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The Germ of Justice
The Germ of Justice
Essays in General Jurisprudence
L E SL I E G R E E N
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
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Library of Congress Control Number: 2023935120
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To Denise Réaume
Preface
DeRoche of Mount Sinai Hospital, and of kind friends, I could not have fin-
ished it.
Once again, Denise Réaume got more than she bargained for. She has
made it not only possible but worthwhile for me to keep going.
Leslie Green
Oxford
27 November 2022
Acknowledgements
I . L AW, A S SU C H
I I . L AW A N D M O R A L I T Y
I I I . T H E D E M A N D S O F L AW
1. This Book
2 Introduction: A Philosophy of Legal Philosophy
and sanctions, or meaning and metaphysics, have always failed, and the time
has come to stop doing the same thing over again while expecting a different
result. We must work in a modular way. If we can deepen our understanding
of questions about law in general, ensuring our answers are consistent with
each other and with what we already know, that is enough. At any rate, it has
been my approach.
These pieces do nonetheless belong to a tradition of understanding law
developed and elaborated by Hume, Bentham, Austin, Kelsen, Hart, Raz,
and many contemporaries who hold, as I do, that all law is positive law. Legal
positivism, in this sense, is the idea that the basis of law is entirely social.
All law is the creation, whether intentional or accidental, planned or cha-
otic, of ordinary, dateable, human thought and action. Nothing is law merely
because it would be reasonable, fair, efficient, or even logical for it to be law;
everything that is law is law because it was made in a way that is recognized
as making law. I believe the ‘sources thesis’, as Joseph Raz dubbed it, is part
of any adequate theory of law.1 I do not demonstrate that thesis. (Few inter-
esting ideas in legal philosophy admit of demonstration.) Happily, jurispru-
dence makes progress—in ways I will explain—and I am relieved that others
have done about as much as we can, for now, to make the sources thesis plaus-
ible. If these essays contribute to our confidence in legal positivism, they do
so by clarifying what that approach commits us to, detaching it from certain
common errors, and showing how key problems in legal philosophy have so-
lutions that conform to it.
Chapter 2 comes closest to a résumé of my own view. It begins with Hans
Kelsen’s idea that ‘law is a means, a specific social means, not an end’. It takes
work to unpack that slogan. What is Kelsen denying? No one holds that law
itself could literally be ‘an end’. Whose end? On the other hand, all law that is
deliberately created is made with some end in view, if only to repeal or con-
solidate legislation. I think we can go further. Law is constitutively oriented
to certain ends. We cannot distinguish a system of legal rules from the rules
of a game without attending to who and what the rules aim to regulate, and
why. I return to this issue in Chapter 7 in studying some connections between
law and morality and then single it out for focused attention in Chapter 8,
where I criticize H. L. A. Hart’s claim that the necessary content of law is
fixed by what it takes for a society to survive or for law to enjoy voluntary
compliance. I argue instead that positive law has features that make it apt for
supporting morality, and that is how law must be used by people like us, in
1 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press, 1979) chap. 3.
Other Books 3
our circumstances, with our needs. That is just one of several ‘necessary con-
nections’ between law and morality, in one sense of ‘necessary’.
How do I square the idea that law has constitutive ends with my vote in
favour of Kelsen’s proposal that law is a means? Nothing is a legal system un-
less it aims at regulating violence, but other things also have that aim, and
even have it constitutively. (The World Peace Association, for example.) So
we cannot identify law by reference to its aims, even though there are aims
law must have. We cannot identify law without considering how it goes about
its constitutive aims, and that is the sense in which law is a ‘specific social
means’ and not ‘a [set of] ends’.
