,"
articulating a strong antifeudal politics across western Eritrea while arguing
for the creation of new clan units to remove tensions between tigre and
šmagla.53
Thus the founding of the Muslim League in November 1946 was, in part,
a result of Eritrean nationalists' investment in what Jordan Gebre-Medhin
termed the "new confidence of the serfs" and the growing political cohesion
among Eritrean Muslims as a whole.54 The emphasis on empowering those
who were most oppressed within the traditional social structures of western
Eritrea was not lost on the BMA authorities. In July 1947, Kennedy Trev-
askis, one of the BMA's senior district officers in Western Eritrea, reflected
on the sudden surge of popularity of the League among the grass roots:
I made the mistake of expecting political leadership, if it came at all,

to come from the chiefs. In fact it came in the first instance from the
huge mass of serf or subject classes which remain in a state of political

& partial economic subjugation to the small aristocratic ruling groups
of the Northern & Western Eritrean tribes.55
When appearing in front of both the Four Power Commission in 1947

and the UN Commission of Inquiry in 1950, Ibrahim Sultan argued that
the status of the tigre was "below the treatment of slaves" and that their
condition represented an affront to God and a violation of shari'a law.56
The establishment of the Muslim League came at almost exactly the same

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time at which he had cultivated his broadest support for tigre emancipa-
tion and British intervention in clan restructuring.57 According to Gaim
Kibreab, Ibrahim Sultan's success in working with the BMA and the šmagla
by "resurrecting the social organizations" of traditional tigre society could
not have been achieved without the legacy of the "deeply embedded social
organization that was inherited from the past."58 This inheritance was
also linked with the considerable activism of Muslim authorities among
the tigre, as Ibrahim Sultan's colleagues in Keren and Agordat used their
religious authority, much as Muslim businessmen used their economic
influence, to help shape the negotiations with BMA officials and quell the
unrest.59
The tone used by contributors to Sawt al-rabita supports the claim

that many League members viewed their organization as a genuinely
grassroots movement, one that was particularly sympathetic to the plight
of the tigre. The newsletter's first issue mentioned the circumstances in
which the League had been founded, stating that the organization was
itself a compromise that resulted from discussions between Eritrea's various
Muslim groups, including disposed tigre, religious leaders, and merchants.
Within the newsletter, the "serf' issue was discussed and analyzed with
particular emphasis on šmagla who took exception to the League's agenda.
For example, when Diglal Gailani Hussien Pasha, a šmagla ( nabtab ) from
the Beni-Amer clan, renounced his allegiance to the League and planned to
join the Unionist Party in November 1947, he was heavily criticized in the
newspaper's editorials. Most writers argued that his departure was not due
to sincere political concerns but rather to his worry that he would eventually
lose his lands and feudal dues in the event of independence. One writer,
Ahmad Muhammad Ibrahim al-Tigrawi, argued that the existence of any
of the Š magia in an independent Eritrea was equivalent to a "plague" being
cast upon the country's citizens.60
Official tigre representatives later echoed the spirit of many of the
commentaries. When delegates from the Four Power Commission arrived
in Eritrea in November 1947, tigre leaders sent a 16-page memorandum to
the Commission, stating that with regard to the conditions of those living
under šmagla influence, "a population of a half million souls is subjected
to the will of 1,000 parasites."61 The representatives' letter, dated almost
a year after the Muslim League's creation, contained a political platform
identical to the one that the League established at its founding meeting in

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Keren. The representatives rejected "categorically any system of annexation

or union with Ethiopia or any other nation" and declared themselves willing
to accept a period of British trusteeship before assuming full independence.62
Moreover, the representatives used their memorandum to craft a detailed
history of the social and economic relations between their various clans and
the šmaglcL They noted to the UN committee:
It is our duty to explain to your commission, with great displeasure,

the very ugly situation in which we, the Tigré of Eritrea, find ourselves;
a situation which has lasted for more than three centuries; a situation
which could not even be applied to animals, seeing that there are laws
that protect them from ill-treatment, and people who break these laws
are liable to punishment.63
Although the representatives went into detail to describe the various

ways in which tigre were abused and forced to pay various forms of tribute,
the testimony also illustrates how abolishing tigre subjugation became, in
the eyes of many, one of the central tenets in the Muslim League's push for
social reform. Kennedy Trevaskis also took notice of the party's grassroots
strength on the issue. He noted that although in the earliest stages many
šmagla chiefs "formed the party together with their subjects thinking that
they would control its activities," they subsequently discovered that it was
not "a Chiefs party & that it is a party which stands (in their tribes) for serf
emancipation."64 Perhaps not surprisingly, Trevaskis also observed that the
amalgamation between the League and the cause of tigre emancipation took
place as several "aristocratic ruling groups" from Western Eritrea began
joining Eritrea's Unionist Party (UP).65
In both their rhetoric and their actions, League leaders understood
tigre emancipation as part of a wider struggle to break out of the previous
feudal traditions that, coincidentally, remained well entrenched in Ethiopia.
Consequently, support for the tigre also aided the organization in providing
additional justification to be used in arguing against Eritrea's absorption
into Ethiopia. League representatives noted that their constituents, tigre
and non-tigre alike, "do not like any other system than that given under the
Atlantic Charter, which gives freedom of religion, freedom of the press, etc."66
Beyond the League's support for emancipation, the League's activities
demonstrated how the growing nationalist movement was being adopted

