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Simulation and Optimization
in Process Engineering
Simulation
and Optimization
in Process Engineering
The Benefit of Mathematical Methods
in Applications of the Chemical Industry
Edited by
Contributors xiii
Preface xvii
v
vi Contents
Index 401
Contributors
Numbers in parenthesis indicate the pages on which the authors’ contributions begin.
Heiner Ackermann (339), Fraunhofer ITWM, Kaiserslautern, Germany
Simen Akkermans (243), BioTeC+, Department of Chemical Engineering, Technology
Campus Gent, KU Leuven, Ghent, Belgium
Satyajith Amaran (365), The Dow Chemical Company, Midland, MI, United States
Michael Amrhein (201), Online Control, Lausanne, Switzerland
Norbert Asprion (57), BASF SE, Ludwigshafen, Germany
Tilman Barz (273), Center for Energy, AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH,
Vienna, Austria; KIWI-biolab, Department of Biotechnology, Technische
Universit€at Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Satyajeet Bhonsale (243), BioTeC+, Department of Chemical Engineering, Technology
Campus Gent, KU Leuven, Ghent, Belgium
Lorenz T. Biegler (33), Department of Chemical Engineering, Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
Filippo Bisotti (161), Politecnico di Milano, CMIC Dept. “Giulio Natta”, Centre for
Sustainable Process Engineering Research (SuPER), Milano, Italy
Dominique Bonvin (201), Laboratoire d’Automatique, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
Michael Bortz (57,143), Fraunhofer Institute for Industrial Mathematics (ITWM),
Kaiserslautern, Germany
Mariano Nicolas Cruz Bournazou (273), KIWI-biolab, Department of Biotechnology,
Technische Universit€at Berlin, Berlin, Germany; DataHow AG, D€
ubendorf,
Switzerland
Luisa C. Bree (225), Process Systems Engineering (AVT.SVT), RWTH Aachen
University, Aachen, Germany
Andreas Bulan (225), Covestro Deutschland AG, Leverkusen, Germany
Jorge Diaz (321), BASF SE, Ludwigshafen, Germany
Sebastian Engell (77), Process Dynamics and Operations Group, Department of
Biochemical and Chemical Engineering, TU Dortmund University, Dortmund,
Germany
Gregor Foltin (321), Fraunhofer Institute for Industrial Mathematics (ITWM),
Kaiserslautern, Germany
Gregory François (201), HES-SO Valais-Wallis, Sion, Switzerland
xiii
xiv Contributors
Andrea Galeazzi (161), Politecnico di Milano, CMIC Dept. “Giulio Natta”, Centre for
Sustainable Process Engineering Research (SuPER), Milano, Italy
Francesco Gallo (161), Itelyum Regeneration s.r.l, Lodi, Italy
Federico Galvanin (273), Department of Chemical Engineering, University College
London (UCL), London, United Kingdom
Jochen Gattermayer (321), BASF SE, Ludwigshafen, Germany
Thomas Gerlach (143), Bayer AG, Building E 41, Leverkusen, Germany
Joachim Gross (1), Institute of Thermodynamics and Thermal Process Engineering,
University of Stuttgart, Stuttgart, Germany
Ignacio E. Grossmann (365), Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, United
States
David Hajnal (321), BASF SE, Ludwigshafen, Germany
Raoul Heese (143), Fraunhofer Institute for Industrial Mathematics (ITWM),
Kaiserslautern, Germany
Melanie Heidgen (321), Fraunhofer Institute for Industrial Mathematics (ITWM),
Kaiserslautern, Germany
Michael Helmling (339), Fraunhofer ITWM, Kaiserslautern, Germany
Jesús D. Hernández (77), Process Dynamics and Operations Group, Department of
Biochemical and Chemical Engineering, TU Dortmund University, Dortmund,
Germany; Acciai Speciali Terni (AST), Terni, Italy
Christoph Herwig (273), Institute of Chemical, Environmental and Bioscience
Engineering, Technische Universit€at Wien, Vienna, Austria
Stefan Hoeser (339), BASF Italia S.p.A., Pontecchio Marconi, Italy
Shachit S. Iyer (365), The Dow Chemical Company, Midland, MI, United States
Julian Kager (273), Competence Center CHASE GmbH, Linz, Austria
Thomas Kochenburger (143), Bayer AG, Building E 41, Leverkusen, Germany
Stefan Lehner (321), BASF SE, Ludwigshafen, Germany
Neele Leith€auser (339), Fraunhofer ITWM, Kaiserslautern, Germany