Law’s means have a special institutional complexity, however, which
Kelsen oversimplifies. He says law is essentially and entirely a system of co-
ercive norms, an idea shared by legal philosophers from Jeremy Bentham to
Ronald Dworkin. It is also a view that resonates with common-sense ideas
about law. I air doubts about it in various places and bring them together
when considering Frederick Schauer’s claim that law is in fact mostly coercive
and there is no point in debating whether coercion is an ‘essential’ feature of
law or not (Chapter 13). Like some other contemporary legal theorists (in-
cluding those discussed in Chapters 4 and 5), Schauer distrusts ‘conceptual
analysis’ and wants more attention paid to empirical evidence. I think jur-
isprudence is already attentive, for it is the facts that show that law is a site
of coercive force and also that some laws coerce no one. In principle, there
could be legal systems in which all laws were like that. Only the final (‘in
principle’) point depends on something more than coercion-counting. I hold
that it is a necessary feature of legal systems that they can provide for coer-
cion (when necessary) but not that they always do provide it. Law has other
means at its disposal, including the creation of duties and duty-related norms
and the ability to harness extra-legal, social power to its ends. These facts are
perfectly familiar. Then why expend philosophical energy nit-picking about
what is necessary to law, or about the precise differences between coercion,
duty, and power? It promises a deeper understanding of familiar facts about
law. That is the aim of general jurisprudence, and deepening our under-
standing is, I will suggest, one of the marks of progress in the subject.
2. Other Books
Not all law is found in books, and neither is all jurisprudence. But much of it
is, and any approach to jurisprudence involves the study of books. A course
4 Introduction: A Philosophy of Legal Philosophy
I hope that this arrangement may discourage the belief that a book on legal
theory is primarily a book from which one learns what other books contain.
So long as this belief is held by those who write, little progress will be made
in the subject; and so long as it is held by those who read, the educational
value of the subject must remain very small.’4
2 On the supposed relevance of diet to jurisprudence, see Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern
Mind (Tudor, 1936) 137. Frank does not, however, provide the reader with any recipes that might
make for healthier judicial decisions.
3 These are Hart’s discursive notes that appear between 277 and 308 in the third edition (H.
L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz, eds; Leslie Green,
intro, Oxford University Press, 2012)). The scholarly and bibliographic notes between 309 and
325 were written by me with the help of Tom Adams.
4 Hart, The Concept of Law, vii.
Choices 5
3. Choices
Problems in general jurisprudence often begin with, or take us back to, fun-
damental questions about the nature, or ‘definition’, of law. But some scholars
hold that law in general is a thing without a nature (or, perhaps, that it is a
thing whose nature is to have an indeterminate nature). The set of things we
intelligibly call ‘law’ is a purely nominal kind, and no analysis can pin down
all the things to which it applies in a way that we might think of as plausible or
correct. If there is nothing to get right in general jurisprudence, there is also
nothing to get wrong. And if that is so there is no focus for the subject, nor
any serious prospect of making progress in it, or finding value in it.
Ideas like this often turn up in debates about the relations between law and
morality (for example, in the arguments in Chapter 9). Some writers hold
that if no empirical considerations settle such questions, there is nothing else
to go on and we might as well stipulate a ‘definition’ of law to suit some ex-
trinsic purpose: a definition that is uplifting, or profitable, or intellectually
stimulating. In thus ‘choosing a concept of law’ we might, for example, think
of seriously unjust laws as non-laws, or as valid laws that are seriously unjust,
or as marginal or defective law-specimens, or as punishments for original
sin. There is no fact of the matter, empirical or conceptual: the decision falls
within our inalienable freedom to choose concepts.
Theorists of starkly different outlooks have been friendly to such ideas.5
It is not so clear what they have in mind. There is no doubt that vague con-
cepts can be sharpened in various ways or that some socially prevalent con-
cepts, such as race, should not be used and that others, such as gender, should
be reformed. If this is ‘choosing concepts’, then fair enough. But all such
5 Among the philosophers considered here, Brian Leiter and Frederick Schauer propose
choosing a concept of law with an eye to predictive, empirical concerns. Others, including
Ronald Dworkin, John Finnis, Michael Moore, Liam Murphy, and Jeremy Waldron prefer that
we guide conceptual choices by moral or political considerations. See Philip Soper, ‘Choosing a
Legal Theory on Moral Grounds’ (1986) 4 Social Philosophy and Policy 31. (Contrary to rumour,
this is not the point of Hart’s remarks about the ‘broad’ concept of law: see Chapter 1, section 5,
this volume.
6 Introduction: A Philosophy of Legal Philosophy
6 ‘Yet law-
abiding scholars write:/Law is neither wrong nor right, /Law is only crimes/
Punished by places and by times.’ W. H. Auden, ‘Law, say the gardeners is the sun’ in his Collected
Shorter Poems, 1927–1957 (Faber and Faber, 1969) 154–6.
