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Nuclear Decisions
 Nuclear Decisions
Changing the Course of Nuclear Weapons Programs
LISA LANGDON KOCH
 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the
University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing
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certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
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© Oxford University Press 2023
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You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same
condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Koch, Lisa (Lisa Langdon), author.
Title: Nuclear decisions : changing the course of nuclear weapons programs / Lisa Langdon
Koch.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2023] | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022062279 (print) | LCCN 2022062280 (ebook) | ISBN 9780197679531
(hardback) |
ISBN 9780197679548 (epub) | ISBN 9780197679555 | ISBN 9780197679562
Subjects: LCSH: Nuclear nonproliferation—Government policy—Case studies. |
Military policy—Decision making—Case studies.
Classification: LCC JZ5675.K62 2023 (print) | LCC JZ5675 (ebook) |
DDC 327.1/747—dc23/eng/20230216
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022062279
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022062280
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197679531.001.0001
 Contents

Acknowledgments

1. Introduction to Nuclear Decisions

2. Proliferation Curves
3. A Theory of Nuclear Decision-Making
4. Changing Proliferation Environments across the Nuclear Age
5. The Permissive Period: The Soviet Union, Israel, and France
6. The Transition Period: Sweden, South Korea, and India
7. The Nonproliferation Regime Period: Pakistan, South Africa, and
Brazil
8. Changing the Course of Nuclear Weapons Programs

Appendix
Notes
Bibliography
Index
 Acknowledgments

I began conducting the research that led to this book when I was a
graduate student at the University of Michigan. Allan Stam supported
and encouraged my work, helped me think about the big picture,
and never failed to provide wise counsel. James Morrow, Philip
Potter, and Robert Franseze each taught and advised me in
important ways as I pursued this research in its early form and in
the years after I finished my graduate work. I remember in
particular the times I was lucky enough to be able to talk about the
project with Al, Jim, Phil, and Rob all together, and I thank them for
their invaluable insights and advice. I am also grateful for Charles
Shipan’s scholarly guidance, and for his continuing mentorship.
Chuck’s graduate seminar on American political institutions
influenced the way I think about key institutional players and the
relationships among them. I thank Cameron Thies, Thorin Wright,
and many other generous scholars at the School of Politics and
Global Studies at Arizona State University for their support and
assistance as I finished my dissertation.
I am indebted to Scott Sagan, Vipin Narang, and Branislav
Slantchev, whose insights shaped my thinking about the manuscript.
I reflected upon our lively discussion many times when making the
revisions that have led to a better book. I thank Scott in particular
for his mentorship, which began several years ago when I
introduced myself after a conference panel. Scott invited me to sit
down then and there to tell him about my work, and I have
benefited from his generous guidance and insightful critiques ever
since.
My colleagues at Claremont McKenna College made the
development and completion of this book possible in many different
ways. I thank Hilary Appel and the Keck Center for Strategic and
International Studies for supporting the development of the
manuscript at key moments. The Government Department has
enthusiastically supported my research since I arrived at CMC, and I
thank especially Hilary Appel, William Ascher, Mark Blitz, Hicham Bou
Nassif, Jordan Branch, Andrew Busch, Roderic Camp, Minxin Pei,
Jack Pitney, Shanna Rose, Jon Shields, Aseema Sinha, Jennifer Taw,
and George Thomas for their insights and advice. When I arrived at
CMC, I had the good fortune to be assigned the office next to the
other assistant professor in the department, Emily Pears. I thank
Emily for her friendship, for many conversations about the process of
writing a book, and for helping me think through theoretical tangles
that arose as I wrote.
For generating and sustaining a faculty writing community, I am
grateful in particular to Peter Uvin, Adrienne Martin, Esther Chung-
Kim, Ellen Rentz, Sharda Umanath, Heather Ferguson, Emily Pears,
and Janice Heitkamp. I thank the outstanding students who provided
excellent research assistance, including Katrina Frei-Herrmann,
Daniel Krasemann, Tallan Donine, Marcia Yang, Alexander Li,
Johnson Lin, Charles Warren, and my many nuclear politics seminar
students, in particular Henrietta Toivanen and Stuart Brown. Katrina
deserves special recognition for working with me on various projects
over three years and for executing the first polished drawings of the
proliferation curves.
Alexander Lanoszka, Sarah Croco, Matthew Fuhrmann, and
Leanne Powner each offered valuable advice during the writing
process. I thank Matthew Wells for many discussions and
conversations as the project evolved, and most of all for many years
of friendship. At the University of Michigan, I relied on the
professional knowledge and experience of political science librarian
Catherine Morse, and on Sofia Rosenberg, who volunteered to
translate Swedish writings into English so that I could puzzle out the
characteristics of Swedish nuclear institutions. I thank David McBride
and two anonymous reviewers for Oxford University Press for their
valuable guidance, and Sharon Langworthy for expert copyediting.
I am indebted to Donald Hafner, who taught me about nuclear
weapons strategy when I was an undergraduate student at Boston
College. His teaching and his ideals continue to inspire me, and I
greatly value his ongoing mentorship. For their scholarly advice and
their friendship, I thank Katja Favretto, Vanessa Cruz-Nichols, and
Ida Salusky. I thank Rebecca Martinez for significantly influencing my
approach to the process of research and writing. I am grateful to my
faith community at the Claremont Colleges, in particular Steve Davis,
Esther Chung-Kim, TJ Tsai, George Montanez, and Dave Vosburg for
steadfast support.
My family deserves the most thanks, starting with my mom and
dad, Janice and John Langdon, and my sister, Heather, each of
whom has always provided me with unconditional love and support.
From the start, they have been enthusiastic about this project and
its development into a manuscript, and I am deeply grateful for our
many conversations and for their advice. My mother-in-law and
father-in-law, Paige and Joseph Koch, have also showered me with
love and support ever since I had the good fortune to join their
family. They have read my work, sent me articles related to my
research, and thoughtfully asked me about the manuscript’s
progress.
My dad is professor emeritus of history at Le Moyne College, and
I thank him in particular for the many, many hours he has spent
reading and commenting on various drafts of this manuscript over
the years. Everyone should be so lucky as to have a world historian
on call while conducting case research, not least because the
conversations are such great fun.
I completed much of this manuscript in 2020 and 2021, during
the global pandemic. My husband, Matt, and I worked hard to try to
adapt to a time of significant disruption, including the loss of in-
person school for our three children for more than a year. Writing
during this time was tremendously challenging, and I am truly
fortunate to be part of a wonderful family of five that sustains me.
Thank you, Matt, for your love and support over many years. You
have been on the entire journey with me, start to finish. And finally,
I thank our children, Audrey, Paul, and Timmy, who sometimes
permit me to sneak in a few more minutes to write, sometimes
distract me, and always fill our lives with a special joy.
 1
Introduction to Nuclear Decisions

