Debating Worlds: Contested Narratives

of Global Modernity and World Order

Daniel Deudney
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/debating-worlds-contested-narratives-of-global-moder
nity-and-world-order-daniel-deudney/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Sticky Power. Global Financial Networks in the World

Economy Daniel Haberly

https://ebookmass.com/product/sticky-power-global-financial-
networks-in-the-world-economy-daniel-haberly-2/

Sticky Power: Global Financial Networks in the World

Economy Daniel Haberly

https://ebookmass.com/product/sticky-power-global-financial-
networks-in-the-world-economy-daniel-haberly/

The Wrecking of the Liberal World Order Vittorio

Emanuele Parsi

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-wrecking-of-the-liberal-world-
order-vittorio-emanuele-parsi/

Informal Workers and Organized Action: Narratives From

the Global South Choudhary

https://ebookmass.com/product/informal-workers-and-organized-
action-narratives-from-the-global-south-choudhary/
eTextbook 978-0393918472 Worlds Together, Worlds Apart:
A History of the World: From the Beginnings of
Humankind to the Present (Concise Edi

https://ebookmass.com/product/etextbook-978-0393918472-worlds-
together-worlds-apart-a-history-of-the-world-from-the-beginnings-
of-humankind-to-the-present-concise-edi/

The Value of the World and of Oneself. Philosophical

Optimism and Pessimism from Aristotle to Modernity Mor
Segev

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-value-of-the-world-and-of-
oneself-philosophical-optimism-and-pessimism-from-aristotle-to-
modernity-mor-segev/

The Value of the World and of Oneself : Philosophical

Optimism and Pessimism from Aristotle to Modernity Mor
Segev

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-value-of-the-world-and-of-
oneself-philosophical-optimism-and-pessimism-from-aristotle-to-
modernity-mor-segev-2/

Negotiating Masculinities and Modernity in the Maritime

World, 1815–1940 Karen Downing

https://ebookmass.com/product/negotiating-masculinities-and-
modernity-in-the-maritime-world-1815-1940-karen-downing/

The Making and Mirroring of Masculine Subjectivities:

Gender, Affect, and Ethics in Modern World Narratives
Susan Mooney

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-making-and-mirroring-of-
masculine-subjectivities-gender-affect-and-ethics-in-modern-
world-narratives-susan-mooney/
Debating Worlds
 Debating Worlds
Contested Narratives of Global Modernity
and World Order
Edited by
DA N I E L D E U D N EY, G . J O H N I K E N B E R RY, A N D
KA R O L I N E P O S T E L -​V I NAY
 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2023

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2022950251

ISBN 978–​0–​19–​767931–​9 (pbk.)

ISBN 978–​0–​19–​767930–​2 (hbk.)

DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197679302.001.0001

Paperback printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America
 Contents

Acknowledgments  vii
List of Contributors  ix

Introduction: Debating Worlds  1

Daniel Deudney, G. John Ikenberry, and Karoline Postel-​Vinay
1. Angloworld Narratives: Race as Global Governance  28
Duncan Bell
2. The Rise and Fall of a Global Narrative: The Soviet Challenge to
the Western World  58
Michael Cox
3. Pan-​Islamic Narratives of the Global Order, 1870–​1980  80
Cemil Aydin
4. The Enduring Dilemma of Japan’s Uniqueness Narratives  115
Kei Koga and Saori N. Katada
5. Writing the Right: Radical Conservative Narratives
of Globalization  143
Jean-​François Drolet and Michael C. Williams
6. The Chinese Global in the Long Postwar: Narratives of War,
Civilization, and Infrastructure since 1945  162
Rana Mitter
7. Narrating India in/​and the World: Colonial Origins and
Postcolonial Contestations  184
Itty Abraham
8. Inequality, Development, and Global Distributive Justice  211
Jeremy Adelman
vi Contents

9. The Great Schism: Scientific-​Technological Modernity versus

Greenpeace Civilization  236
Daniel Deudney
Conclusion: Many Worlds and the Coming Narrative Dilemma  271
Karoline Postel-​Vinay

Index  285
 Acknowledgments

This volume is the outcome of several workshops held in Paris, Oxford, and
Princeton. The editors wish to express their gratitude for their encourage-
ment and generous support to the Policy Planning Department of the French
Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Sciences Po Center for International
Research, and Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies.
 Contributors

