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Stress Testing the
USA
Public Policy and Reaction to
Disaster Events

John Rennie Short

Second Edition
Stress Testing the USA
 John Rennie Short

Stress Testing
the USA
Public Policy and Reaction to Disaster Events

Second Edition
John Rennie Short
School of Public Policy
University of Maryland Baltimore County
Baltimore, MD, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-65998-1 ISBN 978-3-030-65999-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65999-8

1st edition: © John Rennie Short 2013

2nd edition: © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to
Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
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general use.
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 Contents

1 Introduction to Stress Testing the USA 1

2 The War on Terror and the Costs of Empire 7
3 Hurricane Katrina, Infrastructure Deficit and the Costs
of Climate Change 37
4 The Financial Crisis and the Costs of Neoliberalism 87
5 The Gulf Oil Spill and the Costs of Regulatory Capture 127
6 The Pandemic and the Costs of an Unhealthy America 143
7 The United States of Stress 167

Index 181

v
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction to Stress Testing the USA

The new millennium was not kind to the United States. The first decade
of the twenty-first century was a decade of disasters. Four stand out.
The first, emerging out of 9/11, was the War on Terror and especially
the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which caused the deaths of 4400 US mili-
tary personnel and left 32,000 wounded. Its cost, always a guesstimate,
is anywhere between $740 billion and $1 trillion and the total cost of
subsequent 9/11 wars from 2001 to 2020 is estimated at $6.4 trillion.1
The true cost is probably higher but unknowable. How do we factor
in the cost of depression, poor health, and substance abuse of returning
troops long after the conflict has ended? By almost any criterion, it was a
tragedy. American lives and treasure were lost; a hundred thousand Iraqis
died and millions more were displaced and fled the country. The United
States was tainted, not strengthened, by the war and at the end of the war
was less rather than more secure from terrorism. Indeed, the reasons for
and conduct of the war probably led to the recruitment of many more
would-be terrorists. The invasion of Iraq motivated rather than weakened
our enemies and undercut support from our traditional allies across the
world. Begun under dubious premises, it soon became a blunder of epic
proportions. The title of Thomas Ricks’s 2006 book, one of the best
books on the American military campaign in Iraq, says it all, Fiasco.
Second, Hurricane Katrina led to the drowning of a major US city,
the loss of 2000 lives, and the destruction of property along the Gulf

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2021
J. R. Short, Stress Testing the USA,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65999-8_1
2 J. R. SHORT

Coast. It was less a natural than a preventable disaster, exacerbated by

inadequate infrastructure, poor environmental management, and a tardy
and ineffective governmental response. Years after the event, large parts
of the city of New Orleans have yet to recover.
Third, in 2008 the Dow Jones Industrial Average plummeted from
14,066 on October 12 to 6626 in March 2009. Trillions of dollars of
value on the stock market evaporated in the subsequent recession along
with the financial security of millions of households. The economic ripples
were felt around the globe. And fitting for its worldwide ripples, it is
commonly referred to as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). In the United
States, house prices collapsed, seven million families lost their homes, four
million jobs were lost in 18 months, and unemployment reached almost
10 percent. It was the Great Recession, a downward economic slide not
seen since the 1930s.
Then, there was the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. On April 20,
2010, an explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig led to
oil gushing uncontrollably from the underground reservoir. For 87 days,
53,000 barrels a day, almost five million gallons in all, escaped from the
well into the Gulf of Mexico, poisoning the water, contaminating the
beaches, and killing sea creatures and animal life. Day after day the tele-
vised images showed oil flowing uncontrollably from the deep earth into
the sea. The event highlighted corporate indifference and government
inadequacy in dealing with the risks of deep-sea drilling.
The second decade started well. A long recovery from the GFC was
reducing unemployment. The economy was growing. The War on Terror
continued but there was no longer the same existential threat. New
Orleans was being rebuilt and the levees that surrounded the city were
raised and hardened for future storms. The oil spill in the Gulf was
brought under control and lessons were learned about the regulation of
offshore oilrigs. By the end of the second decade, things seemed to be
back on an even keel. Then, came 2020. A global pandemic swept the
world, but death rates in the United States were higher than most other
developed countries. By the end of February 2021, half a million people
in the United States had died as a direct result of the virus. The pandemic
revealed the major cleavage on US society and the flaws in US public
health. The tardy response highlighted the crisis in governance. And in
2020, when George Floyd, a 46-year old Black man was killed by police,
the latest in a long and seemingly endless death of black people at the
 1 INTRODUCTION TO STRESS TESTING THE USA 3

hands of police, it sparked not only national conversations about race,

about policing but also about the very nature of US society.
These five events broke all kinds of records: the longest foreign war,
the costliest “natural” disaster, the biggest economic downturn sincethe
Great Depression; the largest oil spill; and the worst pandemic since 1918.
Not just a quiet police action like Grenada, a memorable hurricane like
Andrew, an economic downturn as in the early 1990s, an “average” oil
spill, or a typical epidemic like the flu. No, they were of such a magni-
tude, individually and collectively, that they provide a perfect storm of
a combined stress test. They reveal what the mundane and the ordinary
cannot. Not simply was the size impressive in each case, but so was the
level of incompetence: military fiasco, an emergency response debacle,
economic mismanagement of epic proportions, an environmental tragedy,
a botched pandemic response that turned into a public health catas-
trophe—five huge disasters all in one decade. If triumphal success justifies
social institutions, extreme failure should produce piercing critiques of
them. The events represent extreme cases and thus the most profound of
stress tests.
In this book, I will stress test the United States using these five case
studies to highlight fundamental fractures in US society. Stress testing
is a long-established procedure to determine the stability of a system.
Software is stress tested to see how it reacts with heavy Internet traffic.
So are our hearts when the doctor makes us ride stationary bikes and
then monitors our heartbeat and blood pressure. Force is applied to
containers to determine how they stand up to heavier-than-normal loads.
Economists also bring stress testing into play when they utilize models to
assess changing variables, such as when interest rates rise sharply, demand
shrinks, or supplies dwindle. There is now an annual stress test of major
US banks. Stress testing shows how a system responds to pressure and, if
carried far enough, highlights the system’s weak spots. It reveals how a
system responds in a crisis and exposes its deep structural flaws.
The stress testing used here is not an empirical technique but rather
an analysis of the events in some detail and a widening of the frame of
reference so that we move on from assigning blame to individuals to iden-
tifying the deeper and more profound causes. The stress test used here
foregrounds a search for structural, endemic causes of the apocalyptic
events of the new millennium rather than assigning individual culpability.
It is so much simpler if we could just blame George Bush, Michael Brown,
greedy bankers, the CEO of BP, Donald Trump: their failures, however
4 J. R. SHORT

