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Instructor’s Manual
Containing Solutions to
Over 300 Problems
Selected From
STATISTICAL MECHANICS
(FOURTH EDITION)
By
R. K. PATHRIA and PAUL. D. BEALE
1
2
Preface
This instructor’s manual for the fourth edition of Statistical Mechanics is based
on RKP’s instructor’s manual for the second edition. Most of the solutions
here were retypeset into TeX from that manual. PDB is responsible for the
solutions of the new problems added in the third and fourth editions. The
result is a manual containing solutions to over 300 problems selected from the
fourth edition.
The original idea of producing an instructor’s manual first came from RKP’s
friend and colleague Wing-Ki Liu in the 1990’s when RKP had just embarked
on the task of preparing the second edition of Statistical Mechanics.
This should provide several benefits to the statistical mechanics instructor.
First of all, there is the obvious advantage of saving time that one would oth-
erwise spend on solving these problems oneself. Secondly, before one selects
problems either for homework or for an exam, one can consult the manual to
determine the level of difficulty of the various problems and make one’s selection
accordingly. Thirdly, one may even use some of these solved problems, especially
the ones appearing in later chapters, as lecture material, thereby supplementing
the text. We hope that this manual will enhance the usefulness of the text –
both for the instructors and (indirectly) for the students.
We implore that instructors not share copies of any of the material in this
manual with students or post any part of this manual on the web. Students
learn best when they work together and struggle over difficult problems. Readily
available solutions interfere with this crucial aspect of graduate physics training.
3
4
Chapter 1
1.1. (a) We expand the quantity ln Ω(0) (E1 ) as a Taylor series in the variable
(E1 − Ē1 ) and get
The first term of this expansion is a constant, the second term van-
ishes as a result of equilibrium (β1 = β2 ), while the third term may
be written as
1 ∂β1 ∂B2 2 1 1 1
+ E1 − Ē1 = − + (E1 −Ē1 )2 ,
2 ∂E1 ∂E2 eq. 2 kT12 (Cv )1 kT22 (Cv )2
1.2. Since S is additive and Ω multiplicative, the function f (Ω) must satisfy
the condition
f (Ω1 Ω2 ) = f (Ω1 ) + f (Ω2 ). (1)
5
6 CHAPTER 1.
so that
Ω1 f 0 (Ω1 ) = Ω2 f 0 (Ω2 ). (2)
Since the left-hand side of (2) is independent of Ω2 and the right-hand side
is independent of Ω1 , each side must be equal to a constant, k, independent
of both Ω1 and Ω2 . It follows that f 0 (Ω) = k/Ω and hence
Substituting (3) into (1), we find that the constant of integration is zero.
1.4. Instead of eqn. (1.4.1), we now have
so that
ln Ω = C + ln V + ln (V − v0 ) + ln (V − 2v0 ) + . . . + ln (V − N − 1v0 ),
N 2 v0
P N N N v0
= + = 1 + , i.e.
kT V 2V 2 V 2V
−1
N v0
PV 1 + = NkT .
2V
Since N v0 << V, (1 + N v0 /2V )−1 ' 1 − N v0 /2V . Our last result then
takes the form: P (V − b) = NkT , where b = 12 N v0 .
A little reflection shows that v0 = (4π/3)σ 3 , with the result that
3
1 4π 3 4π 1
b= N· σ = 4N · σ .
2 3 3 2
The first and second derivatives of this expression with respect to α are
N N
[−N ln α + N ln(1 − α)] and − − (2a,b)
α 1−α
It follows that
5 5
(∆S)P = Nk ln(Tf / Ti ) = (∆S)V .
2 3
A numerical verification of this result is straightforward.
It should be noted that, quite generally,
(∆S)P T (∂S / ∂T )P CP
= = =γ
(∆S)V T (∂S / ∂T )V CV
1.15. For an ideal gas, CP − CV = nR, where n is the number of moles of the
gas. With CP /CV = γ, one gets
Clearly, then,
which is the desired expression. It follows quite readily now that for this
system
∂P 1
= P.
∂µ T kT
which is indeed equal to N/V , whereas
" ( 3/2 )#
h2
∂P 5 µ 5 N Nk
= P− 2 P = 2 − ln
∂T µ 2T kT V 2πmkT V
2.3. The rotator in this problem may be regarded as confined to the (z = 0)-
plane and its position at time t may be denoted by the azimuthal angle
ϕ. The conjugate variable pϕ is then mρ2 ϕ̇, where the various symbols
have their usual meanings. The energy of rotation is given by
1
E= m(ρϕ̇)2 = p2ϕ / 2mρ2 .
2
Lines of constant energy in the (ϕ, pϕ )-plane are “straight lines, running
parallel to the ϕ-axis from ϕ = 0 to ϕ = 2π”. The basic cell of area h in
this plane is a “rectangle with sides ∆ϕ = 2π and ∆pϕ = h/2π”. Clearly,
the eigenvalues of pϕ , starting with pϕ = 0, are n~ and those of E are
n2 ~2 /2I, where I = mρ2 and n = 0, ±1, ±2, . . .
