Constitutional Public Reason Wojciech

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Constitutional Public Reason
Constitutional Public Reason

WOJCIECH SADURSKI
University of Sydney,
University of Warsaw
 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
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 Preface

The legitimacy of democratically enacted laws is a key issue in

contemporary constitutional theory—perhaps not the key issue, but
certainly one of central dilemmas that various constitutional systems
need to grapple with. It would appear that the question is
particularly acute when a supreme or a constitutional court has the
power to set aside statutes for their unconstitutionality, but the issue
of legitimacy goes further than that. Whether or not judicial bodies
have such an authority, a meaningful question that can always be
asked is if a given law—be it sub-constitutional legislation or even a
constitution itself—contains rules that are legitimate: that is,
whether we all, subject to this law, have good moral reasons to
respect and comply with it, regardless of whether or not we agree
with the particular rule on merits. We, the concerned citizens, may
as well adopt the hypothetical position of a constitutional judge, and
model our thinking about the legitimacy of laws that apply to us on
the reasoning typical of constitutional judges. Such a thought
experiment naturally provides us with only one among many
perspectives for evaluating laws—but not an insignificant one. After
all, in a democratic society marked by deep moral and political
pluralism, in which consensus on the merits of some controversial
laws is unlikely, we need to have some standards for ascertaining
whether a law is worth our respect—perhaps even our compliance—
even if we happen to disagree with it. This is the function of the
concept of the legitimacy of law.
A prevailing response to the question of legitimacy has focused on
the effects of a given law: whether the consequences of the law are
such that it does not impose unfair burdens upon anyone, however
the unfairness is defined. This may be called (roughly, and not
necessarily tracking the technical uses of this concept in the law and
in scholarly literature) ‘output legitimacy’. But there is another way
that (subject to the same proviso) is called ‘input legitimacy’: what
sort of considerations—including motives, intentions, and purported
purposes or aims—warrant the law? It is with a variant of that
approach that this book will be concerned. It will look at public
reason (PR—an acronym that will be used throughout the book,
despite its unfortunate connotations with that other PR).
PR is a concept frequently used in political philosophy but one that
is less often seen in scholarship on constitutional law. As Mattias
Kumm has noted as recently as in 2020: ‘Surprisingly,
notwithstanding the considerable literature on the idea of public
reason among political philosophers, legal and constitutional scholars
have engaged with the idea relatively little.’1 It is not a modern
idea,2 but as a point of reference in this book I will only use a
contemporary reinterpretation of the concept and further, only the
most influential version of it, developed in John Rawls’s idea of
political liberalism. In Rawls’s theory, PR is intimately tied up with
the liberal principle of legitimacy which proclaims that only those
laws that are based upon arguments and reasons to which no
members of a society could have a rational reason to object can
boast political legitimacy, and as such can be applied coercively even
to those who actually disagree with them. Another way of expressing
the same thought is the ‘endorsability by all’ thesis, which can be
found in Jürgen Habermas’s suggestion about how individual
interests may appear in public deliberations: ‘In practical discourses,
only those interests “count” for the outcome that are presented as
inter-subjectively recognized values and hence are candidates for
inclusion in the semantic content of valid norms.’ Habermas
concludes: ‘Only generalizable value-orientations, which all
participants (and all those affected) can accept with good reasons as
appropriate for regulating the subject matter at hand … pass this
threshold.’3 Perhaps the best recent articulation of PR (very much in
line with Rawls’s idea) was given by Charles Larmore who stated the
fundamental directive of political liberalism by saying that ‘basic
political principles should be suitably acceptable to those whom they
are to bind’.4 The implication of this is clear: some arguments, if
actually present in the minds of legislators or policymakers, are not
qualified to figure in the public defence of a law. The law must be
defensible in terms that belong to a forum of principle rather than an
arena of political bargains, or power plays of naked interest, or
competition between sectarian ideologies.
For all the problems, complications, and shortcomings of this idea
(most of which will be confronted openly in Chapter 3), I will take it
seriously and see how much mileage we can get from it when
reflecting upon the legitimacy of law in a democracy. Part I will lay
down the philosophical groundwork for the idea: I shall argue (in
Chapter 1) that PR is a plausible interpretation of a broader concept
of the common good, and that it is based on a justificatory
constellation of certain ideas of respect for persons, equality, and
freedom; I shall recalibrate the Rawlsian theory of PR to render it
plausible and feasible for constitutional uses (Chapter 2); and I will
defend it against the most representative challenges (Chapter 3). In
Part II, I will provide an overview of the uses of the ideal of PR in
some representative constitutional national systems,5 and there is no
escape from my sincere admission that by ‘representative’, I rather
mean those with which I happen to be familiar: there is absolutely
no pretence to the comprehensiveness of the overview which should
be rather called a ‘bird’s eye view’, the bird in question flying freely
and arbitrarily over this or that country. I will introduce and discuss
the idea of motive-based constitutional scrutiny (Chapter 4); I shall
reflect upon some of the main problems that such a scrutiny raises,
in particular regarding the evidentiary difficulties of reconstructing
(or second-guessing) legislative motives, and also of ‘harmonizing’
motives and effects of legislation (Chapter 5); and then I will look at
the uses of PR in the spheres of freedom of speech (Chapter 6),
freedom of religion (Chapter 7), and anti-discrimination law (Chapter
8). In Part III of the book, I will posit the idea of a ‘supranational
public reason’ and reflect upon the uses of this ideal in those
(quasi-) constitutional systems that transcend national boundaries: I
will suggest that public reason may be particularly suitable to the
legitimacy of supranational regulations, which suffer from weak
legitimacy based on democracy and consent (Chapter 9); and I will
discuss, in some detail, one particular putative ‘exemplar’ of
supranational PR, namely the European Court of Human Rights
(Chapter 10).

