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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/7/2022, SPi
Identifying Future-Proof
Science
PETER VICKERS
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/7/2022, SPi
For my parents
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/7/2022, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/7/2022, SPi
Contents
Preface ix
List of Figures xiii
1. What Is Future-Proof Science? 1
1 Science and Scepticism 1
2 Misleading Evidence 6
3 Approximate Truth 10
4 Future-Proof Science 13
5 Outline of the Book 19
2. The Historical Challenge to Future-Proof Science:
The Debate So Far 23
1 Frustration and Miscommunication in the ‘Scientific
Realism Debate’ 23
2 Stanford’s Scientific Scepticism: Death by a Thousand
Qualifications? 29
3 The Historical Challenge: Are We Epistemically Privileged? 38
4 Weight of Evidence Judgements: Scientists vs Philosophers 43
3. Meckel’s Successful Prediction of Gill Slits: A Case of Misleading
Evidence? 52
1 Introduction 52
2 The Gill Slit Prediction: Success from Falsity? 54
3 A Response? 60
4 Von Baer 63
5 The Argument from Empirical Knowledge 67
6 Conclusion 72
4. The Tiktaalik ‘Missing Link’ Novel Predictive Success
and the Evidence for Evolution 76
1 Introduction 76
2 Tiktaalik: An Impressive Novel Predictive Success
of Evolution Theory? 78
3 The Full Body of Evidence 87
4 The ‘Consensus Approach’ to Evolution 91
5 Conclusion 98
5. The Judgement of the Scientific Community: Lessons from
Continental Drift 100
1 Introduction 100
2 Was There a Consensus Regarding the Truth of Continental
Permanency? 102
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/7/2022, SPi
viii
Bibliography 241
Index 261
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/7/2022, SPi
Preface
This book starts with something that looks more like philosophy of science,
and ends with something that looks more like sociology of science. Or perhaps
I should say integrated history, philosophy, and sociology of science. One
reason is that the methods of ‘pure’ philosophy can be frustrating: they never
seem to establish anything definitively. Debates seem destined to go around in
circles, or else evolve somehow, without ever reaching a firm conclusion that
might be held up to outsiders as a noteworthy achievement. I tried to add
something important to the ‘scientific realism debate’ earlier in my career, fully
imbued with the philosophy that the truth is out there, and the thought that
just maybe I could help us reach that truth. But the tools at my disposal as a
‘pure’ philosopher never seemed to go very far. Whilst one could fill a career
that way, I didn’t want to just fill a career; I wanted to reach truth, or at least
head clearly in that direction.
Thus I was drawn towards methods that were not merely philosophical.
History seemed a good place to start, since with the history of science comes
data, of a kind, that one might build a philosophy upon. Thus we reach ‘HPS’,
a field premised on a thorough integration of history and philosophy of
science. But what came to me much later was the thought that the methods
of sociology might also be thrown into the mix. I had been averse to sociology,
since the term ‘sociology of science’ always seemed to be attached to a specific
(rather extreme) attitude towards science, as being so thoroughly influenced
by social factors that there could never be any talk of ‘facts’, as I understood
that word. But if we shake this specific movement off, and think more broadly
about what sociology of science might be (social epistemology)—inspired by
scholars such as Helen Longino—then another promising methodology pre-
sents itself. Just as HPS allows for a method that is partially empirical, so too
sociology is no stranger to empirical methods. These methods bring the
endeavour that bit closer to natural science, and move us that bit further
away from ‘pure’ philosophy. In this way, one might still dream of saying
something definitive about science, something that could draw a consensus of
opinion in a way that is vanishingly rare in philosophy.
The extent to which I have managed to combine these methods, and say
something rather definitive, is unclear. It remains predominantly a work in
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/7/2022, SPi
x
HPS, and the contribution of sociological methods is meagre to say the least.
But I hope that the reader will see value in the attempt, at least. And I hope that
at least some readers will be inclined to pick up the baton and run with it.
There are no doubt many holes in this work, as it stands. But if the funda-
mental methodology constitutes an improvement on ‘the scientific realism
debate’, then it may save some readers years of toil, who would otherwise have
adopted a methodology destined to lead them in circles, or at least nowhere
definitive.