The eigenvalues of E obtained here are precisely the ones given by quan-
tum mechanics for the energy “associated with the z-component of the
rotational motion”.
2.4. The rigid rotator is a model for a diatomic molecule whose internuclear
distance r may be regarded as fixed. The orientation of the molecule in
space may be denoted by the angles θ and ϕ, the conjugate variables being
pθ = mr 2 θ̇ and pϕ = mr 2 sin2 θϕ̇. The energy of rotation is given by
1 1 p2θ p2ϕ M2
E= m(rθ̇)2 + m(r sin θϕ̇)2 = + = ,
2 2 2mr 2 2mr 2 sin2 θ 2I
where I = mr 2 and M 2 = p2θ + p2ϕ / sin2 θ .
The “volume”
R0 of the relevant region of the phase space is given by the
integral dp θ dp ϕ dθ dϕ, where the region of integration is constrained
by the value of M . A little reflection shows that in the subspace of pθ
and pϕ we are restricted by an elliptical boundary with semi-axes M and
M sin θ, the enclosed area being πM 2 sin θ. The “volume” of the relevant
region, therefore, is
Zπ Z2π
(πM 2 sin θ)dθ dϕ = 4π 2 M 2 .
θ=0 ϕ=0
1
2
1 h 2 i 1
3
1
1
2
Mj+ 1 − Mj− 1 = j + j+ − j− j+ = 2j + 1.
~2 2 2 2 2 2 2
This is precisely the degeneracy arising from the eigenvalues that the az-
imuthal quantum number m has, viz. j, j − 1, . . . , −j + 1, −j.
2.6. In terms of the variables θ and L(= m`2 θ), the state of the simple pendu-
lum is given by, see eqns. (2.4.9),
1
Ω(E) = (R + N − 1)!/ R!(N − 1)!, R = E − N ~ω /~ω. (1)
2
For R >> N , we obtain the asymptotic result
(E / ~ω)N −1 ∆ E N −1 ∆
Γ(E; ∆) ≈ · = . (1)
(N − 1)! ~ω (N − 1)!(~ω)N
The “volume” of the relevant region of the phase space may be derived
from the integral
N
Z 0Y N
X 1 1 2
(dq i dp i ), with kq 2i + p ≤ E.
i=1 i=1
2 2m i
so that
Σ(n, V, E) = V N (8π E 3 / h3 c3 )N / (3N )!,
which is a function of N and VE 3 . An isentropic process then implies
that VE 3 = const.
The temperature of the system is given by
1 ∂(k ln Σ) 3Nk
= = , i.e. E = 3NkT .
T ∂E N,V E
The equation for the isentropic process then becomes VT 3 = const., i.e.
T ∝ V −1/3 ; this implies that γ = 4/3. The rest of the thermodynamics
follows straightforwardly. See also Problems 1.7 and 3.15.
Chapter 3
3.4. For the first part, we use eqn. (3.2.31) with all ωr = 1. We get
( )
k X
−βEr
ln Γ = k ln e + kβU,
N r
A(N, V, T ) = Nf (v, T ) (v = V / N ).
It follows that
∂A ∂f −V ∂A ∂f 1
N =N f +N · 2 , and V = VN · .
∂N V,T ∂v T N ∂V N,T ∂v T N
1
2
P P
1, Es Pr,s = E and Nr Pr,s = N . Varying P ’s and using the method
r,s r,s
of Lagrange’s undetermined multipliers, we are led to the condition
X
{−(1 + ln Pr,s ) − γ − βEs − αNr } δPr,s = 0.
r,s
Pr ∝ exp(−βEr ),
2
∂P ∂V ∂P ∂P
CP − CV = T = −T > 0. (1)
∂T V ∂T P ∂T V ∂V T
Now
e−U/kT (U/kT 2 )d3N q
R
∂ ln Z kT Ū
kT = R
−U/kT d3N q
= , while
∂T N,V e T
n o Ū
k ln Z = k ln V̄ N e−Ū /kT = Nk ln V̄ − .
T
Substituting these results into the above expression for S, we obtain the
desired result for S. In passing, we note that hHi ≡ A + TS = 23 NkT + Ū .
P
For the second part of the question, we write U (q) = u(rij ), so that
i<j
Y Y
e−βU (q) = e−βu(rij ) = (1 + fij ) ,
i<j i<j
and follow Problems 3.23 and 1.4. The quantity V̄ then appears to be in
the nature of a “free volume” for the molecules of the system.
3.14. a) The Lagrangian is given by
X1 X X
L =K −V = 2
mṙiα − u(rij ) − [uw (riα ) + uw (L − riα )],
iα
2 i<j iα
This is clearly the instantaneous force per unit area on the right, back,
and top walls.
b) The cartesian coordinates for the scaled position inside the box are
siα = riα /L so the Lagrangian becomes
X1 X X
L = mL2 ṡ2iα − u(Lsij ) − [uw (Lsiα ) + uw (L − Lsiα )].
iα
2 i<j iα
The first term is (2/3)(N/V ) times the kinetic energy per particle so is
O(N ). The second term is (1/3)(N/V ) times the virial per particle so is
also O(N ). On the other hand, third term is proportional to the short-
ranged virial on the walls divided by the volume so is O(N 2/3 ) which is
negligible in the thermodynamic limit.