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by a wider spectrum of Eritrean Muslim society that had previously been

overlooked in the political process. For example, with the creation of
Shuban al-rabita in mid- 1947, students and teenagers for the first time
joined the ranks of the League.67 Initially, Shuban al-rabitďs members were
responsible mainly for disseminating information about the organization
and for gathering new recruits. Members also trained for public events
such as parades and party demonstrations and served as the main security
force for party meetings, usually guarding meeting venues and compounds
with sticks and swords.68 At large political gatherings, the association also
acted as a social center for Muslim youth, distributing food and directing
pro-independence marches. Moreover, the association also seems to have
allowed a certain degree of participation by female youth. While few written
records document women's involvement in the Muslim League's activities,
some former members recalled that in certain instances, unmarried Muslim
girls between the ages of 14 and 16 accompanied male members in public
marches between villages, often carrying banners and participating in
anti-Ethiopian chanting.69
The participation of Eritrean youth, in both urban and rural areas, was
another indicator of how the League extended its reach into grassroots activ-
ism. Even in Sawt al-rabita, League writers explained that the newspaper's
primary objective, as an instrument of the League, was to serve as a forum
for addressing broader political concerns. They stated that in their pursuit
of giving a voice to all Eritreans, the League was "open to accepting articles
from contributors from outside the organization."70 This inclusive view of
nationalist participation had important ramifications for the way in which
the League's members developed their political program, that is, in concert
with pro-independence Christians.
Muslim-Christian Nationalist Cooperation
While the Muslim League's efforts in supporting tigre emancipation were

targeted toward a privileged class of landowners, their broader implications
were that they united a sizable number of politically engaged Muslims to
counter the already polemic atmosphere among Eritrea's Coptic clergy.
Tekeste Negash argued that the Eritrean Orthodox Church "did not have to
wait for mobilization by the Ethiopian state for its union with Ethiopia."71

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" Because God Has Given Us the Power of Reasoning" ■ 45
Rather, by the beginning of British occupation, the most radical unionist

elements, both within and outside the MFH, were already beginning to
connect Eritrea's Christian communities with Ethiopia's cultural legacy.
Yet even with the backdrop of the growing sectarianism, Ibrahim Sultan
and other Muslim League leaders strove for a harmonious relationship with
their Christian nationalist peers. Muslim-Christian cooperation represented
one of the lasting legacies of those who established the League. Even the
organization's charter made a point of mentioning its members' desire to
come to a political agreement with their "Christian brothers."72
Also indicative of its progressive, pluralistic view of Eritrean society
was the fact that the League's policies and proclamations were carried out
with the intention that the organization would not be seen as an Islamist
organization. The League's resolution to adopt both Tigrinya and Arabic as
its official languages was intended to "demonstrate that it was a nationalist
party," despite the fact that it was overwhelmingly composed of Muslims
who did not speak Tigrinya as a first language.73 Resisting unionist attempts
to label the organization as a purely Islamic association, League leaders
argued that their organization already enjoyed a strong legacy of joint
Muslim-Christian political cooperation, best illustrated by the partnership
between Ibrahim Sultan and Woldeab Woldemariam, one of the leading
Christian nationalist leaders. British officials also took note of the growing
partnership during late 1946 and early 1947, observing that "the present
state of affairs points to a merging of the Moslem League with those Coptic
Christians who are unwilling to accept union with Ethiopia."74
Ibrahim Sultan, Woldeab Woldemariam, and many of their politically
active contemporaries were founding members of the MFH in 1941. 75
While many of the organization's Christian members were later absorbed
into the UP after the Christian leadership's alliance with the Ethiopian
government "changed the equilibrium in favor of pro-union sentiments,"
Woldeab Woldemariam and a small number of other (predominantly
Tigrinya) Christian intellectuals began to support a nationalist platform.76
Thus in later years, even after the formation of the Muslim League and the
Liberal Progressive Party (LPP), members who had formed the nucleus of
the anti-unionist faction within the MFH continued to work together from
within their new respective organizations.77
Although Sultan contended that Eritrea's Muslim masses had been "put
asunder" by Christian leaders at Eritrea's first mass political conference at

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Bet Ghiorgis, the establishment of the Muslim League was in large measure
a compromise that addressed the need for political protection for Muslims
as well as a guarantee to continue the interfaith unity established with pro-
independence Christians in previous years within the MFH.78 Even Kennedy
Trevaskis recognized the significance of their interreligious cooperation:
the most remarkable developments of the last six months has been
the rise of a Moslem party styling itself "the Moslem League" and a
Christian party calling itself the "Liberal Party." Both these parties are
united in their opposition to annexation by Ethiopia and both stand
for an independent Eritrea.79
Social and political camaraderie among pro-Independence Muslims and

Christians was an integral part of the League's organizational philosophy.
Following the League's first general conference in January 1947, Ibrahim
Sultan affirmed that Muslim and Christians were "brothers and children
of the same homeland" and that independence could only be achieved by

coming together and embracing each other's "culture, religion, habits and
customs."80 Interfaith cooperation also developed into one of the major
criteria for joining the League's ranks. Beyond an individual's personal cour-
age and efficiency, the criteria for people to represent the party was based
largely on their ability to build strong alliances with Christians, Italians,
"half-castes," and other groups.81 Under the banner of Islam, many League
leaders used their credentials as Muslim scholars to remind followers that
their faith "calls for the freedom of all people without distinction between
race or ethnicity and makes freedom the founding principle of humanity
by prohibiting the despotism of the powerful against the oppressed."82 The
spirit of this unity was eloquently captured in the League's anthem, entitled
"Peace Be Upon You, Flag of Eritrea":
Peace be upon you, flag of Eritrea

al-rabita al-islamiyya at the center of Asmara
Consulting with her sister, the freedom seeker [LPP]
Let her flag wave in the center of her country
With her greenish hips and red lips
Her strong Mission like a bridge with a scale at her core

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Bringing both Christians and Muslims together

At daybreak, she went down to Massawa
She crossed through the Red Sea and came into sight of Assab
Climbed up to Sen1 afe
Stopped by Adi-KeyĶ saying " hear me out"

Toured Emni Hajer, Tessenei and Barentu
And she said she wouldn't leave behind Agordat, Keren and Nakfa
Whomever distances themselves from her or sees her as trivial
will not see our country developed.83
The idea of independence being a joint Muslim-Christian venture

was a reality for the League leadership, who had come of age during the
earlier part of the decade and saw how unionist elements took advantage
of religious differences to weaken the nationalist movement.
The rapport that defined the relationship between League leaders and
prominent Christian nationalists was a testament to the inclusive vision
of independence that the intellectual authorities espoused. Ras Tessema
Asberom, a Tigrinya noble and the president of the LPP, stated in a 1947
speech that Eritrea had belonged to both religions "for thousands of years."
He noted that "we [Christians and Muslims] have lived in harmony with
our respective religions and helped each other."84 The LPP's ideology of an
unconditionally independent Eritrea, although different from the Muslim
League's support for a ten-year period of European trusteeship, helped
cement mutual support within each organization's leadership apparatus.
Ibrahim Sultan, Abdelkadir Kebire, and other Muslim League officials also
made a point of attending the founding ceremony of the LPP in February,
1947. 85 Kibreab's study suggests that this accord between the religions
among nationalist leaders was chiefly the result of the wider social capital
that was accumulated through the proximity of Christian and Muslim
communities to each other. Indeed, concerns over maintaining religious ca-
maraderie are evident in many of the private testimonies of Muslim League
officials. Writing to his colleague Muhammad Nurhussein, Abdelkadir Kebire
explained the Muslim rationale for Eritrean unity:
It is not our purpose to dominate the Christians of our home country

or to expand the Muslim religion. The purpose is to reject, in all

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conditions, the supported statement of Ethiopian federation. Since