palpable, nevertheless transcend them. The size and impact of the disasters
discussed in this book, like all good stress tests, tell us more about funda-
mental weaknesses in social structure than simply reconfirm the eternal
verities of human frailty.
In 1979 during a televised speech to the nation, President Jimmy
Carter addressed the looming energy crisis and the deepening reces-
sion. He said, “It’s clear that the real problems of our Nation are much
deeper.” It was not a popular or successful speech. It is now described
as the “malaise speech,” much criticized for presenting problems not
solutions. A year later, Ronald Reagan beat him in the presidential race.
Reagan offered a sunny optimism, a hope in a future presided over by the
United States. While there are many who believe that Reagan turned the
country around, there are some, like me, who see his presidential victory
as inaugurating a huge military buildup, rising deficits, and a massive
transfer of national wealth from the poor and the middle classes to the
very wealthy. Reagan’s new dawn in America shone most warmly on the
rich. The fate of Jimmy Carter’s failed second presidential bid should be
a warning to those who ask the United States to look at the deeper prob-
lems. A nation that is so invested in an optimistic future rarely takes time
to attend to the anxieties of the present, let alone to acknowledge the
failings of the past. It is a national habit to “put things behind us,” “look
to tomorrow,” to “move to the next level,” “win the future,” a trait that
is superficially constructive, but actually avoids any sustained search for
structural weakness, as it alights upon the quick fix. The disasters are of
such magnitude that they demand a sober assessment of the United States
and its institutions rather than an unthinking affirmation.
I am perhaps genetically programmed to focus on problems. I was born
in Europe, Scotland to be precise, where the past hangs heavy. The great
years of Scotland’s global eminence during the Enlightenment, when it
was one of the centers of intellectual thought and then one of the epicen-
ters of the Industrial Revolution, are long over. Located on the periphery
of the periphery, shaded with the darker hues of Scottish Presbyterianism
and burdened with long historical memories, late-twentieth-century Scot-
land was not a place to engender a fierce commitment to the future. It
was not a place of despair; rising living standards took care of that. But it
was a place where the future was to be managed with care, not embraced
with abandon. I took these sensibilities with me when as an adult I relo-
cated to the United States. I have now lived here for more than 30 years,
my accent a constant reminder of where I came from. The result then is
 1 INTRODUCTION TO STRESS TESTING THE USA 5

a book written by someone raised in Scotland, the old Europe, but living
in the New World of the United States. I have held onto my intellectual
legacy but imbibed a belief in the future. A dour Scottish Presbyterianism
meets a New World sunny optimism is the unlikely result. A foreign-born
longtime citizen, I am reminded of my liminal (dis)location when Amer-
icans tell me I have a strong Scottish accent and my family in Scotland
remind me that I sound very American. It is this awkward shifting space
that provides the perspective for this book.
But the United States is also losing some of its easy optimism, chas-
tened no doubt by the four events. There is now a deep sense of
pessimism in the United States. In a poll conducted in January 2012
by Rasmussen Reports, 60 percent of people interviewed in a telephone
survey responded that they felt the country was going in the wrong direc-
tion.2 Eight years later in September 2020, it was 69 percent.3 Other
surveys reveal similar if not higher levels of disapproval. There is a dark-
ening mood to the national spirit. Not only is there a lack of confidence in
specific government policies, but the belief in the idea of government itself
is at an all-time low. Approval rating for Congress is in the single digits.
Across the spectrum of political opinion there is a profound sense that
the country has lost its way. Compounding the feeling of malaise, there
is no general agreement in which direction it should be headed. Election
results embody rather than solve the deadlock. The United States remains
a house divided. While some propose even more military spending, deeper
tax cuts, and further deregulation, some others argue that this is exactly
the policy that got us into the present mess. While the sense of pessimism
is shared, there is no general agreement on the direction of the way
forward. There is a real sense that the country is floundering. In this
book I will examine some of the events that got us into the present state.
I will also look at how these events reveal some of the structural flaws that
we need to address if we are to move forward. I will conduct a stress test
of the United States.
The book is meant not to anchor us in despair because of the
depth of the structural problems. It is not, I hope, solely a “malaise”
book. However, optimism unconnected to realities is a naiveté that risks
perpetual disappointment. It is only by identifying the profound prob-
lems can we address and overcome them. Only by soberly identifying the
deeper origins of our crises can we map a successful path to the future. A
belief in a better future requires a deeper understanding of the crises of
the present.
6 J. R. SHORT

Crises and disasters reveal, like nothing else, the fracture lines within a
society. In this book, I will explore the five events to see what they reveal
about the fracture lines, strengths, and weaknesses in US society. I explore
their settings, causes, consequences, and representations. It is not a polit-
ically partisan exercise; rather, the events will be a prism through which
to view issues of power, class, race, money, globalization, the meaning
of patriotism and citizenship, environmental issues, and private influences
on government and public policy. It will highlight the unexpected conse-
quences of agreed-upon ideas. The book is less about assigning blame
than about uncovering structural faults.

Notes
1. Stiglitz, J., & Bilmes, L. (2008). The three trillion war: The true cost of the
Iraq conflict. Norton. Crawford, N. (2019). United States budgetary costs
and obligations of post-9/11 wars through FY2020: $6.4 trillion. Costs of
War Project. Brown University. https://tinyurl.com/y6ckw9m3. Accessed
5 Oct 2020.
2. https://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of_a
merica/right_direction_or_wrong_track. Accessed 10 Feb 2012.
3. https://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/weekly_upd
ates/what_they_told_us_sep05. Accessed 7 Sept 2020.
 CHAPTER 2

The War on Terror and the Costs of Empire

The War on Terror was first announced less than a week after the 9/11
attack on the United States. On September 16, 2001, George Bush said,
“the American people understand, this crusade, this war on terrorism, is
going to take a while.” Not only was a war announced, but it was also
given a name, The War on Terror. And it was just not a war but The War.
And the enemy was not a narrow group of antagonists but all those who
would commit terror.
Waging a war is one of the biggest burdens for any society and the
stresses of this war tested the United States to its breaking point. The
War on Terror was an open-ended and vaguely strategized response that
would quickly mire the United States in a fiasco in Iraq and then an open-
ended and seemingly endless commitment in Afghanistan that strategists
deemed, “The Long War.” How are we to situate this war? So soon
after 9/11 it seems we have a simple origin: a swift response to an
unprecedented attack on innocent civilians in the United States. In this
reading, the shallow and narrow view, the resulting problems are then
just short-term tactical blunders that tell us about the failings of the Bush
administration and its flawed policies. This is the standard interpretation
made attractive by its simplicity. And it can be made even simpler through
personalization: Bush is to blame. Eager to assert military might, he was
unconcerned about the postwar construction of the country he ordered
to be invaded. And a slice of blame should be placed on Cheney: the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 7