Itty Abraham, Professor, Arizona State’s School of Futures and Innovation

Jeremy Adelman, Henry Charles Lea Professor of History and Director of the Global
History Lab, Princeton University
Cemil Aydin, Professor, Department of History, University of North Carolina-​
Chapel Hill
Duncan Bell, Professor of Political Thought and International Relations, Fellow of
Christ’s College, University of Cambridge
Michael Cox, Emeritus Professor of International Relations and Founding Director
of LSE IDEAS
Daniel Deudney, Professor, Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins
University
Jean-​François Drolet, Reader in Politics and International Relations, School of
Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University of London
G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs,
Princeton University
Saori N. Katada, Professor, Department of Political Science and International
Relations and Director of the Center for International Studies, University of Southern
California
Kei Koga, Assistant Professor, Public Policy & Global Affairs, School of Social
Sciences, Nanyang Technological University—​Singapore
Rana Mitter, Professor of the History and Politics of Modern China, St Cross College,
University of Oxford
Karoline Postel-​Vinay, Professor, Center for International Research, Sciences
Po Paris
Michael C. Williams, Professor, University Research Chair in Global Political
Thought, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa
 Introduction
Debating Worlds

Daniel Deudney, G. John Ikenberry, and Karoline Postel-​Vinay

By the last decade of the twentieth century, the great questions of moder-
nity seemed to be answered. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and
global communism, the liberal democratic capitalist project seemed to be
the only one left standing.1 The liberal narrative of 1989 was symbolized by
the fall of the Berlin Wall. Leonard Bernstein and Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy”
provided the soundtrack. The 1980s and 1990s were decades when the “lib-
eral ideal” spread worldwide. China joined the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and all the great powers—​East and West—​seemed to be converging
and integrating as stakeholders into a single global liberal world order. After
centuries of tumultuous conflicts and waves of globalization, it appeared that
humanity was on the verge of achieving a worldwide shared understanding,
a universal narrative, of how societies should operate—​and a narrative of a
jointly held brighter future.
Today, this universalistic narrative clearly rings hollow. The tectonic plates
of the global distribution of power have shifted and the preeminence of the
West is clearly on the wane. As the West recedes, the Rest have surged in
power, bringing with them new stories of the global past and new directions
for world order. China is rapidly emerging as a peer competitor of the United
States, bringing with it a powerful new global narrative, emphasizing griev-
ance and revision. A decade ago, new narratives of the so-​called emerging
powers—​the BRICS—​provided a narrative of global transformation. Political
Islam also burst onto the global scene as a multifaceted transnational move-
ment reshaping regional political order and geopolitical alignments. Its
narrative centers on a civilizational religion, rejecting secular and Western
ways of life. With the rapid advance of climate change—​and the advent of the
Anthropocene Age—​there have arisen new narratives of global endanger-
ment and dystopia, as well as new narratives of science, technology, and the

Daniel Deudney, G. John Ikenberry, and Karoline Postel-​Vinay, Introduction In: Debating Worlds. Edited by Daniel
Deudney, G. John Ikenberry, and Karoline Postel-​Vinay, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023.
DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197679302.003.0001
2 Daniel Deudney et al.

environment. Far from converging, fragmentation and contestation increas-

ingly dominate debates over world order.
Challenges to the universalistic narrative have also erupted in the West.
The high bastions of the advanced industrial democracies, the vanguard in
the old narrative, have fallen on hard times. Economic decline of the working
class, the financial crisis of 2008, the rise of extreme inequality, and renewed
racial turmoil have all called into question the viability of the progressive
liberal narrative in the United States and Europe. The new media environ-
ment of the internet has eroded civility and amplified grievances. With these
setbacks, there has been a rise of right-​wing and illiberal movements, or-
ganized around authoritarian parties and governments across the West. In
Europe, the project of union has been undermined by Brexit. The spread
and deepening of democracy have been challenged and reversed by rising
ethno-​centric and illiberal nationalism, especially in Poland and Hungary.
In the United States, which had styled itself as the indispensable leader of the
free world for the better part of a century, the election of Donald Trump was
an abrupt shock and regression. Under the banner of America First, Trump
actively undermined and subverted American multilateral leadership and
global problem-​solving. Across the world, the “third wave” of democratiza-
tion rising after the Cold War has rapidly receded. With the growing power,
self-​confidence, and ideological assertiveness of authoritarians and even
totalitarians, the future seems to be trending strongly against the universali-
zation of Western liberal democratic modernity.
As the dominant narrative of the West has waned, a new plurality of
narratives has emerged. Each of these narratives combines stories of the
past with understandings of the present and attractive visions of the future.
Competing narratives have always existed, but over the last several decades,
narrative plurality and contestations have become increasingly salient. Given
these new realities, a primary task for theorists of world order must be to
map these narratives. This task requires an understanding of the key features
of narratives, their origins, and their roles in struggles over world order. In
short, narratives are an important part of all world orders, and no under-
standing of contemporary politics and the prospects for conflict and concord
in the future can fail to take them into serious consideration.
The narratives prominent on the contemporary world stage are a volatile
mix of components. Not only are they very different from one another, they
are themselves internally heterogeneous and contested. They offer different
understandings of the past, present, and future. Some are “pre-​Western,”
 Introduction 3