Comparing to equation (3.7.15) for the average pressure we see that
* +
P 1 X
=1− u0w (rij )rij .
nkT 3N kT i<j
Z∞
V · 4πp2 dp 8πV 1
Q1 (V, T ) = e−βpc = 3 3 3,
h3 h β c
0
which yields the desired result for QN . The thermodynamics of the system
now follows straightforwardly.
As regards the density of states, the expression
Z∞
8πV 1
Q1 (V, T ) = e−βε g(ε)dε =
h3 β 3 c3
0
leads to
4πV 2
g(ε) = ε
h3 c3
for a single particle, while the expression for QN (V, T ) leads to
N
E 3N −1
1 8πV
g(E) =
N! h3 c3 Γ(3N )
for the N -particle system; cf. the expression for Σ(E) derived in Prob-
lem 2.8.
∂2U ∂U
= hE 3 i − hE 2 ihEi + 2U .
∂β 2 ∂β
∂2U
= hE 3 i − 3hE 2 iU + 2U 3 ,
∂β 2
t+τ t+τ
G(t + τ ) − G(t)
Z Z
1 X 1
(q̇i pi + qi ṗi )dt = Ġdt = . (1)
τ i
τ τ
t t
3.20. The virial of the noninteracting system, by eqn. (3.7.12), is −3PV . The
contribution from interparticle interactions, by eqn. (3.7.15), is given by
the “expectation value of the sum of the quantity −r(∂u/∂r) over all pairs
of particles in the system”. If u(r) is a homogeneous function (of degree
n) of the particle coordinates, this contribution will be −nU , where U is
7
the mean potential energy (not the internal energy) of the system. The
total virial is then given by
v = −3PV − nU .
The relation K = − 12 v still holds, and the rest of the results follow
straightforwardly.
3.21. All systems considered here are localized. The pressure term, therefore,
drops out, and we are left with the result
n n
K= U= E.
2 n+2
Example (a) pertains to n = 2, while examples (b) and (c) pertain to
n = −1. In the former case, K = U = 12 E; in the latter, K = − 21 U = −E.
The next problem pertains to n = 4.
1 2
H= p + cq 4 (c > 0).
2m
It follows that
R∞ 2
e−βp /2m
(p2 /2m)dp
1 2 −∞ 1
p = R∞ = ;
2m −βp2 /2m 2β
e dp
−∞
for the values of these integrals, see eqns. (13a) of Appendix B. Next,
R∞ 4
e−βcq (cq 4 )dq
−∞ ∂
hcq 4 i = R∞ =− ln I(B),
−βcq 4 ∂β
e dq
−∞
3.23. The key to this derivation is writing the partition function in terms of
position integrals over scaled coordinates. Assume a cubic box of size L
and volume V = L3 . The scaled position for particle i is si = r i /L. The
8
partition function is
Z
1 X
QN (V, T ) = exp −β u(rij ) dN r
λ3N N ! i<j
N Z
V X
= exp −β u(V 1/d sij ) dN s.
λ3N N ! i<j
This can be simplified by going back to integrals over the normal position
variables to give equation (3.7.15).
3.24. By eqn. (3.7.5), we have, for a single particle,
* 3 +
X
pi q̇i = 3kT . (1)
i=1
The left-hand side of (1) is the expectation value of the quantity p · u, i.e.
pu which, for a relativistic particle, is equal to m0 u2 (1 − u2 /c2 )−1/2 . The
desired result follows readily.
In the non-relativistic limit (u << c), one obtains: 12 m0 u2 ≈ 32 kT ; in
the extreme relativistic limit (u → c), one obtains: hmc 2 i ≈ 3kT . Note
that, in the latter case, m0 c2 is negligible in comparison with mc 2 , so
there is no significant difference between the kinetic energy and the total
energy of the particle.
3.25. For the first part of this problem, see Sec. 6.4 — especially the derivation
of the formula (6.4.9). For the second part, equate the result obtained in
the first part with the one stated in eqn. (3.7.5).
3.26. The multiplicity w(j){= (j + s − 1)!/j!(s − 1)!} arises from the variety
of ways in which j indistinguishable quanta can be divided among the
s dimensions of the oscillator: j = j1 + . . . + js ; this is similar to the
calculation done on page 70 of the text.
h iN
(s) (s)
As for the partition function, QN (β) = Q1 (β) , where
∞
(j + s − 1)!
e−β (j+ 2 s)~ω
(s)
X 1
Q1 (β) =
j=0
j!(s − 1)!
1
= e− 2 sβ~ω (1 − e−β~ω )−s .
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The circumstances seemed favourable for the establishment of a
base which would immediately threaten the European shore.
Aristagoras had asked for one hundred ships; and, for some
reason which is not satisfactorily accounted for in the story, had
offered to defray the expenses of the expedition.
