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In a Bad State
 In a Bad State

Responding to State and Local

Budget Crises

DAVID SCHLEICHER
 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the
University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing
worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and
certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2023

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in
writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under
terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning
reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same
condition on any acquirer.

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

ISBN 978–0–19–762915–4
eISBN 978–0–19–762917–8

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197629154.001.0001
For Amanda, Charlie, and Nate
 CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

PART I WHY IS IT SO HARD TO GET OUT OF A BAD

STATE? AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF STATE
AND LOCAL FISCAL CRISES

Introduction: Why Is It So Hard to Get Out of a Bad State?

PART II WHEN WE’VE BEEN IN A BAD STATE: THE

THEORY AND HISTORY OF FEDERAL RESPONSES TO
STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL CRISES

1. What Has Already Been Said about Federal Responses to State

and Local Budget Crises? What Has Been Left Out?
1.1. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL MORAL HAZARD OR THE PROBLEM
OF “SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS”
1.2. STATE FISCAL CRISES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
1.3. STATE BUDGET CRISES, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT
1.4. AVOID MORAL HAZARD, ALLEVIATE RECESSIONS, AND/OR BUILD
INFRASTRUCTURE: PICK TWO, BUT NOT THREE
1.5. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1: THREE METHODOLOGICAL NOTES
2. State Debt Crises through the 1840s
2.1. HAMILTON, THE ASSUMPTION OF STATE DEBTS, AND MORAL HAZARD
2.2. THE STATE DEBT CRISES OF THE 1830S AND 1840S
3. The Dual Debt Crises of the Second Half of the Nineteenth
Century
3.1. THE RAILROAD BOND CRISES
3.1.1. Railroad Bonds in the Courts
3.1.2. Railroad Bonds and Local Government Law
 3.1.3. America’s Urban Civic Infrastructure: “The
Achievements of Government . . . Rivaled the Feats of the
Old Testament God”
3.2. THE OTHER DEBT CRISIS OF THE 1870S: SOUTHERN STATE POST-
RECONSTRUCTION REPUDIATION AND THE “ODIOUS DEBT”
DOCTRINE
3.3. CONCLUSION
4. State and Local Debt Crises in the 20th Century
4.1. STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL CRISES DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION
4.1.1. The Creation of Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy
4.1.2. When a State Goes Broke: Arkansas in the 1930s
4.2. WHEN BIG CITIES GO BROKE
4.2.1. New York City: Ford to City, Drop Dea . . . Well, Wait
a Minute
4.2.2. Bailouts without Moral Hazard: The Case of
Washington, DC
5. The Great Recession and State and Local Fiscal Crises
5.1. THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT
5.2. BUILD AMERICA BONDS
5.3. THE END OF STIMULUS AND THE RISE OF THE PENSION CRISIS
5.4. MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY IN THE GREAT RECESSION AND THE
PUERTO RICO CRISIS
5.4.1. Chapter 9: A Quick Primer
5.4.2. Chapter 9 in the Great Recession
5.5. PUERTO RICO AND PROMESA
5.6. CONCLUSION
6. COVID-19, the CARES Act, the MLF, and the ARP
6.1. WHO CARES ABOUT STATES AND CITIES?
6.2. THE MUNICIPAL LIQUIDITY FACILITY
6.3. THE DECEMBER 2020 STIMULUS AND THE ARP
6.4. CONCLUSION: THE SECOND DRAFT OF HISTORY

PART III TOOLS FOR GETTING OUT OF A BAD STATE

7. An Introduction to the Principles for Responding to State and

Local Fiscal Crises
 8. Building Better Bailouts
8.1. TRADITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN BUILDING BAILOUTS
8.1.1. General or Specific?
8.1.2. Conditional or Unconditional?
8.1.3. Loans or Grants?
8.2. BUILDING BETTER BAILOUTS: ADVANCING PRUDENCE, MIXING, AND
SPREADING IN BAILOUT DESIGN
8.2.1. Conditions on General State and Local Crisis Aid
8.2.2. Conditions on Aid to Specific Jurisdictions in Fiscal
Crisis
9. Building Better Defaults
9.1. BUILDING BETTER DEFAULTS: REFORMS TO CHAPTER 9
9.1.1. Insolvency
9.1.2. Preferences
9.1.3. Financial Engineering
9.1.4. Chapter 9 and Overlapping Local Governments
9.2. BUILDING BIGGER DEFAULTS: STATE GOVERNMENTS AND CHAPTER 9
9.3. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 9: THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF “BIG
MAC”S
10. Building Better Forms of State and Local Austerity
10.1 SEPARATING STATE AND LOCAL TAX BASES
.10.2 PENSION REFORM
.
11. Resilience, or Building a Better Federal System
11.1 ENCOURAGING INTER-REGIONAL MOBILITY
.11.2 THE TENTATIVE CASE FOR KEEPING THE MUNICIPAL BOND INTEREST
. TAX EXEMPTION
11.3 THE EFFICIENCY OF INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING
.11.4 NATIONALIZING PARTS OF THE WELFARE STATE
.
PART IV THE CONCLUSION, OR WHY STATES ARE OFTEN
BAD