As for the holes, they remain despite my receiving an enormous amount of
help along the way. Indeed, some scholars helped me to write this book to such
an extent that if the culture of co-authorship were more like the natural
sciences, then this monograph might have had twenty co-authors. I would
first mention Kyle Stanford, who read the book carefully from beginning to
end, and offered critical feedback weighty enough to reduce the number of
chapters from ten to nine. Kerry McKenzie also read the whole thing, as did
anonymous Reviewer A, each providing crucial comments (and crucial
encouragement!). Mike Stuart and Hasok Chang both set up reading groups
when I first had a full draft of the book, and each of these meetings brought
immensely valuable feedback. I am hugely grateful to Mike, Hasok, and those
in attendance at these two reading groups.
Some scholars carefully read one or two chapters. Juha Saatsi was a big help
here, challenging me on Chapters 2 and 6, for example. Several scientists
provided invaluable feedback concerning Chapters 5 and 7, including Gillian
Foulger, Peter Schulte, Alessandro Chiarenza, Sean Gulick, Gerta Keller,
Vincent Courtillot, Stephen Brusatte, and Sean McMahon. And concerning
Chapter 7 specifically, I must thank the Geological Society of America (GSA),
who assisted me in acquiring data about past GSA conferences. I benefitted
from similar help courtesy of Jon Korman at the SVP (Society of Vertebrate
Paleontology).
For help and advice on specific issues, sincere thanks (in no particular
order) also go to: Teru Miyake, Naomi Oreskes, Neil Thomason, Thomas
Rossetter, James Fraser, Robin Hendry, Nancy Cartwright, Wendy Parker,
Joseph D. Martin, Timothy D. Lyons, Alexander Bird, Darrell Rowbottom,
Henry Taylor, Douglas Allchin, Andy Hamilton, Ludwig Fahrbach, Maya
Goldenberg, Karim Thebault, Omar El Mawas, Alex Broadbent, and Ian
Kidd. A special vote of thanks to Manuel Galvão de Melo e Mota, who spent
many hours providing me with rich information from the archives of the
SPMicros/SPME (Portuguese Society of Electron Microscopy), far more infor-
mation than I could ultimately use in the book, however fascinating.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/7/2022, SPi
xi
I presented this material, in one form or another, at various venues over the
years, and profited hugely from these experiences, both because I was forced to
reframe the material for presentation, and also because I gained invaluable
feedback from the audiences. Here I must give thanks to 3rd-year undergradu-
ate students at the University of Durham, UK, who took Philosophical Issues
in Contemporary Science between 2015 and 2021, as well as MA students who
took Philosophical Issues in Science and Medicine. Thanks also to the Joseph
Cowen Lifelong Learning Centre, as well as the ‘Lit & Phil’ (both in Newcastle,
UK) where I presented relevant material in 2019. And thanks also to an
audience at Johns Hopkins University, USA, where I presented relevant
material, again in 2019.
Huge thanks of course to the funder, The British Academy, who trusted me
with a Mid-Career Fellowship, which ultimately ran from 1 December 2019
through to 30 June 2021. And thanks to the administrative staff at the
University of Durham research office, including Anna Hutchinson, Linda
Morris, Eleanor Glenton, and Rachael Matthews, who worked hard to make
the Fellowship a reality. This book simply wouldn’t be here without that
Fellowship.
Finally, most important of all was personal support, without which I could
never have completed this project during the extraordinary stresses of the
Covid-19 pandemic. Here I must mention the support of my parents, who
have been solid rocks for me all the way through. I must also mention my
running buddy in Durham, Chris Cowie—those runs were so important for
mental health. But the last word must go to my extraordinary wife, and friend,
Laura Vickers, who has been amazing in a thousand different ways, and who
is, for me, a constant source of inspiration.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/7/2022, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/7/2022, SPi
List of Figures
xv
8.2a Direct image of a cell from a mouse liver, infected with coronavirus,
20 hours after inoculation. 199
Reproduced with permission from Rockefeller University Press; from
David-Ferreira and Manaker (1965), ‘An electron microscope study of the
development of a mouse hepatitis virus in tissue culture cells’, p. 71.
8.2b Direct image of coronavirus virions accumulating within a human
cell, 12 hours post-infection. 199
Reproduced with permission from American Society for Microbiology; from
Hamre et al. (1967), ‘Growth and intracellular development of a new respiratory
virus’, p. 814.
8.3 Coronaviruses multiplying inside a host cell. (a) SARS (2002–3);
(b) MERS (2012–13); (c) Covid-19 (2019–ongoing). 200
Images all sourced from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC): (A) https://www.cdc.gov/sars/lab/images/coronavirus5.jpg;
(B) https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/images/MERS-cytoplasm.jpg;
(C) https://phil.cdc.gov/details.aspx?pid=23591. Not under copyright.