1 Mattias Kumm ‘ “We Hold These Truths to be Self-Evident”: Constitutionalism,

Public Reason, and Legitimate Authority’, in Silje Langvatn, Mattias Kumm, and
Wojciech Sadurski (eds.), Public Reason and Courts (Cambridge University Press
2020) 143, 143, footnote omitted.
2
See Miguel Vatter, ‘The Idea of Public Reason and the Reason of State:
Schmitt and Rawls on the Political’, (2008) 36 Political Theory 239.
3 Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (MIT

Press 1998) 81, both emphases in the original.

4
Charles Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality (Cambridge University Press
2008) 146. For other well-known expressions of a similar idea, see Onora O’Neill,
Toward Justice and Virtue (Cambridge University Press 1996) 54 (‘Those whose
actions and plans of action constantly assume the intelligent cooperation and
interaction of many others, who differ in diverse ways, will also expect some at
least of their reasoning to be followable by these others’), emphasis added; T.M.
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press 1998) 189
(articulating a ‘non-rejectability’ requirement derived from contractualism).
5 I should acknowledge a recent use of the concept ‘Constitutional Public

Reason’ (which figures in the title of this book) in Ronald C. Den Otter, ‘The
Importance of Constitutional Public Reason’, in Silje Langvatn, Mattias Kumm, and
Wojciech Sadurski (eds.), Public Reason and Courts (Cambridge University Press
2020) 66, and earlier, in his Judicial Review in an Age of Moral Pluralism
(Cambridge University Press 2009), Ch. 5.
 Acknowledgements

Often, acknowledgements in academic books begin with a partly

apologetic, partly self-deprecating (not necessarily sincere)
confession that the book was too long in the making. This one is no
exception, and my (sincere) excuse is that this work was interrupted
by the felt need to write two other books, very quick in the making.
But the duration of my work also explains why I incurred intellectual
debts to such a large number of colleagues and research assistants
(this latter category merging and overlapping with the former, so I
will not draw a distinction here) in connection with this project:
Margot Brassil, Violeta Canaves, Adam Czarnota, Grainne de
Burca, Ros Dixon, Kirsty Gan, Leszek Garlicki, Tom Ginsburg, Sam
Goldsmith, Alon Harel, Sam Issacharoff, Nikila Kaushik, Pooja Khatri,
Martin Krygier, Mattias Kumm, Silje Aambø Langvatn, Christopher
McCrudden, Liam Murphy, Maria Paz Avila, Michael J. Perry, Niels
Petersen, Philip Pettit, Rick Pildes, Robert Post, David Pozen, Dominik
Rennert, Michel Rosenfeld, Michael Sevel, Sivan Shlomo-Agon, Alec
Stone Sweet, Chantal Tanner, Alexander Tsesis, Jeremy Waldron, and
Joseph Weiler. I was lucky, both as an academic and as a frequent
traveller, to be able to share my ideas with colleagues at very many
conferences and seminars, at Haifa Law School, Harvard Law School,
Supreme Administrative Court (NSA) in Warsaw (a conference by
‘Państwo i Prawo’ journal), Loyola Law School in Chicago, University
of Chicago Law School, University of Paris-Nanterre, University of
Trento Faculty of Law, Tsinghua University in Beijing, National
University of Singapore, Australian Society of Legal Philosophy
(Sydney), University of Toronto Faculty of Law, National University of
Singapore Faculty of Law, Thamassat University in Bangkok,
Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin, WZB Center for Global
Constitutionalism in Berlin, Melbourne Law School, Academia Sinica
in Taipei, Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales in Madrid,
University of Amsterdam Faculty of Law, Harvard Law School, Kiyv-
Mohyla Academy in Kiev, University of Western Ontario, Faculty of
Law in London, Ontario.
My even greater gratitude is to those extraordinary academic
institutions with which I have been associated. I am very grateful to
NYU Law School, to Yale Law School, Cardozo Law School, Fordham
Law School, and Rutgers University—five great universities with
which I was associated as a visiting professor or research fellow over
the years in which I worked on the book. I am grateful to the Centre
for Europe at the University of Warsaw and, most of all, my home
institution Sydney Law School, and of course, to my real home and
my family in it.
 Contents

Table of Cases
List of Abbreviations

I. PUBLIC REASON AND ITS DISCONTENTS

1. Justifying Public Reason

1. From Common Good to Public Reason
2. Respect for Persons as a Justification for Public Reason
3. Liberty and Public Reason
4. Equality—Respect for Persons—Public Reason

2. The Parameters of Public Reason

1. Public Reason and Exclusionary Reasons
2. Internal and External Reasons
3. Input Model of Democracy
4. The Scope of Public Reason
5. Public Reason and the Legitimacy of Law
6. Public Reason and Reason of State

3. Defending Public Reason

1. The Feasibility of Public Reason
2. ‘Too Thin’: The Issue of Reasonableness
3. ‘Too Thick’: Drawing the Line between Discussion and
Decision-Making
4. Distorting the Process of Justification?
 5. Public Reason and the Principle of Candour

II. CONSTITUTIONAL PUBLIC REASON IN MUNICIPAL LAW

4. Motive-based Judicial Review: Introduction

1. Unconstitutional Motives or Purposes?
2. Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law
3. The Level of Judicial Scrutiny and Detection of Illicit
Legislative Motives
4. Motive Scrutiny and the Legitimacy of the Judicial Role

5. Problems with Motive-based Scrutiny—and Some Judicial

Solutions
1. The Story of Palmer v. Thompson: Evidentiary Difficulties?
2. Direct Insights into Motives
3. ‘Res Ipsa (often) Loquitur’
4. Interconnections between Motive and Effect Inquiries
5. Effect as a Threshold and as an Indicator of Motives
6. Dynamic Purposes and Effects
7. Proportionality and Purpose-oriented Scrutiny

6. Freedom of Speech, Viewpoint Regulation, and Wrongful

Legislative Motives
1. Speech, Harm, and Viewpoint
2. Content, Subject Matter, and Viewpoint
3. Intolerance and Paternalism in Regulations of Speech