12. Why States Are Often Bad

Notes
Index
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

At a cocktail party in 2015, then-Yale Law School Dean Robert Post

introduced me to Dick Ravitch, the former lieutenant governor of
New York, chair of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, a
central figure in the New York City fiscal crisis, and the éminence
grise of the world of municipal finance. I was, and am, a scholar of
state and local government law, focusing mostly on land use, urban
economic development, and election law. At the time, I had not
written much about state and local fiscal issues. But, after one
conversation with Dick, I realized I needed to fix that.
Dick and I started teaching a class together at Yale Law School
called “The State and Local Budget Crisis.” Doing so has been a
great education and pleasure. This book is very much the product of
interactions in class with the excellent students, Dick, and the variety
of people in the municipal finance world who have joined us over the
years. I’m not the first person for whom an encounter with Dick
Ravitch was a formative experience, nor will I be the last, but I will
be forever grateful for his vision, brilliance, focus, and kindness.
That said, there are ways in which Dick was pushing on an open
door. My brilliant wife Amanda Kosonen is an international law expert
and knows more than I ever will about sovereign debt and
international financial institutions (among many, many, many other
things). Her views on sovereign debt provided a lens into the
municipal debt world that I wouldn’t have had otherwise. This book
clearly bears the marks of her thinking.
They say when you scratch a scholar’s theory, you find a
biography. That is certainly true in this case. My parents—my mother
Linda Schleicher, my father Bill Schleicher, and my stepmother Ellen
Chapnick—taught me to care about local politics and, beyond that,
about the people who work for governments and those who rely on
government services. Mom and Dad both worked for municipal labor
unions in New York City, where the shadow of the 1970s fiscal crisis
was ever-present. The human costs of fiscal crises were apparent to
me, even at an early age. The other day I told Mom that I was
pretty sure she wouldn’t agree with everything in this book, but that,
no matter what, I always know that she is proud, loving, and
supportive of me. A child could ask for nothing more from his
parents. (Also, my mother is playing a game with my boys while I
write this—thanks Mom!)
While all of the book’s flaws are my own, many people contributed
to any successes it has. My editor at Oxford University Press, David
McBride, identified this project and then did an amazing job working
with me and shepherding the book into print. The rest of the team
that worked with us—Emily Benitez and Kavitha Yuvaraj particularly
—did great work. In addition, my publicist Michelle Blankenship
helped so much as well.
A group of brilliant research assistants helped me over the many
years I’ve been working on this book. Many, many thanks are due to
Rebecca Brooks, Adam Gerrard, Paul Healy, Adela Lilollari, Steffi
Ostrowski, Will Poff-Webster, Anirudh Sivaram, and Talia Stender.
Colleagues and friends provided a great deal of feedback and
advice. Steve Teles convinced me to write this as a book, rather than
as a series of law review articles, advising me both on the scholarly
content and talking me through some of my worries about it. I have
been working with my regular coauthor Rick Hills on land use
projects for years now; my thinking on all sorts of issues has been
deeply shaped by his intense and sometimes manic intelligence. Bob
Ellickson has been a mentor, a great commentator, and, perhaps
most importantly, a role model for how to do scholarly work. Others
who provided extremely useful comments on the manuscript or
otherwise provided feedback include Bruce Ackerman, Nicholas
Bagley, Vincent Buccola, Aure Chaudhury, Peter Conti-Brown, Justin
Driver, Christopher Elmendorf, Brian Feinstein, David Fontana, Brian
Galle, Heather Gerken, Clayton Gillette, Edward Glaeser, William
Glasgall, Tracy Gordon, Daniel Halberstam, Andrew Haughwout,
Daniel Hemel, Don Herzog, Noah Kazis, Daryl Levinson, Adam
Levitin, Zachary Liscow, Yair Listokin, Julia Mahoney, Gregory Makoff,
E. J. McMahon, Gabe Mendlow, Thomas Meyer, Eloise Pasachoff,
Michael Pyle, Roberta Romano, Reihan Salam, David Skeel, Douglas
Spencer, Susan Wachter, Benjamin Wallace-Wells, David Zaring, Taisu
Zhang, and several anonymous reviewers. I also had several
wonderful conversations about the Municipal Liquidity Facility and
municipal finance more generally with Kent Hiteshew, which taught
me a great deal.
The book also benefited tremendously from comments at
workshops at the Antonin Scalia Law School, the Federal Funding
Issues Workshop, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Johns
Hopkins University, the Law and Macroeconomics Annual
Conference, the University of Michigan Law School, the Yale School
of Management, and the Yale Law School. One of the great
pleasures of teaching at Yale Law School is that the distinction
between students and peers is narrow. Students in my seminar were
assigned draft chapters and provided excellent feedback.
Speaking of Yale, there are many people at the Law School I need
to thank. Since my first day as a law student, Dean Heather Gerken
has been a mentor to me and has provided an example for how to
write insightful and important scholarship. I can’t thank her enough
for all of her support, as a dean, as a mentor, and as a friend. As I
mentioned above, Robert Post got this whole project started; he is
just a total mensch in addition to being a brilliant thinker. Jennifer
Marshall is a terrific assistant. Pascal Matthieu is a wizard with
grants. Joe Crosby Joe Crosbied things in the way only Joe Crosby
can do. Thank you!
Finally, I want to thank my family. They have had to listen to me
talk about things like sales tax bonds or Bridgeport’s history of fiscal
crisis for years. I can’t thank them enough for always doing so with
good humor and interest. My boys—Charlie and Nate—are just the
best, my favorite people. I can’t wait for them to read this. My wife
Amanda is amazing, my love and anchor. They are the most loving
and fun people I have ever met. None of this would have happened
without them.
 PART I

WHY IS IT SO HARD TO GET OUT OF A BAD STATE?

An Introduction to the Problem of State and Local
Fiscal Crises
 Introduction
Why Is It So Hard to Get Out of a Bad State?

Imagine this: Sometime in the late 2020s, while the President and
Congress negotiate over one bill or another, big news drops. The
Governor of Illinois and the Mayor of Chicago are going to hold a
joint press conference to announce that the state and the city are
flat broke. They are both going to default on their debts and slash
their budgets if Congress doesn’t do something quickly to help them
out of their dire fiscal straits.
Everyone in DC turns on their TVs to watch the press conference.
As soon as it ends, the cable networks go live to protests in Chicago.
Schools have closed for the day, disorder reigns, and garbage sits
uncollected, as teachers, police officers, and other public sector
workers take to the streets to oppose proposed layoffs and pension
cuts. On location, reporters interview storeowners in Springfield,
Illinois, worried that soon-to-be fired state employees will stop
spending money, destroying the local economy. The Twitter hashtags
#IllinoIsOver and #ChicaGoAway trend worldwide, as major
companies announce their plans to move their headquarters and
factories away from the state before severe tax increases kick in.
It’s a disaster. The President brings her advisers and
Congressional allies to the White House to formulate a response.
The Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers goes first: “We
can’t let Illinois or Chicago cut services to the bone and fire tons of
employees,” he argues. “It will crush the economy. State and local
layoffs will directly lower employment levels, and multiplier effects
will mean even more job losses. Not to mention the human suffering
caused by lost government services—higher crime rates, 40 students
in each classroom, more homelessness, and reduced healthcare! Tax
increases will destroy economic activity and encourage people and
companies to leave the state. Austerity is not a solution.”
A Senator from Texas interrupts: “No, no, no! The worst thing we
can do is give federal money to Illinois,” she says. “Why should my
constituents pay for Chicago’s mistakes? The state and the city
repeatedly refused to raise taxes or cut spending enough to balance
their budgets. If we give aid to Illinois or Chicago, every governor
and mayor in the country will know that she can spend wildly
without consequences. And lenders will know there is no risk in
providing money to irresponsible governments. Let Illinois cut
spending or let it default. Either way, bailouts are not the answer.”
The Secretary of the Treasury pipes up: “Whatever we do, we
can’t let Illinois default on its promises. State and local governments
build and maintain almost everything useful in this country—roads,
trains, sewer systems, you name it. To do so, they need to be able
to borrow money. If Illinois defaults, or if Chicago files for
bankruptcy, the municipal bond market might collapse. States and
cities around the country won’t be able to borrow, which will mean
they can’t invest in infrastructure. The future of the national
economy depends on Illinois avoiding default.”
What should the President and Congress do?
⋆⋆⋆
This scenario may seem far-fetched, but in March 2020 it looked like
we were in for a wave of state and local governmental defaults.
When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, a massive decline in economic
activity followed.1 Budget experts predicted both huge state and
local governmental revenue losses and large increases in demand for
healthcare and other social services because of the pandemic and
the recession.2
Defaults seemed possible, even likely. The last major recession,
the Great Recession of 2008, had been brutal on state and local
budgets.3 State and local governments laid off hundreds of
thousands of public employees, a loss of jobs so severe that it
substantially extended the length of the recession.4 Detroit and
several other cities were eventually forced to file for bankruptcy; the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico effectively did so as well.
Some jurisdictions had substantially improved their fiscal situations
between 2008 and 2020, building up substantial “rainy day funds.”5
But others kept accruing more and more debt, often in the form of
underfunded pension liabilities and healthcare obligations for retired
public workers.6 In Connecticut in 2019, almost a third of the tax
revenue generated by the state went to making payments on debt
and retiree obligations.7 Connecticut was not alone—debt and
pension payments made up a huge portion of spending in states like
Illinois, New Jersey, and Kentucky as well.8
After what we saw following the Great Recession, the COVID-19
recession seemed sure to produce its own state and local fiscal
crises. The media ran story after story about impending disasters in
state budgets. Municipal bond markets seized up, creating questions
about the ability of state and local governments to borrow.9 State
and local governments laid off or furloughed more than a million
public employees, more than they had after 2008.10 Revenues
shriveled for many local governments, particularly those with
budgets reliant on tourism, the oil industry, car tolls, or mass transit
fares.11 The State of Illinois and New York’s Metropolitan
Transportation Authority were forced to borrow money from the
Federal Reserve.12 The leader of the Illinois State Senate asked
Congress for a $41B bailout.13
But a default crisis did not come to pass. The shock created by the
pandemic was very different in type from the crisis that hit in 2008.
High-income workers had largely stable incomes during the
pandemic and the stock market boomed, leading to consistent or
even increasing state income and capital gains tax revenues.14
Federal aid to individuals and firms helped preserve incomes despite
high unemployment.15 The bond market recovered after the Federal
Reserve, with Congress’s backing, created a facility for buying
municipal bonds.16 And, over the course of several pieces of
legislation, Congress provided an enormous amount of money to
state and local governments, flooding them with more federal money
than they lost in tax revenue.17 The result was state and local
budgets in 2021 were generally in better shape than they were
before the crisis; by 2022, many governments had huge budget
surpluses.
Despite flush budgets, however, the underlying structural
problems of state and local budgets have not been cured in many
places.18 It is possible some state and local budgets will be even
worse off in several years than they were previously, if governments
expand programs or cut taxes now in ways that will be difficult to
reverse when the gusher of federal aid runs out.
The easing of pressure on state budgets, though, provides the
country with some time to consider how it should respond to future
crises, whether they occur in individual jurisdictions or as part of a
national economic crash. This book is an effort to take advantage of
this lull to develop some new ideas about how federal officials and
voters alike should think about the problem of state and local fiscal
stress. The book will also propose some policies that can be enacted
to reduce the costs of such crises, acknowledging that state and
local fiscal crises will inevitably occur in a country with 50 states and
thousands of local governments.
Because a true nationwide state and local governmental default
crisis seemed possible, Congress was forced to wrestle with how to
respond. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic and associated
recession, there was a great deal of public discussion about state
fiscal issues. Ideas like creating a bankruptcy code for state
governments and federal aid to states took turns dominating
headlines.19
But the sides in these public debates often seemed to be talking
past one another. Republicans claimed state fiscal aid amounted to
“blue state bailouts,” despite the fiscal situation being as bad in
many Republican-dominated states as it was in Democratic-
dominated ones.20 Republicans also pooh-poohed the
macroeconomic and social costs of state and local governmental
layoffs, waiting until after November 2020 to allow a vote on a
second large state and local aid package, even though a Republican
president’s re-election chances surely would have been buoyed by a
better economy.21 Democrats argued there would be huge negative
economic and social outcomes if state and local aid was not offered,
and persisted in these claims well after state budgets had recovered
substantially.22 They also claimed that disaster would unfold if states
were given the power to file for bankruptcy, without revealing much
understanding of how sovereign bankruptcy might work in
practice.23
That these debates were unedifying, though, was not the fault of
politicians or journalists. Scholarship and elite discussion around
these issues has not helped them, missing many of the real concerns
created by state and local fiscal distress. Experts have not done a
good job explaining the true stakes of a state or large city default,
nor have we laid out the full set of options available to federal
officials in a crisis of this type.
The goal of this book is to provide a clear theory about the
challenges federal officials face when a state or city nears default
from the perspective of those officials, regardless of their party or
ideology. That is, it will try to explain what federal officials faced with
a state or local fiscal crisis can and cannot do. The goal is to make
federal officials ready when and if such a crisis comes to pass, and,
just as importantly, to provide all of us judging their decisions with
some perspective. Although it will draw on economics, political
science, law, and history, this book will do so in service of providing
a practical guide to understanding the difficult choices that federal
policymakers face in responding to state and local fiscal crises.
Further, looking at the role played by the federal government during
state and local budget crises will provide some lessons about how
we might reform our federal system more broadly.
Fortunately, or unfortunately, there is a lot of historical material to
draw on. Crises much like the one I asked you to imagine above
have happened several times in American history (without the cable
news coverage or Twitter hashtags!). All three branches of the
federal government—the President, Congress, and particularly the
federal courts—have played important roles in developing policy
toward states and cities on the edge of, or after, defaults.
Some of this history is well known. Federal responses to state
fiscal crises generated some of the most famous disputes in
American political history. These include the debate over the
assumption of state debts in Alexander Hamilton’s first financial plan
as Secretary of the Treasury (famously captured by Lin-Manuel
Miranda in “Cabinet Battle #1” in the musical Hamilton) and the fight
over Southern state debts at the end of Reconstruction after 1876.
But other federal responses to state and local debt crises, even
very dramatic ones, are little remembered. President and former
victorious Civil War Union general Ulysses S. Grant threatened to
send federal troops to the stalwart Union state of Iowa in the 1870s
to force small towns to make good on their bonded debt.24 In the
late 19th century, state legislatures effectively disbanded several
major city governments, a practice that became known as “corporate
suicide,” to help them avoid claims by creditors until the Supreme
Court stepped in and stopped the practice. The State of Arkansas
once played a role in global capital markets much like the one
Argentina does today, defaulting on its debts three times between
the 1840s and 1930s.
Other federal responses to local fiscal crises are misremembered.
For instance, in the mid-1970s, the New York Daily News famously
described President Gerald Ford’s position against providing aid to
New York City as “Ford to City: Drop Dead.”25 While the headline
stuck in our collective memory, President Ford supported legislation
that provided federal loans to New York City only a few months after
that headline ran.
While there have been many state and local fiscal crises in
American history, the federal government has not developed a
single, consistent formula for addressing them. What history reveals
is that the federal government does not have any good options when
addressing state and local fiscal crises. As a result, it has cycled
between responses that are bad in different ways.
 When faced with a state or local fiscal crisis, federal officials
generally want to achieve three different things. They want to (1)
avoid the macroeconomic and social harms associated with state and
local spending cuts and tax increases during recessions; (2) avoid
creating an expectation on the part of state and city governments
that they will get bailouts in the future, as they might therefore
refuse to enforce fiscal discipline, what economists call “moral
hazard”; and (3) preserve the ability of states and cities to borrow
money in order to build infrastructure and make other debt-financed
investments.
But the federal government cannot achieve all three of these
things. It can achieve two of them, but not three. That is, it faces a
trilemma.26
Here’s what it can do.
The first option the federal government has is providing money to
deeply indebted states or cities. The federal government can take
advantage of its vast taxing powers, immense borrowing capacity,
and ability to print money to just pay off the creditors of a state or
city. States and cities that receive bailouts do not need to lay off
public workers, cut valuable social programs, or raise taxes, reducing
the harm to the broader economy and service recipients. State and
local bailouts do not require corresponding cuts at the federal level,
because the federal government, unlike states or cities, can easily
run deficits in a recession. Bailouts also encourage state and local
governments to borrow to invest in infrastructure, as lenders will be
comforted by what amounts to a federal guarantee for state debts,
and thus be willing to loan to states and municipalities at lower
rates.
But providing bailouts has an obvious downside: creating moral
hazard among states and localities. State and local officials around
the country may think future debts will be paid for by the federal
government and be reckless going forward. Bond markets may cease
to differentiate between good and bad credit risks, lending to both
responsible and spendthrift governments at similar interest rates, as
investors increasingly believe that the federal government is
providing a backstop for their loans. The easy availability of credit
removes pressure from politicians to budget responsibly. Further,
residents and politicians from other states may resent having their
tax dollars going toward services provided in the state receiving the
bailout.
Political scientist Jonathan Rodden has shown that national
governments around the world rarely provide bailouts to subnational
governments without also imposing severe conditions on their ability
to make fiscal policy choices in the future.27 Otherwise, bailouts lead
