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MEGA EVENT PLANNING
SERIES EDITOR: EVA KASSENS-NOOR
Series Editor
Eva Kassens-Noor
Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI, USA
The Mega Event Planning Pivot series will provide a global and cross-
disciplinary view into the planning for the world’s largest sporting,
religious, cultural, and other transformative mega events. Examples
include the Olympic Games, Soccer World Cups, Rugby championships,
the Commonwealth Games, the Hajj, the World Youth Day, World
Expositions, and parades. This series will critically discuss, analyze, and
challenge the planning for these events in light of their legacies including
the built environment, political structures, socio-economic systems, societal
values, personal attitudes, and cultures.
Contesting the
Olympics in American
Cities
Chicago 2016, Boston 2024, Los Angeles 2028
Greg Andranovich Matthew J. Burbank
Department of Political Science Department of Political Science
California State University University of Utah
Los Angeles, CA, USA Salt Lake City, UT, USA
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect
to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.
The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
Praise for Contesting the Olympics in American
Cities
“Arguably we are at a tipping point in the history of the Olympics and Contesting
the Olympics in American Cities makes a major contribution to debates about the
future of the Games and other sports mega-events. Written by renowned experts
in the field of the urban politics of mega-events, this will become a standard refer-
ence point for students, teachers, researchers and anyone interested in the recent
past and future development of the Olympics.”
—Professor John Horne PhD, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
Contents
vii
viii Contents
Index111
About the Authors
ix
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Sport reveals choices in communities. In the period 2013–2018, 14
European and North American cities withdrew from potential bids to host
the Olympic games. The Covid-19 pandemic resulted in the
took control of and then tinkered with the distribution of sponsorship and
television broadcast revenues. However, in a number of cities Olympic
bidding and hosting led to unfavorable urban outcomes such as over-
spending, expensive and underutilized “white elephant” facilities, and
outright corruption in the bidding process. Increasingly during this
period, the Olympics were seen as being too large in scale and overly com-
mercial indicating the existence of contradictions between Olympic rheto-
ric and urban reality. After 2000, it was becoming evident that there was a
shift in relations between cities and the Olympic games characterized by
increased transnational mobilities (Cashman and Harris 2012; Salazar
et al. 2017). Olympic bids saw new stakeholders representing transna-
tional development interests (Surborg et al. 2008), including the IOC
itself (Kassens-Noor 2012). This shift suggests that the policy path of
uneven urban economic development catalyzed by the Olympics distorts
and disempowers local and national interests (Heying et al. 2007).
Although the IOC has responded to the issues raised in bidding for and
hosting the Olympics, it has done so at the margins with the purpose of
“brand protection” as a guarantor of urban growth. In the process, the
IOC has given anti-Olympics community organizers a number of very real
issues around which they can mobilize and contest the games (Hippke and
Kreiger 2015; Müller 2015a; also see MacAloon 2008).
The costs of hosting the Olympics dwarf city budgets and the amounts
spent to provide programs to city residents. In addition, the Olympic
games are marked in the public eye as much by the cost overruns and the
lack of financial transparency as they are for the athletic competition. The
changing perception of the Olympics indicates both the growing power
and the weakness of the IOC in local urban economic development policy
making and planning (Davis and Groves 2019; Kassens-Noor 2012,
2015). Flyvbjerg et al. (2016) examined local Olympic organizing com-
mittee operating and direct capital costs, or all sports-related costs for
hosting the Olympics, at two points in time (the bid budget and the final
costs) for all Olympics between 1960 and 2016. For those games where
cost data were available (data could not be obtained for 11 out of 30
games), each of the Olympic games seemed to be an outlier when seeking
a pattern among the cities (Flyvbjerg et al. 2020). The $50 billion spent
to put on the Sochi 2014 Olympic winter games—this figure includes all
costs with sports-related costs pegged at $21.9 billion (Flyvbjerg et al.
2016, 9)—blew the lid off the notion that spending could be contained or
that gigantism was being tamed by the IOC (Müller 2015b). The excess
1 CITIES AND THE OLYMPICS IN URBAN POLITICS 5
of the Sochi games underscored the gap between the rhetoric coming out
of the IOC and the reality on the ground in the Olympic host city selec-
tion process.
The IOC processes are codified in the Olympic Charter, which serves
as the “constitution” for international sports. The charter spells out the
principles, rules, and bylaws that guide and regulate the Olympic
Movement and it is organized around the constituent parts—the IOC,
national Olympic committees (NOCs), international sports federations,
and the Olympic games (for more detailed analysis, see Chappelet and
Kubler 2008; Duval 2018). The philosophy of Olympism provides the
moral foundation for the document, and its seven aspirational principles
begin: “Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a bal-
anced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with
culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the
joy of effort, the educational value of good example, social responsibility
and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles” (IOC 2020, 11).