Allah, the Listener and the Knower, has given us the power of reason-
ing, how do we stand united with the deceiver and colonizer Ethiopia?86
Kebire's concerns help reveal that because of extensive Islamic social

capital, leaders from within the League were able to make political overtures
to Christian nationalists without fearing that their gestures would be seen
as being detrimental to Muslim interests.
Most people within the League intelligentsia recognized the importance
of this rich legacy of Islamic-Christian interaction and used it to their
advantage as the nationalist momentum developed throughout the late
1940s; as far as the organization's leadership was concerned, part of being
a pious Muslim meant working with non-Muslims for the betterment of all
Eritreans.87 Many Muslim League representatives even claimed, however
incorrectly, that an overwhelming majority of "Hamasien Christians"
belonged to the LPP and thus, only a fraction of Eritrean Christians did not
support the League's basic aim of independence.88
The Muslim League and the Independence Bloc
As the United Nations General Assembly began debating the future of the
former Italian colonies, political collaboration intensified, and by May 1949,
Muslim League and LPP representatives began drafting the preliminary
program designed to transform their respective organizations into a new
nationalist front.89 Their ability to build a larger nationalist constituency had
gained momentum since the previous April, when all of Eritrea's nationalist
parties, including the LPP and the Pro-Italy Party, rejected the Bevin-Sforza
Plan, which proposed to partition Eritrea between Sudan and Ethiopia.
League members in particular came out strongly against the idea of partition
and instead argued for a united front between all groups:
It is important that all political parties should come together and discuss
one united solution that would rescue the nation from the disastrous
consequences of division. And after they reach a united opinion, that

is - complete independence and a rejection of Eritrea being divided, it
should be presented to the United Nations in one voice.90

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Although the prospect of implementing the Bevin-Sforza plan collapsed

by the following May, it had a tremendous influence on the League leader-
ship in pursuing a broader nationalist agenda. While at the UN General
Assembly meeting at Lake Success, League delegates agreed with other
pro-independence representatives to officially form a new organization upon
their return to Eritrea. By the end of the month, Eritrea's Independence
Bloc emerged to bring the nationalist cause to the international community;
it also represented the culmination of the Muslim-Christian nationalist
partnership.91
As an association of all independence-minded political parties, the
Independence Bloc was modeled on the Muslim League's internal structure,
and its leading representatives included several members of the League's
Executive Council. Ibrahim Sultan's rise as the main spokesman for the
umbrella organization during the representatives' stay at Lake Success also
illustrates the fact that the League provided much of the organizational
apparatus needed to steer the Bloc's agenda. However, even given its
Muslim League-dominated composition, the Bloc's presentation before
the UN General Assembly in September 1949 framed Eritrean sovereignty
in terms devoid of any particular religious rationale. That being said, the
perceived demographic realities did influence some representatives, who
claimed that Eritrea had a a Muslim majority that controlled most of the
territory, and this might be seen as having displayed a decidedly "Islamic
character."92 Sultan claimed that approximately 75 percent of all Eritreans
were Muslims, and that even the remaining non-Muslim population, being
a heterogeneous mix of predominantly Christian and animist sects with an
equally diverse linguistic mixture, "shared no affinities to the Ethiopian
People."93 For their part, League writers in Asmara reported on events
at the UN and went to great lengths to support the Bloc's objectives and
clarify its position to the public. Yasin Ba Tuq argued that all of Eritrea's
delegations with the exception of that of the Unionist Party "were convinced
after their meeting with the UN assembly that the best way would be to
unite their voices, especially when they saw how some nations pursued a
complete rejection of the Eritrean people's wishes."94 Consequently, the
Bloc's "official" establishment at Dekemhare in late June 1949 represented
a moment of great optimism for League leaders, who believed that the
Bloc's principal position of unconditional independence would finally gain
the support of the international community.

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Nationalist Fragmentation
While in the short term the creation of the Bloc demonstrated the League
leadership's ability to unite with other pro-independence groups to
strengthen the nationalist cause, the factionalism that later developed within
the Bloc over its strategy and membership policies and the personal rivalries
between some of the leaders demonstrated that the Muslim League could not
simply sustain a wider nationalist movement by its own political will.95 This
dilemma even applied to those within the League's core membership. By
late 1949, the conflict between the Executive Council and some disgruntled
members, fueled in part by British attempts to divide the organization,
caused the League to fracture and lose some of its original membership.96
The most significant split that occurred involved the defection of Shaykh Ali
Musa Radai, a former League official who led a breakaway sect of several
tigre clans to form the Muslim League of the Western Province (MLWP)
in early 1950. Referred to as "Täqsim" by its members, the organization
rejected the Muslim League's welcoming of Italian settlers into the Inde-
pendence Bloc. The MLWP's leaders also argued that Ibrahim Sultan had
betrayed his original Muslim constituency and had become nothing more
than an agent for Italian interests.97 When the Bloc finally collapsed less
than a year later, in early 1950, it presented the League leaders with their
greatest political challenge since their organization's formation.
Despite the failure of the Independence Bloc and the UN's later deci-
sion to compromise Eritrean sovereignty by voting for the creation of the
Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation in December 1950, the Muslim League and
its intellectual leadership achieved considerable success by mobilizing its
resources to spread as never before among Eritrea's Muslim communities.
Consequently, the League carried on and did its best during the interterm
period from December 1950 through September 1952 to guarantee Muslim
rights and representation within the impending Federation government. By
relying largely on grassroots activists and the voices of Muslim intellectuals,
the League continued to serve as a vanguard organization for articulating
Muslim concerns against perceived Ethiopian domination throughout the
Federal period.98

