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Russia’s Relations with
the GCC and Iran
Edited by
Nikolay Kozhanov
Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran
 Nikolay Kozhanov
Editor

Russia’s Relations
with the GCC
and Iran
Editor
Nikolay Kozhanov
Gulf Studies Center
Qatar University
Doha, Qatar

ISBN 978-981-33-4729-8 ISBN 978-981-33-4730-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
 Foreword

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a change in the dynamics
of relations between Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
occurred which was due to the change in international and regional orders
that took place when Russia, as a Soviet superpower, lost its status. At that
time, the newly shaped Russia had not defined its interests, although it was
still one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council, while the United States had secured stability and security in the
Gulf region. However, in 1992, Andrei Kozyrev, who served as the former
and the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation under
President Boris Yeltsin, visited the GCC states. This visit reflected, for the
first time, Russia’s need for a collaboration with the Gulf and its interest in
the region. Consequently, a few agreements were signed with a number of
Gulf states, principally UAE and Oman. With war in Chechnya, Russia’s
policy toward the GCC had shifted and inclined negatively mainly because
Russia viewed GCC states as supporters of ‘terrorists’ in the Caucus.
Until the end of the twentieth century, the United States maintained
stability in the region. At the turn of the millennium, several changes have
occurred in the Gulf region after the US shook the security architecture
with its initiation of the war on terror in Afghanistan and its invasion
of Iraq. These changes have coincided with the rise of Vladimir Putin
to presidency in Russia and culminated to offer a platform of collabora-
tion between Russia and the GCC. Both showed more interest in seeking
political stability and security in the region, and Russia started acquiring

v
vi FOREWORD

a pro-active role in political relations. Therefore, relations between the

GCC and Russia have been embodied with a new character, imple-
menting stability in the Middle East and re-imposing interest in the
region. Hereby, Russia sought to reformulate its relationship with the
GCC states, with an emphasis on economic ties in the first place through
establishing agreement and projects fundamentally in the fields of energy,
oil, and gas as well as other fields such as military, infrastructure, irri-
gation, civil construction, and agriculture. Therefore, intense communi-
cations have distinguished the first ten years of the twenty-first century
between Russia and the countries of the GCC.
With the outbreak of the Arab spring at end of the first decade of
the twenty-first century, the GCC countries became pro-active in regional
disturbances and had opposing stances toward those uprisings. Russia was
closer to countries who wanted to maintain the status quo. It supported
Bahrain with arms to suppress the uprisings, which came in favor of the
GCC states who fear an increased role for Iran in the region. Moreover,
Russia stood with Bashar Al Assad’s regime and criticized the GCC states
who supported the uprisings in Syria, as well as condemned Qatar for its
role in Libya.
There are other areas where both the GCC and Russia share a similar
vision with regard to regional security, such as the Middle East peace
process, where Russia hosted both Fatah and Hamas in a pledge of unity
between Palestinian factions. Both the GCC and Russia had a cooperation
against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and other organizations.
In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed
between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, Russia,
China, France, and Germany) together with the European Union. As a
result, the GCC countries became less confident with the role of the
United States in the region as a guarantor of their security. This move
has caused the GCC states to reach out to Russia, who is close to Tehran.
Through Russia, GCC states would maintain a diversified future and a
hope that it would moderate Iran’s position in the region. This was suit-
able with Russia’s hopes to develop ties with the GCC states to secure its
political and economic interests.
Despite differences over the Arab Uprisings and the JCPOA, Russian-
GCC relations are at an apex and both sides share mutual interests and
understandings. Moreover, Russia acts as a hub for GCC states’ invest-
ments. On the other side, Russia has taken a neutral stance toward the
GCC crisis. It is seen that intervening and taking a side in an internal
 FOREWORD vii

GCC rift is impractical and could officially endanger Russia’s energy inter-
ests especially that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are important energy
partners for Moscow.
Synthesizing the above, there rises an urgent need to study the complex
relationship between Russia and the GCC. In light of this, this book offers
an alternative narrative on GCC-Russia relations by digging into the deep
roots of these relations to view, explain, and analyze how bilateral and
collective relations have interwoven together. It also offers an analysis of
the relation to study how domestic politics affect the foreign policy of
Russia and individual GCC states, considering that relations reflect the
changing course of the international order and how players are engaging
in the outside arena.
This book is one of a kind as it provides an updated narrative on the
behaviors and policies of both sides. It is an added value to the field of
GCC-Russia relations, which need extensive and intensive understanding
of its dynamics and entanglements.

Dr. Mahjoob Zweiri, Ph.D.

Director—Gulf Studies Center
Qatar University
Doha, Qatar
Acknowledgments The editor would like to thank all the authors involved in
this book as well as those from the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University who
supported this project and made it possible, particularly its director Mahjoob
Zweiri and research assistant professor Luciano Zaccara.

Dr. Mahjoob Zweiri, Ph.D. is the Director of Gulf Studies Center. He is an

Associate Professor in Contemporary Politics of the Middle East at Qatar Univer-
sity. Before joining Qatar University in 2010, Dr. Zweiri was senior researcher
in Middle East Politics and Iran at the Center for Strategic Studies, University
of Jordan. He was also a visiting professor to School of Government & Inter-
national Affairs at Durham University. From March 2003–December 2006 he
was a research fellow and then a director of the Centre for Iranian Studies in
the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham University. Dr.
Zweiri has more than 60 publications in the areas of Iran and Contemporary
Middle East History and Politics. In addition to Arabic, Dr. Zweiri is fluent in
Farsi and English.
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Nikolay Kozhanov
1 Understanding Russia’s Relations with the GCC 4
2 About the Volume 8
2 New-Old Key Player: What to Expect from Russia’s
Growing Role in the Middle East 21
Ian Parmeter
1 Introduction 21
2 Russian Relations with the Middle East from the Cold
War to 2010 22
3 Crisis at Home, and Challenges Abroad 25
4 Russian Interest in the Middle East Revives After 2010 28
4.1 Russia’s Syrian Intervention 30
4.2 Public Support 31
5 Impact of Syrian Intervention on Russia’s Relations
with Other Middle East States 34
5.1 Gulf Arab States 34
5.2 Iran 39
5.3 Israel 40
5.4 Turkey 41
5.5 Balancing Acts—Libya, Egypt, Turkey
and Qatar 42

ix
x CONTENTS

6 Trump’s Impact on Russian Policy Towards the Middle

East 43
7 Where the Russian Intervention Is Headed 47
8 Conclusion 49
3 What’s Driving Russia’s Return to the Middle East? 53
Irina Zvyagelskaya
1 Introduction 54
2 A Search for Self-Identity 54
3 Soviet Legacy 58
4 A Domestic Dimension 59
5 Russia’s Interests in the Middle East 61
6 A Burden of Partnership 68
6.1 Turkey 68
6.2 Israel 70
6.3 Iran 71
6.4 Saudi Arabia 73
7 The Middle East: A Window of Opportunity or a Trap
for Russia? 75
4 Russian Foreign Policy in the Gulf: A Quest
for Regional Partnerships and Opportunities 79
Nikolay Surkov
1 Introduction 80
2 Brief Overview of the History of Relations 81
3 Current Russian Interests in the Gulf 89
3.1 Russia’s Economic Interests in the Gulf 90
3.2 Political Interests 92
3.3 National Security, Counterterrorism,
and Islamic Dimension of Russia–GCC Ties 95
4 Russia’s Potential Partners in the Gulf 98
5 Russian Arms Sales and the Collective Security
of the Gulf 103
6 Conclusion 107
5 Russia and the Gulf States: Between West and East 109
Roland Dannreuther
1 Introduction 109
2 The United States, the West and the Gulf 113
3 The Gulf Pivot to the East 120
 CONTENTS xi