In addition, the IOC has recognized certain issues—sustainability, legacy,
and non-discrimination—that are larger than the sporting event and these
represent a nod toward the human development foundational values of
Olympism (Hayes and Karamichas 2012). The regulations contained in
the remainder of the Olympic Charter recognize the proprietary and
financial stakes in global sport and range from establishing the composi-
tion of the IOC and the bidding process, to laying out what the opening
ceremonies do, who the athletes are, what they can wear, and governing
their conduct during the Olympic games (IOC 2020). It is important to
note that the charter does get revised regularly, often in response to an
issue or issues that cropped up in a locality or in more than one city orga-
nizing the Olympic games. In the early 1990s for example, the environ-
ment (or rather, environmental degradation) became a focus for organizing
the Olympic games and the idea of sustainable development was enshrined
in the charter in 1996 and post-games legacy concerns made it into the
charter in 2007 (Andranovich and Burbank 2011, 827). Both of these
appear under Rule 33 (2.5), “Election of the host of the Olympic games”
and Rule 34, “Locations, sites, and venues” (IOC 2020, 72). London
2012 was the first Olympic games to be under the IOC’s new legacy
requirements, and it is in the period following the 2012 summer games
that anti-Olympics opposition and resistance has gained traction.
Chappelet (2016, 750) describes what the IOC does today as “network
governance of a complex system,” pointing to the sheer scope and scale of
6 G. ANDRANOVICH AND M. J. BURBANK
global sports (also see Müller 2014). While it might appear that the IOC
is a central authority, the Olympic Charter institutionalizes a fragmented
hyper-relational set of activities and events under the guidance of the
IOC. Reading the language used in the Olympic Charter’s Rule 33, which
covers host city selection, suggests the close attention, through the IOC
Executive Board or intermediaries, over the Olympics (IOC 2020, 70–72).
Behind these rules and regulations is an infrastructure of activities that aim
to keep the Olympics at the center of global sport, and for this center to
be negotiated as a “functional and financial system” (Chappelet 2016,
749). These rules belie the turbulent and changing environment of global
sport, which is addressed through ongoing scrutiny and assessment, and
corresponding administrative and managerial shifts (MacAloon 2008).
The IOC’s extensive changes to the bidding process reflect this dynamic
operating environment, and a long standing dispute between the IOC, the
United States Olympic Committee (USOC; the USOC renamed itself the
US Olympic & Paralympic Committee in 2019), and the other 200-plus
NOCs over the allocation of sponsorship and television revenues under-
scored the role of politics in the host city selection process. More specifi-
cally, as the Olympics became more transnational this also affected a
dispute over the share of revenue from global sponsorships and USA tele-
vision broadcast revenues. The dispute pitted the USOC against the other
NOCs in an environment of economic globalization where the value of
national boundaries was diminishing in importance and IOC tinkering
with its share aggravated this dispute and weakened USA bids to host the
games (Barney et al. 2004; Elcombe and Wenn 2011). After an agreement
to resolve the dispute was reached, the USOC sent a letter to 35 mayors
in February 2013 seeking confirmation of interest for bidding for the
2024 summer games. That letter described what it takes to be an Olympic
host city (Livingstone 2013):
The USOC letter identifies the key linkages that drive the Olympic dreams
of urban leaders and make the mega-event strategy an appealing policy
choice for local leaders embracing consumption-oriented economic devel-
opment: “unparalleled opportunity to grow,” “transformative impact,”
“creation and implementation of a new vision,” and “rallying point for
progress” provide catch phrases worthy of any aspiring urban leader. When
cities bid for the Olympics the period of hosting the games is not the only
time a global sports space comes into play; the overlays of the Olympic
City development requirements exacerbate tensions in urban develop-
ment, providing new opportunities to challenge political power and
consumption-oriented development strategies. In this instance, the con-
trasting intentions between this letter and the IOC’s shift toward adopting
Agenda 2020 resulted in an opening between policy and practice. As the
year 2013 ended the IOC was queuing bids for 2024, the USOC was
conducting informal visits to Boston, Dallas, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and Washington, DC as it moved toward the decision to field an American
city in the competition for the 2024 Olympic summer games (Mackay 2013).
