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 International Archives of the History of Ideas 237
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For my parents

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Acknowledgements

This book was originally written between 2016 and 2018, for my PhD dissertation,
which I defended in February 2019 before the Federal University of Minas Gerais
(Belo Horizonte, Brazil). The research on Locke was quite a challenge for me,
because in the previous decade my work had basically focused on the history of
early modem scepticism. I must say, though, that this challenge was rewarding. I
learnt a lot; Locke broadened my intellectual horizons and introduced me to new
people and places. After defending my dissertation, I turned to the more detailed
study of other authors, such as Pierre J urieu, and to some related issues, such as the
concept of lai"cite. Meanwhile, I have attempted to incorporate the works on Locke
and toleration, published in 2019 and 2020, into the present book.
Several people supported me in different ways on the long path that led to the
publication of this book. I am happy to take this opportunity to publicly acknowl-
edge them for their assistance and friendship.
First of all, I am grateful to Professor Jose Raimundo Maia Neto, my supervisor
since my time as an undergraduate. My PhD dissertation owes a lot to his knowl-
edge and erudition. I could always count on him, even in the years between my
Master's and my PhD, when we had no formal or institutional bonds. I deeply
admire not only his ability to focus on the main philosophical issues but also his
generosity and politeness. Rarely have I seen so remarkable an example of excel-
lence and simplicity.
I am also profoundly grateful to Professor Ian Harris, who advised me as a PhD
candidate when I was an exchange student at the University of Leicester in 2018.
We had several meetings to discuss Locke's philosophy. I owe a debt of gratitude to
him, not only for all that he taught me, through his incisive comments and his wit,
but also for his assistance in grappling with the practicalities of settling in a foreign
country. While in England, I had the honour of discussing my research with
Professor John Dunn, at his office in King's College, Cambridge, and with Professor
John Coffey at the University of Leicester. I thank Professor Timothy Stanton for
placing his trust in me, in sending me an advanced version of his transcription of
Locke'sA Defence of Nonconformity. I also mention Professor G. A. J. Rogers, who
was extremely kind to me, and I regret the fact that we were not able to meet. I thank

ix
x Acknowledgements

The Warburg Institute for giving me opportunity to conducl research lhere, which Contents
made a significant difference for my work.
The suggestions I received from the committee that evaluated my dissertation led
me to see some points that I was unable to perceive before. I am grateful to Professors
Eunice Ostrensky, Antonio Carlos dos Santos, Telma Birchal, Helton Adverse, and
Newton Bignotto for their attentive reading.
Throughout my research, especially in the initial years, I relied on several friends
in Germany, France, England, and Canada to send me articles and books lhat I was
unable to access in Brazil. I can hardly express how indebted I feel to them. I owe
my sincere gratitude to Daniel Arelli, Roberta Miquelanti, Pedro Vianna Faria, Luiz
Philipe de Caux, Julio Cesar Terra, Celso Neto, Sacha Kontic, and Joao Cortese. In
regard to access to bibliographical material, I also record my gratitude to Professors
Jose Raimundo Maia Neto and Ian Harris, who ordered books related to my research
for inclusion in the library archives of the Federal University of Minas Gerais and
the University of Leicester. 1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I am grateful to Fabio Fortes and Wellington Ferreira Lima for agreeing to trans- References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
late the Epistola de Tolerantia for the commented edition that I organised, and that
2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia . . . . . . . . 15
was published by Autentica Editora in November 2019. The technical revision I did
2.1 The Evangelical Argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
of the Latin translation was essential for my understanding of Locke.
2.2 The Argument from Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
I thank the two reviewers who approved the manuscript of this book. Both were
2.3 The Argument of Unfitness of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
very generous. I am also grateful to a group of people that, at various times and in
2.4 The Argument of Reductio ad Absurdum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
different ways, helped me to improve my English. Writing in a foreign language is
2.5 Argumentative Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
always a challenge, and Isabela Caixeta, Bennett Bullock, Fiona Stephenson, and
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Husain Bhana saved me from countless pitfalls.
To my family and close friends, I am grateful for all their support for this work, 3 The Locke and Proast Controversy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
but in their case, this is to say too little. My whole life has been shaped and moulded 3.1 The Argument of 'The Letter Concerning Toleration'
by them. Briefly Consider'd andAnswer'd................ .. .... . .... 65
3.2 Locke's Second Letter Concerning Toleration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3 Proast's Third Letter Concerning Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.4 Locke' s Third Letter f or Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.5 Further Developments of the Controversy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
References. . ........ ... .. .............. . ... . . ...... ........ 133
4 Ethics of Belief. ... . ....... . .. ................ ... . . . ... . . ... 137
4.1 Obstinacy, Fallibility and Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.2 Examination, Method and Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.3 Reason and Faith, Miracles and Enthusiasm ..... . . . .. . . . ..... 161
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Index....... .. . . .. ...... ... ... . . ... . ... . .. .. . . .... ...... .. . . . . 207

xi
List of Tables

Table 2.1 Synoptic table................................................................................. 55

Table 3.1 Thematic correspondence............................................................... 78

xiii
About the Author

Flavio Fontenelle Loque is associate professor at the Federal University of Lavras,

Brazil. His primary research interests are toleration and the history of scepticism.
He has published a work on fideism, Ceticismo e religiao no in{cio da modernidade
(Loyola, 2012), Scetticismo e religione all'inizio dell'eta moderna (Morcelliana,
2018), and a bilingual and commented edition of John Locke's Epistola de
Tolerantia (Autentica, 2019) in partnership with Fabio Fortes and Wellington
Ferreira Lima. His research interests include the notion of laicite and the translation
of modern authors, such as John Locke, Blaise Pascal, and Pierre Bayle.

xv
Abbreviations1

Arg. Proast, The Argument of the 'Letter concerning Toleration' briefly

consider'd and answer'd, ed. 1690
Cond. Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. P. Schuurman
Corr. Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. de Beer
DM Locke, A Discourse of Miracles, John Locke: writings on religion, ed.
V. Nuovo
DNC Locke, A Defence of Nonconformity, ed. Stanton (the quotations give the
page of the manuscript)
E Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Nidditch
Epist. Locke, Epistola de Tolerantia, A Letter on Toleration, ed. Klibansky
and Gough
ET Locke, An Essay concerning Toleration, ed. Milton and Milton
FL Locke, Fourth Letter for Toleration, Posthumous Works, ed. 1706
Letter Augustine, Letters, ed. 1870-1873
Pol. Es. Locke, Political Essays, ed. Goldie
Popple Locke, A Letter concerning Toleration, ed. Montuori
RC Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. Higgins-Biddle
RLP The Reception of Locke's Politics, ed. Goldie, vol. 5: Long, The Letter for
Toleration deciper'd... ; Proast, The Argument... , A Third Letter. .. , A
Second Letter. ..
SL Locke, A Second Letter concerning Toleration, ed. 1690
SL-P Proast, A Second Letter to the author of the Three Letters for Toleration ,
ed. 1704
TL Locke, A Third Letter for Toleration, ed. 1692
TL-P Proast, A Third Letter concerning Toleration, ed. 1691
TTG Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Laslett
Works Locke, The Works of John Locke, ed. 1823

1 No changes have been made in order to modernise either the spelling or the punctuation of the

early modem English works, or of their critical editions.

xv ii
Chapter 1
Introduction

Abstract This chapter presents a brief overview on toleration in early modern

Europe. It then presents the purpose of this book, which consists of an effort to
understand, in detail, how Locke justified religious toleration in the Epistola de
Tolerantia, in the letters written as part of the controversy with Proast and in An
Essay concerning Human Understanding. The definition of toleration and the cen-
tral conceptual distinction between vertical and horizontal toleration are explained,
along with the two main questions that this book claims are at the core of Locke's
reasoning: why should the ends of State not be extended to include the care ofsouls?
and why should private persons tolerate each other?. The chapter ends with a brief
methodological remark and a summary of the structure of the book.

Religious intolerance is a common phenomenon, but it emerges with greater force

at certain times and places. Once such example occurred in early modern Europe,
when the Reformation divided Christianity, causing the coexistence of Christians to
become such a serious problem that it resulted in a series of wars. Due to these con-
flicts, the beginning of the modern age was also a period when the forms of coexis-
tence with the otherness were widely discussed. In general terms, we can say that
the initial attitude towards religious diversity among Christians was the quest for
concord. Especially in the sixteenth century, the ideal of reconciliation between
Catholics and Protestants was very much alive, and encompassed a political dimen-
sion (restoring peace) as well as a theological and ecclesiastical dimension (agree-
ment about the fundamental articles of faith and the communion of all men in the
same church). The unity that had been lost with the Reformation needed to be recov-
ered, and this was meant to happen with the reestablishment of uniformity through
consensus rather than through force. The hope was to achieve an agreement as to the
fundamentals of the faith - smoothing out all the most crucial differences - so that
only the so-called indifferent things would be left to the individual believer's discre-
tion. Therefore, the main ambition of those who yearned for concord was not really
the coexistence of different Christian denominations, but their reunification.
Accordingly, concord should not be confused with toleration, even though both