7. Illicit Legislative Intentions in the Separation of State and

Religion
1. The United States and Secular Legislative Purposes
2. On the Uses and Misuses of Religion in Judicial Opinions and
Amicus Curiae Briefs
 3. Non-establishment of Religion in Australia
4. Secular Legislative Aims in Canada
5. Religious Freedom in South Africa
6. German Secular Rationales
7. Freedom of Religion in the ‘Jewish and Democratic State’ of
Israel

8. Standards of Scrutiny, Equal Protection, and Illicit Motives for

Discrimination
1. Suspect Classifications and Prejudice
2. Indicia of Illicit Motives
3. Judicial Uses of the Wrongful-motives Conception

III. SUPRANATIONAL PUBLIC REASON

9. Constitutional Legitimacy beyond the State

1. Uncoupling Democracy from Statehood
2. Uncoupling Legitimacy from Democracy
3. Public Reason in the Supranational Sphere
4. Supranational Public Reason and Rawls’s ‘Public Reason of
the Society of Peoples’
5. Two Regional Human Rights Bodies and a Note on
Autonomization
6. The WTO and ‘Political Obiter Dicta’
7. Between Statehood and the Supranational Sphere
8. The Relationship between International and Constitutional
Law

10. European Court of Human Rights in Pursuit of Public Reason?

1. Proportionality Analysis and Alliances with Constitutional
Courts
2. The Scrutiny of the Legitimacy of Legislative Aims
 3. ‘Necessity’ Scrutiny and the Ascertainment of Legislative
Goals
4. ‘Protection of Morals’ and Public Reason

Afterword
Bibliography
Index
 Table of Cases

AUSTRALIA
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. (1920) 28 CLR
129…… 128
Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v. Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559……
225–26
Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd. & NSW v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR
106…… 134–35, 202–4
Australian National Airways Pty Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29…… 128
Bank of NSW v. Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1…… 128
Commonwealth v. Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1…… 134
Hogan v. Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506…… 134–35
Huddart Parker Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1931) 44 CLR 492…… 128
Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1…… 226–27
Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31…… 128

CANADA
Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony [2009] 2 SCR 567…… 141–42
Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General) [2003] 1 SCR 912…… 133–34
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927…… 141
Manitoba Rice Farmers Association v. Human Rights Commission (Man.) (1987) 50
Man. R. (2d) 92 (Q.B.)…… 260–61
Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General) [2015] SCC
1…… 164–65
Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City) [2015] SCC 16…… 231–32
R v. Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd. [2001] 3 SCR 209…… 133
R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 SCR 295…… 126–27, 140–41, 163–64, 228–31,
232, 233–34
R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd. [1986] 2 SCR 713…… 166–67, 230–31
R v. Kapp [2008] 2 SCR 483…… 260–61
R v. Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103…… 139–41, 166–67, 181–82
RJR MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General) [1995] 3 SCR 199…… 177–78
Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) [2002] 3 SCR 519…… 165–67
Vriend v. Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493…… 172–73
Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education (1988) 65 O.R. (2d) 641…… 166–67

ECOWAS (THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST

AFRICAN STATES) COURT
Tidjani v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/01/06, Judgment of 28 July 2007……
303–4

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Bayatyan v. Armenia, Grand Chamber Judgment of 7 July 2011, Appl. No.
23459/03…… 339–40
Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 ECHR ser. A (1990)…… 330–31
D.H. & Others v. Czech Republic, Grand Chamber Judgment of 13 November 2007,
Appl. No. 57325/00…… 337–38
Dubská and Krejzová v. Czech Republic, Judgment of 11 December 2014, Appl.
Nos. 28859/11 and 28473/12…… 338–39
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 22 October 1981, Appl. No. 7525/76……
342, 343, 345, 349–50, 355–57
Engel & Others v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 8 June 1976, ser. A no 22, 1
EHRR 647…… 330–31
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 22 EHRR 123, 143–44 (1996)…… 342
Greens and M.T. v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 23 November 2010, Appl. Nos.
60041/08 and 60054/08…… 310–12
Handyside v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 December 1976, Appl. No.
5493/72…… 342, 354–56
Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), Judgment of 6 October 2005, Appl. No
74025/01…… 310–12
Kamoy Radyo Televizyon Yayincilik ve Organizasyon A.Ş. v. Turkey, Judgment of 16
April 2019, Appl. No. 19965/06…… 335–36
Kövesi v. Romania, Judgment of 5 May 2020, Appl. No. 3594/19…… 335–36
Marckx v. Belgium, Judgement of 13 June 1979, Appl. No. 6833/74, Series A, No.
31; 2 EHRR 330…… 323
Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, Judgment of 2 March 1987, Appl.
9267/81…… 315–16
Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 13 July
2012, Appl. No. 16354/06…… 344, 346–48, 357
Müller & Others v. Switzerland, Judgment of 24 May 1988, Appl. No. 10737/84……
352–53, 355–57
Norris v. Ireland, Judgment of 26 October 1988, Appl. No. 10581/83…… 343, 357
OOO Flavus & Others v. Russia, Judgment of 23 June 2020, Appl. No.
12468/15…… 335–36
Perinçek v. Switzerland, Judgment of 17 December 2013, Appl. No. 27510/08……
340, 341
Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Grand Chamber Judgment of 22
December 2009, Appl. Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06…… 340–41
Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 27 September 1999, Appl. Nos.
33985/96 and 33986/96…… 336–37
Surikov v. Ukraine, Judgment of 26 January 2017, Appl. No. 42788/06…… 337–38
Vajnai v. Hungary, Judgment of 8 July 2008, Appl. No. 33629/06…… 345–47
Vojnity v. Hungary, Judgment of 12 February 2013, Appl. No. 29617/07…… 337–
38

EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

C-46/08 Carmen Media Group Ltd. v. Land Schleswig-Holstein & Others [2010]
ECR I-8149…… 122–23

