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Extremism in
the Digital Era
The Media Discourse of Terrorist
Groups in the Middle East

Adib Abdulmajid
Extremism in the Digital Era
 Adib Abdulmajid

Extremism in the
Digital Era
The Media Discourse of Terrorist Groups
in the Middle East
Adib Abdulmajid
KU Leuven
Antwerpen, Belgium

ISBN 978-3-030-74832-6    ISBN 978-3-030-74833-3 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74833-3

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
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Cover illustration: Jens Benninghofen / Alamy Stock Photo

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Preface

Amid the extensive use of digital media platforms by extremist groups

operating in war-torn countries like Syria and Iraq, the discourse of
such organizations is believed to have incited sectarian confrontations
among diverse components of the society and to have contributed to
the escalation of violence and the deterioration of living conditions in
the heart of the Middle East. Major extremist religious organizations
that emerged in the recent years in Syria and Iraq include ISIS, embody-
ing radical Sunni Islam, and al-Hashd al-Shaabi, representing extremist
Shia Islam. Each organization has founded multiple media platforms
and made a remarkable use of the digital era to convey their messages
and promote their activities to an unlimited audience. These groups
have developed a discourse characterized, to a certain degree, by sec-
tarian extremism and immense rancor toward rivals. The impact of the
discourse employed by such radical organizations is deemed wide-rang-
ing, with considerably resounding manifestations on local, regional,
and international levels.
This discourse analytical study delves into the diverse aspects and
dimensions of the discourse of ISIS and al-Hashd al-Shaabi. It explores
the discursive practices and strategies utilized by media outlets associated
with these extremist organizations. This volume also delves into the dis-
cursive environment within which these organizations have emerged and
developed, namely the multifaceted Syrian and Iraqi media landscape and

v
vi PREFACE

the discursive activities pursued by influential local outlets. While multiple

previous studies shed an increasing light on the emergence and the devel-
opment of radical groups and their digital activities in the Middle East, the
domain of discourse analysis with respect to the ultra-sectarian tendencies
and strategies of such organizations remained relatively obscure. Besides,
various previous studies illustrate remarkable academic efforts that mainly
focus on the exploration of radical Sunnism, whereas radical Shiʿism
remained scarcely researched, especially in terms of discourse. Thus, the
volume at hand strives for providing a better understanding about the
specific elements of the extremist discourse of influential radical Islamist
organizations with diverse sectarian affiliations. It involves an exploration
of linguistic and contextual activities and seeks to identify and interpret
explicit and implicit messages associated with the discourse of the con-
cerned organizations. The methodological framework applied for the sake
of accomplishing the objectives of this study comprises Van Dijk’s (2000)
Ideological Square and Blass’s (2005) Manipulative Strategies. These
methodological instruments and the associated tools have allowed the
researcher to conduct an in-depth discourse analytical study to the data
included in the corpus of this research. Hence, activities and practices that
fall under discursive ideologization and discursive manipulation are thor-
oughly investigated.
Key aspects and features identified within the discourse of the examined
organizations include politicization, religionization, and sectarianization.
Each organization has developed a discourse characterized by manipula-
tive and ideological practices. Political, religious, sectarian, and ethnic
affiliations and loyalties appear to have played a key role in the way the
concerned organizations discursively approached ongoing matters and
developments in the Syrian and Iraqi arenas. Religio-sectarian references
are deemed crucial elements within the discourse of both ISIS and al-­
Hashd al-Shaabi. While the former emerges as global-minded in its discur-
sive approach toward a worldwide Sunni community, the latter arises as
more local- and regional-minded within the framework of its Shia-based
discourse. The establishment of legitimacy and righteousness in leading
the community, based on extremist sectarian-guided interpretations of
theological concepts, doctrinal principles, and jurisprudential tenets, is
deemed to be of a fundamental significance for each of these radical orga-
nizations. The incitement of sectarian and social divide emerges as a main
 PREFACE vii

dimension of the discourse employed by the organizations investigated

within the framework of this volume. The impact of such discursive dimen-
sions, once adopted and acted upon, is believed to hold serious conse-
quences with regard to the attitudes and behaviors of the concerned
individuals and the society at large.

Antwerpen, Belgium Adib Abdulmajid

 Acknowledgments

Throughout the stages that have constituted an enriching journey of

knowledge and eventually led to the completion of this volume, the gener-
ous input and support of several persons have been invaluable. While
words sometimes fail to express the extent of gratitude we feel toward
certain remarkable people for their great and unconditional assistance and
support, we still try to find a way to express our gratitude and appreciation
to the efforts of such praiseworthy people.
Special thanks to Prof. Abdalrahman Alsulaiman and Prof. Michaël
Opgenhaffen for their assistance, input, and suggestions throughout this
remarkable journey.
I am also grateful to each of Prof. Leen d’Haenens, Prof. Helge Daniëls,
Prof. Said Shiyab, and Prof. Dimitri Vanoverbeke for their reviews and
enriching feedback. Discussing the content of my work with you could
not be more fruitful.
Many thanks to my family, my source of inspiration to pursue my aca-
demic dreams. Despite the hardships of war and displacement across Syria
and Iraq, being caught in the crossfire of a devastating ethno-sectarian
conflict, my family has never hesitated to support me over the years. It is
that unconditional love that persistently provides us with hope for a better
tomorrow, free of violence, tyranny, discrimination, and marginalization.
To my soulmate, Rita, I would like to express my deepest gratitude.
Your patience, assistance, and support have been crucial throughout the
journey of writing this book.

ix
 Contents

1 Introduction  1

2 Extremism in a Multifaceted Revolutionary Age 13

3 Jihād, Salafi-Jihadism, and Sectarianism 47

4 Media Landscape in a Changing Middle East 71

5 Discourse: Theory and Practice 97

6 Media Discourse in Syria and Iraq131

7 Radical Islamists in the Digital Era: A Multifaceted

Extremist Discourse169

8 Conclusions: Discursive Practices by Sectarian-Guided

Propaganda Machines247

Bibliography271

Index285

xi
 Note on Transliteration

The topics covered within the framework of this volume necessitate the
employment of various Arabic terms. These terms are mainly transliterated
by the author in accordance with the conventions of the International
Journal of Middle East Studies with diacritic markings. There are, however,
some exceptions. The Arabic alphabetic system comprises 28 letters, of
which 15 are consonants, phonetically comparable to the English b, d, f,
h, j, k, l, m, n, r, s, t, w, y, and z. Three other consonants in Arabic reflect
particular sounds as in the English sh and both the voiced and voiceless th,
which are orthographically represented by a combination of two letters.
Besides, there are four unfamiliar consonants that emerge in Arabic
describable as the emphatic parallels of the English sounds d, s, t, and the
voiced dh. Another two consonants sound as the voiced and voiceless
French r, while the remaining four consonants are to be considered as
entirely unfamiliar, including the glottal stop. In the case of the familiar 15
Arabic consonants that hold phonological features comparable to that of
English sounds, explicit Latin parallel graphemes are used. Whereas vari-
ous symbols are employed while transcribing the other unfamiliar conso-
nants. Hence, the unique Arabic letters transcribed throughout this
volume include: glottal stop [’]; voiceless interdental fricative [th]; voiced
palato-alveolar sibilant [j]; voiceless pharyngeal constricted fricative [ḥ];
voiceless velar fricative [kh]; voiced interdental fricative [dh]; voiceless
palatal sibilant [sh]; voiceless emphatic post-dental fricative [ṣ]; voiced
emphatic post-dental stop [ḍ]; voiceless emphatic post-dental stop [ṭ];
voiced emphatic post-interdental fricative [ẓ]; voiced pharyngeal fricative

