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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC HISTORY

Exploring the Roots of

Systematic Tax Avoidance
in Greece
Business, the Tax System and
Tax Conscience, 1955–2008
Zoi Pittaki
 Palgrave Studies in Economic History

Series Editor
Kent Deng, London School of Economics, London, UK
Palgrave Studies in Economic History is designed to illuminate and enrich
our understanding of economies and economic phenomena of the past.
The series covers a vast range of topics including financial history, labour
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http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14632
 Zoi Pittaki

Exploring the Roots

of Systematic Tax
Avoidance in Greece
Business, the Tax System and Tax Conscience,
1955–2008
Zoi Pittaki
Brunel Business School
Brunel University London
London, UK

ISSN 2662-6497 ISSN 2662-6500 (electronic)

Palgrave Studies in Economic History
ISBN 978-3-030-71978-4 ISBN 978-3-030-71979-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71979-1

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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 Contents

1 Introduction 1
2 Unstable Politics, Unfair Taxation and a Public
Administration Afflicted by Clientelism: Key
Information About the Greek State 39
3 A ‘Sibylline Authority’ in a Growing Economy,
1955–1967 63
4 ‘No Mutiny Will Be Allowed’: Dismantling Democracy
and Delegitimising the Tax System, 1967–1974 117
5 A ‘Tax Surprise’ Amidst Economic Recession,
1974–1981 163
6 A ‘Wild Tax Hunt’ in the Era of Rapid
De-Industrialisation: 1981–1989 205
7 A Tale of Hope, Disillusionment and Crisis: 1989–2008 247
8 Conclusion 255

Bibliography 267
Index 283

v
 Abbreviations

ASDY Public Service Commission

CET Common External Tariff
EEC European Economic Community
EMU European Monetary Union
FGI Federation of Greek Industrialists
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IMF International Monetary Fund
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
PASOK Panhellenic Socialistic Movement

vii
 List of Charts

Chart 2.1 Taxes on income, profits and capital gains, % GDP

(Source Revenue Statistics, OECD.stat, https://stats.
oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV [accessed
13/12/2015]) 52
Chart 2.2 Total tax revenue, % GDP (Source Ibid.) 52
Chart 3.1 Manufacturing, gross private investment in fixed capital,
% GDP (1948–1967) (Source Long-term Statistical Series
of the Greek Economy, pp. 27; 10) 68
Chart 3.2 Number of new factories and workshops of industrial
and handicraft enterprises established (1955–1967)
(Source Hellenic Statistical Authority, Statistical Yearbook
of Greece, various issues) 70
Chart 3.3 Number of extended factories and workshops
of industrial and handicraft enterprises (1955–1967)
(Source Statistical Yearbook of Greece, various issues) 71
Chart 3.4 Tax revenue, % GDP (1955–1967) (Source Long-term
Statistical Series of the Greek Economy, pp. 13; 86–87) 74
Chart 3.5 Mines and quarries, gross private investment in fixed
capital, % GDP (1959–1970) (Source Long-term
Statistical Series of the Greek Economy, pp. 27; 10) 78
Chart 4.1 Annual rate of increase, gross private investment in fixed
capital in manufacturing, 1967–1974 (Source: Long-term
Statistical Series of the Greek Economy, p. 27) 128

ix
x LIST OF CHARTS

Chart 4.2 CHROTEX S.A., fixed assets’ value, 1967–1974 (Source

CHROTEX Archive, Board of Directors Meeting
Minutes, various dates) 136
Chart 4.3 Manufacturing, gross private investment in fixed capital,
% GDP (1967–1974) (Source: Long-term Statistical Series
of the Greek Economy, pp. 10; 27) 137
Chart 4.4 Number of extended factories and workshops
of industrial and handicraft enterprises, 1967–1974
(Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, various issues) 138
Chart 4.5 Number of new factories and workshops of industrial
and handicraft enterprises established, 1967–1974
(Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, various issues) 139
Chart 4.6 Tax revenue, % GDP (1967–1974) (Source: Long-term
Statistical Series of the Greek Economy, pp. 13; 86–87) 149
Chart 5.1 Annual rate of increase, gross private investment in fixed
capital in manufacturing, 1974–1981 (Source: Long-term
Statistical Series of the Greek Economy, p. 27) 174
Chart 5.2 Manufacturing, gross private investment in fixed capital,
% GDP (1974–1981) (Source: Long-term Statistical Series
of the Greek Economy, pp. 10; 27) 174
Chart 5.3 Number of extended factories and workshops
of industrial and handicraft enterprises, 1974–1981
(Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, various issues) 175
Chart 5.4 Number of new factories and workshops of industrial
and handicraft enterprises, 1974–1981 (Source: Statistical
Yearbook of Greece, various issues) 175
Chart 5.5 Tax revenue, % GDP, 1974–1981 (Source: Long-term
Statistical Series of the Greek Economy, pp. 13; 86–87) 180
Chart 6.1 Annual rate of increase, gross private investment in fixed
capital in manufacturing, 1981–1990 (Source: Long-term
Statistical Series of the Greek Economy, p. 27. The rate
of increase for 1986 is very small (0.11%) so it is
not visible in the chart. The figures for 1989 and 1990
are provisional and an estimation, respectively) 213
Chart 6.2 Number of new factories and workshops of industrial
and handicraft enterprises, 1981–1990 (Source: Statistical
Yearbook of Greece, various issues) 214
Chart 6.3 Number of extended factories and workshops
of industrial and handicraft enterprises, 1981–1990
(Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, various issues) 214
 LIST OF CHARTS xi

Chart 6.4 Manufacturing, gross private investment in fixed capital,

% GDP (1981–1988) (Source: Long-term Statistical Series
of the Greek Economy, pp. 27, 10) 216
Chart 6.5 Tax revenue, % GDP (1981–1988) (Source: Long-term
Statistical Series of the Greek Economy, pp. 13; 86–87) 221
 List of Tables

Table 3.1 Ratio of total special allowances to taxable profits 78

Table 3.2 GDP growth rate (%), 1950–1967 91
Table 3.3 Share of income tax of legal entities over total direct taxes 97
Table 4.1 GDP growth rate (%), 1965–1974 122
Table 4.2 Direct taxes over total tax revenues (%), 1958–1975 130
Table 5.1 GDP growth rate (%), 1974–1981 169
Table 6.1 GDP growth rate (%), 1980–1990 209
Table 6.2 Public expenditure, % GDP (1955–1986) 209