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Conclusions
In a space of roughly four years (1946-50), many of the activists wi

Eritrean Muslim League contributed to a significant political transfo
within the country's incipient nationalist movement. By building up
strengthening the preexisting Islamic social capital, intellectuals asso
with the organization utilized the growing strength of Islamic educa
institutions to help articulate the beginnings of a discernible
consciousness. League leaders thus solidified a nationalist discour
embraced the moral significance of Islam to the independence s
while remaining mindful of the inherent religious pluralism in Eritre
process, they achieved meaningful cooperation with Christian nation
and supported attempts for greater social reform among the region
dispossessed communities. The members of this generation of intelle
were more than willing to use their faith as an "ideological an
point" to achieve their goal of an independent and self-governing Er
These developments are significant because they suggest that the
authorities within the Muslim League manifested many ideological s
ties with other nationalist movements during the early period of A
decolonization.
As the international debate over Eritrea's future progressed, Muslim

League officials increasingly framed their struggle as only part of a wave
of nationalism spreading across the Islamic world and specifically the Horn
of Africa. The Somali independence movement received particular focus in
the League press; members viewed the struggle of their "Somali brothers"
as reflecting a parallel development among the Muslim peoples of the
two former Italian colonies. One commentary asserted that "the political
movements [within Eritrea and Somalia] express the alertness of the spirit
of conscience among all Muslim nations spreading from the Indian Ocean
to the Red Sea."100 Muslim League writers also showed a particular interest
in Pakistan's fortunes. Many commentators focused on how increased levels
of formal education and Arabic language training were helping promote
Pakistani national unity.101 In subsequent years, as the League began ad-
dressing more direct threats to Muslim security from unionist supporters,
developments in Pakistan received greater coveragefrom League officials
who tried to build momentum for their own cause by highlighting Pakistan's
perceived success.102 The interest displayed in the wider Islamic world

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suggests that the organization's basic political program was much more
broad and far-sighted than many scholars have assumed and that only
further research can better assess the relationship between the Eritrean
Muslim League and wider nationalist trends in the post-World War II era.
Furthermore, the available sources should be approached with a greater
attentiveness to how particular members of Eritrea's Islamic clergy com-
bined their political aspirations with their religious duties. While this article
has discussed how this combining developed generally among the leadership
and political activists, deeper analysis is needed of how religious officials
affiliated with the League fused their actual Islamic duties as teachers and
qadis with political action. Through such analysis, greater insight into the
political significance of Muslim "organic intellectuals" in Eritrean civil
society may be achieved. Although not as widely studied as the nationalist
movements that developed in predominantly Muslim countries such as
Egypt, Sudan, Pakistan, and elsewhere during the late 1940s, the growth
of the Eritrean Muslim League and its allies represented a significant
period in which politically active Muslim intellectuals (alongside their
Christian nationalist peers) emerged to challenge assumptions that there
were no inherent differences between Eritrean society and culture and that
of Ethiopia. By doing so, they helped lay the groundwork for much of the
later nationalist discourse that emerged during the Federal period and the
subsequent armed struggle for independence (1961-91).
NOTES
I am
and
and
pro
enti
1. A
193.
2. Bereket Habte Selassie, Erìtrea and the United Nations (Trenton, NJ: Red
Sea Press, 1989), 30. Although most Arabic and Tigrinya names of persons
mentioned in this paper have been transliterated according to the guidelines
set forth in the International Journal of Middle East Studies and Encyclopaedia

196.188.160.210 on Fri, 23 Dec 2022 22:20:35 UTC
Aethiopica, some appear according to their more common English spelling.

Familiar place names, including those of major Eritrean cities and towns,
appear in the form most familiar to English speakers.
3. Ghirmai Negash, "Native Intellectuals in the Contact Zone: African
Responses to Italian Colonialism in Tigrinya Literature," Biography 32, no.
1 (2009): 76. See Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual (New York:
Pantheon, 1994).
4. Mahber Fikri Hager is henceforth referred to as MFH. See Amare Tekle,
"The Creation of the Ethio-Eritrean Federation: A Case Study of Post-War
International Relations (1945-50)" (PhD diss., University of Denver, 1964),
71.
5. Thomas P. Ofcansky, "Mahber Fikri Hager," in Encyclopaedia Aethiopica,

ed. Siegbert Uhlig, vol. 3 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2007). Gäbrä
Mäsqäl Wäldu and Abdelkadir Kebire served as the MFH's president and vice
president, respectively. See Tesfai, 'Aynfälalä, 32-36.
6. Shumet Sishagne, Unionists and Separatists : The Vagaries of Ethio-Eritrean
Relation 1941-1991 (Hollywood, CA: Tsehai Publishers, 2007), 22-29. For
additional information on the "Greater Tigray" concept and its development,
see Alemseged Abbay, "The Trans-Mareb Past in the Present," Journal of
Modern African Studies 35, no. 2 (1997): 321-34; Alemseged Abbay, Identity
Jilted or Reimagining Identity? The Divergent Paths of the Eritrean and Tigrayan
Nationalist Struggles (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1998).