xiii
xiv Note on Transliteration

[ʿ]; voiced uvular fricative [gh]; long open front unrounded [ā]; long close
back rounded [ū]; long close front unrounded [ı ̄]. Nonetheless, certain
terms, such as the Arabic names of organizations or acronyms, and par-
ticular concepts, which are derived from Arabic and transcribed into a
comprehensive and straightforward Latin form, do not fall under this
transliteration system for their already prevalent use and commonness.
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011 and the continued unrest in
neighboring Iraq following the 2003 war, several radical Islamist groups
have emerged and taken control of major areas, established their own
institutions, and called for support from fellow Muslims both at home and
in diaspora. Among the most powerful Islamist groups that emerged in
Syria and Iraq were the Islamic State (ISIS),1 embodying the most radical
form of Sunni Islam, and al-Hashd al-Shaabi,2 representing extremist Shia
Islam. Each group has founded its own media outlets, mostly online, mak-
ing use of the digital era and the age of social media to convey its messages
and promote its activities to an unlimited audience. These groups have
developed a discourse characterized, to some extent, by sectarian extrem-
ism and hostility toward rivals. This radical discourse is believed to have
incited a sectarian conflict in Syria and Iraq, and continued to contribute
to the escalation of the already intensifying confrontations between the
social components of both war-torn countries.
When the Islamic State group (ISIS) took over about one-third of
Iraq’s territory and swept further into Syria in 2014, the group’s self-­
proclaimed khila ̄fah (caliphate) encountered resistance from various local
armed factions, some of them supported by the U.S.-led International
Coalition, also known as the Global Anti-Terror Coalition that includes
more than 60 countries. With the launch of the war on ISIS, the Iraqi
security apparatus largely collapsed, leading a large number of volunteer
fighters to join paramilitary militias rather than the fragile state army and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2021
A. Abdulmajid, Extremism in the Digital Era,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74833-3_1
2 A. ABDULMAJID

police forces.3 These militias gathered under the umbrella organization of

the so-called Popular Mobilization Units, known as al-Hashd al-Shaabi in
Arabic. Being engaged in a heavy fight against the mainly Sunni militants
of ISIS,4 the predominantly Shia organization was soon recognized by the
Iraqi central government as a legitimate force combatting “terrorism”
alongside the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, and received
a great support from Shia Muslims in the region, who described the orga-
nization as al-Ḥashd al-Muqaddas or the Sacred Mobilization Units. Since
then, al-Hashd al-Shaabi has been regarded as a representative of the
Shia’s efforts to eradicate the so-called radical Sunnism represented by
ISIS.5 This sectarian dimension of the multifaceted conflict has been con-
stantly emphasized by both ISIS and al-Hashd through their official state-
ments, news items, and multimedia materials, backed by and spread via
their capable media arms. Each group sought support from its “sect” to
carry on the struggle for defending the righteousness and authenticity of
its own version of Islam. However, while al-Hashd al-Shaabi occasionally
built alliances with other groups for the sake of an alleged “greater cause,”6
the strict institution of ISIS banned any form of alliances with any faction
outside the umbrella of its self-proclaimed caliphate, leading to clashes
even with other Sunni groups including al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nuṣra),
the al-Qaeda branch in Syria.7 Besides persecuting and suppressing reli-
gious minorities and committing some of the most barbaric acts in the
modern history against unarmed civilians in areas under its control, since
its establishment ISIS has been in conflict, directly or indirectly, with any
armed or political force, local, regional, or international, that differs ideo-
logically or denies the legitimacy of the group’s so-called caliphate. ISIS
has carried out multiple atrocities against civilian populations in areas
under its control, including massacres against minorities, beheading of
those considered by the group as “apostates,” throwing off suspected
homosexuals from the top of high buildings, stoning to death women
accused of “committing adultery,” carrying out ethnic cleansing cam-
paigns, capturing and selling Yezidi women at sex slavery markets in Syria
and Iraq, flogging people for smoking, chopping hands of those accused
of theft, using various methods of execution such as drowning or burning
to death, besides destroying cultural heritage sites. Many such crimes and
practices were documented by the group and spread through social media
with the goal of creating a state of panic among their opponents and send-
ing a message of intimidation to their enemies.
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

Unlike ISIS, the predominantly Shia organization of al-Hashd al-Shaabi

has focused its activities on a local and regional scale. The group has been
successful in establishing alliances, mostly bound by sectarian ties. This has
been evident in the unlimited support the group has received from Iran,
the major Shia power in the Middle East. Tehran has provided al-Hashd
al-Shaabi with a remarkable military support and training, and the group’s
leadership has constantly consulted with Qassem Suleimani, the late com-
mander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC), in regard to its military strategies in Iraq, with the objec-
tive of maintaining the Shia power in key areas.8 Furthermore, al-Hashd
al-Shaabi declared allegiance to the Alawite (Shia-offshoot) regime of
Bashar al-Assad in Syria, vowing to provide military assistance to pro-­
Assad forces whenever and wherever needed. The sectarian aspect has
been repeatedly emphasized by al-Hashd al-Shaabi’s discourse through its
media channels, and the grudge toward the Sunni population in Iraq has
overshadowed the group’s actions on the ground, accusing Sunnis of pro-
viding a popular incubator to ISIS and blaming them for the country’s
instability. Al-Hashd al-Shaabi has been accused by various rights organi-
zations, including Human Rights Watch, of committing war crimes against
Sunni civilians in Iraq, blamed for mass killings, summary executions, kid-
nappings, and forced displacements.9 The hate speech repeatedly pre-
sented and delivered by such radical groups toward rivals has undoubtedly
carried a considerable bunch of sectarian elements, resulting in and rein-
forcing a discourse of “we” versus “them,” remarkably deepening the
divide among the various social components in the region. The impact of
this discourse and the violent actions attached to it may exceed the recent
chain of events in war-ravaged countries like Syria and Iraq, especially with
the demographic changes and the geopolitical developments that this
region has witnessed during the recent years, turning issues of coexistence
and reconstruction of social ties in such culturally diverse societies into a
considerable challenge. The sectarian dimension of the conflicts in Syria
and Iraq has brought about a new reality for the social fabric in the region,
forcing threatened minorities to either flee their towns and villages in
search of safe haven or submit to the rule of aggressive armed groups, and
in both cases such populations suffered the most and the ensuing humani-
tarian calamities led to mounting outrage among affected communities
and caused an apparent breach in the social contract, rendering peaceful
coexistence into a major challenge in the affected areas.
4 A. ABDULMAJID

