Operation Fustian

Operation Fustian
Part of the Allied invasion of Sicily

Primosole Bridge after capture, with damaged

pill box on the right.

Date 13–16 July 1943

Location Primosole Bridge, Catania
37°23′58″N 15°3′54″E
Result British victory

Initial operational failure

Bridge captured with
advancing Eighth Army

Belligerents
United Kingdom Germany
Italy
Commanders and leaders
Gerald Lathbury Richard Heidrich
Sidney Kirkman Carlo Gotti
Units involved
50th Infantry 1st
Division Fallschirmjäger
1st Parachute Division
Brigade 213th Coastal
Division
 Casualties and losses
141 dead[nb 1] Unknown
168 missing or
wounded
11 Dakotas[1][2]
1 Albemarle
5 Waco gliders

Operation Fustian was an airborne forces operation undertaken during the Allied invasion of Sicily in July
1943 in the Second World War. The operation was carried out by Brigadier Gerald Lathbury's 1st Parachute
Brigade, part of the British 1st Airborne Division. Their objective was the Primosole Bridge across the
Simeto River. The intention was for the brigade, with glider-borne forces in support, to land on both sides
of the river. They would then capture the bridge and secure the surrounding area until relieved by the
advance of British XIII Corps, which had landed on the south eastern coast three days previously. Because
the bridge was the only crossing on the river and would give the British Eighth Army access to the Catania
plain, its capture was expected to speed the advance and lead to the defeat of the Axis forces in Sicily.

Many of the aircraft carrying the paratroopers from North Africa were shot down or were damaged and
turned back by friendly fire and enemy action. Evasive action taken by the pilots scattered the brigade over
a large area and only the equivalent of two companies of troops were landed in the correct locations.
Despite this and the defence by German and Italian forces, the British paratroops captured the bridge,
repulsed attacks and held out against increasing odds until nightfall. The relief force led by the 50th
(Northumbrian) Infantry Division, under Major-General Sidney C. Kirkman, which was short of transport,
were still 1 mile (1.6 km) away when they halted for the night. By this time, with casualties mounting and
supplies running short, the parachute brigade commander, Gerald Lathbury, had relinquished control of the
bridge to the Germans. The following day the British units joined forces and the 9th Battalion, Durham
Light Infantry, with tank support, attempted to recapture the bridge. The bridge was not finally secured until
three days after the start of the operation, when another battalion of the Durham Light Infantry, led by the
paratroopers, established a bridgehead on the north bank of the river.

The capture of Primosole Bridge did not lead to the expected rapid advance, as by this time the Germans
had gathered their forces and established a defensive line. It was not until early the following month that the
Eighth Army captured Catania. By this time the 1st Parachute Brigade had been withdrawn to Malta and
took no further part in the conquest of Sicily. Lessons were learned from the operation and were later to be
put into practice in future Allied airborne operations.

Background
After the Axis powers were defeated in North Africa, the Allied armies' next logical objective was to cross
the Mediterranean, landing in either the south of France, the Balkans, Sicily or Italy. The objective chosen
was Sicily, with the landing scheduled for 10 July 1943.[3] The Allied 15th Army Group, commanded by
General Sir Harold Alexander, consisted of the American Seventh Army, commanded by Lieutenant
General George Patton, which would land in the west between Licata and Scoglitti,[3] and the veteran
British Eighth Army, commanded by the experienced General Bernard Montgomery, which would land in
the south east between Cape Passero and Syracuse.[4]
In addition to the seaborne landings, there were also airborne
landings during the invasion. The U.S. 82nd Airborne Division,
under Major General Matthew Ridgway, would land in support of
the Seventh Army, while the British 1st Airborne Division, under
Major General George Hopkinson, conducted brigade-sized
landings along the eastern coast to support the Eighth Army.[3]

The first British airborne landing was Operation Ladbroke, which

was carried out by the 1st Airlanding Brigade, under Brigadier
Philip Hicks, during the night of 9–10 July. Their objective was to Map of the July 1943 Allied landings
seize and hold the Ponte Grande bridge just outside Syracuse. [5] in Sicily.