Filip Logist (243), BioTeC+, Department of Chemical Engineering, Technology
Campus Gent, KU Leuven, Ghent, Belgium
Jonas Mairhofer (1), BASF SE, Ludwigshafen, Germany
Flavio Manenti (161), Politecnico di Milano, CMIC Dept. “Giulio Natta”, Centre for
Sustainable Process Engineering Research (SuPER), Milano, Italy
David C. Miller (33), National Energy Technology Laboratory, Pittsburgh, PA, United
States
Alexander Mitsos (225), Process Systems Engineering (AVT.SVT), RWTH Aachen
University, Aachen, Germany; JARA-ENERGY, Aachen, Germany; Institute of
Energy and Climate Research: Energy Systems Engineering (IEK-10),
Forschungszentrum J€ulich GmbH, J€ulich, Germany
Contributors xv
xvii
xviii Preface
Throughout the book, the reader will discover how mathematical structure
hidden in models, in simulation and optimization tasks, is exploited to arrive at
new insights. We hope that this book will be an inspiration for both engineers
and mathematicians challenged by real-world problems.
and vapor phase heat capacities, liquid density and further required properties.
The gas phase is most often approximated as an ideal gas. This approach
shows several drawbacks: it is not suited for high-pressure applications because
the pressure dependence of the activity coefficients is usually neglected, and
the ideal gas approximation will not be justified. The nonideality of the gas
phase then also has to be addressed in calculating the vapor enthalpy. Further-
more, special treatment is necessary for components with a critical temperature
lower than the simulation temperature.
An equation of state model complemented with expressions for ideal gas
heat capacities of all pure species can provide all static thermodynamic prop-
erties. Furthermore, models for transport coefficients, such as viscosity, thermal
conductivity, or diffusion coefficients, exist which build on outputs of an
equation of state. However, simple cubic equations of state such as the Peng-
Robinson [2] or Soave-Redlich-Kwong [3] equations of state can only be
applied to simple molecules and in general, do not produce results that are accu-
rate enough for all required properties in most real-world processes simulation
applications. The need for more accurate thermodynamic models applicable
also to molecules showing complex molecular interactions such as hydrogen-
bonding or polar interactions led to the development of more sophisticated,
physically-based equations of state such as the statistical associating fluid the-
ory (SAFT) developed by Chapman et al. [4,5] and Jackson et al. [6] based on
the work of Wertheim [7–10]. SAFT leads to an expression for the residual
Helmholtz energy Ares(T,ρ,x) ¼ A(T,ρ,x) Aig(T,ρ,x), where Aig denotes the
Helmholtz energy of the ideal gas at temperature T, number density ρ and mole
fractions x. The value of Ares is obtained as the sum of different contributions.
Each contribution takes into account a specific type of molecular interaction.
The different Helmholtz energy contributions are developed using perturbation
theory which (under suitable conditions) allows to obtain the thermodynamic
properties of a target fluid with specified interaction potential from the proper-
ties of a reference fluid with a simpler interaction potential and known proper-
ties. The advantage of SAFT is that it allows to include a contribution for highly
directional attractive interactions such as hydrogen-bonding which makes it a
suitable choice for modeling the properties of molecules (and their mixtures)
exhibiting such complex molecular interactions. Different SAFT-type equa-
tions of state can be derived depending on the choice of reference fluid and
interaction potential of the target fluid.
A detailed description of the fundamentals of SAFT can be found in the book
by Solana [11]. A comprehensive list of successful applications of SAFT-type
equations of state to complex systems including polar and associating mole-
cules, polymers, ionic liquids, pharmaceuticals as well as bio-molecules can
be found in review articles [12–18].
The scope of this chapter is to introduce the perturbed-chain statistical asso-
ciating fluid theory (PC-SAFT). The equations to implement the model are
given in Section 1. The determination of meaningful pure-component and
binary interaction parameters is the topic of Section 2. Section 3 presents
The PC-SAFT equation of state Chapter 1 3
Cf. H. vi. 1.
The only real indication of the date of his return is
given in a subsequent chapter, where it is clearly
implied that it was subsequent to the departure of Aristagoras from
Miletus, if not to his death at Myrkinos.
Cf. H. v. 108.
From Susa the story shifts back to Cyprus. The
siege of Amathus is still proceeding, and
STRATEGIC VALUE Onesilos has just received word of the coming
OF CYPRUS. of a Phœnician fleet with a large Persian force
aboard of it, under the command of Artybios.
He accordingly despatched messengers to Ionia to ask for help.
Herodotus emphasizes the promptness with which the Ionian fleet
was despatched to aid the Cypriotes.
It is plain that both sides recognized the crucial importance of the
part which Cyprus had to play in the great struggle. The peculiar
configuration of the neighbouring continent, which brings the only
really practicable military line of communication between Asia Minor
and the Euphrates valley into immediate contact with the shore of
the Levant at that corner of the sea which is commanded by Cyprus,
renders this island a strategical position of inestimable value either to
a power assailing Asia Minor from the east, or to one defending it
from the west. The Cypriote Greeks, backed by the Ionian fleet,
would have been in a position to threaten at its weakest point the
Persian line of communication with the Western satrapies. From it as
a base also, the Ionian fleet might have made it impossible for the
Phœnicians to sail to the Ægean. Cyprus was then, as it is now, the
key of the Levant.
Of its value as a strategic position the Greek was, moreover, fully
aware. The alacrity with which the Ionians accepted the invitation in
the present instance was equalled by the eagerness with which,
twenty years later, the Greeks on the fleet under Pausanias sought
to seize it, even when the liberation of the Ægean coast was as yet
in its initial stage. They knew that its possession would inevitably
facilitate their task nearer home. Had not Kimon died so
inopportunely, Athens might have realized the dream of its
permanent acquisition.
But it was not merely its strategic position that rendered it so
attractive in the eyes of the trading cities of Ionia. From a commercial
point of view it would have supplied an ideal base for trade with the
wealthy East, and would have placed the Greek trader in possession
of a sea route of his own, instead of, on the one hand, a sea route on
which he had to face the fierce Phœnician competition, and, on the
other, a land route through Asia Minor, inconvenient alike from the
expense of traffic along it, and from its passing through many alien
peoples.
When it is considered that the Ionian fleet had already in this
campaigning season brought about the revolt both of the
Hellespontine region and of Caria, it cannot be supposed that the
expedition to Cyprus was undertaken earlier than the late summer of
this year 497.
Apart from the time spent in the actual operations at these two
comparatively distant points, the ships of those days were not able to
keep the sea for any prolonged period without a refit.
H. v. 108.
The Ionian fleet seems to have arrived at Cyprus at
about the same time as the Persian expedition. The
Phœnician fleet transhipped the Persian army from the Cilician coast
to the north shore of the island, whence it marched overland towards
28
Salamis. The fleet then rounded the islands called “the Keys,” and
so sailed towards the same destination.
Herodotus describes an interview between the Cypriote tyrants
and the Greek commanders, in which the former offer to embark
their men on board the fleet and let the Ionians fight on land. The
latter, however, replied that the Common Council of the Ionians had
sent them to fight on board the fleet, and on board the fleet they
intended to fight.
Of the battle by sea which ensued, Herodotus says but little, save
that the Ionians fought well and beat the Phœnicians; and that, of the
Ionians, the Samians fought best.
Whatever the measure of success attained, it was more than
compensated for by the loss of the battle on land. There was
grievous treachery in the Cypriote army. Stesenor, tyrant of Kourion,
with a large band, deserted during the battle; and part, at least, of
the Salaminian contingent followed his example. Onesilos and one of
the Greek tyrants perished in the battle.
