TEAM CODE: HLC/MC&I/6.

5/10

MOOT COURT AND INTERNSHIP (PAPER: 6.5)

CLINICAL PAPER – IV

_________________________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________________

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF SCANDINA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

_________________________________________________________________________________________

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. _____/ 2024

_________________________________________________________________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF

MR. ALEX ...................................................PETITIONER

VERSUS

UNION OF SCANDINA..................................RESPONDENT

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

_________________________________________________________________________________________

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDANT

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 3
2 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 4
3 STATEMENT OF FACTS 5
4 STATEMENT OF ISSUES 6
5 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 7
ISSUE I : Whether or not this writ petition brought before the 8
Honourable Court is maintainable?
ISSUE II : Whether or not the Doctrine of Reverse Burden is 10
constitutionally valid under the PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM
SEXUAL OFFENSES ACT 2012 ?
ISSUE III : Whether or not section 29 and section 30 of the POCSO 13
ACT takes away valid defenses available to the accused and there is
substantial shifting of burden of proof to the accused, which is contrary
to the settled legal principles?
ISSUE IV : Whether or not Section 29 and Section 30 of the POCSO 15
ACT are arbitrary and violates constitutional provisions ?
6 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER 17
7 BIBLIOGRAPHY 19
 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF CASES
1. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (3) 569……………………………………12,6
2. Zahid Mukhtar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 (NOC) 518 (BOM.)……………..17.18
3. Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, 1980 AIR 470………………………...…13.15
4. Rattiram v. State of M.P., 2013 AIR SCW 2456……………………………………......8,7
5. Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, 2008 AIR SCW 5964………………………………………6
6. Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State Of Orissa,. 1977 AIR 170…………………………………9
7. State of Bombay Versus Kathi Kalu Oghad, 1961 AIR 1808…………………………....10
8. Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, 2008 AIR SCW 5964…………………………...………...13

BOOKS
1. Jain M.P, Indian Constitutional Law, 6th Edition 2011, LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa
Nagpur………………………………………………………………………………………..7
2. The Constitutional law of India volume 1 (3rd Edition) by H.M.Seervai…………………8

STATUTES
1. The Constitution of India, 1950
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
3. Indian Penal Code, 1860
4. Protection Of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
5. Indian Evidence Act, 1872

DATABASE
1. Indiankanoon.org
2. casemine.com
3. ipleaders.in
 4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The petitioner have approached the Hon'ble High Court being aggrieved by the decision of the
learned trial court, under article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of Scandina, & section 374(2) of
the Criminal Procedure Code a as it involves the substantial question of law.
226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
1. Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and
certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for
any other purpose
2. The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to
the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such
power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such
person is not within those territories
3. Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in
any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1),
without
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for
such interim order; and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for
the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour
such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the
application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date
on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High
Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on
which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall,
on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power
conferred on the Supreme court by clause ( 2 ) of Article 32.
 5

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The FIR was lodged against Mr. Alex, a school teacher alleging that Mr. Alex has sexually
assaulted one of the girl student from his school and he was charged under section 376 of the
Penal Code of Scandina and section 5(i) r/w section 6 of the POCSO ACT and he was arrested.

2. The FIR had been lodged after six months of the commission said offence.The medical reports
of the appellant petitioner Mr. Alex states that he is capable of having sexual intercourse. The
medical reports also highlighted some simple injuries on his arm which may have resulted from
human nails.

3. According to medical reports of the victim, there was no evidence of recent sexual assault on
her. The statement of the victim was recorded under section 164 of the Crpc which was in
accordance with the complaint from the FIR.

4. Along with this under section 161 of Crpc the statement of the parents was also recorded in
which they stated that their daughter was sexually assaulted by the original accused.

5. After police submitted the chargesheet, the charges were framed against the appellant original
accused for the offense punishable under section 5(i) r/w section (6) of the POCSO ACT. The
charge under section 376 of the Penal Code of the Scandina was dropped.