So thoroughly did Artaphernes approve of the plan that, in order
to ensure its success, he offered to furnish double the number of
ships for which Aristagoras had asked, provided Darius assented to
the proposed expedition. It is evident that the custom, if not the
constitution, of the empire under Darius did not permit even a great
satrap like Artaphernes, who was the king’s own brother, to call out a
force of considerable magnitude without leave from the king himself.
H. v. 31.
Artaphernes further promised that the ships should be
ready in the coming spring, which shows that
Aristagoras’ visit to Sardes must have been made in the first year of
the fifth century, probably in the winter of 500 b.c.
Aristagoras returned to Miletus elated at his diplomatic success.
A few months must have elapsed ere Artaphernes received a
despatch from Susa approving of his proposal. The assent of Darius
is important, as showing that the king was quite willing to resume his
designs on Greece when fair opportunity offered.
The true tale of what followed is one of the many unsolved riddles
of this period. As told by Herodotus, it runs as follows:—
Artaphernes prepared a fleet of two
FAILURE AT NAXOS.
hundred triremes, together with a considerable
force of Persians and other allies, and appointed Megabates, a
member of the Achæmenid family, and cousin of Darius, to the
command. This armament he despatched to Miletus to pick up
Aristagoras together with the Ionian contingent and the Naxian
exiles. Thence the expedition sailed to Kaukasa in Chios, with the
pretended object of operating in the Hellespontine district,—a
pretence which would not have been very effective had the
operations of Otanes left it in a wholly satisfactory state of
subjection. It was at Kaukasa that the design of the expedition was
fated to be wrecked. Megabates, going his rounds, found a Myndian
vessel without any guards set, and punished the Greek captain by
causing him to be tied with his head through one of the oar-holes.
On this being reported to Aristagoras, he made protest to
Megabates; but as this had no effect, he himself released the man. A
quarrel ensued between the two commanders, the result of which
was that Megabates sent a ship and gave warning to the Naxians of
the coming expedition. The latter prepared in all haste to meet the
danger, and successfully resisted a four months’ siege. The attempt
turned out a complete failure, and Aristagoras found himself in the
position of guarantor of the expenses, without the means of meeting
the guarantee. Such is the tale in Herodotus.
It is necessary to pursue the story somewhat further before any
attempt can be made to hazard a conjecture as to the true
explanation of some of the incidents in this narrative.
Aristagoras had brought his affairs into a very critical position. He
had quarrelled with Megabates, and had made himself surety for a
debt to Artaphernes which he had no prospect of being able to pay.
He had, indeed, reason to fear that he would lose his tyranny of
Miletus.
H. v. 36. Cf.
The meeting of the conspirators took place
immediately after the return from Naxos. The place of
v. 36, ad fin.
meeting was presumably Miletus. It certainly was not
held on board the fleet.
On the question of revolt the conspirators were unanimous, with
one prominent exception. Hecatæus the historian spoke words of
serious warning. He pointed out the magnitude of the resources of
the great king when compared with their own. Failing to dissuade
them, he advised that, as they were bent on revolt, they should
secure the command of the sea. This, he considered, offered the
sole chance of success. For its successful maintenance capital was
necessary; and this, he suggested, might be obtained from the great
treasures of the temple of the Branchidæ, a shrine which had been
enriched by the offerings of Crœsus. This plan was also rejected by
the meeting.
The express mention of Hecatæus’ name in connection with two
proposals, of one of which Herodotus must have cordially approved,
is noticeable as an indication of the origin of much of the “prejudice”
Cf. H. ii. 16;
which is discoverable in Herodotus’ work. Either from
iv. 36; iv. 95, jealousy or from conviction, he had no very high
96; ii. 123. opinion of the Ionian historio-geographers, and of the
Ionian intellect generally. One of his most depreciatory
H. iv. 36.
remarks about them is in all probability directed
against Hecatæus personally.
Yet though he entertained so poor an opinion of one side of
Hecatæus’ work, though he was probably jealous of his reputation as
a historian, he does not hesitate to reproduce from his sources
emphatic testimony to the practical wisdom and judgment of the
man.
The statement of the absolute rejection of the second proposal of
Hecatæus must be understood in a modified sense. The Ionians did
in the subsequent campaign allot a very prominent part to their fleet.
The meaning of the proposal was that the offensive should be taken
on sea; and, above all, that the sea should be regarded as the real
base.
But Aristagoras, as his subsequent language at Sparta makes
clear, was convinced that the Greek hoplite was infinitely more than
a match for any soldiery which Persia could put into the field; and
others apparently shared his opinion. The events of twenty years
later proved the truth of his general judgment on this point. He and
his fellow conspirators may have made a mistake, when they took
the offensive on land, in expecting too much from the land forces
which the insurgents could put into the field. But in great ventures
great risks have to be taken; and the attack on the Persian base
made at the beginning of the year 498, had it been successful, must
have brilliantly justified the plan.
It is easy now, in the light of knowledge after the event, to see
that, if the revolt was to be successful, it must succeed on both
elements:—on sea, because only by means of the fleet could the
concentration of a large land force be brought about: on land,
because only on that element could an effective blow be struck
against the Persian dominion in Western Asia.