©The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature

Switzerland AG 2022
F. F. Loque, John Locke and the Grounds for Toleration , International Archives
of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idees 237,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90363-3_1
 2 1 Introduction
conl:t:pls reject the use of force in religious matters, for toleration presupposes that
diversity is insurmountable. 1
The contrast between these two concepts is illuminating, as it reveals that tolera-
tion holds as permanent the coexistence with the otherness or, strictly speaking,
with a relevant otherness (i) of which we make a pejorative judgment and (ii) to
which we have power to make opposition. By definition, the adjective 'tolerant'
refers to an institution or a person that does not make opposition to what is taken as
bad or false, 2 although he has the power to do so. Without these two features, we
should not speak of toleration, but of indifference (when there is no pejorative judg-
ment) or acquiescence (when there is no superiority of power). 3 Consequently, in its
more immediate sense, toleration consists in a coexistence with an otherness that we
do not have a good opinion of, but that we choose not to combat. This is the reason
why toleration is commonly conceived as concession.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the notion of toleration as concession
was prevalent and it had a characteristic that needs to be emphasised: it was always
a concession of the State towards religious dissenters. The emphasis on this charac-
teristic is important because it helps us to delineate a polysemy that is intrinsic to
the notion: toleration can describe either the vertical relationship between the State
and its citizens, or the horizontal relationship between private persons or groups.4
Historically speaking, the Edict of Nantes (1598) and the Declarations oflndulgence
of Charles 11 (1672) and James II (1687) instance the vertical relationship, whereas
the Augsburg Peace Treaty (1555) instances the horizontal one. As we can see, tol-
eration as concession springs from a power asymmetry, and is properly exemplified
by the institutional acts of France and England, countries already very centralised in
early modem Europe. In the absence of such an asymmetry, toleration can no longer
be conceived as concession, for it refers to a horizontal relation between similar
forces, as in the case of the Holy Roman Empire, where political dispersion and
independence led to an accord among reasonably equal parts that allowed different
regions to have different religions, as the maxim cuius regio, eius religio shows.
1
0n the notions of concord and toleration, see Turchetti (199la, b), Bejan (2017, 20-49) and
Guggisberg ( 1983, 37-39). As Laursen (1999, 4) points out, "the basic idea of concordance was
the proto-Haberrnasian idea that we can all agree in the long run; the basic idea of tolerance is that
we will continue to disagree and dislike one another". For a broad view of research on toleration
in early modem Europe and its main interpretative lines since the end of the nineteenth century, see
Walsham (2006, 6-13).
2
This pejorative valence of the concept is found in the Latin origin of the word, but it is also found
in the Greek words to which it goes back. A s tntoµovf] and µaKpo0oµia , tolerantia describes the
capacity to suffer an evil (both Greek terms occur in the New Testament and were translated as
patientia and longanimitas, cf. Harris 201 3, 82-83). In some vernacular languages, the negative
valence is conveyed in the synonymous of the verb to tolerate: souffrir and Leiden. On the negative
tone of toleration and its medieval heritage, see Bejczy ( 1997).
3 5 0n
For a good view of the concept of toleration in its more abstract and broader aspects, see Forst
(2003), Horton ( 1996, 2011 ) and Galeotti (2015).
4 6 For a broad view of different approaches to toleration, see Nederrnan and Laursen ( 1996) and
On the difference between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of toleration, see Williams and
Waldron (2008, 5).
Introduction 3
With regard to toleration in early modem Europe, we must also take into account
the fact that political stability was traditionally associated with religious uniformity,
i.e. dissidence was seen as politically disruptive. The threat to social order raised by
sedition was a justification for intolerance - a justification of a political nature to
which others were added, notably those of a theological nature, as we shall see. In
this respect, it is interesting to remember the case of France, whose history illus-
trates this line of thought very well. In that country, where the adage une Joi, une Loi,
un roi clearly depicts the association between religious uniformity and political
stability, the disturbances caused by the civil wars were so damaging that they led
the State to concede toleration to dissenters at the end of the sixteenth century (those
who defended toleration in these pragmatic terms became known as politiques).
Nevertheless, almost a century later, France turned to its old conception of itself as
an exclusively Catholic country, and the religious persecutions reached new heights
with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.5
In fact, and not only in France, the pragmatic defence of toleration rests on a
constellation of political forces. As it is a concession, there is nothing to prevent it
being revoked in the future. If its value is merely instrumental, as a means of ensur-
ing peace, it is clear that a social or institutional rearrangement might lead to the
subsequent conclusion that toleration can be discarded. All that would be required,
for instance, would be for the State to gain enough power to suppress dissidence. If
one does not bring into question the association between religious uniformity and
political stability, it is impossible to assign to toleration a value in and of itself.
However, aside from this politically based justification for intolerance, there are
also those of a theological nature, whose central aspect rests on the need to correct
the people that are in error and guide them to truth and salvation. Throughout the
modem age, opposition to these two types of justification for intolerance repre-
sented the main philosophical advancement with regard to toleration. Therefore, in
order to decisively establish the concept of toleration in principle (and not merely in
pragmatic terms), it was necessary to show that religious diversity does not impinge
on the social order, and that each person must be free to search for salvation in what-
ever way he deems most suitable.
There are several concepts and arguments that can be deployed in the philosophi-
cal drive to underpin toleration,6 but it is not the intention of this book to discuss all
of them. The aim here is to analyse the reflection of one of the most important and
influential thinkers on this theme, John Locke ( 1632-1704), in order to understand,
in more detail, how he justified religious toleration. More precisely, this book aims
to elaborate an interpretation of his mature works, reconstructing his arguments and
highlighting some of their political, ethical, theological, and epistemological
aspects. While it is well known that to achieve religious toleration the ends of the
State must be circumscribed to the preservation and advancement of civil goods and
the history of toleration in France, besides Lecler (1994, 400-554), see Garrisson ( 1985),
Labrousse ( 1990), Armogathe (1985) and Negroni (2014).
Laursen and Nederrnan (1998).
4 I Introduction
must never extend lU the salvation uf souls, we cannot say that the reasons for reli-
gious toleration, and the correlation of these reasons, are well-established. Moreover,
the distinction between the secular ends of the State and the saving ends of the
Church cover just one of the dimensions of Locke's treatment of toleration: the
vertical one. But a thorough interpretation of his thought must also encompass the
reasons why private persons should not impose their opinions on others in the hori-
zontal relationship, i.e. between themselves. Indeed, as we shall see, Locke's
treatment of toleration is primarily concerned with the question why should the ends
of State not be extended to include the care of souls? But he is also interested in
answering another question: why should private persons tolerate each other? With
regard to his main writings, the first question is the core of the Epistola de Tolerantia
whereas the second is touched upon in a crucial section of An Essay concerning
Human Understanding. In An Essay concerning Human Understanding, though,
Locke deals still with a third question: Why does a person become impositional?
Throughout the present book, issues related to epistemology will receive particu-
lar attention because we believe it is necessary to disentangle three arguments that
are often confused, especially in the readings of the Epistola. As we shall see below,
all of these arguments deal with the problem of truth, but they are based on different
concepts - fallibility, reciprocity and distinction between belief and knowledge - to
explain why the care of souls should not belong to the State, or the magistrate, as
Locke prefers to call it. Without clarifying these arguments, it is impossible to per-
ceive clearly the moral implications of the duty to examine, which, according to
Locke, is incumbent upon human beings as rational creatures, i.e. it is impossible to
ascertain the horizontal dimension of toleration in contrast to the vertical one. By
way of introduction, we submit that the interpretation proposed here is that in the
Epistola, the arguments of fallibility and reciprocity are politically framed because
they are related to the institution of the ends of the State (the vertical dimension of
toleration) whereas, in An Essay concerning Human Understanding , these two
arguments are formulated and deployed with a moral purpose: to demonstrate that
private persons should not impose their opinions on others (the horizontal dimen-
sion of toleration). Meanwhile, the argument of the distinction between belief and
knowledge, whose locus classicus is An Essay concerning Human Understanding,
is explicitly adduced in Locke's treatment of toleration only in A Third Letter, as a
rejoinder to an important objection to the argument of reciprocity, as we shall
explain.
It must be noted, however, that the distinction between secular and sacred ends
related to State and Church never implied that ethics and politics could be conceived
without taking into account God's existence and designs. From Locke's perspective,
human life (individually and socially) is inconceivable without God's designs.
Therefore, it is no exaggeration to affirm that Locke's philosophy is immersed in a
religious worldview. 7 Inevitably, his arguments in favour of toleration also assume
7 1
As Harris (2002, 181) points out, "in agreement with most of his contemporaries, Locke acknowl-
edged that God wanted there to be a civil government and thought that God was the moral law-
maker". On this topic, see Dunn (1969, 1989, 1990), Waldron (2002) and Nuovo (201 1). On
I Introduction 5
the ~ame standpoint, although his writings on this theme more presuppose than
exhibit it. Accordingly, since it is impossible to disentangle theology from politics,
ethics and even epistemology, the present book points out their relations, but it
nonetheless emphasises the problem of truth, as we just said.8 It is important to
remember, though, that Locke himself was never a sceptic, but that he neatly saw
the limits of human understanding as well as the frequent misuse of truth as a justi-
fication (indeed, as a pretext) for persecution.9
With regard to toleration, the period in which Locke lived was a troubled one.
Born in 1632 and dying in 1704, 10 he lived through some very important events,
such as the end of the Thirty Years War with the Peace of Westphalia ( 1648) and the
above-mentioned revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV in October 1685.
With respect to the history of England, Locke saw the civil wars of the 1640s, the
regicide of Charles I (1649), Cromwell's Protectorate (1653-1659), the Restoration
of Monarchy (1660) and the Glorious Revolution (1688-1689), to quote just the
great historical landmarks. Although it is very difficult to establish precisely how
these events may have influenced Locke's treatment of toleration, it is reasonable to
say that at one stage the entanglement of politics and religion was seen by Locke as
a target of attack through the distinction between the ends of State and Church and
the criticism of private persons who impose their beliefs on others, or who make
their own beliefs a pretext to violate civil laws.
In early modem Europe, the most evident entanglement of politics and religion
consisted in the statement that the State should promote salvation, and, ergo, that the
use of force by the State to convert souls was legitimate. Thus, not only a civil func-
tion, the conservation of political stability, but also pastoral and ecclesiastical ones
were assigned to the magistrate, since force was supposed to help guide erroneous
persons to communion into the only true church. As we shall see below, this view
was shared and underpinned by Locke's most important critic, Jonas Proast (c.
1642-1710), but its origins goes back to Augustine (354-430), in particular to his
Locke's religious worldview and the interpretations of his philosophy, see Ashcraft (1996) and
Sigmund (2005).
8
The present work occupies a sort of intennediary position between two groups of interpretations:
on the one hand, the group devoted to the religious worldview that underlies Locke's treatment of
toleration, such as Stanton (2006) and Harris (2013); on the other, the group that focuses on par-
ticular explicit topics on the texts, especially the discussion of usefulness of force, such as
Waldron ( 1988).
9 Although Locke was not a sceptic and never defended toleration based on scepticism, it is conve-
nient to remark that there is a common view according to which there is a necessary conjunction
between scepticism and toleration. This common view, however, is far from true. From a philo-
sophical perspective, toleration would be a straightforward issue if it could be treated in such linear
tenns. In this respect, see Popkin (1998), who discusses two branches in the modem defence of
