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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY
SERIES EDITOR: GARY BROWNING

Asylum as Reparation
Refuge and Responsibility for
the Harms of Displacement

James Souter
 International Political Theory

Series Editor
Gary Browning, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK
The Palgrave International Political Theory Series provides students and
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 James Souter

Asylum as Reparation
Refuge and Responsibility for the Harms
of Displacement
James Souter
School of Politics and International Studies
University of Leeds
Leeds, UK

ISSN 2662-6039 ISSN 2662-6047 (electronic)

International Political Theory
ISBN 978-3-030-62447-7 ISBN 978-3-030-62448-4 (eBook)
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 Acknowledgements

I have accumulated many debts as this work has made its long journey
from MSc dissertation, to doctoral thesis, to its current form a decade
later. First and foremost, my supervisor throughout my postgraduate
studies, Matthew Gibney, has deeply shaped my understanding of the
ethics and politics of asylum and refugee protection, and I am grateful
for his invaluable support, guidance and encouragement. During these
studies, I was fortunate to receive very helpful written and/or oral feed-
back on my work in progress from Jenny Allsopp, Megan Bradley, Roger
Duthie, Marcus Carlsen Häggrot, Rob Heimburger, Diletta Lauro, Susan
MacDougall and Jonathan Seglow, as well as from audiences at confer-
ences and seminars in Oxford, Copenhagen, Sibiu and Cairo. My exam-
iners at various stages of the doctorate—namely Alexander Betts, Daniel
Butt, Dawn Chatty, Katy Long and David Miller—also really helped me
to develop my work. My postgraduate studies were only made possible by
a full scholarship from the Economic and Social Research Council.
As the manuscript gradually made its way to completion, I have bene-
fited from further feedback and support. I would like to thank Blair
Peruniak, who has offered me very valuable input and encouragement
throughout this project, providing challenging comments during long
conversations not only on my draft doctoral thesis, but also on the book
manuscript. Since moving to Leeds, I have been glad of discussions
with and support from colleagues, particularly Laura Considine, Derek
Edyvane, Josh Hobbs, Jason Ralph and Kerri Woods. Members of the

v
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Centre for Contemporary Political Theory at Leeds offered very helpful

advice and support in the final stages of writing. When developing my
argument in Chapter 5 of this book, I received useful guidance from
Christina Nick, and I am grateful to Derek for the opportunity to try
out an early version of that chapter at a MANCEPT workshop at the
University of Manchester in September 2017.
I was also very appreciative of the opportunity to participate in a work-
shop on the draft manuscript of this book at the annual conference of the
Association for Political Thought in Oxford in January 2020. In addition
to the conference organisers, particularly large thanks are due to the two
discussants at the workshop, David Owen and Clara Sandelind, for very
helpful comments on a previous version of the whole manuscript. I am
also grateful for detailed feedback from an anonymous reviewer.
Anne Birchley-Brun and Ambra Finotello at Palgrave Macmillan
offered very useful and reliable support, as well as much patience, as I
completed the manuscript. Earlier versions of some passages of this book
were published in Political Studies as ‘Towards a Theory of Asylum as
Reparation for Past Injustice’ (2014, 62(2), 326-342) and in the Journal
of Refugee Studies as ‘Durable Solutions as Reparation for the Unjust
Harms of Displacement: Who Owes What to Refugees?’ (2014, 27 (2),
171-190). I am grateful for helpful feedback from anonymous reviewers
for these journals, as well as to those for the Journal of Social Philosophy.
The usual disclaimer—that any remaining errors and shortcomings are my
responsibility alone—of course applies.
This work took shape during a long period of mental health difficul-
ties, and I am very grateful to my family, friends and colleagues for their
support throughout. Without ongoing support from my mother, Annette
Souter, I doubt I would have completed the thesis at all, let alone this
book. My brother, Andrew Souter, offered a valuable pair of eyes as
I finished both projects. Finally, I am grateful to Agi for her love and
support, and to Marianna and Robin: it is because of them all that I got
there in the end.
 Praise for Asylum as Reparation

“How should the role of external states in generating refugee flows inform
our understanding of obligations to refugees? In this book James Souter
provides a lucid and compelling response to this question that elaborates
the place of reparations within the moral functions of asylum. Working
through a range of cases, Souter demonstrates the scope and significance
of this reparative function for state responsibilities and its important role
in strengthening the international refugee regime. This is a vital contri-
bution to the political ethics of asylum that significantly develops the
field.”
—Professor David Owen, Politics and International Relations, School of
Economic, Social and Political Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences,
University of Southampton

