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John F. Kennedy’s
1957 Algeria Speech
John F. Kennedy’s
1957 Algeria Speech
The Politics of Anticolonialism
in the Cold War Era
Gregory D. Cleva
LEXINGTON BOOKS
Lanham • Boulder • New York • London
Published by Lexington Books
An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.rowman.com
86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE
Copyright © 2022 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any elec-
tronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without
written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages
in a review.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.
This book is dedicated to my daughter, Elise,
and to the memory of my father, Gregory Cleva, and my mother, Rose Cleva.
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: The Speech: Background and Preparation 19
Chapter 2: The Politics and Ideals of Kennedy’s Algeria Speech 65
Chapter 3: What Kennedy Said 89
Chapter 4: Aftermath: The Controversy in Washington and Paris 137
Chapter 5: Nationalism and French Colonialism in North Africa 173
Chapter 6: The Need to Change American Foreign Policy toward
North Africa 213
Chapter 7: Kennedy’s Algeria Speech: An Assessment 233
Appendix 247
Bibliography 249
Index 263
About the Author 273
vii
Acknowledgments
ix
Introduction
The American historian Robert Dallek begins his 2003 biography of John F.
Kennedy, An Unfinished Life, by asking “why another Kennedy book?”1 The
answer Dallek gave was that his book filled a void by using newly released
documents that provided important details of Kennedy’s life heretofore
unknown. Obviously, almost twenty years later, the same question can be
asked about this book. The answer again is that it fills a void by addressing
for the first time, in any substantial way, the details of Kennedy’s Algeria
speech—a major foreign policy address that then-Senator Kennedy delivered
on July 2, 1957 in the US Senate calling for an “independent personality”2
for the Algerian nation. Almost universally, policymakers in the United States
and France interpreted Kennedy’s phrase independent personality to mean
that he was really calling for an independent Algeria—a sovereign nation
freed from French colonial rule that had lasted more than a century.
This speech has been mentioned countless times in articles and books about
Kennedy and his approach to foreign policy, but rarely has the substance of
his remarks or their background been discussed in any extended manner.3 Nor
has serious consideration been given to the speech’s significance to American
diplomatic history—a matter of importance to anyone (from general readers
to scholars) interested in American foreign policy toward colonialism in the
post-World War II era (an era in which the United States responded guard-
edly to the challenges of world leadership). While this was not a speech that
changed existing policies, it marked an event that added significantly to the
narrative of America’s repeated attempts to balance the powerful forces of
nationalism in Africa and Asia with the moribund remnants of the European
colonialism of its NATO allies.
To the extent contemporary authors have dealt with Kennedy’s Algeria
speech, they have examined it primarily in the context of domestic politics.
Kennedy was a leading candidate for the 1960 Democratic presidential
1
2 Introduction
nomination, and discussing such issues as Algeria would enhance his stature
by contributing to his foreign policy credentials. Consider the remarks of
Alistair Cooke, the British-American journalist, who dismissed Kennedy’s
speech cynically in the Manchester Guardian Weekly (July 1957), stating that
Kennedy had only one goal in mind, that of “pitching [himself] into center
stage.”4 This view is regrettable.
Undoubtedly, Kennedy was seeking issues to enhance his position as a
presidential challenger. Yet the sole focus on domestic politics overlooks
Kennedy’s longstanding anticolonial views—opinions he had expressed on
multiple occasions beginning in 1947, his first year in the US Congress. (A
select list of Kennedy’s anticolonial statements is contained in the Appendix.)
This preoccupation with Kennedy’s political motives also fails to acknowl-
edge that, considering his other anticolonial speeches, the Algeria speech
represented the most complete and compelling expression of his outlook
on this subject. Similarly, this preoccupation has precluded, until now, a
full examination of the implications Kennedy’s Algeria speech has for an
understanding of US foreign policy at this time. The more appropriate way
of describing Kennedy’s speech, therefore, is that the speech was motivated
by both political and foreign policy concerns. While politics increasingly
dominated Kennedy’s life as the 1960 presidential race drew closer, he also
believed it imperative to America’s national interest and to that of France to
speak out against its colonial practices in Algeria at this time.