GERMANY
BVerfG v. 14.12.1965, 1 BvR 413/60, 1 BvR 416/60, BVerfGE 19, 206 (Church tax
decision)…… 123–24, 238–39
BVerfG v. 05.08.1966, 1 BvF 1/61; BVerfGE 20, 150…… 123–24
BVerfG v. 16.05.1995, 1 BvR 1087/91, BVerfGE 93, 1 (Crucifix decision)…… 235
BVerfG v. 24.09.2003, 2 BvR 1436/02, BVerfGE 108, 282 (Headscarf I decision)……
234–35, 236–37
BVerfG v. 14.10.2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, BVerfGE 111, 307 (Görgülü decision)……
332
BVerfG v. 28.03.2006, 1 BvR 1054/01, BVerfGE 115, 276 (Monopoly on Sports
Betting decision)…… 122–23
BVerfG v. 26.02.2008, 2 BvR 392/07 (1), BVerfGE 120, 224 (Prohibition of Incest
decision)…… 142–43
BVerfG v. 04.11.2009, 1 BvR 2150/08, BVerfGE 124, 300…… 125–26, 194–95
BVerfG v. 01.12.2009, 1 BvR 2857/07, 1BvR 2858/07, BVerfGE 125, 39 (Sunday
closing laws decision)…… 233–34
BVerfG v. 27.01.2015, 1 BvR 471/10, 1 BvR 1181/10, BVerfGE 138, 296 (Headscarf
II decision)…… 236, 237–38
 INDIA
Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar (1955) 1 SCR 1045…… 258
Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2010) Cri LJ 94…… 259–60
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar (1959) SCR 279…… 258
State of West Bengal v. Anwar All Sarkarhabib (1952) SCR 284…… 258
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1…… 258–59

INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of 13 November 1985, IACHR…… 299
Baena Ricardo et al. (270 workers) v. Panama, Judgment of 28 November 2003,
IACHR Series C No. 104…… 296–97
Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, Judgment of 19 September 2006, IACHR Series C No.
151…… 302–3
Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment of 2 May 2008, IACHR Series C No. 177…… 299–300
Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, Judgment of 22 November 2005, IACHR Series C No.
135…… 300–1, 302–3
Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, Judgment of 23 November 2009, IACHR Series C No.
209…… 297–98
Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, Judgment of 20 November 2009, IACHR Series C No.
207…… 301–3

ISRAEL
A & B v State of Israel, CrimA 6659/06 (2008)…… 182
Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior, HCJ
7052/03 (2006)…… 181–83
Commitment to Peace and Social Justice Society v. Minister of Finance, HCJ 366/03
(2005)…… 182
Gal-On v. Attorney General, HCJ 466/07 (2012)…… 181–82
Horev v. Minister of Transportation, HCJ 5016/96 (1997)…… 240–41
Keinan v. Film and Play Review Board, HCJ 351/72 (1972)…… 240–41
Oron v. Chairman of Knesset, HCJ 1030/99 (2002)…… 183–85
Segal v. Minister of Interior, HCJ 217/80 (1980)…… 240–41
Szenes v. Broadcasting Authority, HCJ 6126/94 (1999)…… 181–82
United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v Migdal Cooperative Village, CA 6821/93 [1995] IsrLR
1…… 181–82
 NEW ZEALAND
Zdrahal v. Wellington City Council [1995] 1 NZLR 700…… 195–96

SOUTH AFRICA
Beinash & Another v. Young & Others 1999 (2) SA 116 (CC)…… 179–80
Bhe & Others v. Khayelitsha Magistrate & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC)…… 179–
80, 255–56
Centre for Child Law v. Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development &
Others 2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC)…… 178–79
Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC)……
135–36, 179–81
Dawood & Another v. Minister of Home Affairs & Others; Shalabi & Another v.
Minister of Home Affairs & Others; Thomas & Another v Minister of Home Affairs
& Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC)…… 179–80
De Reuck v. Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) &
Others 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC)…… 179–80
Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security & Others: In Re S v. Walters & Another
2002 (4) SA 613 (CC)…… 136–37
Hoffmann v. South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC)…… 255–56
Islamic Unity Convention v. Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4)
SA 294 (CC)…… 179–80
Khosa & Others v. Minister of Social Development & Others; Mahlaule & Another v.
Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC)…… 255–56
LS v. AT & Another 2001 (2) BCLR 152 (CC)…… 179–80
Magajane v. Chairperson, North West Gambling Board 2006 (5) SA 250 (CC)……
139
Minister of Home Affairs & Another v. Fourie & Another 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC)……
255
Minister of Home Affairs v. National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-
integration of Offenders (NICRO) & Others 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC)…… 178–79
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality & Another v. Minister of Justice &
Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC)…… 179–80, 252, 255
Prinsloo v. Van der Linde & Another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC)…… 120
Richter v. Minister for Home Affairs & Others (Democratic Alliance & Others
Intervening; Afriforum & Another as Amici Curiae) 2009 (3) SA 615 (CC)……
178–79
S v. Jordan & Others (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force & Others
as Amici Curiae) 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC)…… 164, 175–76
S v. Lawrence; S v Negal; S v. Solberg 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC)…… 232–33
S v. Steyn 2001 (1) SA 1146 (CC)…… 179–80
S v. Williams & Others 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC)…… 179–80
South African National Defence Union v. Minister of Defence & Another 1999 (4)
SA 469 (CC)…… 179–80
Union of Refugee Women & Others v. Director, Private Security Industry
Regulatory Authority & Others 2007 (4) SA 395 (CC)…… 255–56
United Democratic Movement v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Others
(No. 2) 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC)…… 128–29

UNITED STATES
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)…… 192–93
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)…… 161–62
Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2005)…… 162
American Legion v. American Humanist Association, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019)……
215–16
Armstrong v. O’Connell, 451 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wis. 1978)…… 160–61
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)…… 188
Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979)…… 221–22
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)…… 120–21, 220–21
Brown v. Board of Education, 348 U.S. 886 (1954)…… 224–25, 254–55
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)…… 118–19
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)…… 188–89
Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891 (1992)…… 220
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)……
157–58, 216–18
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)…… 245
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000)…… 162
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982)…… 121–22
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)…… 198–99
Cox v. Cox, 493 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)…… 220–21
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)…… 243
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)…… 224–25
De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978)…… 145–46, 170, 171
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)…… 100–2
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)…… 211–14
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990)…… 218
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)…… 127–28, 161–62
Felton v. Felton, 383 Mass. 232, 418 N.E.2d 606 (1981)…… 221–22
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)…… 205–6
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)…… 127
Frank v. Frank, 26 Ill. App. 2d 16, 167 N.E.2d 577 (1960)…… 221–22
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
MARY, OR, "SHE MADE ME DO IT." Frontispiece.

