Is Henry Home the author of David Hume's mature theory of belief?

Josef Moural

In James Boswell's private papers there is a fairly well known report of a story that Lord Kames told
him in 1778. The story goes as follows: after The Treatise of Human Nature was published, David
Hume was rather impatient to learn what people thought about it. He urged Kames to read the first
two books, which Kames first refused, saying that he got out of practice with metaphysical thoughts.
When Hume repeated his request after a month, Kames replied that he will read the book under the
condition that Hume would explain it to him first – and Hume attempted to do so and failed. But then,
one morning in May, Kames took up Hume's book again, and "he read it, to his astonishment, with
clearest understanding. And he sat down and wrote Observations upon it. David, who used to come
frequently to him, came soon after. 'Well, David, I'll tell you News. I understand your Book quite
well.' He shewed him his Objections, and David, who was not very ready to yield, acknowledged he
was right in every one of them." /Boswell Papers, XV. 274/

If the story is trustworthy, it would be rather interesting to know what the objections were. I realize
there are some factors that, prima facie, speak against its reliability. First, Kames was extremely vain
about his intellectual abilities, second, he was eighty one when he told the story, and third, Hume had
died two years before and could not provide his version of the event any more. Also, even if Kames's
narration was a true account of his experience, it seems easily conceivable that Hume simply did not
want to quarrel, that he was pulling Kames's leg or that he just wanted to do a favour to his friend's
and protector's vanity. Yet I shall show that there is enough independent evidence to make us to
consider the story seriously, that we can plausibly identify at least one of the objections, and that the
picture we gain significantly modifies the established view of Hume.

My paper consists of the following three parts: first, I shall speak about the shift in Hume's theory of
belief between his early position prevalent in the Treatise book I and his mature position prevalent in
the Appendix and in the first Enquiry on the other. Next, I shall compare this shift with the argument
of Kames's essay "Of belief". Third, I shall discuss why the late publication date of Kames's essay
(1751) not only is compatible with the hypothesis that the argument of the essay is based on the
objection from the Boswell's story but that, all things considered, it rather supports it.
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1.

In the Appendix, published in November 1740, David Hume announces modificiatons of his previous
position stated in the first two books of the Treatise. The modifications concern mainly the following
two topics: personal identity and theory of belief. Quantitatively, theory of belief occupies by far the
greatest part of the Appendix (some 10 pages out of 17 in Selby-Bigge's edition, compared with only
over 3 pages on personal identity and over 3 pages on various other things). Thus, it is clear that
Hume wants to say something anew about belief by the time of writing the Appendix. So what is it
that he wants to say anew?

A brief and simple answer is that Hume wants to repudiate his early doctrine, according to which
belief consists in a higher degree of force and vivacity of the idea in question, and that he wants to
replace it by a different doctrine, according to which belief is a primitive notion irreducible to
anything else. A line of thought typical for the early doctrine would be something like: if we look for
the difference between belief and disbelief in the same content, we find it must consist in the degree
of force and vivacity, since there is nothing else available in the mind. And a line of thought typical
for the mature doctrine: belief is a manner of conception primitive and irreducible to anything more
primitive, and force and vivacity are but two of the words that may be used to refer to or to
characterize that primitive phaenomenon; fortunately, we all recognize well the primitive
phaenomenon itself, even if we cannot explain it.

A quotation for the first kind of passage would be e.g.

„When you wou'd any way vary the idea of a particular object, you can only encrease or diminish its
force and vivacity. If you make any other change on it, it represents a different object /.../. So that as
belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it can only bestow on our
ideas an additional force and vivacity.“ (T I.3.7.5)
And a quotation for the second:
„When I wou'd explain this manner (i.e. the different manner of conception), I scarce find any word
that fully answers the case, but am obliged to recourse to every one's feeling /.../. An idea assented
feels different from a fictitious idea /.../: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it
a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness. This variety of terms, which may
seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities more
present to us than fictions /.../. Provided we agree about the thing, 'tis needless to dispute about the
terms. /.../ I confess 'tis imposible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may
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make use of words, that express something near it. But its true and proper name is belief, which is a
term that every one sufficiently understands in common life.“ (TApp I.3.7.7)

