Homicide: Murder

Homicide is the killing of a human being by another human being. Note that there are offences
of unlawful homicide: they include murder, manslaughter, infanticide and causing death by
reckless driving. According to section 306, homicide is the killing of any person when the killing
is not authorized, justified or excused by law. From this, we can reasonably infer that there
could be circumstances where killing of a human being can be authorized, justified or excused
by law.

Therefore to be liable for the killing of any person the defendant must cause the death of
another in circumstances not authorized by law. From the foregoing there are three elements
of homicide from section 306 of the Criminal Code. The elements are (1) a human being, (11)
death, and (111) causation.

Note that the offence of murder is defined in section 316 of the Criminal Code and for murder
to be committed the accused must have killed another under any of the circumstances listed in
the section. They are;

If the offender intends to cause the death of the person killed, or that of some other
person,
If the offender intends to do to the person killed to some other person some grievous
harm,
If death is caused by means of an act done in the prosecution of an unlawful purpose,
which act is of such a nature as to be likely to endanger life,
If the offender intends to do grievous harm to some person for the purpose of
facilitating the flight of an offender who has committed or attempted to commit any
such offence;
If death is caused by administering any stupefying or overpowering things for either of
the purpose last aforementioned;
If death is caused by willfully stopping the breath of any person for either of such
purposes.
Section 316 sub sections (1) and (2) restates the general proposition that, for a
conviction for murder, there must be proof of an intent to kill or cause grievous harm. In
Holmes v. D.P.P, the House of Lords held that an intent to cause death or grievous
bodily harm is established if it is proved that the accused deliberately and intentionally
did an act knowing that it was probable that it would result in the death of or grievous
bodily harm to the victim, even though he did not desire that result. In that case, the
accused was discarded by her lover who began to pay his respects to another woman.
At about 2 a.m. one morning the accused was driven by jealousy to set fire to the house
in which the other woman lived with her three children. Two of the children were burnt

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 to death. The accused pleaded that her only intention was to frighten the other woman
into leaving the neighbourhood and that she had no intention to cause death or
grievous bodily harm. The House of Lords held that ….if a man, in full knowledge of the
danger involved, and without lawful excuse, deliberately does that which exposes a
victim to the risk of the probable grievous bodily harm or death, and the victim dies, the
perpetrator of the crime is guilty of murder and not manslaughter to the same extent as
if he had actually intended the consequences to follow, and irrespective of whether he
wishes it.
On the ingredients of the offence of murder, the prosecution must establish beyond
reasonable doubt:
that the deceased has died or that the death of a human being was caused;
that the death of the deceased resulted from the acts of the accused person;
that the act of the accused was intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily
harm was the probable consequence. See the case of Umaru Sani v. The State [2018] 8
NWLR, part 1622, page 415, and the case of Ijeoma Anyasodor v. The State [2018] 8
NWLR (Part 1620, p.110, the case of Etim Etim Udo v. The State [2018] 8 NWLR (Part
1622) p. 465
In section 316 (3), the Supreme Court held in Aga v. State (1976) 7 S. C. 173 that the
expression “in the prosecution of” means “in furtherance of.” In R. v. Stuart and Finch
(1974) Qd. R. 297 an attempt to distinguish between a preparation to prosecute an
unlawful purpose and an actual prosecution of the purpose failed.
Section 316 (4) (5) (6) cover situations where any of the acts specified in them is done
for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence which is such that the
offender may be arrested without warrant or for the purpose of facilitating the flight of
an offender.

A human being

Who is a human being and when can we say a child becomes a human being capable of being
killed? To be the victim of homicide a person must be “in being.” According to section 307 of
the Criminal Code, a child becomes a person capable of being killed when it has completely
proceeded from the body of its mother, whether it has breathed or not, and whether it has an
independent circulation or not, and whether the navel-string is severed or not. In the case of R.
V. Castles [1969] Q.W.N 36, the accused induced an abortion on a female who was 22 weeks
pregnant as a result of which the baby was born alive but died about two hours later. Medical
evidence showed that the child had no prospect of continued survival because of the stage of
its development and its weight. On a charge of manslaughter the accused contended that
section 292 of the Queensland Criminal Code (our section 307 of the Criminal Code) must be
construed as referring to a viable child, i.e. a child capable of continued independent existence.