to too much moral hazard and/or inter-state conflict. This was borne
out recently. The huge state and local aid package in President Joe
Biden’s American Rescue Plan in 2021 barred states from using
federal funds to cut taxes and put limits on the uses for which the
money could be spent (although these limits were challenged in
court). Repeated bailouts would lead to subnational governments
losing much of their independence as fiscal entities.
Put another way, federalism as we know it is inconsistent with the
regular provision of bailouts to states and cities.
The second option the federal government has is to encourage
states and cities to pay their debts, using political and financial
pressure to overcome subnational jurisdictions’ legal protections
against creditor lawsuits where necessary. If state and local
taxpayers are forced to dig deep to pay their debts, moral hazard
ceases to be a concern. And the municipal bond market would be
strengthened, as lenders would know that they will get paid back
even when times are tough.
But forcing states and cities in a fiscal crisis to pay their debts
without federal aid has negative macroeconomic and social
consequences. States and cities cannot easily run deficits—they can’t
print money and they have state constitutional and market-based
limits on their ability to run deficits or issue debt. The only way a
jurisdiction in fiscal crisis can meet its obligations is to cut important
services, lay off public workers, and increase taxes. As most state
and local fiscal crises occur during recessions, these cuts are
particularly economically painful, destroying jobs and economic
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Papuina 1
Phoenicobius 7
Cochlostyla 247
Amphidromus 2
Hapalus (?) 4
Hypselostoma 1
Pupa 4
Clausilia 1
Subulina 3
Prosopeas 2
Opeas 4
Geostilbia 1
Tornalellina 1
Succinea 3
Vaginula 2
Ancylus 1
Limnaea 3
Planorbis 3
Physa 2
Melania 50
Pirena 2
Bithynia 1
Vivipara 7
Ampullaria 5
Acmella 2
Diplommatina 41
Arinia 6
Pupina 5
Registoma 7
Hargreavesia 1
 Callia 2
Pupinella 3
Helicomorpha 4
Coptochilus 1
Alycaeus 1
Leptopoma 42
Lagochilus 11
Cyclophorus 31
Ditropis 7
Cyathopoma 5
Cyclotus 19
Omphalotropis 3
Helicina 18
Georissa 3
Anodonta 1
Cyrena 3
Corbicula 7
Islands adjacent to the Philippines.—The Philippines are
connected with Borneo by two distinct ridges or banks of elevation,
which enclose between them the Soo-loo or Mindoro Sea. There can
be little doubt that these ridges represent the ancient highway of
transit, by which Indo-Malay species passed into the Philippines. The
depth of the sea on either side is profound, ranging from an average
of about 1000 fathoms west of Palawan to 2550 off the south-west
coast of Mindanao.
It appears that the fauna of the Soo-loo ridge is definitely
Philippine up to and including Bongao, Sibutu, and Bilatan, the last
islands at the Bornean end of the ridge. On these are found two
species of Cochlostyla and an Obbina.
The Palawan ridge may also be described as more or less
Philippine throughout. One species of Cochlostyla occurs on
Balabac, just north of Borneo, and two on Palawan, but these are
perhaps counterbalanced by the definitely Indo-Malay Amphidromus
and Opisthoporus (1 sp. each). At the northern end of the ridge, on
Busuanga and Calamian, the Philippine element predominates.
Representatives of two remarkable groups of Helix (Camaena and
Phoenicobius) occur along the Palawan ridge and in Mindoro. The
Phoenicobius find their nearest allies in the curious small group
known as Obba, from N. Celebes, the Camaena possibly in a type of
Helix (Hadra) occurring in New Guinea and N.E. Australia. The only
other Helix from the whole of the E. Indies which bears any
resemblance to the Phoenicobius group is H. codonodes Pfr., which
is peculiar to the Nicobars. A few forms assigned to Camaena also
occur in Further India and Siam. It would appear possible, therefore,
that these two isolated groups are a sort of survival of a fauna which
perhaps had once a much more extended range.
(2) The Chinese Sub-region.—The Chinese Sub-region includes
the whole of China from its southern frontier up to and including the
basin of the Blue or Yang-tse River, together with the coast district,
including Corea, perhaps as far north as Vladivostok, and the
outlying islands of Hainan, Formosa, the Loo-Choo and Bonin
groups, and Japan to the north of Niphon. It may be divided into two
provinces, the Chinese and the Japanese.
(a) The fauna of the Chinese province proper bears, in many
respects, strong marks of relationship to that of India and Siam. Thus
Streptaxis, Helicarion, Macrochlamys, Kaliella, Sitala, Ariophanta,
Rhysota, Hemiplecta, Diplommatina, Opisthoporus, Pterocyclus,
Lagochilus, and Alycaeus all occur, especially in Southern China.
The two points in which the sub-region bears special marks of
individuality are Helix and Clausilia. The sub-genera of Helix which
have their metropolis in China are Satsuma, Cathaica, Aegista,
Acusta, Euhadra, Plectotropis, and Plectopylis. Sinistral forms
(compare Fig. 213) are rather prevalent. In several cases—e.g.
Trichia, Gonostoma, Fruticicola—there is a reappearance of forms
which appear to belong to well-known European sub-genera.
Clausilia here attains a kind of second centre of distribution, and is
represented by its finest forms, which belong to several peculiar sub-
genera. The carnivorous Mollusca are not abundant, and are
represented by Rathouisia (a peculiar genus of naked slug), Ennea,
and Streptaxis. In the western provinces Buliminus is abundant in
several sub-genera, one of which appears to be the European
Napaeus.
 Fig. 213.—Helix
(Camaena) cicatricosa
Müll., China.
There is little which is striking in the operculates, which are most
abundant in the south, and appear to be mainly derived from Indian
and Siamese sources. The occurrence of Helicina (3 sp.),
Omphalotropis (1), Leptopoma (2), and Realia (2), is evidence of
some influence from the far East. Heudeia is a very remarkable and
quite peculiar form of Helicina with internal plicae, perhaps akin to
the Central American Ceres.
Fresh-water genera are exceedingly abundant, especially
Melania, Unio, and Anodonta. The occurrence of Mycetopus (a
South-American genus) is remarkable. There are several peculiar
forms of fresh-water operculates, whose exact position is hardly yet
assured.
Land and Fresh-water Mollusca of the Chinese Province
Rathouisia 1
Streptaxis 7
Ennea 12
Parmarion 2
Helicarion 15
Euplecta 3
Macrochlamys 19
Microcystina 2
Microcystis 7
Kaliella 16
Sitala 8
Ariophanta 1
Rhysota 5
Hemiplecta 1
Trochomorpha 2
Limax 1
Philomycus 1
Patula 2
Gonostoma 4
Metodontia 2
Vallonia 1
Plectotropis 9
Fruticicola 11
Satsuma 14
Trichia 10
Cathaica 22
Aegista 10
Armandia 3
Acusta 15
Obbina 1
Camaena 5
Euhadra 14
Plectopylis 19
Stegodera 6
Chloritis 1
Hel. Inc. sed. 39
Buliminus 21
Buliminopsis 3
Buliminidius 3
Napaeus 14
Rachis (?) 4
Pupa 10
Clausilia 102
Opeas 12
Euspiraxis 1
Subulina 5
Stenogyra (?) 12
Succinea 8
Vaginula 7
Limnaea 2
Planorbis 6
Melania 44
Paludomus 3
Bithynia 12
Lithoglyphus 3
Melantho (?) 1
Pachydrobia 1
Prososthenia 2
 Stenothyra 2
Hydrobia 2
Mecongia 1
Oncomelania 9
Margaracya 1
Rivularia 4
Delavaya 1
Fenouillia 1
Vivipara 34
Diplommatina 20
Pupina 6
Alycaeus 23
Leptopoma 2
Lagochilus 10
Cyclophorus 18
Coelopoma 1
Pterocyclus 3
Opisthoporus 4
Cyclotus 10
Scabrina 4
Ptychopoma 12
Omphalotropis 1
Realia 2
Pseudopomatias 1
Helicina 3
Georissa 4
Heudeia 1
Cyclas 1
Corbicula 50
Unio 53
Monocondylaea 1
Anodonta 55
Mycetopus 12
Pseudodon 1
Dipsas 4