toleration, the one sceptical, the other dogmatic; and Tuck (1988), who shows how scepticism can
entail intolerance. For a synthesis of this issue, see Coffey (2006).
°For Locke's life, see Cranston ( 1985) and Woolhouse (2007), along with Le Clerc ( 1732), Coste
( 1735), King (1830) and Fox Bourne ( 1876). There are also excellent biographical syntheses writ-
ten by Goldie (2010) and Milton (2011).
6 1 Introduction
writings concerning the Donatists, 11 where several biblical passages are seen as
authorising the use of force to correct heretics and schismatics. Compelle intrare, an
imperative found in Luke's version of the parable of the great banquet (14:23), is the
emblematic expression of this tradition to which Locke opposed himself, and
against which an open attack was launched by Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) in his
Philosophical Commentary on these words of the Gospel, 'Compel them to come in,
that my house may be full ' (1686-1688)_12 In Locke's case, the opposition to
Augustine consists not of an express rebuttal of the injunction compel them to come
in, but essentially of a discussion of the notions of charity in the Epistola and obsti-
nacy in An Essay concerning Human Understanding.
After the Restoration of Monarchy, especially when the reestablishment of the
Anglican Church was at issue, this view was the main justification for the adoption
of persecuting laws for dissenters and Catholics. 13 In spite of the discussions about
comprehension and indulgence, 14 what really took place in the aftennath of Charles
II's enthronement was the institution of laws 15 aimed at preserving the structure of
the Anglican Church and restricting the religious exercise of dissenters and
Catholics. Later, after the Glorious Revolution, the same view concerning the func-
tions of the State still prevailed, but even so, small advances were made towards
11
Of Augustine's writings on the Donatists, the most important are Letters 93 (to Vicentius, dated
408) and 185 (to Boniface, dated 417). For a list of all Augustine's writings in the Donatist contro-
versy (letters, sermons and treatises). see Monceaux (1923, 275-292). There is a good synthesis of
Augustine's position in Lecler (1994, 83-88) and Zagorin (2003, 24-33). On the Donatist contro-
versy and the development of Augustine's thought on coercion, see Evers (2002~. Brown (1964)
and Gaddis (2005, 131- 150). For a detailed analysis of the revival of Augustine during the
Restoration, see Goldie (199 1). On intolerance at the end of the seventeenth century in several
countries of Europe, see Marshall (2006).
12
0n the third volume of A Philosophical Commentary, published in 1687, Bayle openly discusses
Augustine's letters: the two most important ones, letters 93 and 185, but also, on the final chapters,
other letters against the Donatists. For a list of these other letters, see Bayle (2002, 21-22, n. 1).
For a comparison of Locke and Bayle, see, for example, Dunn ( 1996), Jenkinson ( 1996), Almeida
(2010) and Savonius-Wroth (2012).
13
In general, the word 'dissenter' describes those who do not follow the established religion of
their country. In France, the term refers to Protestants as a whole. In England, however, it refers
only to the non-Anglican Protestants (also called non-conformists). For this reason, it is necessary
to point out the 'Catholics' in the universe of those who are not in the Anglican communion.
" In a letter to Philip van Limborch ( 1633-1712) of 12 March 1689 (cf. Corr, v. III, 1120), when
once again Parliament debated comprehension and indulgence, Locke explains these notions as
follows: "the question of toleration has now been taken up in parliament under a twofold title,
namely Comprehension and Indulgence. The former signifies extension of the boundaries of the
Church, with a view to including greater numbers by the removal of part of the ceremonies. The
latter signifies toleration of those who are either unwilling or unable to unite themselves to the
Church of England on the terms offered to them".
llTuese laws constitute the famous Clarendon Code, composed by the Corporation Act (1661 ), Act
of Uniformity (1662), Five Miles Act (1665) and Conventicle Act (1670), which were followed by
two versions of the Test Act (1673). All this legislation, as well as other relevant documents on
toleration from 1660 to 1714, is gathered in English Historical Documents, see Browing (1953,
v. VIll).
Introduction 7
toleration - after all, political decisions are not based on ideology alone, but also on
circumstantial considerations. 16 Clearly a mere concession, the so-called Toleration
Act ( 1689)17 suspended the penalties of part of the legislation against the Trinitarian
dissenters and authorised them to worship in public. That is why it is often seen as
an advancement, even if, on the one hand, nothing was conceded to Anti-Trinitarians
and to Catholics and, on the other, the Test Act ( 1673) remained untouched.
In England, to sum up, the institutional debate about toleration was dualistic. The
debate centred around what should be (r) the conduct of the State regarding those
who do not profess the established religion (dissenters and Catholics) and (11) the
degree of dogmatic, disciplinary and ceremonial rigidity of the Anglican Church. In
the former case, the issue was civil toleration while, in the latter, it was ecclesiasti-
cal toleration. These two branches must be demarcated because there is no neces-
sary bond between them. It was perfectly possible, for instance, to claim ecclesiastical
toleration (as did the latitudinarians) without claiming civil toleration. 18 With respect
to Locke, the defence of the distinction between the ends of State and Church falls
into the field of civil toleration, but he was also in favour of ecclesiastical
toleration. 19
An uncertain issue with respect to Locke is the extent to which the distinction
between State and Church should be pursued. It is not clear whether the distinction
between the ends of these two societies required a real separation of them.20 It
16
ln England, the most important circumstantial element was anti-Catholicism, which influenced
the Glorious Revolution and the so-called Toleration Act ( 1689). For a broad view of Restoration,
Glorious Revolution and the debate on comprehension and indulgence, see Beddard ( 1979), Spurr
( 1989), Schochet (1996) and, in particular, Coffey (2000).
17
Although this act is known as Toleration Act, the word 'toleration' never appears in the text of the
official document, not even in the resume of its content: "an act for exempting their majesties'
Protestant subjects dissenting from the Church of England from the penalties of certain laws" (cf.
Browing 1953, v. VIII, 400). On the Toleration Act and its meaning, see Wykes (1990).
18
ln An Essay concerning Toleration, Locke defines latitudinarianism as the amplification of the
terms of church communion: "few & large" articles in speculative opinions and "few & easy"
ceremonies in worship (cf. ET, 302). However, as we pointed out, latitudinariani sm is not neces-
sarily linked with toleration; in this respect, see Ashcraft (1992). For the context of the concept,
and a general overview of the similarities and differences between Locke and other authors on lati-
tudinarianism, see Spurr (1988), Marshall (1992) and Simonutti (2003).
19
According to Coffey (2000, 11-13, 2006, 630), besides the civil and ecclesiastical branches of
toleration, there are two others: a social and a polemical one. The social branch of toleration refers
to the actual coexistence of private persons, usually in villages and local communities, a coexis-
tence that may be hostile or courteous regardless of the legal status of dissenters and Catholics. On
this topic, see, for instance, Bossy (1991) and Walsham (2006, 269-280). The polemical branch of
toleration, in its tum, describes the civility or incivility of the public debates and corresponds to a
reflection on the persecution of the tongue. For a reading of Locke with an emphasis on this last
branch, see Wilhelm ( 1999) and, in particular, Bejan (20 17).
20
According to Goldie in his introduction to the edition of A Letter concerning Toleration and
Other Writings, "it is unclear if Locke was a categorical separationist. ... If we assume that Locke
was a categorical separationist, then it is not to Britain that one would look for a modern Lockean
state, but to the United States, where the argument of Locke's Letter found futfillment in Thomas
Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom ( 1779), or to France, with its secular republican
8 l Introduction
seems that the Stale could have an established religion as long as it did not discrimi-
nate among its citizens based on religious motives, i.e. as long as it assured equal
civil rights for all. At any rate, this is not a question that the present book seeks to
answer. Similarly, the aim here is not to reconstruct Locke's treatment of toleration
from a chronological perspective in which, in broad terms, toleration was initially
refused and later supported by him, as is commonly said when Locke's major writ-
ings on toleration are compared: on the one hand, his two speeches, one in English
(1660), the other in Latin (c. 1662), known nowadays as Two Tracts on Government;
and on the other, An Essay concerning Toleration ( 1667),A Defence ofNonconformity
(1681-82) and the Epistola de Tolerantia (1689). 21 As we said above, the present
book seeks to analyse Locke's mature reflection in order to understand, in as much
detail as possible, how he sustains religious toleration and how he does so with
regard not only to the vertical relationship between State and citizens, but also to the
horizontal relationship between private persons. From a methodological standpoint,
the interpretation proposed here is focused chiefly on the concepts and arguments
adduced by Locke, i.e. on the objective of identifying, defining and assessing them
by giving precedence to the texts themselves. Evidently, there are other possible
approaches to Locke's writings (as well as to any other author's writings). There are
methodological choices that emphasise the historical and political context or that
seek to ascertain the sources of his thought but, although relevant and fruitful, these
are research itineraries that will not be adopted in this book. 22
The interpretation that will be developed here encompasses three chapters,
besides the introduction (Chap. 1) and the conclusion (Chap. 5). In the second chap-
ter, we shall examine the Epistola de Tolerantia in order to establish its arguments
tradition of lai'cite" (Locke 2010, xiv). In this respect, see also McCabe (1997) and Pritchard
(2014). According to Coffey (2000, 12), Locke was a radical tolerationist who defended "the natu-
ral right or entitlement of religious dissenters to worship freely and enjoy civil equality. The most
radical tolerationists went a stage further and advocated what was later called 'disestablishment',
or 'the separation of church and state', a development that we tend to associate with the American
and French Revolutions, but one which has never taken place in England itself'. For a contempo-
rary discussion of toleration and of the so-called separation of church and state, see Maclure and
Taylor (2010), Baub6rot and Milot (2001), Laegaard (2011) and Taylor (2014).
21We indicate here the dates of composition, except in the case of the Epistola, written in the
European winter of 1685-86 and published in 1689. OfLocke's main writings on toleration, apart
from the publication of excerpts, A Defence of Nonconformity remains unpublished. There is,
though, a transcription of the manuscript in Stanton (2003). An Essay concerni11g Toleration was
published for the first time in 1876 in the Life of Joh11 Locke by Fox Bourne; the Two Tracts 011
Government were originally published in 1961 by Viano (both of Locke's works received a critical
edition in 2006 and 1967, respectively). Of the uncountable articles and books that reconstruct and
analyse Locke's treatment of toleration, see Gough (1973), Cranston (1987), Cay6n (1996),
Sommerville (2004), Tate (2016) and, above all, Stanton (2013), besides the more comprehensive
research of Harris ( 1998), Marshall (1994) and Collins (2020).
22 For examples of other methodological approaches, see Ashcraft ( 1986), whose research focuses
on the historical and political context of Locke's political philosophy, and Loconte (2014), who
seeks to ascertain the sources of Locke's conception of toleration. For a discussion of methodology
and of the interpretations of Locke's philosophy, with an emphasis on the liberal and Marxist read-
ings as well as on the reading of the so-called Cambridge school, see Santos (2017).
References 9
and their correlation. In this analysis we shall reson to some of Locke's already
published manuscripts, to Two Treatises of Government and to The Reasonableness
of Christianity. In the third chapter, our task is to scrutinise the controversy between
Locke and Proast, an adversary against whom Locke composed other three letters
concerning toleration (the last of which remained unfinished). In the fourth chapter,
based on An Essay concerning Human Understanding, and also on the writings Of
the Conduct of the Understanding, A Discourse of Miracles and An Essay for the
Understanding of St Paul's Epistles by consulting St Paul himself, we discuss how
the due examination of truth is associated with toleration. We then analyse Locke 's
broader reflection concerning the duty to examine that is incumbent upon the human
being as a rational creature. From a conceptual perspective, Chaps. 2 and 3 discuss
the grounds for toleration concerning the relationship between State and citizens,
while Chap. 4 develops the grounds for toleration with regard to the relationship
between private persons.
At the end of this book, we hope to convey a coherent and comprehensive view
of Locke's mature treatment of toleration, in which we see clearly the two dimen-
sions of toleration and their grounding reasons. We also hope that this book will
provide elements for reflecting on our contemporary world, in which religious
fanaticism has prompted urgent discussion on the ends of State and Church, and
reflection about the duties of private persons one to another.
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Chapter 2
The Argumentative Structure
of the Epistola de Tolerantia