7 How far the neighbourhood extends, and what its resident sciences are, has never been
agreed. We are not going to be able to develop jurisprudence based solely on physics or chem-
istry. We allow the social sciences in the door. Then everything from functionalist anthropology,
behavioural psychology, neo-classical economics, cognitive science, to social surveys gets touted
as the key to a science of jurisprudence. On this basis, ‘ordinary language’ philosophy should
qualify. It was exquisitely, minutely, empiricist, and less encumbered by theoretical apriorisms
than most subjects on that list.
Choices 7
then why not choose criteria that give the best understanding of the concept
of law, taking law as we find it, without regard to whether that concept has
predictive utility?
The natural sciences do constrain humanistic inquiry. We cannot have
philosophy revising Planck’s constant. The question is whether this con-
straint permits other forms of inquiry and, if it does, whether it contributes
anything beyond marking the no-go zones. Lawyers sometimes associate an
empirical, fact-driven, approach to law with American legal realists and their
heirs in what used to be called ‘sociological jurisprudence’. If the realists were
empiricists, they must have been very timid ones, for they rarely left the la-
boratory of the law reports. Their atoms were the facts as reported and their
molecules were patterns among such facts in so far as they indicate general
attitudes of judges. It would be a poor sociology of law that worked within
those constraints.
Others with empiricist sympathies took a broader view, including David
Hume (Chapter 11), who thought history and even common sense might
help us understand the nature of law. In our day, Brian Leiter (Chapter 4) and
Frederick Schauer (Chapter 13) suggest that the concept of law is determined
by whatever proves most useful to a predictive social science of law. On this
view, neither the lawyer’s professional idea of ‘law’ nor our common concept
of law, is of interest unless it happens to pick out something causally effica-
cious in the social world.
There is no denying the relevance of reliable evidence to general jurispru-
dence. A legal system does not exist unless it is generally effective in a society,
and understanding effectiveness requires attention to empirical questions
in sociology and psychology. Or again: general jurisprudence attends to the
complex causal relations between law and the social (accepted, effective)
morality of a society. The law typically bears the imprint of our social mor-
ality, but in Chapter 10 I suggest that the connection can also run the other
way round, for what is unlawful can affect what people regard as immoral
(moreover, what people regard as immoral can sometimes affect what is actu-
ally immoral). Here too, jurisprudence needs empirical evidence, and I offer
a little second-hand evidence of law’s capacity to do good by making good.
But these empirical conjectures presuppose that we have already done some
conceptual work in pinning down the nature of law, and also the nature of
morality. That work cannot be deferred or displaced by something else.
We cannot know what sort of evidence could be relevant to predictive
projects in jurisprudence until we have an adequate understanding of the
concept of law. For example, the American realists’ leading conjecture, that
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contrasted theme of choral-like character, an effect one may fancy to
bear a slight analogy to the finale of Beethoven's Kreutzer Sonata.
Joseph Henius, whose untimely death in 1912 cut short the career of
a musician of high ideals, has left a published violin sonata of high
merit. It was first produced by David and Clara Mannes in New York
in 1909 and was enthusiastically received. It is fairly strict sonata
form except for the slow movement. This is a romance of deep
poetic fervor, alternately sombre and exalted, and reveals a lofty
melodic beauty and much warmth of feeling. Henius has aimed at
keeping melody plainly in view, and at the same time to gain
perfection of the cyclic form. He was a pupil of Dvořák and a
determined classicist. Among his manuscripts are a quintet in D
major, a quartet in G minor, a comic opera and various songs.
Carl Busch (b. 1862), although of foreign birth, has long been
classed among American composers. He has for many years been
identified with the musical life of Kansas City, Mo., where he is
conductor of the symphony orchestra and the Philharmonic Choral
Society. He has also conducted concerts in his native land,
Denmark, where he was knighted by the government in 1912. His
early studies were conducted in Copenhagen, but his work as a
composer began only with his residence in America, now of twenty-
five years' duration. Busch's tendency is almost wholly along
romantic lines, and his achievements are of a substantial character.