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The court rejected this argument and held that a child who lives, albeit doomed to die, for
some period after it has proceeded from the body of its mother, is within the section. In
Attorney-General Reference (No. 3 of 1994), a man stabbed his pregnant girlfriend in the
abdomen. The child was born prematurely due to the complications arising from her premature
birth. The House of Lords held that the foetus was not an integral part of the mother but a
unique organism. Thus, if a person injures a foetus and the baby is then born alive but
subsequently dies from the injuries, the concept of a human being would be satisfied for the
purpose of a homicide offence.

Death

Note that the requirement of death must be satisfied before a person can e offence of
homicide. There is no single definition of death. In the past absence of breathing, a heartbeat,
or pulse meant that a person could be safely be pronounced dead. With the medical and
technological advances, it is possible for a person to be kept on a life support machine for many
years. As a result, the courts have considered whether a person is alive or dead and if dead at
what point can be said to have occurred. In R. V. Malcherek and Steel (1981), the court
appeared to favour the approach that death occurs when the victim is brain-dead.

The purport of section 308 0f the Criminal Code is that death of another can be caused directly
or indirectly, and by any means whatever. Also note that when a child dies in consequences of
an act done or omitted to be done by any person before or during its birth, the person who did
or omitted to do such acts is deemed to have killed the child. Again, it is important to note that
a person shall not be responsible for the death of another unless such death occurs within a
year and a day of the cause of death. Such a period is reckoned inclusive of the day on which
the last unlawful act contributing to the cause of death was done. See section 314 of the
Criminal Code. In the case of R, V. Dyson [1908] 2 K.B. 454, the accused had inflicted injuries on
the deceased more than a year and a day before the date of death and also certain further
injuries within that period which tended to accelerate the death. The accused was convicted for
the death of the deceased but on appeal the conviction was quashed on the ground that the
deceased died more than one year and a day rule.

Causation

For a person to be responsible for the death of another he must have done something that
causes the death of the person. The prosecution must therefore prove that the death was
caused by the defendant’s act. In doing this the prosecution must prove both factual and legal
causation. A person can only be responsible for the death of another where his acts are both a
factual and a legal cause of his victim’s death.
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Factual causation

In order to prove factual causation, the prosecution must establish two things;

That but for the conduct of the accused the victim would not have died as and when de
did. The defendant will not be responsible for the death if the victim would have died at
the same time regardless of the defendant’s act or omission. In White (1910) the
defendant gave his mother poison but, before the poison began to take effect on the
mother, she died of a heart attack which was not caused by the poison. He was not
liable for the death of his mother. Also in the case of Uche Udo v. The Federal Republic
of Nigeria [2020] 18 NWLR (Part 1755, pp 122 &123 the appellant was arraigned at the
High Court of the Federal Capital Territory on a charge of murder contrary to section
220(a) and (b) of the Penal Code. It was alleged that the appellant stabbed his father on
the head with a broken bottle, which led to his death. One of the witnesses for the
prosecution was the daughter of the deceased who admitted under cross-examination
that she did not actually witness the appellant stab their father on the head with a
broken bottle. PW4 who was a Medical Doctor testified only about assault and scar on
the neck of the deceased. The Medical certificate stated the direct cause of death of the
deceased as stroke due to hypertension. Furthermore, nothing was stated in the exhibit
as the antecedent cause of death. He was convicted for the murder of his father and
sentenced him to death by hanging. He appealed to the Court of Appeal and the court
held that in the circumstance, the alleged stabbing of the deceased could not be linked
to his death by stroke caused by hypertension.
That the original injury arising from the defendant’s conduct was more than a minimal
cause of the victim’s death.
This is known as the de minimis rule, and it refers to the fact that when we say a person
kills someone, what it actually means is that he makes the person’s death occurs earlier
that it otherwise would, since we are all dying anyway. The acceleration of death caused
by the defendant’s conduct must be more than merely trivial.
Legal causation
Legal causation can be proved in any of the following three ways or by a combination of
them.
The original injury was an operative and significant cause of death. Under this criterion,
the prosecution must show that at the time of the victim’s death, the original wound or
injuries inflicted by the defendant were still an operative and substantial cause of that
death. In R. V. Smith (1959), a soldier was stabbed in a barrack-room brawl. He was
dropped twice as he was being taken to the officer, and then there was a long delay
before he was seen by a doctor, as the doctor mistakenly thought that his case was not
urgent. When he did eventually receive treatment it was inappropriate for the injuries