8.4 Three different types of coronavirus virion, all of which have
demonstrated the capacity to infect humans. (a) SARS-CoV;
(b) MERS-CoV; (c) SARS-CoV-2. 201
Images sourced from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID): https://www.flickr.com/photos/niaid/.
8.5 A SARS-CoV virion (RHS) ejecting its genetic material (LHS); for
present purposes the arrows can be ignored. 202
Reproduced with permission from American Society for Microbiology; from
Neumann et al. (2006), ‘Supramolecular architecture of severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus revealed by electron cryomicroscopy’, p. 7925.
8.6 Real images of a virus particle infecting a cell, in three stages:
(i) A&D, (ii) B&E, (iii) C&F; the arrow shows the moment
infection occurs. 202
Reproduced with permission from the American Association for the
Advancement of Science; from Hu et al. (2013), ‘The bacteriophage T7
virion undergoes extensive structural remodeling during infection’.
8.7 Transmission electron microscopy partially reveals the double-helix
structure in a strand of DNA. 203
Reproduced with permission from the American Chemical Society;
from Gentile et al. (2012), ‘Direct imaging of DNA fibers: the visage
of double helix’.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 1/7/2022, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/7/2022, SPi
1
What Is Future-Proof Science?
(i) We are stuck in a rut of human thinking out of which we will never
escape. Our idea is totally wrong (or mostly wrong) but we are some-
how prevented from seeing that, or even if we do see it we are unable to
replace it with something better/truer.
(ii) Science has hit upon the truth, and all that remains is for scientists to
build upon and develop the correct idea they already have. No feasible
scientific developments could bring them to reject the idea.
It is the latter option, (ii), that I mean to refer to with the phrase ‘future-
proof science’. This isn’t to say that (i) is impossible, and we’ll take it quite
Identifying Future-Proof Science. Peter Vickers, Oxford University Press. © Peter Vickers 2023.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192862730.003.0001
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/7/2022, SPi
seriously in some later chapters. But what I mainly wish to argue is that some
scientific ideas should be called ‘facts’, and they should be called ‘facts’ because
they are true ideas—the universe really is the way the theory says it is (allowing
for small adjustments). Moreover, we have overwhelming evidence for this, to
such an extent that no feasible scientific developments could overturn it. For
example, it couldn’t ever be the case that we have the right idea, and lots of
evidence, but somehow (by sheer bad luck perhaps?) we go on to accumulate
lots of contrary evidence that is sufficient to overturn the correct idea we
started with.
In short, this book argues that we have come to know things through
science, beyond all reasonable doubt. Certain knowledge claims—the product
of scientific labour—are justified, where by ‘knowledge claims’ I mean asser-
tions of fact without any significant hedging or caveats. I hope even sceptics
will grant that this is possible. Sometimes we can have knowledge where we
didn’t have it before. To give an example, we can come to know why the sky
does not run out of rain. Further, it can be the case that we don’t just have a
theory about the rain, but that, over time, we have so much evidence for the
‘water cycle theory’ that it is not unreasonable to say that we are certain, and it
is a fact. We stop talking about ‘the water cycle theory’, and simply talk about
‘the water cycle’. If we meet a sceptic, it would not be unreasonable (though it
may come across as patronising or arrogant) to say, ‘I’m certain; I know that
I’m right about this.’ Of course, in social interactions it is often much preferred
to ‘agree to disagree’, to respect somebody’s opinions and beliefs. It is often
much preferred to dial down one’s confidence and say something like ‘I think
there’s good evidence for this’, as opposed to ‘I know this is true’. But what
may seem like objectionable hubris to your audience can sometimes be fully
justified: it may be no exaggeration to say that you are sure (beyond reasonable
doubt) that you are correct, and an alternative view is wrong, however
uncomfortable it may feel to say this.¹
I think it’s worth expanding on this point about social discomfort a little
further. In many cases we face difficult dilemmas vis-à-vis how we express our
degree of confidence. For example, suppose you visit a music festival, and
you’re laid on the grass one evening staring up at the stars with a new friend.
You hear them say, ‘I guess we’ll never know what those twinkly dots of light
really are.’ You might feel so awkward about contradicting your new friend,
that you actually reply, ‘Yeah, I guess not’, even though (let’s assume) you
¹ The concept of future-proof science is not inconsistent with ‘epistemic humility’; see e.g. Kidd
(2020) for a useful entry to the literature on humility and science.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/7/2022, SPi
studied astrophysics at university, and feel 100 per cent sure that scientists do
know what stars are. The problem is, you just can’t think of any way to
contradict the person without coming across as patronising. It also doesn’t
really matter if you ‘let it go’ in this particular context.