7. Gaim Kibreab, Critical Reflections on the Eritrean War of Independence:
Social Capital, Associational Life, Religion, Ethnicity and Sowing the Seeds of
Dictatorship (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2008), 88.
8. Ibid., 99.
9. In his article on the relationship between nationalism and Eritrea's
colonial legacy, Uoldelul Chelati Dirar proposed that scholars need to
begin approaching the topic with a greater emphasis on the "role of
modernity in the Eritrean colonial context," thereby reexamining the
political contributions of the small class of intellectuals and civil servants
that first emerged from the lower ranks of the Italian colonial government.
See Uoldelul Chelati Dirar, "Colonialism and the Construction of National
Identities: The Case of Eritrea," Journal of Eastern African Studies 1, no. 2
(2007): 269.
10. The Jabarti are Tigrinya-speaking Muslims engaged primarily in trade

and other commercial activity. They have a strong presence in Eritrea's

196.188.160.210 on Fri, 23 Dec 2022 22:20:35 UTC
highlands, especially in and around Asmara. See J. Spencer Trimingham,

Islam in Ethiopia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 150-53;
Abdelkadir Salih, "Jabarti," in Encyclopaedia Aethiopica, ed. Siegbert Uhlig,
vol. 2 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2005).
11. Robert Putman, Making Democracy Work : Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 167.
12. Nebil Ahmed, interview by author, Athens, OH, 23 November 2009.
13. Ibrahim al-Mukhtar Ahmad Umar, "The Mufti's Correspondence to the United
Nations Representative in Eritrea concerning the Arabic Language," edited
by Ismael Ibrahim al-Mukhtar, http://www.mukhtar.ca/contentN.php7type = vi
ewarticle&id = 58&category = lettersjnukhtar (accessed 3 August 2008). Unless
otherwise noted, all translations from Arabic and Tigrinya are my own.
14. Jonathan Miran, "A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea," Des Welt des
Islams 45, no. 1 (2005): 195. The spelling of sharVa reflects the version used
originally by the author. See Giuseppe Puglisi, Chi e dell' Erìtrea: Dizzionario
Biografico (Asmara: Agenzia Regina, 1952). By the end of 1947, the BMA
operated 60 schools employing approximately 150 indigenous teachers and
serving more than 5,000 students with Arabic and Tigrinya as the medium
of instruction. See Fabian Colonial Bureau, MSS Brit. Emp., s 365, 180/3,
Bodleian Library, Oxford University. Henceforth cited as FCB.
15. Miran, "A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea," 196. See also Silvia
Bruzzi, "II colonialismo italiana e la Hatmiyya in Eritrea (1890-1941):
Sayyid Ga'fer al-Mirgani e Sarifa 'Alawiyya nelle fonti coloniali italiane,"
Africa (Rome) 61, no. 3/4 (2006): 435-53. In his analysis of Tigre-speaking
communities during the late 1940s, Kennedy Trevaskis concluded that
because the inhabitants all followed "the Tarig'a El-Khatmia [sic]" they
also benefited from greater political cohesion than other Muslim peoples
living along the Red Sea coast and in the lowlands. See Papers of Sir
Kennedy Trevaskis, MSS Brit. Emp., s 367, Box 1 (B), "The Tigre-speaking
Population," 107, Bodleian Library, Oxford University. Henceforth cited as
Trevaskis Papers.
16. Miran, "A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea," 196. See John O. Voll,
"A History of the Khatmiyyah Tariqah in the Sudan" (PhD diss., Harvard
University, 1969).
17. See Jonathan Miran, "Constructing and Deconstructing the Tigre Frontier
Space in the Long Nineteenth Century," in History and Language of the Tigre-
Speaking Peoples , ed. Gianfrancesco Lusini (Naples: Universita Degli Studi Di

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Napoli "L'orientale," 2010), 33-50.

18. Nebil Ahmed, interview.
1 9. Ibrahim al-Mukhtar Ahmad Umar is henceforth referred to in the text as
Ibrahim al-Mukhtar. For the mufti, see Jonathan Miran, "Grand mufti, érudit
et nationaliste érythréen: Note sur la vie et l'oeuvre de cheikh Ibrâhîm al-

Mukhtâr (1909-1969)," Chroniques Yéménites 10 (2002): 6-7, http: //www.
wwu.edu/liberalstudies/ documents /Miran%20Chroniques%20Yemenites.pdf
(accessed 8 September 2010).
20. Ibrahim al-Mukhtar Ahmad Umar, "The Mufti Describes the Conditions of
Muslims until His Arrival and His Reform Efforts," edited by Ismael Ibrahim
al-Mukhtar, http://www.mukhtar.ca/contentN.php7type = viewarticle&id = 70
&category = mawakef_mukhtar (accessed 10 June 2010); Ismael Ibrahim al-
Mukhtar, email correspondence with author, 14 October, 2009.
21. Miran, "A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea," 196. See Yassin Aberra,
"Muslim Institutions in Ethiopia; The Asmara Awqaf," Journal of the Institute
of Muslim Minority Affairs 5, no. 1 (1984): 203-23.
22. Nebil Ahmed, interview. Waqf is defined broadly as an institution of
religious endowment within a given Islamic community. It usually
corresponds to a donation made in the form of a specific building, house, or
property to be used for religious and/or charitable purposes.
23. Ibid.
24. Aberra Osman Aberra, interview by author, telephone interview, Columbus,

OH, 23 July 2010.
25. Although instructors and Arabic teachers arrived from al-Azhar periodically
during the early and mid-1 940s, the first official delegation of scholars from
Cairo came in 1948 under the direction of Shaykh Ali Mustafa Alughabi al-
Shafi. Salim Ibrahim al-Mukhtar, "Shaykh Ibrahim al-Mukhtar Ahmad Umar:
The British Throne: 1942-1952," al-Dawlia, part 5, August, 1997.
26. Aberra Osman Aberra, interview. See Abd al-Qadir Haqus al-Jibirti,
Abushehada Abdelkadir Kebire (Cairo: al-Nasri dehebi, 1998), 40.
27. Jamil Aman Mohammed, interview by author, Ottawa, Canada, 18 July
2010.
28. Ibrahim Sultan, interview by Ahmad Haji Ali, Cairo, Egypt, 20-25 March
1982. See Tesfai, 'Aynfälalä, 185-208.
29. Nebil Ahmed, "A History of AI Rabita Al Islamiya Al Eritrea (1946-50)," in
Proceedings of a Workshop on Aspects ofEňtrean History, ed. Tekeste Melake
(Asmara: Hdri Publishers, 2007), 1 35.