Switzerland AG 2021
J. R. Short, Stress Testing the USA,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65999-8_2
8 J. R. SHORT

vice president who refused to believe intelligence that did not support his
long-held belief that the United States should invade Iraq. And then there
was Rumsfeld: the defense secretary whose arrogance covered an almost
criminal incompetence in managing postwar Iraq. And there was Paul
Wolfowitz, whose decades-long obsession with Iraq led him to promote
the invasion of the country even while the World Trade Center was
still smoldering and there was absolutely no proof of Saddam Hussein’s
involvement in 9/11. There is a lot of raw material for the simplistic
blame-the-incompetents argument, but it does not provide a deep stress
test. Change the president, vote out the administration, or change the
policy and, according to this perspective, the problem is solved. But the
flaws are much deeper than one misguided president, a war-mongering
vice president, an arrogant and incompetent defense secretary, or an Iraq-
obsessed advisor and far longer than a two-term administration. The Long
War and its legacies continued long after the cast of characters responsible
for the fiasco in Iraq had left the national political stage.
The very limited interpretation that focuses on one administration’s
failure does not stand up to even the rudest of scrutiny. Even if we
concentrate on the very immediate decisions, the responsibility quickly
shifts from just a narrow group in the Bush administration. It was not just
the president who made “wrong decisions” but the Congress, Democrats
as well as Republicans, the Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An
embedded press provided cover and support. And early on, The War on
Terror received tremendous public support. The conception and imple-
mentation of The War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq did not just
reveal the mistakes of one administration and the failure of sensible lead-
ership to emerge at a time of crisis; they also highlight the fundamental
problems of a United States committed to global military intervention.
I will refer to this commitment as Empire. From this wider frame and
deeper historical context, the problematic nature of the invasion of Iraq
suggests a longer and more complex genealogy. Big events, such as a long-
running war, rarely have singular origins. And epic failures have multiple
births. The catastrophe of the invasion of Iraq and the ongoing fallout
from the War on Terror results from the imperial posture of the United
States.
 2 THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE COSTS OF EMPIRE 9

The Rise of Empire

Immediately after the Second World War, the United States began a
pronounced demobilization. By 1948 the numbers mobilized shrunk to
just over half a million in the Army and less than half a million in the Navy
from a peak of 11 million at the height of the war. Despite the vastness
of the enterprise and the globality of the conflict, the United States was
doing what it had always done—mass and rapid demobilization after war.
The military was set to return to its default position of always small with
little direct influence on the broad contours of public political debates.
But this time was to be different as the United States began its rise as a
global superpower.
It started as a defensive posture. In 1946 a young diplomat in Moscow,
George Kennan, sent a long telegram to Washington outlining a contain-
ment policy for a perceived Soviet threat. In March 1947 President
Truman announced to the world that the United States would “support
free peoples who are resisting subjugation.” The Truman Doctrine, enun-
ciated during a civil war in Greece, gave official weight to the notion of
containment. It was a warning shot against what Truman and many others
saw as Soviet expansionism. In a growing climate of postwar paranoia,
Congress later on that same year passed the National Security Act, which
created the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and reshaped the Department of Defense as the largest and most
influential of government agencies. The world was reimagined as the stage
for global conflict, a Manichean struggle between good and evil, right and
wrong, democracy and capitalism against an expanding communism bent
on world domination. The Bush administration framed the War on Terror
as a similarly Manichean struggle.
The United States was able to imagine this global role for itself because
it was the largest economy at the end of the Second World War. The old
imperial powers such as the United Kingdom and France were bankrupt,
and Japan and Germany were defeated. The Soviet Union experienced
huge wartime losses of people and resources. A more sober assessment
could have depicted the USSR as what Daniel Yergin called a “cruel,
clumsy, bureaucratized fear-ridden despotism” just hanging on to power.
But a Soviet Union of formidable power and efficiency was represented
instead, all the better to frame the US response. From this “founda-
tional paranoia,” emerged the outline of an imperial United States. It
was never described in those terms. The words and images of Empire
10 J. R. SHORT

and imperialism were tainted because of its association with European

colonialism. For domestic consumption the United States was never an
empire, simply a powerful force for good, keeping the darkness at bay,
spreading the light of democracy and the unalloyed benefits of capitalism.
America stood for democracy, freedom, and liberty. Who could question
these ideals? And the obligatory answer is, only those promoting undemo-
cratic regimes, unfree societies, and a totalitarian agenda. The United
States was portrayed at home as a force against evil, a knight in shining
armor, which allowed the country to be inextricably linked to the rest of
the world as a nation permanently at arms. Now, “America’s interests and
responsibilities were unrestricted and global.”1
Paranoia increased in 1949 when communists gained control of China
after decades of civil war, and the Soviets exploded their first atomic
weapon. The response was a 58-page report produced by the newly estab-
lished National Security Council. Known as NSC-68, the report outlined
a global strategy for the United States of a massive buildup of military
power to achieve “situations of strength.” It was an open-ended commit-
ment to an Empire of global reach and military dominance. However, the
potential costs of the new role were initially too much for Truman. In
1949 the expanded global military presence was a plan, a hope, a fantasy.
And although Truman enunciated his doctrine, US troops were not sent
to Greece during its civil war. Between the rhetoric of Empire and the
political realities, there was a large gap filled by caution, uncertainty, and
a sober assessment of the costs.
Korea changed everything. On June 25, 1950, at Ongjin, northwest
of Seoul, fighting broke out between the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea, (DPRK, henceforth North Korea) and the Republic of Korea
(ROK, henceforth South Korea). North Korean forces quickly overran
much of the peninsula as South Korean forces scattered and ran. By mid-
September the North Korean Army had pushed all the way south to
Pusan in the far south of the peninsula. The United States sent troops
to South Korea, persuaded the United Nations (UN) to get involved,
and quickly pushed the North Koreans all the way back north to the
border of China on the Yalu River. The Chinese Army also entered the
conflict supporting North Korea and launched a counteroffensive that
pushed the US–UN forces back to the 38th parallel. Rapid advances and
retreats on both sides stalled by June 1951, and the war became a static
trench war. The divide between North and South created after the cease-
fire in 1953 formed a front line between the communist and capitalist
 2 THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE COSTS OF EMPIRE 11

