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From Perception to Communication
O X F O R D ST U D I E S I N S E M A N T I C S A N D P R A G M AT I C S

General Editors
Chris Barker, New York University, and Chris Kennedy, University of Chicago

RECENTLY PUBLISHED IN THE SERIES

8
Subjectivity and Perspective in Truth-Theoretic Semantics
Peter Lasersohn
9
The Semantics of Evidentials
Sarah E. Murray
10
Graded Modality
Qualitative and Quantitative Perspectives
Daniel Lassiter
11
The Semantics and Pragmatics of Honorification
Register and Social Meaning
Elin McCready
12
The Meaning of More
Alexis Wellwood
13
Enriched Meanings
Natural Language Semantics with Category Theory
Ash Asudeh and Gianluca Giorgolo
14
Parenthetical Meaning
Todor Koev
15
Actuality Inferences
Causality, Aspect, and Modality
Prerna Nadathur
16
From Perception to Communication
A Theory of Types for Action and Meaning
Robin Cooper

For a full list of titles published and in preparation for the series see pp. 439–40
 From Perception to
Communication
A Theory of Types for Action and Meaning

R O B I N C O O P ER
 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Robin Cooper 2023
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Some rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, for commercial purposes,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly
permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization.

This is an open access publication, available online and distributed under the terms of a
Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivatives 4.0
International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), a copy of which is available at
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of this licence
should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2022945201
ISBN 978–0–19–287131–2
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192871312.001.0001
Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
 For Jon
who would have read and understood
and then suggested a completely different way of doing it
 Contents

General preface x
Acknowledgements xi
How to read this book xii

Introduction 1

I . F R O M P ER C EP T I O N A N D A C T I O N
T O GR A MM A R

1. From perception to intensionality 9

1.1 Introduction 9
1.2 Perception as type assignment 9
1.3 Modelling type systems in terms of mathematical objects 11
1.4 Situation types 14
1.5 Intensionality: Propositions as types 38
1.6 Summary 39

2. From event perception and action to information states and

information exchange 40
2.1 Introduction 40
2.2 The string theory of events 40
2.3 Doing things with types 46
2.4 Speech events 61
2.5 Signs 66
2.6 Information exchange in dialogue 67
2.7 English resources 84
2.8 Summary of resources introduced 89
2.9 Summary 92

3. Grammar in a theory of action 94

3.1 Introduction 94
3.2 Constituent structure and events 94
3.3 Syntax 97
3.4 Semantics 104
3.5 Incremental processing and building a chart type 118
3.6 Summary of resources introduced 131
3.7 Summary 135

I I . T O WA R D S A D I A L O GI C A L V I EW
O F SE M A N T I C S

4. Reference and mental states 139

4.1 Introduction 139
viii CONTENTS

4.2 Proper names as signs 139

4.3 Proper names and communication 142
4.4 Proper names, salience, and accommodation 157
4.5 Paderewski 165
4.6 The interpretation of unbound pronouns 171
4.7 Summary of resources introduced 175
4.8 Summary 181

5. Frames and descriptions 183

5.1 Introduction 183
5.2 Common nouns and individual concepts 183
5.3 The Partee puzzle 184
5.4 Frames as records 188
5.5 Frames and common nouns 195
5.6 Definite descriptions as dynamic generalized quantifiers 198
5.7 Individual vs. frame level nouns 211
5.8 Passengers and ships 215
5.9 Summary of resources introduced 225
5.10 Summary 237

6. Modality and intensionality without possible worlds 238

6.1 Introduction 238
6.2 Possible worlds, modality, and intensionality 238
6.3 Modal type systems 241
6.4 Modality without possible worlds 244
6.5 Intensionality without possible worlds 254
6.6 Summary of resources introduced 282
6.7 Summary 295

7. Witness-based quantification 296

7.1 Introduction 296
7.2 Quantifiers and their witness sets 296
7.3 Relating witness sets to probabilities 306
7.4 Witness conditions for quantificational ptypes 310
7.5 Long distance dependencies 321
7.6 Summary of resources introduced 331
7.7 Summary 349

8. Type-based underspecification 350

8.1 Introduction 350
8.2 Quantifier scope and underspecification 351
8.3 Anaphora 357
8.4 Summary of resources introduced 375
8.5 Summary 393

Conclusion 394

Appendix: TTR 398

A1 Underlying set theory 398
A2 Basic types 400
 CONTENTS ix

A3 Complex types 400

A4 Function types 401
A5 Set types 403
A6 Singleton types 403
A7 Join types 404
A8 Meet types 404
A9 Models and modal systems of types 405
A10 The type Type and stratification 406
A11 Records and Record types 407
A12 List types 416
A13 Strings and regular types 416

References 419
Symbols and notations used 431
Named types 432
Name index 434
Subject index 437
 General preface