The Ionian fleet seems to have remained some time longer upon
the coast, until, at any rate, the Persians began the siege of the
various Greek cities. Then, finding itself powerless to effect anything,
it sailed away home. One of the towns, Soli,
CHRONOLOGICAL
DISCREPANCY.
held out for five months, but with its capture
the revolt of Cyprus came to an end; and
“thus,” says Herodotus “the Cyprians, after a year of freedom, were
enslaved anew.”
Five months of siege would protract the revolt far into the winter of
497–96. It is noteworthy that the chronological details deducible from
the account of the revolt in Cyprus are in reasonable agreement with
the general statements as to its duration. This chapter of the history
of the revolt as a whole is, indeed, conspicuous as being the only
one in which chronological data can be said to be existent.
From the end of the revolt in Cyprus in the winter of 497–96 until
the siege of Miletus in 494, the course of recorded events does not
admit of any certain chronological arrangement, and, apart from this,
the record is manifestly of a most fragmentary character.
It is now necessary to carry back the story to the Ægean coast.
Earlier in the year the Ionian fleet had brought about the revolt of
Caria and the district of the Propontis. These events can be
attributed with some assurance to the spring and early summer of
497. But the chronology of the measures taken by the Persians to
reduce these revolted regions to submission is so hopelessly
29
involved that it is impossible to accept it.
H. v. 117.
Daurises began operations in the district of the
Hellespont, and took Dardanos, Abydos, Perkote,
Lampsakos and Paisos. These places he is reported to have taken
31
with incredible rapidity. From these successes he was called away,
so Herodotus says, by the revolt of Caria. Why Caria should have
revolted at a time when the structure of revolt in the Hellespont was
falling like a house of cards, and why, above all, the Common
Council of the Ionians, after bringing about the revolt of both the
Hellespont and Caria by means of its fleet, should have
unhesitatingly despatched the fleet to Cyprus at a time when a large
part of the one district had been resubjugated, and the other was on
the point of being attacked, Herodotus does not explain. The
chronological combination of events in these chapters is intended to
heighten the impression of the hopelessness of the revolt which has
been conveyed by the story of the disaster at Ephesus, and with that
intent these events are brought into close juxtaposition with it. When
it is remembered that the defection of Thrace
CAMPAIGN IN
CARIA.
and Macedonia must have been closely linked
with that of the Hellespontine region, it is
impossible to suppose that the revolt in these parts was of so feeble
a nature that it could be suppressed within what, if Herodotus’
second chronological series is to be accepted, cannot have
amounted to more than a few weeks from its outbreak—so feeble,
too, that a large number of the most prominent cities were captured
with the utmost ease.
The campaign of Daurises in the Hellespont seems to have taken
place in the spring of 496. It seems, moreover, to have been
successful. The European shore was, indeed, left alone for the time
being, but the revolt on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont must have
been practically stamped out.
H. v. 117.
Herodotus represents Daurises as having been
called away to Caria before his work in the
Hellespontine region was done. It may be that he was called away
from the north; but, even on Herodotus’ own evidence, he had done
his work thoroughly on the Asiatic side of the Propontis.
The reconquest of Caria was a much more difficult matter. The
Carians were not mere amateurs in the art of war, but numbered
among them men who had seen fighting in many lands, the soldiers
of fortune of their time. The race was infected with that strange fever
which has at different periods driven members of some of the world’s
most virile peoples to seek a livelihood in quarrels not their own.
Herodotus makes no attempt to place the striking events of this
war in Caria in a chronological setting. Three great battles take
place, of which the first two are great Persian victories, while the last
is a tremendous disaster to their arms. There is no means of judging
of the interval between the victories and the disaster; though, from
the way in which the narrative is told, it might be supposed that the
Carians recovered almost instantaneously from two serious and
successive defeats.
On the general question of the campaign it may be said that it
seems to have been part of a great design planned at Sardes in the
winter of 497–96, to be carried out so soon as reinforcements came
up from the east.