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In a letter leaked to the Financial Times in early March 2015, the ex-
Finance Minister of Greece Yanis Varoufakis suggested that the Greek
state could use undercover tax agents in order to curb tax evasion. The
idea was for the government to have ‘students, housekeepers and even
tourists to serve as undercover tax inspectors’, by wiring them ‘with audio
and video equipment to track down lawbreakers’.1 Such a measure would
act as a deterrent to potential tax evaders and would also ‘[engender] a
new tax compliance culture’ in Greece.2
No matter how absurd this idea sounds, the mere fact that it was
proposed by a then member of the Greek government indicates how
serious the problem of tax evasion has been for Greece and how diffi-
cult it has been for state mechanisms to cope with it.3 More recently,

1 The letter was addressed to the president of the Eurogroup and Dutch minister
of Finance Jeroen Dijsselbloem and it contained a number of suggested measures for
the reform of the Greek economy (see Peter Spiegel, ‘Greece Proposes Tourists as
Tax Inspectors’, The Financial Times, 6.3.2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b65fa81c-
c411-11e4-a02e-00144feab7de.html#axzz3pOaWCPUW [accessed 2.11.2015]).
2 Spiegel, and Ian Traynor and Helena Smith, ‘Wired-Up Tax Snoopers Could
Be Unleashed in Greece’, The Guardian, 6.3.2015. http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/mar/06/wired-up-tax-snoopers-could-be-unleashed-in-greece [accessed
2.11.2015].
3 For the purposes of this research, tax evasion is defined as every illegal act or omission
aiming to the reduction of the tax liability or the payment of no tax at all. Tax avoidance,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2021
Z. Pittaki, Exploring the roots of systematic tax avoidance in Greece,
Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71979-1_1
2 Z. PITTAKI

reports suggested that the country has the second-highest level of VAT
tax evasion in Europe.4 It is characteristic that, according to Varoufakis,
‘the prospects of successfully countering tax dodging are dismal because
of the demoralised and understaffed state of the tax inspection service’.5
This last point indicates that tax evasion, a ‘burning issue’ all around
the EU,6 is, for the Greek case, also an outcome of administrative prob-
lems that have been burdening the country’s system of taxation for
decades. These problems mainly stem from the characteristics of the tax
system such as its complexity, constant change and tax officers’ inad-
equate training. This reality has made it particularly challenging for
Greek taxpayers to understand and comply with the tax legislation, and
equally difficult for the members of the tax services to manage the tax
administration mechanism.
In fact, the problems of tax administration have been a topical issue
in a number of European states. This is indicated through the Euro-
pean Commission’s 2014 Competitiveness Report, which contained the
results of a survey exploring the dimensions of public administration
that most impede firms’ operations across a number of European coun-
tries.7 The survey utilised business perceptions methodologies and drew
primary data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. It examined 15
different dimensions of public administration, among which were corrup-
tion, ineffective justice systems, customs and trade, labour regulation, tax
administration and tax rates. The finding of the survey was that the most
severe obstacles to firm growth are tax administration (not tax rates),

a term also used here, has the same results, but is achieved through technically legal acts,
which do not entail the breach of the rule of law (for a more extensive analysis see Nikos
Tatsos, Shadow Economy and Tax Evasion in Greece [Athens: Papazisi, 2001], pp. 16–26,
in Greek).
4 Spyros Dimitrelis, ‘Greece Loses the Revenue from Three ENFIA Taxes Due to
VAT Evasion’, Capital.gr, 05.09.2019, https://www.capital.gr/oikonomia/3380524/
treis-enfia-xanei-i-ellada-apo-ti-forodiafugi-fpa [accessed 10.07.2020].
5 Traynor and Smith, ‘Wired-Up’.
6 Vanessa Houlder, ‘Europe’s Shadow Economy Costs e454bn in ‘Lost’ Taxes’, The
Financial Times, 24.9.2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9c30cc14-5e1c-11e5-a28b-
50226830d644.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3mpp1uGbt [accessed 5.12.2015].
7 The study covered 11 European Union Member States, four candidate countries, one
applicant country and one country that is neither a candidate nor an applicant.
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

corruption and ineffective justice systems.8 Therefore, the study indicates

that tax administration is perceived as a common problem in many Euro-
pean states. Due to this reason, the implications of the examination done
here can prove useful not only for Greece but for these countries too.
This book examines the problems in the Greek system of taxation,
explaining also how they affected business, from the mid-1950s up to the
late 2000s. The mid-1950s were chosen as a starting point because they
witnessed efforts to reform the tax system as well as promote industry
and the development of the economy as a whole, in the aftermath of
the Second World War. The late 2000s were another critical point for
the Greek economy, since they marked the period before the devastating
economic crisis that erupted in the country.
It should be noted that, in economic terms, the period examined
here experienced high rates of growth for the most part. Still, and this
is telling of how much taxation has contributed also to the economic
crisis currently affecting the country, even during these years of growth,
the problematic aspects of the tax system were perceived to have nega-
tively affected the economy. The analysis here shows this by focusing on
entrepreneurship; there is an emphasis on manufacturing industry, the
largest industry of the secondary sector, which, as explained later, was the
most dynamic sector of the Greek economy for the majority of the years
covered here.
The view of Xenophon Zolotas, the eminent economist who served
as the Head of the Bank of Greece for more than 20 years,9 confirms

8 European Commission, Helping Firms Grow, European Competitiveness Report

2014, Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2014)277 final. http://ec.europa.
eu/growth/industry/competitiveness/reports/eu-competitiveness-report/index_en.htm
[accessed 12.3.2016], pp. 136–137.
9 Zolotas served as a co-Governor of the Bank of Greece in 1944–1945 and
as a Governor in 1955–1967 and 1974–1981. See Kostas Mavragannis, ‘110 Years
from the Birth of Xenophon Zolotas: His Life Through Unpublished Photographs’,
The Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.gr/2014/12/13/110-xronia-xenophon-
zolotas_n_6317764.html?utm_hp_ref=greece [accessed 15.12.2014], in Greek. Zolotas
was also the non-party Prime Minister of Greece in 1989–1990, see ‘Xenophon
Zolotas’. http://www.intercomprehension.eu/modules/intercom_new/template.php?mod
ule=3&activity=1&sc=9&langID=en&w_langID=gr [accessed 15.12.2014], in Greek.
Also, Zolotas, along with Randolph Burgess of the United States, Sir Paul Gore-Booth
of Great Britain and Bernard Clappier of France, was part of the group of the ‘four wise
men’ which, in early 1960, being appointed to work upon the United States’ proposal for
a reorganisation of the OEEC, prepared a report that led to the creation of the OECD
4 Z. PITTAKI