“In this excellent book, James Souter explores the urgent question of
state responsibility for asylum. Which countries should be responsible for
refugees, and why? He provides an original, compelling, and nuanced case
for viewing asylum as reparation for states’ role in the causes displacement,
whether due to military intervention, climate change, or colonial legacies.
Asylum as Reparation is a significant contribution to Political Theory and
Refugee Studies, which will be of great interest to students, researchers,
and practitioners interested in the design of more just refugee policies.”
—Alexander Betts, Professor of Forced Migration and International
Affairs, University of Oxford

vii
viii PRAISE FOR ASYLUM AS REPARATION

“This book fills an important gap in the literature on the ethics of

asylum, by detailing how asylum can be a form of reparation rather
than mainly a fulfilment of humanitarian obligations. Unlike dominant
accounts of asylum, this book emphasises the role of refugee-receiving
states in contributing to the production of refugees. This emphasis ought
to strongly impact how the literature as a whole understands asylum,
leading us towards a more political and historical understanding. The
book is exceptionally well-written and, as the first account of asylum as
reparation, will be one of the key texts in this field.”
—Clara Sandelind, University of Manchester

“Asylum as Reparation is an insightful, sophisticated, original work that

forces us to rethink the traditional moral basis for protecting refugees.
By highlighting the need to take the historical wrongs suffered by the
displaced seriously, Souter has produced a book that is essential reading
for anyone interested in the future of asylum.”
—Matthew J. Gibney, Professor of Politics and Forced Migration,
University of Oxford
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Foregrounding the Causes of Forced Migration 2
Military Intervention and Displacement 3
Climate Change and Displacement 4
Colonial Legacies and Displacement 4
A Reparative Approach to Asylum 5
Structure of the Argument 11
References 16

Part I Asylum as a Form of Reparation

2 Asylum and its Humanitarian Function 23
Asylum’s Moral Functions 24
Asylum’s Humanitarian Function 29
Existing Understandings of Humanitarian Asylum 30
A Revised Conception of Humanitarian Asylum 37
References 39
3 Asylum’s Reparative Function 43
The Principle of Reparation 43
The Case for Viewing Asylum Reparatively 51
Asylum as Restitution, Compensation and Satisfaction 53
What This Argument is Not 59
References 60

ix
x CONTENTS

Part II The Conditions of Asylum as Reparation

4 Causality and Outcome Responsibility 69
Outcome Responsibility 70
Causal Responsibility for Forced Migration 75
Creating Refugee Movements 76
Intensifying Refugee Movements 78
Creating the Conditions for Refugee Movements 79
Joint Responsibility 80
Assigning Outcome and Reparative Responsibility 81
References 87
5 Unjustified Harm 91
Just Displacement 95
Tragically Justified Displacement and Dirty Hands 97
Features of Dirty Hands Cases 101
Reparative Obligations and the International Context 103
What Reparation Would Be Owed? 108
References 109
6 Reparative Fittingness 113
Reparative Alternatives to Asylum 114
Other Considerations 122
Refugees’ Choice 123
Rectifying Particular Harms of Displacement 127
References 130
7 Reparation and Capability 135
Absorptive Capacity 136
Incapacity and Progressive Realisation 142
From Reparation to Capability 145
References 148

Part III Domestic and International Implications

8 Reparative Justice and the Prioritisation of Refugees 153
Reparative and Humanitarian Asylum 154
Reparative Asylum and Prioritisation in Refugee
Admissions 157
 CONTENTS xi

Humanitarian Duties and Reparative Obligations 159

Asylum, Reparation and Prioritisation 162
References 166
9 Reparative Justice and International Refugee
Responsibility-Sharing 169
Situations of Full Compliance 171
Situations of Partial Compliance 176
Incentives 178
Incentive 1: ‘Refugee Insurance’ and Moral Hazard 179
Incentive 2: The ‘Blame Game’ 181
Incentive 3: Refusing Humanitarian Intervention 182
Implications 184
References 185
10 Conclusion 189
References 193
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Refugees face the stark threat of serious harm. They escape dangers such
as war, generalised violence, persecution, severe poverty and damaging
environmental change, whether these ills have been created partly or
wholly by their own states, non-state actors or other states. Refugees flee
in very large numbers: at the end of 2020, there were around 82 million
displaced persons in the world, of whom around 26 million had crossed
an international border as refugees (UNHCR, 2021: 2).1 Yet very many
do not find the protection they seek. Given the policies of a range of
states, they endure frequently perilous journeys only to be trapped in inse-
cure camps or to lead precarious lives in urban settings throughout the
developing world for years, or even decades, on end (see Parekh, 2020).
In particular, the variety of measures that wealthy states use to exclude
refugees ensures that only a relatively small number reach their borders
to claim asylum, although this does not prevent loud declarations of ‘cri-
sis’ in response by politicians, publics and sections of the media in those
states (see FitzGerald, 2019; Gibney, 2004).
The plight of refugees is now one of the most urgent moral and polit-
ical issues in the contemporary world. Indeed, the sheer magnitude of