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 he was suffering from and harmful. The victim died from the injuries and the court held
these intervening factors had not broken the chain of causation so that the original
wound was still an operative cause and the accused was liable for murder.
In R. V. Malcherek and Steel, the victims of two separate attacks had been on life-
support machines and these were switched off when tests showed that they were brain-
dead. The two defendants argued that when the hospital switched off the machines the
chain of causation was broken, thereby relieving the defendants of liability for murder.
The court rejected this argument on the grounds that the original injuries were still an
operative cause of their victims’ deaths.
In R. V. Cheshire (1991), a dispute developed in a fish and chip shop, ending with the
defendant shooting his victim in the leg and stomach, and seriously wounding him. The
victim was taken to hospital, where his injuries were operated on, and he was placed in
intensive care. As a result of negligent treatment by the medical staff, he developed
complications affecting his breathing, and eventually died. The court stated that the
negligent medical treatment in this case was not enough to break the chain of causation
and that the defendant was still liable for the death of the victim. This simply means
that medical treatment can only break the chain of causation in the most extraordinary
cases; incompetence or even grossly abnormal treatment will not suffice if the original
injury is still an operative cause of death.
In R. V. Holland (1841), the accused injured his victim’s finger. It was recommended by a
surgeon that the finger should be amputated and the victim refused to have it
amputated. Lockjaw set in and when the finger was amputated it was too late and the
victim died from lockjaw. On a charge of murder the accused argued that the victim’s
refusal to allow amputation of the finger was the cause of the victim’s death. The
accused was convicted of murder for the wound inflicted by him was the cause of death.
In R. V. Jordan (1955), the defendant was convicted of murder after stabbing the victim,
but the conviction was quashed by the Court of Criminal Appeal when it heard new
evidence that, at the time of the death, the original wound was almost healed, and that
the victim’s death was brought on by the hospital giving him a drug to which he was
known to be allergic. It was held that the wound was no longer an operative cause of
death.
The intervening act was reasonably foreseeable
An intervening act which is reasonably foreseeable will not break the chain of legal
causation. For instance, if the defendant knocks his victim unconscious, and leaves him
lying on a beach, it is reasonably foreseeable that when ocean tide comes in, the victim
will drown, and the defendant will have caused that death. The defendant would not be
liable if the victim is left unconscious and a vehicle swerving from the road for loss of
control runs over the victim and kills him as this could not have been foreseen. In R. V.

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 Pagett (1983), the defendant was attempting to escape being captured by armed police,
and used his girlfriend as a human shield. He shot at the police, and his girlfriend was
killed by shots fired at him in self-defence by the policemen. He was liable for the girl’s
death as it was reasonably foreseeable that when he fired at the police they would
shoot back and hit her girlfriend in response to his shoots.
Note that in cases involving medical treatment only grossly abnormal treatment will be
treated as not reasonably foreseeable based on the decision of Cheshire. In R. v. Dear
(1996) the Court of Appeal suggested that if the defendant’s conduct was still an
operative and significant cause of the death, the defendant would in law be the cause of
that death, regardless of whether or not any intervening factors were foreseeable. In
that case, the accused’s daughter told him that she had been sexually assaulted. On
hearing this allegation the accused stabbed the alleged abuser repeatedly with a knife.
The victim died two days later. On appeal against his conviction for murder the
appellant argued that he was not the cause of the death. He contended that the victim
had committed suicide either by reopening his wounds or the wounds having reopened
themselves, by failing to seek medical attention and the suicide broke the chain of
causation. The appeal was dismissed as the injuries inflicted on the deceased were still
an operative and significant cause of the death.
The thin skull test
Where the intervening cause is some existing weakness of the victim, the defendant
must take his victim as he finds him. According to this rule, if a defendant hits a person
over the head with the kind of blow which would not usually kill, but the victim has an
unusually thin skull which makes the blow fatal, the defendant will be liable for the
subsequent death. The principle has been extended to mental conditions and beliefs, as
well as physical characteristics. In R. v. Blaue (1975), the victim of a stabbing was a
Jehoval’s Witness, a church which, among other things, forbids its members to have
blood transfusions. As a result of her refusal to accept a transfusion, the victim died of
her wounds. The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s argument that her refusal to
accept blood transfusion broke the chain of causation, on the ground that the
defendant had to take his victim as he found her.
Joint enterprise
It is easier to find defendants to have caused a result where they are part of a joint
enterprise. A joint enterprise exists where two or more people act together with a
common intention that they have communicated to each other. For example, there is a
joint enterprise where two men decide to attack a person, and one hits him and the
other kicks him. If the man dies as result of a kick to the head both defendants would be
found to have caused the death of the man because the relevant injuries are inflicted as
part of a joint enterprise.