The island of Hainan, in the extreme south of the sub-region, has

40 species of Mollusca, 22 of which are peculiar, but there is no
peculiar genus.
The Mollusca of Formosa, although in many cases specifically
distinct, show close generic relationship with those of China. The
characteristic Chinese groups of Helix and Clausilia occur, and there
is still a considerable Indian element in several species of Streptaxis,
Macrochlamys, Kaliella, and Alycaeus. The occurrence of two
Amphidromus, a genus which, though Siamese, is not found in
China or Hainan, is remarkable.
The peninsula of Corea must undoubtedly be included in the
Chinese sub-region. It is true that the land operculates scarcely
occur, but there are still a number of Clausilia, and several of the
characteristic Chinese groups of Helix are reproduced. In some
points Corea appears to show more affinity to Japan than to China,
four of the Helices being specifically identical with those of Japan,
but the peninsula is at present too little explored for any
generalisations to be made as to its fauna in this respect.
(b) Japanese Province.—Kobelt distinguishes four groups of
Mollusca inhabiting Japan (a) circumpolar species, actually occurring
in Europe, Siberia, or N. America, or represented by nearly allied
species (these of course do not belong to the Japanese province as
such); (b) Indo-tropical species; (c) species which are Chinese or
akin to Chinese; (d) peculiar species, a mixture of two forms,
southern and northern, the latter being chiefly Hyalinia, Patula, and
Fruticicola. Out of a total of 193 Japanese species, at least 164 are
peculiar.
The Japanese Helices belong to sub-genera common to China
(Plectotropis 8, Euhadra 21, Acusta 23?); but the Naninidae scarcely
occur at all. The principal feature of the fauna is the development of
Clausilia, which presents some extraordinarily fine forms. One slug
(Philomycus) is identical with an Indian species. The operculates,
which consist mainly of a few species each of Diplommatina,
Cyclophorus, Pupinella, Pupina, Helicina, and Georissa, belong
almost exclusively to the southern islands Kiu-siu, Sikoku, and
southern Niphon. The three species usually reckoned as Japonia are
probably forms of Lagochilus.

C. The Australasian Region

This region includes all the islands of the Pacific east of the
Moluccas, and falls into three sub-regions—the Papuan, the
Australian, and the Polynesian.
1. The Papuan Sub-region may be divided into—(a) the Papuan
Province proper, which includes New Guinea, with the Aru Is. and
Waigiou, the Admiralty Is., New Ireland, New Britain, and the
d’Entrecasteaux and Louisiade Groups; (b) the Queensland
Province, or the strip of N.E. Australia from C. York to the Clarence
R. (about 29° S. lat.); (c) the Melanesian Province, which includes
the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, with the Loyalty Is. and the Viti
Is. The Solomons form a transition district between the Papuan and
Melanesian provinces, abounding on the one hand in characteristic
Papuan Helices, while on the other they form the north-western limit
of Placostylus, the group especially characteristic of the Melanesian
province.
(a) The Papuan Province.—The molluscan fauna of New Guinea
is the richest and by far the most original of all the Australasian
region. We find ourselves, almost in a moment, in a district full of
new and peculiar forms. New Guinea may be regarded as the
metropolis of the rich Helicidan fauna, which is also characteristic of
the Moluccas to the west, of N. and N.E. Australia to the south and
south-east, and of the Solomons and other groups to the north-east.
Here abound species of Papuina and Insularia (the latter being quite
peculiar), among which are found, if not the largest, certainly the
most finished forms of all existing Helices. Chloritis (13 sp.),
Planispira (5), and Cristigibba (9) are common with the Moluccas,
while a tropical Australian element is shown in Pedinogyra (1) and
Hadra (4). Very remarkable, too, is the occurrence of one species of
Obbina and Rhysota, genera which culminate in the Philippines and
here find their most eastward extension; while a single Corasia
serves to form a link between the Corasia of the Philippines and
those of the Solomon Is., if the latter are true Corasia.
We naturally find considerable traces of a Polynesian element,
which appears to be principally characteristic of the eastern part of
the island. Most noteworthy in this respect is the occurrence of
Partula (3), Tornatellina (1), Charopa (1), Thalassia (3). As compared
with the true Pulmonata, the operculates are feebly represented, and
the great majority are of a markedly Polynesian type. Not a single
Cyclophorus occurs; Lagochilus, Alycaeus, and all the tubed
operculates, so marked a feature of the Indo-Malay fauna, are
conspicuous by their absence, and the prevailing genera are
Cyclotus, Helicina, and a number of sections of Pupina. Leptopoma,
as in the Philippines, is strongly represented. Not that an Indo-Malay
element is altogether absent. We still have Xesta (5), Hemiplecta (8),
and even Sitala (2), but the great predominance of Helix seems to
have barred the progress, for the greater part, of the Indian
Naninidae.
The slugs appear to be represented by a solitary Vaginula. A
single Perrieria is a very marked feature of union with Queensland,
where the only other existing species (P. australis) occurs. The
solitary Rhytida, so far the only representative of the carnivorous
group of snails, emphasises this union still further. Little is known of
the fresh-water fauna. Melania (28 sp.) is predominant, but on the
whole the relations are Australian rather than Indo-Malay. Ampullaria
is wanting, while a decisive point of similarity is the occurrence of
Isidora (3 sp.), a genus entirely strange to the Oriental region, but
markedly characteristic of the Australasian.
Land and Fresh-water Mollusca of New Guinea
Rhytida 1
Helicarion 2
Rhysota 1
Hemiplecta 11
Xesta 2
Microcystis 3
Microcystina 2
Sitala 2
Oxytes (?) 2
Conulus 1
Trochomorpha 8
Nanina (?) 3
Charopa 1
Thalassia 3
Ochthephila(?) 1
Chloritis 13
Planispira 5
Cristigibba 9
 Insularia 17
Obbina 1
Albersia 3
Hadra 4
Pedinogyra 1
Papuina 35
Corasia (?) 1
Bulimus (?) 1
Calycia 4
Partula 3
Pupa 1
Stenogyra 1
Tornatellina 1
Perrieria 1
Succinea 1
Vaginula 1
Limnaea 2
Isidora 3
Melania 28
Faunus 1
Vivipara 4
Diplommatina 1
Pupina 4
Pupinella 3
Omphalotropis 2
Bellardiella 2
Leptopoma 16
Cyclotus 5
Cyclotropis 5
Helicina 15
Unio 4
Cyrena 3
Corbicula 1
Batissa 8
Waigiou is practically a part of New Guinea. Twelve genera and
twenty species of Mollusca are known, eight of the latter being
peculiar. The occurrence of Papuina, Insularia, and Calycia
sufficiently attest its Papuan relationship. Two species each of
Albersia, Chloritis, and Planispira occur.[372]
 The Aru Is. are, as we should expect from their position, and
particularly from the configuration of the adjacent sea bottom (see
map), markedly Papuan. At the same time they show unmistakable
signs of long-continued separation from the parent island, for of their
36 land Mollusca 15, and of their 20 fresh-water Mollusca 9 are
peculiar. The Papuan element consists in the presence of Papuina,
Albersia, and Cristigibba. Moluccan influence is not absent, for the
three Helicina, the Albersia, and one Cyclotus are all Moluccan
species. The fresh-water fauna appears to be a mixture of varied
elements. The single Segmentina is common to India, the
Glaucomya to Malacca and the Philippines, while the single Batissa
is also found in New Zealand.
Land and Fresh-water Mollusca of the Aru Islands
Xesta 4
Microcystis 1
Hyalinia(?) 1
Trochomorpha 1
Patula 1
Eulota 1
Chloritis 5
Cristigibba 2
Albersia 1
Papuina 4
Pupa 2
Stenogyra 2
Planorbis 1
Segmentina 1
Melania 14
Leptopoma 3
Moussonia 1
Realia 1
Cyclotus 3
Helicina 3
Cyrena 2
Glaucomya 1
Batissa 1
The Louisiades, the d’Entrecasteaux, and Trobriand Is., and
Woodlark I., are closely related to New Guinea, containing no
peculiar genera. Each group, however, contains a considerable
proportion of peculiar species, an indication that their separation
from New Guinea dates from a very distant period. From the
Louisiades are known 34 species in all, 22 of which are peculiar.
The fauna of the Admiralty Is., of New Hanover, and New Ireland
is markedly Papuan, without any especial feature of distinction. The
Admiralty Is. contain 15 sp. Papuina, 7 Chloritis, 1 Planispira, and 1
Corasia. A single Janella shows relationship with the New Hebrides
and with New Zealand. In New Ireland Planispira (which is specially
characteristic of W. New Guinea and the Moluccas) has
disappeared, but there are 7 Papuina and 6 Chloritis. The essentially
Polynesian Partula is present in both groups.
The prominent feature of the Mollusca of the Solomon Is. is the
extraordinary development of Papuina, which here culminates in a
profusion of species and singularity of form. The genus is arboreal,
crawling on the branches and attaching itself to the leaves of trees
and underwood. Of the 140 land Pulmonata known from the group,
no less than 50, or 36 per cent, are Papuina. Ten species of Corasia
occur, but whether the shells so identified are generically identical
with those of the Philippines, is not satisfactorily determined.
Trochomorpha, with 22 species, here attains its maximum. Chloritis
begins to fail, but still has 3 species. Indo-Malay influence still
appears, though feebly, in Hemiplecta (3), Xesta (1), and possibly
even Macrochlamys (1). The Rhytida, the 3 Hadra, and possibly the
Paryphanta represent the Australian element. The growing numbers
of Partula (13), the small and inconspicuous land operculates (only
22 in all, with Helicina very prominent), and the almost complete
absence of fresh-water bivalves, show signs of strong Polynesian
affinities. An especial link with the New Hebrides, New Caledonia,
and the Viti Is. is the occurrence of Placostylus (16 sp.). It is very
remarkable that this genus should occur in the Solomon Is. and not
in New Ireland. The occurrence of Streptaxis, if authentic, is very
noteworthy, the nearest species being from the Philippines.
Land and Fresh-water Mollusca of the Solomon Islands
Streptaxis (?) 1
Rhytida 1
Paryphanta (?) 1
 Helicarion 2
Xesta 1
Macrochlamys 1
Hemiplecta 3
Microcystis 2
Trochomorpha 22
Nanina (?) 2
Patula 1
Thalassia 2
Chloritis 3
Philina 2
Hadra 3
Papuina 50
Merope 1
Corasia (?) 10
Placostylus 16
Partula 13
Succinea 1
Melania 18
Diplommatina 2
Pupina 4
Leptopoma 4
Omphalotropis 2
Cyclotus 1
Cyclotropis 2
Helicina 7
Unio 1