1 The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as an individual with a ‘well-founded

fear of persecution’ on various grounds who is ‘outside their country of nationality’, and
excludes those displaced for other reasons and those who remain within the borders of
their own states.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
J. Souter, Asylum as Reparation, International Political Theory,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62448-4_1
2 J. SOUTER

current refugee movements, the severity of the harms faced by refugees

and the ongoing political controversies surrounding asylum in Western
states, all give rise to many pressing questions. How should the insti-
tution of asylum function? Who, of the many millions who live with
their basic needs unfulfilled in their states of origin, should be granted
asylum? Should the question of which actors caused refugees’ flight have
any bearing on the question of who is obliged to protect them? How
should responsibilities to protect refugees be distributed among states?2
In addressing such questions, political theorists have identified a
number of moral functions that asylum may assume. As I examine in
Chapter 2, the dominant understanding of asylum, in both theory and
some contemporary political practice, is humanitarian, viewing asylum
as a response to the moral imperative to protect refugees from serious
harm and to meet their immediate needs, simply by virtue of our common
humanity (e.g. Gibney, 2004). Proponents of this humanitarian approach
to asylum tend to view the refugee as an individual in flight from serious
harm, to recommend that refugees are allocated to states on the basis
of their capacity to protect them, and that they are prioritised for protec-
tion, where necessary, on the basis of the urgency of their need. However,
theorists have also recognised a range of other moral roles that asylum
may take and have highlighted, for instance, its potential as a means of
condemning the illegitimate actions of refugee-producing states (Price,
2009), expressing solidarity with refugees with whom a state of asylum
shares particular affinities (Walzer, 1983: 49), and even repairing the
legitimacy of the international states system (Owen, 2016).

Foregrounding the Causes of Forced Migration

These accounts all provide important rationales for protecting refugees
in other states. As I hope to show throughout this book, however, they
are also incomplete: they offer only a partially adequate moral and polit-
ical picture of the institution of asylum and its moral functions, and need

2 While there are also a number of vital ethical questions surrounding the proper
response to refugees by non-state actors—from the role of multinational corporations in
creating displacement, to the proper response of civil society organisations to the arrival
of refugees—my focus in this book is on the responsibilities of states. This is because
the state generally remains the central actor with the capacity to respond to the plight of
refugees in the contemporary world, given their control of access to territory that refugees
need to enter in order to avoid serious harm.
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

to be supplemented in order for us to capture the full range of these

functions. As I explain shortly, these accounts are incomplete precisely
because of their general reluctance to engage fully with the moral signifi-
cance of the causes of contemporary forced migration, and particularly its
external, international causes. Placing the causes of contemporary forced
migration at the forefront of our ethical analysis of states’ responsibilities
to refugees should, I will argue, lead us to embrace an additional repara-
tive approach to asylum as a political institution, which asserts that states
bear special responsibilities to offer asylum to refugees where they have
caused or contributed to their flight. In order to see more clearly why the
external causes of forced migration matter when seeking to understand
states’ responsibilities to refugees fully, consider the following kinds of
cases.

Military Intervention and Displacement

In March 2003, the United States led a military coalition into Iraq
to oust Saddam Hussein’s regime, following air strikes with a ground
invasion. While the invasion itself generated little initial displacement
(Chatty & Marfleet, 2009: 1), the coalition’s subsequent military activ-
ities, a steep decline in public services, and the emergence of sectarian
violence between Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’a religious communities, led to
growing patterns of large-scale forced migration. Having brought about
the effective collapse of the Iraqi state and its institutions, coalition forces
produced a power vacuum into which insurgent groups could move,
creating the conditions for the full-scale civil war which erupted in 2006,
as part of which a pattern of ethnic cleansing in previously mixed cities
such as Baghdad arose (Stansfield, 2007: 205). Although a subsequent
change in US military tactics led to a decline in the bloodshed, and
its military presence formally ended in December 2011 (Dodge, 2012:
13, 75), the extremist militant group, Islamic State, were soon able
to capitalise upon persisting Iraqi state weakness, seizing territory and
major cities in northern Iraq from 2014 until their ousting from these
strongholds several years later. As a result, 1.7 million Iraqis were esti-
mated to have become refugees, and 2.8 million had fled as internally
displaced persons by 2012 (Chatty & Mansour, 2012: 98), while at least
3.2 million people fled from areas seized by Islamic State between January
2014 and October 2015 (Ferris & Kirişci, 2016: 24).
4 J. SOUTER

The plight of Iraqi refugees has become increasingly overshadowed by

the displacement of an estimated 13.5 million Syrians—over half of Syria’s
population—since the onset of its brutal civil war in 2011 (UNHCR,
2021: 7). While Syria has not been subject to any thoroughgoing external
invasion during this conflict, as in the case of Iraq, other states (notably
Russia and Iran) have played significant roles in fuelling this mass displace-
ment. As the Syrian regime has forced out huge numbers of its own
citizens, it has enjoyed the supply of weapons, ammunition and other
military support from Russia (Souleimanov & Dzutsati, 2018: 42), which
has also intervened more directly through air strikes against civilian areas,
including hospitals and markets, thereby worsening the displacement crisis
more directly (Ferris & Kirişci, 2016: 25).