The extremist Islamist discourse has proven highly influential on an

even broader scale, exceeding the regional boundaries and transforming
the alleged cause of radical groups into an international issue by giving it
a global dimension, reaching Muslims worldwide and leading to deadly
assaults in the name of Islam.10 One of the most active radical Islamist
organizations on an international scale over the recent years has been
ISIS. Amid a rapid decline of the group on the ground in Syria and Iraq in
mid-2017, where local forces supported by the Global Anti-Terror
Coalition expelled the extremist group from major areas in the region,
ISIS increased its appeal to Muslims in the West to carry on the “Jihad”
against Coalition member-states. It is worth mentioning that since its
emergence as a powerful organization in 2014, the extremist group has
succeeded in launching a series of attacks in key European cities that
claimed dozens of civilian lives. On the 13th of November 2015, ISIS
claimed responsibility for a sequence of terrifying attacks in Paris that
killed at least 130 people and injured hundreds of others, an assault con-
sidered the deadliest on French soil since World War II. On March 22,
2016, the Belgian capital of Brussels was exposed to three terror bomb-
ings claimed by ISIS, causing the death of 32 people and the injury of over
300 others. Developing a new method for carrying out terrorist attacks,
ISIS recruits in Europe started using trucks as an alternative weapon to hit
densely populated locations and kill as many people as possible. The
French seaside town of Nice fell victim to the first attack of such kind on
July 14, 2016, when an ISIS recruit driving a lorry mowed down revelers
on the Bastille Day, killing 84 people and injuring hundreds of others. On
the 19th of December of the same year, a similar attack struck the German
capital of Berlin, when a terrorist drove a lorry into a packed Christmas
market, killing 12 people and injuring over 60. On April 7, 2017, an ISIS
member drove a truck down a crowded shopping street in the Swedish
capital of Stockholm, killing four people and injuring at least 15 others.
The city of Barcelona, Spain, was also exposed to such an attack on August
17 of the same year, when a terrorist plowed a van into crowds. ISIS
claimed responsibility for the attack that led to the death of 13 civilians
and the injury of more than a hundred. In the UK, the extremist organiza-
tion claimed several major assaults, including the Manchester terror attack
on May 22, 2017, when a suicide bomber detonated explosives among
teenage fans at a concert killing 22 and wounding 59 more, and the
London Bridge attack on June 3, 2017, when three pro-ISIS knifemen
mowed down pedestrians killing eight people and wounding several
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

others. This series of deadly attacks on Western soil within a period of less
than three years is an obvious indication of how powerful and influential
the extremist discourse and propaganda machines of radical groups like
ISIS could be, and how facilitated the radicalization and recruitment of
young Muslims by such groups in the era of digital media have become.
One of the key incentives for the numerous terrorist attacks by ISIS abroad
was the group’s hostility toward member-states of the Global Anti-Terror
Coalition, ignited by the loss of territory in Syria and Iraq amid intensified
airstrikes by the coalition. The extremist discourse has also nurtured and
increased divide among the social components on a local and regional
level, turning people against each other in spite of a long history of coex-
istence. In addition, the Muslim community in diaspora began to suffer
from the consequences of terrorist attacks through being confronted with
a new reality where mounting suspicions by authorities about the exis-
tence of possible “sleeping cells” within the community increased,11 exclu-
sion under the pretext of maintaining national security became visible,12
and anti-Islam campaigners grew stronger.13
Despite the influential role of the discourse of such radical Islamist
groups and the serious consequences of their propaganda strategies, this
domain remains in need of more extensive investigation and exploration.
In the framework of this book, a thorough discourse analysis is conducted
on written texts and multimedia materials released by ISIS and al-Hashd
al-Shaabi in the period between 2014 and 2017. This phase in the history
of those radical groups is being investigated for it represents a key stage in
the development of extremist Islamist discourses through digital media
that have gained a great attention from the international community,
besides their association with an intensified sectarian hostility on a regional
level, the persecution of religious minorities, rapid demographic changes,
and the reproduction of administrative borderlines in accordance with
military gains by parties to conflict in the region. Religious minorities in
Iraq and Syria, such as the Yezidis and Christians, were notoriously victim-
ized by armed Islamist groups and many of their places of worship were
demolished. Campaigns of ethnic cleansing, forced displacements, and
resettlements witnessed in different areas in the region at the hand of vari-
ous armed groups have resulted in a dramatic demographic change in the
affected towns and villages. As certain armed forces extended their areas of
control at the expense of others, some villages and towns fell outside their
usual, previously formal administrative borders and became part of
6 A. ABDULMAJID

other—sometimes artificial—governorates or provinces. This has been

reinforced by sieges, security checkpoints, and military fortifications.
This volume also delves into the religious texts and recitations employed
by these groups to support and further increase the impact of their mes-
sages, with the goal of investigating the specific sources each group relies
on and the general context of the original texts compared to the contem-
porary discourse and its ultimate objectives. Moreover, this volume inves-
tigates the development of extremist discourse in Syria and Iraq in the
period between 2014 and 2017 in terms of topics, linguistic and contex-
tual activities, messages, and targeted audiences. The research also touches
on relevant issues, including—but not limited to—the Islamization of the
Syrian pro-democracy uprising, the emergence of a Sunni—rather than a
collective Syrian—discourse, the geopolitical environment and the involve-
ment of sectarian-oriented foreign groups, and the role of the pro-Shia
Iraqi official discourse in the escalation of the sectarian tension in Iraq.
Furthermore, it sheds light on the sectarian element of the extremist dis-
course employed by radical groups through online media platforms to
induce, radicalize, and eventually recruit a group of Muslim youth in
Europe. The extremist discourse through digital media has played a cen-
tral role in the radicalization of a considerable number of Western Muslims,
which makes this discourse and the associated messages of a key interest to
explore.
Hence, this volume comprises a journey into a relatively obscure field
of research, in that there is a limited academic research done on the sectar-
ian aspect of the discourse of radical Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq.
Conducting a discourse analysis on the media material issued by leading
extremist groups could provide new insights into the ideological mecha-
nisms utilized by such organizations to incite sectarian conflicts and suc-
ceed in recruiting local and foreign guardians to their alleged cause.
Moreover, sectarianism has played a key role in the escalation of conflicts
in Syria and Iraq, endangered local minorities and stimulated sedition,
hostility, and violence abroad, which raises the need for more academic
efforts to investigate and analyze the inducing discourse behind that. The
role of digital media in spreading the messages of such groups to audi-
ences beyond regional borders is another aspect worth examining, given
the relatively limited research done in this domain. The volume at hand
provides an in-depth analysis of the discourse of ISIS and al-Hashd al-­
Shaabi, besides providing a large-scale insight into the discursive
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