Aristagoras’ estimate of the strategic position of the insurgents
was singularly justified by the history of the subsequent warfare of
the century. The sea was, indeed, and must be, the Ionian base. The
strategic weakness of the position of the cities rendered any other
alternative impossible. But ages of fighting were destined to prove
that no mortal blow could be inflicted on Persia by sea alone. The
Ægean might be made a Hellenic lake. The islands on the Asian
coast might be liberated. But so long as Persia maintained her hold
upon the continent, the cities of the mainland must be ultimately at
the mercy of a great land power holding the central position in
Western Asia. If the revolt was to be successful, it was at this central
position that the blow must be struck. Sardes must be the objective
of the insurgents.
It was evident that nothing could be done
FIRST ACT OF
REVOLT.
with the fleet until the tyrants who were in
command of its contingents were removed. A
H. v. 37.
certain Iatragoras was accordingly sent to seize them.
He did so “by a trick,” whose nature is not specified.
He seized four who are mentioned by name, and “many others.” It is
a remarkable fact that not one of the four is Ionian. Two are Æolan,
18
and two are Helleno-Carian Aristagoras, of his own accord,
“nominally” laid aside the tyranny of Miletus. He then proceeded to
depose other tyrants in Ionia, besides those whom he had caught
upon the fleet, and handed over the whole number to their various
cities. The Mytilenians slew their tyrant Koës; the others were
allowed to depart. Inasmuch as those tyrants had all been acting in
the interests of Persia, their deposition was necessarily the first step
in the revolt.
This measure must have been taken later in the autumn of 499,
just at the close of the campaigning season; for Aristagoras could
not otherwise have ventured on the journey to Greece which he
immediately undertook with a view to getting assistance.
It was to Sparta that he first turned for help.
The tale of his visit to Kleomenes, the Spartan king, is told at
considerable length. As told, it contained at least one incident which
was likely to render it famous in Greek story. The version of it which
19
Herodotus has preserved is of Lacedæmonian origin.
Aristagoras brought with him a map of the world engraved on a
bronze tablet, the work of one of the Ionian geographers,—possibly
of the famous Hecatæus. The strong appeal which he addressed to
Kleomenes as leader of the foremost state in Greece to save the
Ionians from their slavery comes strangely from the mouth of one
who has just been represented as doing all in his power to bring one
of the European islands into that state from which he now begged
Kleomenes to save the Asiatic Greeks. It is still more strange that in
this story, whose origin is manifestly different from that of the affair at
Naxos, there is no mention whatever of any suspicion having been
excited by Aristagoras’ conduct; and no explanation of it was
demanded from him.
Coming to the practical question of the possibilities offered by a
campaign in Asia, Aristagoras emphasizes in a very remarkable way
the superiority of the Greek military equipment over that of the
H. v. 49.
Persian. His proposal does not confine itself to the
liberation of Ionia: he even holds out the prospect of
the conquest of the rich lands of Western Asia. To the men of the
time at which Herodotus wrote, this part of the story must have
seemed a striking example of the wild exaggeration of the Ionian
imagination. As an estimate of possibilities it was, however, far more
near the truth than they can have supposed—nearer, perhaps, than
Aristagoras supposed himself. “When it is in your power,” said he, “to
rule all Asia with ease, will you choose aught else?”
Kleomenes took three days for consideration, and then, at a
second conference, asked Aristagoras how far the king was from the
Ionian sea. When informed that it was a journey of three months up
country to Susa, he broke off negotiations and dismissed Aristagoras
at once.
Aristagoras would not accept dismissal, but returned once more,
and, so the story goes, in the presence of the king’s little daughter
Gorgo, tempted him with ever-increasing bribes. The child, with more
than childish wisdom, brought the interview to a conclusion by
saying, “Father, the stranger will corrupt you, unless you go away.”
Whether the story itself be truth or fiction the fact remains that
Sparta abided by that policy which she had followed for some years
past, and refused to become embroiled with the great empire of the
East.
H. v. 55.
From Sparta Aristagoras went to Athens. His arrival
was, in a sense, opportune. The demand of
Artaphernes for the reinstatement of Hippias had created an
intensely bitter feeling of hostility towards the Persian. Introduced
before the public assembly, he used the same arguments as he had
employed at Sparta, and further claimed that the Milesians were
Athenian colonists. “There is nothing that he did not promise, so
urgent was his request, until he persuaded them.”
Herodotus is at considerable pains to show
AID FROM GREECE.
the depth of the folly, as he conceived it to be,
with which Athens entered upon a fatal venture.
In the end the Athenians voted an aid of twenty ships; not a small
number, when it is remembered that their navy at this time was but a
H. v. 97.
fraction of what it was twenty years later. “These ships
were a source of woes to the Greeks and the
barbarians,” says Herodotus. There can be no doubt as to his
meaning. He regarded this as the decisive moment in the relations
between Persia and European Greece.