Climate Change and Displacement

There is today compelling evidence that the intensive and ongoing use of
fossil fuels since the advent of the industrial era, particularly by Western
states, is driving rising temperatures and the breakdown of the world’s
climate. This process is increasing the frequency of extreme weather
and climatic events (such as heatwaves, droughts, wildfires, deluges and
storms), jeopardising health and food security and potentially risking
violent conflict, while sea-level rise is threatening coastal communities and
the very existence of small island states. This range of risks is contributing
to growing patterns of displacement, as millions are expected to find life
in their homes less and less viable, to the point of becoming impossible
(see Romm, 2018). Although it can be very challenging to separate out
environmental drivers of forced migration from other contributing factors
clearly, climate change can be seen as a ‘threat multiplier, which magnifies
existing vulnerabilities’ (McAdam, 2012: 5). Despite the large responsi-
bility of Western states for causing these grave threats of displacement,
they have generally not shown the political will to respond adequately
and some, such as the United States under its former president, Donald
Trump, have openly denied this responsibility (Romm, 2018: 280–281).

Colonial Legacies and Displacement

While many refugee movements flow from recent military intervention or
the ongoing effects of excessive carbon emissions, others may be rooted
in historical injustice, such as the legacies of colonialism. In general,
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

some have argued that the prevailing models of the colonial state ‘set
the stage’ for postcolonial refugee movements, by deploying strategies
such as ‘divide and rule’, which involved the privileging of certain ethnic
groups over others, and thereby creating the conditions in which post-
independence conflict and displacement would result (Anthony, 1991:
574; see also Hovil, 2019). It is also frequently observed that the imposi-
tion of arbitrary boundaries that were insensitive to local social and ethnic
groupings also sowed the seeds of such conflict (e.g. Adepoju, 1982:
24), and that the leaders of former colonies perpetuated the repressive
apparatus of the colonial administration that they inherited upon inde-
pendence in order to consolidate and maintain their control (Hovil &
Lomo, 2015: 41; Otunnu, 1992: 18).
More specifically, there are cases in which particular former colonial
powers may have created conditions ripe for contemporary displacement.
One example here is the role of Belgium in creating the conditions that
made the Rwandan genocide possible, as well as its attendant refugee
crisis, in which three million Rwandans had become refugees by the end
of July 1994 (Klinghoffer, 1998: 3). Although the genocide has been
framed as a form of almost primordial ethnic violence (see Chimni, 1998:
360–361), Belgian colonial policies can be seen as largely responsible
for ossifying the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi, and privileging
the latter, thereby laying the ground for the subsequent acrimony and
violence between them (see e.g. Prunier, 1995: 37).

A Reparative Approach to Asylum

In these and many other cases, external states have been deeply impli-
cated in the production of refugees. This much is perhaps unsurprising
in a globalised world that has become highly interconnected politi-
cally, economically and socially. However, dominant approaches to asylum
in contemporary political theory do not take the moral significance of
these causes into account fully when discussing states’ responsibilities to
refugees.3 For instance, the widespread humanitarian account of asylum,

3 Although Matthew Price’s view of asylum as a potential form of condemnation recog-

nises the internal causes of forced migration, by seeing asylum as a remedy for those
facing persecution at the hands of their own states (Price, 2009), the other accounts
canvassed briefly at the start of this chapter do not engage with the external causes of
forced migration in any depth.
6 J. SOUTER

with its heavy focus on meeting refugees’ immediate and pressing needs,
generally views the capacity of each state to protect refugees, and not any
special responsibility it may have for the creation of those refugees, as
morally decisive when determining the correct distribution of responsi-
bilities to refugees among states. It does not ultimately matter for this
distribution, on the humanitarian view, whether or not Syrians were
forced to flee partly given Russia’s actions or purely due to those of
their own government, whether some may be displaced as a consequence
of other states’ excessive carbon emissions, or whether ethnic conflict
that produces refugees is rooted in ongoing colonial legacies. It would
follow from this that Russia has no greater responsibility to protect Syrian
refugees than any other state, that the world’s highest-emitting states
bear no more responsibility for hosting the environmentally displaced
than the lowest emitters, and that Belgium was no more responsible for
protecting Rwandan refugees in 1994 than, say, Thailand. Yet, intuitively,
these conclusions are highly implausible. The reason they are implausible,
or so I shall argue, is that the humanitarian impulse sits alongside another
widespread and deeply rooted conviction which, very roughly, asserts that
those who cause harm, and especially unjustified harm, bear a special obli-
gation to make amends for it. This, in very basic terms, can be described
as a principle of reparation. In many other contexts—from legal settings to
interpersonal relationships—we routinely apply something like this prin-
ciple, so a key question facing the humanitarian and other theoretical
accounts of asylum is: why not in the context of asylum?
Acknowledging both the frequently external causes of forced migra-
tion and the intuitive force of the principle of reparation should lead us
also to recognise an additional moral function that asylum may possess:
as a form of reparation for the unjustified harms of displacement. This
potential reparative function, I shall argue, stems from a special obliga-
tion on the part of states to offer asylum to refugees for whose flight they
are responsible, whether through their military interventions, support for
oppressive regimes or imposition of damaging economic policies. Asylum
needs to be partly re-conceptualised in order to reflect fully the range
of moral obligations that states bear towards refugees; it should also be
conceived as potentially offering a means by which states that have caused
or contributed to refugees’ flight can rectify the unjustified harms that
they have imposed on them. In ethical theorising on states’ responsibili-
ties to refugees, I aim to show, it is of great moral import that states of
asylum are often implicated in the flight of the refugees to whom they
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