The pursuit of nuclear weapons is rarely the story of a race to the

bomb at any cost. Even the five initial nuclear pursuers, each of
which worked to acquire nuclear weapons in the context of World
War II, did not take uniform paths. The United States devoted vast
national resources to developing a fission bomb as quickly as
possible, and the British government provided expert and material
support to that project.1 The Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan
made different decisions, however, resulting in different approaches
to nuclear weapons development. Those nuclear decisions shaped
not only the outcome of the atomic programs but also, quite
possibly, of the war itself.
Japan offers an interesting example. Japan’s uneven efforts to
develop nuclear weapons were initiated by Army Minister Tōjō Hideki
in 1940, well before the United States launched the Manhattan
Project. Most Japanese officials remained unconvinced that atomic
bomb research and development should be prioritized, and the
poorly funded program made slow and unsteady progress.2
However, in October 1941 Tōjō ascended to the office of prime
minister. After Japan’s 1942 loss at Midway, Tōjō led the cabinet to
accelerate new weapons development, including the nuclear bomb
projects.3
Despite the enormously high stakes for Japan, the effort, shaped
by leaders’ decisions, did not succeed. While the American nuclear
weapons project took the form of a single, focused effort, under
Japan’s highly militarized government, different service branches
conducted separate, fragmented nuclear programs.4 As Manhattan
Project scientists made swift progress toward a nuclear test in New
Mexico, Japanese scientists advised military officers that atomic
weapons would take too long to build and declared that American
scientists surely faced the same constraints and difficulties. Within
one of the navy’s nuclear projects, the frustrated captain in charge
had first told the scientists to redouble their efforts. But eventually
he too abandoned the nuclear project in favor of other, well-
established research and development programs that were making
better progress. Scientists’ pessimistic reports continued to inform
decision-making, and in June 1945—less than a month before the
United States would successfully test its first nuclear device—Army
Minister Anami Korechika decided to shut down the army’s nuclear
program. The navy terminated a second nuclear project in July
1945.5
On August 6, 1945, the United States attacked the Japanese city
of Hiroshima with the first nuclear weapon used in war. In the
immediate aftermath, some leaders, including the emperor,
recognized the likely implications. But the failure of Japan’s nuclear
weapons effort, and the scientists’ belief that no other country could
succeed where Japan had failed, injected confusion and doubt into
official discussions. The army rejected the possibility of an American
atomic bomb, branding as propaganda President Harry S. Truman’s
post-attack announcement to the world. And the few military officers
who were willing to accept that the United States had produced one
atomic bomb assumed the Americans lacked the capacity to quickly
produce more. Japan’s military elected to proceed with existing plans
to defend Japan from invasion.6
In contrast, Soviet leaders already knew that the US atomic effort
had succeeded and correctly interpreted the news from Hiroshima.7
Having previously agreed to attack Japan no later than August 15,
and realizing that the atomic bomb would change the course of the
war’s conclusion, the Soviet Union launched a million-soldier attack
against Japanese troops in Manchuria on August 9, broadcasting the
declaration of war on Moscow Radio a day earlier. The forceful
denials and expressions of doubt from Japan’s scientific and military
experts, which arose from their frustrations with the nuclear project
and the decisions to abandon the work, had delayed Japan’s
response to the bombing of Hiroshima. Now, reeling from the
additional shock of the Soviet attack, Japan’s Supreme War Council
met in a bomb shelter beneath the imperial palace and began at last
to discuss surrender with new urgency.8
Despite the common context of World War II, Japan’s nuclear
development looked very different from America’s, and different still
from the Soviet Union’s. As today’s nuclear hopefuls work toward
acquiring nuclear arsenals, their programs, too, have taken paths
that have been difficult to predict. Approximately two dozen states
have decided, at some point, to pursue the bomb. Yet throughout
the nuclear age, the progress states have made toward that goal has
been neither linear nor consistent. Why does the pursuit of nuclear
weapons look so different across cases? How can we make sense of
the range of paths to and away from the bomb?

Nuclear Decisions
Nuclear decisions offer the answer. State leaders make decisions
within different information environments that affect their beliefs and
preferences about nuclear weapons. These decisions to accelerate or
reverse progress toward a nuclear weapons capability define each
state’s course. Whether or not a state ultimately acquires nuclear
weapons depends to a large extent on those nuclear decisions.
I argue that two crucial features of the political environment
affect nuclear decision-making. Leaders make decisions not in a
vacuum but in changing international and domestic contexts. First, in
different proliferation eras, changes to international political and
structural conditions constrain or free states to pursue nuclear
weapons development. These conditions are imposed from the top
down. Second, across these eras, domestic scientific and military
organizations may intervene to bring about, or prevent, a nuclear
decision that could redefine a state’s course to the bomb. The
conditions under which scientific and military experts are able to
influence state leaders from the bottom up are thus a critically
important aspect of this story.

Nuclear Goals
The historical record demonstrates that states do not initiate nuclear
weapons programs and then uniformly follow linear paths to a
singular goal. One possible explanation for erratic progression is
political meddling in scientific research and development. Jacques E.
C. Hymans argues that leaders who are unconstrained by state
institutions often interfere in nuclear weapons programs,
unintentionally disrupting progress toward the bomb. Whether
scientists are free to pursue their work in ways that will advance
good research and development or instead face strong incentives to
appease repressive leaders through shortcuts and false reporting
should affect a program’s timeline.9
This compelling argument about time-to-outcome, however,
cannot explain the form a nuclear weapons program takes. Implicit
in Hymans’s argument are the assumptions that states have a
common goal—to quickly produce nuclear weapons—and take linear
paths to the bomb. The observation that few states had obtained a
speedy outcome led Hymans to conclude that something had gone
wrong. However, while racing to the bomb was more common during
the early Cold War, for most of the nuclear age the full-speed-ahead
approach has been the exception, not the rule.10 Rather, leaders
have exhibited a range of preferences regarding the importance and
necessity of quickly acquiring a nuclear arsenal.
If these nonlinear pathways are not a deviation—if nuclear
weapons development is instead typically nonlinear—then
interference with project management cannot be a sufficient
explanation. I argue that the paths to the bomb are rarely linear
because they are interrupted and reformed by nuclear decisions.
Leaders may allow a nuclear weapons program to maintain the
course it is on or even decide to slow or suspend its development.
Domestic organizations are a key source of expert information that
shapes the leader’s perception of the value and strategic purpose of
the nuclear program.
Another possible explanation is that changes in the security
environment prompt a state to move toward or away from the
bomb. Security concerns are an important motivator for the initial
decision to start a nuclear weapons program.11 Yet the security
explanation, too, is insufficient. States that do decide to begin a
program may exist in insecurity for years before choosing the
nuclear path. And once a nuclear weapons program is underway,
many leaders appear to make nuclear decisions that are not based
on either stable or changing external security environments. If
security were the sole driver of nuclear decisions, we would expect
to see acceleration decisions during times of high insecurity and
reversal decisions during times of low insecurity.
The case studies I conduct in this book do not indicate the
presence of such a dynamic. For example, India’s program slowed
significantly in the mid- to late 1970s, despite nuclear weapons
progress in its regional rivals, China and Pakistan. South Korea did
not accelerate its program when its security environment worsened.
Brazil gave up its pursuit of nuclear weapons despite little to no
change in its security environment. South Africa sprinted toward a
nuclear arsenal despite its significant regional military superiority.
Perhaps deep concerns over Soviet interference in southern Africa,
or even fears of invasion, could explain South Africa’s proliferation
curve instead—but then why did Pretoria implement two different
program reversals, well before the fall of the Soviet Union?12
Within the context of an ongoing nuclear weapons program, the
threat environment is not the only important factor that affects
leaders’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of the nuclear
weapons effort. A nuclear weapons program is one of many options
available to a government that faces serious security concerns. A
state could instead decide to arm conventionally, seek military
assistance from an ally, or enter into a defense pact. Or a leader
may decide to gain leverage over adversaries by hedging: pursuing
nuclear development to achieve a latent nuclear weapons capability
without progressing all the way to the weapons themselves. Fears of
a preventive war aimed at the nuclear program could prompt either
a reversal decision to remove the cause of the threat or an
acceleration decision, in hopes of acquiring nuclear weapons to deter
future attack. A threatening security environment could therefore
lead to either type of decision or no decision at all. Security cannot
fully explain states’ proliferation pathways.
Because states consider different policy options in response to the
strategic environment, and each option has its own potential
benefits and drawbacks, nuclear weapons programs are situated
within a political context. Leaders consider many possibilities beyond
the simple binary outcomes of acquisition or termination, and they
do so within a complex information environment that affects how the
value of a nuclear weapons program is understood. They must
weigh the benefits of state security against drawbacks like domestic
resource trade-offs, potential damage to strategic international
relationships, and the likelihood of program success.

Decisions Define Programs

My approach jettisons the assumption that leaders in nuclear
weapons–pursuing states share a common desire to acquire nuclear
weapons as quickly as possible. Instead, I hold that leaders make
political decisions to accelerate, slow, or end altogether the path of
nuclear weapons development. I offer a novel theory of nuclear
decision-making that identifies two mechanisms that shape leaders’
understandings of their nuclear pursuits. The external mechanism—
the proliferation constraints that emerge from the structure and
politics of the international system—has evolved across three distinct
time periods, which I define and describe in Chapter 4.
The internal mechanism is the intervention of domestic experts,
which I briefly introduce in the next section. Leaders make decisions
in an informational environment that, under the right circumstances,
experts may be able to structure. I examine the conditions under
which scientific and military organizations are able to influence state
leaders from the bottom up. In conducting a systematic examination
of proliferators extending beyond the United States, I obtain a broad
range of evidence to support my arguments. Through this approach
to studying nuclear proliferation, I find something very different than
the conventional wisdom. Determined states do not simply pursue a
straight path to nuclear weapons acquisition. Nuclear decisions
define a state’s nuclear pursuits.

The Domestic Nuclear Decision-Making

Environment
The internal mechanism of domestic expert influence has been
present from the start of the nuclear weapons age. There were
many reasons that Japanese and American leaders made such
different nuclear decisions in the 1940s. The practicalities of waging
war and the outcomes of battles created different constraints on
each country’s national resources and capabilities. But from the start
American and Japanese leaders also operated in different
information environments. They made important decisions about
whether, and how, to continue along the path to the bomb, and each
did so within a political context that was shaped not only by the
external security environment but also by key domestic organizations
that house nuclear experts.
I argue that the key domestic organizations that hold distinct
preferences about nuclear weapons are the domestic nuclear agency
and the state military. These organizations are important sources of
information and incentives that can, under certain conditions,
influence a leader’s beliefs about the value of a nuclear weapons
program relative to the cost. They are not the sole influencers of
leaders’ strategic calculations, nor can they explain every case of
nuclear decision-making. But they are a crucial source of information
and influence in the nuclear context.
Further, nuclear agencies and militaries may take advantage of
opportunities to shape leaders’ knowledge and understanding of the
domestic and international factors that affect nuclear decision-
making. An organization with greater access to and influence over
the leader has greater capacity to inform and persuade. Effective
organizations can alter the leader’s perceptions of the costs and
benefits of pursuing nuclear weapons and may work to constrain or
expand the set of options the leader will choose among. In addition,
nuclear agencies and militaries have heightened abilities to influence
leaders on nuclear weapons matters because leaders typically
assume office without a background in nuclear science or doctrine.
The secretive and technologically sophisticated nature of nuclear
weapons development renders these programs largely opaque to
state leaders, who then rely on these key organizations to signal the
benefits and disadvantages of the nuclear weapons effort.
Within domestic nuclear agencies, nuclear scientists are
professionally invested in nuclear development and prefer to push
programs forward. Nuclear agencies also enjoy an informational
advantage because states do not employ rigorous oversight of the
highly secret, expert processes of designing, producing, and testing
nuclear weapons. I argue that more independent nuclear agencies,
with greater access to political leadership, are better able to control
the flow of information on nuclear benefits and to exert influence on
decision-makers both to accelerate programs and to prevent
reversals.
Military organizations, on the other hand, may be less likely to
advocate for nuclear acceleration during development stages and
more likely to allocate resources to conventional capabilities instead.
Competing organizational interests may lead a military to prioritize
spending on conventional arms, which provide immediate utility,
rather than on the long-term potential of developing a future nuclear
capability. While militaries value the deterrent benefits of nuclear
weapons, they also believe that future wars are more likely to
remain conventional. Many within the military will prefer to invest
organizational resources in the conventional weapons and equipment
most likely to be used in war fighting. When a military organization
leads the government, the leader will need to satisfy traditional
military interests to remain in office and will be likely to seek to use
conventional means to conduct political repression and consolidate
power.
 Each of these organizations may—or may not—be able to shape
the country leader’s understanding of the domestic and international
factors that affect nuclear decision-making. An organization with
greater access to and influence over the leader has a greater
opportunity to inform and persuade. Effective organizations can alter
the leader’s perceptions of the costs and benefits of pursuing nuclear
weapons and may work to constrain or expand the set of options the
leader will choose among. But organizations that lack access to the
leader, or that lack the capacity to advance their interests, are
unlikely to have a significant effect on nuclear decision-making.

Implications
This book joins the growing literature on nuclear proliferation and
reversal, offering a systematic analysis of the process and politics of
nuclear decision-making. I approach this subject from a different
conceptualization of nuclear weapons programs: that they are
defined by decisions to accelerate or reverse nuclear development.
In doing so, I investigate the strategic decisions that create the form
of nuclear weapons programs rather than focusing on the time
between program initiation and the outcome of a nuclear bomb.
Pursuing nuclear weapons, whether in Iran, North Korea, India, or
Pakistan, is a long process punctuated by political decisions that can
change the course of nuclear development. Rather than examining
the conditions present when a milestone program outcome is
realized, I examine the conditions present at the time the nuclear
decision was made.
This analysis reveals that both international structural conditions
and domestic coalitions matter. Even in wartime, whose voices are
heard from within the state and what preferences they express can
change how a leader understands the international environment.
Those domestic experts can highlight or downplay the advantages
and disadvantages of steps to change the course of nuclear weapons
development. The relative balance of power among the key domestic
organizations, which can change as they interact with each other
and their political environment, affects the ability each expert group
has to influence the leader. These organizations may prefer to push
the state either toward or away from nuclear weapons. If we ignore
the domestic environment and instead assume that states pursue
nuclear weapons along uniform and consistent paths, we
underestimate the importance of the nuclear decisions that
determine whether a state ultimately acquires nuclear weapons.
Finally, a central argument of this book is that we should not
study the decision to start a nuclear weapons program as if the
state’s ultimate goal is to quickly produce the weapons. Not only do
nuclear aspirants pursue different goals, but changing circumstances
may also lead a state to later deviate from the original goal. And
because the end results of nuclear decisions are realized months or
years later, programs may reach milestones that are the product of
decisions made by leaders who were responding to conditions that
have since changed. Because a nuclear weapons program outcome
will occur at some period of time after a nuclear decision was made,
examining the conditions at the time of the outcome will be
misleading. We should instead seek to understand the conditions at
the time of the decision that paved the way to the outcome. This
shift in focus could allow states to respond more productively to
changes in their adversaries’ or allies’ nuclear weapons development
and create better nonproliferation policy tools.

Plan of the Book

The book begins with the theoretical argument. Leaders are at the
center of nuclear decision-making, but they face serious constraints
on their access to, and understanding of, the range of possible
nuclear choices and outcomes. I present evidence of the different
proliferation pathways and define nuclear decision-making in
Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 I discuss how, and when, nuclear agencies
and military organizations influence leaders’ decision-making, as well
as why alternative explanations are insufficient. In Chapter 4 I
describe the features of each of the three historical eras I have
defined, and I explain why each era comprises a distinct decision-
making context in which states operate over time.
In Chapters 5, 6, and 7 I test my arguments through case studies
of countries that have pursued nuclear weapons. The three chapters,
each of which contains three different country studies, correspond to
the three historical eras. In organizing the cases by era, I am able to
examine how nuclear decision-making has been conducted within
each international context.
The case study approach provides the benefit of adding context
and depth to broad theorizing. One could argue that certain
decisions seem to have been brought about by very specific causes,
or that each decision may be situated in a unique historical and
cultural context. I do not claim that the theory I present wholly
explains every nuclear weapons program decision. While it is true
that some decisions may be exceptional, developing a theory of
decision-making is an exercise in seeking out common factors that
systematically affect the likelihood of a decision being made. Case
studies allow me to explore these dynamics and attempt to illustrate
common mechanisms that underlie nuclear decision-making. Finally,
in Chapter 8 I discuss nuclear decision-making in the current case of
Iran and explore the implications of this study for nonproliferation
policy.
 2
Proliferation Curves

Much of the literature on the pursuit of nuclear weapons concerns

the decision to start a program or the conditions under which states
succeed in acquiring nuclear arsenals. While weapons acquisition is
an outcome rather than a decision, systematic studies typically blur
the distinction between the two events. Several studies first estimate
a model of nuclear start decisions and then re-estimate the model
with a new dependent variable: the year of nuclear weapons
acquisition. But uneven findings across these studies warn against
conflating decisions (program start) and outcomes (weapons
acquisition).1 Considering the two different types of events—a
decision and an outcome—within one common framework has not
generated a coherent theoretical explanation. This should not be
surprising given the conceptual muddling of a political decision and
an end product that is many steps removed from that initial decision.
In this chapter I demonstrate that nuclear proliferation should
instead be conceived of as a political process that hinges on
decisions. I identify types of nuclear decisions and then present
empirical evidence of the proliferation pathways—which I call
proliferation curves—taken by six nuclear weapons pursuers. The
proliferation curves indicate that leaders do not pursue nuclear
weapons in uniform ways. At first glance, nuclear decisions do not
appear to be easily predictable.
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OF CELEBRATED TRAVELLERS, VOL. 1. (OF 3) ***
The Lives of Celebrated
Travellers, Vol. I.
 FAMILY LIBRARY.