Oxford Studies in Semantics and Pragmatics publishes original research on meaning in

natural language within contemporary semantics and pragmatics. Authors present their
work in the context of past and present lines of inquiry and in a manner accessible to both
to scholars whose core areas of expertise are in linguistic semantics and pragmatics, and to
researchers in related and allied fields such as syntax, lexicology, philosophy, and cognitive
science. The series emphasizes rigorous theoretical analysis grounded in detailed empirical
investigation of particular languages.
This is a companion series to Oxford Surveys in Semantics and Pragmatics. The Surveys
series provides critical overviews of the major approaches to core semantic and pragmatic
phenomena, a discussion of their relative value, and an assessment of the degree of con-
sensus that exists about any one of them. The Studies series equally seeks to put empirical
complexity and theoretical debate into comprehensible perspective, but with a narrower
focus and correspondingly greater depth. In both series, authors develop and defend the
approach and line of argument which they find most convincing and productive.
In this volume, Robin Cooper makes the case for a theory of natural language meaning
that is grounded in a comprehensive theory of perception and action, rather than a theory
of belief and description, as is standardly assumed. The book begins by laying out a the-
ory of types related to perception and action, and then extends this model to a theory of
grammar that prioritizes language’s role in dialogue. It then turns to a close examination of
several empirical phenomena, showing how the perception-and-action-based framework
provides new insights on questions about reference, quantification, modality, and seman-
tic indeterminacy that have resisted fully satisfactory analyses. This carefully crafted and
ambitious work will be of interest to scholars across the subdomains of cognitive science.
Chris Barker
New York University
Christopher Kennedy
University of Chicago
 Acknowledgements

I am grateful to many people for discussion of the matters discussed in this book, some
of which has led to significant changes in the material. Among them are: Nicholas Asher,
Ellen Breitholtz, Stergios Chatzikyriakidis, Liz Coppock, Simon Dobnik, Elisabet Engdahl,
Raquel Fernández, Tim Fernando, Jonathan Ginzburg, Eleni Gregoromichelaki, Christine
Howes, Ruth Kempson, Torbjörn Lager, Shalom Lappin, Staffan Larsson, Andy Lücking,
Zhaohui Luo, Bill Noble, Bengt Nordström, Aarne Ranta, Hannes Rieser, Asad Sayeed,
and Kwong-Cheong Wong. Two anonymous referees for Oxford University Press provided
detailed insightful and helpful comments which have led to several important improve-
ments in the final version of the book. None of these people is responsible for what I have
done with their ideas and suggestions.
Andy Lücking provided some beautiful artistic tikz code.
I am also extremely grateful to the linguistics team at OUP, in particular Julia Steer and
Vicki Sunter, for patiently guiding me through the steps of making the manuscript into a
published book.
This research was supported in part by the following projects: Records, types and
computational dialogue semantics, Vetenskapsrådet, 2002-4879, Library-based grammar
engineering, Vetenskapsrådet, 2005-4211, Semantic analysis of interaction and coordina-
tion in dialogue (SAICD), Vetenskapsrådet, 2009-1569, Incremental Reasoning in Dia-
logue (IncReD), Vetenskapsrådet project 2016-01162, Dialogical Reasoning in Patients
with Schizophrenia (DRiPS), Riksbankens Jubileumsfond project P16-0805:1, and Veten-
skapsrådet project 2014-39 for the establishment of the Centre for Linguistic Theory and
Studies in Probability (CLASP) at the University of Gothenburg.
Many of the ideas concerning situation semantics and situation theory which are used in
this book come from collaboration and discussion with Jon Barwise. I would have loved to
be able to discuss this book with him but he was taken from us before it was even conceived.
Let it be a small offering to his memory.
 How to read this book

This book is addressed to different audiences. The main ideas of the book can be followed
without delving into all the technical details and I would encourage even readers who have
technical interests to go for the intuitive ideas first and then fill in the technical details of
their realization. Technical developments that might be skipped on first reading are pre-
sented in boxes. The main technical development of the theory of types in these boxed
areas is collected again in the Appendix and some technically interested people may want
to start there and follow the leads back into the body of the book for examples and moti-
vation. In addition, at the end of each chapter there is a summary of what has been added
or changed to the treatment of linguistic phenomena since the previous chapter so that
the development can be followed chapter by chapter. These summaries use (but do not
include) the theory of types presented in the Appendix.
While the book can be read as the development of an argument from beginning to end it
is not necessary to read it that way. Part I of the book gives a basic introduction to the kind of
theory of types that I propose and how I want to use it to analyse action and communication
from a dialogic point of view. Part II takes up a number of central issues in traditional
formal semantics and readers may want to select among these chapters according to their
interests. Where the later chapters rely on things introduced in earlier chapters this is clearly
marked and will lead the reader back to the appropriate place in the book.
When referring to theoretical objects in the text we use single quotation marks, e.g. the
label ‘e’, if the representation of the object does not involve mathematical or logical symbols.
Otherwise double quotation marks are used in the text for items such as informal descrip-
tions of objects introduced in the theory, translations, and quotations. Double quotation
marks are also used in formulae and occasionally in the text to represent informally types of
strings of phonological events, e.g. “Dudamel is a conductor”. Linguistic examples referred
to in the text (as opposed to the numbered examples) are italicized, e.g. Dudamel is a con-
ductor. Names of types, such as Ind, for “individual”, are italicized and begin with a capital
letter.
Material related to this book is available on https://sites.google.com/view/robincooper/
publications/ttrbook.
 Introduction