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 Manslaughter

Section 317 of the Criminal Code gives definition of manslaughter by saying that a person who
unlawfully kills another in circumstances as not to constitute murder is guilty of manslaughter.
Section 318 of the Criminal Code provides for a situation when a person kills another as a result
of provocation and the implication of this provision is that provocation acts as an extenuating
or mitigating factor to reduce murder to manslaughter.

What is provocation? Provocation is an act, or series of acts, done by the victim to the accused
person, which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually caused in the accused person
a sudden and temporary loss of self-control rendering the accused person vulnerable or
susceptible to passion so much as so that, for the moment, he or she was no longer the master
of his or her mind. See the cases of Emmanuel Eze v. The State [2018] 16 NWLR P.3, Akalezi v.
State [1993] 2 NWLR (part 273) p.1, and Musa v. State (2009) 15 NWLR (part 1165) 467

What amounts to provocation, provocation is an action or conduct which arises suddenly in the
heat of anger. Such action or conduct is precipitated by resentment, rage or fury on the part of
the accused person to the person that offered the provocation. Because of the anger,
resentment, rage or injury, the accused person suddenly and temporarily loses his passion and
self-control; a state of mind which results in the commission of the offence. Note that there can
hardly be provocation in respect of words or acts spoken or done in the absence of the accused
person. The reason being that words spoken or acts done in the absence of the accused person
will not precipitate any sudden anger, resentment, rage, or fury as there is time for passion to
cool. See the case of Emmanuel Eze v. State, supra.

What are the ingredients of the defence of provocation?

The three elements which a defendant who wants to rely on the defence of provocation must
prove are that:

there must be deceased person’s act of provocation which caused his loss of self-
control,
he killed the deceased in the heat of passion, and,
At the time of killing, the heat of passion had not waned.

Note that section 318 of the Code does not define provocation therefore reference is made to
section 283 of the Criminal Code which provocation in relation to an offence of which an assault
is an element. It is important to note that a lawful act is not provocation to any person for an
assault. But note that the best provocation can do is to reduce murder to manslaughter but
cannot operate to completely free an accused who kills another person under provocation. In
the case of Obaji v. State the Supreme Court considered the question whether the meaning of

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provocation in section 318 is to be found in section 283 or in the common law and held that
sections 283 and 318 must be read together.

Manslaughter can be voluntary as well as involuntary. Voluntary manslaughter occurs when a

person intentionally kills another but the offence is reduced from murder to manslaughter
because of provocation. Involuntary manslaughter covers all other cases in which there is no
intention to kill or do grievous harm, or which do not fall under section 318 of the Criminal
Code, negligence, motor vehicle accidents, and medical negligence.

Elements of provocation

Note that no amount of provocation can ever justify a killing. The most that it can do is to
reduce murder to manslaughter. Before a plea of provocation will succeed in reducing murder
to manslaughter certain conditions must be satisfied.

First, the provocation must be such as to cause a reasonable person to lose his self-control. This
requirement is part of the section 283 of the Criminal Code which says “to deprive him of the
power of self-control.” The text is the effect which the provocation would have on a reasonable
man, not the effect which it did actually have on the accused. Accordingly, if a reasonable
person would be provoked but the accused himself was not provoked, a plea of provocation
will fail. It must be shown not only that the provocation was such as could cause a reasonable
man to lose his self-control but also that the accused did in fact lose his self-control as a result
of the provocation.