that the sort of problematic aspects of the tax system examined here
created difficulties for business. According to the journalist Nikos Niko-
laou, Zolotas always had a standard response when asked about how
to promote business investment in the country: ‘What the entrepreneur
needs is not the introduction of incentives but the removal of disincen-
tives. That is, he needs to stop being chased by the tax officers, the
ministries’ bureaucrats, the immoral members of the local authorities,
etc’.10 In broad terms, Zolotas’ view was similar to that of Johannes
Witteveen, the director of the International Monetary Fund from 1973
to 1978. Witteveen considered that a stable tax regime is one of the most
important conditions for the promotion of private investment.11
The coming chapters show that the Greek tax system was burdened
by the complexity and continuous changes of the tax laws as well as the
insufficient organisation and bureaucratic rigidities12 of the tax services.
Entrepreneurs’ relations with tax officers were also problematic, with
tax officers often accused to be lacking in training,13 arbitrary in their
decisions14 and sometimes corrupt. It seems that such problems created
difficulties for business in the post-Second World War setting. Due to the
complexity and the frequent change of tax legislation, entrepreneurs knew
that they were constantly at risk of being accused of breaking the tax law.
It becomes clear from the evidence that will be presented here that this
was a source of constant upset for them. At the same time, because of the
arbitrariness of the system, taxes were the object of a constant negotiation
between business and the tax authorities. Entrepreneurs could never be
certain about where they stood with regard to their tax liabilities. This
increased their vexation even more.

in December of the same year. See ‘OECD agreement’, CQ Almanac. http://library.cqp

ress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal61-1373318 [accessed 15.12.2014].
10 Nikos Nikolaou, ‘We Need to Get Rid of Disincentives’, To Vima, 14.11.2004.
http://www.tovima.gr/finance/article/?aid=162410 [accessed 15.12.2014], in Greek.
11 See Chapter 5, p. 20.
12 The term bureaucratic rigidities denotes the various cumbersome, time-consuming
and inflexible practices that were followed in the tax offices.
13 That is, tax officers were the object of criticism with regards to their knowledge of
accounting and tax legislation.
14 That is, that their decisions were contingent solely upon their discretion, without
been controlled by law or any relevant regulations.
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

With this evidence in mind, the research also throws light on some
of the main causes of the current economic crisis affecting Greece, as
the difficulties facing entrepreneurship seem to have contributed to the
general weakness of the economy and to the gradual emergence of the
crisis. Of course, what also contributed to the crisis was the great increase
in public deficit from the 1980s onwards, from 8.7 between 1980 and
1985 to 11.7 between 1990 and 1995.15 One of the causes of the contin-
uously growing public deficit was tax evasion, which also started growing
significantly from the late 1970s.16
It will be argued in Chapter 2 that tax evasion occurred mainly as a
result of the perceptions that the tax system was money-driven and unfair.
Indeed, tax evasion has been to a large extent an outcome of Greeks’
low tax conscience, where tax conscience can be defined as the moral
sense of right and wrong guiding tax-paying behaviour.17 Through this
perspective, tax evasion in Greece has often taken the form of a justified
reaction towards an unfair, untrustworthy and therefore illegitimate tax
system. The term tax conscience is considered of value here, precisely
because it denotes that Greeks were aware that avoiding paying taxes
was an unlawful act, they did commit it though because their conscience
allowed it: as noted above, it seems that they considered tax evasion to
be a justifiable practice.
For example, a 1953 article noted that the fact that there were people
having their salaries ‘decimated by the state each month’ whereas others
managed to ‘slip through the fingers’ of tax authorities, was a sign of an
undeveloped tax conscience. The state never managed to cultivate citi-
zens’ tax conscience, it was noted, mainly because it lacked the necessary
‘inspiring ethos’. According to the author, this was one of the reasons why
tax evasion had become ‘exonerated’, taking the form of taxpayers’ ‘just

15 Barry Bosworth and Trifon Kollintzas, Economic Growth in Greece: Past Performance
and Future Prospects, in Greece’s Economic Performance and Prospects, eds Ralph C. Bryan,
Nikolaos C. Garganas and Georgios S. Tavlas (Athens: The Bank of Greece and The
Brookings Institution, 2002), p. 177.
16 K. Kalyvianakis et al., Tax Regime, Shadow Economy and Tax Evasion in Greece
(Athens: Papazisis, 1993), pp. 275–279.
17 In Oxford Dictionaries conscience is defined as ‘[a] person’s moral sense of right
and wrong, viewed as acting as a guide to one’s behaviour’ (see ‘Conscience’, Oxford
Dictionaries. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/conscience [accessed
2.12.2015]).
6 Z. PITTAKI

defence’. In order to have conscientious taxpayers, it was stressed, the

state should ‘impose taxes with dispassionate and honest conscience’.18
The illegitimacy of the tax system was an outcome of other factors
too. When the independent Greek state was established right after the
end of the Second World War, the system’s primary scope was to collect
revenues, without having any significant redistributive and social dimen-
sions.19 Due to this reason, people saw the tax system mostly as a
mechanism that ‘drained’ money away from their pockets and this natu-
rally made them eager to avoid paying taxes. To this also contributed
the fact that the distribution of the tax burden was considered unfair,
because, among others, the burden for the lower income brackets was
significantly higher than that of the higher ones.20 There were also a series
of features of the tax system that affected all tax-paying citizens, irrespec-
tive of income class. One such feature, which again harmed severely the
system’s legitimacy, was taxes in favour of third parties. As explained in
more detail in the next chapter, these taxes were imposed on transactions
in order to fund groups with great negotiating power, such as lobbies,
trade unions, professional bodies, etc.
A further cause of tax evasion has been the very high level of corrup-
tion in the country,21 which damaged people’s confidence towards the
state and again increased incentives to avoid paying taxes. The first study
examining Greeks’ perceptions about corruption, that is, their perceptions
about ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’,22 took place in 1996