As we interact with the world and with each other we need to classify objects and situa-
tions; that is, we need to make judgements about what types of objects and situations we
are confronted with. This is an important part of what is involved in planning the future
actions we should carry out and how we should coordinate with other agents in carry-
ing out collaborative actions. This is true of action in general, including linguistic action.
This classification needs to be multimodal in that we need to classify what we experience
through different senses and be able to combine the information in order to come to a
judgement. The aim of this book is to characterize a notion of type which will cover both
linguistic and non-linguistic action and to lay the foundations for a theory of action based
on these types. We will argue that a theory of language based on action allows us to take a
perspective on linguistic content which is centred on interaction in dialogue and that this is
importantly different to the traditional view of natural languages as being essentially simi-
lar to formal languages such as logics developed by philosophers or mathematicians. At the
same time we will argue that the tremendous technical advances made by the formal lan-
guage view of semantics can be incorporated into the action-based view and that this can
lead to important improvements both of intuitive understanding and empirical coverage.
In this enterprise we use types rather than possible worlds as commonly employed in stud-
ies of the semantics of natural language. Types are more tractable than possible worlds and
give us more hope of understanding the implementation of semantics both on machines
and in biological brains.
Part I of the book (Chapters 1–3) deals with a theory of types related to perception and
action and shows a way of presenting a theory of grammar within a theory of action. Part II
(Chapters 4–8) then looks at a number of central issues in semantics from a dialogical
point of view and argues that there are advantages to looking at some old puzzles from this
perspective.
In Chapter 1 we introduce a notion of perception of an object or situation as making a
judgement that it is of a type. In symbols, we write a : T to indicate that a is of type T. We
shall talk interchangeably of something being of a type or being a witness for a type. Our
claim is that perceiving something involves classifying it as being of a type, even if that type
is very general (like PhysicalObject or Event)—we cannot perceive it simpliciter. Following
Kant we cannot perceive das Ding an sich (“the thing itself ”) but only in terms of a type that
we assign to it. We present basic notions of the theory of types which will be developed in
the book, TTR, a theory of types with records, which builds to a great extent on ideas taken
from the type theory of Per Martin-Löf although we have made significant changes both
in the general design and aims of the theory and a number of details which appear to us
to be motivated by cognitive and linguistic considerations. The overall approach presented
here owes much to the theory of situations and situation semantics presented by Barwise
and Perry in the 1980s. One of the themes of this book is a working out of parts of the old
situation theory using ideas taken from Martin-Löf ’s type theory.

From Perception to Communication. Robin Cooper, Oxford University Press.

© Robin Cooper (2023). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192871312.003.0001
2 INTRODUCTION

A central notion in TTR is that of record. The term “record” is used in computer science
for what is often called an attribute-value matrix (AVM) or feature structure in linguistics.
A record is a collection of fields consisting of a label (attribute or feature in the standard
linguistic way of talking) and an object of some kind (which itself can be a record). A
schematic example of a record is given in (1), where the ℓi are labels and the oi are objects
(including situations).

⎡ ℓ = o0 ⎤
⎢ ℓ0 = [ 1 ] ⎥
(1) ℓ2 = o1
⎢ ⎥
⎣ ℓ3 = o2 ⎦
Records are witnesses for record types which are also collections of fields. Rather than
objects, the fields in a record type contain types. In the schematic example in (2) the Ti are
types.

⎡ ℓ1 : T 0 ⎤
(2) ⎢ ℓ0 : [ ℓ2 : T 1 ] ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎣ ℓ3 : T 2 ⎦
The record (1) will be of the type (2) just in case the objects are of the types with the same
labelling, that is, o0 : T0 , o1 : T1 and o2 : T2 . Martin-Löf ’s orginal type theory did not
have records or record types though there have been many suggestions in the literature on
how to add them. We have borrowed freely from some of these ideas in TTR although the
way we have developed the notions differs essentially from previous proposals. We will use
records and record types to model situations and situation types in a sense related to that
of situation semantics as developed by Barwise and Perry. The records and record types
are also related to discourse representation structures as introduced by Kamp.
In Chapter 2 we introduce some basic notions of a theory of action based on these types
which will be developed further as the book progresses and apply the theory of types from
Chapter 1 to basic notions of information update in dialogue. Here we build on seminal
work on dialogue analysis by Jonathan Ginzburg and also related computational imple-
mentation by Staffan Larsson leading to the information state update approach to dialogue
systems. We have adapted these ideas in a way that allows us to pursue the questions of
grammar and semantics that we take up in the remainder of the book. A central notion
here is that of the dialogue gameboard which we construe as a type of information state
representing the current state of play in the dialogue from the perspective of a dialogue
participant. It includes the dialogue participant’s view of what has been committed to as
being true in the dialogue so far and what questions are currently under discussion.
In Chapter 3 we show how syntax and semantics can be embedded in the theory of action
characterized in Chapters 1 and 2. Grammatical rules are regarded in terms of affordances
which license us to draw conclusions about the types to be associated with speech events
on the basis of speech events previously perceived. This is in contrast to a formal language
view where language is seen as a set of analysed strings of symbols associated with mean-
ings of some kind. The philosophical ground of the action-based approach goes back to
the relational theory of meaning introduced in Barwise and Perry’s situation semantics
which focusses on the relation between utterance situations and described situations. This
was perhaps the first attempt to generalize the Speech Act Theory developed by Austin and
 INTRODUCTION 3