A reasonable man in this context has been held to mean a reasonable man in the accused
person’s station in life and standard of civilization. In R. v. Adekanmi, (1944)17 N.L.R, 99 Francis
J. held that in considering provocation-

“the effect it would be expected to have on a reasonable man, must be taken to mean “the
effect it would be expected to have on a reasonable man of accused person’s standing in life,
for it would, I think, be improper to examine the question in the light of what would be
sufficient provocation in the case of an educated and civilized person. The accused, be it noted,
is an illiterate and primitive peasant of this country, and it must be beyond doubt that the
passions of such a type are far more readily aroused than those of a civilized and enlightened
class.”

In the case of Bedder v. D. P. P [1954] 1 W.L.R, 1119, the accused who was sexually impotent
tried unsuccessfully to have sexual intercourse with a prostitute. She jeered at him and kicked
him causing him to lose self-control. He stabbed her twice and killed her. On a charge of murder
he pleaded provocation and argued that the proper test was what would be the reaction of an
impotent reasonable man in the circumstances. The House of Lords upheld a direction that the

8
proper test was the effect which the conduct of the prostitute would have on an ordinary
person, not on a sexually impotent person. The House of Lords however departed from their
earlier position when the case of D.P.P v, Camplin came before them. In that case, the accused,
a boy of 15 killed the deceased by striking him on the head with a chapatti pan because the
deceased had buggered him against his will and then laughed at him as a result of which he lost
his self-control. He was charged with murder and pleaded provocation. The accused was
convicted of murder and appealed to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) which substituted
a conviction for manslaughter, taking the view that the direction was wrong. The prosecution
appealed to the House of Lords which held that the reasonable man test should take into
account everything including the physical peculiarities of the accused such as his age, colour,
sex, physical and mental disabilities.

Second, the act which causes death must be done in the heat of passion caused by sudden
provocation and before there is time for passion to cool. This is another requirement of section
318 of the Criminal Code. If between the provocative act and the killing enough time has
elapsed for passion to cool, a plea of provocation will fail. In R. v. Green, the accused person’s
wife having left him went to stay with her mother where she began to accept the advances of
another man. The accused tried hard to win back his wife but to no avail. He visited her at his
wife’s mother house one day around 9 pm and found his wife having sexual intercourse with
the other man. He returned to his house only to return to his mother-in-law’s house around 1
a.m. with a matchet. He met his wife and the other man still talking in a dark room and struck
twice on the bed and killed his wife. He also killed his mother-in-law when she ran into the
room to see what was going on. He raised provocation as justification for the killing of his wife
and mother-in-law but failed due to the fact that enough time had lapsed for his passion to cool
between the time he first went to his mother-in-law’s house around 9 p.m. and the time the
killing around 1 a.m.

In considering whether enough time has lapsed for passion to cool it is proper to take into
account previous provocative acts of the deceased to determine whether the last wrongful act
would amount to sufficient provocation. For example, in the case of Thuku (alias Nyaga) v. The
Republic, the appellant came home in a drunken state one night and found his stepfather
beating his mother. He tried to separate them and the deceased hit him twice on the head with
a stick warning him not to interfere in a fight between husband and wife. The appellant then
went indoors, slept for a few hours and woke in response to the deceased’s call. The appellant
went outside, found his mother dead with a severe head injury and saw the deceased some
distance away. He then moved his mother’s body to a shade, took a panga from the house and
chased the deceased to a house about three hundred yards away. They then exchanged words
which made the appellant to be more angry and while they were walking towards the mother’s
body the appellant killed the deceased. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s plea of

9
provocation to a charge of murder because according to the court enough time had elapsed for
passion to cool. On appeal, it was held that the incidents formed a connected series of events
which made the actual killing of the appellant’s mother so proximate to him as to have been
constructively done in his presence and that, taking into account the degree of provocation,
enough time had not elapsed for passion to cool.

Thirdly, provocation by one person is no excuse for killing another person who does not in fact
offer any provocation to the accused. In R. v. Ebok, the accused went to a farm and met four
women. One of the women was his ex-wife who had since married another man. The accused
demanded the cloth she was wearing and as she was untying it at the insistence of the other
women he stabbed her several times and killed her. He overtook one of the other three women
as they were running away and killed her. He was charged for the killing his ex-wife and the
other women. The court held that the plea of provocation failed because assuming his ex-wife
offered provocation to him the killing of the other woman who did not offer provocation to him
would not make him succeed in his plea of provocation.