4 Russia—Between East and West 125

5 Conclusion 130
6 Trade, Investment and Politics: Prospects for Russian
Economic Cooperation with the Gulf 133
Duncan Allan
1 Introduction 134
2 Trade Relations 135
2.1 Bilateral Trade 135
2.2 Trade: Competition 140
3 Investment 142
3.1 Gulf Investment in Russia 142
3.2 Russian Investment in the Gulf 145
4 Russia & ‘OPEC−+’ 150
5 Conclusions 157
7 Going Beyond Politics: Russian Energy Interests
in the Gulf Region 159
Mikhail Krutikhin
1 Forget the USSR 159
2 Friend or Foe? 161
3 Big Boys’ Nursery Games 165
4 Conclusions 176
8 Russian-Iranian Relations: Impact on Persian Gulf
Interests 177
Ghoncheh Tazmini
1 Introduction 177
2 The Taxonomy of Russian-Iranian Relations 180
3 An Anti-hegemonic Alignment 182
4 Untangling Russo-Iranian Relations 184
5 “Russia is not a Fire Brigade” 186
6 Regional Theater 188
7 The Russia-Iran Partnership and Its Impact on Gulf
Interests 192
8 Conclusion 202
xii CONTENTS

9 Russia-GCC Relations and the Future of Syria:

Political Process and Prospects for the Economic
Reconstruction 205
Anton Mardasov and Andrey Korotayev
1 Introduction 205
2 Background 206
3 Political Process and Prospects for the Syrian Economic
Reconstruction 213
4 The Syrian Constitutional Committee 214
5 Russia, the GCC, and the Syrian Negotiation Process 216
6 Syrian Reconciliation Prospects 217
7 Current Economic Situation in Syria and Perspectives
of the Syrian Reconstruction 219
8 Russia and the Syrian Reconstruction 224
9 Russia-Gulf Rapprochement and the Syrian
Reconstruction 225
10 Conclusion 227
10 Russian Presence in Syria: Gulf States Views 229
Sinan Hatahet
1 Introduction 229
2 The Evolution of Confrontation 230
3 Pragmatism Primes Over All 236
4 A Geopolitical Reality Check 240
5 Conclusion 247
11 Russia’s Policy Toward the War in Yemen 249
Leonid Issaev
1 Introduction 249
2 Historical Background 253
3 After the Arab Spring 257
4 Arab Coalition and Russia’s Position 261
5 Russia’s Bilateral Efforts with Arab Gulf Parties
Involved in the Coalition 264
6 Russia’s Interests and Aspirations of Expanding Its
Influence in the Middle East 266
7 Conclusion 269
 CONTENTS xiii

12 Broker, Partner, or Troublemaker: Russian

Involvement in Regional Conflicts and GCC Interests 271
Ibrahim Fraihat and Yegor Lodygin
1 Introduction 271
2 The Potentials of Smart Power 273
3 Russia in the Gulf 275
3.1 Role Definition in Relations to the United States 276
3.2 Economic Cooperation 278
4 Russia’s Smart Power in Action 279
4.1 Access 280
4.2 Compartmentalisation 281
4.3 Quid-Pro-Quo 282
4.4 Shared Political Values 283
5 Analysis 285
5.1 Access, Neutrality, and Compartmentalisation 285
5.2 Process Obsession 286
5.3 Branding 287
5.4 Competitor or a Scarecrow 288
5.5 Energy: Partners or Foes 289
5.6 Smart Power: A Synergy Between Hard and Soft
Power 290
6 Conclusion 290

Index 293
 Notes on Contributors

Duncan Allan spent more than 28 years in the Foreign Office’s Research
Analysts cadre, working on the countries of what is now the former Soviet
Union. He completed several full tours and spells of temporary duty at the
British embassies in Moscow and Kyiv. He left the diplomatic service in
November 2017 and set up an independent consultancy, Octant Research
& Analysis Ltd, which offers assessments of political, economic, and repu-
tational risk in the post-Soviet space. He is also an associate fellow on the
Russia and Eurasia Programme of the Royal Institute for International
Affairs (Chatham House).
Roland Dannreuther is Professor of International Relations at the
University of Westminster. He was previously Professor of International
Relations at the University of Edinburgh; International Fellow at the
Tbilisi State University; Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security
Policy; and Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic
Studies. His research interests include security studies, energy security,
and his regional interests include Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle
East. Recent publications include Energy Security (Polity: 2017); Global
Resources: Conflict and Cooperation (2013) (co-edited with Wojciech
Ostrowski); International Security: The Contemporary Agenda (2013);
China, Oil and Global Politics (2011) (co-authored with Philip Andrews-
Speed). ‘Understanding Russia’s Return to the Middle East,’ Interna-
tional Politics (2019); ‘Russia and the Arab Spring: Supporting the
Counter-Revolution,’ Journal of European Integration, (2015); ‘Shifting

xv
xvi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Dynamics of the Insurgency in the North Caucasus,’ Ethnopolitics (2014);