The fact that Kennedy’s speech expressed his beliefs so thoughtfully and so
thoroughly suggests the importance he attached to it. Truly, he never spoke on
the subject of colonialism again with such command and eloquence. Further,
it was his first major foreign policy address following his appointment to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1957. The speech, titled
“Imperialism—The Enemy of Freedom,” has an abiding quality, though
the issues it addresses have long since been settled. In speaking on Algeria,
Kennedy was dealing with an extremely controversial situation involving one
of the longest and deadliest colonial wars ever fought. The Algerian conflict
dominated the political and social affairs of France for eight years. France
was a principal NATO ally of the United States and keystone of the West’s
opposition to the Soviet Union in Europe. The Algerian conflict, over time,
became a major contextual element of the development of Third World con-
sciousness. Accordingly, policymakers in most European countries paid close
attention to the speech as did many Third World leaders throughout Africa
and Asia. These Third World leaders were buoyed by Kennedy’s words and
Introduction 3
the position he took in the speech, believing that America might return to its
anticolonial tradition and that this would have positive implications for their
own independence. Moreover, Kennedy took pains to widely advertise his
speech on Capitol Hill and to the domestic and international press so as to
attract maximum attention.
It is an understatement to say that this speech deserves our attention now
as much as it deserved the controversy it caused in America and Europe at
the time he spoke. Admittedly, this address will always be overshadowed by
other Kennedy speeches such as his “Farewell to the Massachusetts State
Legislature” on January 9, 1961, in which he invoked the spirit of John
Winthrop’s “City Upon a Hill,” or the unconditional support he expressed
for the people of West Germany in his rousing “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech
at Berlin’s City Hall on June 26, 1963. His inaugural address on January 20,
1961 is regarded as one of the nation’s best, and his commencement speech
dealing with arms control, delivered at American University on June 10,
1963, remains in many ways unsurpassed on that subject.
It is true that Kennedy’s speech did not change America’s policies on
Algeria or other colonial issues. He did not expect that it would. It was not a
watershed speech such as that given by Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) on
January 10, 1945, breaking with the Republican Party’s longstanding isola-
tionism and providing needed support for a truly bipartisan post-World War II
foreign policy. (Vandenberg himself said that he addressed the US Senate “in
the spirit of anxious humility” to put that body on notice that “there are criti-
cal moments in the life of every nation which call for . . . the most courageous
thinking of which we are capable. We confront such a moment now”).5 Much
like President Franklin Roosevelt’s first inaugural address given at the US
Capitol on March 4, 1933, in which he counselled against all forms of fear,
including “fear itself,”6 during one of the darkest moments of the Depression,
both speeches succeeded in summoning a different temperament in the nation
that, in the case of Vandenberg’s speech, paved the way for the Truman
Doctrine (March 1947) and the Marshall Plan (April 1948) and in the case
of Roosevelt, the New Deal. Rather, Kennedy’s speech more resembles that
of the declaration of conscience that Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME)
delivered in the US Senate on June 1, 1950, denouncing the fear monger-
ing of fellow Republican Joseph McCarthy (R-WI).7 Like Senator Smith,
Kennedy spoke from a sense of urgency. In the case of Algeria, the urgency
stemmed from Kennedy’s perception that the current policies on Algeria were
taking both the United States and the French down the same road that had
been traveled in Indochina—a road that ended in the disastrous French defeat
at Dienbienphu, Vietnam in May 1954.
The fact that Kennedy’s speech did not change US policy toward Algeria,
however, should not be the only standard by which it is judged. Other reasons
4 Introduction
argue for its relevance. In fact, its importance is threefold. First, it reflects the
maturing of Kennedy’s thinking about American foreign policy at this time.
In fact, Kennedy’s Algeria speech in July 1957, his Senate speech on Poland
and Eastern Europe in August 1957, and his October 1957 Foreign Affairs
article titled “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy” (all separated by only
three months) taken together fully convey the essence of Kennedy’s emerg-
ing worldview. All of these show the hand of Frederick L. Holborn, a young
Harvard teaching assistant working in Kennedy’s office at this time. Holborn
largely researched and wrote the Algeria speech, and it would not be saying
too much to state that Holborn greatly helped to facilitate the development
of Kennedy’s foreign policy outlook. This author was fortunate to speak
with Holborn, then a professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies, before his death in 2005.8 More will be said
about Holborn and Kennedy’s foreign policy outlook in chapter 1.