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30. The duties of the League's secretary general, as defined by the organization's
statutes, included "preservation of the documents of the League; fixing dates
of meetings of the Superior Council; addressing invitations to the Provincial
Committees; preparing documents and arguments subject to discussion;
registration of statements of decisions; and despatching [sic] of copies of
decisions to Provincial Committee etc." Trevaskis Papers, Box 2 (A), Four
Power Commission of Investigation for the Former Italian Colonies, Report
on Eritrea, Appendix 106, "Memorandum on Aims and Program," 4.
31. Nebil Ahmed, "A History of AI Rabita Al Islamiya Al Eritrea (1946-50),"
134; "This Is the Muslim League," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 25 February
1947, 2.
136; Nebil Ahmed, interview. The original members of the Executive Council
included Ibrahim Sultan, Abdelkadir Kebire, Hajj Suleiman Ahmad Umar,
Dagyat Hassan Ali, Adem Muhammad Kusmallah, Hajj Imam Musa Abdu,
Muhammad Uthman Hayuti, Berhanu Ahmedin, Yasin Ba Tuq. Hajj Zeinu
Adem Kusmallah, interview by Nebil Ahmed, Asmara, Eritrea, 2 January
2003.
33. "Decision of the Muslim League," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 4 March 1947,
2.
34. Tesfai, ' Aynfälalä, 199.

137.
36. Lloyd Ellingson, "The Emergence of Political Parties in Eritrea, 1941-1950,"

Journal of African History 18, no. 2 (1977): 276; Miran, "A Historical
Overview of Islam in Eritrea," 204. One of the more prominent League
supporters in the Khatmiyya was Osman al-Mirghani, Sayyid Abu Bakr's
younger brother and reportedly a close confidant of Ibrahim Sultan. See
Foreign Office (FO), Kew Gardens, London, UK 742/23, 32. Although
a founding member of the League, Sayyid Abu Bakr "converted" to the
Unionist Party in October/November 1948 and later switched back to the
Muslim League-dominated Independence Bloc in 1949 after reportedly
being given a "regular salary from Italian sources." FO 403/473-18351.
See also FO 742/23, "The Case of Morgani's Defection and Its Possible
Development."
37. Miran, "A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea," 204. Sawt al-rabita al-
islamiyya is henceforth cited in the text as Sawt al-rabita. Born in Massawa in

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1914, Yasin Ba Tuq came from a prominent merchant family and received
his initial education in local Islamic and Italian schools. During the early
1 940s, he studied under the mufti and became a steadfast supporter of his
reform efforts. After attending the League's founding meeting in December
1946, he served simultaneously on the League's Executive Council and
as secretary of the League's Massawa branch. Ismael Ibrahim al-Mukhtar,
"Professor Yasin Ahmed Ba Tuq, Writer, Thinker and Political Leader,"
http://www.mukhtar.ca/contentN.php7type = viewarticle&id = 88&category = b
iosjnukhtar (accessed 29 July 2010).
38. "This is the Muslim League," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 25 February 1947, 2.
39. Ibid.
40. Yasin Ba Tuq, "We and Independence," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 4 March
1947, 1. See also Nay Ertra Sämunawi Gazeta, 18 March 1947, 1-2.
41. Muhammad Uthman Hayuti, "Our Duties toward Independence," Sawt al-
rabita al-islamiyya, 4 March 1947, 1.
42. Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, Central Administration of Eritrean
Liberation, "A Questionnaire regarding the Political Parties of the 1 940s and
1950s," 1 March 1991. Research and Documentation Center, Asmara (RDC),
01712.
43. Mehmedin Ahmed Se'id, Umardin Abdelkadir Mahmud Muhammad, Idris

Ibrahim Hussein, interview, RDC/01714.
44. Ismael Ibrahim al-Mukhtar, "Qadi Ali Umar Osman, Senior Scholar and
Leader of Eritrea," http: // www.mukhtar.ca/contentN. php? type = viewarticle&id
= 7&category=bios_mukhtar (accessed 6 July 2010).

45. See Jonathan Miran and R. S. O'Fahey, "The Islamic and Related Writings of
Eritrea," in Arabic Literature of Africa, ed. R. S. O'Fahey and J. O. Hun wick
(Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2003), 1-17.
46. The last-mentioned official was also the mufti's elder brother. After his
walkout from the Bet Ghiorgis conference, Ibrahim Sultan was alleged to
have consulted the mufti and asked for his approval to establish a political
association that could guard Muslim interests.
47. Ismael Ibrahim al-Mukhtar, email correspondence with author.
48. Miran, "Grand mufti, érudit et nationaliste érythrée," 11. See Deborah
Johnson, "Media History of Eritrea," Eritrean Studies Review 1, no. 1 (1996):
142-54. In the first issue of Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, the mufti hinted at
this emerging Eritrean consciousness, commending the staff and noting that
"newspapers are the strongest idiom of a nation." Nebil Ahmed, "A History

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of Al Rabita Al Islamiya Al Eritrea (1946-50)," 139.

49. See "The Society for Cultural Cooperation," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 3
June 1947, 2. Several prominent Muslim League members held positions in
the organization, including Shaykh Idris Hussein Suleiman, Shaykh Ahmad
Suri, and Hajj Suleiman Mussa, the last-mentioned being a close associate of
the mufti.
51. The term šmagla is also written as shumagulle. Although the term "tigre"
served as a pejorative word for someone of servant status, it also developed
into a marker of wider ethno-cultural identity for all those, servant and
šmagla alike, who came from the Tigre-speaking areas. In the context of this
article, "tigre" refers to those with vassal or "serf' origins.
52. See G. K. N. Trevaskis, Eritrea: A Colony in Transition (London: Oxford
University Press, 1960), 69-76.
53. Jordan Gebre-Medhin, Peasants and Nationalism in Eritrea : A Critique of
Ethiopian Studies (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1989), 151.
54. Ibid., 152.
55. FCB/180/3, Trevaskis to Hinden, July 24, 1947: 3-4.
56. Ibrahim Sultan, interview. Composed of delegates from the United States,
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France, the Four Power Commission
served as the first international body assigned the task of ascertaining the
political atmosphere in Eritrea. Delegates set up official meetings of inquiry
in more than a dozen cities and towns during its stay in Eritrea from 8
November 1947 through 3 January 1948.
57. See Jan-Bart Gewald, "Making Tribes: Social Engineering in the Western
Province of British-Administered Eritrea, 1941-1952," Journal of Colonialism
and Colonial History 1, no. 2 (2000), http://130.102.44.247/journals/
journal_of_colonialism_and_colonial_history /toc/ cchl. 2.html (accessed 12 August
2010).
58. Kibreab, Critical Reflections on the Eritrean War of Independence, 88.