predating the encounter with Western global modernity. Some are clearly
Western in origin and character. And some are vigorously anti-​Western.
They also differ in regard to their scope. Some are regional and civilizational,
without global aspirations. But others cast themselves as globally expansive
and universally ambitious. They are defined in different degrees by their
antagonism with their alternatives, ranging from essential indifference to
vigorous hostility. Many view this new discursive plurality as a welcome lib-
eration from the experience of an oppressive and unwanted hegemonic and
imperial Western narrative of modernity.2 One way or another, it is the inter-
action of these diverse narratives that will in some significant measure shape
debates and struggles over world order in the decades ahead.
These narrative clashes have first-​order, real-​world implications. The es-
sential feature of the contemporary global and planetary era is that all the
parts of fragmented humanity are now embedded in a planet-​wide mesh of
cascading interdependences. In a rapidly globalizing and changing world
system, beset with major global problems—​ranging from nuclear war to
pandemics to climate change—​this vigorous dissensus casts a darkening
shadow over humanity’s future. This cacophony and strong contestation
over the fundamentals of world order diminish humanity’s capacity to avoid
conflict and solve global problems of increasing magnitude.3 Whatever
the attractions of the past, of historical grievances, or disputes about pre-
ferred cultures and ways of life, and whatever their posture toward liberal
and Western modernity, the fractious branches of the human world are all
dependent on the competent global management of increasingly potent
technologies and the onslaught of climate change.
In a world marked by clashing narratives, global cooperation is becoming
precarious. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a stark reminder that large-​scale
conflict, and even nuclear war, could be increasingly difficult to avoid. Beyond
hard-​power politics, what is at play in Russia’s aggression, along with China’s
de facto support, is the volatile significance of global connectivity fueled by
contradictory interpretations and stories. Global regulatory capacities are
decaying, and so is the possibility of addressing global challenges such as
climate change, pandemics, or the rise of extreme inequality. The Covid-​19
sanitary crisis exposed yet again a fierce worldwide narrative contestation
described by Josep Borrell, the European Union High Representative, as a
“global battle of narratives”4 that impacted the management of the crisis.
In short, this new battle of narratives arrives just at the moment when hu-
manity faces its greatest need yet for common understanding and collective
4 Daniel Deudney et al.

action. Given these disturbing realities and trends, this volume is motivated
by the hope that an improved mapping and understanding of these diverse
narratives and their interaction can contribute to the reviving and reshaping
of a universalistic project that is both truly universal, significantly pluralistic,
and responsive to the imperatives of global problem-​solving.
Our aim is to examine on their own terms many of the major narratives
of global modernity and world order that have emerged and clashed across
the past several centuries. As a first step toward this goal, the next section
considers the character and importance of narratives in world politics. The
following section examines the key feature of global modernity and Western
liberalism about which the major narratives explored in this volume have
been preoccupied. The final section introduces and overviews the histor-
ical cases.

What Are Narratives in World Politics?

Narratives are stories that people tell themselves about the world they live
in, their role in it, and what they should be doing. Narratives are a ubiq-
uitous feature of the human world and play important roles in politics.
This fact has been widely recognized. In recent years, extensive work on
narratives has been pursued by scholars of both the humanities and social
sciences. Narratives are a central focus for psychologists, theologians, and
philosophers. Popular culture and politics are permeated with competing
narrative constructions of many types and grades.
Looking across history, narratives have played often prominent roles in
politics and international affairs. Narrative constructions play a powerful
role in the founding of cities, religions, states, and empires. For all their
profound differences, successful founders such as Moses, Mohammad,
Madison, Hitler, and Lenin were storytellers as much as organizers. And in
periods of great upheaval and challenge, leaders such as Napoleon, Lincoln,
Bismarck, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Churchill were successful in part be-
cause of their skill of articulating and reaffirming narrative stories of history,
identity, and purpose. As the clash of narratives between Russia’s President
Putin, Ukraine, and the West reminds us, the battlefields of politics are as
much narrative wars as clashes of arms.
At the most general level, narratives in world politics are “big stories.”
They are produced, as in any storytelling process, by individual or collective
 Introduction 5