6. As the trial began the special public prosecutor under section 29 and 30 of the POCSO ACT
refused to lead the evidence and submitted that the court was to presume the accused guilty and
having committed the offense charged under POCSO ACT unless he proved otherwise.

7. As a witness of the case the neighbors and relatives of Mr. Alex was also examined and
testified to the enmity between the accused and the parents of the victim. The accused has failed
to contest the presumption against him under the POCSO ACT of having committed the sexual
offenses and the trial court convicted the accused for the offenses charged and sentenced him to
ten years imprisonment and fine Rs. 50,000/ .

8. After being convicted Mr. Alex appealed his conviction in the High Court.
 6

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE I
Whether or not this writ petition brought before the Honourable Court is maintainable?

ISSUE II
Whether or not the Doctrine of Reverse Burden is constitutionally valid under the
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL OFFENSES ACT 2012 ?

ISSUE III
Whether or not section 29 and section 30 of the POCSO ACT takes away valid defenses
available to the accused and there is substantial shifting of burden of proof to the accused, which
is contrary to the settled legal principles?

ISSUE IV
Whether or not Section 29 and Section 30 of the POCSO ACT are arbitrary and violates
constitutional provisions ?
 7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE I
This criminal appeal along with writ petition brought before the Honourable Court is not
maintainable under section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Article 226 &
227 of the Constitution of the Scandina. The jurisdiction of the Hon'ble High Court can’t be
invoked when there is a substantial question of the law.

ISSUE II
The Doctrine of Reverse Burden is constitutionally valid under the PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL OFFENSES ACT 2012 (Hereinafter referred as POCSO ACT), as
it does not violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Constitution of Scandina.

Article 14 The state shall not deny to any person equality before law and equal protection of
laws within the territory of Scandina.
Article 20 (3) The privilege provided by the criminal jurisprudence against self incrimination is
a fact for every act under it.
Article 21 This article includes the Right to fair trial: No individual is deprived of his or her
personal property, life or liberty without following the basic rule of jurisprudence for the security
of private rights.

ISSUE III
The section 29 and section 30 of the POCSO ACT doesn’t take away valid defenses available to
the accused and there is no substantial shifting of burden of proof to the accused, which is not
contrary to the settled legal principles.
Reverse burden given in section 29 and 30 of the POCSO ACT doesn’t discriminates
unequivocally between those accused of reverse burden crimes and those accused of non reverse
burden crimes, it is solely based on the ostensible goal of public welfare, denying the
constitutional guarantees of equality before the law and equal protection of law .
 8

ISSUE I : Whether or not this writ petition brought before the Honourable Court is
maintainable?

1. The primary issue before the Honourable Court is whether the writ petition filed by Mr. Alex
challenging his conviction under the POCSO Act is maintainable. The respondents argue that the
writ petition is not maintainable for several reasons. This argument will focus on procedural
propriety, jurisdictional appropriateness, the sufficiency of alternative remedies, and the specific
legal standards that apply to writ petitions in criminal matters.1

2. Mr. Alex was convicted by a trial court after a full fledged trial where evidence was presented,
witnesses were examined, and legal arguments were made. The conviction is thus the result of a
judicial process that has already examined the facts and law in detail.

3. Under Indian law, the proper course of action for a convicted individual is to file an appeal in
a higher court, as Mr. Alex did. The High Court is the appropriate forum for appeals, and it has
the jurisdiction to review both facts and law. Filing a writ petition while an appeal is pending or
available is generally seen as bypassing the established legal procedure.2

4. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CrPC) allow for the quashing of proceedings to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of
justice. However, these powers are discretionary and should be exercised sparingly. Since Mr.
Alex has already exercised his right to appeal, invoking Section 482 through a writ petition is
redundant and an abuse of the process.3

5. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution is
primarily for the enforcement of fundamental rights and to address significant jurisdictional
errors or violations of natural justice.