blocs of the Cold War. The Korean War was a bloody encounter. From
hostilities breaking out in 1950 to the armistice in 1953, military and
civilian casualties and deaths are estimated at between 4.2 and 4.7 million.
It also marked the beginning of the US Empire.2
The Korean War propelled the United States into a permanent global
empire. The sudden advance and stunning success of the North Korean
Army called into question the credibility of the fledgling superpower
of the United States. Korea turned a tentative notion and inchoate
desire into the hard reality of Empire as US troops were shipped to the
peninsula, North Korea was invaded, and permanent military bases were
established. Korea crystallized the postwar paranoia, allowing a quadru-
pling of the US defense budget, the official adoption of NSC-68, and
the domestic acceptance that the United States would have a permanent
military presence far from home. The war in Korea “occasioned the enor-
mous foreign military base structure and the domestic military–industrial
complex to service it.”3
The Empire that first emerged from the Korean War is now a sprawling
archipelago of military bases around the world, a vast military–industrial
security complex backing a pervasive worldview dominated by visions of
global hegemony. There are now at least 800 bases with 200,000 US mili-
tary personnel spread around the world in at least 80 countries at a cost
of $150 billion a year.4 From the ending of the Second World War until
today, the United States has redefined itself as a national security state
with global reach, while war and military involvement were normalized
by a self-fulfilling predisposition to paranoia.
There were always critics of Empire. The title of the American Anti-
Imperial League established in 1898 summed up their basic position.
There were also the critics who argued, and continue to argue, that expan-
sion overseas diverts the nation from the construction of true democracy
at home.5 Opposition also came from more unusual sources. President
Eisenhower, a Republican and former military leader, gave a farewell
address to the nation on January 17, 1961, in which he warned his fellow
Americans of the political influence of a military–industrial complex of
“an immense military establishment and a large arms industry.” He spoke
of the grave implications of a huge defense establishment. It is still an
amazing speech. Eisenhower was a professional military man, supreme
commander of Allied forces in Europe during the Second World War, and
no stranger to war. And yet he realized the dangers of a rising militarism
and in a striking metaphor of arms spending spoke of “humanity hanging
12 J. R. SHORT

from a cross of iron.” It was a recurring worry to Eisenhower. He gave a

speech in the first year of his presidency in 1953 when he warned of exces-
sive defense spending. The farewell speech was not a rushed afterthought;
Eisenhower worked on at least 20 drafts. The final version was the result
of a decade of rising concern with the emergence of an American Empire.
Critics notwithstanding, the empire grew and expanded. There were
ebbs and flows in the course of Empire. Plotting the Department of
Defense (DOD) budget, for example, reveals four postwar peaks. There
was the huge spike of the Korean War when annual defense spending
reached $500 billion (in 2002 dollars), two smaller spikes topping $400
billion during the Vietnam War and Reagan’s military buildup in the
1980s, and then a huge increase in the wake of 9/11. By 2010 the DOD
total budget, including the costs of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, was
$685 billion—doubling from the 2001 figure. Defense spending now
accounts for 23 percent of all federal spending in the United States. A
complex web of connection links the military with armaments manufac-
turers and political representatives. The revolving door propels former
military and political figures into lucrative corporate appointments as
lobbyists and consultants. The arms industry provides jobs in congres-
sional districts, keeping politicians in power. The manufacturers promote
more value-added technologies to a military eager to spend and to
politicians eager to burnish their commitment to defense spending. A
lethal alliance of politics, economics, and military promotes a continual
spending on war despite its designation as “defense spending.” The
United States is the single biggest military spender in the world, respon-
sible for almost 40 percent of total global arms spending. Its military
expenditure is now greater than the next 10 largest military powers
combined.6
Once the Empire was established it soon developed an expansionary
dynamic. Threats, both real and imagined, included phony missile gaps,
a Vietnamese peasant uprising recast as a Communist takeover, national
liberation movements perceived as communist insurgents, and a Soviet
Empire on the verge of collapse portrayed as an expansionary force. Local
events reimagined as global conspiracies all helped to fuel imperial expan-
sion. And even when the Soviet empire did collapse in 1989, there was no
long-lasting peace dividend. As we will see, the US role was reimagined
from a containment of communism to the single global power respon-
sible for global security. The bipolarity of the Cold War was replaced by
 2 THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE COSTS OF EMPIRE 13

the unipolarity of American power reaching across the globe. In a stun-

ning twist, the collapse of the USSR signaled not the abatement of the
US Empire but its enlargement and expansion.
Empire fed on itself: a vast military–industrial-security complex was
established with a huge and insatiable appetite for expansion and growth.
Its tentacles reaching into every state and congressional district ensured
widespread political support for a distribution of bases abroad and an
unwavering acceptance at home that the United States could and should
pursue global reach to maintain hegemony.
Empire needs a shadow. To justify the huge costs, an equally large
counterforce needs to be imagined, created, or invented. This was easy
during the Cold War when an “evil” Soviet empire fitted the bill. With
the USSR’s demise came a brief period of uncertainty before global
terrorism became the shadow of the US empire, standing for everything
bad against everything good, the evil empire counter to the good empire.
The Empire needs enemies, which have to be of some consequence to
justify and legitimate their counterweights. Acts of terrorism are thus
seen as acts of war, assassins as criminal masterminds. Shadow empires,
if absent, are soon manufactured and invented. And if no specific animus
is found, then a more general notion of maintaining a global order is
employed or a vaguely defined global terrorist threat is conjured up.
The shadow can be strategically invoked. As the war on Iraq failed
to show progress and criticism was mounting, Rumsfeld circulated a 15-
point memo on April 19, 2006. “Keep elevating the threat,” he noted in
point 14. The next point went on to say, “Talk about Somalia, the Philip-
pines, etc. Make sure the American people realize they are surrounded in
the world by violent extremists.”7 It is in the interests of many leaders
to jack up the level of threat and portray a picture of a United States
beleaguered by enemies. The shadow justifies Empire.
As a vital prop of Empire, the shadow is always there, real or imag-
ined. A permanent threat is invoked, morphing over time from Soviet
expansionism to global terrorism. A never-ending threat is used to justify
American military power, promote the Pentagon’s global footprint, justify
massive military expenditures and evoke the public’s support of Empire.
The United States is placed on the path of persistent conflict, recurring
national security crises, a never-ending war. A permanent war, either in
process, or in preparation, is the tragic outcome of the US Empire.8
14 J. R. SHORT