Second, Kennedy’s speech represented a serious challenge to US policy
regarding the Algerian conflict and the nation’s policies on colonialism in
general. It was rare that anyone had confronted the status quo in this area, and
Kennedy should be given credit for boldly taking on this issue since more dis-
cussion of America’s policies toward the emerging nations in Asia and Africa
was sorely needed. Moreover, Kennedy’s speech involved an important
critique of the Eisenhower-Dulles approach to world politics—one of many
he would offer in the years leading up to the 1960 election. While Kennedy
made no other major speeches on Algeria, he continued to raise objections to
the colonialism of the nation’s European allies, both because of moral reasons
but also because he felt it jeopardized America’s own national interests.
The third reason accounting for the importance of Kennedy’s Algeria
speech was its handling of a major dilemma over colonialism that bedeviled
American foreign policy throughout the Truman and Eisenhower administra-
tions. Vernon McKay indicates that, as the Cold War with the Soviet bloc
began to seriously concern American leaders, they became increasingly con-
flicted about how the United States should respond to the forces of national-
ism then sweeping Africa and Asia and the desires of the emerging nations in
these regions for independence. This quandary “emerged at once as the major
preoccupation of American policy.”9 McKay elaborates:
This dilemma was the conflict between our interest in supporting the principle
of self-determination and our need for a strong NATO alliance. The essence of
the problem was quite simple: we needed friends in both Europe and Africa
[and Asia], and whatever we did to please one group angered the other. For this
reason, all American policy statements from 1950 to 1958 contained certain
paragraphs to placate Europeans and others to appeal to Africans.10
Introduction 5
More will be said about this dilemma in chapter 1. In chapter 7, we will con-
sider Kennedy’s handling of it in his Algeria speech and other statements on
colonialism.
“Politics are vulgar when they are not liberalized by history,” wrote Sir John
Seeley, “and history fades into mere literature when it loses sight of its rela-
tions to practical politics.”11 Accordingly, this book will consider Kennedy’s
speech in its historical context—a context in which the remnants of European
colonialism in Asia and Africa became increasingly ill-suited to the dawning
of a new age.
To illustrate this period of profound change in global politics, consider
some of the events that were unfolding at the time of Kennedy’s speech. US
foreign policy, for example, was still dealing with the fallout of the Suez
crisis of the previous fall (October-November 1956). There were serious
questions whether NATO would fully recover from having three key alli-
ance members—Britain, France, and the United States—pitted against one
another in this crisis that also saw the Soviet Union (implausible as this may
seem since it occurred during the Cold War) allied with the United States.
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, a Third World leader, basked in the
approval of the Arab world because of his “victory” at Suez. Domestically,
the United States was dealing with a serious social issue concerning the racial
integration of public schools which came to a head with troops being used to
avoid violence in Little Rock, Arkansas. This racial strife negatively impacted
America’s image abroad, particularly in the Third World. The United States
had begun to doubt its scientific and technological superiority over the
Russians as their launch of Sputnik made them first into space. The Soviets
had likewise tested successfully an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
with grave implications for US national security.
Largely in response to these Soviet successes, the Gaither Commission
on Defense recommended increasing substantially the arsenal of US mis-
siles, thus escalating the superpower arms race. The Treaty of Rome was
signed establishing the European Common Market. In the Third World, the
West African nation of Ghana became independent and claimed a seat (like
so many other nations in Africa and Asia during this period) in the United
Nations and other international organizations. Thus, at a time when Africa
was breaking apart into several separate and independent nations, Europe
was seeking to unify its countries into one economic and, possibly, political
entity. Mao began his “let 1,000 flowers bloom” campaign, which ended in
an ideological purge of opponents of the Communist Party. The United States
6 Introduction
experienced its first combat death in Vietnam, the beginning of a tragic era
in which the nation continued to view the Third World primarily through the
militaristic perspective of the Cold War. In France, the government of Guy
Mollett was replaced in June 1957 (one month before Kennedy’s speech)
by that of Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, which itself was replaced after five
months by the government of Felix Gaillard. This instability alone made any
settlement of the war in Algeria almost impossible, as Kennedy would men-
tion in his speech. Algeria in 1957 was rocked by a general strike, further
demonstrating the widespread disapproval of continued French rule. The
French newspaper L’Express published major stories dealing with the French
military’s extensive use of torture and acts of terrorism in Algeria, further
alienating native Algerians in an escalating cycle of violence. This same year,
the French vetoed any suggestion of a role for the United Nations in Algeria
since they considered it purely a domestic matter.