MARY,
OR,
 "SHE MADE ME DO IT."

"SEE that woman coming down the road!" said Mary

Willis to her companions. "Isn't she a funny-looking body?"

"She has just come off the cars, I suppose," said

another girl. "Look at her bonnet. I should think it had been
made before the flood."

"Poor thing, she looks very tired," said Helen Arnold:

"and see how lame the little boy is. She seems to be a
stranger in town."

"Go and make acquaintance with her, Helen," said Cora

Hart, with a sneer. "She is so fashionably dressed and so
elegant looking, she would be a nice companion for you."

"See, she is coming this way!" exclaimed Jane Marvin.

"I do believe she means to speak to us. Let us have some
fun with her, girls!"

"I will have nothing to do with such fun as yours!" said

Helen Arnold. "I think it is downright mean and wicked to
make sport of poor and old people. Mary Willis, you had
better come home with me and be out of mischief."

"Oh, of course she will!" said Jane, scornfully. "I should

like to know why Mary Willis is to do as you say. You are
neither her teacher nor her mistress, if you are the
teacher's niece, and the oldest girl in the class. You stay
here, Mary, and show her that you won't be ordered about
by her."
 "Come, Mary," said Helen, again. "You had much better
be going home with me."

Helen spoke rather sharply, and Mary was vexed.

"I shall go home when I please, Miss Helen Arnold! I will

thank you to mind your own business and let me alone."

"Very well!" replied Helen, and she walked away, feeling

both grieved and angry.

She was very fond of Mary Willis, though Mary was

much younger than herself. She helped her in her lessons,
dressed her dolls for her, and taught her how to make
pretty things for them; for Helen was very quick and skilful
in all sorts of work. She was anxious that Mary should be a
good girl and a good scholar, and she did keep her out of a
great deal of trouble which Mary's quick temper and
readiness to be led away would have brought upon her.

For a long time Mary had loved Helen more than any
one else in the world, except her own mother. But when
Jane Marvin came to school, she began, as she said, to put
Mary up to be jealous of Helen. She told Mary that Helen
did not really care for her, and that she only wished to
govern and patronize her, and so show off her own
goodness. She laughed at Helen's plain cheap dress and
what she called her old-fashioned strict ways, and she told
Mary that Helen was a regular little Methodist, and wanted
to make her so. Jenny had never been in a Methodist
church in her life, and knew nothing about them, but she
had heard her father call people Methodists who were
religious and strict in their conduct.

It may seem strange that Mary should listen to such

talk against her best friend; but Mary had a great idea of
being independent and having her own way: and like many
other people of the same sort, she was ready to be made a
fool of by any one who would take the trouble to flatter her.
This Helen never did; nay, I am afraid that in her desire to
be honest, she sometimes went to the other extreme and
found fault with Mary when there was no reason for doing
so.

If Mary had thought a little, she would have seen one

great difference between Helen and Jenny. Helen never
asked her for anything, and if she happened to borrow a
sheet of paper or a steel pen from Mary's store, she was
always careful to return it. Mary's mother was rich and Mary
had a great abundance of pretty and useful things. She
would often have liked to divide with Helen, for she had a
generous disposition: but except at Christmas and on her
birthday, Helen would never accept presents.

Jenny was very different. She not only took all that was
offered her, but she had no scruple in begging for anything
in Mary's desk or play-room to which she took a fancy.
Mary's paper and pens, Mary's thread and needles, Mary's
lunch basket, she used as if they were her own, and she
had already got possession of some of Mary's prettiest and
most expensive toys. Still Mary could see no fault in her
new friend, and she was very much vexed at her mother
because she would hardly ever ask Jenny to tea, and would
never let her go to Mr. Marvin's to stay all night.

Helen went away feeling very much hurt, and Mary

stayed with Jenny and the other girls. The poor woman
walked slowly toward them, and when she came opposite
she crossed over the street to speak to them.

"Can any of you tell me where Mrs. Willis lives?" she

asked, in a sweet, pleasant voice. Her clothes were old-
fashioned and worn but she looked and spoke like a lady.
 Mary was starting forward to answer her, when Cora
Hart pulled her back and at the same moment Jane
answered, glibly:

"Mrs. Willis? Yes, ma'am, she lives in that white house

up there on the hill," pointing as she spoke to a farm-house
which stood about half a mile away upon the side of a steep
hill.

"Does she live as far from the village as that?" asked

the stranger. "I thought her house was quite near the
church."

"She did live near the church," said Jane; "but her
house was burned down, and she moved away up there. It
is a beautiful place, but rather far-away from the village,
and the hill is pretty steep. If you go round the corner by
that yellow building with the stairs outside you will be in the
road."

The lady thanked her for her information and turned

into the street which Jenny had pointed out as leading up to
the white house.

"There she goes, trudging along with her bundles," said

Jenny, bursting out laughing. "I hope she will find Mrs. Willis
at home!"

"Mary was for telling her right away," said Cora. "She
would have spoiled all the fun, if I had not stopped her.
What do you suppose she wants with your mother, Mary?"

"I dare say she is some beggar woman," answered

Mary. "We have heaps of them coming to our house all the
time."
 "I should think you did!" said Jane, scornfully. "I don't
see how your mother can encourage them. I do despise
beggars!"

"Two of a trade never agree, oh, Martha?" said Cora.