(b) The Queensland Province.—The strip of coast-line from Cape

York to the Clarence R. stands apart from the rest of Australia, and is
closely connected with New Guinea. There can be little doubt that it
has been colonised from the latter country, since an elevation of
even 10 fathoms would create (see map) a wide bridge between the
two. Many of the genera are quite strange to the rest of Australia.
Land operculates are abundant, and of a Papuan type. Several of
the characteristic Papuan genera of Helix (Papuina, Chloritis,
Planispira) occur, while Hadra attains its maximum. Panda,
Pedinogyra, and Thersites are three remarkable groups in a rich
Helix fauna. Parmacochlea is a peculiar form akin to Helicarion. The
carnivorous Mollusca are represented by Rhytida, Diplomphalus
(New Caledonia), and Elaea. One species of Janella, a slug peculiar
to this region, occurs. The predominant fresh-water genus is Bulinus
(Isidora). Ampullaria and Anodonta are entirely absent from Australia
and New Zealand.
Fig. 214.—Characteristic
Australian Helices: A, H.
(Hadra) pomum Pfr.; B, H.
(Thersites) richmondiana Pfr.
× ⅔.
 Map D. To face page 322.
MAP
to illustrate the relations
OF THE LAND MOLLUSCA OF
NEW GUINEA WITH THOSE
OF NORTH AUSTRALIA.
The red line marks the 100 fathom line
London: Macmillan & Co.