Abstract This chapter aims to identify and analyse the argumentative structure of
the Epistola de Tolerantia. The interpretation developed here argues that there are
two dimensions of toleration in Locke's reasoning-a vertical one (State-to-citizens)
and a horizontal one (citizen-to-citizen)- and that, when considering his arguments,
both dimensions should be taken into account. Vertical toleration relates to the so-
called three considerations and other important arguments. Deeply intertwined, they
constitute the core of the Epistola de Tolerantia, whose central purpose is to dem-
onstrate that the ends of the Commonwealth cannot be extended to the care of souls,
i.e. that the magistrate has no commission to use force in religious matters.
Horizontal toleration, meanwhile, is fonned by a single argument built on the
notions of meekness and charity. Its aim is to show that no Christian shall compel
his neighbour in religious matters, because force is incompatible with Christ's life
and teachings.

Toleration is the abstention from force as a means to convert souls (cf. SL, 2, 6,
Works, 62, 67). 1 Formulated in 1690, approximately one year after the publication
of the Epistola de Tolerantia, Locke's definition presents, in a few words, a duty that
private persons, churches, clergymen and the magistrate should respect. The great
challenge, though, is to substantiate this. Why should one not compel others to sal-
vation when one has the power to do so and believes that he has the truth? Why

1 In his Second Letter, Locke addresses Proast as follows: "Force, you allow, is improper to convert

Men to any Religion. Toleration is but the removing that Force" (SL, p. 2, Works, p. 62); "The
purpose of the Letter is plainly to defend Toleration, exempt from all Force; especially Civil Force,
or the Force of the Magistrate" (SL, p. 6, Works, p. 66). ln A Defence of Noncofonnity, Locke
defines toleration as follows: "taking off the power of the Magistrate from restraining any differ-
ences amongst Christians" (DNC, 7), and, in the same vein, "takeing off the Magistrates hand from
holding men close to uniformity" (DNC, 42). In a similar fashion, this straightforward definition is
also adopted by Bayle. In a letter to David Constant de Rebecque (1638-1733) from 16/26 July
1690, he says that toleration (in his own words, "political toleration") "is nothing but the exemp-
tion from the penal laws" (Bayle 1737, 645).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 15