Entanglements and Blowback

A global presence means that the United States can be entangled by polit-
ical events around the world. The manager of the global world order may
quickly become caught up in national and local situations that confound,
confuse, and penalize. On November 26, 1979, the ruling elite of the
Soviet Union, the Politburo’s inner circle, decided to invade Afghanistan.
A month later, on Christmas Eve, troops from the 40th Soviet Army were
deployed. The Soviet, and before them the pre-Soviet Russian govern-
ments were long interested in the country situated close to its southern
border, a zone made vulnerable by the explosive mix of ethnicities,
nationalities, and religious affiliations. The country was the single biggest
recipient of USSR foreign aid. In 1978 a small urban-based, Commu-
nist party overthrew the existing government that itself was established
after a coup against King Mohammad Zahir Shah in 1973. The events
were a result of internal tensions and not Soviet expansionism per se, but
the new socialist neighbor was appreciated by the Soviets who stepped
up aid. The new regime was thuggish and deeply factionalized. It forced
its policies too quickly and brutally on the Afghans, and when it faced
extreme resistance it jailed and killed opposition members. The growing
repression whittled away most of the remaining support and soon most
of the rural areas were in open revolt. The government in Kabul appealed
for Soviet aid. The Soviets believed that the regime would not remain
in power without military intervention and the removal of the president.
Soviet troops entered the country, killed the existing president Hafizullah
Amin, and established Babrak Karmal as president. Soon there were over
100,000 Soviet military personnel in the country.
In the summer of 1979 Carter had authorized funding of anticom-
munist guerrillas in Afghanistan. Aid and money from the United States
increased during the 1980s. Aiding the guerrillas was seen as a way to
drain the power and prestige of the Soviet Union. Afghanistan was a
wound that could be deepened to bleed the Soviet empire. The United
States joined Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in funding and training resisters
to Soviet occupation. There were diverse groups, such as Tajiks and
Pashtuns, and competing warlords. The insurrection also caught the
imagination of Islamicists who saw the struggle as a jihad, a holy war
between the followers of Islam and the godless communists. Mujahedeen,
roughly translated from Arabic, means people undertaking jihad. Arabs
such as Osama bin Laden joined the fight. The United States in effect
 2 THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE COSTS OF EMPIRE 15

helped pave the path to power for the Taliban that later provided refuge
to bin Laden.
On August 2, 1991, Iraqi troops invaded the oil-rich Persian Gulf state
of Kuwait. The United States swiftly responded. This was Empire 2.0,
when there was no risk of nuclear war as the Soviet Union had faded into
history. There was the Carter Doctrine to uphold, and Kuwait was an
oil-rich state. Under President George H. W. Bush, the United States
initiated sanctions and organized a coalition of international forces to
force the Iraqis out of Kuwait. Alliances and loyalties can quickly change.
Iraq was controlled by Saddam Hussein, previously supported by the
United States in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). With that war now
consigned to history, Saddam Hussein was no longer an ally but now
the enemy. The Gulf War was a great success for the United States. The
Saudi government footed more than half of the total bill, and the coalition
forces defeated the Iraqis in a stunningly quick campaign with very few
casualties. The coalition forces were poised to topple the entire Hussein
regime but stopped well short of Baghdad. The failure to topple Hussein
rankled many right-wingers who were to become influential members of
the next Bush’s presidency.
The entry of infidel troops into Arab lands outraged radical Islamicists
such as Osama bin Laden. Buoyed by the defeat of the Soviet superpower
in Afghanistan and motivated by a deep anti-modern, anti-US sentiment,
terrorist groups began to form. Following on from the entry of US troops
into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a sustained terrorist campaign was
launched against the United States and its interests abroad. There was a
blowback of costs and consequences to Empire.9
Throughout the summer of 2001, Al Qaeda recalled its senior opera-
tives to Afghanistan. The US intelligence-gathering communities reported
enormous “chatter.” On the morning of September 11, 2001, 19 young
Arab men boarded four westbound aircraft on the east coast of the United
States, which they hijacked soon after takeoff. At 8:46 A.M., American
Airlines Flight 11 flew directly into the North Tower of the twin-towered
World Trade Center. Seventeen minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175
crashed into the South Tower. Little more than 30 minutes later, Amer-
ican Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the outer ring of the Pentagon in
Washington, DC. On the final hijacked plane, United Airlines Flight
93, the passengers, now aware of the hijackers’ deadly mission, strug-
gled to regain control of the plane. It crashed into a field in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania, killing all on board.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 ‫خ‬

chara-en-nahhla (B.) ‫خرا النحله‬ Cerinthe major L.

charrūb, chrrūb (B.) ‫خروب‬ Ceratonia Siliqua L.
chaschchásch, ‫خشخاش‬ Papaver somniferum L.
cheschchāsch (B.
LaC.)
chebūq (LaC.) Sparganium ramosum L.
cheijātta (H-M.) Bryonia dioica L.
chejattāt-el-geráhh, ‫خياطه االجراح‬ Scabiosa maritima L.
cheijátt-el-geráhh (B.)
chelchāla (B.) Lavandula Stoechas L.
chobeīsa (B.) ‫خبيزه‬ Malva sylvestris L.
chobbēs (H-M.) Malva parviflora L.
chof-el-gemel (LaC.) Centaurea sp.
chórschef (B.),
chórschref, chórschuf ‫خرشف‬ Cynara cardunculus L.
(H-M.)
chorttal (B.) ‫خرطال‬ Avena fatua L.
chorttal-berri (B.) ‫خرطال برى‬ Avena hirsuta L.
el-chutss-el-áhhmar (B.) ‫الخوص االحمر‬ Alnus glutinosa L.

d‫د‬
 dd
‫ض‬
dh‫ذ‬
ds‫ظ‬

defla (B.) ‫دفله‬ Nerium Oleander L.

derdār (B. H-M. LaC.)
dífle (H-M.)
dīss (B. H-M.)
drīass, drīess (B. Kabyl.
H-M.)
ddarū, dderū, ddrū
(LaC.)
ddemrān, ddomrān (B.)
dhēl-el-chrūf (B. H-M.) ‫ذيل الخروف‬
dhēl-en-na'ga (B.)
dhēl-en-na'aga (B.)
dsrū (B. LaC.)
‫دردار‬ Fraxinus excelsior L.
Nerium Oleander L.
‫ديس‬ !Ampelodesmos tenax
Vahl.
Cachrys peucedanoides
⎰ Desf. (= Magydaris)
‫درياس‬
⎱
!Thapsia garganica L.
Pistacia Lentiscus L.
‫ضيمران‬ Marrubium vulgare L.
Reseda alba L.
Andryala integrifolia L.
‫ذيل النعجه‬ Reseda alba L.
‫ظرو‬ Pistacia Lentiscus L.

e ‫(' ا‬siehe a)
'enēb (B.) ‫عناب‬ Ziziphus spina-Christi L.
'éneb-edh-dhīb (B.) ‫عنب الذيب‬ Solanum nigrum L.
ermen (B.) ‫ارمن‬ Galium aparine L.
el-esēriq[30], lesēriq (B.) ‫ليزيرق‬ Anagallis caerulea L.
ethaíja (B.) ‫اثايه‬ Cistus salviifolius L.

f
‫ف‬

faraūn (B.) ‫الفاراون‬ Urginea maritima Bak.