"What do you mean by that, Cora Hart?" asked Jane,

angrily.

But Cora only laughed scornfully and did not answer.

"Well, for my part, I think it was a real mean trick!" said

Julia Davis. "Sending the poor woman all the way up that
steep hill to an empty house. I wish I had just told her the
truth."

"Why didn't you, then?" asked Jane. "Nobody hindered

you, Miss Tell-tale; only just let me catch you getting me
into a scrape, that's all!"

Julia turned away and went into her own gate without
saying a word. She felt very much ashamed of herself, for
she knew she had been a coward—she had been afraid to
do what she knew was right.

Mary also felt uneasy as she went home. She had been
taught her duty towards her neighbor, and she knew right
from wrong. All the time she was eating her nice supper,
she thought of the poor woman with her little lame boy
toiling up the steep road only to find an empty house.

"Helen Arnold would never have done such a thing!" she

said to herself, and she wished over and over again that she
had gone with Helen.

It was a pleasant, dry evening, and after tea, Mrs. Willis

took her work and sat down in a garden chair on the green
lawn. Mary stood by her with her doll, but she did not feel
like playing or talking. Her conscience troubled her more
and more, and she felt very unhappy.

"I have some good news for you, Mary," said Mrs. Willis.
"You have often heard me talk of your godmother, your
father's sister, who married a missionary and went away to
China."

"O yes, mamma!" replied Mary. "I have always wished

to see her so much. You know she sent me that beautiful
box of shells and curiosities."

And then Mary sighed as she thought how Jenny had

begged from her some of the prettiest things, and rarest
curiosities in the box.

"Well, my love, I think you will see her very soon. I had
a letter from her this afternoon, in which she says she
expects to sail the next week for America and will come
directly to us. She has a little boy who is lame, and she is
bringing him home to see if he can be cured."

"How glad I am!" said Mary. "I have so often looked at

her picture—the one you said she painted herself, when she
was teaching you to draw, mamma—and wished she would
come home."

Mrs. Willis smiled and sighed. "You must not expect to

see Aunt Mary looking like her picture," said she. "It was
painted long ago, when we were both young, and she has
been through a great deal since then."

Mrs. Willis sighed, and looked down on the ground. She

was thinking of all that had happened since she had seen
her dear sister—how she had lost her husband and all her
children but Mary. Mary stood leaning on her mother's chair
without speaking, till the sound of the opening gate caused
her to look up. There, coming in at the gate, was that very
poor woman and her little boy, whom Jane Marvin and her
companions had sent "on a fool's errand," as the saying is,
to the empty farm-house on the hill.

Before she could make up her mind what to do, Mrs.

Willis looked up also, and met the gaze of the stranger. With
a scream of delight, she started up and flew to meet her,
kissing her and calling her, her dear, precious sister, her
darling sister Mary!

"Come here, Mary, and see your aunt," said her mother,
turning round.

Mary came forward. She trembled so that she could

hardly stand, and she was very pale, but her mother did not
notice her confusion.

"Now run into the house and tell Jane to get tea ready
as quickly as she can," said. Mrs. Willis. "And this is my
nephew and god-son Willie. But how lame he is, poor little
fellow!"

"He is not always so lame," said Mrs. Lee. "But we have

had a long and hard walk and he is almost tired to death. I
am afraid he will not be able to stir to-morrow."

"I did not expect you till next week, at the earliest,"
said Mrs. Willis. "But how do you come to arrive at this time
of day? The train has been in for two hours."

"I will tell you all about it, presently," replied Mrs. Lee.
"Just now I am anxious to find a resting-place for Willie,
who, I fear, is suffering very much from his knee."
 "It does ache!" said poor Willie. "It always hurts me to
go up-hill."

"Well, you shall soon rest it, my dear boy," said Mrs.
Willis. "Where are your trunks, Mary?"

"They will be here to-morrow, I suppose," replied her

sister. "They were left behind by some mistake, but I have
telegraphed and heard that they are safe and on the way. I
must keep out of sight till they come, for between dust and
the long journey I look more like a beggar than a lady."

The travellers were soon washed and brushed and sat

down to a bountiful meal.

"And now tell me how you came here at this time in the
evening?" said Mrs. Willis.

"The matter is easily enough explained," replied Mrs.

Lee. "We sailed a week sooner than we expected and had
an uncommonly short voyage. We came directly on from
Boston, and arrived on the train at four o'clock."

"But where have you been since?" asked Mrs. Willis.

"I am sorry to say we have been made the victims of a

most malicious trick," replied Mrs. Lee. "There were no
carriages at the station, and I thought I could find your
house easily enough. Meeting a party of school-girls, I
asked them the way, that I might be sure, and was told by
one of them that your house had been burned and that you
had moved into a house which she pointed out on the hill-
side. If I had known how far it was I should have gone to
the hotel, where, of course, I should have been set right."

"But as it was, Willie and I toiled all the way up the

steep rough road to find ourselves at an empty, deserted
and half-ruined house. Poor Willie broke down entirely, and
I felt very much like doing the same, for we had travelled all
night and were tired out. I hardly know what we should
have done but for a good-natured teamster, who stopped to
water his horses at the trough by the gate. I made some
inquiries of him, and he not only set me right, but insisted
on bringing me back to the village. Poor Willie is quite
discouraged at his first experience in a Christian land, and
wants to go back to China."

"I do not wonder!" said Mrs. Willis.

"I did not believe there was a girl in the village who
would do such a wicked thing. Who do you suppose it could
have been, Mary?"

Mary, in her corner of the sofa, murmured something,

she hardly knew what. She was wishing that she were in
China, or anywhere else out of the sight of her mother and
aunt. Oh, if she had only gone with Helen! If she had only
been brave enough to defy Jane, and set her aunt right! But
there was no use in wishing.

"She was a short and rather dark girl, with a great deal
of curling black hair, and bold black eyes," said Mrs. Lee.
"There were several others with her, but I did not notice
them so as to be able to know them again."