The second British airborne mission, Operation Glutton, was to

have been undertaken by the 2nd Parachute Brigade, under Brigadier Ernest Down, on the night of 10–11
July, aiming to capture a bridge beside Augusta. However circumstances changed and the second operation
was cancelled.[5]

The third British airborne mission planned was Operation Fustian, to be carried out by the 1st Parachute
Brigade, under Brigadier Gerald Lathbury, and scheduled for the night of 13–14 July.[5] The 1st Parachute
Brigade's objective was the Primosole bridge, crossing the Simeto River, south of Catania.[6] The bridge
was a vital objective, as it was the only crossing point over the Simeto. Its capture would give the Eighth
Army access to the Catania plain, to enable them to continue their advance northwards; its destruction
would seriously hamper the advance.[7] Once the parachute brigade had captured the bridge, they would
then have to defend it until relieved by units of the Eighth Army advancing from the landing beaches.[8][9]

British forces
The 1st Parachute Brigade, under Brigadier Lathbury, comprised the 1st, the 2nd and 3rd Parachute
Battalions, the 16th (Parachute) Field Ambulance, the 1st (Parachute) Squadron, Royal Engineers and the
1st (Airlanding) Anti-Tank Battery, Royal Artillery. The airlanding anti-tank battery were equipped with the
1st Para Brigade's only anti-tank guns, the British 6 pounder. Despite the formation being a parachute
brigade, the only way to transport the anti-tank guns and the jeeps required to pull them when they had
landed, was by glider.[10] Transporting artillery by air was something new to the British or any other army,
and this would be the first time that any artillery guns had ever been flown into combat.[11]

The 1st Parachute Brigade was an experienced formation, initially under command of the 1st Airborne
Division before being detached from the division to fight in North Africa. The brigade had taken part in the
landings in Algeria in November 1942 and the subsequent Battle of Tunisia, during which each of the
brigade's three parachute battalions had taken part in their own battalion-sized parachute landings.[12] It was
during this campaign that the 1st Parachute Brigade had been given their nickname the Red Devils by the
Germans.[13] A British parachute battalion had an establishment of 556 men in three rifle companies. Each
of the companies were divided into a small headquarters and three platoons. The platoons had three
sections; each section had a Bren light machine gun and a 2-inch mortar as well as the men's own personal
weapons.[14] The only heavy weapons in the parachute battalion were in the 3-inch Mortar platoon and the
Vickers machine gun platoon which were part of the battalion headquarters.[15]
It was decided that the brigade's paratroops would land on four
separate drop zones and that the gliders would land at two landing
zones. The paratroops of the 1st Parachute Battalion were divided
into two groups, one of which would land at 'Drop zone One' to the
north of the river, and the second at 'Drop zone Two' to the south of
it.[16] Once they had landed the two groups would head for their
assembly points, before conducting an assault on the bridge from
both sides simultaneously.[7] The 2nd Parachute Battalion were to
be landed south of the bridge on 'Drop zone Three', in the area
between the Gornalunga Canal and the main highway.[16] The 2nd
Battalion then had to assault and occupy three small hills, which
had been given the codenames 'Johnny I', 'Johnny II' and
'Johnny III'. The hills were believed to be occupied by an Italian British paratroopers, before taking
part in a practice parachute jump in
force of around platoon strength. Once the battalion had secured the
April 1944.
three hills, they were to dig in and prepare to defend the hills
against an attack from the south.[7][17] The 3rd Parachute Battalion
would land at 'Drop zone Four', 1,000 yards (910 m) north of the bridge.[16] Their objective was to secure
the ground in this area, defending against any counterattack from the direction of Catania.[17] The brigade's
glider force had two landing areas, 'Landing zone Seven' north of the river and 'Landing zone Eight' south
of the river.[16] Owing to the complexity of the landing plan and the short time between inception and
execution, the pathfinders belonging to the 21st Independent Parachute Company, Army Air Corps, would
be deployed to mark the correct drop zones. This was the first occasion this had been done in British
airborne operations.[18] The pathfinder company had special marker lights and Rebecca and Eureka
beacons that the transport aircraft and gliders would be able to identify and home in on.[19]

The senior officers of the 1st Airborne Division had estimated that there would be around 450 casualties
during the capture of the bridge, of which 25 per cent would be killed or missing, and the other 75 per cent
wounded.[10] It was appreciated that by themselves the three battalions' medical officers and staff would be
unable to cope with the expected numbers of casualties, so one section from the 16th (Parachute) Field
Ambulance, consisting of one doctor and 16 other ranks, would be attached to each of the parachute
battalions. The remainder of the field ambulance, comprising the headquarters with two surgical teams,
would be co-located with the brigade and establish their main dressing station in farm buildings to the south
of the bridge.[20]