‘Russia and the Middle East: A Cold War Paradigm,’ Europe-Asia Studies,
(2012); Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism (2010) (co-
edited with Luke March).
Ibrahim Fraihat is an associate professor in international conflict reso-
lution at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. He previously served
as senior foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution and taught
conflict resolution at Georgetown University and George Washington
University. His latest book publications include: Iran and Saudi Arabia:
Taming a Chaotic Conflict (Edinburgh University Press February 2020),
Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia Ater the Arab Spring
(Yale University Press, 2016). Dr. Fraihat has published extensively on
Middle East politics, with articles appearing in The New York Times, Huff-
ington Post, Newsweek, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and Al Jazeera
websites. Fraihat received a doctorate in conflict analysis and resolu-
tion from George Mason University in 2006. He is the recipient of
George Mason University’s Distinguished Alumni Award (2014) for his
achievements in the field of conflict resolution.
Sinan Hatahet is a senior fellow researcher at Sharq Forum and Omran
for Strategic Studies. He is also a researcher in the War and Post-
Conflict Syria Project of the European University Institute studying
Syria’s national and local political economy dynamics. Sinan’s research
interests include non-state actors, the Kurdish political movement, and
emerging new regional order. Hatahet holds a Ph.D. in cyber security
from the University of Technology of Compiegne, France.
Leonid Issaev is Associate Professor in the Department for Asian and
African Studies in the National Research University Higher School of
Economics (HSE) in Saint Petersburg. He is also Deputy Head of the
Laboratory for Monitoring the Risks of Socio-Political Destabilization in
HSE; and Senior Fellow at the Center for Civilizational and Regional
Studies in the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of
Science and coordinator of the ‘Russian in the Middle East’ research
project. He is a member of the Scientific Council of the Russian Polit-
ical Science Association. He has published numerous monographs and
journal articles, mostly in Russian and English. He is coauthor of Syria
and Yemen: Unfinished Revolutions (2013), Revolutions and Instability
in the Middle East (2016); Fight for the Middle East: Regional Actors in
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xvii

the Course of Middle Eastern Conflict (2019), among many others. He

is a regular contributor to Al Jazeera News.
Andrey Korotayev is a Russian Middle Eastern scholar, anthropolo-
gist, comparative political scientist, demographer, and sociologist. He is
currently the Head of the Laboratory of Monitoring of the Risks of
Socio-Political Destabilization at the National Research University Higher
School of Economics, and a Senior Research Professor at the Institute
of Oriental Studies as well as in the Institute for African Studies of
the Russian Academy of Sciences. In addition, he is a Senior Research
Professor of the International Laboratory on Political Demography and
Social Macrodynamics (PDSM) of the Russian Presidential Academy of
National Economy and Public Administration, as well as a Full Professor
of the Faculty of Global Studies of the Moscow State University. He is an
author of more than 200 academic articles and 20 monographs, including
the recently published Great Divergence and Great Convergence. A Global
Perspective (New York: Springer, 2015) and Islamism, Arab Spring, and
the Future of Democracy. World System and World Values Perspectives (New
York: Springer, 2019). His monograph Introduction to Social Macrody-
namics (Moscow: URSS, 2006; in collaboration with Artemy Malkov
and Daria Khaltourina) has brought him an award of the Russian Science
Support Foundation in ‘The Best Economists of the Russian Academy of
Sciences’ nomination. In 2012, he was awarded with the Gold Kondratieff
Medal by the International N. D. Kondratieff Foundation.
Nikolay Kozhanov is a Research Associate Professor at the Gulf Studies
Center of Qatar University. Nikolay is also a consulting fellow at the
Russia and Eurasia Programme of Chatham House where he leads a
project on Russia’s policy in the Middle East and a non-resident fellow
at the Center for Middle East Studies at the Institute of World Economy
and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. His research
focuses on the geopolitics of Gulf energy, Russian foreign policy in the
Middle East as well as Iran’s economy and international relations. Nikolay
recent publications include Russia and the Syrian Conflict: Moscow’s
Domestic, Regional and Strategic Interests (Gerlach Press 2016); Iran’s
Strategic Thinking: The Evolution of Iran’s Foreign Policy 1979–2017.
(London, Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2018) and Russian Policy across the
Middle East: Motivations and Methods (Chatham House 2018).
xviii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Mikhail Krutikhin is a co-founder and leading analyst of RusEnergy,

an independent consulting agency based in Moscow, Russia. A graduate
of the Institute of Oriental Languages at the Moscow Lomonosov State
University, he majored in Iranian philology in 1970, and in 1985 obtained
a Ph.D. in modern history. Between 1972 and 1992 he worked at the
TASS news agency on missions to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. Since
1993 he has been analyzing opportunities and specifics of investments
in the energy industry in the ex-USSR—first with the US-based Russian
Petroleum Investor Inc., and then with RusEnergy.
Yegor Lodygin is an M.A. student in Conflict Management and
Humanitarian Action at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.
Anton Mardasov is a non-resident scholar in MEI’s Syria Program. He
is also a non-resident military affairs expert at the Russian International
Affairs Council (RIAC) focusing on Syria, Iraq, and extremist organiza-
tions. Anton is the author of numerous articles in the Russian media,
several studies and chapters of books on Russian strategy in Syria and
the Syrian opposition, as well as Moscow’s relations with Iran, Lebanon,
and Egypt. His articles and commentary have appeared in Al-Monitor,
Al Jazeera, Asharq Al-Awsat, and others. In the past, Anton has been a
consultant to the analytical departments of the security services of two oil
companies. He is based in Moscow.
Ian Parmeter was an Australian diplomat for 25 years, working within
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia’s Foreign
Ministry). His diplomatic postings included Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Russia (as Deputy Head of Mission), and Lebanon (as Ambassador).
From 2004 to 2015 he was with the then-Office of National Assess-
ments (now Office of National Intelligence), the Australian government’s
primary foreign policy analytical agency, within the Prime Minister’s port-
folio. There he had a Senior Executive role as Assistant Director-General
responsible for analyses of the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. Since
2015 he has been a Research Scholar at the Centre for Arab and Islamic
Studies, Australian National University, where he researches and lectures
on Russian policy toward the Middle East in the Putin era. In 2019 he
lectured and tutored also at the university’s Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre. He has presented papers on Russia-Middle East and Australia’s
Middle East policy at several other Australian universities and think tanks
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xix

including the University of Melbourne, the University of Adelaide, Grif-

fith University, the Australian Defence College, and the Australian Insti-
tute of International Affairs. He has published articles based on these
papers in the Australian on-line journals Australian Outlook and The
Interpreter. As part of his research he visited Iran and Russia in 2015,
Russia and the UK in 2018, and Qatar in 2019.
Nikolay Surkov is a Senior Research Fellow at the Primakov Insti-
tute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian
Academy of Sciences (IMEMO), an Associate Professor at the Chair or
Oriental Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Rela-
tions (MGIMO), and a Middle East Expert at the Russian International
Affairs Council. He was also a staff writer and an editor in various Russian
newspapers (such as the Rossiyskaya Gazeta and the Izvestia) covering
foreign policy and military affairs. After a Master’s in Oriental Studies,
Dr. Surkov did a Ph.D. on International Politics at the Institute of Asian
and African Studies at the Moscow State University. His fields of interest
include foreign and domestic policy of the Arab States, security situation
in the Middle East, Russian, and US policy in this region. Dr. Surkov
speaks Russian, English, French, and Arabic.
Ghoncheh Tazmini is a Visiting Fellow at the Middle East Centre at
the LSE. She is a political scientist, and while her formal training was
in Russian studies, she has a special interest in Iranian politics. Dr.
Tazmini obtained a degree in International Relations at the University
of British Columbia and a Masters in Russian and Post-Soviet Studies
at the London School of Economics. Holding a Ph.D. in International
Relations from the University of Kent at Canterbury, she is the author of
Khatami’s Iran: The Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform
(I.B. Tauris, 2009, 2013) and Revolution and Reform in Russia and
Iran: Politics and Modernisation in Post-revolutionary States (I.B. Tauris,
2012), Dr. Tazmini has written numerous book chapters, scientific arti-
cles and opinion pieces on Iranian and Russia affairs. Dr. Tazmini was
formerly Iranian Heritage Foundation Visiting Fellow at the London
Middle East Institute at SOAS—University of London. A former Asso-
ciate Member of the Centre for Iranian Studies at SOAS, she was occa-
sional lecturer for the Masters in Iranian Studies. Dr. Tazmini is regu-
larly commissioned for ongoing consulting projects with NGOS, law firms
and semi-governmental bodies. She is also Research Associate at ISCTE-
Center for International Studies, University of Lisbon, Portugal. As a
xx NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

British Academy grant-holder, she is currently conducting research on the

Persian-Portuguese Encounter in Hormuz.
Irina Zvyagelskaya is Head of Center for Middle East Studies at
the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian
Academy of Sciences. She is also a Chief Research Associate at the Insti-
tute of Oriental Studies. Irina Zvyagelskaya is a Professor at the Moscow
State Institute of International Relations under the Russian Foreign
Ministry (MGIMO). Prof. Zvyagelskaya’s area of expertise includes
contemporary history, conflicts, international relations, and security issues
in the Middle East and Central Asia. Irina Zvyagelskaya is a member of
IISS. She authored over 250 publications, including books, chapters, and
articles.
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Nikolay Kozhanov

During the last five years, Russian relations with the GCC demonstrated
a strong tendency for positive development. Even Moscow’s decision to
leave the OPEC+ agreement and launch a price war with Saudi Arabia in
March 2020 was unable to offset those achievements that were reached
by the Russian diplomacy in the region. Russia’s policy toward the GCC
is driven by a complex mixture of traditional factors—such as the ongoing
confrontation with the West and the current deadlock—and new trends.
All in all, Russia’s current approach to the region is determined by the
Kremlin’s intentions to:

• use the Middle Eastern agenda as leverage in its relations with the
West,
• secure its economic interests, and
• ensure domestic security.

First and foremost, the Russian leadership is keen to maintain Russia’s

position as an influential external player in the Middle East, including

N. Kozhanov (B)
Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_1
2 N. KOZHANOV

the region of the Persian Gulf.1 However, Moscow is not confident that
it would be able to respond effectively if forced into a reactive mode
by other players in the region. The Kremlin therefore seeks to retain
initiative and thus shape the regional agenda according to its needs and
resources. This makes prediction of Moscow’s next moves in the region a
challenging, but not impossible, task.
Moscow’s involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Libya, its close
contacts with the Palestinian authorities and Israel, as well as attempts
to maintain good ties with the warring sides in Yemen, help to demon-
strate both to the regional players and the West Russia’s importance as
a global player, thus compelling the GCC countries and their Western
partners to further take Russia’s worldview into account and to keep
communication channels with Moscow open. In other words, Russia’s
presence in the Middle East advertises its capacity to project power and
helps Moscow avoid international isolation. In this respect it considers
its relations with the region as just another (albeit important) bargaining
chip in its relations with the United States and the EU.
The economic agenda, on the contrary, drives Russia’s decision-makers
to treat the Middle East (and the Gulf per se) as important in and of
itself and ensures they do not see the region solely through the prism of
relations with the West. Russia’s economic goals in the region are twofold:
First, it considers the GCC as an important source of investments and
as a market for some of its industries (above all, arms manufacturing,
agriculture, the nuclear sector, and oil, gas, and petrochemicals). Second,
the dependence of the state budget on the exports of hydrocarbons and
the Kremlin’s concerns about a potential fall of the oil price to below
USD 40 per barrel (which would mean Moscow would be unable to put
money into its reserve funds and sustain all budget needs) compels Russia
to cooperate actively with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), and its informal leader, Saudi Arabia.
After decades of negligence, Russia declared its intention to develop
closer relations with OPEC. This decision was driven by largely due to