18 Vovolini Archive, ‘Notes—Tax Evasion’, Viomichaniki Epitheorissis, Vol. 20,

September 1953, p. 302.
19 As Giouras and Psalidopoulos’ work indicates, this was also the character of tax
policies followed by the German occupation forces during the war: Thanasis Giouras and
Michalis Psalidopoulos, Occupation, Nazism and Greek Economy—Official Reports and
Memoirs (Athens: Metamesonikties Ekdoseis, 2015), pp. 19–20; 34; 224–246, in Greek.
20 Tatsos, Shadow Economy, p. 287.
21 International Monetary Fund, Greece, Selected Issues, Country Report No.13/155,
June 2013. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13155.pdf [accessed
1.11.2015], p. 26.
22 International Monetary Fund, Corruption: Costs and Mitigating Strategies, IMF Staff
Discussion Note, May 2016. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1605.
pdf [accessed 8.10.2016], p. 3. One of the means through which corruption is facil-
itated is bribing, that is, the offering, to those holding public office, of ‘something,
usually money, to gain an illicit advantage’ (see ‘What Is Bribery and Corruption?’, Tack-
ling Bribery and Corruption. http://www.anticorruption.ie/en/acjs/pages/fq08000018
[accessed 8.10.2016]).
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

and was based on an opinion poll conducted on a national level. The

survey indicated that 67% of the respondents agreed with the statement
that ‘the State is corrupt’, with the tax services characterised as the most
corrupt sector of public administration.23
This latter point shows that tax evasion has been an indication of the
taxpayers’ doubt about the legitimacy of taxes and, by an extension, the
legitimacy of the state that imposed such taxes. Ultimately, it was an
expression of doubt about the authority of the Greek state itself. Apart
from being a factor of uncertainty that affected business, taxation was also
an issue, about which the lack of trust between the state and civil society
in Greece was expressed in its most direct manner.
By analysing the administrative weaknesses of the Greek system of taxa-
tion, this work suggests some of the reforms that the system needs today,
especially in view of the current economic situation of the country.24
However, the argument presented here has wider theoretical implications
too, as it shows that the socio-political and economic environment is of
crucial importance for the development of entrepreneurship. This was
suggested through the work of William Baumol, who indicated that tax
rules influence the allocation of entrepreneurship into either productive or
unproductive and even destructive activities.25 Not only that, but, as the
work of the Austrian sociologist Rudolf Goldscheid has shown, taxation
influences and shapes state policies.26
The present research follows a perspective which differs from the usual
economic one, by focusing mainly on the problems eroding the admin-
istrative structures of the tax system and not on the level of taxes or
on tax rates. Of course, as will be shown in the next pages, there have
been theoretical contributions indicating that tax rates and the amount of
money that people pay in taxes do indeed affect entrepreneurship. And

23 Tatsos, Shadow Economy, pp. 247–249.

24 Philip Stephens, ‘An Offer That Greece Should Not Refuse’, The Financial Times,
4.6.2015. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f6127244-09e1-11e5-b6bd-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz3dJwTCDQG [accessed 12.9.2015].
25 See pp. 10–12 for an analysis of Baumol’s perspective.
26 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, ‘The Crisis of the Tax State’, in Joseph A. Schumpeter:
The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism, ed R. Swedberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, [1918], 1991), p. 100 and also Rudolf Goldscheid, ‘A Sociological
Approach to Problems of Public Finance’ in Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, eds
R. A. Musgrave and A. T. Peacock (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., [1925], 1958),
p. 202; 210.
8 Z. PITTAKI

it is well-noted that Greek entrepreneurs complained about the level of

tax rates too, especially after the mid-1970s, when the tax burden for
the whole of the economy started to increase significantly. However, it is
interesting to note that, as will be shown in detail in the next chapter,
after the mid-1970s, it was not entrepreneurs who bore the majority of
the tax burden in Greece. Additionally, their share of this burden was
continuously decreasing for the majority of the years explored here. More
generally, Greece’s share of taxes on income, profits and capital gains (but
also that of total tax revenue) over GDP was for most of the period exam-
ined significantly lower than the OECD average.27 Therefore, it seems
that the obstacles that the tax system created for entrepreneurship came
from the way it functioned, and not from the level of taxes.

The Tax System as an Institution

The theoretical basis behind the topic of the present research is that the
system of taxation is an institution of great significance for every economy.
The work of Douglas North is famous for indicating the importance of
institutions. He defined them as ‘the humanly devised constraints that
structure political, economic and social interaction’.28 North noted that
humans use their perceptions about the world in order to structure their
environment and reduce uncertainty when interacting with each other.
In such a process, the way that perceptions transform the ‘human envi-
ronment’ has to do with the institutional structure. North viewed such a
structure as ‘a combination of formal rules, informal constraints, and their
enforcement characteristics’.29 It must be noted here that the system of
taxation is viewed not from the perspective of Douglas North, but that
of historical institutionalism, more details about which will be offered in
the next pages.
A set of rules that plays a fundamental role in every function of the
modern state is the system of taxation. This was demonstrated through

27 See Chapter 2.
28 Douglass C. North, ‘Institutions’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 1 (1991),
p. 97. See also Geoffrey M. Hodgson, ‘What Are Institutions?’, Journal of Economic Issues,
XL, 1 (2006), p. 2, who defined institutions as ‘systems of established and prevalent social
rules that structure social interactions’.
29 Douglass C. North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 6.
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

the work of Rudolf Goldscheid. Specifically, in The Crisis of the Tax State,
Schumpeter quoted the following famous phrase by Goldscheid: ‘The
budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies’.30
This phrase denotes that, a state’s needs for funding, usually covered
through taxes, is the decisive factor for the various policies undertaken
and, eventually, for the general economic profile the state will adopt.
According to this perspective, the emergence of specific types of economic
activities, the economic prevalence of specific social classes as well as the
establishment of specific types of industry, are all an outcome of the way
the system of taxation of a state has been structured.
The importance of taxation is underlined also in a subsequent work
of Goldscheid, where he embarked on an analysis that demonstrated the
way that society affects and largely shapes financial and political condi-
tions within a state. According to his view, social needs determine to
a great extent the interconnection between public revenue and public
expenditure. In such a framework, taxation seems to be a factor of crucial
importance, as ‘[t]ax struggles were the oldest form of class struggle’,
‘fiscal matters were an important contributory cause even in the mightiest
spiritual movements of mankind’ and even ‘the great religious revolutions
can be proved to have been strongly rooted in intolerable tax pressure’.31
Goldscheid also maintained that there is a direct link between the state
and households, as the latter are merely a reflection of the former. The
‘soundness’ of the state, he noted, defines public economy and morality
and thus also the economic and moral position of individuals. Therefore,
he asked: ‘[w]hat is the point of eternal complaints about low tax ethics,
if the financial practices of the State and other public authorities cannot
stand the test even of economic standards, let alone moral ones?’32
The arbitrary character of the tax system and the regressive distribution
of the tax burden in Greece33 was, for me, an example of state prac-
tices that did not seem to follow specific economic or moral standards
of fairness. In this way, they contributed to the very high levels of tax