Searle to the concerns of compositional interpretation of syntactic structure. It also enables

us to develop a formal approach to dialogical theories of language such as those developed
by the psychologist Herb Clark and the linguist Per Linell. A recent theory to which the
ideas in this chapter are related is that of Dynamic Syntax (DS). While the particular for-
mulations in our approach look rather different from those in DS, the two theories have
common aims relating to the analysis of language as action and an emphasis on the incre-
mental nature of language which in this chapter we relate to the building of a chart type.
There is also a common interest in the treatment of language as a system in flux where
an act of speaking can create a new previously unavailable linguistic resource that can be
reused in future speech events.
Thinking of grammar in terms of a theory of action leads us into an approach to syn-
tax and semantics which emphasizes how we reason about speech events and their types.
This relates to several strands in linguistic analysis which emphasize the inferential nature
of syntactic and semantic processing including Pereira and Warren’s parsing as deduc-
tion, various kinds of categorial grammar including Morrill’s Type Logical Grammar and
glue semantics as used in Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) by Dalrymple and others.
Of particular importance is Aarne Ranta’s work on Type-Theoretical Grammar and the
Grammatical Framework. The use of records and record types and their similarity to typed
feature structures makes the notion of grammar here closely related to that of Head Driven
Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG).
The theory of types that we employ gives us two notions which will be important in
the development of semantics in Part II. The first is the notion of intensionality. Types in
TTR are intensional in that the identity of a type is not established in terms of the set of
witnesses of that type. That is, types are not extensional in the way that sets are in a standard
set theory. The axiom of extensionality in standard set theory requires that there cannot
be two sets which have the same members. In contrast, there can be different types which
have exactly the same set of witnesses. The second notion has to do with the facts that the
types themselves are treated as objects that can enter into relations and be used to construct
new types. We will call this first class citizenship of types, though it is related to notions of
intentionality (with a “t”) and reflection in programming languages, that is, the ability not
only to carry out procedures but to reflect on and reason about them. In our terms, an
important enabling factor for human language is that we not only can perceive objects and
situations in terms of types and act on these perceptions but that we can also reason about
and act on the types themselves, for example, in ascribing them to other agents as beliefs
or making a plan to achieve a goal by creating an event of a certain type. The types become
cognitive resources which we can exploit in our communicative activity. In Part II we will
look at a number of examples of this.
In Chapter 4 we examine reference by uses of proper names and occurrences of pro-
nouns which are not bound by quantifiers. In order to account for this we need a notion of
parametric content, which is to say that the content of an utterance depends on a context
belonging to a certain type. For example, an utterance of the proper name Sam requires a
context in which there is an individual named “Sam”. But where in her resources should a
dialogue participant look for such a context? One obvious place is the conversational game-
board that we introduced in Chapter 2. That is, the dialogue participant should determine
whether there has been reference to somebody of that name already in the current dia-
logue according to her gameboard. Another place is the visual scene, or more generally
4 INTRODUCTION

the ambient situation which the agent can perceive by different sense modalities. This we
also represent as a resource using a type—that is, the type for which the ambient situation
would be a witness if the agent’s perception is correct. Yet another place to look is the agent’s
long-term memory (which we will equate with the agent’s beliefs, although one may ulti-
mately wish to make a distinction). This resource is also modelled as a type representing
how the world would be if the agent’s memory or beliefs are correct. (The structured nature
of record types means that they can be used in effect as large repositories of information
indexed by the paths provided by the labels in the record type.) The fact that we are reason-
ing about the extent to which the context type associated with the utterance matches the
types modelling the agent’s relevant resources enables us to talk about cases where there
are names of non-existent objects (that is, the agent’s resource types do not exactly match
the world) or where a single object in the world corresponds to two objects in the resources
or vice versa (another way in which there can be a mismatch between reality and an agent’s
resources). The proposal to represent different aspects of mental states in terms of record
types is closely related to (and inspired by) similar proposals for representing mental states
using discourse representation structures.
In Chapter 5 we look at frames associated with common nouns. (The restriction to com-
mon nouns here has to do with the examples that will be discussed and is not a claim
that only common nouns are associated with the kinds of frames we propose.) The idea
of frames goes back to early work on frame semantics by Fillmore and also psychological
work on frames by Barsalou. We will construe frames as situations (modelled as records in
TTR). We will argue that frame types are an additional kind of resource which is exploited
in natural language semantics. A common noun like dog, in addition to being associated
with the property of being a dog (that is, a simple property characterized in terms of the
single predicate ‘dog’), can also be associated with a type of situation (a frame type) which
is common for dogs, for example, where the dog has a name, an age and various other
attributes we commonly attribute to dogs. We will argue that such a frame can play an
important role in interpreting utterances such as the dog is nine in the sense of “the dog is
nine years old”. Some nouns, such as temperature, seem to represent frame level predicates,
following an analysis suggested by Sebastian Löbner in order to account for the analysis
of utterances like the temperature is rising where it is not the case that some particular
temperature is rising (say, 30°) but that different situations (frames) with different temper-
atures are being compared. Nouns which normally predicate of individuals can be coerced
to predicate of frames. An example is the noun ship in an example originally discussed
by Manfred Krifka: four thousand ships passed through the lock which can either mean
that four thousand distinct ships passed through the lock or that there were four thousand
ship-passing-through-the-lock events some of which may have involved the same ship. We
argue that in order to interpret such examples you need to have as a resource an appropriate
frame type associated with the noun ship.
In Chapter 6 we explore phenomena in natural language which are standardly referred to
as modal and intensional. We argue that types as we conceive them are better placed to deal
with these phenomena than the possible worlds that are used in standard formal seman-
tics. In standard formal semantics propositions are regarded as sets of possible worlds.
For example, the proposition corresponding to a boy hugged a dog is the set of all logi-
cally possible worlds in which a boy hugged a dog is true. What we substitute for this is
the type of situations in which a boy hugged a dog. At an intuitive level these notions are
 INTRODUCTION 5