After problems with the first two airborne operations in Sicily, the Royal Air Force advisor assigned to the
1st Airborne Division suggested that the American C-47 pilots adopt the Royal Air Force bomber stream
formation. This entailed the aircraft flying in pairs one behind the other with one minute between each
aircraft, instead of flying in their normal 'V' formation.[18] The suggestion was dismissed by the American
pilots, who were mostly pre-war airline pilots, not least because their training had not included any
instruction in night time navigation and the inexperienced crews relied heavily on following the aircraft in
front.[21]

Unconnected with Operation Fustian, but being conducted at the same time, No. 3 Commando would carry
out a separate operation 8 miles (13 km) to the south of the Simeto River. The commando unit were to carry
out an amphibious landing from the sea, then assault and capture the Malati Bridge over the Leonardo
River.[17]
The relieving force for both the commandos and paratroopers
would be from British XIII Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-
General Miles Dempsey. The corps consisted of the 5th Infantry
Division, 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division and the 4th
Armoured Brigade.[22] The armoured brigade, with three tank
regiments, was equipped with the American built Sherman tank.[22]
Early on 13 July the commander of the 50th Division, Major-
General Sidney Kirkman, was called to General Montgomery's
Eighth Army headquarters. Here he was informed about the two
missions by the British Commandos and the 1st Parachute Brigade,
and the requirement for the bridges to be captured intact.
Montgomery's intention was for the 50th Division to lead the Sicily 1943, British infantry with a
Eighth Army's advance and relieve the commandos and the Sherman tank to their rear.

paratroopers. To assist Kirkman in the task, Montgomery placed the

4th Armoured Brigade under his command.[23] Montgomery was insistent that he wanted the infantry
division to relieve the parachute brigade early on 14 July, which would require the division to advance
around 25 miles (40 km) in 24 hours.[23] The 50th Division had landed on 10 July and by this time had
been fighting for three days non-stop. With the daily temperature most of the time reaching 100 °F (38 °C),
many of the men in the division were physically exhausted and suffering from heat exhaustion.[23] The
division's situation was not improved by a grave error of judgement by Montgomery. During the planning
for the invasion, he had overestimated the strength of the German and Italian resistance to the Allied
landings. The British Eighth Army consisted mainly of infantry, tanks and heavy weapons but were light on
any form of mechanical transport, so any advance by the 50th Division would have to be conducted on
foot.[24]

Axis forces
The Italian Army force in the area of Primosole Bridge came from the 213 Coastal Division commanded by
General Carlo Gotti.[25] Coastal divisions were second line divisions, usually formed from men in their
forties and fifties, and were intended to perform labour or other second line duties. Recruited from the local
population, their officers were mostly men who had retired but had then been called up again. Their morale
was low, not least because of their second rate equipment and weapons. It had been intended to improve
their armaments with equipment seized from the recently disbanded Vichy French army, but when the arms
arrived in Sicily, many of them had been made unusable, and some had the wrong type of ammunition or
no ammunition at all.[26]

The Italians were supported by German paratroopers of the 1st

Parachute Division, who were ordered to move to Sicily from
France, and if necessary were to parachute in on 9 July.[27] The 1st
Fallschirmjäger Machine Gun Battalion commanded by Major
Werner Schmidt had landed at Catania during an Allied air raid
early on 13 July. Their aircraft and anti-tank guns were destroyed
during the raid, so the battalion left on foot for Primosole
Bridge.[17] When Schmidt informed the divisional commander of German Fallschirmjäger of the
his intentions, he was warned to expect a sea or airborne landing Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 1 in Oslo,
that night. If the Allies landed to the rear of the division, Schmidt's 1940.
battalion had to hold Primosole Bridge so that the division could
escape.[28] Forewarned in this way, the machine gun battalion started to dig in and prepare a defence
around 2,000 yards (1,800 m) to the south of the bridge once they arrived, well located to deal with any
parachute or glider landing in that area.[29]

Primosole Bridge
The Primosole Bridge is built from steel girders. It has a span of 400 feet (120 m), and is raised 8 feet
(2.4 m) above the Simeto River. The land to the north of the bridge is mainly olive and almond groves in
tree-lined fields. Immediately to the south of the bridge is the Gornalunga canal, and beyond that three
prominent hills.[17] The road crossing the bridge is Highway 114, running from Lentini 10 miles (16 km) to
the south to Catania 7 miles (11 km) to the north.[30][16] To assist the Italians defending the bridge, four
pillbox bunkers had been constructed, two on the north bank and two on the south bank.[31]