Let me just point out three characteristics of the shift: first, the direction of explanation is reversed. In
the early doctrine, force and vivacity are taken for granted and they explain what belief is; in the
mature, belief is taken for granted and the relevant meaning of the words force and vivacity is drawn
from it. Second, the early doctrine involves a minimalist theory of mind according to which there is
nothing in the mind except for perceptions consisting of just two features: content and force/vivacity
(remember, if you keep the content identical, there is nothing left to be varied except force/vivacity);
the mature doctrine is incompatible with the minimalist theory (remember, force and vivacity are
terms that come near to what belief is, but not close enough – so if the content remains identical again,
there must be something else at work here than force/vivacity). Third, one can use the same phrase to
express the main point of either of the doctrines, namely, belief is an idea conceived in a lively
manner, but the meaning of the phrase differs according to which doctrine is expressed.

The new doctrine is present already in the Abstract in March 1740. It is there, but Hume also attempts
to play down or even hide the shift. Whatever his other motives could have been, it is clear that such
policy was required by the very genre of the text: one either writes an abstract of a lately published
book, or its emendation. Next, the new doctrine is prevalent both in the Appendix and in the first
Enquiry, with close textual resemblances. So, coming back to the main topic of my paper, we notice
that Hume abandoned the mistaken position prevalent in the Treatise, book I, sometime between
January 1739 and March 1740.

2.

Next, let us look at Kames's essay "Of belief". It begins as follows: "Belief is a term so familiar, as to
have escaped the inquiry of all philosophers, except the author of the treatise of human nature." /221 -
I quote from the first edition, published 1751/ And he continues: "This author has made two
propositions sufficiently evident; first, that belief is not any separate action or perception fo the mind,
but a modification of our perceptions, or a certain manner of conceiving propositions. 2d, That it does
not accompany every one of our perceptions." /221/ So far, Kames agrees with Hume (perhaps with a
slight shift of emphasis towards making propositional belief equally important as perceptual).
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The criticism begins in the second paragraph: "Having proved that belief is not a separate perception,
but only a modification of some percpetions, our author goes on to explain the nature of this
modification. And his doctrine is, that belief making no alterations upon the idea, as to its parts and
composition, must consist in a lively manner of conceiving the idea; and that, in reality, a lively idea
and belief are the same. I have a high opinion of this author's acuteness and penetration; but no
authority can prevail with me to embrace such a doctrine." /221-2/

Kames provides two arguments in support of his criticism. First, he claims that additional liveliness is
but one of the possible modifications of an idea – i.e. that there is no reason to assume the minimalist
theory that the early Hume works with. Thus, Hume's step from showing that belief must be a
modification of an idea to claiming that the modification in question must be a lively conception is
not a valid inference. /223/

Second, Kames finds an easy target in Hume's opinion that historical books present its objects in a
more lively manner than a parallel fictional narration can do. "Every man must judge for himself; I
cannot admit this to be my case", he says. "[C]an any man doubt, who has not an hypothesis to
defend, that poetry makes a stronger impression than history?" /223-4/

Then, Kames states his own view: "The truth of the matter is, that belief and a lively conception, are
really two distinct modifications of the idea; which, tho' often conjoined, are not only separable in the
imagination, but in fact are often separated." /225/ And again, two pages later: "the real truth appears
to be this. There is a peculiar manner of perceiving objects, and conceiving propositions, which, being
a simple feeling, cannot be described, but is expressed by the word belief." /227/

Let's compare these views of Kames with the relevant texts by Hume. It seems beyond doubt that:
(1) the target of Kames's criticism is the doctrine of the first book of the Treatise;
(2) both of the arguments provided by Kames in support of his criticism are also provided by Hume in
the Appendix in the context of his own self-criticism; and
(3) the positive doctrine embraced by Kames is identical with the doctrine stated by Hume
consistently in the Abstract, in the Appendix and in the Enquiry in the key respect of making belief a
primitive notion which cannot be further analyzed.
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3.