1 The use of term ‘Persian Gulf’ in this book does not endorse any nationalistic agenda.
The editor and authors use it following the most common practice to name the body of
water that in some studies is also called ‘the Arabian Gulf.’ Moreover, in the book the
preference is given to the shorten version of the geographical name—‘the Gulf’—in order
to avoid sensitive and unnecessary political discussions.
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328
Herod. i. 136.
329
Rawlinson’s Herodotus, vol. i, p. 214, n. 10. We omit the
references.
330
Cf. Herod. ix. 109.
331
Rawlinson, The Five Great Monarchies (1871), vol. iii, p. 170.
The exception was the case of the Barcæans. Cf. Herod. iv.
201.
332
The modern Persians, who have exchanged the truth-impelling
creed of Zoroaster for that of Mohammed, seem to have lost
this ancestral virtue. It is noteworthy, however, that the Indian
Parsees, the inheritors and preservers of the faith of ancient
Persia, are noted for their uprightness and veracity.
333
“They [the Parsees] form one of the most esteemed, wealthy,
and philanthropic communities on the west coast of India,
notably in the city of Bombay.”—Bloomfield, The Religion of
the Veda (1908), p. 15.
334
“The whole history of the religion of Israel is a history of the
development of the moral consciousness, and consequently of
the deepening and widening of the opposition between that
which ought to be and that which is.”—Edward Caird, The
Evolution of Religion (1894), vol. ii, p. 92.
335
It may be urged that the moral character given to Yahweh was
the creation of the moral consciousness of his worshipers; but
even so, this conception of deity once formed would inevitably
react upon the moral sense to deepen and purify the feelings
that gave it birth.
336
Geschichte des Volkes Israel (1889), Bd. i, S. 429.
337
Budde, Religion of Israel to the Exile (1899), pp. 35 ff.; Toy,
Judaism and Christianity (1891), p. 307; W. Robertson Smith,
The Religion of the Semites (1894), pp. 75 ff.
338
W. Robertson Smith urges that sacrifice among the Hebrews
had its origin in the sacramental communal idea. According to
this belief the clansmen and their god are of the same stock,
and the bond of kinship is renewed and strengthened through
the human and the divine members of the community
partaking together of the flesh and blood of an animal slain.
339
Job iii. 19.
340
Eccl. ix. 5; and so ix. 10: “For there is no work, nor desire, nor
knowledge, nor wisdom in Sheol, whither thou goeth.”
341
Is. xxxviii. 18.
342
See below, pp. 165 f.
343
Cf. Chapter II.
344
The oldest form of the Decalogue is found in Ex. xxxiv; cf. Ex.
xxxiii.
345
If we compare the morality of this Hebrew Decalogue with that
of the Egyptian Negative Confession, we shall find it to belong
to about the same stage of ethical development.
346
In the Book of Judges are preserved some traditions which are
illustrative of the moral state of society at this time; for though
all the details of these stories may not be historical, still they
doubtless reflect the general condition of things during this
period. There is a striking similarity between these traditions of
gross and incredible crimes and the traditions of the atrocious
immoralities of the Merovingian Age in European history.
347
The kingdom of Israel was destroyed by the Assyrian power
722 b.c.; the kingdom of Judah fell before Nebuchadnezzar,
king of Babylon, 586 b.c.
348
Cf. Kuenen, The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel.
349
The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel (1877), p. 344.
350
Cf. 1 Kings xxi—the story of Naboth’s vineyard.
351
“The life-work of Elijah was a turning-point in the history of the
religion of Israel, similar in its consequences to those which
followed the appearance of Zarathustra in Iran.... It was the
ethical idea of God matured in the soul of the prophet by the
need of his time which broke through with irresistible power to
the demand for a final choice between Jehovah, the holy God,
and the unholy nature gods of the heathen.”—Pfleiderer,
Religions and Historic Faiths (1907), pp. 225 f.
352
History of the People of Israel (1892), vol. ii, p. 275.
353
Calamities were at this time befalling Israel. “The national
distress served to awaken Israel’s conscience. The obligation
covenanted at Sinai knocked again at the door of their hearts”
(Budde, Religion of Israel to the Exile (1899), p. 93).
354
Amos iii. 10.
355
Ibid. v. 11, 12.
356
Ibid. viii. 5, 6.
357
Ibid. v. 21.
358
Ibid. v. 22.
359
Ibid. v. 24.
360
Hosea vi. 6.
361
To Amos and Hosea, Yahweh is simply the supreme god, the
suzerain of all other gods.
362
Is. ii. 3, 4; cf. Micah iv. 1–3. See Driver, Introduction to the
Literature of the Old Testament (1897), p. 229, for the opinion
of different commentators on the possible exilic or postexilic
date of these passages.
363
Is. i. 11–17.
364
Micah vi. 6–8.
365
Wellhausen, Prolegomena to the History of Israel (1885), p.
414.
366
This festival was probably of Babylonian origin. It was
associated with astronomical phenomena—with the seven
planets of ancient astronomy and with the phases of the moon.
367
The feast of Purim is another transformed festival; “Babylonian
in origin, it was given a Jewish dress and became incorporated
into the system of Jewish observances” (David Philipson, The
Reform Movement in Judaism (1907), p. 3).
368
Thus the festival of Dionysus, which “in its origin was a mere
burst of primitive animal spirits, is transmuted into a complex
and beautiful work of art” (Dickinson, The Greek View of Life,
p. 14).
369
Deut. vi. 14.
370
Montefiori, Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion
(1892), p. 197.
371
Prolegomena to the History of Israel (1885), p. 402. Renan
speaks of Deuteronomy in the same strain: “This Thora was
the worst enemy of the universal religion which the prophets of
the eighth century had in their dreams” (History of the People
of Israel (1891), vol. iii, p. 175).
372
Cf. Chapter XVI. The persecutions of the medieval Church
were largely the outcome of this legislation which made the
extermination of God’s enemies, that is, idolators and
misbelievers, a pious duty. “The terrible Directorium
Inquisitorum of Nicholas Eymeric follows Deuteronomy word
for word” (Renan, History of the people of Israel (1891), vol. iii,
p. 179).
373
Deut. xx. 16.
374
Ibid. vii. 2.
375
Jewish Religious Life after the Exile (1898), p. 45. The
teachings of this same intolerant monolatry has, down to the
present day, exerted a retarding influence upon the
development of international morality, especially upon the war
ethics of the Christian nations.
376
We meet with the same phenomenon in medieval times. The
Christian Church, which was so harsh in its dealings with
misbelievers, was a tender mother toward the poor and the
afflicted of the faith.
377
The origin of these cities may date from a much earlier time
than the reform under King Josiah. The code may simply
register changes already effected in the customary law. See
Nathaniel Schmidt, The Prophet of Nazareth (1905), p. 61.
378
Deut. iv. 41, 42; xix. 1–13.
379
Deut. xv. 7, 8.
380
Ibid. xxiv. 6.
381
Ibid. xxiv. 12, 13.
382
Ibid. xxiv. 17.
383
Ibid. xxiv. 14, 15.
384
Ibid. xxiii. 19, 20. Cf. Maspero, The Dawn of Civilization, p.
760. The poor in these early times were, in all the lands
advancing in civilization, literally devoured by the money
lenders.
385
Deut. xxiv. 19.
386
Ruth ii. 4–17.
387
Deut. v. 14, 15.
388
Ibid. xv. 12.
389
Ibid. xv. 13, 14.
390
All these regulations respecting slaves, however, lack
universalism. It is compassion for the slave not as a man, but
as a Hebrew, that moves the legislator. The laws are in general
for the benefit of Hebrew slaves alone. Gentiles or foreigners
are not included in these humane provisions. See Lev. xxv and
Ex. xxi. 2.
391
See Is. xl-lxvi.
392
“Deutero-Isaiah was the first to emphasize and make use of
this plenary and unconditional monotheism.”—Montefiori,
Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion (1892), p. 269.
393
Is. xliii. 10.
394
Ibid. xliv. 6.
395
Ibid. xliv. 24.
396
Ibid. xlv. 5.
397
Ibid. xlvi. 9.
398
There is a repetition of this in the Koran, where the Prophet of
Arabia speaks as one to whom the idea of the unity of deity
had come as a new thought.
399
W. Robertson Smith, The Religion of the Semites (1894), p.
81.
400
See above, pp. 18–20.
401
“I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the
fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation
of them that hate me.”—Deut. v. 9.
402
Ezek. xviii. 2.
403
Ibid. xviii. 3.
404
Ezek. xviii. 20. The entire chapter is devoted to this single
subject. This truer view had dawned upon the compilers of the
Deuteronomic code. Cf. Deut. xxiv. 16 and Jer. xxxi. 29, 30.
405
See below, p. 364.
406
See lii. 13-liii. 12.
407
Cf. Bennett, The Religion of the Post-Exilic Prophets (1907),
pp. 326 ff.
408
In the year 539 b.c. Cyrus, king of Persia, having captured
Babylon, issued a decree giving the Jewish exiles in Babylonia
permission to return to their own land and to rebuild the
Temple destroyed fifty years before by Nebuchadnezzar. A
band returned and set themselves to the task of restoring their
houses and rebuilding the Temple. After many interruptions
and long delay the building was finished and dedicated anew
to the worship of Yahweh (516 b.c.).
409
“The growth of Judaism and the Judaic veneration for the law,
after Ezra’s reformation, shows some marked resemblances to
the growth in post-Reformation Protestant theology of the legal
conception of salvation, and particularly the tendency to
formalize and almost to deify the literal inspiration and
authority of the Scriptures.”—Newman Smyth, Christian Ethics
(1892), p. 95.
410
For life under the law consult Schürer, History of the Jewish
People, division ii, vol. ii, pp. 90 ff.
411
Matt. xxiii. 23.
412
Ibid. xv. 11, 20. “The identification of morality with ritual in his
[Jesus’] day had confused the issue before human life much as
 that issue is now confused by the identification of morality with
opinion” (Hall, History of Ethics within Organized Christianity
(1910), p. 62).
413
Ps. cxxxvii. 9; see Ps. cix.
414
On this subject see Toy, Judaism and Christianity (1891), pp.
246 ff.
415
“The people had learned to draw nigh to God without the aid of
sacrifice.”—W. Robertson Smith, The Religion of the
Semites (1894), p. 215.
416
Cf. Mark i. 21; vi. 2.
417
Renan, History of the People of Israel (1895), vol. iv, p. 195.
418
Consult on this subject Charles, A Critical History of the
Doctrine of a Future Life (1898–1899).
419
See above, pp. 139 f.
420
See Cheyne, Jewish Religious Life after the Exile (1898), p.
229; and Toy, Judaism and Christianity (1891), pp. 378, 386.
421
Ps. xvi. 10, Rev. Ver.
422