quite similar. They both represent mathematical objects which allow for many different
possibilities as long as the fact that a boy hugged a dog is held constant across them. One
important difference is that sets of possible worlds are extensional sets whereas our types
are intensional. Thus it is possible for us to have two distinct types which have exactly the
same witnesses. One pair of such examples we discuss is Kim sold Syntactic Structures to
Sam and Sam bought Syntactic Structures from Kim. Intuitively we want these to represent
different propositions and we argue that they can yield different truth conditions when
embedded under a predicate like legal. (Under Swedish law, for example, it is illegal to buy
sex but legal to sell sex.) Another pair involves so-called mathematical propositions which
are true in all possible worlds but which nevertheless we would want to represent differ-
ent propositions: Two plus two equals four and Fermat’s last theorem is true (as proved by
Andrew Wiles).
The chapter begins with a discussion of the problems associated with possible worlds
analyses. We then continue with a discussion of modality and in particular of how Angelika
Kratzer’s notions of conversational background and ideals can be seen as resources based
on types and the kind of topoi that Ellen Breitholtz has introduced in the TTR literature.
In the third part of the chapter we discuss what are traditionally regarded as intensional
constructions involving attitude verbs like believe and intensional verbs like need and want.
We treat ‘believe’ as a relation between individuals and types (corresponding to the content
of the embedded sentence). For an individual to believe a type it has to be the case that the
type matches (in a way we make precise) the type which models the beliefs (or long-term
memory) of the individual, that is the same resource that was needed in Chapter 4 to get
the dialogical analysis of proper names to work out.
In Chapter 7 we look at generalized quantifiers from the perspective of dialogic inter-
action. Traditionally generalized quantifiers are treated as sets of sets or sets of properties
and the work of Barwise and Cooper on generalized quantifiers built on this idea. Bar-
wise and Cooper also introduced the auxiliary notion of witness set for quantifiers under
the heading “Processing quantified statements”. In this chapter we turn things around and
make the characterization of witness sets the primary notion in defining quantifiers. This
makes it more straightforward to account for the anaphoric possibilities relating to quanti-
fied expressions in dialogue. We often use quantified statements in dialogue when we have
inadequate information to determine their truth. This is particularly true of determiners
like every and most when talking about large sets. We suggest that this phenomenon can
be analysed by estimating a probability based on the evidence presented in our cognitive
resources (long-term memory or beliefs as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6).
In Chapter 8 we give an account of how TTR types can be used to talk of content which
is underspecified. The idea is to exploit the notion of types which can have several wit-
nesses as “underspecifications” of those witnesses. Rather than associating contents with
utterances as we have done in the earlier chapters, we associate types of contents with utter-
ances. Thus a dialogue participant when observing a speech event associates it with a type
of content rather than a particular content. We show how earlier ideas about the treatment
of underspecification of quantifier scope and anaphora can be accommodated in this view.
 PART I
FR OM PER CEP TION A N D ACTION
TO GR A MM A R

Part I presents a theory of types related to perception and action and shows a way of
presenting a theory of grammar within a theory of action.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Among the earliest particulars which Robert gave, was the fact that
he was not alone in his confinement. Various others, all in antique
garb, were in there with him—a corpulent middle-aged gentleman
with tied queue and velvet knee-breeches who spoke English fluently
though with a marked Scandinavian accent; a rather beautiful small
girl with very blonde hair which appeared as glossy dark blue; two
apparently mute Negroes whose features contrasted grotesquely
with the pallor of their reversed-colored skins; three young men; one
young woman; a very small child, almost an infant; and a lean,
elderly Dane of extremely distinctive aspect and a kind of half-malign
intellectuality of countenance.
This last named individual—Axel Holm, who wore the satin small-
clothes, flared-skirted coat, and voluminous full-bottomed periwig of
an age more than two centuries in the past—was notable among the
little band as being the one responsible for the presence of them all.
He it was who, skilled equally in the arts of magic and glass working,
had long ago fashioned this strange dimensional prison in which
himself, his slaves, and those whom he chose to invite or allure
thither were immured unchangingly for as long as the mirror might
endure.

Holm was born early in the seventeenth century, and had followed
with tremendous competence and success the trade of a glass-
blower and molder in Copenhagen. His glass, especially in the form
of large drawing-room mirrors, was always at a premium. But the
same bold mind which had made him the first glazier of Europe also
served to carry his interests and ambitions far beyond the sphere of
mere material craftsmanship. He had studied the world around him,
and chafed at the limitations of human knowledge and capability.
Eventually he sought for dark ways to overcome those limitations,
and gained more success than is good for any mortal.
He had aspired to enjoy something like eternity, the mirror being his
provision to secure this end. Serious study of the fourth dimension
was far from beginning with Einstein in our own era; and Holm, more
than erudite in all the methods of his day, knew that a bodily
entrance into that hidden phase of space would prevent him from
dying in the ordinary physical sense. Research showed him that the
principle of reflection undoubtedly forms the chief gate to all
dimensions beyond our familiar three; and chance placed in his
hands a small and very ancient glass whose cryptic properties he
believed he could turn to advantage. Once "inside" this mirror
according to the method he had envisaged, he felt that "life" in the
sense of form and consciousness would go on virtually forever,
provided the mirror could be preserved indefinitely from breakage or
deterioration.
Holm made a magnificent mirror, such as would be prized and
carefully preserved; and in it deftly fused the strange whorl-
configured relic he had acquired. Having thus prepared his refuge
and his trap, he began to plan this mode of entrance and conditions
of tenancy. He would have with him both servitors and companions;
and as an experimental beginning he sent before him into the glass
two dependable Negro slaves brought from the West Indies. What
his sensations must have been upon beholding this first concrete
demonstration of his theories, only imagination can conceive.
Undoubtedly a man of his knowledge realized that absence from the
outside world if deferred beyond the natural span of life of those
within, must mean instant dissolution at the first attempt to return to
that world. But, barring that misfortune or accidental breakage, those
within would remain forever as they were at the time of entrance.
They would never grow old, and would need neither food nor drink.