The tale of the revolt is that part of his history in which he allows
his own personal views to be most clearly seen. To him it seemed
the great mistake of the century; that is clear from his story of it; but
it is not so easy to say why he so utterly condemned it, unless he
regarded it as leading to the renewal of those designs on Greece
which Darius had been obliged for ten years past to lay aside.
But that cannot have been all. It is necessary to examine the
whole story as told by him. That alone can afford some clear clue to
the causes which brought about what was undoubtedly a strange
perversion of his judgment.
H. v. 98.
Aristagoras, he says, returned from Athens to
Miletus, “having devised a plan from which no
advantage was fated to come to the Ionians.”
It must have been in the winter of 499 b.c. or early spring of the
year 498 that Aristagoras returned.
His first act was to send a message to those Pæonians whom
Darius had removed from the Strymon to Asia, telling them that they
were free to return, as all Ionia had revolted from the king. Unless his
object in so doing were to create an impression in the Persian
sphere of influence in Europe, it is impossible to attribute a motive to
any otherwise apparently causeless act. Herodotus looks upon it as
simply designed to give annoyance to Darius, an end which, it may
be presumed, Aristagoras had sufficiently attained by raising the
standard of revolt. It is quite possible that he sought to carry out the
policy attributed to his father-in-law, Histiæus, some ten years
before, and to enlist the aid of the Thracians in a struggle with the
Persian power in Western Asia. If this was the intent, the design did
not meet with success. The Thracians did not take any active part in
the revolt, though they took advantage of the events on the Asian
side to throw off whatever allegiance they had hitherto owed to the
king.
In the spring of 498 the twenty Athenian ships, accompanied by
five triremes from Eretria, arrived on the Asiatic coast. The Eubœan
city had apparently sent her aid unasked, influenced by those trade
relations of which so little is heard from the two great historians of
the fifth century, but which must have played so decisive a part in the
shaping of events. The academic atmosphere of the Athens of the
latter part of the century excluded such banausic details from a
cultured narrative of events.
Hitherto the offensive operations of the insurgents had been
confined to the deposition of the tyrants of the Greek cities.
Herodotus is absolutely silent as to the measures which
Artaphernes took in consequence of this bloodless act of war. He
can hardly have entertained any illusions as to its significance; yet, if
Herodotus’ account is to be taken as a complete narrative of events,
the Ionians took the offensive in the spring of 498, some months at
least after this act of unmistakable hostility, without meeting at first
with any opposition.
H. v. 99.
After the arrival of the ships from European Greece
Aristagoras sent an expedition against Sardes. He did
not accompany it himself, but placed his brother Charopinos and
another Milesian in command. The expedition went by sea to
Ephesus, and, leaving the ships at Koresos in the Ephesian territory,
20
went up country under the guidance of the Ephesians.
Following first the river Kaÿster, they afterwards crossed Mount
Tmolos, and took Sardes, except the Acropolis, without opposition.
That was saved by Artaphernes “with no inconsiderable force.”
The town was composed of houses either
ATTACK ON
SARDES.
thatched with reeds or wholly constructed of
them. One of these was kindled by a Greek
soldier, either by accident or design, and the whole place was burnt
to the ground. A statement is then made which seems inconsistent
with the assertion that the town had been taken without opposition,
to the effect that, in consequence of the conflagration, the Lydians
and Persians were compelled to defend themselves in the market-
place, and that the Ionians, by reason of their numbers, found it
advisable to retreat under cover of night to their ships.
The most remarkable feature of this story, as it stands in
Herodotus, is its lack of consequence. Cause and effect are as little
apparent in it as in the narrative of a dream. Artaphernes, after
months of warning, is caught unprepared. Sardes is taken without
opposition; yet, when the conflagration takes place, a host, not
merely of Lydians, but of Persians also, springs from its very ashes,
and in such formidable numbers that the Ionians are obliged to
withdraw under cover of night.
If Greek history is to bear the guise of history, this story requires
examination. No useful end can be served by accepting as fact that
which is incapable of rational interpretation. Human motive springs
from human thought; and if thought has its formal laws, it is
reasonable to suppose that there is a formality in motive also.
It happens that in the present instance there exists evidence
which puts a complexion on these events very different to that which
is given by Herodotus.
Plut. de
Plutarch has preserved a tradition that at the time
Herod. at which the expedition against Sardes took place the
Malignitate, Persians were engaged in the siege of Miletus, and
24.
that one object of the expedition was to force the
Persians to raise the siege. The bitter animus of the treatise in which
this assertion is made makes it impossible to accept statements in it
without consideration. In the present instance, however, the
statement is so manifestly in accord with the situation at the time that
it is impossible to reject it as untrue.
Miletus had been, through Aristagoras, the author of the revolt.
Artaphernes had had a whole winter’s warning. It is inconceivable
that he should have allowed months to elapse without taking
measures to crush the rising before it became formidable; and this
end could best be attained by an attack on that centre at which the
conflagration had had its origin, and from which it was, if left
unchecked, but too likely to spread far and wide. Artaphernes was
no child playing at empire, but a practised administrator, who had
governed a great outlying province for nearly ten years of a critical
period of its history.