This new age (which provided the context of Kennedy’s speech) would
be global in scope, and Europe would no longer be its center. Instead, the
spirit of nationalist self-determination would dominate all other consider-
ations in the emerging nations of Asia and Africa. It would only seem logical,
therefore, that figures such as Kennedy, who sought to lead this new age,
would speak out against the remaining anomalies, such as that exemplified
by colonialism. Kennedy’s Algeria speech represented a serious challenge to
the status quo policies of US leaders who allowed these anomalies to remain
unchallenged for fear that such challenges would disrupt relations between
the United States and European NATO allies.
Kennedy’s words held a particular resonance because they drew on
America’s deeply rooted anticolonial traditions. The United States was a
nation born in revolution and here, too, there was an inevitable logic to the
reality that the majority of Americans would support the nationalist struggles
in Asia and Africa. In fact, many encouraged—even demanded—that the
United States lead the “world revolution”12 that was transforming these areas,
principally in the name of self-determination. This clearly was Kennedy’s
view. He unmistakably calls for the United States to champion the political
and economic aspirations of nations in the Third World. Consider excerpts
from Kennedy’s speech in Washington, DC, in January 1960 titled “The
Global Challenge”:
If the title deeds of history applied, it is we, the American people who should
be marching at the head of the world-wide revolution, counseling it, helping it
to come to a healthy fruition. . . . Yet we have allowed the Communists to evict
us from our rightful estate at the head of this world-wide revolution. We have
been made to appear the defenders of the status quo, while the Communists
Introduction 7
have portrayed themselves as the vanguard force, pointing the way to a better,
brighter, and braver order of life.13
If we, the scholars, with our patient and unsensational labors, can help statesmen
to understand . . . not only the dangers we face and the responsibility they bear
for overcoming these dangers but also the constructive and hopeful possibilities
that lie there to be opened up by wiser, more restrained, and more realistic poli-
cies . . . we will be richly repaid for our dedication and our persistence, for we
will then have the satisfaction of knowing that scholarship, the highest work of
the mind, has served, as it should, the highest interests of civilization.14
Nor is it naïve to believe that Kennedy’s speech could have played this role
of content and context. It would have been far better if American leaders had
8 Introduction
The reader will benefit throughout this work in knowing of Kennedy’s endur-
ing interest in American foreign policy. This point is obviously relevant to
understanding his Algeria speech. Equally important, it accounts for his very
involvement in government where the power resides to shape policies that
affect every aspect of America’s dealings with the world. Indeed, Kennedy’s
interest in foreign policy was always a preoccupation and grew to be almost
all-consuming after he became president.
Kennedy educated himself in foreign affairs by years of study, travel, and
conversations with leaders in other countries. He was an avid reader of his-
tory and political biography. History was his major area of study as a Harvard
undergraduate, and his historical interests were evident to those meeting him
for the first time. William Carelton, a political scientist and friend of the
Kennedy family, observed that “it was clear to me that John had a far bet-
ter historical and political mind than his father or elder brother, indeed that
John’s capacity for seeing current events in historical perspective and project-
ing historical trends into the future was unusual.”15
Kennedy believed that foreign policy issues were paramount in the nuclear
age. “Foreign policy today,” Kennedy stated in a 1951 speech, “irrespec-
tive of what we might wish, in its impact on our daily lives, overshadows
everything else. Expenditures, taxation, domestic prosperity, the extent of
social services—all hinge on the basic issue of war and peace.”16 French
diplomat and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1958–1968) Jacques-Maurice
Couve de Murville stated emphatically that Kennedy’s interest in interna-
tional politics was overriding. He said Kennedy was attuned to US-French
relations “beginning of course with the question that, at that time, was the
most important . . . decolonization.”17 Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy’s coun-
selor and speechwriter, stated that “foreign affairs had always interested him
far more than domestic. They occupied far more of his time and energy as
President.”18 Roger Hilsman, another Kennedy aide, wrote in a similar vein:
“Certainly, he thought foreign affairs were central to his concern. He used
to say that a domestic failure hurt the country, but a failure in foreign affairs
could kill it.”19 It is clear also that in choosing Dean Rusk—described as an
“ideal staff person”20—to be his secretary of state, Kennedy was signaling
that he meant to run foreign policy from the White House. According to
Hirsh Freed, a Kennedy associate, Kennedy was “never really . . . interested
in local politics in the city of Boston or in the state of Massachusetts. . . . His
Introduction 9
interest lay in international politics, the topic that engaged most of his seri-
ous talk.”21 This was true even in his initial race for Congress in 1946. From
his earliest years in the Senate, he made it a priority to become a member of
the Foreign Relations Committee. Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson
(D-TX) had blocked this appointment and only agreed to it in January 1957,
after Kennedy’s ascent in the Democratic Party. Historian James MacGregor
Burns underscores this point.