He is best known for his works for chorus and orchestra, impressive
compositions conceived on broad lines. Among the most important
of these are 'King Olaf,' and 'The Four Winds,' the latter of Indian
character. Others are: 'The American Flag,' 'Paul Revere's Ride,'
'The League of the Alps,' and 'The Brown Heather.' Busch has an
excellent technical command of orchestral resource, and has
produced a number of large orchestral works, among them a
prologue, 'The Passing of Arthur,' a rhapsody, 'Negro Carnival,' and
a testimony to the persistence of Stephen Foster's fame and
influence in string variations on 'The Old Folks at Home' and 'My Old
Kentucky Home.' During the last ten years Busch has felt strongly
the Indian influence and, aside from 'The Four Winds,' has produced
an 'Indian Legend' for violin and piano, two groups of Indian songs,
two symphonic poems and several smaller orchestral works, all of
Indian character. From an earlier period are many songs and
choruses and a number of violin pieces.
Also foreign born, and famous chiefly through his long and
distinguished career as a conductor, Walter Damrosch (b. 1862) has
made noteworthy incursions into the field of composition. Wherever
David Bispham has sung, his stirring setting of Kipling's 'Danny
Deever' is a popular favorite. In 1894 he essayed an American grand
opera in 'The Scarlet Letter,' produced in Boston and New York
under his own direction, but the work did not hold the stage. Much
more favorable comment was evoked by his second opera, 'Cyrano,'
text by W. J. Henderson, which was produced at the Metropolitan
Opera House in New York on February 27, 1913. The critic of the
'New Music Review' wrote of Mr. Damrosch and this work, 'He has
written in a well recognizable post-Wagnerian style.... His score is
commendable for its coloring, its richness, and for the touch with
which he has emphasized and elucidated passages now emotional,
now gay, now picturesque, now tragic. The music of "Cyrano" is
undoubtedly composed with skill, with verve, and in parts with
spontaneity.' In the midst of a busy conductor's life Mr. Damrosch
has unquestionably borne his share of the effort to make America an
opera-producing nation.
Two other Americans coming within the present classification who
have striven in the field of grand opera are Albert Mildenberg and
William Legrand Howland. Mildenberg has written three grand
operas, 'Michael Angelo,' in one act, and two three-act operas,
'Raffaelo' and 'Angelo,' none of which, however, have yet come to
performance. His light operas have been produced at different times,
'The Wood Witch,' by the Bostonians; 'The Weather Vane,' by an
independent company; and 'The Princess Delft,' by various American
colleges. Howland has also written three grand operas, 'Nita,'
'Sarrona,' and 'Bébé.' These have been produced in Italy, 'Sarrona'
being the only one to be heard in America, when given under
somewhat trying conditions by an independent company in New
York, February 10, 1910. It is a melodious score, rather lightly
orchestrated, but not without moments of notable effectiveness.
VII
San Francisco, especially as the home of the Bohemian Club, with
its world-famous 'Midsummer High Jinks' or 'Forest Festival,' holds a
record as a city of composers that is little appreciated in the Eastern
part of the United States. Of this group William J. McCoy has
probably made the most significant contribution to musical art. A
composer of high ideals and broad artistic vision, of large emotional
capacity and wide experience, his work reveals him as an artist of no
ordinary stature. Educated in America under William Mason, and in
the German schools under Carl Reinecke and Moritz Hauptmann, he
nevertheless at an early period made himself familiar with the
principles of the French school. His music is characterized by
directness of invention, breadth of resource, and an appealing
emotional warmth, and shows him, as well, as an adept in
orchestration. His virile and dramatic music for 'The Hamadryads,'
the 'Midsummer High Jinks' of 1904, text by Will Irwin, was one of
the strongest factors in the elevation of the Bohemian Club's festival
to the high fame which it enjoys. The themes are all lyrically
appealing and of jubilant spontaneity, those of 'hope' and
'supplication' being particularly felicitous, while the final processional
march shows an almost Wagnerian breadth and rhythmic swing. The
overture was performed in New York, on April 18, 1909, at a concert
of the American Music Society at Carnegie Hall. McCoy's music for
the 'Jinks' of 1910, 'The Cave Man,' text by Charles K. Field, shows
a pronounced advance in the employment of modern resource. One
of its chief features is the 'Song of the Flint,' a work of strong
dramatic power. A grand opera, 'Egypt,' libretto by Charles K. Field,
is the composer's most recently completed work, having been
finished in 1914, and is thought to be his most representative and
substantial achievement. An early symphony was performed in
Leipzig in 1872. There are also an 'Ave Verum' for solo, male chorus
and organ, a quintet in G, and various songs and short instrumental
pieces. The composer is also the author of a theoretical work,
'Cumulative Harmony.' McCoy was born in Crestline, Ohio, in 1848.