!fr'aūn (B.) ‫فرعون‬ Urginea maritima Bak.
feriēss (H-M.) ‫فرياس‬ Carduus pycnocephalus
L.
fernān (B.) ‫فرنان‬ Quercus suber L.
ferssīk (LaC.) Pteris aquilina L.
figēl (B. H-M.) ‫فجيل‬ Ruta chalepensis L.
flēju, flīju (B.) ‫فليو‬ Mentha aquatica L.
frēsch-en-ndā (B.) ‫فرش النده‬ Salvia argentea L.
full (B.) ‫فل‬ Jasminum officinale L.

g
‫ج‬
g'aïda (B.) ‫جعيده‬ Phagnalon rupestre D.C.
geda' (B.) ‫جدع‬ Smyrnium olusatrum L.
gelbanat-el-hhanesch, ‫جلبانه الحنش‬ Vicia lutea L.
gilbān-el-hhanesch
(B.)
gendūl (H-M.) Calycotome spinosa
Lam.
gernēss (H-M.) Cirsium lanceolatum L.
gernīss (LaC.) Scolymus hispanicus L.
gerrēd (H-M.) ‫جرايد‬ Smyrnium olusatrum L.
girfēla (H-M.) Lathyrus Ochrus L.
gnība (B.) ‫جنيبه‬ Plantago coronopus L.

h
‫ه‬

el-hendi (H-M.) Opuntia ficus indica L.

hh
‫ح‬

hhafer (B.) ‫حافر‬ Andropogon hirtus L.

hhalhhāla (B.) ‫حلحلة‬ Lavandula Stoechas L.
hhalīb-edh-dhabba' (B.) ‫حليب الذابه‬ Euphorbia peplus L.
hharscha (B.) ‫حرشه‬ Helminthia echioides L.
hharscha (H-M.) ‫حرشاى‬ Cerinthe major L.
hharscha (LaC.) Cichorium pumilum Jacq.
hhaschīschet-edh- ‫حشيشه الذبان‬ Silene gallica L.
dhubān (B.)
hhaschīschet-el-hhasaïs ‫حشيشة الحزايز‬ Hypericum perforatum L.
(B.)
hhaschīschet-mhabūla ‫حشيشه مهبوله‬ Convolvulus althaeoides
(B.) L.
hhaschīschet-en-nhhāl ‫حشيشة النحل‬ Melissa officinalis L.
(B.)
hhaschīschet-el-qartssa ‫حشيشه‬ Rumex bucephalophorus
(B.) ‫القارصه‬ L.
hhaschīschet-er-rechām, ‫حشيشه الرخام‬ Fumaria agraria Lam.
hhaschīschet-er-
rechess (B.)
hhaschīschet-er-ri' (B.) ‫حشيشه الريح‬ Parietaria officinalis L.
hhaschīschet-et-tbēr (B.) ‫حشيشه التبر‬ Filago spathulata Presl.
hhassēq (LaC.) Cladium Mariscus L.
el-hhasska (B.) ⎰
‫الحسكه‬ Daucus maximus Desf.
hhessqa (H-M.) ⎱

hhermel (B.) ‫حرمل‬ Conium maculatum L.

hhommēd (H-M.) Rumex dentatus L.
hhamrája, hhomrája Alnus glutinosa L.
(LaC.)
hhorrēq (B. H-M.) ‫حريق‬ Urtica pilulifera L.

i. j
‫اي‬

jassmīn (B.) ‫يسمين‬ Jasminum officinale L.

ichtssetss (B.) ‫اخصص‬ Smyrnium olusatrum L.
ifiss-el-beqer (B.) ‫افيس البقر‬ Medicago Murex L.

k
‫ك‬

karām (H-M.) Ficus Carica L.

keff-el-gerāna (LaC.) Ranunculus trachycarpus
F. M.
keff-eth-thōr (B.) ‫كف الثور‬ Echium plantagineum
Desf.
kelch (B. H-M.) ‫كلخ‬ Ferula communis L.
kelletūss (H-M.) Eucalyptus globulus l'Her.
kera'a-degāga (LaC.) ‫كراع الدجاجه‬ Chrysanthemum
Clausonis Pom.
kerma-dhakār (LaC.) Ficus Carica L. v.
caprificus
kermūss (H-M.) Ficus Carica L.
kiftsē (H-M.) Paronychia argentea
Lam.
klēl, kelīl (B.) ‫كليل‬ Rosmarinus officinalis L.
kmémta (B.) ‫كميمته‬ Phlomis floccosa L.
kurrēt (H-M.) Allium sphaerocephalum
L.

l
‫ل‬

lansāsch (el-hansāsch) Pyrus communis L.

(H-M.)
less.ssāka (B.) ‫لساكه‬ Musci sp. omnes
letssāqa (B.) ‫لصاقه‬ Musci sp. omnes

⎰ Brassica Napus L.
libssān (B. H-M.)
⎱ Sinapis arvensis L.

lifla (H-M.) Trifolium Jaminianum B.

lift-mta-el-baqar (H-M.) Beta vulgaris L. v. cicla L.
lissān-eth-thūr (LaC.) Echium plantagineum L.
luája (B.) ‫لوايه‬ Convolvulus althaeoides
L.
 m
‫م‬

Marrubium vulgare L.
⎰
magl-etss-tssēf (H-M.)
⎱ Teucrium scordioides
Schr.
mahbūla (LaC.) Lonicera implexa L.
maqramān (B.) ‫مقرامن‬ Plantago Coronopus L.
mardaqūsch (B.) ‫مردقوش‬ Origanum Majorana L.
massāss (LaC.) Alisma Plantago L.
meqremān, meqramēn ‫مقرامن‬ Inula viscosa Ait.
(B.)
melīliss, mlīless (B.) ‫مليلس‬ Rhamnus alaternus L.