In other contexts, this tendency to ‘let it go’ or ‘agree to disagree’ absolutely
must be resisted. Sometimes it is crucially important to distinguish clearly
between items of human knowledge, and issues that are unsettled and open for
discussion, without hiding that distinction behind social niceties. If we swap
the musical festival example for the Covid-19 pandemic, and we swap the
statement for ‘I guess we just can’t know whether the AstraZeneca vaccine is
safe’, it becomes far more important to respond honestly instead of simply
answering ‘Yes, you might be right about that’, or similar. Indeed, if you know
a lot of about vaccine testing, it would be wrong not to challenge the statement;
you might even end up saving the person’s life. And in science generally there
are plenty of high-stakes contexts where absolute honesty is paramount, and
social niceties must be put to one side. To illustrate: scientists could not ‘agree
to disagree’ with chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) companies in the 1980s on the
question whether CFCs were causing ozone depletion. If scientists had agreed
with the CFC companies that they couldn’t really prove the link between CFCs
and ozone, and didn’t really know, and there was room for rational doubt, that
would have been a death sentence—at the hand of skin cancer—for thousands
of individuals who are alive today. A similar story can be told about the HIV-
AIDS link (Godfrey-Smith 2021, pp. 311–12), and there were indeed many
unnecessary deaths in this case—this isn’t all merely hypothetical.
At the same time there is of course a sense in which we are never 100 per
cent certain; a certain degree of doubt is always possible. Suppose I strike the
keys of the laptop and say to myself, ‘Do I really know I am typing right now?
Do I really know that I am attempting to write the opening chapter of a book?’
It’s certainly possible that I am wrong. For example (as Descartes famously
urged in the 17th century) I could be having the most vivid dream I’ve ever
had. Or perhaps I am not asleep, but my senses—sight, sound, touch—are
being manipulated in a way that is totally hidden from me (as in The Matrix).
Or perhaps (back with Descartes again) even my thoughts are being manipu-
lated, by some ‘evil demon’ or similar powerful being.
If we accept that these are (remote) possibilities, even for a case as rudi-
mentary as whether I know that I am striking keys on my laptop, then it may
be urged that I shouldn’t say I am sure. I shouldn’t say I am certain. At least not
100 per cent. And if not for everyday facts such as this, then definitely not
for scientific ideas—such as the causal link between CFCs and ozone
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“Why, certainly,” said the Whispering Vines. “Some of course are
older than others. But here on the Moon we consider a plant or a bird
or a moth quite young if he has seen no more than two hundred
years. And there are several trees, and a few members of the Animal
Kingdom too, whose memories go back to over a thousand years.”
“You don’t say!” murmured the Doctor. “I realized of course that
your lives were much longer than ours on the Earth. But I had no
idea you went as far back as that. Goodness me!—Well, please go
on.”
“In the old days, then, before we instituted the Council,” the vines
continued, “there was a terrible lot of waste and slaughter. They tell
of one time when a species of big lizard overran the whole Moon.
They grew so enormous that they ate up almost all the green stuff
there was. No tree or bush or plant got a chance to bring itself to
seeding-time because as soon as it put out a leaf it was gobbled up
by those hungry brutes. Then the rest of us got together to see what
we could do.”
T
he Whispering Vines then went on to tell the Doctor in
greater detail of that institution which they had vaguely spoken
of already, “The Council.” This was apparently a committee or
general government made up of members from both the
Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms. Its main purpose was to regulate
life on the Moon in such a way that there should be no more warfare.
For example, if a certain kind of shrub wanted more room for
expansion, and the territory it wished to take over was already
occupied by, we’ll say, bullrushes, it was not allowed to thrust out its
neighbors without first submitting the case to the Council. Or if a
certain kind of butterfly wished to feed upon the honey of some
flower and was interfered with by a species of bee or beetle, again
the argument had to be put to the vote of this all-powerful committee
before any action could be taken.
This information explained a great deal which had heretofore
puzzled us.
“You see, Stubbins,” said the Doctor, “the great size of almost all
life here, the development of intelligence in plant forms, and much
more besides, could not possibly have come about if this regulation
had not been in force. Our world could learn a lot from the Moon,
Stubbins—the Moon, its own child whom it presumes to despise! We
have no balancing or real protection of life. With us it is, and always
has been, ‘dog eat dog.’ ”
The Doctor shook his head and gazed off into space to where the
globe of our mother Earth glowed dimly. Just so had I often seen the
Moon from Puddleby by daylight.