storytellers who assemble disparate events, data, and beliefs into a narra-
tive form that makes sense of the past, the present, and the future.5 Political
narratives are accounts that mix empirical claims about the past and present
with privileged values and preferred futures.6 Narratives offer answers to the
questions that all peoples ask: who we are, how did we get here, and where
are we going? And they seek to address these questions in ways that orient
actors toward political action, thus answering the perennial question: what
is to be done?
Our focus is on a subset of political narratives that we call “narratives of
the global.” These are macro-​stories that actors generate to make sense of
their place in the long span of historical global development. Narratives of
the global purport to explain how particular groups got to where they are,
and where they are going on the world stage. Looking at macro-​narratives
of the global over the past several centuries shows many quite different
narratives of the global. They include characterizations of relative power, the
degree of interconnectedness, and ideas about the nature of global moder-
nity. These narratives and the agendas that they support point toward spe-
cific world orders, patterns of authority, identity, and legitimacy. In world
politics, narratives are deployed as calls for universal action or to help set
international codes, norms, and rules. While always speaking to the whole,
global narratives also embody the perspectives and experiences of partic-
ular peoples.7 At the center of every narrative of the global is an actor—​a
people, a country, a movement, a religion, a civilization—​whose interests
and predicaments are the focus.
Narratives also have important performative aspects.8 Their exponents
make great efforts in embodying key narrative points in popular song, mon-
umental architecture, commissioned art, and public ceremonies.9 The key
features are cast to be seen and emotionally captivating. For example, en-
vironmental narratives have typically entailed visual communication and
collective performance, such as Al Gore’s presentations of The Inconvenient
Truth or Greta Thunberg’s Fridays for Future.10 Taken to the extreme, the
public performance face of narratives not only can become the basis for
special mass ceremonies, but also can be woven into texture of ordinary
life in encompassing ways. Authoritarian governments, operating with
the tools of unchecked state power, have produced total regimes that have
sought to bring every aspect of life into conformity with what are deemed
to be the edicts of their narratives. While most narratives of global moder-
nity either do not have totalizing aspirations or have been unable to realize
6 Daniel Deudney et al.

them, all have performative manifestations that are essential tools for re-
cruitment and education and the mobilization of collective action on a large
scale. The performativity of narratives has a naturalizing power. By com-
bining political agendas and worldviews with emotional power and widely
shared understandings and values, narratives are able to contain internal
contradictions, discrepancies, and deviations and the inevitable gaps be-
tween the narrative storyline and real events.11
Finally, narratives have wide appeal and important impacts because they
seek to respond to pressing and important actual situations and problems.
When new problems arise and crises erupt, narrative revision and refor-
mation frequently result. Big problems, major setbacks, and fundamental
novelties compel actors to rethink their narratives. Threatening changes in
circumstances require new ways of doing things and the mobilization of col-
lective action, thus entailing the recasting of the narrative script. For example,
when the Industrial Revolution brought scattered and low-​skilled peasants
into factories and cities, the pre-​industrial agrarian narratives of ancien régimes
were no longer adequate. To reclaim their political usefulness, narratives have
to account for and incorporate, both discursively and politically, new ac-
tors and problems. As a result of this dynamic interplay between real-​world
problems and shared stories and understandings, narratives rise, fall, and
evolve in major ways. Hence narratives succeed, fail, and change in significant
measure as a result of their strengths and weaknesses in illuminating problems
and predicaments and guiding actors in their problem-​solving pursuits.
In sum, narratives are norm-​infused cognitive maps that provide over-
arching stories of the past, present, and future in ways that frame and
guide practical action and problem-​solving at a societal—​now increasingly
global—​scale. When the map in a narrative story ceases to capture important
parts of reality, actions guided by the old map are unlikely to be responsive
and can often be disastrous. Given these features of narratives, major rifts,
common problems, and new directions can be identified across the global
space of modernity. By looking at narratives in this way, an important di-
mension of world politics in the modern global era is illuminated.

Studying Global Narratives

Within the humanities and social sciences, the study of narratives, or “nar-
ratology,” has been extensively developed. The study of narratives is an
 Introduction 7

integral part of literary studies and criticism.12 The difference between a

chronicle and a history is a narrative, and historians recognize themselves
as storytellers. Advocates of “Big History” promote educational curricula in
order to disseminate an appreciation of the temporal and special impacts of
human agency.13 Communication theorists study narratives.14 Empirical so-
cial scientists study the role of narratives in society, economics, and politics.15
Political scientists have identified the importance of narrative for institutions
and collective action.16 Political historians and analysts of elections study
the role of clashing narratives in election campaigns and presidential policy-​
making.17 Among international relations theorists, postmodernists and
constructivists have explored the ways in which discourses and narratives
permeate politics.18 As scholars such as Thomas Risse, Nita Crawford, and
Martha Finnemore have demonstrated, many of the great global struggles,
such abolitionism and decolonialism, entailed the construction and wide
dissemination of new stories that prominently feature moral arguments.19
International relations (IR) theory has experienced a “narrative turn” in-
spired by subject-​centered methodologies used in other disciplines, notably
history.20 The study of foreign policy-​making has also analyzed the influen-
tial role of strategic narratives.21
A prominent tendency in thinking about narratives with wide influence
has been the effort to subvert, debunk, and abandon narratives, and partic-
ularly grand narratives. The particular target of anti-​narrative thinking has
been the grand Enlightenment vision of human progress and liberation,
and the various narratives and ideologies associated with it in late-​modern
politics. In the nineteenth century, a new hermeneutic of critique and sus-
picion of powerful social narratives was developed by many thinkers, es-
pecially Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund
Freud. Their basic insight was that the organized ideas prevalent in society
were essentially a sham—​edifices of ideas designed to bolster the interests of
powerful groups. Thus was born “critical theory,” which entailed the system-
atic analysis of the reigning stories of modernity. This type of thinking was
further developed by the members of the Frankfurt School in the interwar
period, and then by postmodern anti-​structuralists, most notably Jean-​
François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, who emphasized
the unreliability of language and the ultimately arbitrary character of all
human claims, including those offered by natural science.
In the later years of the twentieth century and beyond, this comprehen-
sive posture of suspicion became vernacularized. On both the right and left,
8 Daniel Deudney et al.