Fustian
At 19:30 on 13 July 1943, the first aircraft carrying the 1,856 men of the 1st Parachute Brigade took off
from North Africa.[20][32] The aircraft used consisted of 105 Douglas C-47 Skytrains belonging to the 51st
Troop Carrier Wing, 51 each from the 60th and the 62d Troop Carrier Groups, while the 64th Troop Carrier
Group supplied the other three. No. 38 Wing Royal Air Force supplied eleven Armstrong Whitworth
Albemarles.[33] Following behind the parachute force were the glider towing aircraft. These aircraft, again
supplied by No. 38 Wing, comprised 12 Albemarles and seven Handley Page Halifaxes, towing 11 Horsa
gliders and eight Waco gliders. The gliders were used to carry 77 men, mostly from the anti-tank battery, ten
6 pounder anti-tank guns and 18 jeeps.[33]

The aircraft's flight path took them around the south eastern corner
of Malta and up the eastern coast of Sicily.[33] The route was
measured to ensure that the first planes arrived over the drop zones
at 22:20.[20] When the planes arrived off Sicily, they were supposed
to stay 10 miles (16 km) offshore until reaching the Simeto River,
when they would head inland for the drop zones.[34] Somehow, 33
aircraft strayed off course and approached an Allied convoy. The
naval gunners had been warned to expect an air raid, and opened
fire on the American and British aircraft.[34] Two of the planes,
A pair of C-47 Skytrains, similar to
trying to avoid the unexpected anti-aircraft fire, collided and
the 105 C-47s used in the operation.
crashed into the sea.[34] Another two were shot down, and nine
were so badly shot up, with wounded crew and passengers, that
they were forced to turn back towards their airfields in North Africa.[7]

Those aircraft that did reach the Sicilian coast were engaged by Axis anti-aircraft guns, which shot down
11[1][2] of them. Another ten were damaged and were forced to abort their mission.[7] Some of the
inexperienced pilots now refused to go any further, and on his aircraft Lieutenant Colonel Alastair Pearson,
commanding officer of the 1st Parachute Battalion, realising his plane was flying round in circles, had to
threaten to shoot the crew to make them continue.[21] The anti-aircraft fire and the evasive action taken by
the pilots had dispersed the aircraft formations, and the parachute drop was scattered over a large area.[35]
The violent evasive manoeuvring left some of the paratroopers in heaps on the aircraft floor, and they were
unable to jump when ordered. When safely back out to sea, some of the pilots refused to try again,
considering the risk too great.[36] Of the surviving aircraft which carried on with the mission, only 39
managed to drop their paratroops within 0.5 miles (0.80 km) of the correct drop zone.[21] The furthest off
course were some groups from the 3rd Parachute Battalion and Royal Engineers who landed 12 miles
(19 km) to the south of the bridge,[35] while another four aircraft landed their paratroops on the slopes of
Mount Etna 20 miles (32 km) to the north.[19]

Those men of the 1st Parachute Brigade that landed on the southern drop zone were well within range of
the 1st Fallschirmjäger Machine Gun Battalion. In the darkness, the Germans initially thought that the
paratroopers were their own reinforcements landing, but they soon realised their mistake and opened
fire.[29] Some of those who escaped the machine gun fire were rounded up on the drop zone, and about
100 of them became prisoners of war as soon as they had touched ground.[25][nb 2] In the confusion of the
landing, 50 men of the 1st Parachute Battalion had assembled, assaulted and managed to capture the bridge
before the 50 Italian defenders could destroy it with the attached demolition charges. The Italians were
taken prisoner, just as a second group of 40 paratroopers led by Brigadier Lathbury arrived at the bridge.
Lathbury organised the safe removal of the demolition charges and set up a defensive perimeter. More
paratroopers continued to gather at the bridge, and soon they numbered around 120 men, who dug in to the
north and south.[25]

The Brigade Headquarters and the field ambulance main dressing station were established to the south of
the bridge, where the brigade's casualties started arriving for treatment.[35] Away from the main dressing
station, the medics on the 2nd Battalion drop zone had 29 wounded as a result of the parachute drop, and
there were 15 wounded on drop zone one from the 1st Battalion.[37]