environment within which both groups have emerged and grown, namely
the discourse of the Syrian and Iraqi media.
Among the main contributions of this volume to the academic domains
of discourse analysis, media studies, and Middle Eastern studies is the
exploration of discursive practices and strategies employed by radical
Islamist groups and the overall digital media in the region. The utilization
of the Ideological Square and Manipulative Strategies has enabled the
author to identify, analyze, and underline crucial aspects and dimensions
within the discourse of prominent and influential extremist organizations
in crisis-stricken Middle East. Politicization, religionization, and sectarian-
ization are among those key aspects of the analyzed discourses. A large set
of data is analyzed and efficient methodological instruments are employed
for the sake of conducting an in-depth analysis of the discourses of ultra-­
sectarian extremist organizations in Syria and Iraq. This volume ultimately
strives for studying and understanding the role of online propaganda in
inciting sectarian-guided rifts and conflicts in the heart of the Middle East.
As this volume focuses on the analysis of the extremist discourse of ISIS
and al-Hashd al-Shaabi, texts, news items, and multimedia materials
released by online media outlets affiliated with these groups constitute the
core data tackled by the analysis. The data that form the collective corpus
of this study are extracted from online platforms of media organizations
affiliated with ISIS and al-Hashd al-Shaabi, as well as platforms represent-
ing influential Syrian and Iraqi media to understand the discursive envi-
ronment within which both groups emerged and grew. Hence, websites
and digital magazines run by the concerned organizations constitute the
main source of data. Unlike individual online communication channels
utilized by members and followers of the involved parties, official online
platforms of such organizations are included as they represent the official
discourse of each of the involved organizations. Thus, this volume rather
focuses on the prevalent language use by media outlets affiliated with the
groups under study than that employed by members and followers of
these groups through their online activities or interpersonal
communications.
Leading pro-ISIS media outlets included for analysis are al-Hayat
Media Center, al-Furqan Foundation for Media Production, Dabiq
Magazine, and Al-Naba Newspaper. These outlets will form a key source
of data for the sake of analyzing the discourse of the ISIS group. On the
other hand, al-Hashd al-Shaabi, a representative of extremist Shia Islam,
also publishes its statements and news reports through its own digital
8 A. ABDULMAJID

media outlets. The most followed media channels of the group included
in the data corpus are Al-Tawjih Al-Aqaidi corporation, Humat al-Watan
Magazine, and al-Hashd al-Shaabi Newspaper. Other media corporations
with diverse ethno-sectarian affiliations and political tendencies operating
in Syria and Iraq, whose releases and news items demonstrated relevance
to the topic of this volume, are incorporated for the sake of studying the
discursive environment within which both ISIS and al-Hashd emerged
and grew in impact. Syrian media sources consulted include the state-run
Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), pro-opposition media outlets Enab
Baladi and Zaman al-Wasl, and pro-Kurdish ANHA and ANF. Iraqi out-
lets included as data sources are the pro-government As-Sabah Newspaper,
pro-opposition Ash-Sharqiya Channel, and pro-Kurdish Rudaw News
Network. The discourse analytical study covered by this volume primarily
focuses on data produced by the aforementioned media outlets in the
period between 2014 and 2017, a period that represents a key phase in the
life of ISIS and al-Hashd. Both groups emerged in 2014 and gained a
tremendous popularity among audiences at home and abroad. The events
that followed throughout the next couple of years up until the end of
2017 marked a remarkable decline of ISIS and a widespread debate about
the position of al-Hashd in Iraq. It is a period during which the radical
groups under investigation have been highly active in the media arena and
received an extensive local, regional, and international attention; a term of
increased terror attacks in the West; and a phase of rapid changes in the
power balance on the ground in Iraq and Syria that brought about a cer-
tain degree of demographic change, instability, and an increased sectarian
strife that have threatened social coexistence in the region.
While various studies illustrate remarkable academic efforts to focus on
radical Sunnism, radical Shiʿism remained under-researched. Multiple
studies that tackle propaganda activities and discursive strategies by Sunni-­
based ISIS have emerged over the past few years,14 while discursive activi-
ties by Shia-guided propaganda machines remained scarcely investigated.
Including ISIS and al-Hashd al-Shaabi within the framework of the dis-
course analytical study covered by this book allows a room for drawing
comparisons and contrasts between Sunnism and Shiʿism in their modern
extremist forms in terms of discursive practices and the potential impact
among the addressees. Also, the diversity of the research data extracted
from Syrian and Iraqi media outlets, and analyzed accordingly, allows
enriching this volume with research-based findings and conclusions on
practices by influential media organizations operating in a crisis context.
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

The potential incitement of sectarian schism through the employment

of religionized and politicized messages, besides the associated linguistic
and contextual strategies and practices, demonstrates the critical impor-
tance of exploring and identifying such discursive dimensions. The prob-
able effects of these multifaceted discourses can be seen as indicators to
the significance of this study for the academic domains of Linguistics,
Media Studies, and Middle Eastern Studies, or researchers operating in
one of the domains to which this study belongs and contributes to. That
is on an internal academic scale of benefit that could be derived from
this volume.
On an external scale, namely contributions to the larger society con-
cerned with the questions marked and tackled by this volume, raising
awareness and sharing knowledge concerning the specifics and particulari-
ties of the discourse of extremist groups is another main objective of the
book at hand. Given the fact that certain circles and components within
the society as a whole are usually addressed and targeted by the discourse
of extremist organizations, familiarity with the ideological and manipula-
tive practices and strategies, and the correlated aspects and dimensions,
utilized by such groups through their increasingly digital media discourse
seems crucial. Insight, awareness, and comprehension may, to a certain
degree, mitigate, reduce, or even eliminate the potential impact of the
discursive strategies employed by extremist groups and relatively render
the incorporated messages ineffectual and fruitless.
While the first chapter is dedicated to introducing the key topics cov-
ered through and tackled by this volume, the second chapter delves into
the socio-economic and politico-religious circumstances that have largely
contributed to the rise of ultra-extremist Sunni and Shia Islamist organiza-
tions, namely ISIS and al-Hashd al-Shaabi. The third chapter comprises a
review of key theoretical concepts and movements with regard to the main
topic of this volume, namely jihad, Salafi-Jihadism, and sectarianism.
Chapter 4 tackles the development of the media landscape in the Middle
East over the past three decades up until the outbreak of the Arab Spring
and the associated media activities, and the eventual rise of media outlets
affiliated with radical Islamist groups, besides reviewing recent analytical
studies in the field. The fifth chapter delves into theoretical and practical
aspects of discourse and discourse analysis, which will constitute the basis
for the analytical Chapters 6 and 7, wherein an extended analysis of the
media discourse in Syria and Iraq is conducted, and discursive activities
pursued and employed by ISIS and al-Hashd al-Shaabi are explored and
Another random document with
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 legislation, but from the circumstances that the existing laws
were hastily framed or were the outcome of party rancour. If
we had formerly had a Senate composed of men of experience and
good patriots, they would never have consented to the conclusion
of so many onerous loans, to the application of so many
iniquitous measures, nor to the convocation of the special
tribunal, 'le tribunal extraordinaire,' of 1899.