To make his prison tolerable he sent ahead of him certain books and
writing materials, a chair and table of stoutest workmanship, and a
few other accessories. He knew that the images which the glass
would reflect or absorb would not be tangible, but would merely
extend around him like a background of dream. His own transition in
1687 was a momentous experience; and must have been attended
by mixed sensations of triumph and terror. Had anything gone
wrong, there were frightful possibilities of being lost in dark and
inconceivable multiple dimensions.
For over fifty years he had been unable to secure any additions to
the little company of himself and slaves, but later on he had
perfected his telepathic method of visualizing small sections of the
outside world close to the glass, and attracting certain individuals in
those areas through the mirror's strange entrance. Thus Robert,
influenced into a desire to press upon the "door," had been lured
within. Such visualizations depended wholly on telepathy, since no
one inside the mirror could see out into the world of men.
It was, in truth, a strange life that Holm and his company had lived
inside the glass. Since the mirror had stood for fully a century with its
face to the dusty stone wall of the shed where I found it, Robert was
the first being to enter this limbo after all that interval. His arrival was
a gala event, for he brought news of the outside world which must
have been of the most startling impressiveness to the more
thoughtful of those within. He, in his turn—young though he was—
felt overwhelmingly the weirdness of meeting and talking with
persons who had been alive in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.

The deadly monotony of life for the prisoners can only be vaguely
conjectured. As mentioned, its extensive spatial variety was limited
to localities which had been reflected in the mirror for long periods;
and many of these had become dim and strange as tropical climates
had made inroads on the surface. Certain localities were bright and
beautiful, and in these the company usually gathered. But no scene
could be fully satisfying; since the visible objects were all unreal and
intangible, and often of perplexingly indefinite outline. When the
tedious periods of darkness came, the general custom was to
indulge in memories, reflections, or conversations. Each one of that
strange, pathetic group had retained his or her personality
unchanged and unchangeable, since becoming immune to the time
effects of outside space.
The number of inanimate objects within the glass, aside from the
clothing of the prisoners, was very small; being largely limited to the
accessories Holm had provided for himself. The rest did without
even furniture, since sleep and fatigue had vanished along with most
other vital attributes. Such inorganic things as were present, seemed
as exempt from decay as the living beings. The lower forms of
animal life were wholly absent.
Robert derived most of his information from Herr Thiele, the
gentleman who spoke English with a Scandinavian accent. This
portly Dane had taken a fancy to him, and talked at considerable
length. The others, too, had received him with courtesy and good-
will; Holm himself, seeming well-disposed, had told him about
various matters including the door of the trap.
The boy, as he told me later, was sensible enough never to attempt
communication with me when Holm was nearby. Twice, while thus
engaged, he had seen Holm appear; and had accordingly ceased at
once. At no time could I see the world behind the mirror's surface.
Robert's visual image, which included his bodily form and the
clothing connected with it, was—like the aural image of his halting
voice and like his own visualization of myself—a case of purely
telepathic transmission; and did not involve true inter-dimensional
sight. However, had Robert been as trained a telepathist as Holm, he
might have transmitted a few strong images apart from his
immediate person.

Throughout this period of revelation I had, of course, been

desperately trying to devise a method for Robert's release. On the
fourth day—the ninth after the disappearance—I hit on a solution.
Everything considered, my laboriously formulated process was not a
very complicated one; though I could not tell beforehand how it
would work, while the possibility of ruinous consequences in case of
a slip was appalling. This process depended, basically, on the fact
that there was no possible exit from inside the glass. If Holm and his
prisoners were permanently sealed in, then release must come
wholly from outside. Other considerations included the disposal of
the other prisoners, if any survived, and especially of Axel Holm.
What Robert had told me of him was anything but reassuring; and I
certainly did not wish him loose in my apartment, free once more to
work his evil will upon the world. The telepathic messages had not
made fully clear the effect of liberation on those who had entered the
glass so long ago.
There was, too, a final though minor problem in case of success—
that of getting Robert back into the routine of school life without
having to explain the incredible. In case of failure, it was highly
inadvisable to have witnesses present at the release operations—
and lacking these, I simply could not attempt to relate the actual
facts if I should succeed. Even to me the reality seemed a mad one
whenever I let my mind turn from the data so compellingly presented
in that tense series of dreams.
When I had thought these problems through as far as possible, I
procured a large magnifying-glass from the school laboratory and
studied minutely every square millimeter of that whorl-center which
presumably marked the extent of the original ancient mirror used by
Holm. Even with this aid I could not quite trace the exact boundary
between the old area and the surface added by the Danish wizard;
but after a long study decided on a conjectural oval boundary which I
outlined very precisely with a soft blue pencil, I then made a trip to
Stamford, where I procured a heavy glass-cutting tool; for my
primary idea was to remove the ancient and magically potent mirror
from its later setting.