Herman Perlet, another of the San Francisco group, wrote the music
for the Grove Play of 1913, 'The Fall of Ug,' text by Rufus Steele.
The themes show a considerable power of characterization and a
lively and elastic rhythmic sense. Perlet's tone-poem 'Mount
Tamalpais,' was heard, under the composer's direction, in San
Francisco in June, 1912, and called forth warm praise from the critic
of the 'Call.' While not an avowed nationalist or 'aboriginalist,' he has
based this work upon a theme of the Lake County Indians. A
'Symphonic Suite' and a 'Symphonie Spirituelle' are of more recent
date.
Nathaniel Clifford Page (b. 1866), at one time associated with the
San Francisco group, but who later removed to the East, is a
composer of a high order of musicianship. He has an early opera,
'The First Lieutenant,' produced in San Francisco in 1889, as well as
two later operas, and has written much incidental and entr'acte
music for plays. An orchestral 'Caprice' is an astonishing display of
orchestral and contrapuntal ingenuity, and his part song on lines
from the opening of Keats' 'Endymion' shows a highly refined sense
of beauty.
VIII
The classical tendency, by which is commonly meant the impulse to
compose in the 'cyclic' forms, is seldom manifested by women
composers, for reasons which have been variously explained, or for
which explanation has been attempted. Whatever the true reason
may be, it is, in fact, wholly on the side of romanticism, with the
possible exception of literary tendencies in the choice of poems for
songs, that all the women composers coming within the scope of this
chapter are found. One of the most gifted of these is Mabel Daniels
(b. 1878), who has the distinction of having won both prizes offered
for women composers in the competition of the National Federation
of Musical Clubs for 1911, the first with a song for soprano, 'Villa of
Dreams,' poem by Arthur Symons, and the second with two three-
part songs for women's voices with accompaniment of pianoforte
and two violins, 'Eastern Song,' the author of the text not stated, and
'The Voice of My Beloved,' the text selected from the 'Song of
Solomon.' 'Villa of Dreams' is a broadly conceived aria, essentially
melodious, and harmonically modern in the general sense of being
free in modulatory treatment, without crossing the border line of
ultra-modern chord effects. It is fluent in inspiration and authentically
poetic. Miss Daniels' most significant work is a poem for baritone
and orchestra. 'The Desolate City' (W. S. Blunt), produced at the
Peterborough festival in 1913, and later by the Chicago orchestra in
Syracuse, the composer conducting. 'Love, When I Sleep,' on
original verses which show the composer to have a marked poetic
gift, from three 'Songs of Damascus,' is notable for its melodic
warmth. A 'Fairy Scherzo' for orchestra was conducted by the
composer at the MacDowell Festival at Peterborough, N. H., in
August, 1914.
A. F.
CHAPTER XIV
NATIONALISTS, ECLECTICS, AND ULTRA-
MODERNS
I
No American composer stands forth with a more sharply defined
individuality than Henry F. Gilbert, and none has given himself with
greater ardor to the accomplishment of something truly American in
musical art. The ultimate stature of an artist finds a certain measure
of adumbration in the absorptive and impressionable capacity of his
early years. With Gilbert this capacity was exceptionally large and
sensitive. As a mere boy in his teens he had an insatiable curiosity
concerning every discoverable phase of the world's music, and at
that age, while America was still in the throes of the Wagner
controversy, he was thoroughly familiar with the music of the entire
group of now famous French, Russian, Bohemian, and other
composers, whose names at that time were wholly unknown on this
side of the water, and comparatively little known at home. At the
same time he gained an authoritative knowledge of the folk-songs of
the world, and made extensive studies into remote aspects of the
world's literature. Gilbert was born in Somerville, Mass., in 1868, and
studied for a time with MacDowell, in Boston, but he never had much
academic training. Concerning his formative influences, the
composer may be allowed to speak for himself, as he has done in
the following words: