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HISTORY OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Marking the Centenary of

Samuel Alexander’s
Space, Time and Deity
Edited by
A.R.J. Fisher
History of Analytic Philosophy

Series Editor
Michael Beaney
Humboldt University Berlin
King’s College London
Berlin, Germany
Series editor: Michael Beaney, Professor für Geschichte der analytischen
Philosophie, Institut für Philosophie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin,
Germany, and Regius Professor of Logic, School of Divinity, History and
Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Scotland.

Editorial board members:

Claudio de Almeida, Pontifical Catholic University at Porto Alegre, Brazil
Maria Baghramian, University College Dublin, Ireland
Thomas Baldwin, University of York, England
Stewart Candlish, University of Western Australia
Chen Bo, Peking University, China
Jonathan Dancy, University of Reading, England
José Ferreirós, University of Seville, Spain
Michael Friedman, Stanford University, USA
Gottfried Gabriel, University of Jena, Germany
Juliet Floyd, Boston University, USA
Hanjo Glock, University of Zurich, Switzerland
Nicholas Griffin, McMaster University, Canada
Leila Haaparanta, University of Tampere, Finland
Peter Hylton, University of Illinois, USA
Jiang Yi, Beijing Normal University, China
Javier Legris, National Academy of Sciences of Buenos Aires, Argentina
Cheryl Misak, University of Toronto, Canada
Nenad Miscevic, University of Maribor, Slovenia, and Central European
University, Budapest
Volker Peckhaus, University of Paderborn, Germany
Eva Picardi, University of Bologna, Italy
Erich Reck, University of California at Riverside, USA
Peter Simons, Trinity College, Dublin
Thomas Uebel, University of Manchester, England

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14867
 A. R. J. Fisher
Editor

Marking the
Centenary of Samuel
Alexander’s Space,
Time and Deity
Editor
A. R. J. Fisher
Department of Philosophy
University of Washington
Seattle, WA, USA

ISSN 2634-5994     ISSN 2634-6001 (electronic)

History of Analytic Philosophy
ISBN 978-3-030-65120-6    ISBN 978-3-030-65121-3 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65121-3

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
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translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
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to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.
The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
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Cover illustration: © F.W. Schmidt, ‘Samuel Alexander’, 1924

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Series Editor’s Foreword

During the first half of the twentieth century analytic philosophy gradually
established itself as the dominant tradition in the English-speaking world,
and over the last few decades it has taken firm root in many other parts of
the world. There has been increasing debate over just what ‘analytic phi-
losophy’ means, as the movement has ramified into the complex tradition
that we know today, but the influence of the concerns, ideas and methods
of early analytic philosophy on contemporary thought is indisputable. All
this has led to greater self-consciousness among analytic philosophers
about the nature and origins of their tradition, and scholarly interest in its
historical development and philosophical foundations has blossomed in
recent years, with the result that history of analytic philosophy is now rec-
ognized as a major field of philosophy in its own right.
The main aim of the series in which the present book appears, the first
series of its kind, is to create a venue for work on the history of analytic
philosophy, consolidating the area as a major field of philosophy and
promoting further research and debate. The ‘history of analytic philoso-
phy’ is understood broadly, as covering the period from the last three
decades of the nineteenth century to the start of the twenty-first century,
beginning with the work of Frege, Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein,
who are generally regarded as its main founders, and the influences upon
them, and going right up to the most recent developments. In allowing
the ‘history’ to extend to the present, the aim is to encourage engage-
ment with contemporary debates in philosophy, for example, in showing
how the concerns of early analytic philosophy relate to current concerns.

v
vi SERIES EDITOR’S FOREWORD

In focusing on analytic philosophy, the aim is not to exclude compari-

sons with other—earlier or contemporary—traditions, or consideration
of figures or themes that some might regard as marginal to the analytic
tradition but which also throw light on analytic philosophy. Indeed, a
further aim of the series is to deepen our understanding of the broader
context in which analytic philosophy developed, by looking, for example,
at the roots of analytic philosophy in neo-Kantianism or British idealism,
or the connections between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, or
discussing the work of philosophers who were important in the develop-
ment of analytic philosophy but who are now often forgotten.
Samuel Alexander (1859–1938) is one of those philosophers who has
indeed been unduly neglected in the history of analytic philosophy but
whose work was not only important, historically, but is also receiving a
renaissance of attention from analytic metaphysicians today. The present
volume, edited by Anthony Fisher, will do much to restore Alexander’s
reputation. As Fisher notes in his introduction, Alexander was seen by
some as the leading philosopher in Britain after the death of F. H. Bradley
(1846–1924). Like Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and G. E. Moore
(1873–1958), his younger contemporaries, he also rebelled against British
idealism and developed a form of realism that might justly be described as
‘analytic’. The method of metaphysics, he wrote, is ‘analytical’ in that it
‘dissects’ experience, taken as given, into its constituent parts and rela-
tions. In stressing that the initial description of our experience be given in
non-technical language, there is also a connection with Moore’s ‘ordinary
language philosophy’. Where he departs from both Moore and Russell,
however, is in his development of a comprehensive metaphysical system
governed by the idea of inference to the best explanation. With the rise of
logical positivism and the influence of Wittgenstein in the 1930s, however,
British philosophy took an anti-metaphysical turn, which was only deep-
ened by the linguistic philosophy that became dominant in the first two
decades after the Second World War. As a result, both Alexander’s work
and his style of philosophizing fell out of fashion. It was only when ana-
lytic metaphysics re-established itself that the climate became conducive
for a re-assessment of Alexander’s philosophy. Even then it took longer
than one might have expected, partly due (in my view) to the ahistoricism
of much analytic metaphysics, with consequent neglect of its own
predecessors.
 SERIES EDITOR’S FOREWORD vii

In marking the centenary of the publication of Alexander’s most

important work, Space, Time, and Deity (1920), then, this edited collec-
tion not only places Alexander back in the historical picture but also makes
a major contribution to the history of analytic metaphysics. The meta-
physical theory of space and time that Alexander developed in this work
was indeed offered as an explanation of the empirical facts. This collection
contains three of Alexander’s papers that shed light on his magnum opus,
two given as lectures before its publication and one written afterwards,
none of which has been published before. There then follow two bio-
graphical chapters by two distinguished philosophers who were influenced
by Alexander, Dorothy Emmett and Donald C. Williams. The remaining
six chapters explore different aspects of Alexander’s philosophy and its
connection to the work of others, from his realism to his influence on
John Anderson (1893–1962). The collection is not only a fitting tribute
to Space, Time, and Deity but also illustrates very well that combination
of systematic philosophizing and history of philosophy that characterizes
the best work in history of analytic philosophy.

Aberdeen, Scotland Michael Beaney

December 2020
 Acknowledgements

Thanks to Jonathan Farrell for transcribing ‘Taking Time Seriously’, ‘The

Reality of the Past’ and ‘Samuel Alexander and the Analytical Introverts’;
thanks to Emily Thomas for providing financial support for this transcrip-
tion work. I thank Michael Rush on numerous occasions for helping to
decipher Alexander’s impenetrable handwriting. Thanks to the staff at the
John Rylands Library—especially John Hodgson—for their archival assis-
tance over several years of research on the Samuel Alexander Papers and
for permission, with respect to the physical rights, to publish the posthu-
mous papers by Alexander. I thank Helen Beebee—the current Samuel
Hall Professor of Philosophy—for sponsoring my project The Metaphysics
of Samuel Alexander (2014–2015), which was funded by a Newton
International Fellowship from the British Academy. I am immensely grate-
ful for their research support. Thanks again to Helen Beebee for heading
a ‘seed’ project on archival research on the Samuel Alexander Papers in
August 2013, funded by the John Rylands Research Institute, where I first
visited the Samuel Alexander Papers and worked through his papers and
correspondence alongside Michael Rush and Emily Thomas. Last but
certainly not least, I dedicate this volume to Felicity Fisher.

ix
 Contents

1 Introduction  1
A. R. J. Fisher

Part I Posthumous Papers  21

2 On Taking Time Seriously (1914) 23

S. Alexander

3 The Reality of the Past (1915) 41

S. Alexander

4 Ground and Cause (1922) 59

S. Alexander

5 Samuel Alexander in Manchester 77

Dorothy Emmet

6 Samuel Alexander and the Analytical Introverts 89

Donald C. Williams

xi
xii Contents

Part II New Essays 111

7 Samuel Alexander’s Place in British Philosophy: Realism

and Naturalism from the 1880s Onwards113
Emily Thomas

8 Samuel Alexander on Motion129

Michael Rush

9 Samuel Alexander’s Categories149

Peter Simons

10 Samuel Alexander and the Psychological Origins

of Realism165
A. R. J. Fisher

11 Becoming Real: The Metaphysics of Samuel Alexander

and R.G. Collingwood193
James M. Connelly

12 The Rise and Fall of Australian Empiricism211

Mark Weblin

Index237
 List of Contributors

S. Alexander formerly University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

James M. Connelly University of Hull, Hull, UK
Dorothy Emmet formerly University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
A. R. J. Fisher University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
Michael Rush University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Peter Simons Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Emily Thomas University of Durham, Durham, UK
Mark Weblin Independent Scholar, Gold Coast, QLD, Australia
Donald C. Williams formerly Harvard University, Cambridge, USA

xiii
 List of Figures

Fig. 1 Prof. S. Alexander, April 1905 108

Fig. 2 Old Ashburnians, June 1910 109
Fig. 3 Sammy, November 1922 110

xv
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

A. R. J. Fisher

Samuel Alexander (1859–1938) was an Australian-born British philoso-

pher of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. He studied at
Oxford in the late 1870s and early 1880s within the intellectual climate of
British idealism before he settled ‘up north’ as the Chair of Philosophy at
the University of Manchester in 1893. From there he developed a distinc-
tive metaphysical system that was so influential he became a leading figure
of British philosophy in the early twentieth century. J.H. Muirhead reports
that by 1924—after F.H. Bradley’s death—Alexander was the leading phi-
losopher in Britain (Muirhead 1939, 3). With G.E. Moore and Bertrand
Russell, Alexander defended realism in reaction to idealism and thus
became part of the new realism movement. Although Alexander stands
next to Moore and Russell as a leader of this movement in Britain, his
empirical method and goal of system-building are markedly different from
the ‘analytic’ approaches of Moore and Russell.

A. R. J. Fisher (*)
Department of Philosophy, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
e-mail: arjf@uw.edu

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2021
A. R. J. Fisher (ed.), Marking the Centenary of Samuel Alexander’s
Space, Time and Deity, History of Analytic Philosophy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65121-3_1
2 A. R. J. FISHER

Alexander’s metaphysics is expounded in his magnum opus Space,

Time, and Deity (1920a, b). John Laird said of the book that ‘it is the
boldest adventure in detailed speculative metaphysics attempted in so
grand a manner by any English writer between 1655 (when Hobbes very
nearly completed his trilogy by the publication of De Corpore) and 1920’
(Laird 1939, 61). Norman Kemp Smith remarked that Space, Time, and
Deity ‘is likely to mark an epoch in British philosophy’ (in a letter to
Alexander, 19 August 1920)1 and that Alexander’s ‘system demands,
indeed, a re-writing of the whole history of philosophy’ (in a letter to
Alexander, 11 August 1921).2 May Sinclair recalls her experience of study-
ing Space, Time, and Deity:

The encounter with Space, Time, and Deity is the most thoroughly uncom-
fortable, the most upsetting and dislocating experience that the devotee of
idealism could well undergo. There has been nothing like it since the out-
break of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, nothing to compare with Professor
Alexander’s work but the work of the greatest system-makers. Of Spinoza.
Of Kant. Of Hegel. (Sinclair 1922, 162–63)

Such profound descriptions of Space, Time, and Deity were not intended
to boost sales. The metaphysical system he laid out therein had an impact
on British and American philosophy, influencing and affecting the course
of the debate about realism, idealism, naturalism, dualism, and other
major philosophical questions. His work affected C.D. Broad, Edwin
B. Holt, John Laird, William P. Montague, C. Lloyd Morgan, and Kemp
Smith.3 Space, Time, and Deity was widely discussed in many journals and
books in the 1920s and 1930s and Alexander was seen as the British rep-
resentative of new realism (for an overview and criticism of new realism,
see Evans 1928). The American New Realists—most notably, Holt,
Montague, and Ralph Barton Perry—regarded Alexander’s initial efforts
in 1908, 1909, 1910 to be a crucial factor in their cooperative enterprise
to reinstate realism as a competitive worldview in their joint work The New
Realism (Holt et al. 1912). R.G. Collingwood’s philosophy in the 1930s
is influenced by Alexander’s ontology of events (motions) and his theory
of emergence. Montague in his later work develops similar emergentist
insights (Montague 1940, part 2, ch. 13). The influence is apparent in the
work of Errol E. Harris (1965) and Alexander’s distinction between enjoy-
ment and contemplation was pivotal in the evolution of C.S. Lewis’s reli-
gious experience, as recounted in Surprised by Joy (Lewis 1955, 217–20).
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

Moreover, Alexander influenced John Anderson and Donald

C. Williams, who both influenced analytic metaphysics in certain ways.
Anderson attended Alexander’s Gifford lectures on Space, Time, and Deity
in the Winter of 1917 and 1918 and participated in small group discus-
sions with Alexander, Leonard J. Russell, and his elder brother William
Anderson. John Anderson wrote his MA thesis on William James, wherein
he develops certain ideas from Alexander on relations. Anderson absorbed
the rest of Alexander’s realist system and spent the rest of his life in
Australia explicating his own realist system against the backdrop of
Alexander’s (see Anderson 1962). Williams read Alexander as a student at
Harvard University, where he received his PhD under Perry. Williams
endorsed or argued indirectly for several theses found in Alexander: meta-
physical realism, epistemological realism, direct realism about perception,
metaphysical naturalism (see Williams 1966). Both Anderson and Williams
embraced Alexander’s empirical approach to metaphysics and the presup-
position that metaphysics is a legitimate form of inquiry. Like Alexander,
they both did empirical metaphysics.
After Alexander’s death in 1938 his influence waned drastically, just as
a surge in anti-metaphysical sentiment swept across the English-speaking
world, first at the hands of logical positivists, then ordinary language phi-
losophy and the later Wittgenstein. Also, Alexander’s style of exposition
and system-building were not carried forward into the analytic tradition.
However, metaphysics in the analytic tradition underwent a revival and
many of Alexander’s doctrines are once again taken seriously. Most meta-
physicians, for example, are metaphysical realists and most believe that
spacetime plays some fundamental role in structuring reality (put differ-
ently, many metaphysicians today have naturalist and physicalist tenden-
cies). Even the thirst for metaphysical systems in one sense of that term is
in vogue—thanks largely to philosophers like D.M. Armstrong and David
Lewis. What is more, the revival in metaphysics owes something to
Anderson and Williams, who upheld the view that metaphysics is a genu-
ine enterprise at a time when it was under attack and widely unpopular
(see Fisher 2015a). Anderson and Williams, in their own ways, were influ-
enced by Alexander. So Alexander is in fact part of the larger narrative of
the evolution of twentieth-century metaphysics. Historians of twentieth-­
century philosophy are currently investigating the evolution and develop-
ment of metaphysical themes in the early twentieth century and connecting
it with succeeding periods in the mid- and late twentieth century. Recent
4 A. R. J. FISHER

work in this area with a focus on Alexander include: Fisher (2015b, 2017),
Thomas (2013, 2016, 2019).
In contemporary philosophy Alexander’s influence appears directly in
many places. He is recognised as one of the founders of British emer-
gentism, alongside C.D. Broad and C. Lloyd Morgan (see McLaughlin
1992; O’Connor and Wong 2012, sec. 1.3). In philosophy of mind Carl
Gillett has offered a powerful interpretation of Alexander’s metaphysics of
mind (Gillett 2006) and Jaegwon Kim dubbed the Eleatic principle
‘Alexander’s dictum’ (Kim 1993, 348; for discussion, see Hudson 2003).
In contemporary metaphysics Jonathan Schaffer has recently defended
priority monism, invoking Alexander’s monism about spacetime (Schaffer
2010, 324), as well as arguing for the view that spacetime is the one sub-
stance (Schaffer 2009), again with reference to Alexander. Finally, he pop-
ularised the phrase ‘natural piety’, typically used to express the thought
that some fact must be taken as primitive or inexplicable.
This volume marks the centenary of Space, Time, and Deity. It brings
together new essays on Alexander’s philosophy as well as previously
unpublished papers by Alexander himself. The new essays add to scholar-
ship on Alexander and late nineteenth and early twentieth-century phi-
losophy. His posthumous papers provide a novel insight into the
development of his metaphysics and offer some mature thoughts on issues
in logic and metaphysics. In what follows, I outline Alexander’s metaphys-
ics and method, explain the context and some of the content of his three
posthumous papers, and summarise the main theses of the other chapters
in this collection.

1   Alexander’s Metaphysics and Method

Alexander’s metaphysics is thoroughly realist and systematic. It is realist in
that the fundamental entities of his ontology are mind-independent and
non-mental. At the foundation of his metaphysics is space-time. Space-­
Time is an infinite monistic whole that has finite parts, called point-­
instants. Space-Time is a continuum of point-instants as opposed to a
complex of point-instants composed in an atomistic-like way. In Book 1 of
Space, Time, and Deity he argues that space, of its essence, is temporal, and
that time, of its essence, is spatial. For time is succession in duration. The
essence of time is such that the past is no longer present and the future will
become present. This implies a kind of continuity between the past, pres-
ent, and future. But if time exists on its own, this continuity would be lost.
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

It follows that reality is created afresh ex nihilo, which does violence to the
intuition that time is continuous. So, Alexander reasons, there must be
something that explains the continuity of time and this thing is space.
Space allows us to place events in time in a continuous fashion. This leads
him to infer that space and time are merely two aspects of one thing:
Space-Time.
Space-Time serves as the metaphysical ground in Alexander’s realism.
All else is grounded in facts about space-time. So, for instance, a material
thing such as a table is a portion of Space-Time, or better a ‘configuration
of motion’ (Alexander 1920b, 338). After elucidating his theory of space-­
time in Book 1, he offers a theory of categories in Book 2 according to
which categories are grounded in space-time. Categories are fundamental
characters of Space-Time. Existence, identity, relation, particularity, uni-
versality, substance, causation, part-whole, number, class are all categories,
on Alexander’s view, and each of them is grounded in facts about space-­
time. His theory of categories is therefore reductionist: the categories are
reduced to something non-categorial. Space-Time, when considered in
itself, is not categorial. (Alexander distinguishes between Space-Time (and
portions of Space-Time) and some space-time or other, in which case he
uses lower case ‘space-time’. I follow this nuance throughout.)
In Book 3, Alexander spells out a materialist theory of mind, a theory
of emergence, a realist epistemology (including a direct realist theory of
perception), an account of ‘tertiary’ qualities (value, truth, beauty), which
are grounded ultimately in space-time, and a conception of free will
(roughly, a form of compatibilism). According to Alexander, a mental pro-
cess is identical with a brain process, and so in this respect he counts as an
identity theorist (see Simons 2013, 722). However, Alexander also thinks
that a mental quality is emergent and therefore not reducible to some
physical property; the brain process has the emergent quality of mind. In
this sense, then, he is some sort of property dualist. Armstrong labelled
Alexander’s view a dual attribute theory of mind (Armstrong 1968, 12).
Kim called it a token-identity theory, which falls under nonreductive phys-
icalism (Kim 1993, 345). See also (Emmet 1966, xiii).4
Despite the ambiguity, his theory of mind is an insight into how hierar-
chical levels are formed in the world. For each kind of thing there is some
emergent quality that emerges from the previous level of complexity in
space-time. In the case of mind, there is a certain level of complexity in the
brain that gives rise to mind. The mind qua mental quality characterises
the brain process and so it (i.e. the brain process) deserves to be called a
6 A. R. J. FISHER

‘mental process’. Beginning with space-time, there comes matter, then

life, and then mind. At each level the emergent quality sums up the com-
plexity of the previous level and is the ‘resultant’, to use another emergen-
tist label.
Alexander’s theory of emergence allows room for a philosophy of reli-
gion and an account of the existence of God. Since Space-Time is the
ultimate ground according to Alexander, he needs to give an account of
God in relation to time (and more specifically, space-time). On his view,
God is Space-Time as it drives towards the quality of deity, which is yet to
emerge from space-time. In Book 4 he explains how his theory of God can
accommodate our religious intuitions and impulses towards God. Time
plays a crucial role here: it is creative and brings into being qualities (‘forms
of existence’) that did not previously exist. To be clear, this conception of
time and its function is of time in the concrete sense. It is not time under-
stood in the abstract sense. To conceive of time in the abstract is a mistake
and presupposes that time can be separated from space, which in turn begs
the question against Alexander. In the concrete, real sense, time is succes-
sion in duration (Alexander 1920b, 337).
Alexander’s epistemology is realist in character. The object of knowing
(broadly construed so as to cover perceiving, conceiving, and sensing) is
independent of the mind that knows. He thus endorses epistemological
realism. One motivation for this theory is that epistemology is part of
metaphysics and that metaphysics comes before epistemology. Inquiry
begins with trying to understand the world, not our minds or what we
know. Furthermore, he endorses a sophisticated version of direct realism,
where the datum by which we know is identical with what we know. A
green sensum, then, is some aspect of something in the external world (say,
a green leaf). The green sensum or sensation is not some mental item or
mind-dependent object. Sensations, thoughts (or ideas) ain’t in the head.
They are mind-independent aspects of non-mental things. His particular
version of epistemological realism has been labelled epistemological
monism, given that he denies that there is some intermediate entity (such
as a presentation) that we apprehend in an act of (say) perceiving some
object in the external world.
Alexander’s package deal is striking. It is systematic, comprehensive,
and all-encompassing, with a place for God to boot. What arguments did
he give in support of it? First, he argued by way of method. Second, he
developed a hypothesis that gave him reasons to believe it by following
this method. His method and this two-step style of argument were rarely
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

understood by his contemporaries, nor has his method been made explicit
by commentators. Part of the problem is that his method (and any conse-
quences therefrom) must be extracted from various places across his corpus.
The first component of Alexander’s method is to describe what is given
in experience without any philosophical presuppositions (see Alexander
1909–1910, 1). What is given in experience is accepted as real and the
main goal is to describe it without introducing technical vocabulary. To
introduce some technical notion would introduce some theory or some
piece of metaphysics. The resulting description is a description of some
experiential fact. Call this the descriptive component. The second compo-
nent of Alexander’s method is to analyse using metaphysics the facts that
are described in ordinary concrete experience. Call this the analytical
component.
When Alexander talks about method in the context of metaphysics he
says: ‘the method of metaphysics is analytical’ (1920a, 175)—in contrast
with the mathematical method. He continues, referring to the metaphysi-
cal method:

It takes experience, that is, what is experienced (whether by way of contem-

plation or enjoyment), and dissects it into its constituents and discovers the
relations of parts of experience to one another. (1920a, 175)

Any analysis, of course, employs at least one hypothesis such as a hypoth-

esis about space-time or a hypothesis about the object of perception. This
is the stage of hypothesis. A hypothesis is to be accepted on two grounds:
(1) that it faithfully and accurately captures the experiential facts as
described at the descriptive stage, and (2) that it is explanatorily fruitful in
bringing together a unified and systematic account of the given subject
matter. On this view, a hypothesis should be accepted because of its
explanatory success. Alexander writes:

The hypothesis is that the simplest being is Space-Time itself, and that mate-
rial things are but modes of this one simple being, finite complexes which
are familiar to us in sensible experience. That hypothesis must justify itself in
the sequel by its metaphysical success. (1920a, 172)

In volume 2, when talking about his formula (or hypothesis) of space-­

time, he writes:
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Title: A day at Happy Hollow School

Author: Lettie Cook Van Derveer

Release date: May 15, 2022 [eBook #68083]

Language: English

Original publication: United States: March Brothers, 1910

Credits: Charlene Taylor, David E. Brown, and the Online

Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net
(This file was produced from images generously made
available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A DAY AT

HAPPY HOLLOW SCHOOL ***
 A Day at
Happy Hollow
School
By
Lettie Cook Van Derveer

March Brothers
Publishers
208, 210, 212 Wright Ave., Lebanon, O.
 Copyright, 1910,
By March Brothers.
 A Day at Happy
Hollow School
By LETTIE COOK VAN DERVEER

ACT I.
Setting—Interior of schoolroom. Chairs arranged in rows for
scholars; desk and chair for teacher; blackboard.
(Enter teacher. Severe-looking, wearing eye-glasses. Arranges
books and papers on desk. Rings bell.)
(Enter scholars, singly and in groups, talking and laughing until
teacher again taps bell. They wear varied costumes, gingham
aprons, etc. On entering remove coats, caps, shawls, hats and
bonnets—in season and out of season—hanging them on hooks in
the wall or on backs of chairs. Hair in pig-tails or curls tied with
ribbons or shoestrings in all manner of fashions.)
Each has basket, bag or tin dinner-pail.
Teacher opens roll-book and proceeds to call roll.
Teacher. “Annabel Adams.”
Annabel Adams. “Present.”
Teacher. “Bessie Bolitsky.”
Bessie Bolitsky. “P-r-r-esent!”
Teacher. “Curiosity Cornhusk.”
Curiosity Cornhusk. “Present.”
Teacher. “Dennis Dockerty.”
Dennis Dockerty. “Present.”
Teacher. “Etta Elephant.”
Etta Elephant (fat child). “I’m here.”
Teacher. “Fanny Finney.”
Fanny Finney (brogue). “Hyer.”
Teacher. “Geraldine Griggs.”
Geraldine Griggs. “Present.”
Teacher. “Henry Hoskins.”
Henry Hoskins. “Pr-r-esent.”
Teacher. “Isaac Ibsen.”
Isaac Ibsen. “We’s both here.”
Teacher. “Silence! Next time answer as you should.” (Proceeds.) “Ira
Ibsen.”
Ira Ibsen (very faintly). “Present.”
Teacher. “Joshua Judkins.”
Joshua Judkins. “Present.”
(Other names may be added.)
Teacher. “First class in geography, come forward.”
(Advance Annabel, Dennis, Etta, Curiosity and Joshua.)
Teacher. “Now Annabel, you tell me this. If to the right of you is the
South, and on your left the North, and in front of you the East—
what’s behind you?”
Annabel thinks a moment, then starts to cry. “Boo hoo! I knowed it. I
told ma you’d see them buttons missin’ off my waist.”
Teacher. “Ridiculous! I mean the West. Now listen children! Does
anybody remember what the population of China is?” (All shake
heads negatively.)
Teacher. “Well, the population of China is so great that two
Chinamen die every time you take a breath.”
(Etta immediately starts purring furiously. Keeps it up until spoken
to.)
Teacher. “Dennis Dockerty go to the board and draw the map of New
Jersey.”
(Dennis goes, but draws instead a tree, one branch of which is
longer than the others, and has on it three disks representing fruit.)
Teacher (just then observing Etta’s flushed face and energetic puffs):
“Why Etta Elephant, what’s the matter? What on earth are you
doing?”
Etta Elephant. “Killing Chinamen. I never did like them foreigners
what me father calls aliens, and I’m getting rid of them as fast as I
can.”
(Teacher throws up hands in exasperation. Turns to blackboard.)
“Why Dennis Dockerty that’s not the map of New Jersey.”
Dennis. “Please, ma’am, my big brother says New Jersey’s like a
fruit tree, ’cause it’s got a Long Branch, three Oranges and a
Lemon.”
Teacher (meditatively): “Y-e-s, East Orange, West Orange and South
Orange—but where’s the Lemon?”
Dennis (saucily). “You’re the Lemon.”
Other Scholars. “O-h-h!”
Teacher. “Go to your seat.”
(Dennis goes, shuffling his feet and sulking for some time.)
Teacher. “Curiosity, your father is a sailor; would it be possible for
him to start to-day to go round the world, and keep sailing always in
the same direction till he came back to his starting-point?”
Curiosity. “No, Miss Fitzimmons, pop’s laid up with rheumatism.”
Teacher. “Dear me! What ails you all to be so stupid to-day. Joshua,
have we anything in our country as wonderful as the great volcano,
Mt. Vesuvius, which continually pours out smoke and molten lava?”
Joshua. “Sure—give Niagara Falls a chance, it will put the whole
thing out in a minute.”
Teacher. “Very good. You may take your seats.”
(Class obey.)
Teacher. “Next is the class in General Information. Forward.”
(Advance Bessie, Geraldine, Fanny, Henry, Isaac and Ira.)
(In the meantime Etta is seen chewing gum vigorously, and planting
her feet conspicuously in the aisle as she fidgets about.)
Teacher (impressively). “Bessie, tell me what you would think if you
saw the Stars and Stripes waving over the field of battle?”
Bessie (innocently). “I’d think that the wind was blowing.”
Teacher. “Awful!” (observes Etta). “Etta Elephant, take your gum out
of your mouth, and put your feet in immediately.” (Etta does this
literally in pantomime.)
(Just then Curiosity pipes up, raising hand as she asks.) “Teacher,
did you ever see a hair die?”
Teacher. “Certainly not.”
Curiosity Cornhusk. “Or ink stand?”
Teacher. “No! Do be quiet.” (Turns to class.) “Now do you know
whether any one is going to try to discover the South Pole?”
Fanny. “Oi ain’t going.”
Teacher. “Oh, Fanny, my child, you must not say, ‘I ain’t going.’ You
must say, ‘I am not going.’ It’s like this: ‘I am not going; he is not
going; she is not going; we are not going; you are not going; they are
not going.’ Now, can you say all that Fanny?”
Fanny. “Shure Oi can. ‘There ain’t nobody going.’”
Teacher waves her aside in despair. Asks others: “Which of you can
describe the backbone?”
Geraldine (raises hand, standing on one foot in her eagerness to
answer). “The backbone is something that holds up the head and
ribs, and keeps you from having legs clear up your neck.”
Teacher. “Now, children, what is a cat covered with? Is it wool? Is it
fur? Is it feathers? Is it hair?”
Curiosity (pipes up): “Say, ain’t you honest never seen a cat?”
(The others answer in chorus): “Fur.”
Teacher. “Geraldine, what is dew?”
Geraldine. “The earth revolves on its own axis three hundred and
sixty-five times in twenty-four hours. This rapid motion through space
causes it to perspire. This is called dew.”
Teacher. “Henry, where was the Declaration of Independence
signed?”
Henry. “At the bottom, ma’am.”
Teacher. “What is mathematics, Isaac?”
Isaac. “Dunno.”
Ira. “Me neither.”
Teacher. “Well, mathematics is the science that treats of
measurement or numbering. For instance: If it takes one man twelve
days to build a house, then twelve men can build it in one day. That’s
mathematics.”
(Isaac and Ira put heads together over pencil and paper while
teacher asks next question.)
Teacher. “Bessie, if your mother bought four baskets of grapes, the
dealer’s price being a quarter a basket, how much would the
purchase cost her?”
Bessie. “You never can tell. Ma’s great at a bargain.”
(Isaac and Ira wave their hands to attract attention.)
Teacher. “Well, Isaac? Well, Ira?”
Isaac. “Say Miss Fitzimmons, me’n Ira’s figgered out that two
hundred and eighty-eight men will build it in one hour; seventeen
thousand two hundred and eighty, in a minute, and—”
Ira (interrupts). “And one million, thirty-six thousand eight hundred
men will put it up in a second, an’—”
Teacher. “There, that will do—that’s quite enough. I see you
understand the meaning of mathematics fully.”
Curiosity (raises hand and asks). “Please, teacher, did you ever see
a stone step, or a bed spring, or a apple turn over?”
Teacher. “Curiosity Cornhusk, I want you to stop asking questions at
once. Don’t you know that curiosity once killed a cat?” (Curiosity is
thoughtful.) “Children, you may all take your seats.”
Curiosity. “Please, teacher, what was it the cat wanted to know?”
Teacher (sinks into chair). “Somebody bring me a glass of water,
quick!”
(Geraldine gravely goes to pail in the corner and brings a large tin
dipper full. Teacher revives.)
Teacher. “Children I wanted to speak to you about that poor family
who have just moved into the old brown house in the Hollow. The
father is just getting up from a sick-bed and not able to work yet and
I hear there’s scarcely a thing to eat in the house, and to-morrow is
Thanksgiving, you know. I do wish we could send them a good
dinner. Can any of you think of a way to manage it without asking too
much of our parents?”
(A loud knock is heard at the outer door. While teacher answers it
scholars occupy themselves with throwing spit-balls, and various
pranks of school children. She returns.)
Teacher. “There are two automobiles just down the hill. They got off
the main road by mistake, and one of them is broken down, and the
men are trying to get it fixed up. They wanted to know if there was
any place near here where they could get something to eat. The one
at the door says they’re ‘positively starving,’ and would be willing to
pay a good round sum for anything fit to eat. You know there is no
house nearer than old Mr. Dawson’s and—”
Annabel. “Don’t send ’em there, teacher; Mis’ Dawson is just doin’
her washin’ to-day, and she’ll most likely have a cold bite.”
Teacher. “That’s true—and the next place is Mr. Temple’s—”
Curiosity. “I saw ’em drivin’ off to town as I came by, an’ the house
was all shut up.”
Teacher. “Then there’s quite a stretch between there and your place,
Bessie.”
Bessie. “Mercy! Don’t send them there, Miss Fitzimmons. Mother’s
makin’ mince-meat and cookin’ up pumpkin for pies, and she’d be all
upset.”
Teacher. “Well, it appears there isn’t very good promise of lunch for
these wayfarers unless we help them out. What do you say if we sell
our lunches to them and take the proceeds to buy supplies for the
folks down in the Hollow? We only have a short session after recess
on account of the holiday, so you wouldn’t get so terribly hungry
before you go home. I’ll leave you here for awhile, and if you decide
to make this sacrifice you can place your lunches on my desk.”
(Scholars immediately begin discussion; some for, some against
proposed disposal of lunches; all talking at once and moving about.)
(Presently Annabel rises, sighs and slowly advances to desk, placing
basket there, and saying:) “I hate to give up that piece of pumpkin
pie, but I couldn’t relish it thinking of that Hollow family; I’ve been
hollow myself.” (This is funnier if the speaker is a stout girl.)
Bessie (follows her example). “All I hope is that the stew don’t all get
et up before I get home to-day.”
Curiosity. “Guess I’ll keep mine.”
Dennis. “I love my lunch, but oh! them hungry kids.” (Goes forward.)
Geraldine. “Guess I’m as generous as anybody.” (Adds her lunch.)
Etta to Curiosity. “You’d ought to be ashamed of yourself.” (Arises.)
“My lunch is out in the cloak-room; I’ll go get it.”
(While she is gone, Curiosity puts her lunch with the rest, sighing:)
“I’ll do it, but I guess I’ll die like that Curiosity cat; I’ll be so hungry.”
(Thoughtfully.) “Wonder what that cat did want to know anyhow.”
Joshua. “Guess if they can stand them biscuits of Sis’s, I oughtn’t to
kick.”
(Etta returns with huge basket, which she deposits with an air of
importance on the desk. Looks contemptuously at Curiosity.)
Fanny. “And I bet you we won’t have nothin’ but fried praties and
onions for supper. But maybe they ain’t got even them.” (Puts bag
with others.)
(Isaac and Ira go up together, saying:) “And there’s ours.”
Henry. “Here’s mine, too.”
Etta to Curiosity. “There, you see; everybody’s give up their lunch
but you, you little stingy, contrary, stubborn, selfish, tight-fisted, over-
fed, pie-faced pig you—”
Curiosity. “Are you through?”
Etta. “Yes.”
Curiosity. “Ain’t you got nothin’ more to say?”
Etta. “No.”
Curiosity. “Well, all of them things you called me you are. I put my
lunch there when you went after yours.”
Etta (repentently). “Oh, I take it all back.”
Curiosity (cordially). “All right, you’re welcome.”
(Enter teacher.)
Teacher. “Ah, this looks as if everybody has been generous. I’m
proud of you. You’re all true friends in need. But I was sure you’d do
it, so I spoke to the gentleman at the door and he says, he will
consider it a bargain at any price we say, and will be back with his
friends soon. Now for the recitations. Each one of you try to recite
something, if only a stanza. And after all have recited, I will call for
the fire drill, and all be ready to respond immediately. Don’t hesitate,
do as you would if the building was really on fire. Now, Annabel
you’re first on the roll, so you begin speaking.”
Annabel comes forward, bows, announces: “Mary’s Little Lamb.”
Bows again, and recites as follows:
“Some folks say that fleas is black,
But that ain’t true I know,
For Mary had a little lamb
Its fleas was white as snow.”
Teacher. “Now Bessie, it’s your turn.”
Bessie. “Me and Curiosity’s got one together.”
Curiosity.
“I asked my Pa a simple thing,
Where holes in doughnuts go?
Pa read his paper, then he said,
‘Oh, you’re too young to know.’”
Bessie.
“I asked my Ma about the wind,
Why you can’t see it blow?
Ma thought a moment, then she said,
‘Oh, you’re too young to know.’”
Both together.
“Now why on earth do you suppose
They went and licked us so.
Ma asked, ‘Where is that jam?’ I said,
‘Oh, you’re too young to know.’”
Teacher. “Now, Dennis.”
Dennis recites.