The publishers of the Family Library, anxious to obtain and to

deserve the favourable opinion of the public, with pleasure embrace
the present opportunity to express their warm and sincere thanks for
the liberal patronage which has been bestowed upon their
undertaking, and their determination to do all that lies in their power
to merit its continuance. For some time previous to the
commencement of the Family Library, they had entertained thoughts
and wishes of reducing the quantity of merely fictitious writings,
which the reading public had made it their interest to issue from their
press; and they were conscious that this could only be done by
substituting for them works that should be equally entertaining and
more instructive. The difficulty was to find an adequate supply of
books possessing these requisites. At this time the attention of
English philanthropists and authors was strongly turned to the
general dissemination of useful knowledge by means of popular
abridgments, convenient in form, afforded at low prices, and as
much as possible simplified in style, so as to be accessible as well to
the means as to the comprehension of “the people,” in
contradistinction to the educated and the wealthy. The result has
been the production of numerous collections, embracing well written
works treating of almost every department of art and science, and,
by their simplicity, clearness, and entire freedom from technicality,
exactly calculated to attract and compensate the attention of the
general reader. From these collections, with additions and
improvements, and such alterations as were necessary to adapt the
work to the taste and wants of the American public, Harper’s
Family Library has been composed; and it is with pride and
pleasure that the publishers acknowledge the distinguished favour
with which it has been received. The approbation and support that
have already been bestowed upon it are greater than have ever
been conferred upon any work of a similar character published in the
United States; and the sale of every succeeding volume still
demonstrates its continually increasing popularity. In several
instances gentlemen of wealth and of excellent judgment have been
so much pleased with the character of the Library, that they have
purchased numbers of complete sets as appropriate and valuable
gifts to the families of their less opulent relatives; and others have
unsolicited, been active in their endeavours to extend its circulation
among their friends and acquaintances. With these strong
inducements to persevere, the publishers are resolved to prosecute
their undertaking with additional zeal, energy, and circumspection.
What has been done they desire their patrons to consider rather in
the light of an experiment, than a specimen of what they hope and
intend to accomplish: they freely and gratefully acknowledge that the
circulation and popularity of the Family Library are now such as to
justify them in disregarding expense, and to demand from them
every care and every exertion. It shall be their study to make such
arrangements as shall warrant them in assuring the friends and
patrons of the Library that the forthcoming volumes, instead of
decreasing in interest and value, will be found still more deserving of
the support and approbation of the public than those which have
preceded them.
In order to render it thus meritorious, the proprietors intend
incorporating in it hereafter, selections of the best productions from
the various other Libraries and Miscellanies now publishing in
Europe. Several well-known authors have been engaged to prepare
for it also works of an American character; and the Family Library,
when completed, will include a volume on every useful and
interesting subject not embraced in the other “Libraries” now
preparing by the same publishers. The entire series will be the
production of authors of eminence, who have acquired celebrity by
their literary labours, and whose names, as they appear in
succession, will afford the surest guarantee for the satisfactory
manner in which the subjects will be treated.
With these arrangements, the publishers flatter themselves that
they will be able to offer to the American public a work of
unparalleled merit and cheapness, forming a body of literature which
will obtain the praise of having instructed many, and amused all; and,
above every other species of eulogy, of being fit to be introduced to
the domestic circle without reserve or exception.

The Dramatic Series of the Family Library will consist principally

of the works of those Dramatists who flourished contemporaneously
with Shakspeare, in which all such passages as are inconsistent with
modern delicacy will be omitted. The number of volumes will be
limited, and they will be bound and numbered in such a manner as to
render it not essentially necessary to obtain them to complete a set
of the Family Library.