59. G. K. N. Trevaskis, "Report on Serfdom," FO 230/255, 5 June 1948; Ibrahim
Sultan, interview. In light of the parameters of the article, this study
omits an analysis of BMA authorities and their role in the larger political
transformations that took place in Eritrea during the British mandate period,
particularly the "serf rebellion" and the tigre clan restructuring during the
late 1940s. See FO 1015/138, "A Report on Tribal Reorganization in the
Western Province," 1-34.

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60. Ahmad Muhammad Ibrahim al-Tigrawi, "Feudal System," Sawt al-rabita

al-islamiyya, 9 December 1949, 1. For details of Diglal Gailani's testimony,
see Trevaskis Papers, Four Power Commission, "Two Chiefs of the Western
Province," Appendix 128.
61. Trevaskis Papers, Four Power Commission, "Letter of Tigré Representatives,"
Appendix 18, 16.
62. Ibid., 1.
63. Ibid.
64. FCB, 180/3, Trevaskis to Hinden, July 24, 1947: 4.

65. Ibid., 3. For many šmagla and influential merchants from the coastal
areas, the shift from the Muslim League to the Unionist Party continued
throughout the late 1940s. In addition, the League tried to discredit some
members of Massawa's business community who had created a counter
organization, the National Party of Massawa, in mid-1947. Deriding
the group's platform of supporting international trusteeship for an
indefinite period as unrealistic, the League laid blame principally on Nazir
Muhammad Nur, Osman Adam Bey, and a small group of their relatives for
creating the party as a means to "deviate from the track followed by the
mass" in Massawa. See FO 1015/4, 18 C. According to Ellingson, the party
claimed a membership of more than 56,000, including a large number of
the Afar-speaking clans in northern Dankalia. Ellingson, "The Emergence of
Political Parties in Eritrea, 1941-1950," 273; Trevaskis Papers, Four Power
Commission, Appendix 134, 1.
66. Trevaskis Papers, Four Power Commission, "C.F.M./D/L/47/I.C.COM Sixth
Hearing," Appendix 124, 5.
67. The spelling of Shuban al-rabita is based on Nebil Ahmed's spelling.
68. Nebil Ahmed, interview, 1 March 1991.
69. RDC/01712, Hajj Ibrahim Utban Ahmad, interview.
70. "The Opening Message," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 25 February 1947, 1.
71. Tekeste Negash, Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience (New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction, 1997), 38.
72. Yasin Ba Tuq, "We and Independence," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 4 March
1947, 1; Tesfai, 'Aynfälalä, 199.
73. Redie Bereketeab, Eritrea : The Making of a Nation, 1890-1991 (Trenton, NJ:
Red Sea Press, 200), 147.
74. FCB/180/3, Trevaskis to Hinden, January 4, 1947, 3.
75. Abdelkadir Kebire was elected as the MFH's vice president at the

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organization's founding meeting. Abd al-Qadir Haqus al-Jibirti, Abushehada

Abdelkadir Kebire (Cairo: al-Nasri dehebi, 1998).
76. Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 66.
77. BMA officials estimated that the LPP, formed in February 1947, consisted of
more than 55,000 members based mainly in Akkele Guzay. See FO 742/18.
LPP members and the wider Tigrinya-speaking public referred to the
organization by its colloquial name, "Eritrea for Eritreans."
78. Ibrahim Sultan, interview.
79. FCB 180/3, Trevaskis to Hinden, 24 July 1947, 3.
80. "The Party of the Free Eritrean," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 11 March 1947,
1.

138.
82. "There Is No Oppression against any Person in the Islamic Tradition," Sawt
al-rabita al-islamiyya, 11 March 1947, 2.
83. RDC/01712, Hajj Ibrahim Utban Ahmad, interview.
84. Kibreab, Critical Reflections on the Eritrean War for Independence, 105.
85. Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence , 70.
86. Tesfai, ' Aynfälalä, 196. See also Saleh A. A. Younis, "Abdulkadir Kebire,"
Dehai-Eritrea Online, http://www.ephrem.org/dehai_archive/1997/feb/0171.
html (accessed 29 July 2010).
87. Masoud Ramali, Multiple Modernities, Civil Society and Islam : The Case of Iran
and Turkey (Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press, 2006), 244.
88. See Trevaskis Papers, Four Power Commission, "Statement by the Secretary
General," Appendix 124.
89. Nebil Ahmed, "A History of AI Rabita Al Islamiya Al Eritrea (1946-50)," 143.
90. Hassan Mahmoud Abu Bakr, "Rescue Eritrea from Disastrous Consequences,"
Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 19 May 1949, 4.
91. See "Establishment of the Eritrean Popular Front," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya,
26 May 1949, 1.
92. Okbasghi Yohannes, Eritrea ; A Pawn in World Politics (Gainesville: University
of Florida Press, 1991), 113. See also G.A.O.R. Fifth Session, Ad Hoc Political
Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 30 September-14 December
1950.
93. Yohannes, Eritrea : A Pawn in World Politics, 113. This was a view held by
many politically active Muslims, even those not associated with the Muslim

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League, including numerous members of the Pro-Italy Party. Yohannes,

Eritrea, a Pawn in World Politics, 114. Organized by Italian settlers, the Pro-
Italy Party was formed on the eve of the Four Power Commission's arrival in
Eritrea in the fall of 1947 and afterward clashed with the League leadership.
FO 742/19. In their public testimony before the Commission in November
1947, Pro-Italy Party representatives claimed that the Muslim League had
"always tried, through the religious heads, to intimidate anybody who spoke
on the future of Eritrea, endeavoring to impede their work." See Trevaskis
Papers, Four Power Commission, Appendix 143, 1-2.
94. "A Victory on the Horizon," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 30 June 1949, 1.
Other groups included the LPP, New Eritrea Party, Italo-Eritrean Association,
National Muslim Party of Massawa, and Eritrean War Veterans Association.
See Iyob, The Eňtrean Struggle for Independence, 73-76.
95. The main debate that led to the Bloc's internal fragmentation involved
whether or not the organization should accept Italo-Eritreans as members.
These concerns reflected the attitudes of many both within the Bloc and
within the Muslim League who feared that Ibrahim Sultan had become too
close to the Italian authorities and that he had made promises that would
leave Eritrea, even if independent, under continued Italian influence.
Utilizing Italian government archives, Tekeste Negash maintained that both
the Ministero dell' Africa Italiana (MAI) in Rome and the secret Eritrean-
based settler group Comitato Assistenza Eritrei (CAE) maintained a strong