There can be little question that the bold design of a direct attack
on Sardes completely upset his plans. It forced him not merely to
raise the siege of Miletus, but also to hurry with all speed to save the
Persian capital in the west, which must, from its very position, be his
base of operations in the coming struggle. An examination of the
map will show that the loss of Sardes would have necessitated the
withdrawal of that base far to the east. It is doubtful indeed whether
another could have been found west of Halys. The attack was a
brilliant venture on the part of the Greeks. It was a brilliant idea on
the part of the one man to whom it can be attributed,—Aristagoras.
Aristagoras has come down in history with the ill reputation of one
who dared to lead brave men to their death, but dared not die with
them. This feature of his life’s story has tended to obscure the true
picture of the man. The added selfishness of motive is not calculated
to present him in a more favourable light.
Such is the general impression created by the picture which
Herodotus draws of him.
Yet the details do not altogether bear out the impression which is
created by the picture as a whole.
It is doubtless the case that he acted from selfish motives. It may
be that his highest aim was to become the first man among the
Greeks of the Asiatic coast; but he must at least be credited with a
spirit that ventured much to gain more. He miscalculated the means
to the end he sought. But was the miscalculation more discreditable
to him than to those European Greeks on whose aid he had
calculated? They had, no doubt, their excuse; but he had his.
Even in the hostile pages of Herodotus
THE LYDIANS AND
THE REVOLT.
there is clear evidence that the measures he
took with the means at his disposal showed
high ability, if not genius. He all but checkmated the Persians at
Sardes; and the period during which the revolt was formidable was
coincident with the time at which he played the foremost part in it.
The incidental light which Herodotus’ narrative throws on the
events at Sardes is, in some respects, of more historical importance
than his direct story of events.
The attitude of the Lydians towards the revolt is clearly marked
from the very first. This people, for some reason which it is not
possible to conjecture with anything approaching certainty, not
merely stood apart and remained neutral, but actually fought on the
H. v. 102.
Persian side, in Sardes at any rate. This deed of active
hostility may have been exceptional, and both it and
the absence on the part of the Lydians of all sympathy with the revolt
may be due to the destruction of their chief city, and especially of
their national sanctuary of the goddess Kybebe, which perished in
the conflagration. This, so Herodotus says, served as an excuse for
the subsequent destruction of the Greek temples; but if it also served
to alienate the sympathies of the Lydians from the struggle for
freedom, it can only be regarded as a disaster of the first magnitude
21
to the cause of the Asiatic Greeks.
H. v. 102.
The Greek occupation of the town of Sardes does
not seem to have been a matter of a few days. Not
merely had the news of its seizure time to spread to the region west
22
of Halys, but the Persian commanders in that wide stretch of
country had time to assemble a large levy for the rescue of the
capital; and though when they arrived there the Greeks had
departed, their departure had been so recent that the relieving force
actually overtook and fought an action with them before they
reached their ships.
The spreading of the news and the gathering of this force must
have been at least an affair of some weeks; and the summer of 498
must have been at its height ere the Greek retreat began.
It was near Ephesus that the Persian reinforcements overtook the
Greeks. In the battle which followed the Ionians were, so Herodotus
says, badly defeated, and a great many prominent men were slain,
while the survivors dispersed to their various cities. Evalkides, the
Eretrian general, was one of those who perished; and the record of
his death has all the appearance of truth. There are several very
serious reasons, however, for believing that the result of the battle
has been greatly exaggerated.
After the battle the Athenian contingent sailed off home. This was
probably in the autumn of 498. It is the last event recorded by
Herodotus which can be attributed with certainty to that year.
It is possible that the Athenians had a valid excuse for this
apparent desertion, in that they had just become engaged in a war
with Ægina; but the date of the outbreak of that war is quite
uncertain, and the real cause of withdrawal may have been that the
Athenians took too pessimistic a view of the prospects of the
23
revolt. The non-participation of the Lydians was calculated to set
them thinking. If the latter of these alternatives were the case, it is
conceivable that the tale of the results of the battle of Ephesus is of
Athenian origin, put forward in part justification of the withdrawal.
24
Herodotus evidently attributed it to the results of the battle of
Ephesus, and this may be taken to indicate, at any rate, that the
Athenians thought badly of the prospects of the revolt. Aristagoras
sent message after message during the winter
BYZANTION AND
CARIA JOIN THE
of 498–97, imploring them to return; but they
REVOLT. refused to come back.
It seems certain that the Athenians greatly
miscalculated the possibilities of the moment; yet it may be doubted
whether the actual facts were not such as to justify their decision.
Save for the assistance given by their own small contingent and by
the five ships from Eretria, the Ionians had gone through the first
season of the war single-handed. The revolt had merely excited
opposition in Lydia; and its remarkable extension in the next year
could hardly have been foreseen. Even the Greek cities of the coast
were not unanimous in supporting it. Herodotus, himself a Dorian of
Asia, is so significantly silent as to any part which the Dorian cities
played in it, that it must be concluded that they played no part at all.
