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OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 26/10/2022, SPi
Learning to Live
Naturally
Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance
CHRISTOPHER GILL
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 26/10/2022, SPi
To all those scholars, students, and ‘modern Stoics’ with whom I have discussed
Stoic ideas and from whom I have learnt so much.
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OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 26/10/2022, SPi
Contents
Preface ix
Note on Conventions xi
Introduction 1
I. LIVING NATURALLY
1. Virtue and Happiness 15
1.1 Preliminaries 15
1.2 Stoic Ideas in Their Greek Philosophical Context 15
1.3 Happiness as the Life According to Nature 26
1.4 Virtue as Expertise in Leading a Happy Life 34
2. Virtue, Indifferents, and Practical Deliberation 53
2.1 Preliminaries 53
2.2 The Virtue-Indifferents Relationship 54
2.3 The Virtue-Indifferents Relationship Re-Examined 62
2.4 Practical Deliberation: Cicero, On Duties 1 72
2.5 Practical Deliberation: Cicero, On Duties 2‒3 87
3. Ethics and Nature 102
3.1 Preliminaries 102
3.2 Scholarly Debate about Ethics and Nature 102
3.3 The Presentation of Ethics in the Three Ancient Summaries 111
3.4 Is Stoic Theology Foundational for Ethics? 121
3.5 Harmonizing with Universal Nature: Three Versions 133
viii
References 335
Index of Ancient Passages 349
General Index 357
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Preface
x
O’Neill, Malcolm Schofield, David Sedley, and Raphael Woolf. This provided an
exceptional, and highly valuable, opportunity to have detailed, expert, comments
at a stage in the composition of the book when I could take full account of these
responses, and both workshops have made a material difference to my approach
and presentation. I am extremely grateful to all those who gave their time and
attention to the book in this way, and especially to Brad Inwood and Gábor
Betegh, who helped me to organize the workshops. In addition, Julia Annas and
Brad Inwood kindly commented on subsequent drafts of certain chapters. I would
also like to thank anonymous readers for the Press, who reviewed the book at
preliminary and final stages, for their constructive and perceptive observations.
I am very grateful to Peter Momtchiloff for his advice and support, and all those in
the Press who have helped the book through the stages of production.
All scholarly research constitutes a kind of dialogue between oneself and others
exploring the material, and I am deeply conscious of learning much on Stoic ethics
from fellow-scholars as well as students and those with whom, in recent years,
I have been engaged in modern (applied) Stoicism. My life has also been enriched
immeasurably by loving involvement in the lives of my four sons, their partners,
and their children. The book is dedicated to both these groups.
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Note on Conventions
The abbreviations for ancient authors and their works cited or noted are given in
full form in the Index of Ancient Passages. All scholarly works cited by author and
date are given in full form in the References. All quotations in Greek and Latin are
translated. In most cases, a published translation is cited; where there is no
citation, the translation is mine. When a published translation is cited, there
may be minor stylistic modifications to the published version (these are not
marked). Any significant change or addition to the published translation is
noted. Where an ancient passage is cited as LS (an abbreviation explained shortly),
their translation is used unless otherwise indicated.
There are numerous cross-references in footnotes, designed to highlight con-
nections within the argument of the book and to avoid repetition of content. The
cross-references take this form: ‘see text to nn. 3‒4’, referring to the same chapter;
or ‘see Ch. 3, text to nn. 3‒4’, referring to a different chapter (all instances of
capitalized Ch., are cross-references); or ‘see 3.4 and 4.5’ referring to sections
within chapters. References of this type (‘see 3.4, 4.5’) not linked with abbreviated
references to ancient authors and works are cross-references. In addition to the
standard abbreviations such as ‘e.g.’ and ‘i.e.’: I also use ‘esp.’ for ‘especially’.
These abbreviations are used throughout the book:
Other Stoics:
Aristo (3rd cent. ); Posidonius (c. 133‒c. 51 ); Seneca (AD c. 1‒65);
Epictetus (AD c. 50‒c. 130); Marcus Aurelius ( 121‒80); Hierocles
(flourished c. 120).