"At first the Radical party was not favourable to the

institution of an Upper Chamber, but it now recognizes the
great advantages it will offer, and has rallied to my project.
The Progressist party has always been favourable to it. The
majority of the Liberal party has also adhered to it. I
therefore believe that this new institution will be of the
greatest service to the country. All that is required, and
with a little good will it can be easily done, is that the
members of the two Chambers should endeavour honestly,
sincerely, and loyally to work for the good of the State and
of the nation. If I have not thought right to raise the
qualification for the suffrage, as desired by some people, it
is because I did not wish to disfranchise any of those who
have enjoyed the right of voting during the last 35 years. I
do not wish to restrict any of the rights of the nation.

{451}

"The application of the new Constitution will be the great

task of my Government, in which I have every confidence. The
Prime Minister, Dr. Vuitch, has the sympathy and support not
only of his own party but of all who would like to see the
country governed in a liberal spirit. His presence at the head
of the Ministry is a pledge for the active and sincere
co-operation of all elements of order and progress. … As soon
as the new Constitution has been promulgated, the Government
will invite the co-operation of all those which admit its
necessity and fitness. A large Conservative party will thus be
formed which will have the requisite power and authority for
 all purposes of government, for the application of the
Constitution, and for the elaboration of financial and
economic laws necessary for the progress of the country.

"As regards the question of the succession to the Throne, I

wanted to settle it finally, as the members of the reigning
dynasty are not numerous unless the remote collateral lines be
included, which is not possible. Moreover, everybody wished me
to take in this matter such decisions as I might think proper
in view of securing the continuation of the Servian Monarchy.
The first thing to be done was to safeguard the rights of the
direct line without seeking to bind ourselves by the Salic
Law, which there is really no reason to apply in our country.
I should add here that there are no anti-dynastic elements in
Servia, with the exception, perhaps, of a few hare-brained
individuals who really do not enter into account. My people
are profoundly attached to the reigning dynasty, and never
lose an opportunity of showing me their loyalty. It is the
same with all the political parties.

"Before promulgating the Constitution I decided to consult the

most influential members of the parties in office. They agreed
with me, and promised me to assist harmoniously in the work. I
have also consulted the leading members of the Liberal party,
and with two or three exceptions they have given me the same
assurances. Such being the case, I may say that the
Constitution of 1901 is not a production of my will or of my
good pleasure, but that it is the result of an understanding
between the Sovereign and the leaders of the three political
parties. I consequently reckon upon their sincere and active
co-operation, and I trust they will not fail me. I am firmly
convinced that the new Constitution will act as a fresh and
vigorous stimulus to my country, and that it will bring it
that calm and stability which it sorely needs. I sincerely
regard it as a source of prosperity and welfare for Servia."

SEVERALTY ACT, The Indian.

 See (in this volume)
INDIANS, AMERICAN: A. D. 1899-1900.

SEYMOUR, Vice-Admiral Sir Edward:

Expedition to relieve Peking.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (JUNE 10-26).

SEYYIDIEH, The province of.

See (in this volume)

BRITISH EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE: A. D. 1895-1897.

SHAFTER, General:
Commanding the expedition against Santiago de Cuba.

See (in this volume)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (JUNE-JULY).

SHAFTER, General:
Surrender of Spanish forces at Santiago and all eastern Cuba.

See (in this volume)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (JULY 4-17).

SHAFTER, General:
Report of sickness in army.
Removal of troops to Montauk Point.

See (in this volume)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (JULY-AUGUST:
CUBA).

SHANGHAI.
"Shanghai is the New York of China. It occupies a position on
the coast quite similar to that of New York on our own eastern
coast, and its percentage of importations into China is about
the same as that which New York enjoys in the United States.
The large share of the foreign trade of China which Shanghai
controls is due largely to its position at the mouth of the
great artery through which trade flows to and from China—the
Yangtze-Kiang. Transportation in bulk in China up to the
present time having been almost exclusively by water, and the
Yangtze being navigable by steamers and junks for more than
2,000 miles, thus reaching the most populous, productive, and
wealthy sections of the country, naturally a very large share
of the foreign commerce entering or leaving that country
passes through Shanghai, where foreign merchants, bankers,
trade representatives, trade facilities, and excellent docking
and steamship conveniences exist. The lines of no less than
eight great steamship companies center at Shanghai, where they
land freight and passengers from their fleets of vessels which
are counted by hundreds, while the smaller vessels, for river
and coastwise service, and the native junks are counted
literally by thousands. The Yangtze from Shanghai westward to
Hankow, a distance of 582 miles, is navigable for very large
steamships that are capable of coasting as well as river
service. Hankow, which with its suburbs has nearly a million
people, is the most important of the interior cities, being a
great distributing center for trade to all parts of central
and western China and thus the river trade between Shanghai
and Hankow is of itself enormous, while the coastwise trade
from Shanghai, both to the north and south, and that by the
Grand Canal to Tientsin, the most important city of northern
China, is also very large."

United States, Bureau of Statistics,

Monthly Summary, March, 1899, page 2191.

"When the English chose this position, in 1842, for their

mercantile settlement, it seemed difficult to believe that
 they would ever succeed in making the place a rival of Canton
or of Amoy. It is true that Shanghai possessed important
commercial relations already, and the great geographical
advantage of commanding the entrance to the navigable river
which traverses the whole empire from west to east; but the
builders of the city there had to struggle with enormous
difficulties of soil and climate. They had to solidify and
drain the land, dig canals, dry up marshes, cleanse the air of
its miasms, besides incessantly dredging and clearing the
channel, to keep it open for their ships. The first European
merchants established at Shanghai were favored in fortune by
the national disasters of China. The Taiping war drove
fugitives in multitudes to the territory conceded to
foreigners, and when the town of Soutcheou was destroyed, in
1860, Shanghai succeeded it as the great city of the country."

É. Reclus,
Nouvelle géographie universelle,
volume 7, page 455.