this debunking move has been increasingly absolutized and universally ap-
plied. In the face of this extensive radical suspiciousness, and amplified by
the novel features of the internet-​dominated information environment, facts
have become suspect, disinformation rampant, and conspiratorial thinking
widespread.22 Critics of this powerful secular tendency, from the old left and
right and center, question whether civil peace, democratic accountability,
and the competent operation of government can be maintained without
shared narratives and other common understandings, both empirical and
normative.
Despite these debates, narratives are a distinctive social phenom-
enon, a composite mixture of different types of ideas, visions, theories,
interpretations, and agendas. They draw from the past and they claim to em-
body something of prime importance from the past. They are constructed
from selective social or “collective memories”23 of the past, exaggerated
facets of the past, and even largely imaginary renderings of the past.24 In their
most widely disseminated versions, narratives of the global offer selective
histories, simplified in a story that can be widely grasped. They are also often
associated with a grand political tradition such as liberalism, revolutionary
socialism, or national statism. These narrative traditions have founding
visionaries and thinkers, classical texts, complex lineages of arguments and
debates, and interpretations of pivotal events.
Global narratives encompass both causal and normative claims. That is,
they have accounts and theories about the way the world works, intermingled
with normative claims about how the world should work. Integral to
narratives of the global are political projects, ongoing programmatic efforts
by leaders, activists, and movements working across time to realize their
agendas. The narrative’s sense of inheritance, lineage, and genealogy provides
the foundation and legitimacy for shared beliefs about the past in order to
inspire and direct mass action in chosen directions. Narratives also contain
various futures, some vague and normative, others elaborate and specific.
Among the many narratives that have existed across history, the limited set
of narratives considered here have in common sweeping stories speaking to
challenges and experiences of global modernity.
The concept of narrative has affiliations and overlaps with other impor-
tant discursive concepts, most notably ideology, worldview, and cosmology.
Different analysts define these concepts in different ways. Some view
ideologies as ubiquitous across human experience, but others emphasize
that the term dates to the period of the French Revolution, and others view
 Introduction 9

political ideology as a distinctively late-​modern discursive phenomenon.25

However these terms are defined, the focus here is on large stories in global
modern politics. Despite these analytic differences, there is general agree-
ment that ideologies are confined to the sphere of politics, political economy,
and social order. Narratives are also complexly related to the concept of
worldview or weltanschauung. Worldviews are best seen as even more com-
prehensive than narratives and, like narratives, not solely confined to poli-
tics.26 A prominent feature in worldviews is an understanding of the natural
world, and indeed much of the theorizing of worldviews has emphasized the
increasingly influential role of successive scientific revolutions. For many
analysts, the shift from human pre-​modernity to modernity has entailed a
shift in worldview. In a less comprehensive scale, worldviews are thought to
be a universal trait of human culture, psychology, and society. This way of
thinking about worldviews opens the door to micro-​sociological and ther-
apeutic investigations. Another related ideational formation is cosmology,
which is also at play in changing ways across history. In common Western
analysis, cosmology refers to ideas and representations about the natural
world at its largest scale.27 From the beginning, cosmological analysis was
focused on the sky, and it has been the project of astronomy to accurately
grasp these realities. In part because of the profound revolutions in as-
tronomy beginning with Copernicus and Newton, some recent analysists
have used the term cosmology to indicate what previously was considered a
worldview.
The actor-​centric character of narratives means that narrative analysis
must distinguish between four different types of investigations. On the
one hand, there is the project of evaluating, assessing, and testing the truth
content of the claims in the narrative and the project of constructing and
modifying narratives in some significant way. On the other hand, are the
projects—​the focus of this volume—​of providing genealogies of the content
of the narratives, and explaining the roles and impacts that agents acting on
the basis of narratives have had in world politics.28 Consistent with these
distinctions, the chapters in this volume are not attempts to test and evaluate
the content of the narratives. Nor are the chapters attempts to construct or
improve narratives. Rather, the chapters are genealogies and investigations
of the impacts of agents articulating and acting out narratives. Thus, our task
is not to provide new or improved liberal, Islamist, Marxist, civilizational, or
other theories of global modernity and world order. Rather, the objective is to
analyze the content, function, evolution, and impact of narratives of modern
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Chestnut Street; and the home of Miss Grace Machado at 5
Carpenter Street, where a gorgeous wistaria covers the entire front
of the building with its clusters of purple bloom.
 The Stearns House