The Carians were not caught unprepared. The insurgents of the
Ægean coast must have spent a winter of anxious expectation as to
what would happen when the Persian reinforcements arrived. The
Ionian fleet had in the autumn brought back news of the disastrous
failure of the revolt in Cyprus; and from that time it was a question
where the next blow would fall, and how it could best be parried. The
danger of the situation arose from the fact that by the end of the year
497 the opportunity for a vigorous offensive on land in the west had,
for the time being, vanished. The absence of the Ionian fleet in
Cyprus in the late summer of that year would prevent any combined
movement of the insurgents at a time when the available fighting
strength of Persia in the satrapy of Sardes can hardly have been
sufficient to cope with the force which might have been collected had
the fleet been there. The Ionian towns, the moral and geographical
centre of the revolt, had for the moment staked their all on success
in Cyprus, and had despatched thither their fleet, the sole means by
which the concentration necessary for a formidable combined
movement could be brought about. So the revolted were reduced to
a passive state of expectancy, confined to a defensive, which,
inasmuch as Persia held the inner line in Western Asia Minor, was
most disadvantageous to them from a strategical point of view. The
Persian council of war saw this weakness. The revolted regions
could be taken in detail.
The plan adopted seems to have been to deal with the
Hellespont, the Ionian towns, and Caria, as three areas of
operations, and to take a vigorous offensive in one region at a time,
while threatening the other two with a number of troops sufficient to
prevent their sending any substantial help to the region attacked.
With the reduction of one region, the troops which had been
employed in it would be largely available for the second attack.
The Hellespont, certainly the weakest of the three, was first
invaded and reduced, while Ionia and Caria were merely threatened.
This accomplished, a twofold force was directed against Caria, while
Ionia was watched; and, finally, the combined armies fell upon the
land which formed the heart, the life-centre of the revolt.
The first step in this design seems to have succeeded. The
second proved a harder task.
H. v. 118.
Forewarned, and therefore forearmed, the Carians
collected their forces at a place called “the White
32
Pillars,” near a river named Marsyas, a tributary of the Mæander,
with the intention of meeting the Persian invasion at that point.
Arrived there, a discussion arose among the commanders as to
whether it would be better to fight with the river at their backs, and so
animate their men with the courage of despair, or to retire somewhat
from the river and make the Persians, as the assailants, take up a
position which, in case of their defeat, would be infinitely disastrous
33
to them.
The second of these alternatives was wisely chosen. There must
have been many experienced soldiers in the Carian army who would
be well aware of the error which the first proposal involved. The fact
that it was made, and the stated reason for its being made,
suggests, however, the difficulty under which the insurgents
laboured, in that they had to meet the Persian levies with armies
which must have been composed for the most part of untrained men.
The period of subjection to Persia was now half a century old, and,
during that time, the subject population must have been afforded the
minimum of opportunity for anything resembling military training.
Persia did not call out levies except under stress of necessity; and it
is quite certain that she would never have allowed any subject race
to practise its people in arms.
H. v. 119.
The battle on the Marsyas was fiercely contested.
No details of it are given, except that the Carians were
finally overpowered by numbers, and sustained a loss of 10,000
men, whereas the Persian loss was only 2000.
The fugitives took refuge in the temple and sacred precinct of
Strabo, 659.
Zeus Stratios at Labraunda, a village on the mountain
pass between Alabanda and Mylassa, about seven
miles from the latter. They seem to have regarded their position as a
desperate one; for they are reported to have debated the question of
leaving Asia altogether.
This place was, however, near Miletus, and the Milesians and
their allies, presumably Greeks from the smaller towns near
34
H. v. 120. Miletus, sent help to the Carians. This put new heart
into them. Instead of capitulating or deserting their
post, they resisted the Persian attack, only, however, to sustain a
defeat worse than that at the Marsyas river, a disaster in which their
Milesian allies suffered severely.
H. v. 121.
“But after this disaster the Carians recovered and
fought once more,” says Herodotus. When it is
remembered that their first defeat had reduced these Carians to a
state bordering on despair, and that their second defeat is expressly
said to have been still more serious than their first, this statement is
difficult to understand. It may reasonably be suggested that, if the
account of the previous operations be the whole truth, it is
incomprehensible that the Carians should have had time to recover
from such disasters before the Persians followed up their successes.
The question may even arise whether Herodotus is relating the
events of the same campaign as that in which the two defeats took
place. It is impossible to pretend that the available evidence is in any
way conclusive on this point. The only detail which tends to throw
light upon the question is a geographical one. By the time that the
events next recorded took place, the Persians had certainly
advanced beyond Labraunda; and this fact would tend to the
conclusion that they did actually occur in the same campaign.
Herodotus recounts them as follows:—
“The Carians, on hearing that the
HELLESPONT AND
IONIA.
Persians were about to march against
their cities, laid an ambush on the road
H. v. 121. in Pedasos, into which the Persians fell by night
and were destroyed, both they and their
generals, Daurises, Amorges, and Sisimakes. With them
perished also Myrsos the son of Gyges. The commander
of this ambush was Herakleides, the son of Ibanollis, a
Mylassian.”
The scene of this terrible defeat is on the road which would be
taken by an army advancing from Labraunda southward into Caria.
What had really happened can only be a subject for conjecture.
The Persians must have suffered so severely in the battles on the
Marsyas and at Labraunda, that further advance was delayed until
reinforcements could come up. During this delay the Carians rallied,
and then inflicted on the invaders the most crushing defeat of the
whole war.
H. v. 122.
In this campaigning season of the year 496, the
operations in the Hellespont region which Daurises
had left in an all but complete stage, were continued by Hymeës,
who had been campaigning in the Mysian district. But little can have
remained for him to do. His army accomplished the task, though he
himself died before it was actually completed.
H. v. 123.
A little light is also thrown upon the doings of the
army which, under the command of Artaphernes and
Otanes, had occupied the attention of the Ionians during the
campaign in Caria. It captured the towns of Klazomenæ and Kyme.
The outlook towards the close of the summer, before the great
Persian defeat in Caria took place, must have been a gloomy one for
the insurgents. Cyprus was lost. The prospects of the revolt in Caria
seemed desperate. The Hellespont region had been reduced,
though that of the Bosphorus was as yet untouched; and even two of
the Greek coast towns of the Ægean had fallen.
H. v. 124.
It is not strange if Aristagoras began to despair of
the future. Herodotus is consistent in placing his
conduct in the very worst light: he was a coward at heart: he had
thrown Ionia into confusion: he had stirred up a mighty business; and
now he planned flight.
As a preface to a story of a selfish attempt on the part of
Aristagoras to provide for his own safety, regardless of the fate of his
fellow-conspirators, such bitter condemnation of the man would have
been justified. But the tale which follows is singularly inconsistent
with the preface. So far from stealing away from Miletus, and
seeking to save his own life alone, he called the conspirators
together, and, in view of the desperate position of the revolt, he
pointed out to them that it would be well to secure some place of
retreat, in case they were driven forth from Miletus, by establishing a
colony either in Sardinia or at Myrkinos, “which Histiæus had
proceeded to fortify after receiving it as a gift from Darius.”
Hecatæus is reported to have opposed the plan, and to have
suggested the futile alternative of fortifying the small island of Leros,
35
off Miletus, and of using it as a base for the recovery of that town.
The majority of the meeting voted in favour of Aristagoras’ design.
Accordingly, leaving Miletus in charge of a prominent citizen named
Pythagoras, Aristagoras sailed for Myrkinos, presumably late in the
year 496, taking with him all who volunteered to go. They all
perished in an attack on a Thracian town, whose name Herodotus
Th. iv. 102.
does not mention, but which seems, from what
Thucydides says, to have been on the site of the later
Amphipolis.
Herodotus’ story of this last scene in Aristagoras’ life cannot be
said to support the bitter language of the judgment passed on him.