⎰ Cistus monspeliensis L.
mellia (B. H-M.) ‫مليه‬
⎱ Cistus salviifolius L.

memēje (B.) ‫مماي‬ Inula crithmoides L.

meql-etss-tssēf (B.) ‫مقل الصيف‬ Marrubium vulgare L.
merret-el-hhanesch (B.) ‫مرة الحنش‬ Erythraea Centaurium L.
merriūt (H-M.) Marrubium vulgare L.
merssīta (LaC.) Inula viscosa L.
meschtta (B.) ‫مشطه‬ Scandix pecten-veneris
L.
messāssa, metssātssa Cynoglossum pictum Ait.
 (B.)
metenēn (H-M.) Thymelaea hirsuta L.
mtssātssa (B.) ‫مصاصه‬ Umbellifer. sp.
muhháget (LaC.) Serapias cordigera L.
mūl-'Ali (B.) Bellis annua L.
mul'āli (LaC.) (für umm- Anacyclus clavatus Pers.
el-'āli)
mustāssa (H-M.) Umbilicus horizontalis
Guss.
muttār, muttēr (B.) ‫موطر‬ Ranunculus acris L.

n
‫ن‬

nathāss (B. H-M.) Osyris alba L.

nigm (H-M.) Cynodon Dactylon L.
nschīm (B.) ‫نشم‬ Celtis australis L.
nussāhssa (H-M.) Nonea nigricans Desf.
nuuār-al'aschīje, nuuār- ‫نوار العاشيه‬ Convolvulus tricolor L.
l'aschi (B.)
nuuār-el-aqrab (H-M.) Plantago Lagopus L.
nuuar-dsáhhua (B. LaC.) ‫نواره اظحوه‬ Fedia Cornucopiae L.
nuuār-en-nahhla (B.) Echium plantagineum
Desf.
nuuār-es-suāra (B.) ‫نوار الزواره‬ Narcissus Tazetta L.
nuuār-ssuēua (B.) Lupinus luteus L.
nuuār-et-t.hhāla (B.) ‫نوار التحله‬ Echium plantagineum
Desf.
nuuār-tssefra (B.) ‫نواره صفرا‬ Chrysanthemum
Coronarium L.

q
‫ق‬

⎰ Poa trivialis L.
qellēb, qellāb (B. LaC.) ‫قلب‬
⎱ !Lolium temulentum L.

qemhh-el-hhagla (B.) ‫قمح الحجله‬ Briza maxima L.

qendūl, qendül-el-gemel ‫قندول‬ Genista tricuspidata Desf.
(B.)
qendūl (LaC.) Genista sp. spinosae
qendūl-el-gemel (B.) ‫قندول الجمل‬ Calycotome spinosa
Lam.
qerīua' (H-M.) Arum italicum L.
qernīna (B.) ‫قرنينه‬ Onopordum
macracanthum
Shousb.
qettém (LaC.) Ilex Aquifolium L.
qornēna (H-M.) ⎧ Silybum Marianum Gaert.
⎨
⎩
 ⎩ Scolymus hispanicus L.
!Scolymus maculatus L.
qiqeb (B. Kabyl.) ‫قيقب‬ Celtis australis L. (die
Frucht)
qernūnesch (B.) ‫قرنونش‬ Nasturtium officinale L.
qornúnasch-el-gebel (B.) ‫قرنونش الجبل‬ Koniga maritima R.Br.
qtssāb, qtssōb (B.) ‫قصب‬ Phragmites communis L.

r
‫ر‬

ramrām (LaC.) Solanum nigrum L.

Cardopatium
⎰ corymbosum Sp.
rass-hhegla (B. LaC.) ‫راس الحجله‬
⎱
!Fedia cornucopiae L.
rbīb-ed-driass (B.) ‫ربيب الدرياس‬ Lupinus luteus L.
rihhān (B.) ‫ريحان‬ Myrtus communis L.
rihhān-el-ghrīb (B.) ‫ريحان الغريب‬ Prasium majus L.

s
‫ز‬
sakkūm (LaC.) Lolium temulentum L.
sa'arūr (B. H-M.) ‫زعرور‬ !Crataegus oxyacantha L.
sa'arūr (B.) ‫زعرور‬ Prunus insititia L.
sa'āter (B.) ‫زعتر‬ Thymus serpyllum L.
sá'etra (B.) ‫زعيترة‬ Micromeria nervosa Bth.
sās (asās) (LaC.) Daphne Gnidium L.
sās (B.) ‫زاز‬ Osyris alba L.
sebūg (B.) ‫زبوج‬ Olea europaea L. f.
oleaster
sēn (B.) Quercus Mirbeckii Duv.
sénsu[31] (B. H-M.) ‫زنزو‬ Clematis cirrhosa L.
Scolymus hispanicus L.
⎰
sernīs (B. LaC.) ‫زرنيز‬
⎱ Carduus pycnocephalus
L.
serrūdia (LaC.) Daucus Carota L. f.
radice parva
s'ētra (H-M.) Thymus serpyllum L.
sētta (H-M.) Ornithogalum umbellatum
L.
setūn (H-M.) Olea europaea L.

ss
‫س‬
ssāle-lensār (H-M.) Verbascum sinuatum L.
ess-ssāq-alekhhal (B.) ‫الساق االكحل‬ Adianthum Capillus-
Veneris L.
ss'āqet-el-qott.tt (B.) Daucus maximus Desf.
ssbulat-el-far (B.) ‫سبولة الفار‬ Phalaris caerulescens
Desf.
ssbūqa (B.) ‫سبوقه‬ Sambucus nigra L.
ssēf-el-ghrāb (B. H-M.) ‫سيف الغراب‬ Gladiolus segetum L.
sseïsseī (B.) ‫سيسي‬ Salix pedicellata Desf.
ssekérschu (B.) ‫سكرشو‬ Calystegia sepium R.Br.
(= Convolvulus)
ssekkūm, ssukkōm (H- Asparagus albus L.
M.)
sselq (B.) ‫سلق‬ Beta vulgaris L.
ssemlīl, ssemlēl (B. H- ‫سملل‬ Salix pedicellata Desf.
M.)
ssennaría (LaC.) Daucus Carota L.
sseq-ett-ttēr (LaC.) Neslia paniculata Desf.
sseruēl, sseruīl (B.) ‫سرول‬ Cupressus sempervirens
L.
ssibūtss (H-M.) Andropogon hirtus L.
ssilla (H-M.) Hedysarum coronarium
L.
ssitssémber (B.) ‫سيصنبر‬ Mentha piperita L.
sskerga (B.) ‫سكرجا‬ Calystegia sepium R.Br.
(= Convolvulus)
sskerschu (B.) ‫سكارشو‬ Smilax aspera L.
ssmēter (B.) Pteris aquilina L.
ssolttān-el-ghaba (B.) ‫سلطان الغابه‬ Smyrnium olusatrum L.
ssrīss (B.) ‫سريس‬ Campanula Erinus L.
ssrīss (B.) Anagallis caerulea L.
ssuāk-raijān (H-M.) Scorpiurus muricatus L.

sch
‫ش‬

schā'ar-el-fār (B.) ‫شعر الفار‬ Stipa tortilis Desf.