influence over Sultan and his inner circle. See Tekeste Negash, "Italy and Its
Relations with Eritrean Political Parties, 1948-1950," Africa (Rome) 59, nos.
3/4 (2004): 417-52. While considerable support and funding from external
Italian parties did work to alter the Bloc's program as it related to the basic
issue of membership, the true extent of the Italian influence over Sultan's
ultimate political objectives remains open to debate. Other members of the
Executive Council as well as many within the League's general membership
were well aware of Sultan's dealings and took care to address any possible
negative ramifications that excessive Italian influence might have on their
cause. In a special meeting called by officials in Keren in late August 1949,
members discussed their worries openly with the Council and even forced
Sultan to sign a public declaration "on behalf of the Muslim League" that in
the event of independence, no aid or support whatsoever would be accepted
from the Italian government. FO 1015/187, no. 44 Monthly Political Report,
August 1949, 1. Other League writers also addressed the public concerns

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through commentaries within the League's newspaper. See Yasin Ba Tuq,

"Nationalist Political Party Conference Decides to Accept Italo-Eritreans in
Independence Bloc," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 7 July 1949, 1; Muhammad
Said Umar, "Declaration and Warning," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 14 July
1949, 2; Muhammad Uthman Hayuti, "Since Three Years Ago: This Is the
Muslim League," Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, 22 September 1949, 3.
96. See Tesfai, 'AynfālalčĻ 432-36.
97. FO 371/80876. The MLWP's creation seemed only to exacerbate the
regional factionalism and unease that had begun with the creation of the
Independent Muslim League of Massawa (IML) in 1949 under the leadership
of Muhammad Umar Qadi. See FO 742/23, "The Case of Morgani's Defection
and Its Possible Development."
98. See High Council of the Moslem League of Eritrea, Memorandum of the
Moslem League in Eritrea to Commissioner of United Nations for Eritrea H.E.
Eduardo Anze Matienzo (Asmara: 1951); Alemseged Tesfai, Fädärasn fErtra ms
'Ityopyœ Matiyčinso ksab Tädla 1951-55 (Asmara: Hdri Publishers, 2006).
100. "The Consensus of Muslims by the Principles of the Islamic League." Sawt
al-rabita al-islamiyya, 9 December 1947, 2.
101. See Yusef Sadeq, "The Arabic Language in Pakistan," Sawt al-rabita al-
islamiyya , 9 December 1949: 2. Allegedly, the organization based its name
on Pakistan's own Muslim League. See Bereketeab, Eritrea : The Making of a
Nation, 1890-1991, 270.
102. Much of this coverage included excerpts from speeches and articles from
international Arabic publications, particularly from presses based in
Cairo. See Sawt al-rabita al-islamiyya, April 1949-December 1950. The
role of Somali religious authorities and Sufi brotherhoods in building
sustainable networks between Islamic educational institutions and political
organizations, including the growth of the National United Front (NUF) and
the Somali Youth League (SYL) under British administration, also suggests
that the development of intellectual activism within the Eritrean Muslim
League was a manifestation of a larger trend among nationalist-inclined
leaders across the region.

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The Eritrian Muslim Intellectuals

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The Eritrian Muslim Intellectuals

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"Because God Has Given Us the Power of Reasoning": Intellectuals, the Eritrean Muslim

League, and Nationalist Activism, 1946-1950

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41931313

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Joseph L. Venosa, Clayton State University , Georgia, USA

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- Popular joke among members of Eritrea's Unionist Party

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Muslim intellectuals living in British-occupied Eritrea solidified notions of a

The Development of Political Fracturing in

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reprisals against residents. In April 1941, approximately 4,000 Eritreans

Islamic Social Capital- A Framework

Although nationalist political parties first developed in Eritrea more than 60

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Proceeding from Robert Putnam's broad definition of social capital

Islamic Educational Institutions in the 1940s

Eritrean Islamic social capital was rooted in the proliferation of ed

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Muslim community leaders and granted shari'a courts autonomy in matters

Above all, these activities encouraged greater social cohesion, particu-

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in 1940 he was shocked and found the religious conditions of Muslims to be

Some of Asmara's leaders, such as Berhanu Ahmedin, not only involved

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civil society. Moreover, the growing self-awareness within Eritrea's Muslim

The Eritrean Muslim League and National Consciousness

In late November 1946, Eritrea's political factions came together in Asmara,

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Sawt al-rabita and Muslim Intellectual Activism

In an editorial that appeared in the newsletter's first edition on 25

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of all faiths and viewpoints who wished to contribute their opinions. He

and social responsibilities."39

Eritrea can manage its affairs economically, but the essentials of

Other contributors emphasized that Eritrean independence depended on

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According to Jonathan Miran, the mufti also displayed a "remarkable

and Ethiopian identity.48 Consequently, Sawt al-rabita served a central

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Ibrahim Sultan and Articulations of Social Justice

I made the mistake of expecting political leadership, if it came at all,

huge mass of serf or subject classes which remain in a state of political

When appearing in front of both the Four Power Commission in 1947

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The tone used by contributors to Sawt al-rabita supports the claim

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Keren. The representatives rejected "categorically any system of annexation

It is our duty to explain to your commission, with great displeasure,

Although the representatives went into detail to describe the various

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by a wider spectrum of Eritrean Muslim society that had previously been

Muslim-Christian Nationalist Cooperation

While the Muslim League's efforts in supporting tigre emancipation were

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Rather, by the beginning of British occupation, the most radical unionist

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Social and political camaraderie among pro-Independence Muslims and

of the same homeland" and that independence could only be achieved by

Peace be upon you, flag of Eritrea

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Bringing both Christians and Muslims together

Stopped by Adi-KeyĶ saying " hear me out"