SHANGHAI: A. D. 1898.
Rioting consequent on French desecration of a cemetery.
Extension of foreign settlements.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1898-1899.

SHANTUNG, The "Boxer" outbreak in.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (JANUARY-MARCH).

SHIMONOSEKI, Text of the Treaty of.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1894-1895.
{452}

SHIPPING OF THE WORLD: In 1900.

Statement of number and net and gross tonnage of steam and

sailing vessels of over 100 tons of the several countries of
the world, as recorded in Lloyd's Register for 1900-1901
[dated July 1, 1900].

United States, Commissioner of Navigation,

Annual Report, 1900, page 125.

FLAG STEAM.
SAIL. TOTAL.
------------------------- -
----------------- -------------
Number. Net tons. Gross tons.
Number. Net tons. Number. Tonnage.

British:
United Kingdom. 7,020 7,072,401 11,513,759
1,894 1,727,687 8,914 13,241,446
Colonies. 910 378,925 635,331
1,014 384,477 1,924 1,019,808
Total. 7,930 7,451,326 12,149,090
2,908 2,112,164 10,838 14,261,254

American
(United States):
Sea. 690 594,237 878,564
2,130 1,156,498 2,820 2,035,062
Lake. 242 436,979 576,402
73 138,807 315 715,209
Total. 932 1,031,216 1,454,966
2,203 1,295,305 3,135 2,750,271

Argentine. 95 36,938 57,239

106 30,407 201 87,646
Austro-Hungarian 214 240,808 387,471
56 28,613 270 416,084
Belgian. 115 111,624 162,493
2 420 117 162,913
Brazilian. 215 85,799 133,507
117 29,580 332 163,087
Chilean. 52 38,960 62,872
75 48,106 127 110,978
Chinese. 48 41,847 65,721
1 573 49 66,294
Colombian. 1 555 877
5 1,110 6 1,987
Danish. 369 240,599 412,273
433 106,738 802 519,011
Dutch. 289 307,574 467,209
117 63,068 406 530,277
French. 662 542,305 1,052,193
552 298,309 1,214 1,350,562
German. 1,209 1,344,605 2,159,919
501 490,114 1,710 2,650,033
Greek. 139 111,797 178,137
230 65,957 369 245,094
Haitian. 5 912 1,750
2 414 7 2,164
Italian. 312 343,020 540,349
864 443,306 1,176 983,655
Japanese. 484 303,303 488,187
582 86,370 1,006 574,557
Mexican. 25 6,562 11,460
13 3,081 38 14,541
Montenegrin. 1 1,064 1,857
14 3,513 15 5,370
Norwegian. 806 467,123 764,683
1,574 876,129 2,380 1,640,812
Peruvian. 3 3,204 4,869
33 9,607 36 14,476
Portuguese. 48 37,153 57,664
156 53,391 204 111,055
Roumanian. 17 9,686 17,361
3 659 20 18,020
Russian. 496 292,277 469,496
750 251,405 1,246 720,901
Sarawakian. 2 244 418
2 418
Siamese. 4 821 1,435
1 294 5 1,729
Spanish. 422 416,882 642,231
175 52,549 597 694,780
Swedish. 678 260,023 418,550
755 218,722 1,433 637,272
Turkish. 135 58,974 94,781
170 48,709 305 143,490
Uruguayan. 17 6,438 10,468
19 4,032 36 14,500
Venezuelan. 12 2,450 4,246
8 1,185 20 5,431
Zanzibarian. 3 1,871 2,808
3 2,808
Other countries:
Hawaii. 23 11,185 16,922
24 29,707 47 46,629
Cuba. 35 17,651 27,040
11 2,410 46 29,450
Philippine Islands 69 19,587 31,099
42 8,236 111 39,335
Various:
Arabia,
Salvador,
Ecuador,
Liberia,
Samos,
Nicaragua,
Bulgaria,
Costa Rica,
Egypt,
Persia,
Porto Rico,
etc. 31 10,130 17,717
22 9,127 53 26,844

Total. 15,898 13,800,513 22,309,358

12,524 6,674,370 28,422 29,043,728

SHIRE HIGHLANDS, The.

See (in this volume)

BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA PROTECTORATE.

SHOA.

See (in this volume)

EGYPT: A. D. 1885-1896.

SHUN-CH'ING, Anti-missionary insurrection at.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1898-1899 (JUNE-JANUARY).
SIAH CHAI, or Vegetarians, The.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1895 (AUGUST).

SIAM: A. D. 1896-1899.
Declaration between Great Britain and France
with regard to Siam.

A declaration of agreement, in part as follows, between Great

Britain and France, was signed at London, January 15, 1896:

"I.
The Governments of Great Britain and France engage to one
another that neither of them will, without the consent of the
other, in any case, or under any pretext, advance their armed
forces into the region which is comprised in the basins of the
Petcha Bouri, Meiklong, Menam, and Bang Pa Kong (Petriou)
Rivers and their respective tributaries, together with the
extent of coast from Muong Bang Tapan to Muong Pase, the
basins of the rivers on which those two places are situated,
and the basins of the other rivers, the estuaries of which are
included in that coast; and including also the territory lying
to the north of the basin of the Menam, and situated between
the Anglo-Siamese frontier, the Mekong River, and the eastern
watershed of the Me Ing. They further engage not to acquire
within this region any special privilege or advantage which
shall not be enjoyed in common by, or equally open to, Great
Britain and France, and their nationals and dependents. These
stipulations, however, shall not be interpreted as derogating
from the special clauses which, in virtue of the Treaty
concluded on the 3rd October, 1893, between France and Siam,
apply to a zone of 25 kilometers on the right bank of the
Mekong and to the navigation of that river.

{453}
II.
Nothing in the foregoing clause shall hinder any action on
which the two Powers may agree, and which they shall think
necessary in order to uphold the independence of the Kingdom
of Siam. But they engage not to enter into any separate
Agreement permitting a third Power to take any action from
which they are bound by the present Declaration themselves to
abstain.

III.
From the mouth of the Nam Huok northwards as far as the
Chinese frontier the thalweg of the Mekong shall form the
limit of the possessions or spheres of influence of Great
Britain and France. It is agreed that the nationals and
dependents of each of the two countries shall not exercise any
jurisdiction or authority within the possessions or sphere of
influence of the other."