"It must have been Jane Marvin, I am sure," said Mrs.

Willis.

She turned to Mary as she spoke, and observed her

confusion. Could it be that her daughter had been engaged
in the trick? At that moment her attention was diverted by
poor Willie, who had been trying in vain to eat, and who
now, overcome by fatigue and pain, fainted away in his
chair. Mrs. Willis saw him carried up-stairs and made as
comfortable as he could be, and then returned to the parlor,
where Mary was curled up in the corner of the sofa, crying
as if her heart would break.

"Now, Mary, I want to know all that you can tell me

about this matter!" said Mrs. Willis, seating herself by Mary.
"Tell me the whole truth."

Sobbing so that she could hardly speak, Mary told her

mother the story.

"It is one of the most shameful things I ever heard of!"

said Mrs. Willis. "How could you join in such a piece of
wickedness?"

"I did not say anything, mamma," sobbed Mary.

"No, but by your silence, you consented to what Jane

said, when you might have prevented all this trouble by
speaking."

"I was going to tell Aunt Mary at first, but the girls
pulled me back and would not let me," said Mary, hanging
her head.

"Would not let you!" repeated Mrs. Willis. "How did they
hinder you?"

Mary had no answer ready, and her mother continued:

"Where was Helen Arnold? I should have expected

something better of her."

"She was not there, mamma," replied Mary, eagerly.

"She went away before Jane began. She wanted me to go
with her, but I was vexed and would not. Oh, if I had only
minded her!"
 "If you had only minded your own conscience and your
own sense of what was right, you would not have needed
Helen to keep you out or mischief," said Mrs. Willis. "If you
had had one thought of doing as you would be done by, you
would not have allowed a wicked, silly girl to send your aunt
and your poor lame cousin Willie on such an errand."

"I did not know she was my aunt," said Mary.

"That makes no difference, Mary. You knew she was a

woman with a child, and the fact that you thought you were
playing a trick upon a poor person makes your fault worse
instead of better. Nor do I think you mend the matter by
saying that you did not speak a word. You ought to have
spoken, especially when the woman inquired for your own
mother."

"I know it was wicked and mean, mamma," said Mary.

"I have been sorry ever since. I wish Jane Marvin had never
come here!" she added, bursting into tears again. "She is
always making me do bad things and leading me into
mischief!"

"That is sheer nonsense, Mary. Jane could not make you

do anything you did not choose, nor lead you where you did
not choose to go. If you had been so very easily led, you
would have been governed by Helen, whom you have
known three times as long as you have known Jane, and
whom you have every reason to love and trust."

"You have done very wrong, Mary—very wrong,

indeed," continued Mrs. Willis, after a moment's silence. "I
cannot excuse what you have done by throwing the blame
on Jane. Every one of the party who allowed the cruel
imposition to go on was guilty of helping on the cheat. I
shall see that Miss Lyman is informed in the morning of the
way in which her pupils amuse themselves, and you must
expect to take your share of the blame. Now go to bed, and
when you say your prayers, ask God to forgive your mean
and cruel conduct."

"Won't you forgive me, and kiss me, mamma?" sobbed

Mary.

"When I see that you are sensible of your fault, Mary. At

present you seem inclined to throw the blame entirely upon
somebody else, and to think you are to be excused because
'somebody made you' do what you knew was wicked and
cruel."

Mary went away to bed crying bitterly. She had never

been so miserable in all her life. It was not the first time
she had been "made" by Jane to do wrong. She had done
things in Jane's company which she was both afraid and
ashamed to have her mother know; but she had always
excused herself by thinking they were all Jane's faults.

Now, as she thought about the matter, she saw how

useless and vain were all such excuses. If she was so easily
led, why had she not been governed by Helen, whom she
had known more years than she had known Jane months,
who was always ready to give up her own convenience for
her sake, and whom she had never known to do a mean
action? Why was she not as easily led to do right as to do
wrong?

Mary learned more about herself that wretched night

than she had ever known before. She had always known
that she was a sinner—now she felt it, which is quite a
different thing. She thought of all the wrong things she had
done lately—the whispering, and reading story-books in
prayer-time, the playing truant from school and lying to
conceal it—the mysterious private talks about things of
which she ought never to have thought; much less spoken—
the secrets kept from her mother, to whom she used to tell
everything. Mary no longer tried to excuse herself. She felt
her own wickedness, and with real repentance asked her
Heavenly rather to forgive her for Christ's sake. Then
feeling a little comforted, she went to sleep.

She was awakened in the night by her mother sending

for Doctor Arnold. Poor Willie was very ill—so ill that for
several days no one thought he would live. Oh, how
miserable Mary was! She could find no comfort except in
running up and down-stairs and waiting upon her aunt and
Willie. Dr. Arnold had been informed of the cause of Willie's
illness, and the next morning he came into school and told
Miss Lyman the whole story, before the minister and all the
scholars. All the girls concerned in the trick were obliged to
beg Aunt Mary's pardon, and were not allowed any recess
for the rest of the term.

Mr. Marvin took Jane out of school, and every one was
glad when she was gone, for nobody loved her, not even
those who had been the most ready to be governed by her.
I am glad to say, however, that Jane herself was sorry when
she found out how much harm she had done, and that she
had almost caused the death of poor Willie. She went of her
own accord and begged his pardon, when he was well
enough to see her, and she gladly spent hours in reading to
him and amusing him.

But she could not undo the mischief she had done. The
lame knee, which might perhaps have been made well, was
so strained and inflamed by the long rough walk that it
could not be cured, and Willie never walked again without
crutches.
 Jane learned a great deal from the gentle little Christian
boy and his kind mother, and I hope she will grow up a
good, useful woman. I think, after all, there was more
excuse for her than for Mary. Jane had never known the
care and teaching of a good mother. Her mother died when
she was a little baby, and she had been brought up by
servants and by her father, who was a foolish and bad man.
She had always heard him laugh at the Bible as an old book
of fables, and at religious people as fools or knaves, and
she naturally took her notion from him.