scha'r-el-erneb (B.) ‫شعر االرنب‬ Lagurus ovatus L.
scha'āret-el-ma'īs (B.) ‫شعره المعيز‬ Umbellifer. sp.
schegeret-Meriam (B.) ‫شجره مريم‬ Artemisia arborescens L.
schenān, schnān (B.) ‫شنان‬ Melilotus indica Lam.
schendqūra (B.) ‫شندقوره‬ Ajuga Iva L.
schenef (B.) Erodium chium W.
scherraíeq (H-M.) Iris Sisyrynchium L.
schina, schna (B.) ‫شينه‬ Citrus Aurantium L.
esch-schōk-el-asreq (B.) ‫الشوك االزرق‬ Galactites tomentosa
Mch.
schōk-el-bēdda (H-M.) Cirsium lanceolatum L.
schōk-ed-dhab' (H-M.) Eryngium triquetrum
 Desf.
schōk-el-hhamir (B.) ‫شوك الحمير‬ Galactites tomentosa
Mch.
schōk-el-hhánesch (H- Galactites tomentosa
M.) Mch.
schōk-el-hhomār (B.) ‫شوك الحمير‬ Echinops spinosus L.
schōk-es-serqa (B.) Galactites tomentosa
Mch.

t
‫ت‬

tafrīra, tfēfra (B.) ‫تفيفره‬ !Acanthus mollis L.

tahhuirāt (B.) ‫تحويره‬ Papaver Rhoeas L.
teb-er-rajān (B. H-M.) Ononis alba Forsk.
tefifhha (B.) ‫تفيفحه‬ Matricaria chamomilla L.
Cardopatium
⎧ corymbosum Sp.
tefra (B. H-M.) ⎨
Rhaponticum acaule D.C.
⎩
Centaurea Seridis L.
terirásch (B.) ‫تريراش‬ Silene inflata L.
terttūq (B.) ‫ترطاق‬ Genista numidica Sp.
téssekra (H-M.) Echinops spinosus L.
tessulāt (B.) ‫تسوله‬ Hedysarum coronarium
 L.
tibíua (B.) ‫تيبيوه‬ Ficaria calthifolia Reich.
!tiféf (B.) ⎰
‫تيفف‬ Sonchus oleraceus L.
tilfēf (H-M.) ⎱

tifitáss (B.) ‫تيفيتاس‬ Linum angustifolium L.

tirlelt (B.) ‫تيراللت‬ Cyperus longus L.
tsilfāt (H-M.) Sonchus arvensis L.
tuffélt (H-M.) Verbascum sinuatum L.
tūt (B.) ‫توت‬ Morus alba L.

th
‫ث‬

tharrōr (H-M.) Crataegus oxyacantha L.

thatba (B.) Genista numidica Sp.
thinūg (H-M.) Nigella arvensis L.

tss
‫ص‬

tssabūn-el-'aráiss (B.) ‫صابون‬ Inula viscosa Ait.

‫العرايس‬
tssaftssāf (B. LaC.) ‫ ⎰ صفصاف‬Populus alba L.
⎱
Populus nigra L.
tssala-landhār (H-M.) Verbascum sinuatum L.
tssalahh-el-enttār (B.) ‫صالح االنطار‬ Verbascum sinuatum L.
tsserāt-el-ardd (B.) ‫صره االرض‬ Urospermum
Dalechampii Desf.
tssettbat (B.) ‫صطبه‬ Genista sp.

tt
‫ط‬

ttafss (B.) ‫طافس‬ Daucus muricatus L.

ttreilāl, ttreilān (B.) ‫طريالل‬ Chrysanthemum
Clausonis Pom.

u
‫و‬

uard-el-chla' (B.) ‫ورد الخلعه‬ Gladiolus segetum L.

uard-el-ghaba (B.) ‫ورد الغابه‬ Gladiolus segetum L.
uard-er-réqa (B.) Gladiolus segetum L.
'ūd-el-áhhmar, 'ūd-el- Alnus glutinosa L.
hhomr (B.)
'ūd-el-chēr (LaC.) Ilex Aquifolium L.
'udhēn-dhīb (B.) ‫اذن الذيب‬ Arum italicum L.
'udhēn-el-hhalūf (B.) ‫اذن الحلوف‬ Arum italicum L.
um-ess-ssuālef (B.) ‫ام السوالف‬ Salix babylonica L.

[30]d.i. „die kleine blaue“.

[31]Kabylisch: „asénsu“.
 B. LATEINISCH-ARABISCH GEORDNETER TEIL

A B C D E F
G H J. I K L M
N O P Q R S
T U V Z

!Acanthus mollis L. tafrīra, tfēfra (B.) ‫تفيفره‬

Adianthum Capillus- ess-ssāq-alekhhal (B.) ‫الساق االكحل‬
Veneris L.
Ajuga Iva L. schendqūra (B.) ‫شندقوره‬
Alisma Plantago L. massāss (LaC.)
Allium sphaerocephalum kurrēt (H-M.)
L.
Allium subhirsutum L. bibrāss (H-M.)

⎰ bebrūss (B.)
Allium triquetrum L. ‫بيبروس‬
⎱ bibrūss (LaC.)

el-chutss-el-áhhmar (B.) ‫الخوص االحمر‬

⎧ hhamrája, hhomrája
Alnus glutinosa L. ⎨ (LaC.)
⎩
'ūd-el-áhhmar, 'ūd-el-
hhomr (B.)
!Ampelodesmos tenax dīss (B. H-M.) ‫ديس‬
Vahl.
Anacyclus clavatus Pers. mul'āli (LaC.) (für umm-el-
'āli)
[32]
⎰ el-esēriq , lesēriq (B.)
Anagallis caerulea L. ‫ليزيرق‬
⎱ ssrīss (B.)

⎰ hhafer (B.) ‫حافر‬

Andropogon hirtus L.
⎱ ssibūtss (H-M.)

Andryala integrifolia L. dhēl-en-na'ga (B.)

Artemisia arborescens L. schegeret-Meriam (B.) ‫شجره مريم‬

⎧ beqūqa, bqūqa (B.) ‫بقوقع‬

⎪ qerīua' (H-M.)
Arum italicum L. ⎨
⎪ 'udhēn-dhīb (B.) ‫اذن الذيب‬
⎩ 'udhēn-el-hhalūf (B.) ‫اذن الحلوف‬
Asparagus albus L. ssekkūm, ssukkōm (H-M.)

⎰ baruēq (H-M.)
Asphodelus fistulosus L.
⎱ beruāq (B.) ‫برواق‬
Avena fatua L. chorttal (B.) ‫خرطال‬
Avena hirsuta L. chorttal-berri (B.) ‫خرطال برى‬

Bellis annua L. ⎰ almēlai-al'ali (B.) ‫المولى العالي‬