In a despatch to the British Ambassador at Paris, written on

the same day, Lord Salisbury explained the intent and purpose
of the agreement as follows: "It might be thought that because
we have engaged ourselves, and have received the engagement of
France, not under any circumstances to invade this territory,
that therefore we are throwing doubt upon the complete title
and rights of the Siamese to the remainder of their kingdom,
or, at all events, treating those rights with disregard. Any
such interpretation would entirely misrepresent the intention
with which this arrangement has been signed. We have selected
a particular area for the application of the stipulations of
this Treaty, not because the title of the King of Siam to
other portions of his dominions is less valid, but because it
is the area which affects our interests as a commercial
nation. The valley of the Menam is eminently fitted to receive
a high industrial development. Possibly in course of time it
may be the site of lines of communication which will be of
considerable importance to neighbouring portions of the
British Empire. There seems every prospect that capital will
flow into this region if reasonable security is offered for
its investment, and great advantage would result to the
commerce and industry of the world, and especially of Great
Britain, if capitalists could be induced to make such an
application of the force which they command. But the history
of the region in which Siam is situated has not in recent
years been favourable to the extension of industrial
enterprise, or to the growth of that confidence which is the
first condition of material improvement. A large territory to
the north has passed from the hands of the Burmese Government
to those of Great Britain. A large territory to the east has
passed from the hands of its former possessors to those of
France. The events of this recent history certainly have a
tendency to encourage doubts of the stability of the Siamese
dominion; and without in any degree sharing in those doubts,
or admitting the possibility, within any future with which we
have to deal, of the Siamese independence being compromised,
Her Majesty's Government could not but feel that there would
be an advantage in giving some security to the commercial
world that, in regard to the region where the most active
development is likely to take place, no further disturbances
of territorial ownership are to be apprehended."

Great Britain, Parliamentary Publications

(Papers by Command: France, Number 2, 1896, pages 1-3).

Perhaps the above explanation can be better understood after

reading the following:

"In the early eighties France commenced the subjugation of

Tonquin. … It was not until 1893 that France openly attacked
Siam. The demand was subtly formulated—on behalf, not of the
Government of the French Republic, but of 'the Empire of
Annam.' But even so the French had been in Annam for perhaps a
quarter of a century, whereas Siam could show an undisturbed,
undisputed tenure of the Mekong River's 'rive gauche' for at
least ninety years. … The cession to France of territory
amounting to rather more than one-third of the entire kingdom
was insisted upon; and in March 1893 that Power sent the
ship-of-war Lutin to Bangkok, where she remained for months a
standing menace. A rigorous blockade of the Siamese seaboard
followed, resulting in a few short days in complete surrender
of the disputed territory to France and the payment of a heavy
war indemnity. … By the Anglo-French Convention of last year
[as given above] the King of Siam's position became, to say
the least, slightly anomalous. That agreement practically
amounted to the fair division, between France and England, of
the whole of Siam save that portion situate in the fertile
valley of the Meinam, whose autonomy they still guarantee to
preserve. … France holds, in addition to the long-coveted port
of Chantabûn, that part of the province of Luang Phrabang
which is situate upon the right bank of the Mekong. … The
Siamese king is 'nulli secundus' among Oriental monarchs as a
progressive ruler. And fate has been unkind to him indeed! He
has encouraged English customs and the English language by all
the means in his power—has taken the kindliest possible
interest in the introduction of electric light, electric
tramways, &c., into his capital—has endeavoured to model his
army and navy, his prison and other systems, upon the English
method—and has in person opened the first railway (that
connecting Bangkok with Pâknam) in Siam. It is, indeed, one of
the strangest and most interesting sights, as you stroll
through the streets of the capital, to witness the 'riksha and
gharry of comparative barbarism travelling in juxtaposition to
the electric tramcar and the bicycle! And for his broad and
enlightened views the King of Siam has been requited by the
wholesale and utterly unjustifiable plunder of his most
fertile lands."
Percy Cross Standing,
The Significance of the Siamese Visit
(Nineteenth Century, June, 1897).

Frequent collisions between French and Siamese in the

so-called "neutral zone" on the right bank of the Mekong
continued, until a new convention was agreed upon in May,
1890. This gave to France the province of Luang-Phrabang, in
return for which she agreed to withdraw entirely from the
neutral territory and from the port of Chantabûn.

SIAM: A. D. 1898.
Gift of relics of Buddha.

See (in this volume)

BUDDHA.

SIAM: A. D. 1899 (May-July).

Representation in the Peace Conference at The Hague.

See (in this volume)

PEACE CONFERENCE.

SIAN FU,
SI-NGAN-FU,
The Chinese Imperial Court at.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (AUGUST-SEPTEMBER).

SIBERIA.

See (in this volume)

RUSSIA IN ASIA.

SIBERIAN ARCTIC EXPLORATION.

 See (in this volume)
POLAR EXPLORATION, 1805, 1896, 1897, 1898, 1899, 1900.

{454}

SIERRA LEONE PROTECTORATE.

Extension of British authority over the Hinterland of the
Colony of Sierra Leone.
The hut tax.
Insurrection of natives.

"Immediately adjoining the Colony of Sierra Leone, lying to

the northward and eastward, is the Hinterland, the boundaries
of which were defined by the Agreement between Great Britain
and France which was concluded 21st January 1895. The extreme
depth from south to north is about 210 miles, lying between 7°
and 10° north latitude, and 180 miles from east to west, lying
between 10° 40' and 13° 20' of west longitude. The estimated area
is rather more than 30,000 square miles—about the size of
Ireland. … Unlike many regions on the west coast of Africa,
the country is, for the most part, well watered by rivers and
running streams. The population of the Hinterland has not been
ascertained. It has been variously estimated, before the
present troubles, at from about 750,000 up to about 2,000,000.
The trade and revenue of the Colony depend almost entirely on
the Hinterland. A very large proportion of the goods imported
into the Colony are carried into and consumed in the
Hinterland. These goods are paid for by means of the products
of the Hinterland, which are exported, and the profits derived
from the exchange enable the merchants to pay the Customs
duties, which constitute the bulk of the Colonial revenue. The
territories forming the Hinterland are, according to the
native organisation, ruled over by a large number of Chiefs
(or Kings, as they used to be, and still in native parlance
are, called). The portions of country under each Chief are
well ascertained, and recognised by the various Chiefs and
their subjects. …

"The relations between the English Government and the Chiefs

at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement between France
and England in 1895 was … that some of the Chiefs whose
territories lay most adjacent to the Colony of Sierra Leone
had contracted with the English Crown certain treaties of
cession, and treaties directed to definite objects of amity
and good offices. In addition there had sprung up by usage a
limited consensual and advisory jurisdiction, under which
Chiefs as well as persons not Chiefs would bring their
differences (mainly as to territorial boundaries) before the
Governor of Sierra Leone as a sort of arbitrator, and
implicitly follow his awards. This jurisdiction was exercised
over an area of no defined limits, so far as any rules were
concerned. As a fact, it was limited by conditions of distance
and facility of travel, so that whilst the usage was most
established in the countries nearest to Freetown, there was
none in the more distant regions, or if there was any it was
at most so rudimentary as to be jurally of no account. … I
have not been able to trace any instance in which, either
under treaty or any other form of consent, or without consent,
the English Government has imposed, or endeavoured to impose
any direct taxation upon the Chiefs or people of the
Hinterland prior to 1896.