CHAPTER XVI
CHAPTER XVII
"The Saracens!"
Just as the second day of the Great Tourney had opened in the
Valley of the Sepulcher upon the plains below the city of Nimmr, a
band of swart men in soiled thobs and carrying long matchlocks
topped the summit of the pass upon the north side of the valley and
looked down upon the City of the Sepulcher and the castle of King
Bohun.
They had followed upward along what may once have been a trail,
but for so long a time had it been unused, or so infrequently had it
been used that it was scarce distinguishable from the surrounding
brush; but below them now Ibn Jad saw at a short distance a better
marked road and, beyond, what appeared to him a fortress. Beyond
that again he glimpsed the battlements of Bohun's castle.
What he saw in the foreground was the barbican guarding the
approach to the castle and the city, both of which were situated in
much the same relative position as were the barbican and castle
upon the south side of the valley where Prince Gobred guarded the
city of Nimmr and the valley beyond it against the daily expected
assault of the Saracens.
Seeking cover, Ibn Jad and his Beduins crept down toward the
barbican where an old knight and a few men-at-arms kept
perfunctory ward. Hiding in the mountain brush the 'Aarab saw two
strangely apparelled blacks hunting just outside the great gateway.
They were armed with cross bows and arrows and their prey was
rabbits. For years they had seen no stranger come down this ancient
road, and for years they had hunted between the gate and the
summit of the mountains, though farther than this they were not
permitted to wander. Nor had they any great desire to do so, for,
though they were descendants of Gallas who lived just beyond this
mountain top, they thought that they were Englishmen and that a
horde of Saracens awaited to annihilate them should they venture
too far afield.
Today they hunted as they had often hunted when they chanced to
be placed in the guard at the outer barbican. They moved silently
forward, warily awaiting the break of a rabbit. They did not see the
dark-faced men in the brush.
Ibn Jad saw that the great gateway was open and that the gate that
closed it raised and lowered vertically. It was raised now. Great was
the laxity of the old knight and the men-at-arms, but King Bohun was
away and there was none to reprove them.
Ibn Jad motioned those nearest him to follow and crept slowly closer
to the gateway.
What of the old knight and the other watchers? The former was
partaking of a late breakfast just within one of the great towers of the
barbican and the latter were taking advantage of the laxity of his
discipline to catch a few more winks of sleep as they stretched
beneath the shade of some trees within the ballium.
Ibn Jad won to within a few yards of the gateway and waited for the
others to reach his side. When they were all there he whispered to
them and then trotted on silent sandals toward the gate, his
matchlock ready in his hands. Behind him came his fellows. They
were all within the ballium before the men-at-arms were aware that
there was an enemy this side of Palestine.
With cross-bow and battle-axe the men-at-arms sprang to defend the
gate. Their cries of "The Saracens! The Saracens!" brought the old
sir knight and the hunters running toward the ballium.
Below, at the castle of King Bohun, the men at the gates and the
other retainers who had been left while Bohun sallied forth to the
Great Tourney heard strange noises from the direction of the outer
barbican. The shouts of men floated down to them and strange,
sharp sounds that were like thunder and yet unlike it. Such sounds
they had never heard before, nor any of their forbears. They rallied
at the outer castle gate and the knights with them consulted as to
what was best to be done.
Being brave knights there seemed but one thing open for them. If
those at the far outer barbican had been attacked they must hasten
to their defense. Summoning all but four of the knights and men-at-
arms at his disposal the marshal of the castle mounted and rode
forth toward the outer gate.
Half way there they were espied by Ibn Jad and his men who, having
overcome the poorly armed soldiers at the gate, were advancing
down the road toward the castle. At sight of these reinforcements Ibn
Jad hastened to secrete his followers and himself in the bushes that
lined the roadway. So it fell that the marshal rode by them and did
not see them and, when they had passed, Ibn Jad and his followers
came out of the bushes and continued down the winding mountain
road toward the castle of King Bohun.
The men at the castle gate, now fully upon the alert, stood ready with
the portcullis raised as the marshal instructed them, so that in the
event that those who had ridden out should be hard pressed upon
their return by an enemy at their rear they could still find sanctuary
within the ballium. The plan was, in such event, to lower the
portcullis behind the men of the Sepulcher and in the faces of the
pursuing Saracens, for that an enemy must be such was a forgone
conclusion—had not they and their ancestors waited for near seven
and a half centuries now for this momentarily expected assault?