The following opinions, selected from highly respectable Journals, will enable
those who are unacquainted with the Family Library to form an estimate of its
merits. Numerous other notices, equally favourable, and from sources equally
respectable, might be presented if deemed necessary.
“The Family Library.—A very excellent, and always entertaining Miscellany.”—
Edinburgh Review, No. 103.
“The Family Library presents, in a compendious and convenient form, well-
written histories of popular men, kingdoms, sciences, &c. arranged and edited by
able writers, and drawn entirely from the most correct and accredited authorities. It
is, as it professes to be, a Family Library, from which, at little expense, a
household may prepare themselves for a consideration of those elementary
subjects of education and society, without a due acquaintance with which neither
man nor woman has claim to be well bred, or to take their proper place among
those with whom they abide.”—Charleston Gazette.
 “We have repeatedly borne testimony to the utility of this work. It is one of the
best that has ever been issued from the American press, and should be in the
library of every family desirous of treasuring up useful knowledge.”—Boston
Statesman.
“The Family Library should be in the hands of every person. Thus far it has
treated of subjects interesting to all, condensed in a perspicuous and agreeable
style.... We have so repeatedly spoken of the merits of the design of this work, and
of the able manner in which it is edited, that on this occasion we will only repeat
our conviction, that it is worthy a place in every library in the country, and will prove
one of the most useful as it is one of the most interesting publications which has
ever issued from the American press.”—N. Y. Courier & Enquirer.
“The Family Library is, what its name implies, a collection of various original
works of the best kind, containing reading, useful and interesting to the family
circle. It is neatly printed, and should be in every family that can afford it—the price
being moderate.”—New-England Palladium.
“The Family Library is, in all respects, a valuable work.”—Pennsylvania Inquirer.
“We are pleased to see that the publishers have obtained sufficient
encouragement to continue their valuable Family Library.”—Baltimore Republican.
“We recommend the whole set of the Family Library as one of the cheapest
means of affording pleasing instruction, and imparting a proper pride in books, with
which we are acquainted.”—Philadelphia U. S. Gazette.
“It will prove instructing and amusing to all classes. We are pleased to learn that
the works comprising this Library have become, as they ought to be, quite popular
among the heads of Families.”—N. Y. Gazette.
“It is the duty of every person having a family to put this excellent Library into the
hands of his children.”—N. Y. Mercantile Advertiser.
“We have so often recommended this enterprising and useful publication (the
Family Library), that we can here only add, that each successive number appears
to confirm its merited popularity.”—N. Y. American.
“It is so emphatically what it purports to be, that we are anxious to see it in every
family.—It is alike interesting and useful to all classes of readers.”—Albany
Evening Journal.
“The little volumes of this series truly comport with their title, and are in
themselves a Family Library.”—N. Y. Commercial Advertiser.
“We have met with no work more interesting and deservedly popular than this
valuable Family Library.”—Monthly Repository.
“The plan of the Family Library must be acceptable to the American reading
community.”—N. Y. Journal of Commerce.
 “To all portions of the community the entire series may be warmly
recommended.”—American Traveller.
“It is a delightful publication.”—Truth Teller.
 PROSPECTUS
OF THE

LIBRARY OF SELECT NOVELS.

Fictitious composition is now admitted to form an extensive and

important portion of literature. Well-wrought novels take their rank by
the side of real narratives, and are appealed to as evidence in all
questions concerning man. In them the customs of countries, the
transitions and shades of character, and even the very peculiarities
of costume and dialect, are curiously preserved; and the
imperishable spirit that surrounds and keeps them for the use of
successive generations renders the rarities for ever fresh and green.
In them human life is laid down as on a map. The strong and vivid
exhibitions of passion and of character which they furnish, acquire
and maintain the strongest hold upon the curiosity, and, it may be
added, the affections of every class of readers; for not only is
entertainment in all the various moods of tragedy and comedy
provided in their pages, but he who reads them attentively may often
obtain, without the bitterness and danger of experience, that
knowledge of his fellow-creatures which but for such aid could, in the
majority of cases, be only acquired at a period of life too late to turn it
to account.
 This “Library of Select Novels” will embrace none but such as
have received the impress of general approbation, or have been
written by authors of established character; and the publishers hope
to receive such encouragement from the public patronage as will
enable them in the course of time to produce a series of works of
uniform appearance, and including most of the really valuable novels
and romances that have been or shall be issued from the modern
English and American press.
There is scarcely any question connected with the interests of
literature which has been more thoroughly discussed and
investigated than that of the utility or evil of novel reading. In its
favour much may be and has been said, and it must be admitted that
the reasonings of those who believe novels to be injurious, or at
least useless, are not without force and plausibility. Yet, if the
arguments against novels are closely examined, it will be found that
they are more applicable in general to excessive indulgence in the
pleasures afforded by the perusal of fictitious adventures than to the
works themselves; and that the evils which can be justly ascribed to
them arise almost exclusively, not from any peculiar noxious qualities
that can be fairly attributed to novels as a species, but from those
individual works which in their class must be pronounced to be
indifferent.
But even were it otherwise—were novels of every kind, the good
as well as the bad, the striking and animated not less than the
puerile, indeed liable to the charge of enfeebling or perverting the
mind; and were there no qualities in any which might render them
instructive as well as amusing—the universal acceptation which they
have ever received, and still continue to receive, from all ages and
classes of men, would prove an irresistible incentive to their
production. The remonstrances of moralists and the reasonings of
philosophy have ever been, and will still be found, unavailing against
the desire to partake of an enjoyment so attractive. Men will read
novels; and therefore the utmost that wisdom and philanthropy can
do is to cater prudently for the public appetite, and, as it is hopeless
to attempt the exclusion of fictitious writings from the shelves of the
library, to see that they are encumbered with the least possible
number of such as have no other merit than that of novelty.
“The works of our elder dramatists, as hitherto edited, are wholly
unfit to be placed in the hands of young persons, or of females of
any age, or even to be thought of for a moment as furniture for the
drawing-room table, and the parlour-window, or to form the solace of
a family circle at the fireside. What lady will ever confess that she
has read and understood Massinger, or Ford, or even Beaumont and
Fletcher? There is hardly a single piece in any of those authors
which does not contain more abominable passages than the very
worst of modern panders would ever dream of hazarding in print—
and there are whole plays in Ford, and in Beaumont and Fletcher,
the very essence and substance of which is, from beginning to end,
one mass of pollution. The works, therefore, of these immortal men
have hitherto been library, not drawing-room books;—and we have
not a doubt, that, down to this moment, they have been carefully
excluded, in toto, from the vast majority of those English houses in
which their divine poetry, if stripped of its deforming
accompaniments, would have been ministering the most effectually
to the instruction and delight of our countrymen, and, above all, of
our fair countrywomen.
“We welcome, therefore, the appearance of the Dramatic Series of
the Family Library with no ordinary feelings of satisfaction. We are
now sure that, ere many months elapse, the productions of those
distinguished bards—all of them that is worthy of their genius, their
taste, and the acceptation of a moral and refined people—will be
placed within reach of every circle from which their very names have
hitherto been sufficient to exclude them, in a shape such as must
command confidence, and richly reward it. The text will be presented
pure and correct, wherever it is fit to be presented at all—every word
and passage offensive to the modest ear will be omitted; and means
adopted, through the notes, of preserving the sense and story entire,
in spite of these necessary erasures. If this were all, it would be a
great deal—but the editors undertake much more. They will furnish,
in their preliminary notices, and in their notes, clear accounts of the
origin, structure, and object of every piece, and the substance of all
that sound criticism has brought to their illustration, divested,
however, of the personal squabbles and controversies which so
heavily and offensively load the bottoms of the pages in the best
existing editions of our dramatic worthies. Lives of the authors will be
given; and if they be all drawn up with the skill and elegance which
mark the Life of Massinger, in the first volume, these alone will form
a standard addition to our biographical literature.”—Literary Gazette.
“The early British Drama forms so important a portion of our
literature, that a ‘Family Library’ would be incomplete without it. A
formidable obstacle to the publication of our early plays, however,
consists in the occasional impurity of their dialogue. The editors of
the Family Library have, therefore, judiciously determined on
publishing a selection of old plays, omitting all such passages as are
inconsistent with modern delicacy. The task of separation requires
great skill and discretion, but these qualities we have no
apprehension of not finding, in the fullest degree requisite, in the
editors, who, by this purifying process, will perform a service both to
the public and to the authors, whom they will thereby draw forth from
unmerited obscurity.”—Asiatic Journal.
“The first number of the ‘Dramatic Series’ of this work commences
with the Plays of Massinger; and the lovers of poetry and the drama
may now, for the first time, possess the works of all the distinguished
writers of the renowned Elizabethan age, at a cost which most
pockets can bear; in a form and style, too, which would recommend
them to the most tasteful book collector. A portrait of Massinger
adorns the first volume; and what little is known of the dramatist is
given in a short account of his life.”—Examiner.
 FAMILY CLASSICAL LIBRARY.