Notice that the emerging picture may seem rather puzzling. In 1751, Kames publishes an essay in
which he criticizes his friend Hume for a position which the latter held some 13 years ago and
corrected some 11 years ago, and he makes use of the same arguments and results in the same position
as the modified doctrine of the former - and there is not a trace of recognition of Hume's development
in Kames's essay. A strange case of mischievous plagiarism between friends, if one imagines Kames
launching these ideas any time close to 1751. Looking only at Kames’ text, no doubt we should
estimate its origin to be dated before Hume's Abstract, i.e. before March 1740.

That would relieve us from the mischievous plagiarism absurdity, sure: but then, why the text
remained unpublished for so long? And especially, if there are reasons which made Kames not to
publish it before 1750, what made him to change his mind and to go to press in 1751? As we shall see,
there are good answers to both of these questions.

First, Kames was a busy man, and it is possible that, without the unexpected free time he had in 1745-
47, when there were no court sesions in Edinburgh (after the Jacobite uprising of 1745), he would not
manage to write any philosophical book at this stage of his life. And, still with regard to the first
question, it is well known that Kames attempted to discourage Hume from publishing the
Philosophical Essays (i.e. the first Enquiry) as late as 1746, most likely out of prudential
considerations. It is plausible that, in case he had some similar manuscripts himself, he would
recommend to himself a similar policy of not publishing them. In retrospect we indeed see that his
original estimation was quite correct, in view of the seriously threatening campaign going on in 1753-
56 and striving after both Kames's and Hume's excommunication.

Now to the second question: are there good reasons to believe that, despite his antecedent worries, he
would go to press around 1750? Yes: one of them is that Kames could have been misled by the
relatively mild early reaction to Hume's Philosophical Essays, published in 1748, and that he could
have thought that the danger is not as great as he had imagined. And, moreover, if Kames considered
himself the author of some of the doctrines presented in Hume's Essays, his watching the rise of
Hume's fame could have easily made him to rush to the press with his own manuscript and to attempt
to claim the autorship.

This view of the situation would help us with one long-standing biographical difficulty. It is generally
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recognized that the friendship between Hume and Kames, arguably by far the most important
intellectual friendship of Hume's in the period 1738-1748, cooled down quite suddenly after the
publication of Hume's Essays in 1748. The standard explanation is that Kames was offended by
Hume's going to the press against Kames's recommendation. There can be some truth in it, but does it
not seem as quite an over-reaction to you? Should not a true friend be rather happy that his worries
did not come true? Under the assumption of a priority quarrel - and we know how bitter priority
quarrels can be - the sudden cooling down of the friendship would make a far better sense.

Thus, we see that the hypothesis of Kames' early criticism manages to remove two difficulties: the
apparent mischievous plagiarism and the unexplained cooling down of the friendship. And we see that
the late date of publication does not do much harm to the hypothesis, as there are reasons to believe
that Kames would not publish the stuff in question before 1750 if he had it. So did he have it?

Here, our evidence is only indirect, but it is quite good for an indirect one. First, we know that in July
1746, Hume commented on certain philosophical manuscripts sent to him by Kames. He does not
mention the essay "Of belief", but he mentions a text which is quite likely some version of the essay
"Of the Idea of Self and of Personal Identity", eventually to be printed immediately after the essay "Of
belief" in Kames' book (and one other that may also be an ancestor of one essay in the book). It is
worth noticing that Hume praises rather highly what Kames writes regarding personal identity: he
says it is "more satisfactory than any thing that had ever occur'd to me". Again, prima facie we could
imagine he is just polite. But since we know also that he did not include anything concerning personal
identity in the Enquiry it is quite possible that his high praise was meant seriously (and, in the context
of the picture emerging so far, personal identity is a good candidate for the second of the topics of
Kames' objections in the Boswell story: from the Appendix we certainly know that Hume's opinions
changed between January 1739 and November 1740, and from the 1746 letter we know that Hume
considers Kames' view of the topic better than his own).