“I know without me God cannot a moment live;

If I to death should go, He, too, would death receive.”
Quoted by Blow, A Study of Dante (1887), p. 102.

423
Cf. above, p. 44; see also Toy, Judaism and Christianity
(1891), p. 387; Hall, History of Ethics within Organized
Christianity (1910), p. 216.
424
The Pharisees; cf. Acts xxiii. 6–8.
425
We see a repetition of all this in what is going on to-day among
the Jews in the great cities of the New World. Liberal Judaism
is largely the outcome of just such influences as brought forth
Christianity out of the narrow ritual Judaism of the Alexandrian
Age. See David Philipson, The Reform Movement in Judaism
(1907), chap. xii.
426
“Those psalms into which a sense of something like the
brotherhood of nations begins to penetrate are for various
reasons later than 382 b.c.... Not till the coming of the
Macedonian reconciler of East and West could there be a
presentiment of the truth of the divine education, not only of
Israel, but of the human race.”—Cheyne, Jewish Religious Life
after the Exile (1898), pp. 134 f.
427
To Hillel is credited the maxim, “What thou wouldst not have
another do to thee, do not thou to another.”
428
The teaching of the Orphic sects that there are two elements,
one good and another bad, in man’s nature, was an esoteric
doctrine which had no influence on the popular mind and
conscience. Cf. G. Lowes Dickinson, The Greek View of Life,
6th ed., pp. 31 f.
429
There are, it is true, gods of the lower world unfriendly to man,
but there is nothing in the Greek world-view corresponding to
the Egyptian conception of the struggle between the good
Osiris and the wicked Set, or of the Persian idea of the conflict
between the beneficent Ahura Mazda and the evil-working
Ahriman. Nor was there anything in this view like the
Babylonian or Persian notion of malicious spirits.
430
The Dionysian cult fostered art, but not directly morality. In so
far as the Attic drama was an elevating moral influence, the
cult may be said to have indirectly promoted morals. But the
foreign orgiastic god had to be thoroughly converted before he
could strengthen others.
431
The pre-Hellenic Oriental cult of Aphrodite had undoubtedly an
unfavorable influence on morality. “Some part of this evil
character [was] transplanted into Greek legend, but very little
into Greek worship.... What we know is that until the declining
period of Greek history the cult of Aphrodite, so far as it
appears in written or monumental record, was as pure and
austere as that of Zeus and Athena” (Farnell, The Cults of the
Greek States (1896), vol. ii, pp. 657, 663).
432
Cf. Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Griechen (1882), Bd. i, S. 165.
433
Farnell, The Cults of the Greek States (1896), vol. i, p. 74,
quoting Charondas, the Sicilian legislator.
434
Farnell, The Cults of the Greek States (1896), vol. iv, pp. 177
ff.
435
Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the
Christian Church, 2d ed., p. 292.
436
History of Greece (1900), pp. 320 f.
437
Thucyd. i. 70.
438
For an illuminating comparison of the Greek virtues of fortitude
and temperance with the corresponding Christian virtues, see
T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, 5th ed., pp. 304 ff.
439
Ethics, iii. 10.
440
“But let [each man] know,” says Plato, “how to choose the
mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as far as in him
lies, not only in this life but in all that which is to come. For this
is the way of happiness” (Republic, tr. Jowett, x. 619).
441
Socrates, it is true, taught that it is better to suffer wrong than
to do wrong, but he was here far in advance of the common
Greek conscience.
442
Quoted by Taylor, Ancient Ideals (1896), vol. i, p. 247.
443
Christian Ethics (1873), vol. i, p. 63.
444
The Greek View of Life (1909), p. 205.
445
If we contrast the Greek conception of man’s nature with that
of certain systems of Christian theology, we shall better
understand the ethical value of such ideas and beliefs. On the
occasion of a college commencement one of the speakers, a
stout upholder of the doctrines of the fall of man, original sin,
and the utter depravity of the natural man, roundly denounced
this injunction of Pindar’s. He said to the young people who
had chosen as their class motto, “Be what you are,” that that
was just what they ought not to be. He then went on to show
them that their nature was wholly corrupt, that all their natural
inclinations were toward evil continually, and that if they ever
hoped for salvation they must become what they were not.
446
“Aristotle may be almost said to have made the difference
between Greek and barbarian the basis of his moral code.”—
Lecky, History of European Morals, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 200.
447
Politics, i. 7, sec. 5; 8, sec. 12; vii. 14, sec. 21.
448
For the ethics of Greek slavery consult Schmidt, Die Ethik der
alten Griechen (1882), Bd. ii, S. 203–219.
449
Thebes, but not from moral scruples seemingly, prohibited
under the penalty of death the destruction of healthy infants.
450
The reader of Plato will recall how Socrates uses this practice
of the exposition of infants to illustrate his art of bringing to
birth true and false ideas (“lies and shadows”) in the minds of
his pupils, and exposing to die those that are vain shadows.
See his Dialogues, tr. Jowett, vol. iii, pp. 350 f.
451
The practice of the exposition of female infants in the
Hellenistic Age, when luxury increased and children became a
burden, seems to have been more common than in earlier
times.
452
Mahaffy, Social Life in Greece (1888), p. 120.
453
Politics, vi. 4, sec. 12. This contempt for tradesmen and
laborers, generally speaking, continued through all periods of
Greek history. In some states, however, particularly in Athens,
it underwent modification. “The later Athenians began to
consider trade an honorable road to riches, and aristocrats like
Nicias were known as careful trade masters.” In Rhodes, also,
trade became honorable.
454
Paulsen, System of Ethics, tr. Thilly, p. 62 n.
455
Laws, tr. Jowett, xi. 919.
456
They were charged with adulteration of foods, cheating in
measure, etc. Demosthenes declares that a man honest in
commercial transactions was a prodigy. Cf. Mahaffy, Social Life
in Greece (1888), p. 419.
457
See above, p. 89.
458
This ethical feeling is to be reckoned with in dealing with
Asiatics—until there is a change in their ideal of manliness.
The overlooking of an injury is apt to be regarded by them as
an indication of weakness and cowardice.
459
Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Griechen (1882), Bd. ii, S. 312.
460
Herod. vi. 24. The Delphian oracle tried to cure this defect in