may go on to offer protection, even while they more often than not go
to great lengths to debar those refugees from their territory.4
The idea that states bear a special responsibility to offer asylum to
refugees for whose flight they are responsible has been politically salient
in the modern era in light of military interventions by Western and other
states, such as the Vietnam War, NATO’s bombing of Kosovo in 1999,
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Russia’s military role in the Syrian civil
war. In response to these cases, some politicians, citizens and academics
have asserted that the intervening powers bore a special obligation to
protect the refugees whom they generated (e.g. Carens, 2013: 195;
Walzer, 1983: 49). While clear examples of states explicitly using their
asylum policies for reparative ends are not plentiful, the United States’
resettlement of Vietnamese refugees can be seen as implicitly reparative
in character (Carens, 2003: 100), and the legislation passed in the US
promising admission to Iraqi interpreters and translators was explicitly
framed as fulfilling a special responsibility to them.5
In contrast, this reparative approach to asylum has not received detailed
theoretical treatment, as political theorists have often engaged with
this idea only in passing.6 Reflecting the dominance of the humani-
tarian approach, ethical theorising on asylum has instead tended to be
synchronic and ahistorical in character, focusing upon the rights and
duties of refugees and states that stem from the current situations of both
parties, rather than from pre-existing relationships among them. Work

4 In this respect, my argument has parallels with theoretical work that seeks to challenge
the framing of global issues as causally unconnected with Western actions, such as global
poverty (Pogge, 2002) and humanitarian intervention (e.g. Dunford & Neu, 2019; Nili,
2011).
5 The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act asserted that ‘the United States has a fundamental
obligation to help the vast number of Iraqis displaced in Iraq and throughout the region
by the war and the associated chaos, especially those who have supported America’s efforts
in Iraq’ (United States, 2008).
6 Discussions include: Bader (2005: 346–347), Blake (2013: 114–119), Carens (2013:
195), Coen (2017), Ferracioli (2020: 195–196), Mark Gibney (1986: 79–108, 1991),
Matthew Gibney (2004: 48–57), Holtug (2016: 285–286), Lennox (1993), Miller (2016:
113–114), Owen (2020: 67), Shacknove (1988: 140–141), Walzer (1983: 48–51), and
Wilcox (2007). More recently, however, a few scholars have offered somewhat more
detailed explorations of states’ reparative obligations towards the environmentally displaced
(e.g. Buxton, 2019; Draper, 2018; Eckersley, 2015), war refugees (Davidovic, 2016;
Kling, 2019), and migrants more generally (e.g. Achiume, 2019; Bosniak, 2016: 209–217;
Collste, 2015: ch. 12; Glanville, 2020; Nevins, 2019).
8 J. SOUTER

that has addressed the rights of refugees to reparation has tended to focus
strongly on voluntary repatriation and refugees’ claims for redress against
their states of origin during transitional justice processes following periods
of conflict and human rights violations, rather than any entitlement to
asylum from external states (e.g. Bradley, 2013; Bradley & Duthie, 2014).
While Megan Bradley (2013) has convincingly argued that the voluntary
repatriation of refugees can potentially act as a form of redress for the
injustices of displacement, Bradley’s insight that ‘reparations are a critical
expression of accountability for forced migration’ (Bradley, 2013: 2) is
highly relevant for reflection on the responsibilities of refugees’ states of
asylum, as well as those of their states of origin.
Given this relative neglect of the reparative approach to asylum, the
claim that states bear a special obligation to those whom they have
displaced continues to contain unresolved ambiguities. Although this
basic claim may—at least for those of a broadly liberal and internation-
alist ethical orientation—be highly intuitive or even considered obvious,7
it is when we seek to flesh out and specify it that matters become much
more controversial and interesting. As it turns out, even if we are prepared
to admit the existence of this obligation in principle, the conditions under
which it should obtain are far less clear. Should external states offer asylum
to refugees for whose flight they bear only causal responsibility, or should
moral responsibility, in the form of fault or blameworthiness, be required?
Should such states offer asylum as reparation to refugees whom they have
displaced justifiably (assuming this is possible), or is it owed to refugees
who have been displaced only unjustly?8 How should this obligation
be balanced against other competing moral considerations, not least the
morally powerful humanitarian principle? What are the moral and practical
implications of asylum as reparation for the operation of the international
refugee regime?
Moreover, without a clear account of states’ reparative responsibilities
to refugees, theorists are liable to slide, perhaps inadvertently, between

7 For instance, in his discussion of states’ responsibilities to refugees, Mark Gibney

(1986: 80) sees the ‘harm principle’ as being ‘such an intuitive concept that it nearly
defies justification’.
8 In Chapter 5, where I address this question in depth, I use the term ‘justified displace-
ment’ to refer to both the intentional displacement of refugees, and flight that is an
unintended by-product of external states’ actions, giving more attention to the latter kind
of case.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Battle of Manila, May 1, 1898.—The American Fleet.