THE STEARNS HOUSE

Houses of the period following the gambrel-roofed type were in

shape commonly either square or rectangular. Almost always the
third-story windows were nearly square, as compared with the taller
ones of the first and second floors—an architectural device by
means of which the building appeared lower than it actually was.
This was called ‘foreshortening.’ The severity of outline presented by
these simple structures was relieved by various devices—sometimes
by quoined corner-boards, an ornamental cornice, a balustraded
roof, or decorative lintels above the windows; very rarely by
rusticated front-boards in imitation of stone blocks. The chief glory of
the house as one viewed it from the outside was of necessity the
entrance, with its porch, open or enclosed; and it was hither that the
loving attention of architect and wood-carver was most assiduously
directed.
The Stearns house, built in 1776, stands at 384 Essex Street, and
presents a notable example of the Revolutionary style.
As was very often the case with Salem houses, the plain character
of the original structure of the Stearns homestead was later relieved
by the addition of a porch of most artistic design, again from the
hand of Samuel McIntire, regarding whom one is continually led to
wonder that in the short period of his activity he could achieve so
much. This new porch was put in place in 1785, and is of especial
dignity due to the use of flanking pilasters in addition to the engaged
columns at the rear of the structure. The order is Doric and the effect
is one of strength and permanence.
At the North Bridge affair in February, 1775, when Colonel Leslie’s
troops met armed resistance from the Salem citizens, one of the
leading spirits on the patriot side was ‘Major’ Joseph Sprague. It was
for him that this house was erected, later passing into the hands of
the Stearns family, connections of the Major by marriage. Colonel
Sprague, as he later became, died in 1808, since which time this has
been known as the Stearns house.
 The Timothy Orne House
Belonging to the same period as the Stearns house, but a few
years earlier in origin, having been built in 1761, the Timothy Orne
house at 266 Essex Street makes a somewhat more painstaking
attempt at decoration than most of those of the time.
It has balustraded roof, quoined corners, and ornamental cornice;
its chimney-stacks taper at the top; while the handsome porch
presents a center toward which the eye naturally reverts as the
keynote of the whole.
The activities of the Committee of Safety just prior to the
Revolution are well-known, as is the fate which commonly befell
those persons who were suspected of Royalist leanings. Tarring and
feathering was the usual method of exhibiting patriotic distaste for
such proclivities; and Timothy Orne, owner of the house in question,
seems to have fallen under the ban, inasmuch as some old-time
correspondence relates that he narrowly escaped this humiliating
ordeal, being released on condition of good behavior.
The Orne house possessed a ‘decked’ roof—the original purpose
of which was to afford the Salem merchant an elevated platform from
which through his glass he might scan the horizon for his incoming
ships. This type of roof is found upon many of the houses of that
period. The ‘belvedere,’ a small balustraded platform at the center of
the roof at the summit, was a variation of the cupola idea, both of
these as found upon Salem houses having their origin in utility—a
lookout-place rather than an architectural feature. Nevertheless, as
on the Baldwin-Lyman and Pickman-Shreve-Little houses and
others, a gratifying decorative effect was secured.
 The Crowninshield-Devereux-Waters House
Crowninshield, in early days pronounced ‘Grounsell’—was a great
name in Old Salem. The house of George Crowninshield stood on
the present location of the Custom-House, its cupola surmounted by
a weather vane in shape of a man with a telescope. This George, a
famous ship-owner, was the father of three sons, Benjamin, member
of Congress and Secretary of the Navy under Presidents Madison
and Monroe; Jacob, also a Congressman; and Captain George,
owner of Cleopatra’s Barge, one of the first pleasure yachts ever
built in America.
Clifford Crowninshield in 1805 erected a house after designs by
McIntire at 72 Washington Square, East. This building was square,
with a long L at the side, an enclosed porch being placed in the
angle formed by the two buildings.
Clifford Crowninshield might be called a ‘merchant plunger.’ He
amassed great wealth by fortunate ventures. His ship Minerva was
the first Salem vessel to carry the flag around the world. In 1809 he
died, and his house was occupied by his brother-in-law, Captain
James Devereux.
Devereux was of the same type as Crowninshield. As captain of
the ship Franklin, of Boston, he traded with Japan half a century
before Admiral Perry opened the door to American commerce. In
1808 he paid $26,618.25 customs duties on a single cargo of coffee.
Dying in 1846, he left the house to Captain William Dean Waters, his
son-in-law. Waters died in 1880, and in 1892 the property passed out
of the family.
The entrance of this huge homestead, with its elliptical porch
surmounted by a handsome balustrade, its solid Tuscan columns,
spreading fanlight, and paneled door, is in scale with the rest of the
building. The tiny square windows on the third floor add a quaint
touch to the whole.
 The Mansfield-Bolles House