Switzerland AG 2022
F. F. Loque, John Locke and the Grounds for Toleration, International Archives
of the History ofideas Archives intemationales d'histoire des idees 237,
https://doi.org/l 0.1007/978-3-030-90363-3_2
16 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
should one accept religious diversity? In the Epistola, the most famous arguments
to support toleration can be easily found (cf. Epist., 66.19-70.17). They are what
Popple's translation2 designates three considerations, but besides not comprising all
of Locke's arguments, neither their interpretation nor their value is consensual.
The first and foremost expression of this lack of consensus about Locke's argu-
ments is Proast's The Argument of the 'Letter concerning Toleration' briefly
consider'd and answer'd, since he judged that there was just one argument in
Locke's reasoning (cf. Arg., 3-4, RLP, 26-27). 3 Nonetheless, at the beginning of A
Second Letter (cf. SL, 6, Works, 67), Locke presents a metaphor to contest this read-
ing: from his perspective, the house he has built is supported by several beams, not
just one. If one of them were removed, the others would hold it up. This analogy is
not enough to prove the insufficiency, maybe even the error, of Proast's reading (a
metaphor is not an argument), but it is an excellent illustration of the way Locke
himself conceived the Epistola, and a significant indication of the difficulty of inter-
preting it, especially if we take into account the historical recurrence of readings
like that of Proast.4 If Locke makes so blunt an opposition to his main critic's read-
ing, and it continues to be formulated centuries later, we shall conclude that his case
for toleration is more intricate than he imagines.
As for the metaphor, it is important to emphasise two conclusions that may be
drawn from it: firstly, there are different arguments to support toleration; secondly,
they are independent of each other, each capable of supporting the whole building
by itself. Nevertheless, when Locke explains the metaphor and sets out the argu-
ments that he describes as the beams of his case for toleration, they do not corre-
spond exactly to the famous three considerations found in the Epistola. It is puzzling
that Locke does not follow literally that exposition enumerated by the adverbs
primo, secundo, tertio which seemed to contain the central points of his reasoning.
Hence, we may ask (1) what, precisely, the arguments to support toleration are and
(n) how they relate to each other. Without answering these questions, it is impossi-
ble to understand the controversy with Proast and assess the grounds for religious
toleration proposed by Locke.
Nonetheless, before analysing Locke's arguments and the relationship between
them, we must have a clear idea of what it means to support religious toleration in
the seventeenth century. As the Epistola shows, the duty to tolerate relates to private
persons, churches, clergymen and the magistrate (cf. Epist., 78.lss). None of them
are permitted to use force in religious matters, but Locke stresses the role of the
magistrate, whose jurisdiction must be circumscribed to the preservation and
2 0n Popple's life and thought, see Robbins (1967) and Simonutti (1998).
3 It
is the argument of unfitness of force, as we shall see below. In The Argument edited by Vernon
(Proast 2010, 55), there is a mistake in the passage referred to here: one should read single argu-
ment and not.final argument.
4
Undoubtedly, Waldron (1988) is the greatest contemporary example of a reading of the Epistola
focused on the argument of unfitness of force. Concerning this topic, see also Spitz (2002) and
Bou-Habib (2003). For a critical assessment of this reading, see Schwartzman (2005) and Chen
(2006), but in particular Stanton (2006) and Harris (2013).
2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de To/erantia 17
advancement of civil goods (cf. Epist., 64.27-28).5 It is in this context - the effon to
define the ends of the Commonwealth and hence its legitimate sphere of action -
that the three considerations are introduced. In political terms, the defence of tolera-
tion requires a distinction to be made between the ends of Church and State, so that
the care for the salvation of souls should be left exclusively to private persons and
the religious societies they enter into, each one of these societies searching to pro-
cure salvation through its own way. To put it crudely, the distinction between the
ends of Church and State means that each person should be allowed to search for his
own salvation in the church he deems most appropriate, i.e. that the magistrate
should not legislate - in other words, prescribe penalties - concerning religion.
If a person is to be punished when he professes his religion, this must never be
done for religious reasons, only for political ones, as the sole obligation of the civil
power is to maintain public order. The magistrate must be guided by political rea-
sons, as we see in Locke's exposition of intolerable practical beliefs (cf. Epist.,
130.12-134.21) and in his example of the prohibition of the slaughter of calves (cf.
Epist., 108.23-110.26). In summary, it is incumbent upon the civil power to punish
crimes, not heresies, schisms or sins. The distinction between the ends of Church
and State sustained in the Epistola implies that the magistrate has no duty regarding
beliefs and ways of worship as such, but solely regarding the consequences these
may have to civil society. Only their political dimension must concern the magis-
trate, not their religious dimension.
In this sense, Locke's main arguments - i.e. the three considerations - are
intended to support the thesis that the magistrate's jurisdiction must be concerned
"only" (unice) with the civil goods, that the right and dominion of the civil power
must be circumscribed and limited "solely" (so/is) by the care and advancement of
these goods, and that the magistrate's jurisdiction neither can nor ought "in any
manner" (ullo modo) comprise the salvation of souls (cf. Epist., 66.14- 18).6 Locke's
case for toleration, therefore, is essentially focused on the restriction of the ends of
the State, i.e. on the vertical dimension of toleration. In A Second Letter, referring
to the author of the Epistola as a third person, Locke sums up his purpose as fol-
lows: "all that he endeavours, is to show the bounds of Civil Power; and that in
punishing others for Religion, the Magistrate misapplies the Force he has in his
hands, and so goes beyond Right, beyond the limits of his Power" (SL, 66,
Works, 135).
5 Locke writes " ... ad bona civilia conservanda promovendaque", which Popple translates as
" ... for the procuring, preserving and advancing their own civil interests" (Popple, 15).
6 As Spitz (2002, 114) says, "Locke does not take the right to liberty of conscience as a starting
point in order to show, then, that all legitimate government ought to respect this right and so abstain
from all persecution. Rather, he meditates on the possible governmental functions in order to show
that compelling consciences is not one of them". Accordingly, it seems inadequate to divide
Locke's defence of toleration into two branches, civil and religious, as Silva (2013) does. Although
the duty to tolerate regards churches and clergymen (besides private persons and the magistrate),
this does not amount to two different types of toleration, a civil toleration based on the first consid-
eration and a religious toleration based on the second consideration.
 18 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
From Locke's perspective, although it is necessary to distinguish between the
ends of Church and State, the magistrate is not supposed to abandon altogether the
care of the salvation of souls. Indeed, he is required not to seek this goal by the use
of force - that is, by the use of his power as magistrate to prescribe laws and thereby
resort to coercion. 7 However, the magistrate is not forbidden to resort to discourses,
as any private person, clergyman or church. He is not forbidden to teach, admonish,
and persuade. There is a crucial distinction between two types of care: cura authori-
tativa, based on authority, and cura charitativa, based on charity (cf. Epist., 90.6-7):
"in teaching, instructing, and correcting the erroneous by arguments, he certainly
does what it becomes any good man to do; the magistrate is not obliged to put off
either humanity or Christianity" (Epist., 68.12-15). Locke's purpose is to remove
from the magistrate just one of the means by which the conversion of souls can sup-
posedly be wrought. All the others - that amount to discourse but also to the exam-
ple of a good life - are preserved.
There is no doubt that by establishing the distinction between magisterial and
charitable care, Locke wishes to stress that the use of force cannot be conceived as
a charitable act and, thereupon, that Christians must abstain from it as a means to
save souls. If charitable admonitions and endeavours to refute errors "are indeed a
Christian's greatest duties (maxima ... officia)" (Epist., 124.9-10),8 their accom-
plishment must necessarily be exempt from force. "We pray every day for their
Conversion, and I think it is our Duty so to do", Locke says in reference to Pagans,
Muslims, and Jews when he replies Proast's critique concerning the extension of
toleration proposed in the Epistola, "but it will, I fear, hardly be believed that we
pray in earnest, if we exclude them from the other ordinary and probable means of
Conversion, either by driving them from, or persecuting them when they are amongst
us" (SL, 2, Works, 62).
According to Locke, there is a Christian duty to evangelise, 9 a duty that Proast
also acknowledges (cf. TL-P, 2, RLP, 42), but the use of force as a means to lead the
erroneous to salvation is incompatible with Christianity: coercion affronts charity,
the main Christian principle. This incompatibility between force and charity consti-
tutes, then, an argument to support religious toleration, but it is distinct from the
three considerations in two aspects, as we shall see below: firstly, given its theologi-
cal and moral character, it corresponds to the horizontal toleration (whereas the
three considerations have a political character and so correspond to the vertical tol-
eration); secondly, since it is based on Scripture it has a confessional nature (while
the three considerations tend to have no appeal to Scripture and so have a secular
nature). These differences are not a problem, however. It is no wonder that Locke
sustains toleration in its vertical and horizontal dimensions. Moreover, his use of
7
Evidently, it means here physical force or the threat to use it. However, in the Epistola there are
metaphors relating the notion of force to persuasion, as Walker (1996) shows.
8 Translation slightly altered.
9
For an interpretation of the modem debate on toleration and the duty to evangelise, see Goldie and
Popkin (2006, 99-104). See also Goldie's introduction to his edition of A Letter (Locke, 2010,
xi- xii) and Marshall (1994, 179).
2.1 The Evangelical Argument 19
scriptural and non-scriptural arguments should cause no wonder either, given that
toleration is "agreeable" (consona) to the Gospel and to reason (cf. Epist., 64.10-12).
In either case, nevertheless, it is important to note the sense and the limits ofLocke's
reasoning. Hence, considering Locke's reasoning as a whole, we may say that the
Epistola displays four arguments: the three considerations and the argument con-
cerning charity, with which we shall begin our analysis.
2.1 The Evangelical Argument
Of all the arguments displayed in the Epistola, the first is the one concerning charity.
As we have seen, this argument is based on Scripture, particularly the New
Testament, and for that reason it is described here as confessional. This argument -
which we shall call the evangelical argument - is found especially in the prologue
(cf. Epist., 58.1-64.26). 10 It is grounded on a conception of Christianity as conform-
ing to the example of Christ, the Prince of Peace, according to Locke (cf. Epist.,
64. l; Isaiah 9:6). In his own words, "if the Gospel and the Apostles are to be
believed, no man can be a Christian without charity (sine charitate), and without the
faith which worketh, not by force, but by love" (Epist., 58.25-26; cf. Galatians 5:6).
In the opening pages of the Epistola, some passages of the New Testament are
expressly mentioned: Luke 22, Romans 1, Galatians 5, and some others are alluded
to, such as Mathew 11, Luke l 4, 2 Corinthians 10. 11 Nevertheless, it is the reference
to Galatians 5, in particular to Galatians 5:6, that is the most important point to
highlight, because it is based on this passage that Locke not only sustains the bold
opposition between love and force, but also emphasises action over belief. In The
Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke quotes the same passage when he speaks of
obedience to Christ's laws, and again he stresses the role of love and action. In The
Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke reiterates his interpretation, citing the sec-
ond chapter of the Epistle of James, whose predominant theme is faith and works
10
The expression evangelical argument was inspired by Goldie and Popkin (2006, 102), who speak
of an "evangelical case for toleration". However, the sense we give to this expression is different
from that of Goldie and Popkin. Here, evangelical argument is the name given to a specific argu-
ment concerning charity or love and Christ's example, which corresponds to just one conceptual
strand explored in the evangelical case.
11
When Locke gives the references of his quotations in the prologue of the Epistola, he mentions
the chapters, but not the verses. The complete references are as follows: Luke 22:25-26, 22: 32,
Romans I: 19, Galatians 5: 19-21 (the first edition of Popple's translation interpolated a quotation
from 2 Timothy 2: 19: "let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity"). As for
the allusions, we fi nd Matthew 11 :29-30, 26:52-53, Luke 14:26, 2 Corinthians 10:4, Ephesians
6:10-18, Hebrews 2:10, besides the important allusion to Isaiah 9:6. In the case of Galatians
5: 19-21 , Locke does not mention "heresies" as one of the "works of the flesh", as Wolfson (2010,
85-91) points out.
Another random document with
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 She returned to her home,
going first to the patriarch to ask
his blessing on her house and
saying unto him: “My people are
heathen and my son, too; may
God preserve me from harm!”
And the patriarch said: “My
faithful daughter, thou hast been
baptised in Christ, thou hast put
on Christ, Christ shall preserve
thee as he preserved Enoch in
the first ages, and Noah in the
Ark, as he preserved Abraham
from Abimelech, Lot from the
Sodomites, Moses from
Pharaoh, David from Saul, the
three young men from the fiery
furnace, and Daniel from the
Olga lions; thus shall he preserve
thee from the enemy and his
snares!” Thus the patriarch
blessed her and she returned in peace to her own land and came to
Kiev.
Olga lived with her son Sviatoslav and she repeatedly tried to
induce him to be baptised, but he would not listen to her, for if any
one then wished to be baptised it was not forbidden, but people
mocked at him. And Olga often said, “My son, I have learned wisdom
and rejoice; if thou knewest it, thou too wouldst rejoice.” But he paid
no heed to her, saying: “How should I alone adopt a strange faith, my
droujina (followers, men-at-arms) would mock at me.” She said: “If
thou art baptised, all will do likewise,” but he would not listen to his
mother and persisted in the heathen customs, not knowing that who
does not hearken to his mother shall fall into misfortune, for it is
written, he that does not hearken to his father or mother, let him die
the death.[5] And he was angered against his mother. However, Olga
loved her son Sviatoslav, and said: “God’s will be done! If God wills
to have mercy on my race and on the Russian land, he will put into
their hearts to turn to God, even as He did unto me.” And having
thus said, she prayed for her son and for the people night and day,
and she brought up her son until he was grown to be a man.