The IOC’s Olympic Agenda 2020 reforms were discussed as a way of
combating commercialization, costs, and size of hosting the games. These
reforms were adopted in December 2014 ostensibly to give cities more
opportunities to learn about the Olympic bidding process and to allow
more interaction with the IOC before formally entering into a bid (IOC
2015; also see Horne and Whannel 2020, pp. 187–192). The Agenda
2020 process split bidding into two stages: the invitation process and the
8 G. ANDRANOVICH AND M. J. BURBANK
dialogue between the IOC and future Candidate Cities to establish a strong
basis for the next stages. The IOC provides a range of services to NOCs and
cities interested in bidding. Potential Candidate Cities are invited … [to
meet with the IOC] and receive various levels of assistance and feedback
ahead of officially submitting a candidature. This includes the sharing of
best practices, provision of materials and a focus on understanding the
Games to put together a solid project that best meets the city’s long-term
development needs. Encouragement of legacy and sustainability begins
right from the outset of the Invitation Phase to ensure the Games act as a
catalyst for positive development of tangible and intangible legacies for the
city and region. At the end of the invitation phase, NOCs and cities are
invited to commit to the candidature process and a city becomes an official
Candidate City. (IOC 2019)
The candidate city process is more formal and expected to last for two
years. The IOC presented the candidate city process as occurring in three
stages: first, developing a vision and “games concept;” second, designing
the financial and governance structure for the games while learning from
other cities as part of the Olympic observer program; and third, providing
a plan to deliver the games and “ensure a sustainable legacy” for the games
in the host city or region. The IOC established an Evaluation Commission
to review the materials submitted by the cities at each stage and conduct a
formal visit of the city during the third stage.
The Agenda 2020 reforms were intended to encourage more cities to
bid and to improve the quality of those bids. This system, however,
depended on having a sizeable number of cities interested in holding the
games and be willing to compete over many years to get them. During the
decade following the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, it became clear
that cities were less willing to meet the increasingly difficult demands of
the IOC and the various Olympic sports federations with respect to finan-
cial guarantees, venue quality, and public support for the games. During
this period a number of cities including Berlin, Boston, Budapest, Calgary,
Hamburg, Rome, and Toronto publicly considered bidding for the games
but withdrew from the process, in some cases after residents had voted
against bidding for the games (Maennig 2017). Of these, Boston,
Budapest, Hamburg, and Rome were in the 2024 bidding cycle. The
problems of not having enough cities to provide competition and in losing
1 CITIES AND THE OLYMPICS IN URBAN POLITICS 9
high-value contenders resulted in the bids for the 2022 winter games
being a competition between Almaty and Beijing. Although Beijing was
selected, the lack of competition led to another set of changes in the IOC
bidding process and to the rolling out of the New Norm, or the IOC’s
ideas for holding down the costs of hosting (Murray 2018).
In June 2019, shortly after the IOC awarded Milan-Cortina the 2026
winter games, the IOC announced additional changes to the Olympic bid-
ding process. The new changes included eliminating the requirement that
sites be selected seven years in advance of the games. Dropping the seven-
year requirement allowed the IOC greater flexibility in striking deals with
cities for future games as the IOC did when it made the deal for 2024 and
2028 simultaneously, announcing Paris as the 2024 and Los Angeles as
the 2028 host cities. Awarding both the 2024 and 2028 Olympics gave
the IOC time to continue assessing the Olympics business model (Kassens-
Noor 2020). In addition, the new process replaced the old Evaluation
Commission with two new Future Host Commissions, one each for the
summer and winter games. These commissions have eight to ten members
and will recommend cities or joint-city bids to the IOC Executive Board.
Under the new process, the board may simply be asked to approve a host
city without other candidate cities to choose from. The new process may
also encourage evidence of popular support for the games in the form of a
referendum; however, the IOC Executive Board will decide this before a
bid is recommended. The goal of these changes is to create a more flexible
means for the IOC to cultivate and select cities through negotiations
rather than through a rigid, multi-year, and competitive bid process where,
as in the 2024 competition, Budapest, Hamburg, and Rome dropped out
leaving only Paris and LA. “‘It can come to a point where there is only one
candidate being proposed,’ IOC President Thomas Bach said at a news
conference. It chimes with Bach’s wish to avoid ‘too many losers’—a
phrase first heard during the 2024 race…The new panels will be empow-
ered to have ‘permanent ongoing dialogue’ with potential bidders and
pro-actively approach preferred hosts. They will report first to the Bach-
chaired Executive Board, which will pick the members” (Dunbar 2019).
As economist and Olympics critic Andrew Zimbalist put it: “The largest
prize in global sports—the right to host the Olympics—will soon be won
in private negotiations with the International Olympic Committee’s inner
circle instead of unpredictable membership votes....Negotiations also will
give host cities more power to dictate terms. Gone are the days when the
IOC had the market clout to simply issue terms on a take-it-or-leave-it
10 G. ANDRANOVICH AND M. J. BURBANK
basis” (quoted in Fischer 2019). While these rules changes seem to ema-
nate from a less-strident IOC and appear to establish a veneer of local
self-determination, early evidence points to the IOC’s self-preservation via
Agenda 2020, through its newfound willingness to provide some latitude
in negotiating host city contracts, and then allowing these to be
made public.