“The lady in the street-car

 Was glaring down at me,
Because I chanced to have a seat
And she did not, you see.

“But I rose very quickly

And offered her my seat.
’Twas a question whether she or I
Should stand upon my feet.
Ouch!”

Teacher. “Now we’ll have yours, Etta.”

Etta. “Please, teacher, I ain’t thought of mine yet.” (Nudges Fanny.)
“You g’wan, Fanny.”
Fanny (grinning and twisting apron).
“Hyer Oi stand, all ragged and dirty,
Ask me me name, an’ Oi’ll run like a turkey.”
Teacher. “Geraldine next.”
Geraldine.

“When mother was a little maid

She was so very good,
I really often think that she
Must have been made of wood.

“She never, never played a trick

On her pet pussy ‘Tib,’
She would not tease; she would not tell
The tiniest little fib.

“She always kept her dresses clean,—

Her curls were brushed just right;
She never cried and coaxed that she
Might stay up late at night.

“And very often when I’ve been

In mischief and been bad,
 I think, ‘Ain’t it an awful shame
That I took after Dad.’”

Teacher. “Now, Henry.”

Henry (very rapidly and jerkily).
“There was a young girl from Boo Loo
Who wanted to catch the two-two.
Said the porter, ‘Don’t hurry, or scurry or worry,
It’s a minute or two to two-two.’”
Teacher. “Isaac and Ira, I suppose you have one between you?”
(They nod.) “All right.”
Isaac.
“The verse you write
You say is written.
Ira.
You fly your kite
But not your kitten.
Isaac.
The gas you light
Is never litten.
Ira.
The things you drank
Were doubtless drunk.
Isaac.
The boy you spank
Is never spunk.
Ira.
A friend you thank
But never thunk.
Isaac.
 Suppose you speak
Then you have spoken.
Ira.
But if you sneak
You have not snoken.
Isaac.
The shoes that squeak
Have never squoken.”
Teacher. “What is yours, Joshua?”
Joshua.

“Grandma, here’s a little gumdrop.”

“Thank you very much, my sweet,
What a thoughtful little boy you are
To bring Grandma a treat.”

“Did you like that gumdrop, Grandma?”

“Yes, my dear, ’twas very nice.”
“Ain’t it queer now, Towsey didn’t
’Cause he spitted it out twice.”

Teacher. “Dear me, Joshua, perhaps you’d better let me choose your
next piece. Now, Etta, if you are ready, we’ll have your piece as the
final recitation.”
Etta.

Once there was a little boy, whose name was Robert Reece,
And every Friday afternoon he had to speak a piece.
So many poems thus he learned, that soon he had a store
Of recitations in his head, and still kept learning more.

And now this is what happened; he was called upon one

week
And totally forgot the piece he was about to speak!
His brain he cudgelled! not a word remained within his head!
 And so he spoke at random, and this is what he said.

“My Beautiful, my Beautiful, who standest proudly by,

It was the schooner Hesperus—the breaking waves
dashed high!
Why is the Forum crowded? What means this stir in Rome?
Under the spreading chestnut tree, there is no place like
home.

“When Freedom from her mountain height cried, Twinkle little

star,
Shoot if you must this old gray head, King Henry of
Navarre!
Roll on, thou deep and dark blue crested crags of
Drachenfels,
My name is Norval on the Grampion Hills, ring out wild
bells!”

“If you’re waking call me early, to be or not to be,

The curfew must not ring to-night. Oh! woodman spare
that tree!
Charge, Chester, charge! On, Stanley, on! and let who will be
clever!
The boy stood on the burning deck, but I go on forever!”

(Bows and takes seat.)

Teacher (smilingly). “Now, children, what would you say if I should

make a few remarks?”
All together (as in fire drill) “Form a line and march outdoors.”
Teacher. “What! what!” (Teacher taps bell sharply.)
Etta (excitedly). “That’s the fire bell. Hurry up!” (All rush out, leaving
teacher standing amazed.)
(She turns to audience and says:) “Well, ain’t that the beatenest?”
(Also goes out.)
(Curtain.)