THE MANSFIELD-BOLLES HOUSE

Oblong houses in Old Salem stood sometimes with the front to the
street, sometimes with the end; the latter is the case with the
Mansfield-Bolles house at 8 Chestnut Street, built in 1810. The
house is of brick, painted, which has spoiled the mellow effect. It is
entirely covered as to the front with a close growth of ampelopsis. At
the center is the handsome doorway, nearly flush with the façade,
the spreading fanlight, oval-paned side-lights, and proper Colonial
paneled door producing a most pleasing effect. The windows of the
upper story are not foreshortened—an unusual feature in houses of
this type. This is probably due to the fact that this story was a later
addition, the building having previously been used for commercial
purposes.
The late Reverend Dr. E. C. Bolles, professor at Tufts College, and
formerly pastor of the Universalist Church in Salem, lived here for
many years.
 The Richard Derby House

THE RICHARD DERBY HOUSE

This is the oldest brick residence in Salem, being built in 1761 by

Richard Derby, whose son, Elias Hasket Derby, became the greatest
merchant of the time, owning the Grand Turk of 300 tons, originally
built for a privateer, but turned to commercial uses, and one of the
fastest sailing craft afloat. His ship Atlantic was the first of the
famous Indiamen, trading with Calcutta and Bombay before the
eighteenth century had come to a close. The house in question is
said to have been built for him. It was Elias Hasket Derby who
headed the popular subscription for redeeming Salem Common from
its unkempt condition and converting it into Washington Square.
 Richard Derby had formerly occupied a gambrel-roofed wooden
house which, erected in 1738, still stands at the corner of Herbert
and Derby Streets. The brick house we may imagine represented a
great advance in building. There had been one attempt, as early as
1700, at a brick house, but the owner’s wife considered it unsanitary,
and prevailed upon him to demolish it.
An interesting feature of the Derby house is the location of the four
chimneys in pairs at either end. This was no doubt an improvement
over the old style of a huge central stack, with fireplaces opening into
it from all sides. The entrance is most attractive, though
unpretentious. One notices the fluted pilasters with Doric capitals,
the severe square-paned top-light, the elaborate paneling of the
door, and the very unusual effect of the rusticated jambs.
 The Hodges-Peele-West House
Beautifully shaded by huge elms, the Hodges-Peele-West house
at 12 Chestnut Street affords a typical illustration of the square brick
house of the early years of the nineteenth century. This was erected
in 1804 for Captain Jonathan Hodges, and was remodeled in 1845
by its then owner, Willard Peele. The warm red-brick, so effective as
a background for the pure white of the Colonial porch, has here been
hidden by a coat of gray paint. A light and artistic iron fence encloses
the yard, stables of a design harmonious with the house itself are
located at the rear, and a most attractive and handsome porch
invites entrance.
 The Silsbee-Mott House

THE SILSBEE-MOTT HOUSE

Although fallen out of favor at the beginning, as unsanitary and

damp, brick houses in Salem finally triumphantly came into their
own, and the opening of the nineteenth century found them the
prevailing type.
It was some time before so-called double houses, or ‘semi-
detached’ houses, began to be erected; but a first attempt had
already been made in 1814 and soon after we find a number of
examples.
 Notable among these is the Silsbee-Mott house, built for two
families, at the corner of Oliver Street and Washington Square.
Instead of a double house, however, we seem to have two single
houses of similar design joined together.
Our plate shows the handsome porch and entrance of the Mott
side of the house.
 The Hodges-Webb-Meek House