The Battle of Manila, May 1, 1898.—The Spanish Fleet.

 Steaming straight for the little promontory of Cavité, under the
protection of the batteries of which the Spanish squadron was lying,
he at once opened fire, as has already been said, and with the result
that, in the course of the morning, he destroyed the Reina Christina,
a cruiser of 3000 tons, mounting nineteen Hontoria guns, from six to
four inches in calibre, two machine guns and five torpedo tubes;
Castilla, 2350 tons, ten Krupp guns and four revolving cannon, with
three torpedo tubes; Don Antonio de Ulloa, 1152 tons, eight Hontoria
guns, one machine gun and two torpedo tubes; Isla de Cuba, 1040
tons, twelve guns and three torpedo tubes; Marques del Duero,
gunboat, 500 tons, three guns and one torpedo tube; El Cano,
gunboat, 525 tons, three guns, three machine guns and one torpedo
tube; Velasco, cruiser, 1139 tons, five guns and two machine guns;
and the Isla de Mindinao, an armed transport of 4195 tons.
There were several other small gun boats, and one which came
into the harbor some days after the battle and was taken. The
batteries at Cavité were silenced at the same time that the force
afloat was destroyed.
Our loss was limited to eight wounded by an explosion on board
the Baltimore, while Commodore Dewey reported the Spanish loss
as not fully known, but certainly one hundred and fifty killed,
including the captain of the Reina Christina. After Cavité was
possessed he reported two hundred and fifty sick and wounded
within his lines.
Before the battle had been long going on the Reina Christina, the
flag-ship of Admiral Montijo was struck by a shell which set her on
fire, forward. As they were soon compelled by the flames to abandon
her, the Admiral transferred his flag to the Isla de Cuba, and soon
after this time the Don Antonio de Ulloa burst into flames. The
Spanish stuck well to their guns, but seemed to lack practice, as
their aim was for the most part bad, and their shot either fell short or
went clean over the American vessels. The guns on shore, at Cavité,
were also badly served, and did no harm to the assailants, although
the Spaniards fought with great courage to the last. When these
were silenced a small force was landed from the Petrel to occupy the
place, and the medical officers landed to assist the Spanish
wounded.
 On Monday, the 2d of May, the American squadron went up
opposite Manila and anchored. Of course it was impossible for
Commodore Dewey to occupy a place extending over so much
ground without a land force, but he held the city completely under his
guns.
The news of the action was received with great joy all over our
country, and on the day the news was received the Secretary of the
Navy sent the following message, along with a confidential despatch
to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Squadron:

Washington, May 7th.