The winter of 498–97 was passed by the Ionians in preparation
for the continuance of the struggle. The withdrawal of the Athenians
was not a great loss to the actual fighting power of the insurgents. It
seems, moreover, to have had but little moral effect upon them, and
none whatever upon their relations and friends in Asia.
The Ionian fleet opened the year’s campaign by sailing to
Byzantion, and bringing about the revolt of the whole region of the
25
Propontis. From the Propontis the fleet returned to Caria, which
also joined the insurgents. The Carian district of Kaunos had
apparently been invited to join at the time of the burning of Sardes,
but had deferred doing so until the arrival of the fleet.
The action of the fleet, and the sudden spread of the revolt at this
time, tend to throw light on certain obscurities in the history of the
campaign of the previous year.
Inasmuch as the Ionian fleet must, in spite of Aristagoras’ refusal
to recognize the fact, have formed the real base of the insurgent
operations, it is inconceivable that the Persians should have omitted
to bring up the Phœnician fleet to cope with it. This would be the first
measure which would suggest itself to them. Yet at the beginning of
the second campaigning season, at least a year and a half after the
first act of revolt had placed the Ionian fleet in the power of the
insurgents, that fleet is free to leave the Ægean coast undefended,
and to go to the Propontis to stir the Hellespontine region into
activity! Where was the Phœnician fleet meanwhile? The artifice of
Aristagoras in bringing about the mobilization of the Ionian fleet had
indeed given the Asiatic Greeks a long start in naval operations; but
at least eighteen months had elapsed since he had shown his hand.
Had the revolt of Cyprus already taken place, and had the
Phœnician fleet been obliged to make the reduction of that island its
first objective? There are at least three reasons which render this
assumption unlikely:—
H. v 104, ad
(1) Herodotus is certainly under the impression that
init. the Cypriote revolt took place about the same time as
26
that of Caria.
(2) Cyprus was so important to the revolt that, had the Phœnician
fleet been in a position to threaten it at this time, the Ionians could
hardly have ventured on an expedition to the Hellespontine region.
(3) The revolt in Cyprus had been in progress for many months
before the Ionian fleet went thither.
Plut. de
It seems probable that Plutarch has preserved the
Herod. record of an important incident in the history of this
Malign. 24. time, which Herodotus had either forgotten, or of
which he had never heard. He refers to a victory gained by the
Ionian fleet off the Pamphylian coast. This would account for the
non-appearance of the Phœnician fleet in the Ægean in the
campaign of 498.
It may be conjectured that the victory took
REVOLT OF
CYPRUS.
place early in that year—that is, in the spring
or early summer,—and that it was won over a
fleet which was coming up to assist Artaphernes in the siege of
Miletus. It would account also for the spirit shown by the Ionians in
the bold venture of the attack on Sardes.
H. v. 103.
The rapid spread of the revolt in 497 makes it
almost impossible to accept Herodotus’ version of the
battle at Ephesus. If he is to be believed, the reverse there sustained
more than compensated for any success won at Sardes. If that be
so, the impetus given to the revolt by the burning of Sardes becomes
inexplicable. It must be concluded that Ephesus was not the disaster
which Herodotus represents it to have been.
The news of the revolt of the Ionians had thrown the Cypriote
Greeks into a state of ferment. The island had been for many ages
past divided between the Greek and Phœnician interests. The Greek
section of the population seems to have hitherto adopted an attitude
of passive or secretly active resistance to the Persian, while the
Phœnician formed the Medic party. Persian and Phœnician interests
in the island were mutual. The Persian communications were
dependent on the Phœnician fleet, while the Phœnicians could only
hold their ground against the preponderating numbers of the Greeks
by means of Persian support. Salamis and Amathus (Hamath) were
respectively the foremost towns of the Greek and Phœnician
regions.
H. v. 104.
The leader of the movement in the island was
Onesilos, the younger brother of Gorgos, the Greek
king of Salamis. “He had frequently before this time advised his
brother Gorgos to revolt from the king; but now, when he heard that
even the Ionians had revolted, he was very urgent in his endeavours
to induce him to do so.” Failing to persuade Gorgos, he seized the
city during his temporary absence, and Gorgos fled to the Persians.
The revolt spread to all the towns of the island except Amathus.
Onesilos proceeded accordingly to besiege this place.
It is very difficult to assign a certain date to these events. One
thing may, however, be confidently assumed, namely, that when
Onesilos made his urgent representations to his brother, and, still
more, when the revolt broke out, the Phœnician fleet was for the
time being hors de combat. The absolutely indeterminate element in
the matter is the length of time which intervened between the first
urgent representation of Onesilos and the deposition of Gorgos.
Certain facts stated in the subsequent story of the campaign render
it probable that Onesilos’ representations were made after the battle
off the Pamphylian coast, if not after the burning of Sardes, and that
they must therefore be attributed to the autumn of 498; while the first
step in revolt, the deposition of Gorgos, took place in the following
winter, and the siege of Amathus began in the spring of 497.
The customs or necessities of campaigning in the fifth century
rendered the winter the natural time for planning insurrection, and
the summer the time for carrying it out.