Other thinkers:
Socrates (469‒399 ); Plato (427‒347 ); Aristotle (384‒322 ); Antiochus
(c. 130‒c. 68 ); Cicero (106‒43 ); Arius Didymus (late first cent. );
Plutarch ( c. 45‒125.), Galen ( 129‒c. 216).
Introduction
Aims
In this book I have two main aims. In the first two parts, I offer a reading of core
distinctive themes in Stoic ethics, centred on the idea of happiness as the life
according to nature and on ethical development as learning to live this kind of life.
In the third part, I suggest that Stoic ethics has more to contribute to modern
moral theory, especially in virtue ethics, than it has done so far. These two aims are
closely interconnected. My account of Stoic ethics is designed to bring out its
coherence and strengths, as I see them, which are linked with (but not limited to)
its coherence. The combination of the coherence and strengths underlie the main
claim of the final chapters, that Stoicism can serve as an especially valuable
contributor to modern virtue ethics, as a supplement or alternative to the standard
ancient prototype, Aristotle.
I begin by a general statement of these claims, which are explained further in
the following outline of chapters. I see Stoic ethics as a coherent combination of an
innovative theory of value with a credible conception of nature, both human and
universal, and of ethical development or education. The Stoic theory of value is
ethically rigorous in seeing virtue as the sole basis for happiness, as contrasted
with the main ancient alternative, that happiness is based on a combination of
virtue and other kinds of good things. However, this ethical rigour is explained,
and justified, in three main ways. It is justified, in terms of value theory, by the
distinction between the special value (goodness) of virtue and the value of other
things normally regarded as good, which the Stoics call ‘indifferents’. This is
linked, in turn, with a conception of virtue as expertise in selecting between
indifferents and in leading a happy life. This value theory is further supported
by reference to ideas of nature and ethical development. Both virtue and happiness
are analysed as expressing nature at its best, either human or universal (that of the
world or universe) or both. This supports the claim that virtue constitutes the sole
basis for happiness. Stoic value theory is also closely linked with, and supported
by, its account of ethical development, the main distinctive features of which are
the ideas of ‘appropriation’ (oikeiōsis) and emotional development (or ‘therapy’).
The theory of development centres on the ideas that the movement towards virtue
and virtue-based happiness forms an integral part of a life expressing human (or
universal) nature at its best and also that the capacity to develop in this way falls
within the scope of all human beings. A further, correlated, feature of Stoic ethical
Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance. Christopher Gill, Oxford University Press.
© Christopher Gill 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198866169.003.0001
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 26/10/2022, SPi
2
theory is stress on the social and other-benefitting dimensions of human life. This
is conveyed especially in the ideas that human beings are constitutively rational
and sociable and that the motive to care for others is a primary, in-built motive
alongside the motive to care for oneself.
In all these respects, I see the Stoic ethical theory both as exceptionally coherent,
and as strong, in its combination of a rigorous ethical theory with a credible form
of naturalism and approach to ethical development. This interpretation, set out in
the first two parts of the book, forms the basis for the claim, in the third part, that
Stoic ethics has a special, and so far not fully realized, contribution to make to
modern moral theory, especially in virtue ethics.
More precisely, Stoicism can contribute most effectively to the combination
sometimes found in modern theory, of virtue ethics, eudaimonism, and ethical
naturalism. Aristotle has served as the main ancient model for this kind of modern
theory. However, I argue that, even if one assumes a broadly Aristotelian theor-
etical framework, Stoicism offers a stronger and more internally coherent version
of this framework. The Stoic approach avoids the internal tensions or problems
that arise in Aristotle’s thinking about the relative contribution of virtue and other
goods to happiness and about the relation between the practical and theoretical
dimensions of a happy life. As a result, Stoicism offers a more coherent paradigm
for the virtue-happiness relationship. In particular, it provides a better framework
for accommodating two, seemingly competing ideas, that virtue is intrinsically
valuable and that happiness is the overall goal of life. The combination of these
two ideas is seen as desirable in certain strands of modern, as well as ancient,
ethical theory. Stoicism also offers an approach to self-other relations (notably in
the idea that care for others is a primary human motive) that offers an effective
defence against the criticism that eudaimonistic virtue ethics is inherently egoistic.