SVIATOSLAV; THE VICTORY OF NORTH OVER SOUTH

Sviatoslav assumed the reins of government

[964-971 a.d.] in 964, and he ruled only till 972, but this short
period was filled with warlike expeditions. He
crushed the power of the Volga Bulgarians and of the Chazars, and
he incorporated the Viatitchi in the empire—thus destroying the
danger ever menacing from the east, and uniting all the Slavs under
one dominion. In 968 he marched—at the instigation of the Greek
emperor, who furnished him the means—with an army of sixty
thousand men against the Bulgarians of the Danube, conquered
Pereiaslavl (the location of which is unknown) and Durostorus (the
modern Silistria), and began to form the project of erecting for
himself a new empire on the ruins of the Bulgarian power, when
tidings reached him of a raid of the Petchenegs against Kiev and of
the imminent danger to his mother and children who were
beleaguered in that town. Leaving garrisons in the conquered towns
he hurried back by forced marches and drove the Petchenegs back
into the steppe. He divided his Russian dominions among his three
young sons, giving Kiev to Iaropolk, the land of the Drevlians to
Oleg, and Novgorod to Vladimir; while he himself went back to
Bulgaria, for “Pereiaslavl is dear to him, where all good things meet,
fine stuffs, wine, fruits, and gold from Greece, silver and horses from
Bohemia and Hungary, furs, wax, honey, and slaves from Russia.”
In 970 he conquered Bulgaria and crossed the Balkans with an
army of thirty thousand men. Defeated before Arcadipole (the
present Lüle Burpas), his barbarian followers gave way to their
plundering instincts, ravaged Macedonia, and scattered in all
directions, while the emperor John Tzimiskes was making extensive
preparations for their annihilation. Thus the year 971 was spent. In
March of the next year the Russian garrison was almost annihilated
at Pereiaslavl, which the Greeks took by storm, and only a small
remnant reached Sviatoslav. In this hour of need Sviatoslav
exhibited a tremendous energy. By recalling his roving bands he
soon found himself at the head of sixty thousand men, and a pitched
battle was fought. Twelve times the victory wavered from one side to
the other, but finally their lack of cavalry and their inferior armament
decided the day against the Russians, and they were forced back
upon Drster. For three months they held the town against a regular
siege, until, reduced in numbers by hunger and numerous sorties,
Sviatoslav decided on a last desperate effort to break through the
Greek lines. The battle is described in great detail by the Byzantine
historians, in whom Sviatoslav’s bravery excited admiration. Fifteen
thousand Russians were left on the field, the survivors were forced
back into Durostorus. Surrounded on all sides, Sviatoslav sued for
peace, and Tzimiskes granted an honourable retreat to a foe so
gallant and withal dangerous. He renewed with him the old treaties,
undertook to supply his army with provisions on its retreat, and also
to induce the Petchenegs to grant a free passage into Russia. But at
the rapids of the Dnieper these sons of the steppe surprised
Sviatoslav and killed him, and only a small remnant of his force, led
by the voyevod Svenedl, reached Kiev.ga
Sviatoslav’s overthrow was, after all, a fortunate event for the
Russian empire. Kiev was already a sufficiently eccentric capital; had
Sviatoslav established the seat of government on the Danube, his
successor would have gone still further; and Rurik, instead of being
the founder of a mighty empire, would have been nothing more than
the principal leader of one of those vast but transient irruptions of the
northern barbarians, which often ravaged the world without leaving
behind any permanent trace of their passage. But in the Greek
emperor Tzimiskes, Sviatoslav met with a hero as pertinacious as
himself, and with far more talent, and the Russians, driven back
within the limits of Russia, were compelled to establish themselves
there.i
Sviatoslav’s death seems to have left no perceptible influence on
the destinies of Russia, for his three young sons were in the
undisputed possession of authority while he and his warriors were
 fighting for
[977 a.d.] a new
empire in
the Balkan peninsula. But his
division of Russia among his
sons, as if it were his private
estate, soon showed its
mischievous effects. In 977 civil
war broke out between Iaropolk,
who was at Kiev, and Oleg, who
was in the Drevlian country. The
latter was defeated in battle, and
in his flight met death by the
breaking down of a bridge
thronged with fugitives. His
territory was thereupon annexed
by Iaropolk to his own
dominions.
Vladimir I
Vladimir, prince of Novgorod,
the youngest of the three (Died 1015)
brothers, now became alarmed
for his own safety and fled
across the sea to seek refuge among the Scandinavian Varangians.
After two years he returned with a numerous force of Norse
adventurers, expelled from Novgorod the voyevods whom Iaropolk
had installed there during his absence, and led his army against
Kiev. On his march he conquered Polotsk on the Dvina, an
independent Varangian principality, killing its prince by the name of
Rogvolod (Scand. Rangvaldr) and forcing his daughter Rogneda to
marry him. Iaropolk, betrayed by his chief men, surrendered Kiev
without offering any resistance and finally delivered his own person
into the hands of Vladimir, by whose order he was put to death.
Vladimir now became sole ruler of Russia.
The victory of Vladimir over Iaropolk was achieved with the aid of
Northmen and Novgorodians. It was, therefore, a victory of the
Russian north over the Russian south, of Novgorod, where
paganism was still unshaken, over Kiev, which was permeated with
Christian elements. Vladimir was brought up in Novgorod, and during
his two years’ stay in Sweden he must have become still more
strongly impregnated with heathen ideas. Accordingly we find that no
sooner was he firmly seated on his throne at Kiev than he tried to
restore the heathen worship to more than its pristine strength among
the Russian Slavs. Statues of the gods were erected: Perun,
Dashbog, Stribog, Simargla, Mokosh—all of them, with the exception
of Perun, known to us hardly more than by name. Human sacrifices
were introduced, and two Christians, a father and his son, who
resisted this blood-tax, were killed by a fanatical mob—the first and
only Christian martyrs on Russian soil. One is tempted to assume
that the Russian Slavs had originally no representations of the gods,
and that it was their Norse princes who introduced them—at any rate
there is no mention of images before the arrival of the latter; while
the mode of worship introduced by Vladimir bears a bloody
character, quite alien to the eastern Slavs. It is evident that he is
making a last effort to impart to the colourless paganism of his
subjects a systematic character which would enable it to resist the
growing new religion.
But the circumstances of this prince soon underwent a change.
His Norse auxiliaries, whose rapacity he could not satisfy, he was
soon obliged to dismiss. According to northern sagas he was even
involved in a war with Sweden, the stronghold of heathenism. His
new capital was in constant commercial intercourse with Byzantium,
and the reports that reached him of its gorgeous worship made a
deep impression on the imagination of the barbarian. But if he was to
accept the religion of the Cæsars, he was determined to do it not as
a suppliant, but as a conqueror.ga In what follows we give in full the
circumstantial account of Nestor.

NESTOR’S ACCOUNT OF VLADIMIR’S CONVERSION

In the year 987, Vladimir called together his

[987 a.d.] boyars and the elders of the town, and said to
them: “Behold, the Bulgarians have come to me
saying: Receive our law; then came Germans and they praised their
laws; after them came the Jews, and finally came the Greeks,
blaming all other laws, but praising their own, and they spoke at
great length, from the creation of the world, of the history of the
whole world; they speak cunningly, and it is wonderful and pleasing
to hear them; they say that there is another world, and that
whosoever receives their faith, even though he die shall live to all
eternity; but if he receive another law he shall burn in another world
amidst flames. What think ye of it, and what will you answer?”
And the boyars and elders answered, “Thou knowest, prince, that
nobody finds fault with his own, but on the contrary praises it; if thou
desirest to test this matter deeply, send some of thy men to study
their various faiths and see how each one serves God.” And the
speech pleased the prince and all the people; ten wise and good
men were chosen and were told to go first to the Bulgarians and
study their faith. So they went, and coming saw infamous doings,
and how the people worshipped in their mosques, and they returned
to their own country. And Vladimir said to them: “Go now to the
Germans, and observe in the same manner, and afterwards go to
the Greeks.” They came to the Germans, and after having watched
their church services, they went on to Tsargorad (Constantinople)
and came to the emperor; the emperor asked them what brought
them there, and they told him all that had happened. When he had
heard it, he was glad and did them great honour from that day. The
next day he sent to the patriarch saying: “There have come certain
Russians to study our faith, prepare the church and thy clergy, and
array thyself in thy episcopal robes that they may see the glory of our
God.” When the patriarch heard this, he called together his clergy
and they celebrated the service as for a great festival, and they
burned incense and the choirs sang. And the emperor went with the
Russians into the church and they were placed in a spacious part so
that they might see the beauty of the church and hear the singing;
then they explained to them the archiepiscopal service, the ministry
of the deacons and the divine office. They were filled with
wonderment and greatly admired and praised the service. And the
emperors Basil and Constantine called them and said, “Return now
to your country.” And they bade them farewell, giving them great gifts
and showing them honour.
When they returned to their own country, the prince assembled the
boyars and elders and said to them: “These are the men whom we
have sent; they have returned, let us listen to what they have seen.”
And he said: “Speak before the droujina.” And they said: “First we
went to the Bulgarians and we observed how they worship in their
temples, they stand without girdles, they sit down and look about
them as though they were possessed by the demon, and there is no
gladness amongst them, but only sorrow and a great stench; their
religion is not a good one. We then went to the Germans, and we
saw many services celebrated in their temples, but we saw no
beauty there. Then we came to the Greeks, and they took us where
they worship their God, and we no longer knew whether we were in
heaven or on earth, for there is nothing like it on earth, nor such
beauty, and we know not how to tell of it; we only know that it is
there, that God dwells among men, and their service surpasses that
of any other land. We can never forget its beauty, for as every man
when he has tasted sweetness cannot afterwards endure bitterness,
so can we no longer dwell here.” The boyars answered: “If the Greek
religion were evil, then thy grandmother Olga, who was wiser than all
men, would not have adopted it.” And Vladimir replied: “Where then
shall we be baptised?” They answered: “Where thou wilt.” And the
year passed by.
In the year 988 Vladimir marched with his
[988 a.d.] troops against Kherson, a Greek town, and the
inhabitants shut themselves up in the town. So
Vladimir established himself on the other side of the town, in the bay,
at an arrow’s throw from the town. And the people of Kherson fought
hard against him, but he blockaded the town and they were
exhausted, and Vladimir said to them: “If you do not surrender I will
stay three years if necessary.” But they would not listen to him.
Then Vladimir ranged his men in battle array and commanded
them to build a trench towards the town. And a man of Kherson, by
name Anastasius, threw out an arrow, on which he had inscribed: “To
the east of thee lie springs, the waters of which come into the town
through pipes; dig there and thou shalt intercept the water.” When
Vladimir heard this he looked up to heaven and said: “If this comes
to pass I will be baptised.” He commanded his soldiers to dig above
the pipes, and he cut off the water, and the people, exhausted by
thirst, surrendered.
So Vladimir with his droujina entered into the town. And he sent
messengers to Basil and Constantine, saying: “Behold I have
conquered your famous town. I have heard that you have a maiden
sister; if you will not give her to me, I will do with your capital even as
I have done with this town.” The emperors were grieved when this
message was brought to them and sent back the following answer:
“It is not meet to give a Christian maiden in marriage to a heathen. If
thou art baptised thou shalt receive what thou askest, and the
kingdom of heaven besides, and thou shalt be of the same faith as
we, but if thou wilt not be baptised we cannot give thee our sister.”
When he heard this, Vladimir said to the emperor’s messengers,
“Tell your emperor thus: I will be baptised, for I have already inquired
into your religion, and your faith and rites please me well as they
have been described to me by the men whom we have sent.” And
when the emperors heard these words they rejoiced and persuaded
their sister, who was named Anna, and sent to Vladimir saying: “Be
baptised and we will send thee our sister.” Vladimir answered: “Let
them come with your sister to baptise me.” When the emperors
heard this they sent their sister with some dignitaries and priests;
and she did not want to go and said: “I am going like a slave to the
heathen, it would be better for me to die.” But her brothers
persuaded her saying: “It is through thee that God shall turn the
hearts of the Russian people to repentance, and thou shalt save the
land of Greece from a cruel war; seest thou not how much harm the
Russians have already done to the Greeks? And now if thou goest
not they will do more harm.” And they persuaded her with difficulty.
So she took ship, kissed her parents, and weeping went across the
sea to Kherson.
When she arrived, the people of Kherson came out to greet her,
led her into the town, and took her to the palace. By the will of God
Vladimir’s eyes were then sore and he could not see anything, he
was greatly troubled. And the czarina[6] went unto him saying: “If
thou desirest to be delivered from this malady, be baptised as quickly
as possible, or otherwise thou wilt not be cured.” When Vladimir
heard this he said: “If this is accomplished, truly the God of the
Christians is great:” and he was baptised. The bishop of Kherson
after having announced it to the people, baptised Vladimir together
with the czarina’s priests, and as soon as he laid his hands on him,
he saw. When Vladimir perceived how quickly he was healed, he
glorified God, saying: “Now only do I know the true God.” And when
his droujina saw it, many were also baptised. Vladimir was baptised
in the church of St. Basil, which is in Kherson in the midst of the
town, where the people hold their market.
After the baptism Vladimir was wedded to the czarina. And when
he had been baptised the priests expounded to him the Christian
faith. After this Vladimir with the czarina and Anastasius and the
priests of Kherson took the relics of St. Clement and St. Theba, his
disciple, as well as the sacred vessels and relics, and he built a
church on an eminence in the middle of the town, which had been
raised with the earth taken from the trench, and this church still
exists. As a wedding present to the czarina he gave back Kherson to
the Greeks, and himself returned to Kiev. When he came there he
commanded all the idols to be overthrown, some to be chopped in
pieces, others cast into the flames. Then Vladimir had the following
proclamation made throughout the town. “Whosoever to-morrow, rich
or poor, mendicant or artisan, does not come to the river to be
baptised, will be as an alien to me.” When the people heard these
words, they came joyfully saying: “If this faith were not good, the
prince and the boyars would not have adopted it.” The next day
Vladimir came with the czarina’s priests and those of Kherson to the
banks of the Dnieper, and an innumerable multitude of people were
assembled and they went into the water, some up to their necks,
others to their breasts; the younger ones stood on the banks, men
held their children in their arms, the adults were quite in the water,
and the priests stood repeating the prayers. And there was joy in
heaven and on earth to see so many souls saved. When they were
baptised the people returned to their homes and Vladimir rejoiced
that he and his people knew God. He ordered that churches and
priests should be established in all the towns, and that the people
should be baptised throughout all the towns and villages; then he
sent for the children of the chief families and had them instructed in
book learning. Thus was Vladimir enlightened with his sons and his
people, for he had twelve sons. And he henceforth lived in the
Christian faith.h