They wondered if it really had come at last.
While they discussed the question Ibn Jad watched them from a
concealing clump of bushes a few yards away.
The wily Beduin knew the purpose of that portcullis and he was
trying to plan best how he might enter the enclosure beyond before it
could be dropped before his face. At last he found a plan and smiled.
He beckoned three men to come close and into their ears he
whispered that which he had in mind.
There were four men-at-arms ready to drop the portcullis at the
psychological moment and all four of them stood in plain sight of Ibn
Jad and the three that were beside him. Carefully, cautiously,
noiselessly the four 'Aarab raised their ancient matchlocks and took
careful aim.
"Now!" whispered Ibn Jad and four matchlocks belched forth flame
and black powder and slugs of lead.
The four men-at-arms dropped to the stone flagging and Ibn Jad and
all his followers raced forward and stood within the ballium of the
castle of King Bohun. Before them, across the ballium, was another
gate and a broad moat, but the drawbridge was lowered, the
portcullis raised and the gateway unguarded.
The marshal and his followers had ridden unhindered into the
ballium of the outer barbican and there they had found all its
defenders lying in their own blood, even to the little squire of the old
knight who should have watched the gate and did not.
One of the men-at-arms still lived and in his dying breath he gasped
the terrible truth. The Saracens had come at last!
"Where are they?" demanded the marshal.
"Didst thou not see them, sir?" asked the dying man. "They marched
down the road toward the castle."
"Impossible!" cried the marshal. "We didst but ride along that very
road and saw no one."
"They marched down toward the castle," gasped the man.
The marshal knit his brows. "Were there many?" he demanded.
"There are few," replied the man-at-arms. "It was but the advance
guard of the armies of the sultan."
Just then the volley that laid low the four warders at the castle gate
crashed upon the ears of the marshal and his men.
"'Ods blud!" he cried.
"They must have hid themselves in the bush as we passed,"
exclaimed a knight at the marshal's side, "for of a surety they be
there and we be here and there be but one road between."
"There be but four men at the castle gate," said the marshal, "and I
did bid them keep the 'cullis up til we returned. God pity me! I have
given over the Sepulcher to the Saracens. Slay me, Sir Morley!"
"Nay, man! We need every lance and sword and cross-bow that we
may command. This be no time to think of taking thy life when thou
canst give it to Our Lord Jesus in defense of His Sepulcher against
the infidels!"
"Thou art right, Morley," cried the marshal. "Remain you here, then,
with six men and hold this gate. I shall return with the others and
give battle at the castle!"
But when the marshal came again to the castle gate he found the
portcullis down and a dark-faced, bearded Saracen glaring at him
through the iron bars. The marshal at once ordered the cross-
bowmen to shoot the fellow down, but as they raised their weapons
to their shoulder there was a loud explosion that almost deafened
them and flame leaped from a strange thing that the Saracen held
against his shoulder and pointed at them. One of the cross-bowmen
screamed and lunged forward upon his face and the others turned
and fled.
They were brave men in the face of dangers that were natural and to
be expected, but in the presence of the supernatural, the weird, the
uncanny, they reacted as most men do, and what could have been
more weird than death leaping in flame and with a great noise
through space to strike their fellow down?
But Sir Bulland, the marshal, was a knight of the Sepulcher. He
might wish to run away fully as much as the simple and lowly men-
at-arms, but there was something that held him there that was more
potent than fear of death. It is called Honor.
Sir Bulland could not run away and so he sat there on his great
horse and challenged the Saracens to mortal combat; challenged
them to send their doughtiest sir knight to meet him and thus decide
who should hold the gate.
But the 'Aarab already held it. Furthermore they did not understand
him. In addition to all this they were without honor as Sir Bulland
knew it, and perhaps as any one other than a Beduin knows it, and
would but have laughed at his silly suggestion.
One thing they did know—two things they knew—that he was a
Nasrany and that he was unarmed. They did not count his great
lance and his sword as weapons, for he could not reach them with
either. So one of them took careful aim and shot Sir Bulland through
his chain mail where it covered his noble and chivalrous heart.
Ibn Jad had the run of the castle of King Bohun and he was sure that
he had discovered the fabled City of Nimmr that the sahar had told
him of. He herded together the women and children and the few men
that remained and held them under guard. For a while he was
minded to slay them, since they were but Nasrany, but he was so