Furthermore, in its assessment in 2017, the IOC did not note any spe-
cific changes for directly engaging with the general public. But, an
Olympism in Action Forum was initiated during the Summer Youth
Games in Buenos Aires in October 2018. This first forum was mostly a
public relations exercise, although Chris Dempsey of No Boston Olympics
was included as a panelist for “Hosting the Olympic games: City perspec-
tives.” His comments did not appear to be taken seriously by the modera-
tor and IOC President Bach was dismissive afterward. The IOC considered
making this forum a quadrennial event starting in 2023 (Morgan 2019).
This limited effort at engaging with “the public” shows that the IOC still
is unsure about what “public” means. Clearly, as Chappelet (2016) notes,
the IOC sees its local stakeholders in the abstract. Thus, while the matrix
of who is involved in decisions regarding the Olympic games is growing,
it has not yet reached cities that host the Olympics. In some countries,
notably the United States and Italy in 2020, national legislatures were
examining their NOCs and taking steps to potentially thrust themselves
into Olympic decision making (a fear of the IOC which also played into
the revenue sharing dispute; see Elcombe and Wenn 2011).
Finally, although there is no formal requirement for any public opinion
polling in host city candidatures set in the Olympic Charter, its practice
has been recurrent in the IOC host city selection process. Jennings (2012,
216) notes that demands for transparency and accountability, whether in
government or private business, are the bedrock for establishing legiti-
macy. Examining voting patterns in candidate cities, however, suggested
to Jennings that evidence of national, regional, and local support is not a
major factor in the IOC’s assessment of a city’s candidature and instead
might be a form of risk assessment. Hiller and Wanner (2018) note that
how a city’s residents respond to hosting the Olympics should not be lim-
ited to the bid decision because the seven-year long organizing period to
host the games has important consequences for how people’s lives are
affected by the Olympics. Their review of surveys of host city residents
provides a provocative glimpse at differences across host cities. One exam-
ple is a survey that included both emotional and infrastructural legacy
1 CITIES AND THE OLYMPICS IN URBAN POLITICS 11
1. R u d e r f ü s s e r oder S p a l t f ü s s e r (C o p e p o d e n ), Hüpferlinge,
2. K i e m e n f ü s s e r (B r a n c h i o p o d e n ), Wasserflöhe,
3. M u s c h e l k r e b s e (O s t r a k o d e n ).
Zu der zweiten:
1. F l o h k r e b s e (A m p h i p o d e n ),
2. W a s s e r a s s e l n (I s o p o d e n ),
3. S c h e r e n k r e b s e (D e k a p o d e n ), Flusskrebs.
Wir wenden uns zuerst den Gliedern der ersten Abteilung, den
Entomostraken,
zu, da sie in ihrem Bau einfacher angelegt und leichter zu übersehen
sind, als die „höheren Krebse“.
Es fällt schwer, nur einige gemeinsame Kennzeichen für alle
hierher gehörigen Tiere nachzuweisen; denn nicht einmal immer
kann man ohne weiteres einen Kopf- und einen Schwanzteil
unterscheiden. Am besten wird die Abteilung der Entomostraken
dadurch charakterisiert, dass sie ausserordentlich reich an
verschiedenen Krebsformen ist, deren Gliedmassen sowohl in der
Zahl als auch Gestaltung ebenso wie die Segmente des Körpers
sehr variieren. Alle Entomostraken besitzen, wie auch die höheren
Krebse, zwei Paar Fühler. Ferner herrscht unter den nachher zu
besprechenden Ordnungen mit Ausnahme nur einer Unterordnung
annähernde Übereinstimmung in der Körpergestalt während der
ersten Entwickelungsstadien nach dem Verlassen des Eies. Nicht
alle Entomostraken-Familien sind im süssen Wasser vertreten, eine
derselben, die der Rankenfüsser (Cirripedien), findet sich nur im
Meere vor. Die Zahl der Gattungen und Arten, welche einer Familie
angehören, bewegt sich in weiten Grenzen. Von Entomostraken sind
gegenwärtig weit über 2000 Arten bekannt. Von dieser Summe zählt
etwa die Hälfte zu den Copepoden, ¼ zu den Ostrakoden, ⅐ zu den
Phyllopoden und nur ⅛ zu den im Meere lebenden Cirripedien. Die
Mehrzahl der Arten auch der übrigen Familien ausser den
Cirripedien lebt ebenfalls im Meere. Aus der umfangreichen Familie
der Copepoden lebt nur der z e h n t e Teil im süssen Wasser. Wohl die
bedeutendste Rolle von allen niederen Krebsen spielen in unseren
Gewässern die
F r e i l e b e n d e R u d e r f ü s s e r (Gnathostomata).