For 1739, the evidence is far weaker, but at least we find Hume thanking Kames in a letter of 1 st July
for a manuscript received. Mossner and Klibansky comment that they did not identify the manuscript
in question, but at least we know that there was some manuscript traffic from Kames to Hume already
in early summer 1739. And, of course, it is difficult to imagine that a beginning ambitious philosopher
who experienced oral refutation of some of his views would not ask his older friend to send him
written notes summarizing the argument.
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On the basis of this evidence, I think we can consider the emerging narrative of Hume–Kames
relationship a hypothesis with high amount of plausibility. It is compatible with the known facts, and
it explains three or four known facts better than the alternative views (I mean the cooling of Hume–
Kames friendship; the manuscript received in early summer 1739; Kames‘s very late public criticism
of the 1739 book of his friend who meanwhile corrected his blunders himself; Hume‘s abandoning of
the project of the Treatise).

Let me sum up the narrative briefly: already in December 1737 Hume writes to Kames about his
"great Inclination to go down to Scotland this Spring to [...] have your Advice concerning my
philosophical Discoveries" /NHL 2/. Again in March 1738 he expects a lot from possible
philosophical conversation during Kames's planned visit to London /L 25/. In February 1739, when
Hume returns to Edinburgh and the first two books of the Treatise are already printed, he insists on
discussing them with Kames immediately, but the latter finds the book abstruse and unintelligible and
Hume's attempt to explain its message fails. But then Kames suddenly begins to understand the book
on his own and writes down objections, among them probably some concerning belief and some
concerning personal identity (probably in May 1739). After a discussion, Hume admits the objections
are justified, and in the following publications he modifies his position appropriately.

Then, there were no court sessions in Edinburgh for about two years in 1745-47, because of the
Jacobite uprising. That gave Kames enough leisure not only to write his Essays upon several Subjects
(published 1747), but probably also to return to his philosophical notes from 1739 and to give them
somewhat more polished and literary form. He circulates the resulting essays privately around 1746,
without intending to publish them. But after the appearance of Hume's Philosophical Essays in 1748
he feels offended, because Hume did not acknowledge - even if anonymously - his friend's
contribution. When it seems the reaction of the bigots is not all that agressive, he goes to the press
himself with, among other things, his old criticism of Hume's original position in the Treatise.
Because of preserving both his and Hume's anonymity he does not explain the circumstances.
However, the threatening campaign in 1753-56 discouraged Kames from claiming his authorship of
some Hume's philosophical ideas again for many years to follow, and Kames modified the second
edition of his Essays accordingly.

There is a fair amount of conjecture in this narrative and I do not insist that it must be true in all
details. What I claim is that
(1) there is a striking similarity between Kames argument against Hume's Treatise in his essay "Of
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belief" on the one hand and Hume's own mature position in the Abstract, the Appendix and the
Enquiry on the other; and
(2) that, given both the external and the internal evidence, the most plausible explanation of that
similarity is that some germinal version of the argument of Kames's essay "Of belief" was known to
David Hume before he composed the Abstract.

If what I say is sound, there follows a number of consequences:

- In Hume's philosophical development, the shift between the first two books of the Treatise on the
one hand and the Abstract on the other is highly important (and, as a corollary, one could add that the
editorial practice of inserting the passages from the Appendix into the main text is not preferable)
- Certain components of the philosophical position of the first two books of the Treatise are untenable,
Hume realized it and modified his position accordingly
- Quite likely, one of the significant influences leading to Hume's noticing the flaws in his early
position were the objections by Henry Home from May or June 1739. Perhaps this influence was
decisive.
- Hume was not a philosophical solitaire for all his life, and his communication with Kames – while
their friendship lasted – was of genuine relevance to him.