___________________________
1. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (3) 569
2. Zahid Mukhtar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 (NOC) 518 (BOM.)
3. Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, 1980 AIR 470
 9

In criminal matters, especially those involving a conviction after a trial, the writ jurisdiction is
not typically invoked unless there is a gross miscarriage of justice or a glaring legal error.

6. The existence of an alternative and efficacious remedy, such as an appeal, is a crucial factor in
determining the maintainability of a writ petition. The Supreme Court of India has consistently
held that when an alternative remedy is available, writ jurisdiction should not be invoked. In the
case of Mr. Alex, the appellate remedy is not only available but has already been pursued,
making the writ petition unnecessary.1

7. The principle of res judicata prevents the same issue from being litigated multiple times. Since
Mr. Alex has already raised his grievances in the appellate court, allowing a writ petition on the
same grounds would violate this principle and lead to conflicting judgments, thereby
undermining judicial consistency.2

8. Various judicial precedents reinforce that writ petitions should not be entertained in cases
where an appeal is a viable option. In Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors., (2015) 5
SCC 423, the Supreme Court reiterated that issues related to the merits of the case should be
dealt with through the appropriate appellate process rather than through writ petitions.

9. Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act introduce a presumption of guilt, which Mr. Alex failed
to rebut convincingly during the trial. The trial court, therefore, had sufficient basis to convict
him. Questioning the evidentiary basis through a writ petition undermines the statutory
provisions specifically designed to protect children from sexual offenses.3

10. The victim’s statements, corroborated by the FIR and the parents' testimonies, provide a
consistent narrative that supported the conviction. The trial court’s evaluation of this evidence
was within its jurisdiction and expertise. Reexamining this through a writ petition would be an
inappropriate secondguessing of the trial court’s factual findings.
_________________________________________
1. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (3) 569
2. Zahid Mukhtar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 (NOC) 518 (BOM.)
3. Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, 1980 AIR 470
 10

11. The POCSO Act is a stringent law aimed at protecting children from sexual offenses, with
provisions for the speedy trial and stringent punishment. Allowing writ petitions to challenge
convictions under this Act would dilute its effectiveness and contravene the legislative intent of
providing swift and certain justice to victims.

12. Upholding the procedural integrity of criminal justice is vital for maintaining public
confidence. Allowing writ petitions to bypass or parallel the appellate process would create a
perception of judicial inconsistency and erode trust in the criminal justice system.1

In conclusion, the writ petition brought before the Honourable Court by Mr. Alex is not
maintainable due to the availability of adequate alternative remedies, the procedural propriety of
following the appellate route, the jurisdictional limitations of writ petitions in criminal matters,
and the specific legal standards governing such petitions. Additionally, public interest and policy
considerations strongly support the argument that the conviction and the subsequent appeal
process should be the final recourse for Mr. Alex, thereby maintaining the integrity and
efficiency of the judicial process.

ISSUE II Whether or not the Doctrine of Reverse Burden is constitutionally valid under
the PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL OFFENSES ACT 2012

1. The Doctrine of Reverse Burden under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
(POCSO) Act requires the accused to prove their innocence once a prima facie case has been
established against them. This doctrine is crucial in protecting vulnerable children from sexual
offenses and ensuring justice in cases where the power dynamics and nature of the crime make it
challenging to establish guilt using traditional evidentiary standards. The constitutional validity
of this doctrine can be supported by several legal, moral, and societal arguments.2

2. The POCSO Act was enacted to protect children from offenses of sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and pornography. The Act recognizes that children are particularly vulnerable and
_________________________________________
1. Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State Of Orissa,. 1977 AIR 170
2. Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, 2008 AIR SCW 5964
 11

need special provisions to safeguard their rights. The legislative intent emphasizes the protection
of children, who are often unable to effectively articulate or prove instances of sexual abuse due
to fear, trauma, or manipulation by the abuser.1

3. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, which
includes the presumption of innocence. However, this presumption is not absolute and can be
balanced against public interest. The Supreme Court of India has upheld the constitutionality of
reverse burden provisions in various statutes, recognizing the need to balance individual rights
with societal interests. In State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh (1992), the Court held that the
presumption of innocence can be displaced by statutory presumptions when public interest
demands it.2

4. The Doctrine of Proportionality ensures that any limitation on fundamental rights is reasonable
and justified in a democratic society. The reverse burden under the POCSO Act is proportional to
the aim it seeks to achieve—protecting children from sexual offenses. The inherent vulnerability
of children and the serious nature of the offenses justify the reversal of the burden of proof.