“Where the globe of the Earth glowed dimly”
T
hat night was, I think, the most disturbed one that we spent in
the whole course of our stay on the Moon. Not one of us slept
soundly or continuously. For one thing, our growth had
proceeded at an alarming and prodigious rate; and what
bedding we had (we slept in that mild climate with the blankets under
us instead of over us) had become absurdly short and insufficient for
our new figures. Knees and elbows spilled over the sides and got
dreadfully sore on the hard earth. But besides that discomfort, we
were again conscious throughout the whole night of mysterious
noises and presences. Every one of us seemed to be uneasy in his
mind. I remember waking up one time and hearing the Doctor, Chee-
Chee and Polynesia all talking in their sleep at the same time.
Hollow-eyed and unrested we finally, at daybreak, crawled out of
our various roosts and turned silently to the business of getting
breakfast. That veteran campaigner Polynesia was the first to pull
herself together. She came back from examining the ground about
the camp with a very serious look on her old face.
“Well,” said she, “if there’s any one in the Moon who hasn’t been
messing round our bunks while we slept I’d like to know who it is.”
“Why?” asked the Doctor. “Anything unusual?”
“Come and see,” said the parrot and led the way out into the
clearing that surrounded our bunks and baggage.
“With a very serious look on her old face”
“A
ll right, Chee-Chee, all right,” said the Doctor hurriedly.
“Wait now. We’ll see what we can find out. Don’t get
excited.”
In spite of the Doctor’s reassuring words I could see that he
himself was by this time quite a little agitated. And for that no one
could blame him. After weeks in this weird world where naught but
extraordinary things came up day after day we had been constantly
wondering when we’d see the strange Human whose traces and
influence were everywhere so evident. Now at last he had appeared.
I gazed up at the gigantic figure rearing away into the skies
above our heads. With one of his feet he could easily have crushed
the lot of us like so many cockroaches. Yet he, with the rest of the
gathering, seemed not unfriendly to us, if a bit puzzled by our size.
As for John Dolittle, he may have been a little upset by Chee-Chee’s
announcement, but he certainly wasn’t scared. He at once set to
work to get into touch with this strange creature who had called on
us. And, as was usual with his experiments of this kind, the other
side seemed more than willing to help.
The giant wore very little clothes. A garment somewhat similar to
our own, made from the flexible bark and leaves we had discovered
in the forest, covered his middle from the arm-pits down to the lower
thighs. His hair was long and shaggy, falling almost to his shoulders.
The Doctor measured up to a line somewhere near his ankle-bone.
Apparently realizing that it was difficult for John Dolittle to talk with
him at that range, the giant made a movement with his hand and at
once the insects nearest to us rose and crawled away. In the space
thus cleared the man-monster sat down to converse with his visitors
from the Earth.
It was curious that after this I too no longer feared the enormous
creature who looked like something from a fairy tale or a nightmare.
Stretching down a tremendous hand, he lifted the Doctor, as though
he had been a doll, and set him upon his bare knee. From this height
—at least thirty feet above my head—John Dolittle clambered still
further up the giant’s frame till he stood upon his shoulder.
Here he apparently had much greater success in making himself
understood than he had had lower down. By standing on tip-toe he
could just reach the Moon Man’s ear. Presently descending to the
knee again, he began calling to me.
“Stubbins—I say, Stubbins! Have you got a notebook handy?”
“Yes, Doctor. In my pocket. Do you want me to take dictation?”
“Please,” he shouted back—for all the world like a foreman
yelling orders from a high building. “Get this down. I have hardly
established communication yet, but I want you to book some
preliminary notes. Are you ready?”
As a matter of fact the Doctor in his enthusiasm had misjudged
how easy he’d find it to converse with the Moon Man. For a good
hour I stood waiting with my pencil poised and no words for dictation
were handed down. Finally the Doctor called to me that he would
have to delay matters a little till he got in close touch with our giant
visitor.
“Humph!” grunted Polynesia. “I don’t see why he bothers. I never
saw such an unattractive enormous brute.—Doesn’t look as though
he had the wits of a caterpillar anyway. And to think that it was this
great lump of unintelligent mutton that has kept the Doctor—John
Dolittle, M.D.—and the rest of us, hanging about till it suited him to
call on us!—After sending for us, mind you! That’s the part that
rattles me!”
“ ‘Stubbins!—I say, Stubbins!’ ”