Dewey, Manila:—
“The President, in the name of the American people, thanks you
and your officers and men for your splendid achievement and
overwhelming victory. In recognition he has appointed you an Acting
Admiral, and will recommend a vote of thanks to you by Congress.”
Long.
The thanks of Congress were promptly voted, with a sword for
Commodore Dewey, and a medal for each officer and man who took
part in the engagement. Congress also increased the number of
Rear Admirals from six to seven, so that the president might appoint
Dewey a Rear Admiral, which was done at once, and the
appointment confirmed by the Senate.
In considering this action it must be remembered that, although
Dewey’s vessels were more powerful than those of the Spanish
Navy, he had the disadvantage of advancing into strange waters,
where shoals existed, and where, for all he knew, torpedoes and
mines were laid. In fact two of the latter were exploded in front of the
squadron, but so hurriedly as to do no harm. He had also the shore
batteries to contend against, which made the opposing weight of
metal more than equal to his. “The Spanish admiral” says a
contemporary journal, “though he must have been aware that the
American squadron was somewhere in the vicinity, could not bring
himself to believe that the American commodore would have the
audacity to steam into a mined harbor in the night time, with forts on
both sides, and the Spanish squadron ready to receive him. But
Dewey took the chances, and his being beforehand was half the
victory. Many men, equally as brave in action, would have delayed to
reconnoitre, and thereby have given time for the enemy to make
additional preparations to receive him.
In consequence of Dewey’s disregard of possible danger, he found
the Spanish ships in a cramped position where they could best be
attacked.
There is also another thing to be noticed about the engagement at
Manila Bay, and that is in regard to torpedo boats. It certainly seems
that they are not the danger they are supposed to be, if used in
daylight. Two of the Spanish torpedo boats from Cavite were
directed against the Olympia, and were seen as soon as they
started. They escaped several large projectiles directed at them by
the great guns of the flag-ship, but they were easily destroyed when
the six-pounder rapid firers got trained upon them. In daylight the
torpedo boat is no longer to be feared. What a night attack will do,
under the glare of the search lights, is more uncertain. For harbor
defense torpedo boats may be very useful, but they are too wearing,
on both officers and men, for any prolonged sea service.
Dewey’s action has taught us several things, for, except the
Japan-China war, there had been no fighting with the new ships, and
Dewey’s victory was a glorious one in its conduct and its results. It
has also been useful in teaching the nations what they did not know
before, and in impressing more strongly what they had some
apprehension of. It showed that originality and dash, after careful
planning and adequate preparation, will generally succeed. With
several fortified positions on shore the advantage should have
certainly been with the Spanish forces, but in spite of the great risk
that every officer and every man must have known was being taken,
“there was not a faint heart in all that squadron, but an enthusiasm
and esprit du corps that could not but win with such a leader.”
As far as a naval action went, that at Manila was a “clean cut”
thing. Nothing can take away from the small, well-drilled, well-
manned and well-officered East Indian Squadron the credit they
have so thoroughly well earned.
Rear Admiral Dewey was born in Montpelier, Vt., in 1838. Dr.
Julius Y. Dewey, the father of the admiral, was a cultured gentleman
of the old school, honored for his stalwart integrity and stern force of
character. Admiral Dewey’s mother was celebrated throughout
Vermont, her native state, for remarkable beauty of person and
grace of manner.
The handsome colonial mansion in Montpelier was long a center
of New England hospitality, and the Deweys were paramount among
the first families of Vermont.
When Dewey was fourteen years old, a desire for a sea-faring life
took possession of him, but his father did not take kindly to the
thought of his son’s becoming a sailor; so a compromise was
effected, and young Dewey left the Montpelier public school and
entered the Norwich University at Northfield, Vt. This being a military
school the youthful enthusiasm of the boy was temporarily appeased
by musket practice and drill; but after two years had passed, Dr.
Dewey decided that if his son must follow the sea, he should do so in
a manner consistent with the Dewey stock.
An appointment to the Naval Academy placed the future Admiral
at Annapolis in 1858. Upon his graduation, in 1858, he cruised for a
few years as midshipman on the steam frigate Swatara in the
Mediterranean and then returned to Montpelier.
On April 19, 1861, Dewey was commissioned Lieutenant, and for
two years served on the steam sloop Mississippi, taking part in the
action of the West Gulf Squadron. The Mississippi grounded, and
was riddled by the shore batteries at Port Hudson. The officers and
men were landed on the opposite side by boats; Captain Smith and
Lieutenant Dewey being the last to leave the ship. In 1863 the young
Lieutenant was in the thick of the fight with the gunboats that met the
Confederates below Donaldsonville, and subsequently served on the
steam gunboat Agawam, Captain Rhind, of the North Atlantic
Squadron, and participated in two attacks on Fort Fisher in 1864-
1865.
Dewey was commissioned Lieutenant Commander March 3, 1865,
and a year later became executive officer of the famous Kearsarge.
He also served on the frigate Colorado, flagship of the European
Squadron.
On returning to the United States in 1868, he was detailed for duty
at Annapolis, remaining for two years.
 Dewey received his first command—the Narragansett—in 1870,
and was engaged in special service till 1875, two years of which he
had charge of the Pacific Survey. Meantime he became a
Commander.
Commander Dewey became Light House Inspector in 1876, and
was Secretary of the Light House Board from 1877 to 1882, when he
was assigned to the command of the Juniata, of the Asiatic
Squadron. In 1884 he was promoted to be Captain, and took
command of the Dolphin, one of the first craft of the new Navy, and
afterwards of the Pensacola, flagship of the European Squadron.
In 1888 Captain Dewey served as Chief of the Bureau of
Equipment and Recruiting, with rank of Commodore. He was
commissioned Commodore February 28, 1896. From 1893 to 1895
Commodore Dewey was a member of the Light House Board. In
1896 and 1897, he was President of the Inspection and Survey
Board. On November 30, 1897, he was assigned to the command, of
the Asiatic Squadron, and assumed his duties January 3, 1898.
In recognition of his splendid achievement at Manila, Commodore
Dewey was appointed a Rear Admiral in May, 1898.
Admiral Dewey married the daughter of the celebrated Governor
Goodwin, War Governor of New Hampshire—a fighter of the old
school. Mrs. Dewey did not long survive the birth of her only son,
George Goodwin Dewey.
Admiral Dewey made his home in Washington after his wife’s
death. He was fond of horseback exercise, being never without a
thoroughbred animal, and he treated them with a considerate
kindness that was characteristic of the man.
Admiral Dewey was an early riser, and spent most of his time in
the public service. He was temperate to the degree of
abstemiousness. He was Life President of the Metropolitan Club, of
Washington, member of the University Club, of New York, and for
some time a member of the Somerset Club, of Boston. During his
earlier residence in Washington, he was a member of the Maryland
Hunting Club, but later his active public service prevented him
indulging his taste for gunning.
Admiral Dewey’s son said of him: “Father has always been an
extremely active man. He has been a lifelong student of everything
connected with the sea. He is a constant reader, but in his studies he
seldom goes outside of nautical science, or some collateral branch,
such as Naval History. He made a study of harbors, too, and is a
thorough geographer. I attribute his success at Manila in part to his
knowledge of the harbor. He undoubtedly knew just what he was
doing and where he was going when he made that midnight dash
which seems to be so amazing to people who don’t know him. He
knows how to navigate; he never carried a pilot all the time he was
captain. He did his own navigating.
“Then, too, father had every confidence in his men, and the feeling
was reciprocal, which was another strong element that contributed to
his success. He knew what they could do. The cardinal principle of
my father has been: ‘Whatever is worth doing is worth doing well.’”
This was the keynote of the life of George Dewey, whose name in
a day was placed with those of John Paul Jones, Decatur, Farragut,
and others who have shone in Naval History.
 Transcriber’s Notes