5. The Indian judiciary has recognized the validity of reverse burden provisions in various
contexts, particularly where the offenses are heinous and the victims are vulnerable. In Babu v.
State of Kerala (2010), the Supreme Court upheld the reverse burden provision under the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, considering the grave threat posed by
drug trafficking. Similarly, the threat posed by child sexual abuse warrants the application of the
reverse burden doctrine under the POCSO Act.

6. Child victims of sexual abuse often face immense psychological and emotional trauma,
making it difficult for them to testify or provide evidence against the accused. Studies and
reports, such as those by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), highlight the severe
underreporting and challenges in prosecuting child sexual abuse cases.
_________________________________________
1. Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State Of Orissa,. 1977 AIR 170
2. Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, 2008 AIR SCW 5964
 12

The reverse burden helps mitigate these challenges by shifting the evidentiary burden to the
accused.1

7. India is a signatory to various international conventions, such as the United Nations

Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which mandate the protection of children from
all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse. The reverse burden doctrine aligns with international
human rights standards that prioritize the protection of children and ensure that states take
effective measures to combat sexual offenses against minors.2

8. The rights of the accused to a fair trial must be balanced with the rights of the child to
protection and justice. The reverse burden does not negate the right to a fair trial. The accused
still has the opportunity to present evidence and challenge the prosecution’s case. The doctrine
simply adjusts the burden in light of the serious nature of the crime and the vulnerabilities of the
victims.3

9. The nature of child sexual abuse often involves situations where direct evidence is scarce, and
the testimony of the victim is critical. The reverse burden aids in securing convictions in cases
where the perpetrator might otherwise escape due to lack of direct evidence. This is essential for
the effectiveness of the POCSO Act in deterring and addressing child sexual abuse.4

10. The Doctrine of Reverse Burden under the POCSO Act is constitutionally valid. It is a
necessary and proportionate response to the grave issue of child sexual abuse. By shifting the
burden of proof to the accused, the doctrine recognizes the unique vulnerabilities of child victims
and ensures that justice is served without compromising the fundamental principles of a fair trial.
The legislative intent, judicial precedents, international obligations, and practical considerations
collectively support the constitutional validity of this doctrine, ultimately serving the best
interests of society and vulnerable children.5
_________________________________________
1. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (3) 569
2. Zahid Mukhtar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 (NOC) 518 (BOM.)
3. Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, 1980 AIR 470
4. Rattiram v. State of M.P., 2013 AIR SCW 2456
5. Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, 2008 AIR SCW 5964
 13

ISSUE III Whether Section 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act takes away valid defences
available to the accused and there is substantial shifting of burden of proof to the accused,
which is contrary to the settled legal principles?

1. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, was enacted to address
and combat sexual exploitation and abuse of children. Sections 29 and 30 of the Act introduce a
significant shift in the burden of proof, presuming the guilt of the accused once the prosecution
establishes a prima facie case. This provision is often criticized for potentially undermining the
presumption of innocence. However, given the unique vulnerabilities of child victims and the
nature of these offenses, the application of Sections 29 and 30 is justified and necessary to
protect the rights and dignity of children.1

2. The primary aim of the POCSO Act is to provide a robust legal framework to protect children
from sexual offenses and ensure a child friendly judicial process. The presumption of guilt under
Sections 29 and 30 is designed to address the power imbalance between victims and perpetrators,
recognizing that children may face significant challenges in articulating and proving abuse.
Global Standards of International conventions such as the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (UNCRC) emphasize the need for special protections for children against all
forms of sexual exploitation and abuse. India, as a signatory, has an obligation to implement
effective measures to protect children, justifying the special provisions under the POCSO Act.2