"The agreement between France and Great Britain delimited the

respective spheres of interest of the two countries south and
west of the Middle or Upper Niger, and thus defined for
England in the Hinterland of Sierra Leone a territory within
which, so far as concerned any question between France and
England, England was at liberty to exercise whatever species
or extent of jurisdiction she might consider proper. It made,
of course, no alteration on the existing native organisation,
nor upon the existing relations between England and the native
Chiefs, who were not parties to the agreement in any sense. …
On 31st August 1896 a Proclamation was published setting forth
that Her Majesty had assumed a Protectorate over the
territories adjacent to the Colony of Sierra Leone in which
Her Majesty had acquired power and jurisdiction. For purposes
of administration the Hinterland was divided into five
districts, intended to be of about equal size, avoiding
severance as far as possible by the district boundary of the
territories of Paramount Chiefs. These districts have been
named as the Karene, Ronietta, Bandajuma, Pangmua, and
Koinadugu districts. In anticipation of the arrangements that
might become necessary for the government of the Protectorate,
an Order of the Queen in Council had been made on 24th August
1895, … whereby, … Her Majesty was pleased, by and with the
advice of her Privy Council, to order that it shall be lawful
for the Legislative Council, for the time being, of the Colony
of Sierra Leone, by Ordinance or Ordinances, to exercise and
provide for giving effect to all such jurisdiction as Her
Majesty may at any time, before or after the passing of the
Order in Council, have acquired in the said territories
adjacent to the Colony of Sierra Leone. … Following upon the
Order of the Queen in Council, an Ordinance, entitled 'An
Ordinance to Determine the mode of exercising Her Majesty's
Jurisdiction in the Territories adjacent to the Colony of
Sierra Leone,' was passed by the Legislative Council and
Governor of Sierra Leone for the Government of the
Protectorate, on 16th September 1896."

Great Britain,
Report and Correspondence on Insurrection in
the Sierra Leone Protectorate
(Parliamentary Publications:
Papers by Command, 1899, C. 9388, pages 10-17).

The Ordinance above mentioned, which was reenacted, with some

changes, in September, 1897, provided, among other things, for
the imposition of a house tax, or hut tax, upon the natives,
and this proved to be the main cause of a serious native
revolt in the Protectorate. "By way of asserting the Crown's
 ownership of all lands, whether in use and occupation or
not—and also of attempting to make the people defray the cost
of governing them by methods they resent—the Protectorate
Ordinance imposes a 'house tax' of five shillings a year, and,
in the case of 'houses with four rooms or more,' of ten
shillings a year, on every 'householder'; the same to be paid
in 'sterling coin' on or after the 1st January in each year,
or, in default of payment on demand, to be distrained for with
so much addition as will defray the cost of removing the
property and disposing of it for 'the price current at the
nearest market.' The absurdity of thus importing the mechanism
of civilisation into 'house tax' levying among these ignorant
savages matches the injustice of the tax itself. The mud
hovels to be taxed are rarely worth more than the equivalent
of two or three shillings apiece, and shillings or other
'sterling coin' are rarely seen or handled by the natives,
such wages as they earn being generally paid in kind, and such
trade as they carry on being nearly always in the way of barter.
{455}
Few who are not chiefs or headmen own property worth as much
as five shillings, and property for which five shillings could
be obtained 'at the nearest market' might be worth the
equivalent of five pounds to them. There was no attempt to
raise the proposed house or hut tax before last January
[1898], and perhaps none of the natives have even yet any
understanding of the clauses of the Protectorate Ordinance
providing them with new-fangled 'courts of Justice,' and
taking from them all proprietary rights in their land. But as
soon as a proclamation was issued on 21st August, 1896,
notifying the contemplated changes, all who heard of them were
reasonably alarmed, and wherever the news spread seeds of fresh
discontent were sown. …

"There were burning of huts, buffeting of chiefs, and so

forth, in the south and east, as well as in the north, where,
owing to the alleged recalcitrancy of Bai Bureh and the zeal
of Captain Sharpe, the District Commissioner, the havoc was
 greatest. Early in February several chiefs and headmen were
brought to Freetown from Port Lokko in manacles, to be tried,
or punished without trial, on a charge of 'refusing to comply
with the provisions of the Protectorate Ordinance, and
inciting their subjects to resist the law.' 'The most
affecting part of the matter,' says the newspaper report, 'is
that the natives all loudly affirm their unswerving loyalty to
the Government, and say that they do not refuse to pay the hut
tax because they do not wish to, but because they really
cannot pay.' Their apologies were not listened to. Instead, a
detachment of the West India Regiment was sent up to assist
Captain Sharpe in the little war on which he had already
embarked. A futile attempt to arrest Bai Bureh on 18th
February led to a general uprising, and the first battle was
fought on 3rd March, when the town of Karina was recovered
from the 'insurgents' who had occupied it, and over sixty of
them were killed. Another fight occurred at Port Lokko, on 5th
March, when the 'insurgents' lost about forty more. These
victories being insufficient, fresh troops were sent up in
batches, until the entire force of conquerors numbered 800 or
upwards. They found it easier to cow than to conquer the
people, and the unequal struggle went on for three months. At
the end of May operations had to be suspended during the rainy
season, and before they can be renewed it may be hoped that
peace will be patched up. Already, indeed, the 'rebellion'
appears to be practically crushed, and with it all the
civilisation and all the commerce that had been planted in the
Karina district. Hundreds of natives have been shot down, many
more hundreds have died of starvation. Nearly all the huts
that it was proposed to tax have been destroyed, either by the
owners themselves, or by the policemen and soldiers."

H. R. Fox Bourne,
Sierra Leone Troubles
(Fortnightly Review, August, 1898).

SILVER QUESTION, The: A. D. 1895 (January-February).

 Attitude of Free Silver majority in the U. S. Senate
towards the Treasury gold reserve.

See (in this volume)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1895 (JANUARY-FEBRUARY);
and 1895-1896 (DECEMBER-FEBRUARY).

SILVER QUESTION, The: A. D. 1896.

In the American Presidential election.

See (in this volume)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER).

SILVER QUESTION, The: A. D. 1896-1898.

The Indianapolis Monetary Commission report and
Secretary Gage's plan in Congress.

See (in this volume)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896-1898.

SILVER QUESTION, The: A. D. 1897.

Negotiations by envoys from the United States for an
international bi-metallic agreement.

See (in this volume)

MONETARY QUESTIONS: A. D. 1897 (APRIL-OCTOBER).

SILVER QUESTION, The: A. D. 1900.

Practical settlement of the issue in the United States.
Attempted revival in the Presidential canvass.

See (in this volume)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1900 (MARCH-DECEMBER), and (MAY-NOVEMBER).

SILVER REPUBLICANS.