THE HODGES-WEBB-MEEK HOUSE

The Hodges-Webb-Meek house stands in the heart of the

business district at 81 Essex Street, built in the latter part of the
eighteenth century. Located just back from the street, it has been for
many years the only one left of the row of houses where the
exclusive set of Old Salem formerly lived. It is a gambrel-roofed
building of architectural importance and is closely connected with the
early history of the city. Would that these old porches could relate the
many romances and tragedies they have witnessed since coming
into being—to tell us of the days when Salem was a social center,
composed of the ship-owners and their families, of which there were
a sufficient number to make a story which links itself with her wealth
and ventures. It is interesting to trace as far as possible the incentive
which they had in designing their homes, with their wide hallways
and large, square, white paneled rooms opening on either side, often
ending with the old-fashioned garden, laid out at the rear of the
houses.
 The Pickman-Shreve-Little House
Along tree-shaded Chestnut Street stand houses that were built
just after the decline of commerce, and it is to these that we turn for
the study of the different periods. Notable among them is the
Pickman-Shreve-Little house at 27 Chestnut Street, a large three-
story brick mansion with both front and side porches; but it is that
which faces the residential street of Old Salem of which we wish to
speak.
The house was built in 1816, and, while similar in style to the
Dodge-Shreve house, has the distinction of having the very best
Corinthian porch on Chestnut Street, impressive with its hand-tooled
lintels, displaying central vertical bead-moulding.
Originally it was built for one of the most daring of the intrepid
ship-owners who had amassed a fortune in the days when the East
Indies opened up trade which brought glory to the old seaport town
—days when level-headed merchants vied with each other in
competing in foreign lands. It has been said of young Pickman, the
first owner of this house, that he was a man with a mind as keen as
a Damascus blade, faithful in friendship and an absolute genius in
financial affairs, especially during the days when forests of masts
rose at the wharves, when men worked with a will, aided by their
wives and daughters, who were willing to assist them with wise
economies.
In the years to come the history of Salem and her commerce will
have faded from the minds of the younger generation. This makes it
imperative that accurate facts be culled from the oldest inhabitants,
through which we may learn narratives never told concerning the
days and ways when ships were linked with her business life.
Salem architecture will never fade—it will grow more valuable as
time passes on; therefore, it behooves us to cherish not only her
porches and her houses, but her wall-papers, her hand-tooling, and
the treasures brought over by merchantmen and clipper ships just
after the Revolutionary War.
 The Home for Aged Women

THE HOME FOR AGED WOMEN

Many buildings in Salem which now house various charities and

organizations were originally private houses, with which is
associated much interesting history.
One such instance is found in the Home for Aged Women at 180
Derby Street.
Erected in 1810 from designs by McIntire, this was the home of
the Honorable Benjamin W. Crowninshield, Secretary of the Navy
under Madison and Monroe, to whom reference has already been
made. William C. Endicott, Secretary of War during Cleveland’s
administration, was born here in 1826.
When the property passed into the hands of the Association for
the Relief of Aged and Destitute Women, alterations and
improvements were made, but the main portion of the house remains
as originally built.
Notable among all McIntire’s entrances and porches is that which
adorns and dignifies this fine old house. Standing at the head of a
flight of six granite steps, fluted Doric columns support the porch
roof, the architrave and cornice being severely chaste, in the
absence of any carving or ornament whatsoever. Plain pilasters flank
the charming doorway, which is wide and hospitable, with a
generous and beautiful fanlight, and leaded side-lights of graceful
design.
The door itself is of unusual size, but bears the characteristic
Colonial panels, six in number, and is painted white. The total effect
is one of purity and taste, with a certain note of nobility which
inevitably impresses the beholder.
This house, then owned by Secretary Crowninshield, was
occupied by President Monroe when he visited Salem in 1817.
Guests at the time included a number of notable men from every
department of public service—Judge Joseph Story, General
Dearborn, Commodores Bainbridge and Perry, Senator Silsbee,
Lieutenant-Governor Gray, and General James Miller among them.
General Miller became Collector of the Port in 1835, and continued
in this office until 1849. Nathaniel Hawthorne held the position of
Surveyor of Customs for the last three years of General Miller’s
administration, when a political overturn ousted both Surveyor and
Collector. Spare time with Hawthorne was partly spent in preparing
the manuscript of ‘The Scarlet Letter,’ in the introduction to which he
describes the old Custom-House.
General Miller fought at Lundy’s Lane—his historic reply on that
occasion, ‘I’ll try, sir,’ being afterward by governmental order
engraved upon the buttons of his famous regiment.
 The Home for Aged Men

THE HOME FOR AGED MEN

Turner Street Doorway

As late as 1806, in spite of the general exodus from Derby Street

to Chestnut, a few new houses were being built in the old territory.
One of these was put up by Captain Joseph Waters, on the corner of
Derby and Turner Streets, and possesses some unusual and
attractive architectural features. The window lintels are of white
marble with keystones, and this produces a striking effect. The main
entrance is on the side, and the portico is two stories in height,
supported by huge Corinthian columns. Both the main entrance and
the smaller one on Turner Street have a note of something a trifle
different from the prevailing Salem idea.
Through the generosity of Captain John Bertram, this commodious
house was in 1877 donated as a Home for Aged Men.
 The Benjamin Pickman House
Somewhat resembling that famous mansion ‘The Lindens,’ at
Danvers, described elsewhere, is the Benjamin Pickman house at
165 Essex Street, built in 1743. It has the same two-story pilasters
supporting a gable in the gambrel roof, the same rusticated boarding
and groined corners. The dormer windows have alternately arched
and pointed gables.
The doorway is unusually ornate, with rusticated jambs, and a
broken arch pediment in which stands a sculptural bust. This
doorway is of the enclosed variety and was added by McIntire in
1800.
The Pickman house was formerly adorned with much beautiful
interior carved woodwork, little of which remains. The owner, out of
compliment to the industry by which he prospered, caused a carved
and gilded codfish to be mounted on each of the stairways, but
these, too, are missing. The erection of other buildings in front of the
Pickman house hides its real character. Still it repays careful study.