Further, I argue that Stoic ethical ideas about human and cosmic nature can
enhance modern thinking (especially in modern virtue ethics) on human nature
and the environment. Stoic and Aristotelian ethics converge in presenting virtue
or happiness as the realization of human nature at its best. However, Stoicism, by
linking human virtue and happiness with universal nature, provides ideas which
can be used to support modern environmental ethics, especially regarding our
response to climate breakdown. Finally, I suggest that Stoic thinking on develop-
ment and guidance has a distinctive and important contribution to make to
modern thinking on these subjects. Stoicism can inform modern virtue ethical
theory on these subjects in ways that go beyond Aristotle. Also, the recent upsurge
of modern ‘life-guidance’ books and courses based on Stoicism and the positive
public response to these bring out the continuing resonance for modern audiences
of Stoic ethical ideas.
How does this book relate to its broader scholarly context? The increase of
research and publication on Hellenistic philosophy in recent decades, especially
Stoicism, has greatly enhanced our understanding of Stoic ethics. Even so, there
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3
are rather few specialized book-length studies of Stoic ethics, taken as a whole, in
English; and some of these have rather specific concerns.¹ Hence, a further aim of
this book is to present, for a relatively broad readership, the core concepts of Stoic
ethics and their relationship to each other, and to display the evidence on which
any general account of Stoic ethics is based. This book, in its first two sections,
discusses all the main ethical topics recognized in ancient summaries (virtue,
happiness or the goal of life, indifferents, appropriate actions, appropriation,
emotions), along with ‘nature’, an important idea, though not a distinct topic, in
Stoic ethics.² It also explores the interplay between these concepts within Stoic
ethics as a whole, and, at certain points, connections between ethics and other
branches of knowledge, especially theology (part of Stoic physics). As well as
building on previous scholarly work, I sometimes refer to areas of scholarly
debate, for instance on the role of cosmic nature in ethics. However, in general,
I have been rather sparing in scholarly references, and have concentrated on
offering my own interpretation of the evidence and bringing out what I see as
the main strengths of the Stoic framework.³
In the third part of the book, I argue that Stoic ethics offers an alternative, or
better, ancient prototype (compared with Aristotelian ethics) for modern virtue
ethics; and this argument is innovative in its overall character.⁴ However, my
discussion in Chapter 6 builds on philosophically informed discussions of the rival
merits of the Stoic and Aristotelian ethical positions by scholars such as Julia
Annas and Terry Irwin. A further suggestive parallel is Daniel Russell’s compara-
tive assessment of the competing strengths of Stoic and Aristotelian concepts of
happiness, viewed as potential contributors to modern (virtue ethical) ideas of
happiness.⁵ The discussion of Chapter 7, centred on Stoic and modern ideas about
human nature and the natural environment, breaks largely new ground. So too, in
a different way, does the treatment in Chapter 8 of Stoic thinking on ethical
development and guidance and modern theory and practice. Overall, the aim of
this part of the book is to give Stoic ethics a new prominence in modern
theoretical debate.
I have described my discussion as a ‘reading’ or ‘interpretation’ of Stoic ethics:
why present it in this way? Why do I not just summarize Stoic theory, offer a
¹ Brennan 2005 and Jedan 2009 offer relatively comprehensive accounts of Stoic ethics, though
Brennan also treats psychology and fate; Jedan focuses on virtue, appropriate actions, and the religious
dimension of Stoic ethics. Inwood 1985 is centred on the relationship between ethics and action theory.
Inwood and Donini 1999 provide a useful (book-chapter) overview; Annas 1993 contains valuable
discussion of Stoic ethical themes, as does Long 1996. On Becker 1998/2017, see n. 4; for books on Stoic
ethics and life-guidance, see Ch. 8, n. 91.
² See Long and Sedley 1987 (=LS) 56 A (D.L. 7.84); also Schofield 2003: 237–8.