30 Schumpeter, p. 100. This phrase is found in this work: Rudolf Goldscheid and Robert
Lazarsfeld, ‘Staatsozialismus oder Staatskapitalismus - Ein finanzsoziologischer Beitrag zur
Lösung des Staatsschulden-Problems, Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 11,
2 (1917/1918), pp. 255–259.
31 Rudolf Goldscheid, ‘A Sociological Approach’, p. 202.
32 Ibid., p. 210.
33 See Chapter 2, for more detail.
Another random document with
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hablauan, ni en el puesto ni
meneo mostrauan algun
descuydo deshonesto, y
solamente se reyan de aquellos
que hasta entonçes por solo el
hábito, estado y opinion
venerauan honrrauan y obedeçian
pensando que en si fuessen de
algun valor y preçio: y agora se
acusan por verdaderos ydiotas
engañados, pues ven por
experiençia desto sus desmanes,
su poco recogimiento y poca
vergüença. Quando los ven tan
desordenados, descomedidos en
su comer y beber, tan infames y
disolutos en sus injurias, con
tantas vozes y grita por tan façiles
y ligeras ocasiones venir á las
manos y cabello; y sobre todo me
admiraua ver aquel monstruo de
naturaleza Alcidamas cura de San
Nicholas tan desbaratado en su
vibir y costumbres, obras,
conuersaçion, que nos dexó
confusos y admirados a quantos
estauamos alli. Sin empacho
ninguno de las dueñas hazia
cosas de su cuerpo y partes
vergonçosas, y dezia de su
lengua que avn avria empacho de
lo dezir y hazer vn muy profano
joglar.
Miçilo.—Por çierto que me has
admirado, gallo, con tu tan
horrenda historia, o por mejor
dezir, atroz tragedia. ¡Quán
comun cosa es faltar los hombres
de su mayor obligaçion!
Supliquemos a nuesto Señor los
haga tan buenos que no
herremos en los imitar, y
merezçan con su ofiçio inpetrar
graçia de nuestro Señor para sí, y
para nos, y auisemos de oy más a
todos los perlados que pues en la
iglesia son pastores deste ganado
no permitan que en los tales
auctos y çelebridades de misas
nueuas aya estos ayuntamientos,
porque vengan a tanto desman.
Gallo.—Ya, Miçilo, quiero dexar
guerras y contiendas y heridas y
muertes de honbres con las
cuales te he escandalizado hasta
aqui, y quiero que agora oyas la
más alta y más feliçissima
nauegaçion que nunca a honbres
aconteçio. En fin oyras vna
admirable ventura que te quiero
contar, la qual juntamente con el
prospero suçeso te dara tanto
deleyte que holgarás
grandemente de le [980] oyr; y
pues es ya venido el dia abre la
tienda, que en el canto que se
sigue lo oyras.