He went out to secure a refuge for his fellow citizens, and died in so
doing. He never returned, because he could not return. Had he
remained indefinitely at Myrkinos; had he looked on while his native
city and the men who had joined him in the great venture were
destroyed, without making one effort to return and take part in the
last struggle for life and liberty, he might with justice have been
branded with the cowardice of desertion. Herodotus’ account of the
man and all that he did, fails, when examined, to support the picture
of his character which the historian has drawn.
It was about the time of Aristagoras’ death
HISTIÆUS AND
ARTAPHERNES.
that Histiæus, having come down from Susa,
arrived at Sardes. There he met the satrap
H. vi. 1. Artaphernes. The brief account of their meeting given
by Herodotus is a dramatic scene.
“On his arrival from Susa, Artaphernes, the satrap of
Sardes, asked him what he supposed to be the reason for
the Ionian revolt. He said he did not know, and that he was
surprised at what had happened, pretending that he was
36
wholly ignorant of the causes of what was taking place.
Artaphernes, however, seeing through his dissimulation,
and knowing the truth about the revolt, said, ‘Histiæus, the
truth about these matters is this: You stitched this sandal,
and Aristagoras put it on.’ Thus Artaphernes spoke about
the revolt.”
It has been assumed by modern historians of Greece that
Artaphernes’ language is a direct reference to the man with the
tattooed head. The assumption involves, however, certain difficulties.
Unless Artaphernes’ information with regard to the part played by
Histiæus was a recent acquisition at the time at which the latter
arrived at Sardes, it is incomprehensible that Histiæus should ever
have been allowed to leave Susa. The great Persian officials would
certainly not conceal such information from Darius. They loathed
Histiæus, and would have been but too glad to do him a bad turn.
Furthermore, Darius himself had taken the precaution of removing
Histiæus to Susa for reasons which would have seemed as nothing
compared with an allegation that he had been a prime mover in the
great revolt.
The “truth about the revolt” which Artaphernes knew in so far as
Histiæus was concerned, can have amounted to little more than the
suspicion that, at the time when he was fortifying Myrkinos, he had
had designs against the peace of the empire. The remarkable
persistence with which Histiæus and Aristagoras pursued their
designs upon Myrkinos suggests that behind the direct design lay a
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larger one, which is only incidentally mentioned by Herodotus.
Whatever may have been the grounds for Artaphernes’
suspicions, Histiæus saw clearly that it would be dangerous to
H. vi. 2.
remain at Sardes, and so fled by night to the sea,
“having deceived King Darius: for he, having
undertaken to subdue Sardinia, the greatest of islands, sought to
assume the leadership of the Ionians in the war with Darius.” He
went to Chios first, where he was imprisoned upon suspicion of
being engaged in evil designs at Darius’ instigation. “But the Chians,
learning the whole story, that he was an enemy to the king, released
him.”
It is a strange tale this tale of Histiæus. He had certainly been
playing a double game for years past, but it is very difficult to say
what the two sides of the game actually were. His reception by the
Chians shows that some of the insurgents, at any rate, were
unaware that he had played any part in bringing about the revolt. He
had, moreover, been able to persuade Darius of his honesty of
purpose. Probably his purpose was dishonest to both sides, and
what he aimed at was the leadership of the Asiatic Greeks, which
should, if he could make it so, be independent of Persia. Failing that,
he was prepared to serve the king as an Ionian satrap, but not as an
underling of Artaphernes, or any other Persian governor. The great
Persian officials were, accordingly, his irreconcilable opponents.
H. vi. 6.
At the time of Histiæus’ departure, the Ionians were
living in expectation of the renewal of the attack upon
them. By the autumn of 495, reinforcements from the east must have
begun to arrive at Sardes. But the attack does not seem to follow in
that year, in so far as any calculation can be made from the known
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date of the subsequent fall of Miletus. It appears to have been in
the early spring of 494 that the Persians collected all their available
troops for an attack on Miletus, “considering the other cities to be of
less account.” So much for the Greek cities. But what of Caria? That
land practically disappears from the story of the revolt, after dealing
Persia the severest blow she suffered during all the years of it.