the national character. See the story of Glaucus, Herod. vi. 86.
461
Die Ethik der alten Griechen (1882), Bd. ii, S. 413.
462
Ethics, tr. Welldon, i. 4.
463
Ethics: the Facts of the Moral Life (1908), p. 95.
464
Od. xix. 396–398.
465
Thucyd. i. 5.
466
Il. xxii. 485–499.
467
See Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21, for the parable, by the Sophist
Prodicus, of the choice of Heracles at the parting of the ways.
468
The Republic, iii. 386–392.
469
See above, p. 35.
470
“The blessed islands of the West were indeed even then [in the
Homeric Age] a home for the dead, but they had not yet been
opened to moral worth, as in the days of Pindar.”—Mahaffy,
Social Life in Greece (1888), p. 26.
471
See Zeller, History of Philosophy (1881), vol. i, p. 125, and
Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Griechen (1882), Bd. i, S. 99.
“Strictly speaking,” says Professor Seymour, “Homer knows of
no instance of rewards, and of only one case of punishment
after death” (Life in the Homeric Age (1908), p. 469).
472
For the Greek view of the underworld, and the incoming of the
idea of rewards and punishments in the after life, see Schmidt,
Die Ethik der alten Griechen (1882), Bd. i, S. 97 ff., and
Rhode, Psyche: Seelencult und Unsterblichkeits Glaube der
Griechen, 4te Auflage, Bd. i, S. 301–319.
473
This moralization of Hades is carried still further by Vergil. It is
instructive to compare his vision of Hades with Homer’s.
474
Republic, x. 614–616; see also Gorgias, 523–527.
475
Herod. i. 30–32. But Nemesis appears later in the story, and
Crœsus is represented as being punished for the crime of an
ancestor.
476
Ibid. vii. 10. The views which the historian here attributes to the
Persian Artabanus were of course a reflection of Greek belief.
For further instances in Greek literature of the conception of
 the envy of the gods, consult Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten
Griechen (1882), Bd. i, S. 78–84.
477
Thucyd. vii. 77.
478
Pericles (1890), p. 312.
479
“The very event [the Persian war] which determined the
sudden splendor of the drama gave a sublime and terrific
sanction to the already existing morality.”—Symonds, Studies
of the Greek Poets (1880), vol. ii, p. 17.
480
Farnell, The Cults of the Greek States (1896), vol. i, p. 129.
After the tale had been moralized by Æschylus, Phidias carved
the story on the great Zeus throne at Olympia, using it to give
emphasis to the conception of the god as the guardian of the
moral order of the world.
481
Thucyd. v. 84–116.
482
The attitude of the later philosophers toward the notion that the
gods are envious is fairly represented by Plato’s protest: “He
[the Creator] is good, and no goodness can have any jealousy
of anything” (Timæus, tr. Jowett, 29).
483
“The dispensation which takes the aspect of divine envy to
mortals might, it seems, from a higher point of view, be
discerned as the very opposite; human vicissitude is the result
of a divine love anxious to share the true blessedness which
comes in the form of sorrow.”—Wedgwood, The Moral Ideal,
3d ed., p. 112.
484
Taylor, Ancient Ideals (1896), vol. i, p. 227.
485
Farnell, The Cults of the Greek States (1891), vol. i, p. 129.
486
Republic, tr. Jowett, x. 613.
487
See James Adam, The Vitality of Platonism (1911), chap. v,
“Ancient Greek Views of Suffering and Evil.”
488
When we contrast with this Sophocles’ treatment of the same
theme in Antigone we realize how great an advance during the
interval the Greeks had made in humanitarian feeling.
489
See Thucyd. iii. 53–59.
490
The Spartan admiral Callicratides (the successor of Lysander,
406 b.c.) refused to sell his Greek prisoners of war as slaves,
but he stood almost or quite alone in this. See Xen. Hellen. i. 6,
14.
491
Mahaffy, Social Life in Greece (1888), p. 235.
492
The war brought into fearful exaggeration the salient weakness
of Greek morality. The most reprehensible moral faults of the
Greeks were the outgrowth of political factions and cabals, of
party jealousies and rivalries in the close quarters of city walls.
These faults were lifted into the most savage passions by the
war. Thucydides in a memorable passage (iii. 82) draws a
striking picture of the disastrous moral effects of the prolonged
quarrel.
493
See above, p. 180.
494
Republic, v. 469–471.
495
Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution (1906), vol. i, p. 267; see also
A. Ræder, L’Arbitrage international chez les Hellenes (1912).
496
Études sur l’histoire de humanité (1880), t. ii, p. 105. Because
of its long exemption from the ravages of war, Elis was more
populous and wealthy than any other district of the
Peloponnesus (Polyb. iv. 73, 74). The contrast presented by
Greece in general constituted an impressive commentary on
the fatal consequences for Greek civilization of the war
system. Speaking of the depopulation which incessant wars
had caused over almost all the world he knew, Plutarch says of
Greece, a land once “strong in cities,” that the whole country
could raise barely three thousand men, the same number that
 the single city of Megara sent to Platæa at the time of the
Persian war (Philosophical Essays, “On the Cessation of
Oracles,” sec. viii).
497
See above, p. 18.
498
“Really to see the good and to know it as such, yet not to love
and pursue it, is impossible; the vision carries with it its own
persuasion and authority.”—Martineau, Types of Ethical
Theory, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 74. “Mere school and word knowledge,
of course, is powerless, but real knowledge, knowledge that
represents real personal conviction, cannot fail to influence
life.”—Paulsen, System of Ethics, tr. Thilly (1906), p. 62.
499
“There are few men whose minds are not more or less in that
state of sham knowledge against which Socrates made war;
there is no man whose notions have not been first got together
by spontaneous, unexamined, unconscious, uncertified
association—resting upon forgotten particulars, blending
together disparities or inconsistencies, and leaving in his mind
old and familiar phrases and oracular propositions, of which he
has never rendered to himself account; there is no man, who, if
he be destined for vigorous and profitable scientific effort, has
not found it a necessary branch of self-education to break up,
disentangle, analyse, and reconstruct this ancient mental
compound, and who has not been driven to it by his own lame
and solitary efforts, since the giant of the colloquial Elenchus
no longer stands in the market place to lend him help and
stimulus.”—Grote, History of Greece (1888), vol. vii, pp. 168
f.
500
Quoted by Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Griechen (1882), Bd. ii,