Land Mollusca of the Queensland Province

Diplomphalus 1
Rhytida 10
Elaea 1
Parmacochlea 1
Helicarion 7
Nanina 3
Hyalinia 10
Thalassia 4
Charopa 5
 Patula (?) 4
Macrocyclis (?) 1
Helicella 10
Planispira 8
Hadra 51
Chloritis 5
Pedinogyra 1
Thersites 1
Papuina 6
Panda 2
Helix (inc. sed.) 6
Bulimus (?) 1
Stenogyra 1
Tornatellina 4
Pupa 3
Vertigo 4
Perrieria 1
Succinea 3
Vaginula 1
Janella 1
Georissa 1
Pupina 16
Hedleya 1
Callia 1
Diplommatina 3
Ditropis 2
Dermatocera 1
Helicina 8

(c) The Melanesian Province includes those islands on which the

remarkable group Placostylus occurs, the metropolis of whose
distribution is New Caledonia. These islands are very possibly the
remains of what was once a much wider extent of land. A single
species of Placostylus occurs both on Lord Howe’s I. and in the
North I. of New Zealand, but this fact, while highly interesting as
indicating a possible former extension of land in a south-easterly
direction, is hardly sufficient to bring these islands within the
province as now limited. The Solomon Is., although containing
Placostylus as far to the west as Faro I., form, as has been already
stated, a transitional district to the Papuan province.
 New Caledonia.—The chief features of the Mollusca are the
remarkable development of the helicoid carnivorous genera Rhytida
(30 sp.) and Diplomphalus (13 sp.), and of Placostylus (45 sp.).
There is a stray Papuina, and a peculiar form Pseudopartula, but
Helix has almost entirely disappeared. Polynesian influence is
represented by Microcystis (3 sp.), the so-called Patula (13 sp.,
many of which are probably Charopa), Tornatellina (2 sp.), and
Helicina (20 sp.). Partula does not reach so far south, but there are
two species of Janella. The recurrence of Melanopsis (19 sp.),
absent from the whole Oriental region, is curious, and forms another
link with New Zealand. The curious sinistral Limnaea (Isidora),
common with Australia and New Zealand, is abundant.

Fig. 215.—Placostylus
caledonicus Pet., New
Caledonia, × ⅔.
The New Hebrides link New Caledonia and the Solomons by their
possession of the typical heavy Placostylus (5 sp.) of the former, and
the lighter and more elegant Charis (2 sp.) of the latter. There are 4
Papuina, and Partula is abundant (18 sp.), but there is no evidence
at present that the carnivorous genera or the Melanopsis and Isidora
of New Caledonia occur.
The Fiji Is., by the possession of 14 Placostylus of the Charis
section, which is entirely absent from the adjacent Tonga group, form
the eastern limit of the province. There appears to be only a single
Partula, but the Polynesian element, especially as seen in Navicella
(8 sp.), Neritina (20 sp.), Helicina (11 sp.), and Omphalotropis (11
sp.), is very strong. The Microcystis (9 sp.) and Trochomorpha (14
sp.) are also of a Polynesian type.
 (2) The Australian Sub-region includes the whole of Australia
(with the exception of the Queensland province) and Tasmania, with
New Zealand and the off-lying islands. The fauna, from the
prevalence of desert, is scanty, especially in genera. Land
operculates are almost entirely wanting. Limax is not indigenous,
though several species have become naturalised. The bulk of the
fresh-water species belong to Isidora, and it is doubtful whether
Physa occurs at all. Unio has a few species, and also Vivipara, but
neither Anodonta nor Ampullaria occur. There are a few Melania and
Neritina.
Tropical South Australia.—The Mollusca are scanty, and occur
chiefly in the neighbourhood of the rivers, the soil being arid, with no
shelter either of trees or rocks. Fresh-water species predominate,
and the rich land fauna of Queensland is totally wanting. There are
no land operculates, 6 Hadra, 1 Bulimus (?), 1 Stenogyra.
West Australia.—Owing to the deserts which bound it, the
Mollusca are very isolated, only one species being common with N.,
S., and E. Australia. The chief characteristics are Liparus, a form
intermediate between Helix and Bulimus, and, among the Helices,
the group Rhagada. There are no slugs, no carnivorous snails, and
only three land operculates.
Land Mollusca of West Australia
Lamprocystis 1
Hyalinia 1
Patula 7
Chloritis 2
Gonostoma 2
Trachia 3
Xerophila 1
Rhagada 8
Hadra 5
Liparus 10
Pupa 4
Succinea 3
Cyclophorus 2
Helicina 1
 In Eastern and Southern Australia (New South Wales, Victoria,
and South Australia) the tropical element, so abundant in
Queensland, almost entirely disappears, the last operculate (a
Helicina) only reaching Port Macquarie, though several species of
Helicarion occur in the extreme south. Hadra is still abundant in New
South Wales (18 sp.) and S. Australia (10 sp.), but becomes scarce
in Victoria (2 sp.); New South Wales has also one Panda and two
Thersites. Cystopelta is common with Tasmania, and one of the
Janellidae (Aneitea) with Queensland. The carnivorous snails are
represented by Rhytida. Caryodes, a bulimoid group perhaps akin to
Liparus, is common with Tasmania only.
Tasmania.—About 80 species of land Mollusca are known, not
more than 10 being common with Australia. No land operculates
occur; Endodonta and Charopa are rare, and Hadra has entirely
disappeared, but Pupa and Succinea occur. Carnivorous genera are
represented by Paryphanta, Rhytida, and Rhenea. Anoglypta is a
peculiar section of Helix, while Caryodes, Cystopelta, and Helicarion
are common with Australia. Among the fresh-water Mollusca are a
Gundlachia (see p. 345), and some forms of Amnicola or Hydrobia,
one of which (Potamopyrgus) is common only with New Zealand.
[373]

The Neozealanian Province.—The Mollusca of New Zealand, with

the Kermadec, Chatham, and Auckland Is., are remarkably isolated.
Such genera as Nanina, Partula, Pupa, Stenogyra, Succinea,
Vaginula, Truncatella, Helicina, and Navicella, which might have
been expected to occur, are entirely absent. The bulk of the land
Mollusca are small and obscure forms, perhaps remains of a very
early type, and appear to belong to the Zonitidae, neither Patula nor
Helix occurring at all. The carnivorous forms are represented by
Schizoglossa, a peculiar genus akin to Daudebardia, by Paryphanta,
an extraordinary group of large shells with a thick leathery epidermis,
and by Rhytida and Rhenea. In spite of its extreme isolation, the
general relations of the fauna are partly with New Caledonia, partly
with E. Australia. The occurrence of Placostylus has already been
mentioned (p. 323), and three species of Janella, a genus which also
occurs in Queensland and New Caledonia, indicate the same affinity.