There is an exception to this rule. Provocation given by a group of persons acting in concert may
be successfully pleaded where the person so provoked kills a member of such group. This is
usually happens in cases where there is a joint attack by a group of persons and a blow is struck
by one of the group. Retaliation may be taken against any member of the group even though he
was not the person who stuck the actual blow.

Fourth, the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable proportion to the provocation offered.
In considering this question the courts take into account the nature of the instrument with
which the killing was effected and the nature of the act resulting from the provocation.
Provocation which may cause a reasonable person to retaliate with a slap on the face may not
reduce murder to manslaughter where the accused savagely batters the offender to death with
a deadly weapon. In R. v. Akpakpan, a woman brought her daughter’s dead body home and
when her husband remonstrated with her against such conduct, she used filthy and offensive
language to him and he stabbed her five times with a heavy dagger. It was held that the degree
and method of violence used by him precluded the court from bringing a verdict of
manslaughter. In Nomad v. Bornu Native Authority, the deceased who was about to leave her
husband took with her some clothes which he had bought for her. A struggle for the clothes
ensued when she refused to leave them at the request of the husband. She pushed the
husband down twice and he then got hold of a stick, struck her two blows on the head and she
died. It was held that the provocation was slight in proportion to the husband’s deed. In R. v.
Adelodun, after the loss of a local council election by the accused person’s cousin, he was
provoked by abusive songs against his family. He lost his self-control and killed one of the
singers with a matchet. The post-mortem examination revealed that the deceased had about

10
ten wounds some of them very severe. The plea of provocation failed because the injuries
inflicted on the deceased were so severe and so many and the weapons used was such that the
mode of retaliation was out of all proportion to whatever the deceased said or did to the
accused. Note that the principle of proportionality is not specifically stated in the Criminal Code
but was imported from English law. In R. v. Bassey, the appellant was attacked by three persons
of whom the deceased was one. The appellant inflicted four blows on the deceased and she
died. The trial judge found that the sudden attack on the appellant would cause a reasonable
person of the appellant’s standing in life considerable anger and cause him to strike the
deceased once but that it did not excuse his continuing to deal death blows on the deceased
then incapacitated, for the second, third and fourth times in quick succession. The Federal
Supreme Court however disagreed with the reasoning of the trail judge and held that all four
blows were delivered within a matter of seconds of each other and if the first blow was given in
the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation we cannot see how the other blows can be
treated differently.

Fifth, the killing must have involved an assault. This requirement is essential if the meaning of
provocation in section 318 is contained in section 283 which refers to an offence of which
assault is an element.

Nature of provocation

Provocation may be by words or deeds. The old common law rule was that words alone could
not be sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. This rule was modified in
Holmes v. D.P.P where it was said that words alone could not amount to provocation save in
circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character. This reasoning was approved in R.
v. Adekanmi and it was well settled that in Nigeria words alone can amount to provocation
sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter. Thus in R. v. Akpakpan, the Federal Supreme
Court said;

We do not, however, agree with the learned trial Judge that words alone can never constitute
such provocation as to reduce an offence from murder to manslaughter.

Note that there can hardly be provocation in respect of words or acts spoken or done in the
absence of the accused person. This is because words spoken or acts done in the absence of the
accused person will not precipitate or arouse any sudden anger, resentment, rage of fury as
there is time for passions to cool. The very act of reportage of the words or acts to the accused
should materially reduce or drown the anger, resentment, rage or fury of the accused person.
See the case of Eze v. The State.

Discovering a wife in adultery is sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. In

Holmes v. D.P.P it was held that a mere confession of adultery without more is not sufficient for
11
the purpose of reducing murder to manslaughter. See R. v. Akpakpan. Where a woman jeered
at her husband who was an illiterate and primitive peasant, taunted him with being impotent,
and told him that she was having sexual intercourse with other men, this was held to be
sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. See the case of R. v. Akpakpan. For a
village wife who was nursing a seven month old child and was then five months pregnant to call
her husband a fool when he demanded to know who was responsible for the pregnancy was
held to amount to provocation. But a wife’s refusal to prepare food for her husband has been
held to be insufficient for provocation. For a woman to taunt her husband with incompetence
and then spit in his face may in certain circumstances reduce an offence of murder to
manslaughter.

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