S. 396.
501
“His [Socrates’] significancy for moral philosophy lies in his
calling attention to rational knowledge as the source of the
moral.”—Wuttke, Christian Ethics (1873), vol. i, p. 69.
502
Histoire des théories et des idées morales dans l’antiquité
(1879), t. i, pp. 125 f.
503
Cf. Gorgias, 478, 479.
504
Laws, tr. Jowett, xi. 913. Plato saw what the socialist-
philosopher Lloyd saw when he wrote, “More searching ... than
the Golden Rule is that which commands us to inquire if what
we desire for ourselves and others is a right desire” (Man the
Social Creator (1906), p. 147).
505
In the Republic Plato reaches the conception of a Greek
brotherhood, but beyond this he never advanced.
506
Xen. Mem. ii. 6, 35.
507
Politics, i. 7, sec. 5; 8, sec. 12; vii. 2, sec. 15; 14, sec. 21.
508
Histoire des théories et des idées morales dans l’antiquité
(1879), t. i, p. 228.
509
“A moral ideal which was not coextensive with the whole
spiritual nature of man was taken by the schoolmen from the
Aristotelian ethics, and then the so-called religious virtues were
more or less cumbrously and precariously built upon it.
Supernaturalism in morals was added to the classic naturalism
as a divine appendix to ethics.”—Newman Smyth, Christian
Ethics (1892), p. 133.
510
The downfall of the institutions of the free city state was to
Greek morality what the downfall of the papal Church would
have been to the morality of the medieval ages.
511
Philopœman and Aratus.
512
This ascetic tendency in Stoicism is doubtless to be attributed
to the influence of the Orient upon Greek life and thought.
513
Consistently so, since only through self-control and the
avoidance of all excesses of passion, appetite, and desires
 can one maintain that tranquillity of mind which is the condition
precedent of happiness.
514
Lecky, History of European Morals, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 228.
515
Mahaffy, Social Life in Greece, p. 264. The author contrasts
this humaneness of the laws of the Athenian democracy four
centuries before Christ with the atrocious cruelty of the criminal
laws of Christian Europe down almost to the nineteenth
century.
516
Social Life in Greece (1888), p. 269.
517
Ibid. p. 554.
518
The Apostle Paul at Athens, seeking common ground with his
hearers for the doctrine he preached that God hath made of
one blood all nations of men, finds it in the familiar line of the
Stoic Cleanthes—“We are the offspring of God.”
519
Plutarch died about 40 a.d.
520
“From contact with the Greeks, therefore, Christianity obtained
this support, that an ideal long known to the Western world, the
Stoic ideal, was found to correspond with it, so that the
preaching of the Apostles was in this respect not out of
harmony with the wants and aspirations of the higher and
better minds of the age.”—Mahaffy, Progress of Hellenism in
Alexander’s Empire (1905), p. 146.
521
“The essential oneness of human moral experience has shown
itself in the ethical results achieved by these various
peoples.”—Toy, Judaism and Christianity (1891), p. 337.
522
Coulanges, The Ancient City, ii, 9.
523
The authority of the father over each and every member of the
family was legally absolute, extending to life and death. Not
until late in the Empire did the law forbid fathers to kill their
grown-up children or to sell them as slaves. Cf. McKenzie,
 Studies in Roman Law, 6th ed., p. 141; and Sohm, Institutes
(1901), p. 53.
524
Inge, Society in Rome under the Cæsars (1888), p. 8.
525
This Roman virtue of obedience to the state has been just
such an enduring force in the moral life of the Christian world
as has the Jewish virtue of obedience to a revealed law (see
Chapter IX). Historically regarded, the Protestant Church,
which makes obedience to a written revealed law a necessary
virtue, is the inheritor of the ethical feeling and conviction of
ancient Israel; while the Roman Catholic Church, which makes
submission to ecclesiastical authority an indispensable virtue,
is the inheritor of the ethical tradition and spirit of ancient
Rome. See H. M. Gwatkin (co-author), Early Ideals of
Righteousness (1910), pp. 71 ff.
526
Tacitus, Annals, iii. 16, 17.
527
This legal subjection of the son to the father, while it developed
and strengthened the virtue of obedience, seemed to deaden
filial affection. “Of all the forms of virtue,” says Lecky, “filial
affection is perhaps that which appears most rarely in Roman
history” (History of European Morals, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 299).
528
De Off. i. 17.
529
History of European Morals, 3d ed., vol. i, pp. 177 f.
530
See p. 245, on the ethics of persecution.
531
The Moral Ideal, 3d ed., p. 148.
532
Cf. Chapter XVIII.
533
The citizen army, which had been the seed plot of those heroic
virtues that cast such a halo around the earlier history of
Rome, had been replaced by a mercenary force in which only
the coarser military virtues could find sphere for exercise.
534
“The unchecked power of the master ... produced those cold
hearts which gloated over the agony of gallant men in the
arena.”—Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius
(1904), p. 12.
535
Friedlander, Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms
(1888), Bd. i, S. 479–481; English ed., Roman Life and
Manners under the Early Empire, vol. i, pp. 243 f.
536
“The senator was forbidden down to the last age of the empire,
both by law and sentiment, to increase his fortune by
commerce.”—Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus
Aurelius, p. 102.
537
De Off. i. 42.
538
Lecky, History of European Morals, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 271.
539
Friedlander, Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms
(1889), Bd. ii, S. 414; English ed., Roman Life and Manners
under the Early Empire, vol. ii, p. 77.
540
“The unusual enthusiasm for the shows is expressed in many
a rude sketch which has been traced by boyish hands upon
the walls.”—Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus
Aurelius, p. 238.
541
In an eloquent passage Lecky thus sums up the demoralizing
effects of the spectacles: “Those hateful games, which made
the spectacle of human suffering and death the delight of all
classes, had spread their brutalising influence wherever the
Roman name was known, had rendered millions absolutely
indifferent to the sight of human suffering, had produced in
many, in the very centre of an advanced civilization, a relish
and a passion for torture, a rapture and an exultation in
watching the spasms of extreme agony, such as an African or
an American savage alone can equal”. (History of European
Morals, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 467).