Mary, on the contrary, had every pains taken with her.

She had been taught her duty towards God and her
neighbor, she had the kindest of mothers, of teachers, and
friends, who all tried to influence her for good.

Girls, when you are ready to excuse yourselves for

doing wrong by saying somebody "made you," think
whether your words are true, and whether if "somebody"
had tried to "make you" do right, you would have been as
easily led. Remember that God sees your heart, and He will
accept no false excuses; and while He is always ready to
give you His Holy Spirit to guide you, you have no right to
let any human being "make you" do wrong.

"My son, if sinners entice thee, consent thou not."

LOUISA, OR, "JUST ONE MINUTE." Frontispiece.

LOUISA,
 OR,

"JUST ONE MINUTE!"

"COME, Louisa, are you ready? The car will be here

directly."

"In just one minute," replied Louisa, throwing down the

book she had taken up for "just one minute," while she was
getting ready for school, and hastening to put on her hat
and gloves.

But in that minute the street-car passed. There was not

another car for twelve minutes. Then the drawbridge was
raised for the passage of a ship, which made a delay of ten
minutes more.

The consequence of all these delays was, that though

they walked themselves out of breath, Louisa and her little
sister Anna were ten minutes too late for school, and poor
Anna got a bad mark for no fault of her own except her
good-nature in waiting for her sister.

Louisa was in many respects a good girl. She was

amiable, truthful, and very obliging, yet she made more
trouble and caused more disappointments than any other
person in the family. She was much brighter than her sister
Anna, and yet she "missed" in school three times to Anna's
one. Louisa was truthful, and yet she was not to be trusted:
she was obliging, yet she often disobliged those whom she
tried to help, and if she was not fretful herself, she was very
often the cause of fretfulness in others. All these seeming
contradictions are easily explained. The answer to the riddle
lay in Louisa's favorite phrase, "just one minute."
 For instance. An important message was to go to papa's
office and there was nobody to carry it but Louisa. Aunt
Maria had written to say that she was coming to make a
visit and bring her baby; but the measles were prevailing in
D—, and as the baby was a delicate little thing it would not
do to have her exposed to the disease. Papa had gone to his
office in the city before Aunt Maria's letter came.

"I must write a note to papa and ask him to send a

telegraphic dispatch to auntie," said Mrs. Winter; "and you,
Louisa, must carry it, for Anna is not well enough to go out.
Now, can I depend upon you to go straight to papa's
office?"

"Yes, mamma, of course I will!"

Louisa meant what she said, and for once she was
ready for the car when it came along. But, unluckily, to
reach her father's office, she had to pass a toy shop, the
window of which almost always presented some new
attraction, and had many a time delayed Louisa. She did
not mean to stop this time, but only to look at the window
in passing. But behold, there was a grand new baby-house
with the most wonderful rosewood furniture, and such a
kitchen as was never seen in a dolls' house before; and
there was her school-mate Jennie Atridge, looking through
the glass.

"Oh, Louisa, just look here!" she exclaimed, as she saw

Louisa. "Just see what a splendid doll's house! Mamma has
promised me one for my birthday. I wonder if she will buy
this?"

"I have got a doll's house, but it is not furnished," said

Louisa, stopping "just a minute," to look in at the window.
"We are going to buy the furniture next week, if Anna gets
well enough to come into town. She has been sick two days
with a bad cold. I wonder if we could get such a stove as
that?"

"I would rather have a range," said Jennie. "See, there

is a nice one over in that corner."

The "just a minute" lengthened out into ten, while the

girls discussed the furniture, and when Louisa reached the
office she found her father had gone out.

"He has gone over to the South End," said the office-
boy, "and will not be back till noon. It is a pity you did not
come before, for he has not been gone more than five
minutes."

When Mr. Winter came back, he found his wife's note

and sent a message directly. But it was too late. Aunt Maria
had started, and arrived next day to find Anna broken out
with the measles, and another of the children coming down
with the same disease. The baby took it, of course, and was
so ill that its life was despaired of for many days.

Louisa was very sorry, and would gladly have done

anything for her aunt or for baby, but she could not undo
the mischief she had done by "just one minute's" delay.

One would have expected such a severe lesson to do

Louisa some good, but it did not. The truth was that Louisa
had not learned to see that she was in fault. She was
"unlucky," she thought: "it always happened so." She was
sure that she was always ready to do anything that was
wanted of her, and she could not understand why her
mother should go for baby's medicine herself, instead of
sending her, and why Aunt Maria would not let her put into
the post-office box the letter which carried the news that
baby was at last out of danger.
 "Miss Louisa, will you watch these cakes for me while I
run out and pick the beans for dinner?" said Mary the cook,
one day.

The girls were going to have a party to celebrate Anna's

birthday, and Mary had been making and frosting some of
the most wonderful cakes in the world. The great table was
covered with cocoanut cake, and chocolate cake, and
almond cake, and Mary had just put into the oven a pan of
macaroons.

"The oven is rather hot, and you must watch it, or the
cakes will burn," said Mary. "Just as soon as they begin to
brown, open the oven door and leave it."

Louisa promised, as usual. She had already looked at

the cakes once or twice, and was just going to look again,
when she heard the express man's wagon stop at the gate.

"I do wonder what he has brought this time?" said

Louisa to herself. "I mean to run to the front door and see.
It will not take more than a minute."

Away she ran, leaving the outside door open, and the
oven door shut. The express man had brought a number of
parcels, some of them containing presents for Anna from
friends in the city, and of course, Louisa had to stop "just a
minute" to see them opened. Meantime a beggar woman
with a large basket came through the side gate and into the
kitchen. No one was there. Louis had deserted her post, and
Mary, supposing that she was watching the cakes, was
looking over the bean vines and gathering all the beans
which were fit to pickle. It was the work of a moment for
the woman to slip the cakes into her big basket and slip
away herself. When Louisa and Mary came back, both at the