Fin del deçimo septimo canto del

gallo.
 NOTAS:
[845] G., segun tengo entendido por tu esperimentada narraçion
es la mejor y más segura.
[846] me ha pareçido.
[847] G., que comunmente en semejantes lugares suelen passar
[848] G., monstruosas y prodigiosas.
[849] G., puedan entretener el tiempo.
[850] R., Jambulo.
[851] R., de oçeano.
[852] G., escriuan.
[853] G., y.
[854] G., del dezir.
[855] G., poeta.
[856] G., con tu.
[857] G., prometiste.
[858] G., en ello hago ser publico el desorden y poca templança
con que esta gente consagrada toma semejantes ayuntamientos;
los quales les auian de ser vedados por sus perlados y juezes, y
a estos querria yo ser destos relactor, porque lo podrian remediar,
antes que no a tí; porque en contartelo solo doy ocasion con mi
lengua a que auiendo tú plazer, te rias y mofes de aquella
consagrada caterua qne está en la tierra en lugar de la diuina
magestad.
[859] G., que jures de no lo.
[860] G., será.
[861] G., el fundamento.
[862] G., fiesta.
[863] G., tenía.
[864] G., llamaua.
[865] G., que no se si le conoçiste. Este mançebo.
[866] G., y el.
[867] G., de su parte.
[868] G., eran muchos.
[869] G., de la historia.
[870] G., del año.
[871] G., solenidad.
[872] G., boluimonos.
[873] G., alli.
[874] G., auia otra.
[875] G., el missa cantano.
[876] G., otra mano.
[877] G., de San Julian.
[878] G., su.
[879] G., gran.
[880] G., se sento.
[881] G., fueron.
[882] G., por ser más viejo.
[883] G., que la sçiençia son canas en el hombre.
[884] G., asentó.
[885] G., asento.
[886] Y luego dixo.
[887] G., de la Gramatica.
[888] R. (Nota marginal) Gramatica. Figura antiptosis est casus
pro casu posi.
[889] G., notandolos de ambiçiosos, glotones y de poco sosiego:
fingiendose todos tener cuenta con el plato, pero más la tenian
con lo que entre los clerigos pasaua.
[890] G., tras.
[891] G., que rodauan.
[892] G., pastel.
[893] G., de la sala.
[894] G., agora, como sali.
[895] G., apresuré por acabar presto lo misa, que avu no me
sufria.
[896] G., ser.
[897] G., entre.
[898] R. (Tachado) has de saber que.
[899] G., la arroxo.
[900] G., quebro.
[901] G., y no.
[902] G., rodeaua.
[903] G., por todas.
[904] G., a las.
[905] G., grande.
[906] G., prestando y cambiando auia adquerido.
[907] G, y vituperaua.
[908] G., mugeres; y ansi, pensandolo remediar Aristeneto
dandole muy bien a beber y que con esto le haria su amigo, ansi
mando.
[909] G., y en alta voz, que todos con silençio le oyeron,
hablando con la muger de Aristeneto, madre de misa cantano:
señora Magençia (que ansi se llamaua) yo bebo a tí; y mira que
has de beber otro tanto del vaso como yo bebiere, so pena que
no lo beuiendo se arroxe lo que quedare sobre ty; y alçando la
copa bebio della casi vn azumbre y luego la mando tornar a
enchir, y estendiendo el braço la dio a Magençia, diziendola que
sino beuia incurreria en la pena puesta y que la abrá de executar;
y Magençia encogiendose con gran verguença, diziendo que no
acostumbraua beuer, reusó el vaso con miedo que Alçidamas no
la afrontasse; y teniendo lo mesmo los combidados trabajaron
por le apartar fuera, pero él juró por sus ordenes que sino daua
vn fiador que beuiesse por ella que se lo auia de derramar
acuestas; y el cura de San Miguel, que alcançaua buena parte
deste menester se leuantó y dando a entender que lo hazia por
defender a la señora huespeda y empedir que no la afrontasse
Alçidamas, pues este se leuantó de su lugar y saliendo en el
medio de la sala dixo a Alçidamas: dame acá la copa, que yo
quiero cumplir por la señora Magençia; y ansi tomando el vaso en
sus manos beuio vn terrible golpe, que a juizio de todos igualó.
[910] G., amago determinado de arrojar sobre Magençia lo que
en el vaso quedó, pero el cura.
[911] G., tomó.
[912] G., y hizole.
[913] G., y Eustochio, cura de San Martin, porque a todos auia
injuriado con sus donayres; y por el contrario, en fabor de
Alçidamas, por ser sus vezinos y amigos viejos se leuantaron el
sacristan de San Miguel y el cura de San Juan y el cura de San
Pedro y el cura de Santa Marina.
Miçilo.—Que, alli vino el cura de San Pedro? no faltarian
gargajos y importunidad en su vejez.
Gallo.—Alli vino con asco y desgraçia de todos; que en vna silla
le truxieron porque estaua muy enfermo.
[914] G., arroxadas.
[915] G., como graniço.
[916] G., en.
[917] G., a que las damas çerrassen las orejas y avn los ojos.
[918] G., y ansi a este tono si.
[919] G., este tiempo.
[920] G., con vna cuerda.
[921] G., de la sala, començaron.
[922] G., de sautoriçada.
[923] G., y proçedio el.
[924] G., por mi amor.
[925] G., hazian.
[926] G., dexauan.
[927] G., limpiarse el.
[928] G., suçias maneras de festejar, porque avn viles joglares se
desdeñarian tratarlas, por no perder credito con el auditorio.
Estando en esto que todos callauan.
[929] Falta este epígrafe en el ms.
[930] G., ayas.
[931] G., mio.
[932] G., fue infamado con peligro y jatura de mi honrra.
[933] G., que tenía.
[934] G., injurias.
[935] G., los.
[936] diziendo tú a todos que.
[937] G., los.
[938] G., en.
[939] G., ay estan en tu.
[940] G., bueluas.
[941] G., lo.
[942] G., dixe.
[943] G., la oyste.
[944] G., començaron todos a murmurar.
[945] G., vnos dezian que era aguda, a lo menos los amigos de
Etemocles, y dezian que era muy sabiamiente escripta, que bien
pareçia ser de letrado. Los contrarios dezian que no era muy
cuerda y acusauan a Etemocles de hombre gloton y dezian que
la auia escripto como afrontado por no le aver combidado a la
fiesta y comida. Estando...
[946] G., graciosa.
[947] G., representó ingeniosamente la proçesion que hacen los
portugueses el dia de Corpus Cristi y predicó el sermon que ellos
suelen predicar el dia que celebran la batalla del Aljubarrota.
[948] G., despues tañendo con su laud començó en copla de
repente a motejar a todos quantos estauan en la mesa, sin
perjudicar ni afrontar a ninguno, y reyendo donayres.
[949] G., con el.
[950] G., dexando el.
[951] G., procuró por le.
[952] G., tomo.
[953] G., osasse.
[954] G., y cruel como de la Farsalia.
[955] G., acudio.
[956] G., y que el xoglar auia dado a Alçidamas con el palo vn
gran golpe que le descalabró mal. De manera que todos aquellos
curas fueron por el semejante heridos, qual en la cabeça, qual en
el rostro; por lo qual fue neçesario que todos los lleuassen a sus
posadas a los curar. Pues echada toda aquella gente arriscada
fuera de la sala, se alçaron las mesas y se tornaron los que
quedaron a sosegar. Pero como el diablo nunca sosiega de meter
mal y dar ocasion a que suçeda siempre peor, suçedio que
Cleodemo, padrino, boluiendo a la carta de Etemocles, porque
sintio afrontado a Aristeneto y avn a aquellos religiosos que junto
a si tenía, dixo: ¿qué os parecede las elegantes razones de
Etemocles?
[957] G., torta.
[958] G., el.
[959] G., la.
[960] G., que la carta venia elegante muy cuerdamente escripto y
como de letrado.
[961] G., por lo qual.
[962] G., principalmente porque en lo que yo he dicho ninguna
injuria le hize, pues de todos es conoçido Etimoclides bien de
quantos aqui estan, y no me marauillo que responda por él, pues
ambos tienen hecho liga y monipodio en el trato de sus
feligreses, y ansi an jurado ambos a dos de no enterrar a ninguno
en su feligresia.
[963] G., le dio con la copa de vino en el rostro, que le enuistio
todo del, y luego Zenotemides tomó a Cleodemo por la
sobrepelliz y le truxo al suelo y hizole dar con el rostro y cabeça
en vn vanco, de que mal le descalabró. En fin los frayles y misa
cantano y los demas los apartaron, y fue neçesario que
Cleodemo se fuesse luego a su casa a curar, y tambien
Zenothemides se fue. Pues purgada la casa de todos aquellos
arriscados y belicosos capitanes, porque todos fueron de tres
recuentros heridos y sacados del campo, como te he contado...
[964] G., enbobeçidos.
[965] G., ver en gente de tanto exemplo tanto desman.
[966] G., pensaron que hazer.
[967] G., como fue echada.
[968] G., llegosse.
[969] G., Dionico al misa cantano.
[970] G., entiznole.
[971] G., y llenaronle fuera de.
[972] G., del.
[973] G., homo. Misçilo. Propriamente lo pudo dezir.
[974] G., todo el lugar.
[975] G., Dime, gallo, en el entretanto que estas cosas pasauan,
¿que pensauas tú?
[976] G., cosas se çelebrauan pensaua yo otras muchas.
[977] G., alta.
[978] G., letras.
[979] G., ellas.
 ARGUMENTO
DEL DEÇIMO
OCTAUO CANTO
DEL GALLO

En el deçimo octauo canto o

sueño que se sigue el auctor
muestra los grandes daños
que en el mundo se siguen por
faltar la verdad[981] de entre
los hombres.