Except as described under Changes below, this e-

text uses the language used in the source
document. Inconsistent spelling, capitalisation,
spacing and hyphenation, unusual, obsolete and
archaic language, etc. have been retained, also in
proper, geographical and ships’ names. Accents
have not been added or corrected. Differences in
wording between the Lists of Illustrations and the
captions in the text have not been rectified.
Chapter numbering: in the first book chapters are
numbered I through XV (which has been
corrected to XIV) in the Table of Contents, and I
through XIV in the text. The remainder of the
chapters (including those in the second book) are
not numbered. This oddity has been retained in
this e-text.
Page numbering: this e-text uses prefixes I and II in
the page numbers for the first and second book.
Page I-203: But they ‘(the French)’ having covered
...: as printed in the source document; possibly an
error for But they” (the French) “having covered
....
Page I-237, ... than deserving gentlemen sent out by
the Admiralty.”: either the closing quote mark is
redundant, or the opening quote mark is missing.
Page I-358, “Villeneuve, like others, ...: the closing
quote mark is missing.
Page II-62, “It was also asserted that the Guerrière’s
powder was bad; ...: the closing quote mark is
missing.
Page II-251, “The Richmond waved to me ...: the
closing quote mark is missing.
Page II-397, Abbreviations: the abbreviations
referring to the engines do not occur in the
table(s).
Page II-429, ... “though he must have been aware
...: the closing quote mark is missing.
Changes
Illustrations have been moved out of text
paragraphs.
Some obvious minor typographical and punctuation
errors have been corrected silently.
Soleil Royale has been corrected to Soleil Royal
throughtout the book.
Page I-VI: ... the Carthaginians at Myloe ... has been
changed to ... the Carthaginians at Mylœ ... as in
the text.
Page I-XI: XV. DE GRASSE AND RODNEY. A. D.
1782 has been changed to XIV. DE GRASSE
AND RODNEY. A. D. 1782.
Page I-XV: Disputes over Corea has been changed
to Disputes over Korea as in text.
Page I-XVII: page number 226 has been changed to
195 (Le Soleil Royal); entry 21a Dutch Man-of-
War, 17th Century. inserted.
Page I-72: ... too unwieldly to be brought up again
has been changed to ... too unwieldy to be
brought up again.
Page I-265: ... the Genereux and Timoléon ... has
been changed to ... the Généreux and Timoléon ...
as elsewhere.
Page I-270: a superfluous page reference has been
deleted from caption NELSON WOUNDED AT
TENERIFFE.
Page I-353: closing quote mark has been added
after All is mine, right or wrong.
Page I-355: closing quote mark has been inserted
after ... to continue them there until the business
is decided), ....
Page I-393: Opening quote mark has been inserted
before When once he had explained his system
....
Page I-463: ... but when the inflexible and the
Téméraire ... has been changed to ... but when
the ... Inflexible and the Téméraire ....
Page II-XI, List of illustrations: entries 18 and 19
have been inserted.
Page II-XI, List of Illustrations: items 31 (American
Fleet) and 32 (Manila Bay Map) were
interchanged according to their position in the
book.
Page II-62: closing quote mark has been inserted
after The Guerrière, moreover, was out-
manœuvred.
Page II-227: closing quote mark has been inserted
after ... your thundering bad navigation.
Page II-235: closing quote mark has been inserted
after D. G. F.
Page II-270: opening quote mark inserted before
Completely exhausted, I managed to reach the
shore, ....
Page II-344: The lastest completed battle-ships ...
has been changed to The latest completed battle-
ships ....
Page II-388: closing quote mark has been inserted
after This was altered and other changes made.
Page II-395, table row Foote, column Officers: 44
has been changed to 4.
Page II-393-397: the pages have been re-arranged
to form complete tables; the page numbering as
used in the book has been preserved. Page 394:
decimal commas in the column Speed have been
replaced with decimal points for consistency with
the remainder of the table. The data have been
aligned more consistently for better readability.
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