The Death of Vladimir the Christian

The chronicler then goes on to describe the changes wrought in

Vladimir’s character by his conversion: how this prince, who had
hitherto been an oriental voluptuary and maintained in several places
numerous harems with hundreds of wives, suddenly changed into
the faithful husband of his Christian wife; and how he who had
murdered his brother (whose wife he appropriated) and the father
and brother of another of his wives, now became fearful of punishing
offenders and criminals lest he commit a sin, so that it became the
duty of his priests to admonish him to enforce justice and punish the
guilty. All this, whether true or false, shows in what deep veneration
the founder of Russian Christianity was held by subsequent
generations.
On the other hand, his acceptance of Christianity does not seem
to have diminished his love of war, which in those days, surrounded
as the agricultural Russians were by semi-nomadic and marauding
tribes, was indeed a social necessity. Throughout his reign he was
engaged in suppressing revolts, reconquering territory lost during the
reign of the weak Iaropolk—Galicia or Red Russia had then been
lost to Poland—and punishing Lithuanians, Volga Bulgarians, and
Petchenegs. To secure the southern frontier against these last, he
erected a line of fortifications at strategical points and transplanted a
large number of colonists from the north to the borders of the
steppe.a
Vladimir died in 1015, leaving a large number
[1015 a.d.] of heirs by his numerous wives. From the
division that he made among them of his states
we learn what was the extent of Russia at that epoch. To Iaroslav he
gave Novgorod; to Iziaslav, Polotsk; to Boris, Rostov; to Gleb,
Murom—these last two principalities being in the Finn country; to
Sviatoslav, the country of the Drevlians; to Vsevolod, Vladimir in
Volhynia; to Mstislav, Tmoutarakan[7]; to his nephew Sviatopolk, the
son of his brother and victim Iaropolk, the principality of Tourov, in
the country of Minsk, founded by a Varangian named Tour, who, like
Askold and Rogvolod, was not of the blood of princes.j
This division of the territories of the state among the heirs of the
prince was in entire accord with the ideas of the Norse conquerors,
who regarded their conquests as their private property. It was,
moreover, dictated by the economic conditions of the time. Money
being but rarely employed and all payments being made in service
and in kind, it was indispensable, in making provision for the
members of the ruling house, to supply them with territories and
subjects. The immense extent of Russia, the lack of adequate
means of communication, and its subdivision among a large number
of tribes without any national cohesion, were further reasons for the
introduction of this system of government.a

SVIATOPOLK IS SUCCEEDED BY IAROSLAV (1019 A.D.)

Sviatopolk, who claimed a divided parentage

[1019 a.d.] between Vladimir and Iaropolk—being the son
of the widow of the latter, who on the murder of
her husband was forced to live with the former, she being already
pregnant—was at Kiev when the news of Vladimir’s death arrived.
He had long indulged in a project for seizing the throne, which was
favoured in its formation by the increasing imbecility of his father,
whose death now ripened it into action. His ambitious schemes
embraced a plan for securing the sole monarchy, by obtaining the
grand princedom first, and then by artifice or treachery to put his
brothers out of the way, so that he might thus reorganise under the
one head the divided and independent governments. The moment
had now arrived when this violent scheme was to be put into
execution. His brother Boris, who was employed with the army
against the Petchenegs, was the first object of his hate and fear,
because his good qualities had so strongly recommended him, that
he was the most popular of the brothers, and the most likely to gain
the ascendency through the will of the people. There was but one
sure method to get rid of this formidable rival, and Sviatopolk did not
hesitate to adopt it. When the intelligence of his father’s decease
reached Boris, he declared that the throne devolved properly upon
the elder brother, and rejected the unanimous offer of the soldiery to
assist in placing him upon it. This noble insensibility to the general
wish alienated his troops, and exposed him to the designs of his
treacherous rival. The assassins who were commissioned to
despatch him found easy access to his tent, and having first slain a
faithful Russian who threw himself before the person of his master,
they soon effected their horrible purpose.
Two other brothers met a similar fate. Gleb was informed by letter
that his father was ill, and desired his return. On his way he was so
injured by a fall from his horse as to be forced to continue his journey
in a litter. In this state he learned that Sviatopolk had issued orders
for his murder, which, tempted probably by the reward, were carried
into effect by his own cook, who stabbed him with a knife in the
breast. Both Gleb and Boris were afterwards sainted, which appears
to have been the last compliment paid by the Russians to their ill-
used princes. These villainies alarmed a third brother, who fled to
Hungary; but the emissaries of the triumphant assassin seized him in
his flight, brought him back to the capital, and put him to death.
The way to the throne was now tolerably well cleared. Sviatopolk I
found no further difficulty in assuming the government of Kiev, and
calling in such of the tributary provinces as his recent excesses
either terrified into submission or reduced within his control. But the
most powerful opponent yet remained to be subjugated.
Iaroslav, prince of Novgorod, alarmed and outraged by the
cruelties of his brother, and apprehending that, unless they were
speedily arrested, they would spread into his own principality,
determined to advance upon Kiev and make war on the usurping
fratricide. The Novgorodians, to whom he was greatly endeared by
the wisdom and mildness of his sway, entered so warmly into the
expedition, that the tyrant was driven out of Kiev without much cost
of blood, and obliged to flee for refuge to his father-in-law, the duke
of Poland. At that period Poland was resting from the ruinous effects
of a disastrous and straggling campaign in Germany which had
considerably reduced her power, and curtailed her means of
satisfying the ambition of her restless ruler. The representations of
Sviatopolk rekindled the ardour of the Poles, who, animated as much
by the desire of recovering those provinces which Vladimir had
formerly wrested from Miecelsas, as by the prospect of ulterior
aggrandisement, readily fell into the proposals of the exiled prince to
make an attempt for his restoration to the throne. Boleslav at the
head of a powerful force, advanced into Russia. Iaroslav, however,
apprised of the movements of the enemy, met them on the banks of
the Bug, prepared for battle. The army of Boleslav lay at the opposite
side. For some time the invader hesitated to ford the river under the
fire of the Russian soldiers; and might, probably, have returned as he
came, had not a petty occurrence excited his impetuosity, and urged
him forward. A Russian soldier one day, while both armies lay
inactive within sight of each other, stood upon the bank of the river,
and with gesticulations and bold language mimicked the corpulent
size and gait of the Polish duke. This insult roused the spirit of
Boleslav, who, plunging into the water, and calling on his men to
follow, landed in the face of the Russians at the head of his intrepid
troops. A long and well-contested action took place, and tardily
closed in favour of the Poles, who, flushed with victory, pursued the
fugitives to the walls of the capital. Sviatopolk was now reinstated in
his throne, and Iaroslav, disheartened by defeat, made his way to
Novgorod, where, doubtful even of the fidelity of his own people, he
prepared to cross the Baltic in order to get beyond the reach of his
brother. The Novgorodians, however, were faithful, and proved their
attachment to his person by taking down the rigging of the vessels
which had been got in readiness for his departure, and by levying
contributions amongst themselves for the purpose of enabling him to
procure auxiliary troops to assist in the recovery of the grand
principality.
In the meantime, Sviatopolk was unconsciously facilitating his own
downfall. After the Poles had helped him to re-establish himself, he
 began to feel the oppressive
superiority of their presence,
and plotted a base design to
remove them. He instigated the
inhabitants and the soldiery to
conspire against the strangers,
and massacre them in the midst
of their security. Boleslav
discovered the plot before it had
time to be carried into execution;
and, disgusted at a design so
cruel and treacherous, he
resolved to take ample revenge.
The capital was plundered of its
accumulated wealth by the
incensed Poles, who, but for the
moderation of their leader, would
have burned it to ashes; and,
loaded with treasures, they
Iaroslav I returned towards the Russian
(Died 1054) frontiers. Sviatopolk was artful
enough to turn the whole
transaction to the discredit of his
ally, and thus to rouse the courage of his followers, who were easily
persuaded to take the field against Boleslav. The belligerents met on
the banks of the Bug before the Poles had passed the boundaries.
The battle that ensued terminated in the discomfiture of Sviatopolk,
who now returned with broken fortunes to the capital which he had
so lately entered with acclamations of triumph. This was the
opportunity for Iaroslav to appear with his followers. The usurper’s
troops were so reduced by his late disasters, that he was forced to
seek assistance from the Petchenegs, the hereditary enemies of the
country; and they, tempted by hopes of booty, flocked to his standard
to resist the approach of Iaroslav. The armies met on a plain near the
place where Boris had been assassinated by the command of the
fratricide. The coincidence was fortunate, for Iaroslav, taking a
prudent advantage of the circumstance, employed all his eloquence
in describing to his soldiers the righteousness of the cause in which
they were engaged against a second Cain, the shedder of a
brother’s blood. His oration, concluding with a fervent prayer to the
Almighty to nerve his arm, and direct his sword, so that he might be
made the instrument of reparation in so just a fight, wrought
powerfully upon the assembled army, and excited them to an
unexampled display of bravery. The advantage of numbers was on
the opposite side; but such was the courage exhibited by the
Novgorodians, that after a desperate battle, which lasted throughout
the whole day, they succeeded in putting the enemy completely to
flight. Sviatopolk took to horse and fled, but died in a wretched
condition on the road.
The zeal and bravery of the Novgorodians were not forgotten by
Iaroslav when he ascended the throne and concentrated the sole
dominion in himself. His first attention was directed to the revision of
the ill-constructed laws of their city, and to the grant of certain
franchises, which had the effect of procuring unanimity amongst the
inhabitants, and of establishing the peaceful arts and commercial
interests of the place upon a sure and solid foundation. He at once
evinced a capacity for legislation beyond the abilities of his most
distinguished predecessors, and set about the labours of
improvement in so vigorous a temper, and with so much aptitude for
his objects, that the happiest results sprang up under his
administration in all parts of the empire.
But it was not in the destiny of the age in which he lived to permit
such extensive benefits to progress without interruption. His brother
Mstislav, the seventh son of Vladimir, a warrior distinguished in his
wars against the Kossoges, discontented with the enlarged authority
that the grand princedom vested in the hands of Iaroslav, transmitted
to him a petition praying of him to cede to him a part of the fraternal
appanage which he governed. Iaroslav partially assented to the
request, by granting to his brother the small territory of Murom. This
grant was insufficient to satisfy Mstislav, who immediately equipped
an army and proceeded to wage an offensive war against the
monarch. In this war the invader was successful, but he was not
ungenerous in his triumph; for when he had vanquished the grand
prince, he restored to him so large a portion of his possessions that
the empire became equally divided between them. In this league of
amity the brothers continued to govern for seven years, during the
remainder of the life of Mstislav; and at his death the colossal
empire, with all its appanages, reverted to the hands of Iaroslav.
It is in this part of his reign, and in this memorable period in the
annals of the nation, that we find the first development of justice in
Russian legislation, and the first application of philosophy to the
management of public affairs. Although Iaroslav’s career
commenced with war, and although he extended his arms into
Finland, Livonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria, and even penetrated into
Byzantium, yet it was not by war that the glory of his name or the
ability of his rule was to be accomplished. His wars could hardly
claim the merits of conquests; and in some instances they
terminated in such vague conclusions, that they resembled drawn
battles on which much treasure had been lavished in vain. In Greece
he was routed. He was driven before the soldiers of Sviatopolk, and
forced to surrender at his own gates to the victorious Mstislav. His
utmost successes amounted to preservation against aggression; and
so indifferent was he to the barbarian mode of elevating the empire
by wanton and hazardous expeditions into the neighbouring
countries, that on most of those occasions he entrusted the
command of his army to his lieutenants. It is necessary to explain
that part of his character, in order that the loftiness of his nature may
be the more clearly understood.
At this period the Russian Empire comprehended those enormous
tracts that lie between the Volga and the lower Danube, and stretch
from the Black Sea to the Baltic. This accumulation of territory was
not the work of a progressive political system; it was not
accomplished by the growth of a powerful government or by the
persevering pursuit of co-operating interests, and the increasing
circles of acquisition were in a constant state of dismemberment,
separation, and recall. The surface of the land from the days of Rurik
was overrun by revolutions. The marauder, legalised by his tribe,
haunted the forest and devastated the populous places, carrying
away with him plunder, or usurping authority wherever he remained.
The feudal system, introduced by the Scandinavians as a provision
for troublesome leaders, was carried to excess. The nominal head
was disavowed and resisted at will; and the subordinate
governments made war upon each other, or joined in schemes of
rapine, with impunity. The maintenance of each fief seemed to
depend upon civil war; and the office of the grand prince was not so
much to govern the dominions he possessed, as to keep, if he could,
the dominion he was called upon to govern.
Russia, combining these gigantic outlines of territory, was now, for
the second time, united under one head; but, for the first time, under
a head that could discern her necessities, and provide for them. Her
civilisation was in progress, but it wanted the impetus of knowledge,
and the control of law. The reign of the sword had done its work:
what was required was the reign of justice and wisdom to improve
and consolidate the triumphs and acquisitions of the barbarian era.
In Iaroslav, Russia found a prince whose genius was adapted to her
critical circumstances. He effectually raised her from obscurity, and
placed her for a time amongst the family of European states. He
made her church independent, increased the privileges of the
people, facilitated the means of instruction, and elevated her national
dignity by contracting domestic alliances with the most powerful
countries. His sister was queen of Poland; his three daughters-in-law
were Greek, German, and English princesses; and the queens of
Norway, Hungary, and France were his daughters. But these were
the least memorable evidences of his greatness. He gave Russia a
code of laws, which was more valuable to her than the highest
connections, or the most ambitious accessions of dominion.