³ A full treatment of all topics of scholarly controversy in Stoic ethics would have made this book
much longer and less generally accessible.
⁴ Becker 1998/2017 also aims to present Stoic ethics (or at least a modernized version of this) as a
prototype for virtue ethics; see Ch. 6, text to nn. 20–2.
⁵ See Annas 1993: chs. 19–21; Irwin 2007: ch. 13 (also 1986); Russell 2012.
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5
Outline of Chapters
The book is subdivided into three parts, though these are closely interconnected.
In the first part (‘Living Naturally’), I discuss, in the first two chapters, what have
been seen, since antiquity, as central Stoic ethical claims, regarding virtue, happi-
ness, and ‘indifferents’, and in the third chapter, another major theme of Stoic
ethics, the role of nature. In the second part (‘Learning to Live Naturally’),
¹³ On Cic. Fin. 3, see esp. Ch. 4; on Cic. Off., see Ch. 2 (also 4.3); on Cic. N. D. 2, see 1.3, 3.4.
¹⁴ See Barnes 1997: Nielsen 2012; also Sedley 2003: 12; and Gill 2006: 20–2.
¹⁵ On Stoic responses to Socrates, see Long 1996: ch. 1; on Stoic responses to Plato, see A. G. Long
2013a.
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others. The structural similarity between the conceptions of happiness and virtue
does much to explain the Stoic claims that virtue constitutes expertise in living a
happy life and that virtue forms the sole basis for happiness (1.4).
In Chapter 2, I examine evidence both on the virtue-indifferents relationship
and on practical deliberation (in Stoic terms, performing ‘appropriate actions’).
Although Stoic thinking on the value-status of indifferents has sometimes been
regarded as problematic, in antiquity and modern scholarship, I suggest that it
makes good sense if viewed in the light of this framework of thinking about virtue
and happiness. Things such as health and prosperity are potentially positive
factors in a human life and are naturally ‘preferred’ by human beings; but they
do not make the difference between living a happy life or not, as virtue does, and
are ‘indifferent’ in this sense. Virtue, on the other hand, understood as expertise in
leading a happy life (a life according to nature) does make this difference. Virtue is
conceived as expertise in selecting between indifferents in a way that reflects the
recognition of the positive or negative value of indifferents but bases the selection
on what makes for the happy life (2.2–3). I interpret Cicero’s On Duties, the only
surviving extended Stoic study of practical deliberation, as expressing this con-
ception of the relationship between virtue, indifferents, appropriate acts, and
happiness (2.3–4). Although the type of deliberation advocated there recognizes
the positive value of preferable indifferents, the main criterion of properly con-
ducted deliberation is what is right, that is, in line with the virtues, sometimes
combined with ideas about what counts as natural, meaning, in this context, what
is consistent with human nature at its best. All three books of On Duties, in
different ways, offer guidance on developing skill in practical deliberation which
reflects this understanding of the relationship between virtue, happiness, indiffer-
ents, and appropriate actions; in this way, this work offers a good illustration of
Stoic thinking on these topics.
The set of ideas considered so far, especially the idea of happiness as the life
according to nature, provides a new point of access to a question much debated in
recent scholarship, the ethical significance of the idea of nature in Stoic philoso-
phy. In Chapter 3, I review this debate, re-examine the main evidence, and offer a
partly new account. Scholars have disagreed about whether Stoic ethics is
grounded on the idea of universal nature presented in Stoic physics or is seen as
independent but supported by ideas of nature, both human and universal. The
three ethical summaries, our core primary evidence for this topic, present the Stoic
framework in various ways: in purely ethical terms (those of value theory) or with
reference to human nature, universal nature, or a combination of these ideas (3.3).
Some ancient evidence seems to state that ethical principles are grounded on
universal nature or god as presented in physics, specifically, theology. However,
I suggest that this evidence, taken with that for Stoic theology generally, points to a
reciprocal relationship between these branches of knowledge. Theology provides
an authoritative account of the types of nature relevant for ethics, while ethical
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