3. Challenges in Proving Sexual Offenses: Sexual offenses, particularly against children, often
occur in private, with little or no physical evidence. The inherent difficulties in proving such
crimes necessitate a shift in the burden of proof to ensure that offenders do not escape justice due
to lack of direct evidence. Children are often unable to fully comprehend or articulate their
abuse, making it imperative to create a legal environment that supports their testimonies.
Sections 29 and 30 provide this support by presuming the guilt of the accused, thereby reducing
the pressure on child victims to provide conclusive evidence.3
_________________________________________
1. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (3) 569
2. Zahid Mukhtar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 (NOC) 518 (BOM.)
3. Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, 1980 AIR 470
4. Rattiram v. State of M.P., 2013 AIR SCW 2456
 14

4. Reasonable Classification: The classification under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act is
reasonable and based on the distinct needs of child victims. Article 14 of the Indian Constitution
allows for reasonable classification, and the special protection afforded to children under the
POCSO Act falls within this ambit. While the presumption of innocence is a fundamental aspect
of a fair trial, it is not absolute and can be balanced with the need to protect vulnerable victims.
The Supreme Court of India, in various judgments, has upheld provisions that shift the burden of
proof in specific contexts, recognizing the unique nature of certain crimes (e.g., dowry deaths
under Section 304B IPC).1

5. Courts have upheld provisions shifting the burden of proof in cases where the prosecution
faces inherent challenges in proving the offense beyond reasonable doubt. In Shimbhu & Anr. v.
State of Haryana, the Supreme Court upheld the reverse burden of proof in rape cases,
emphasizing the need to protect victims and ensure justice.2

6. The presumption of guilt under Sections 29 and 30 has led to more successful prosecutions,
ensuring that offenders are held accountable. Statistical data indicates that the conviction rates
under the POCSO Act have improved, reflecting the effectiveness of these provisions in
combating child sexual abuse. The stringent provisions serve as a deterrent, sending a strong
message that crimes against children will be met with rigorous legal scrutiny and punishment.
The fear of a high likelihood of conviction acts as a preventive measure, discouraging potential
offenders.3

7. The legal framework under the POCSO Act seeks to balance the protection of child victims
with the rights of the accused. Safeguards such as the right to a fair trial, the opportunity to
present a defense, and the requirement for the prosecution to establish a prima facie case before
the presumption applies ensure that the rights of the accused are not entirely disregarded.4
_________________________________________
1. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (3) 569
2. Zahid Mukhtar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 (NOC) 518 (BOM.)
3. Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, 1980 AIR 470
4. Rattiram v. State of M.P., 2013 AIR SCW 2456
5. Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, 2008 AIR SCW 5964
 15

8. The provisions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, which shift the burden of proof
to the accused, are not only constitutionally valid but also necessary given the unique challenges
in prosecuting child sexual abuse cases. These sections are designed to address the vulnerabilities
of child victims, ensuring that justice is served while balancing the rights of the accused. The
legislative intent, supported by international conventions, judicial precedents, and practical
outcomes, underscores the importance of these provisions in protecting children from sexual
offenses. Therefore, the argument that Sections 29 and 30 take away valid defenses from the
accused and substantially shift the burden of proof, contrary to settled legal principles, lacks
merit in the context of the POCSO Act's objectives and the pressing need to safeguard children
from sexual exploitation.1

ISSUE IV Whether or not Section 29 and Section 30 of the POCSO ACT are arbitrary and
violates constitutional provisions ?

1. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act was enacted to provide a
robust legal framework for the protection of children from sexual abuse and exploitation.
Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, which deal with the presumption of guilt and culpable
mental state, are particularly significant. Critics argue that these sections are arbitrary and violate
constitutional provisions, such as the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence.
However, there are compelling arguments in favor of the constitutionality and necessity of these
provisions, especially in cases like that of Mr. Alex.2

2. Section 29: This section mandates that when a person is prosecuted for committing or abetting
or attempting to commit any offense under the POCSO Act, the Special Court shall presume that
such person has committed or abetted or attempted to commit the offense, unless the contrary is
proved. Section 30: This section deals with the presumption of culpable mental state, which
means the court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defense for the
accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an
offense in that prosecution.
_________________________________________
1. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (3) 569
2. Zahid Mukhtar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 (NOC) 518 (BOM.)
 16

3. The POCSO Act is designed to protect children, who are among the most vulnerable members
of society, from sexual offenses. Children often find it difficult to articulate their experiences due
to fear, shame, or trauma. Therefore, Sections 29 and 30 provide a necessary legal safeguard to
ensure that perpetrators do not escape punishment due to the inherent challenges in proving such
offenses. The Supreme Court of India in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh emphasized the need
for stringent measures to combat sexual offenses against women and children, noting that special
provisions are justified to address these heinous crimes.1

4. While Article 21 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial, it also allows for
reasonable restrictions in the interest of justice and public order. The presumption of innocence
is not absolute and can be modified by legislation to protect societal interests, particularly when
dealing with serious offenses.2
Judicial Precedents: In State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, the court held that
the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 is not absolute and can be curtailed by due
process of law, especially in cases involving the protection of society's vulnerable sections.3

5. Sections 29 and 30 do not eliminate the right to a fair trial. Instead, they shift the burden of
proof to the accused while still allowing them the opportunity to rebut the presumptions. This
ensures that while the state provides additional protection to child victims, it does not completely
negate the accused’s right to defend themselves.4
6. In Dhananjay Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
certain presumptions in law are necessary for effective law enforcement, especially in cases
involving serious offenses, as long as the accused has a fair chance to present a defense.

7. Many countries with advanced legal systems have similar provisions that create presumptions
in favor of the prosecution in cases involving sexual offenses against minors. These legal
frameworks recognize the difficulties in obtaining direct evidence and aim to protect victims'
rights.
_________________________________________
1. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (3) 569
2. Zahid Mukhtar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 (NOC) 518 (BOM.)
3. Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, 1980 AIR 470
4. Rattiram v. State of M.P., 2013 AIR SCW 2456
 17

India is a signatory to various international conventions, such as the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC), which mandate stringent measures to protect children from sexual exploitation
and abuse. Sections 29 and 30 align with these international obligations.

In conclusion, Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act are not arbitrary but are carefully crafted
provisions aimed at protecting the most vulnerable members of society—children. They strike a
balance between the rights of the accused and the necessity of protecting child victims from
sexual offenses. The constitutionality of these sections is supported by judicial precedents,
international practices, and the compelling state interest in safeguarding children. In Mr. Alex's
case, the application of these provisions ensured that the victim's allegations were given
appropriate weight, while also providing the accused a fair opportunity to defend himself.
 18

PRAYERS

Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, It most
humbly and respectfully prayed before this honourable court to adjudged that:

1. Declare the Writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 and 227 of the
constitution of Scandina.
2. Declare the Section 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act is consistent to the constitution of
Scandina as are reasonable and justifiable and be abolished
3. Uphold the conviction passed by the trial court.

Or

Pass any other order that it deems fit to the this Hon'ble court in the interest of justice, equity and
good conscience.
And for this the respondents is duly bound, shall humbly pray.

Respectfully
Submitted

Counsel for the respondents

 BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Kailash Nath Rai, Moot Court PreTrial Preparation And Participation In Trial Proceedings
(Central Law Publication, 2nd edition)

J P S Sirohi and Sunil Sirohi, Moot Court, PreTrial Preparations & Participation in Trial
Proceedings (Allahabad Law Agency, 2nd edition.

R.V Kelkar, Criminal Procedure Code, (7th Edition 2021)

PSA Pillai, Criminal Law 637 (13th ed. 2017)