IAROSLAV’S CODE OF LAWS

This code must be judged in reference to the times in which it was

enacted and in comparison with the formless mass of confused
precedents it superseded. The existence of commercial cities in
Russia so far back as the invasion of Rurik, may be accepted as
presumptive proof that there were not wanting some regulations to
render individuals amenable to the common good. But these were
merely the rude precepts of the hunting and agricultural nations
matured into a stronger form, and adapted to the wants of the
commercial community. When the Scandinavians subjugated the
aborigines, the languages, customs, and laws of both fell into still
greater confusion by admixture. When each was imperfect, it was
unlikely that a forcible intermixture would have improved either, or
led to the harmonious union of both. It is to be observed, too, that
none of the nations that made up the population possessed written
laws; so that whatever notions of legislation they entertained, were
constantly liable to the fluctuations of capricious opinion, and were
always subject to the interpretation of the strong over the weak.
Where there were no records there was but little responsibility, and
even that little was diminished by the character of the rulers and the
lawlessness of the ruled. The exclusive attention of the princes being
of necessity confined to the most effectual methods of preserving
their sovereignties, of enlarging their domains, and of exacting
tributes, it was natural that the unsystematic and crude usages that
prevailed should fall into further contempt, and, instead of acquiring
shape and consistency from experience, become still more
oppressive, dark, and indecisive.
It was this matter of incongruities that Iaroslav cast out; supplying
its place with a series of written laws, in which some sacrifices were
made to popular customs, but which, on the whole, was an
extraordinary boon to a people that, like mariners at sea without a
compass, were tossed about in a tumult of uncertainty and
perplexity. Had Iaroslav been a mere soldier, like the majority of his
predecessors, he would have employed his talents in the field, and
directed the enormous physical means at his command to the
purposes of a wild and desolating ambition. But his policy was in
advance of the heathen age: it restrained boundless licentiousness,
created immunities, protected life and property, bestowed rewards,
enacted punishments, established safeguards and facilities for trade,
and expounded and confirmed those distinctions of ranks in which a
community on a large scale recognises the elements of its
permanency. He had the magnanimity to forego vulgar conquests for
the higher conquest of prejudices and ancient habits. The people,
probably fatigued with the restlessness of their mode of life, and
yearning after repose and settlement, rendered now more necessary
by the rapid increase of their numbers, received his laws with
gratitude.
A short outline of the leading provisions of these laws will form a
curious and valuable commentary upon the character of the grand
prince, and the actual state of the people at this period (1018). The
first article of the code empowers the friends of a murdered man to
take satisfaction upon the murderer; constituting the law as the
public avenger only in cases where there are no friends to take their
vengeance in kind. In the event of there being no relatives to take
the revenge into their own hands, the law goes on to enact that the
assassin shall pay into the public treasury a certain fine, according to
the rank of his victim. Thus, for the murder of a boyar, or thane of the
prince, the mulct was fixed at the highest penalty of eighty grivnas;[8]
for a page of the prince, his cook, or other domestics, for a
merchant, for the sword-bearer of a boyar, and for every free
Russian, without distinction of origin, forty grivnas; for a woman, half
the usual fine: no fine for killing a slave; but if killed without sufficient
cause, the value to be paid to the master: for a serf belonging to a
boyar or free Russian, five grivnas to the owner; for the
superintendent of a village, an artisan, schoolmaster, or nurse,
twelve grivnas; for a female servant, six grivnas to the master, and
twelve to the state.
From these penalties a correct estimate may be formed of the
principles upon which the social fabric was erected. In all these
provisions the rich were favoured above the poor, the strong above
the weak. The life of a woman, because her utility in a barbarous
community was rated according to its menial value, was fixed at half
the worth of a man’s, to be proportioned according to her station.
The murder of a slave was not visited with any penalty whatever; the
exception constituting, in fact, the privilege to kill a slave at pleasure.
Slavery was carried to extremity in Russia. Prisoners of war and their
posterity were condemned to perpetual slavery; the poverty of the
soil, and the oppression of its lords, forced many to sell their freedom
for limited periods; insolvent debtors became slaves by law; and all
freemen who married slaves unconditionally, participated in their
servitude.
Yet, degrading as these institutions must be considered, it appears
that the rights of the person were scrupulously maintained. Thus this
code enumerates penalties for striking a blow, describes the different
degrees of the offence, and regulates the responsibility accordingly.
The distinctions drawn between the different modes of striking are
singular, and help to show that, ill as the Russians could appreciate
public liberty, they had a jealous sense of that individual respect
which, in modern Europe, is called the point of honour. The penalty
for striking a blow with the scabbard or handle of a sword, with the
fist, a stick, cup, or goblet, was twelve grivnas—equal to the fine for
murdering an artisan or a schoolmaster. If the blow was struck with a
club, which, we presume, was considered a plebeian weapon, the
penalty was only three grivnas. But the most characteristic penalty
was that of twelve grivnas for pulling a man by the beard, or
knocking out a tooth. The origin of this law may be easily traced to
the Goths and Germans, who were rigid in the preservation of their
hair, to which they attached extraordinary importance. In the same
spirit was the enactment that prohibited the making use of a horse
without the permission of the owner, and that visited with
imprisonment for life the crime of horse-stealing. This legal
protection of the horse is still preserved in the Saxon laws.
The prevailing tendency of the code was to secure to each man
his lawful property, and to arm him with the means of protection. Yet
it must be remarked as a strange inconsistency, in the midst of this
anxiety to erect safeguards around property, that fraudulent debtors
were granted a direct escape from liability to consequences. It was
enacted, that if one man lent money to another, and the latter denied
the loan, the ordeal should not apply; the oath of the defendant being
deemed a sufficient release from the debt. This law was the more
unaccountable in a country where the legal interest of money was
forty per cent.,—a circumstance calculated to increase the motives
to dishonesty.
Another enactment makes a distinction between the Varangians
and Slavs, which illustrates the fact that the latter had always been