My next step was to figure out the best time of day to make the
crucial experiment. I finally settled on two-thirty A.M.—both because
it was a good season for uninterrupted work, and because it was the
"opposite" of two-thirty P.M., the probable moment at which Robert
had entered the mirror. This form of "oppositeness" may or may not
have been relevant, but I knew at least that the chosen hour was as
good as any—and perhaps better than most.
I finally set to work in the early morning of the eleventh day after the
disappearance, having drawn all the shades of my living-room and
closed and locked the door into the hallway. Following with
breathless care the elliptical line I had traced, I worked around the
whorl-section with my steel-wheeled cutting tool. The ancient glass,
half an inch thick, crackled crisply under the firm, uniform pressure;
and upon completing the circuit I cut around it a second time,
crunching the roller more deeply into the glass.
Then, very carefully indeed, I lifted the heavy mirror down from its
console and leaned it face-inward against the wall; prying off two of
the thin, narrow boards nailed to the back. With equal caution I
smartly tapped the cut-around space with the heavy wooden handle
of the glass-cutter.
At the very first tap the whorl-containing section of glass dropped out
on the Bokhara rug beneath. I did not know what might happen, but
was keyed up for anything, and took a deep involuntary breath. I was
on my knees for convenience at the moment, with my face quite near
the newly made aperture; and as I breathed there poured into my
nostrils a powerful dusty odor—a smell not comparable to any other I
have ever encountered. Then everything within my range of vision
suddenly turned to a dull gray before my failing eye-sight as I felt
myself overpowered by an invisible force which robbed my muscles
of their power to function.
I remember grasping weakly and futilely at the edge of the nearest
window drapery and feeling it rip loose from its fastening. Then I
sank slowly to the floor as the darkness of oblivion passed over me.

When I regained consciousness I was lying on the Bokhara rug with

my legs held unaccountably up in the air. The room was full of that
hideous and inexplicable dusty smell—and as my eyes began to
take in definite images I saw that Robert Grandison stood in front of
me. It was he—fully in the flesh and with his coloring normal—who
was holding my legs aloft to bring the blood back to my head as the
school's first-aid course had taught him to do with persons who had
fainted. For a moment I was struck mute by the stifling odor and by a
bewilderment which quickly merged into a sense of triumph. Then I
found myself able to move and speak collectedly.
I raised a tentative hand and waved feebly at Robert.
"All right, old man," I murmured, "you can let my legs down now.
Many thanks. I'm all right again, I think. It was the smell—I imagine—
that got me. Open that farthest window, please—wide—from the
bottom. That's it—thanks. No—leave the shade down the way it
was."
I struggled to my feet, my disturbed circulation adjusting itself in
waves, and stood upright hanging to the back of a big chair. I was
still "groggy," but a blast of fresh, bitterly cold air from the window
revived me rapidly. I sat down in the big chair and looked at Robert,
now walking toward me.
"First," I said hurriedly, "tell me, Robert—those others—Holm? What
happened to them, when I—opened the exit?"
Robert paused half-way across the room and looked at me very
gravely.
"I saw them fade away—into nothingness—Mr. Canevin," he said
with solemnity; "and with them—everything. There isn't any more
'inside,' sir—thank God, and you, sir!"
And young Robert, at last yielding to the sustained strain which he
had borne through all those terrible eleven days, suddenly broke
down like a little child and began to weep hysterically in great,
stifling, dry sobs.

I picked him up and placed him gently on my davenport, threw a rug

over him, sat down by his side, and put a calming hand on his
forehead.
"Take it easy, old fellow," I said soothingly.
The boy's sudden and very natural hysteria passed as quickly as it
had come on as I talked to him reassuringly about my plans for his
quiet restoration to the school. The interest of the situation and the
need of concealing the incredible truth beneath a rational
explanation took hold of his imagination as I had expected; and at
last he sat up eagerly, telling the details of his release and listening
to the instructions I had thought out. He had, it seems, been in the
"projected area" of my bedroom when I opened the way back, and
had emerged in that actual room—hardly realizing that he was "out."
Upon hearing a fall in the living-room he had hastened thither, finding
me on the rug in my fainting spell.
I need mention only briefly my method of restoring Robert in a
seemingly normal way—how I smuggled him out of the window in an
old hat and sweater of mine, took him down the road in my quietly
started car, coached him carefully in a tale I had devised, and
returned to arouse Browne with the news of his discovery. He had, I
explained, been walking alone on the afternoon of his
disappearance; and had been offered a motor ride by two young
men who, as a joke and over his protests that he could go no farther
than Stamford and back, had begun to carry him past that town.
Jumping from the car during a traffic stop with the intention of hitch-
hiking back before Call-Over, he had been hit by another car just as
the traffic was released—awakening ten days later in the Greenwich
home of the people who had hit him. On learning the date, I added,
he had immediately telephoned the school; and I, being the only one
awake, had answered the call and hurried after him in my car without
stopping to notify anyone.