The Publishers have much pleasure in recording the following

testimonials in recommendation of the Family Classical Library.

“Mr. Valpy has projected a Family Classical Library. The idea is excellent, and
the work cannot fail to be acceptable to youth of both sexes, as well as to a large
portion of the reading community, who have not had the benefit of a learned
education.”—Gentleman’s Magazine, Dec. 1829.
“We have here the commencement of another undertaking for the more general
distribution of knowledge, and one which, if as well conducted as we may expect,
bids fair to occupy an enlarged station in our immediate literature. The volume
before us is a specimen well calculated to recommend what are to follow. Leland’s
Demosthenes is an excellent work.”—Lit. Gazette.
“This work will be received with great gratification by every man who knows the
value of classical knowledge. All that we call purity of taste, vigour of style, and
force of thought, has either been taught to the modern world by the study of the
classics, or has been guided and restrained by those illustrious models. To extend
the knowledge of such works is to do a public service.”—Court Journal.
“The Family Classical Library is another of those cheap, useful, and elegant
works, which we lately spoke of as forming an era in our publishing history.”—
Spectator.
“The present era seems destined to be honourably distinguished in literary
history by the high character of the works to which it is successively giving birth.
Proudly independent of the fleeting taste of the day, they boast substantial worth
which can never be disregarded; they put forth a claim to permanent estimation.
The Family Classical Library is a noble undertaking, which the name of the editor
assures us will be executed in a style worthy of the great originals.”—Morning
Post.
“This is a very promising speculation; and as the taste of the day runs just now
very strongly in favour of such Miscellanies, we doubt not it will meet with
proportionate success. It needs no adventitious aid, however influential; it has
quite sufficient merit to enable it to stand on its own foundation, and will doubtless
assume a lofty grade in public favour.”—Sun.
“This work, published at a low price, is beautifully got up. Though to profess to
be content with translations of the Classics has been denounced as ‘the thin
disguise of indolence,’ there are thousands who have no leisure for studying the
dead languages, who would yet like to know what was thought and said by the
sages and poets of antiquity. To them this work will be a treasure.”—Sunday
Times.
“This design, which is to communicate a knowledge of the most esteemed
authors of Greece and Rome, by the most approved translations, to those from
whom their treasures, without such assistance, would be hidden, must surely be
approved by every friend of literature, by every lover of mankind. We shall only say
of the first volume, that as the execution well accords with the design, it must
command general approbation.”—The Observer.
“We see no reason why this work should not find its way into the boudoir of the
lady, as well as into the library of the learned. It is cheap, portable, and altogether
a work which may safely be placed in the hands of persons of both sexes.”—
Weekly Free Press.