Miçilo.—Pues por tu buena

ventura, gallo, o Pithagoras, o
como más te quisieres llamar, de
todas las cosas tienes esperiençia
que en el çielo y en la tierra
pueden aconteçer agora: yo
deseo mucho de ti saber me
declares vna admirable dubda
que grauemente atormenta mi
spiritu sin poder hallar quién me
satisfaga con bastante respuesta.
¿De dónde prouiene en algunos
vna insaçiable cobdiçia de mentir
en quanto hablan, en tanta
manera que a sí mesmos con
sumo deleyte se saborean, como
sepan que todo es vanidad
quanto dizen, y con suma
efficaçia tienen en atençion los
animos de los oyentes?
Gallo.—Muchas cosas son ¡o
Micilo! las que fuerçan algunas
vezes los hombres a mentir.
Como es en los belicosos y
hombres de guerra se tiene por
ardid saber con mentira engañar
al enemigo, como en esta arte fue
muy sagaz y industrioso Ulises; y
tanbien lo vsan los cobdiçiosos de
riquezas y honrras mundanas por
vender sus mercaderias y
auentajarse en sus
contrataçiones. Pero avnque todo
esto sea ansi te ruego me digas la
ocasion que a saberlo te mueue?
Miçilo.—Todo eso se sufre que
me has dicho por ofreçerse en
esos casos intereses que a mentir
os[982] mueue. Pero donde no se
les ofreçe interes de más que
satisfazer[983] su apetito, ¿de
dónde les viene la inclinaçion a
tan nefando y odioso viçio? Que
ay hombres que en ninguna cosa
ponen más arte, cuydado y
industria que en mentir sin algun
interes como al presente te quiero
contar. Bien conoçes a
Demophon nuestro vezino.
Gallo.—¿Es este rico que está
en nuestra vezindad?
Miçilo.—Ese mesmo. Ya sabes
que abrá ocho dias que se le
murio su muger. Pues a esta
causa por ser mi vezino y amigo
que sienpre me combidó a sus
çenas y çelebridades, quisele yr
la noche passada a visitar y
consolar en su viudez.
Gallo.—Antes auias de dezir[984]
a le dar la buena pro haga.
Miçilo.—Pues auianme dicho
que con el gran pessar que tenía
de la muerte de su muger estaua
enfermo, y ansi le hallé en la
cama muy afligido y llorando, y
como yo entré y le saludé me
reçibio con alguna liberalidad
mandandome sentar en vna silla
que tenía muy cerca de sí, y
despues que le vbe dicho
aquellas palabras que se suelen
dezir en el comun: señor,
pessame de la muerte de vuestra
muger y de vuestro mal;
començele a inportunar me
dixesse qué era la causa que de
nueuo le hazia verter lagrimas
auiendo ya algunos dias que se le
auia muerto la muger. A lo qual
me respondio, que no se le
ofreçia cosa que más nueua le
fuesse que auersele muerto la
muger, su compañera la que él
tanto amó[985] en esta vida y de
que tanto se deuia perpetuamente
acordar[986], y dixome que
estando alli en su cama solo la
noche passada en consideraçion
de la[987] soledad y miseria que le
quedaua sin su[988] amada
Feliçia, que ansi se llamaua su
muger, pessandole mucho por
auerla desgraçiado[989] poco
antes de su muerte[990], porque
rogandole ella que le renouasse
çiertas joyas de oro y faldrillas
que ella tenía de[991] otro tiempo,
no lo auia hecho, y que estando
muy apesarado pensando en
esto, por no le auer complazido le
apareçio Feliçia increpandoles
porque auiendole sido en todo
muy cunplido y liberal, auia sido
muy corto en lo que más
hazia[992] a su honrra, porque en
su entierro y obsequias no la
auian acompañado el cabildo
mayor y cantores con musica, y
porque no la auian tañido las
campanas con solenidad, que
llaman enpino, y que la lleuaron al
tenplo en vnas comunes andas
auiendola de lleuar en ataud; y
otras cosas dixo del paño que
ençima de si lleuaua[993], si era
de brocado, luto o seda. Lo qual
todo pareçiendome muy grandes
disparates y liuiandades me reí
diziendo que se consolasse
mucho, que buen remedio tenía
tornando de nueuo a hazer las
obsequias; y por pareçerle que yo
no lo creya lo trabajó apoyar con
grandes juramentos, y por que via
que mientra él más juraua yo
menos le creya, se leuantó en
camisa de la cama y se abajó
inclinado de rodillas en el suelo
señalándome con el dedo las
señales de sus pies que alli auia
dexado y imprimido, y estaua todo
el suelo tan llano y tan igual que
no se hallara vn cabello de
differençia aunque tuuierades
ojos de linçe; y ansi por me
persuadir su sueño se tornó a la
cama donde sentado y
mandándose encorporar de[994]
almohadas que le tuuiessen
proçedio en cosas tan
monstruosas y tan sin orden
acerca de su sueño y vision, y en
loor de su mujer que no
huviera[995] en el mundo tan vano
juizio que las creyera[996], hasta
que quebrada la cabeça de le
oyr[997] me despedi dél y me
vine[998] acostar.
Gallo.—Verdad es ¡o, Miçilo! que
esas cosas que Demophon ay te
conto no son de creer de
razonable juizio, porque ya te he
dicho lo que en la buelta de las
almas de los defuntos ay[999].
Pero mira bien no incurras tú en
vn genero de incredulidad que
tienen algunos hombres, que
ninguna cosa les dizen por façil y
comun que sea que la quieran
creer; pero marauillandose de
todo, se espantan y santiguan y
todo dizen que es mentira y
monstruosidad. Lo qual todo es
argumento de poca esperiençia y
saber. Porque como no han visto
nada, ni han leydo nada,
qualquiera cosa que de nueuo
vean les pareçe ser hecho[1000]
por arte de encantamiento o
embaymiento, y por el semejante,
qualquiera cosa que de nueuo
oyan y[1001] les digan se
encogen, espantan y admiran, y
tienen por aueriguado que la
fingen siendo mentira por vurlar
dellos y los engañar. Pero los
sabios, los que todo lo han visto,
los que todo lo han leydo, todo lo
menospreçian, todo lo tienen en
poco, y ansi passando adelante lo
rien y mofan y tachan y
reprehenden, mostrando auer
ellos visto mucho más sin
comparaçion. Ansi agora tú
considera que no es peor
estremo, no creer nada, que
creerlo todo, y piensa que
ninguna cosa puede imaginar el