Browne, who at once telephoned to Robert's parents, accepted my

story without question; and forbore to interrogate the boy because of
the latter's manifest exhaustion. It was arranged that he should
remain at the school for a rest, under the expert care of Mrs.
Browne, a former trained nurse. I naturally saw a good deal of him
during the remainder of the Christmas vacation, and was thus
enabled to fill in certain gaps in his fragmentary dream-story.
Now and then we would almost doubt the actuality of what had
occurred; wondering whether we had not both shared some
monstrous delusion born of the mirror's glittering hypnotism, and
whether the tale of the ride and accident were not after all the real
truth. But whenever we did so we would be brought back to belief by
some monstrous and haunting memory; with me, of Robert's dream-
figure and its thick voice and inverted colors; with him, of the whole
fantastic pageantry of ancient people and dead scenes that he had
witnessed. And then there was the joint recollection of that damnable
dusty odor.... We knew what it meant: the instant dissolution of those
who had entered an alien dimension a century and more ago.
There are, in addition, at least two lines of rather more positive
evidence; one of which comes through my researches in Danish
annals concerning the sorcerer, Axel Holm. Such a person, indeed,
left many traces in folklore and written records; and diligent library
sessions, plus conferences with various learned Danes, have shed
much light on his evil fame. At present I need say only that the
Copenhagen glass-blower—born in 1612—was a notorious
Luciferian whose pursuits and final vanishing formed a matter of
awed debate over two centuries ago. He had burned with a desire to
know all things and to conquer every limitation of mankind—to which
end he had delved deeply into occult and forbidden fields ever since
he was a child.
He was commonly held to have joined a coven of the dreaded
witchcult, and the vast lore of ancient Scandinavian myth—with its
Loki the Sly One and the accursed Fenris-Wolf—was soon an open
book to him. He had strange interests and objectives, few of which
were definitely known, but some of which were recognized as
intolerably evil. It is recorded that his two Negro helpers, originally
slaves from the Danish West Indies, had become mute soon after
their acquisition by him; and that they had disappeared not long
before his own disappearance from the ken of mankind.
Near the close of an already long life the idea of a glass of
immortality appears to have entered his mind. That he had acquired
an enchanted mirror of inconceivable antiquity was a matter of
common whispering; it being alleged that he had purloined it from a
fellow-sorcerer who had entrusted it to him for polishing.
This mirror—according to popular tales a trophy as potent in its way
as the better-known Aegis of Minerva or Hammer of Thor—was a
small oval object called "Loki's Glass," made of some polished
fusible mineral and having magical properties which included the
divination of the immediate future and the power to show the
possessor his enemies. That it had deeper potential properties,
realizable in the hands of an erudite magician, none of the common
people doubted; and even educated persons attached much fearful
importance to Holm's rumored attempts to incorporate it in a larger
glass of immortality. Then had come the wizard's disappearance in
1687, and the final sale and dispersal of his goods amidst a growing
cloud of fantastic legendry. It was, altogether, just such a story as
one would laugh at if possessed of no particular key; yet to me,
remembering those dream messages and having Robert
Grandison's corroboration before me, it formed a positive
confirmation of all the bewildering marvels that had been unfolded.
But as I have said, there is still another line of rather positive
evidence—of a very different character—at my disposal. Two days
after his release, as Robert, greatly improved in strength and
appearance, was placing a log on my living-room fire, I noticed a
certain awkwardness in his motions and was struck by a persistent
idea. Summoning him to my desk I suddenly asked him to pick up an
ink-stand—and was scarcely surprised to note that, despite lifelong
right-handedness, he obeyed unconsciously with his left hand.
Without alarming him, I then asked that he unbutton his coat and let
me listen to his cardiac action. What I found upon placing my ear to
his chest—and what I did not tell him for some time afterward—was
that his heart was beating on his right side.
He had gone into the glass right-handed and with all organs in their
normal positions. Now he was left-handed and with organs reversed,
and would doubtless continue so for the rest of his life. Clearly, the
dimensional transition had been no illusion—for this physical change
was tangible and unmistakable. Had there been a natural exit from
the glass, Robert would probably have undergone a thorough re-
reversal and emerged in perfect normality—as indeed the color-
scheme of his body and clothing did emerge. The forcible nature of
his release, however, undoubtedly set something awry; so that
dimensions no longer had a chance to right themselves as chromatic
wave-frequencies still did.
I had not merely opened Holm's trap; I had destroyed it; and at the
particular stage of destruction marked by Robert's escape some of
the reversing properties had perished. It is significant that in
escaping Robert had felt no pain comparable to that experienced in
entering. Had the destruction been still more sudden, I shiver to think
of the monstrosities of color the boy would always have been forced
to bear. I may add that after discovering Robert's reversal I
examined the rumpled and discarded clothing he had worn in the
glass, and found, as I had expected, a complete reversal of pockets,
buttons, and all other corresponding details.
At this moment Loki's Glass, just as it fell on my Bokhara rug from
the now patched and harmless mirror, weighs down a sheaf of
papers on my writing-table here in St. Thomas, venerable capital of
the Danish West Indies—now the American Virgin Islands. Various
collectors of old Sandwich glass have mistaken it for an odd bit of
that early American product—but I privately realize that my paper-
weight is an antique of far subtler and more paleologean
craftsmanship. Still, I do not disillusion such enthusiasts.
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