entendimiento humano que no
pueda ser, y que marauilla es que
todo lo que puede ser, sea de
hecho ya y acontezca. Pues ansi
agora yo, Miçilo, me temo si no
quieres creer cosa de quantas
hasta agora te he dicho, y pienses
y sospeches que todo ha sido
mentira y fingido por te dar
passamiento, y ansi creo que
menos creras vn admirable
aconteçimiento que agora te
queria contar, porque junto con lo
que hasta aqui te he contado
exçede en admiraçion sin
comparaçion alguna a lo que
Demophon tu vezino te persuadio
auer visto.
Miçilo.—Mira, gallo, que
entendido tengo que todas las
cosas verdaderas que se dizen si
bien se quieren mirar muestran en
sí vna verisimilitud que fuerçan al
entendimiento humano a las
creer; porque luego representan y
reluze en ellas aquella deidad de
la verdad que tienen en sí, y
después desto tiene gran fuerça
la auctoridad del que las dize, en
tanta manera que avn la mesma
mentira es tenida por verdad. Ansi
que por todas estas razones soy
forçado a que lo que tú dixeres te
aya yo de creer; por lo qual, di, yo
te ruego, con seguridad y
confiança, que ninguna cosa que
tú dixeres dubdaré,
prinçipalmente que no ay
marauilla alguna que me
marauille despues que vi a tí
siendo gallo hablar nuestra
lengua; por lo qual me persuades
a creer que tengas alguna deydad
de beatitud, y que por esta no
podras mentir.
Gallo.—Por cierto yo queria
çesar ¡o Miçilo! de mi narraçion
por auerla interrumpido con
alguna señal de dubda. Dexaras
en verdad de gozar de la más alta
y más feliçissima historia que
nunca hasta agora ingenio de
historiador ha[1002] escripto, y
prinçipalmente por narrartela yo
que soy el que la passé. Pero por
la seguridad que al credito y fe
me tienes dada quiero proçeder,
porque no quiero pribarte del
gusto y deleyte admirable que en
oyrla gozarás, y verás despues
que la ayas oydo de quanto sabor
te pribarás si por ignorar antes lo
que era menos preçiaras de lo
oyr, y conoçerás quanto amigo te
soy y buen apaniguado y familiar,
pues no estimando la injuria que
me hazias con tu dubdar te
comunico tan gran beatitud. Por
tanto prestame atençion, que oy
verás quan elegante rectorico soy.
Tú sabras, que en vn tiempo
siendo mançebo y cobdiçioso de
ver, vino nueua en Castilla que se
auian ganado en las partes
oçidentales aquellas grandes
tierras de la Nueua España[1003]
que nueuamente ganó aquel
animoso marques del Valle,
Cortés, y por satisfazer en alguna
manera el insaçiable animo de mi
deseo que tenía de ver tierras y
cosas nueuas determinéme de
enbarcar, y auenturarme a esta
nauegaçion, y ansi en este
mesmo deseo me fue para la
çiudad y ysla de Caliz donde se
hazia el flete mas conueniente y
natural para semejante xornada; y
llegado alli[1004] hallé diez
conpañeros que con el mesmo
affecto y voluntad eran venidos
alli, y como en aquella çiudad
venian muchos de aquella nueua
tierra y nos dezian cosas de
admiraçion, creçianos mas el
apetito de caminar. Deziannos el
natural de las gentes, las
costumbres, atauio y dispusiçion;
la diuersidad de los animales,
aues, frutas y mantenimientos y
tierra. Era tan admirable lo que
nos dezian juntamente con lo que
nos mostrauan los que de allá
venian que no nos podiamos
contener[1005], y ansi juntandonos
veynte compañeros todos
mançebos y de vna edad, hecho
pacto entre nosotros inuiolable de
nunca nos faltar, y çelebradas las
çerimonias de la[1006] amistad con
juramento solene fletamos vn
nauio vezcayno velero y ligero,
todos de bolsa comun, y con
prospero tiempo partimos vn dia
del puerto, encomendados a Dios,
y ansi nos continuó siete dias
siguientes hasta que se nos
descubrieron las yslas fortunadas
que llaman de Canaria. Donde
tomado refresco[1007] despues de
vista la tierra, con prospero
tiempo[1008] tornamos a salir de
alli y caminando por el mar al
terçero dia de nuestro camino dos
horas salido el sol haziendo claro
y sereno el çielo dixeron los
pilotos ver vna ysla de la qual no
tenian notiçia ni la podian
conoçer, de que estauan
admirados y confusos por no se
saber determinar, poniendonos en
gran temor ansi a deshora,
admirauanse más turbados de ver
que la ysla caminaua más
veniendo ella azia[1009] nosotros
que caminauamos nosotros para
ella. En fin en breue tiempo nos
venimos tanto juntando que
venimos a conoçer que aquella
que antes nos pareçia ysla era vn
fiero y terrible animal. Conoçimos
ser vna vallena de grandeza
increyble, que en sola la frente
con un pedaço del çerro que se
nos descubria sobre las aguas del
mar juzgauamos auer quatro
millas. Venia contra nosotros
abierta la boca soplando muy
fiera y espantosamente que a
diez millas haçia retener el nauio
con la furia de la ola que ella
arroxaua de sí; de manera que
viniendo ella de la parte del
poniente, y caminando nosotros
con prospero leuante nos forçaua
calmar, y avn boluer atras el
camino. Venia desde lexos
espumando y turbando el mar con
gran alteraçion; ya que estuuimos
más çerca que
alcançauamos[1010] a verla más
en particular pareçiansele los
dientes tan terribles cada vno
como vna montaña[1011] de
hechura de grandes palas;
blancos como el fino marfil.
Venimos adelante a juzgar por la
grandeza que se nos mostró
sobre las aguas, ser de longura
de dos mil leguas. Pues como nos
vimos ya en sus manos y que no
le podiamos huyr[1012]
començamonos a abraçar entre
los compañeros, y a darnos las
manos con grandes lagrimas y
alarido, porque viamos el fin de
nuestra vida y compañia estar en
aquel punto sin remedio alguno, y
ansi dando ella un terrible
empujon por el agua adelante y
abriendo la boca nos tragó tan sin
embaraço ni estorbo de dientes ni
paladar que sin tocar en parte
alguna con gauia, velas, xarçia y
muniçion y obras muertas fuemos