The first glider casualties had occurred on takeoff, when two

aircraft towing Waco gliders crashed.[34] While en route, one of the
gliders was released early by its towing aircraft, and crashed into
the sea. When they did arrive over Sicily, the element of surprise
was gone, and four gliders were shot down by the coastal anti-
aircraft batteries.[34] By the time the gliders arrived at their landing
zones, two hours had lapsed since the parachute landings had
started.[17] One glider pilot later commented that they did not need
the pathfinders, as the tracer and lights from explosions were British paratroopers advance in line
brighter than any of the landing markers.[34] Of the surviving glider abreast.
force, only four gliders managed to land relatively unscathed, all the
others being caught by the Fallschirmjäger machine gun fire and
destroyed on their approach. The four intact gliders had been carrying three of the anti-tank guns, which
were now included in the bridge's defences.[7][38] Including the men from the gliders, the 1st Parachute
Brigade had 295 men at the bridge.[38] Shortage of manpower was not their only problem; their only
support weapons were the anti-tank guns, two 3-inch mortars and a Vickers machine gun.[7]

Daybreak
By 04:30 on 14 July, the 1st Parachute Battalion was in control of Primosole Bridge, but the
Fallschirmjäger Machine Gun Battalion were well dug in to the south.[39] Beyond them, 140 men of the
2nd Parachute Battalion had occupied the three small hills, and taken 500 Italian prisoners.[40] In numbers,
both battalions had little more than company strength. The 3rd Parachute Battalion had suffered the worst in
the scattered parachute drop, and only a few of their men had arrived at the bridge. With no command
structure, they were attached to the 1st Parachute Battalion to help defend the bridge.[41] To the north, the
Italian 372nd Coastal Battalion and the 10th Arditi Regiment had been informed of the parachute landings.
Many of the 372nd Battalion had disappeared, while the Arditi mounted the first of a number of attacks on
the British positions. Without the support of any heavy weapons, they were easily fought off.[39]

Also at dawn the first attack by the Fallschirmjäger Machine Gun

Battalion to the south began, when they opened fire with their
machine guns and mortars. Their first assault was against the 2nd
Parachute Battalion's positions, and was unsuccessful. However,
their next assault, later in the morning, succeeded in capturing
Johnny II, the second of the small hills. Lieutenant Colonel John
Frost, in command of the 2nd Parachute Battalion, immediately
counterattacked, but his men were repulsed after sustaining a Fallschirmjäger with MG 42 machine
number of casualties. [39] At 09:00 a forward observation officer gun.
attached to the 2nd Parachute Battalion managed to make radio
contact with the British cruiser HMS Newfoundland, which then
used its 6-inch guns to target the Fallschirmjäger positions.[39] The naval gunfire had the desired effect,
causing the Germans some casualties and keeping them under cover. From then on, German resistance from
the south was restricted to harassing machine gun fire. A grass fire they started did force the 2nd Parachute
Battalion to abandon Johnny I, and the remnants of the battalion now concentrated on Johnny III.[42]

To the north of the bridge, a German scratch-built battle group of 350 men, including the 1st Company, 1st
Fallschirmjäger Signal Battalion, an anti-aircraft battery and some anti-tank guns, was gathered under the
command of Captain Franz Stangenberg, supported by the 113rd Light Trucks Company of the 10th Arditi
Regiment (the "Commandos" unit of the Italian Army) with 56 men and six heavily armed SPA-Viberti
AS.42,[43] Stangenberg was in position to launch his first assault on the bridge at 14:00. This first attack
was driven off by the British paratroopers.[42] For his second attempt Stangenberg brought up three 88 mm
anti-aircraft guns in support. This assault was more successful, taking some prisoners, and almost succeeded
in reaching the bridge. It also secured a position for the 88s to engage the two pillboxes on the north
bank.[42] By 17:00 the men of the 1st Parachute Battalion were almost out of ammunition, and were forced
to withdraw to the southern side of the bridge.[39] The German 88s were moved forward again, and this
time demolished the pillboxes on the south side. Running short of supplies and with his casualties
mounting, Brigadier Lathbury made the decision to relinquish control of the bridge to the Germans, and the
parachute brigade moved back 1,200 yards (1,100 m). Of the 295 men who had been at the bridge, 115 had
become casualties.[39] The 16th (Parachute) Field Ambulance main dressing station could not be moved or
evacuated, and remained behind in no man's land.[44]

An Italian officer entered the station, and informed the medical staff they were now prisoners of war, but
since they were treating casualties from both sides, they were allowed to remain and continue operating.[4]
Treatment of the wounded continued all day, and by 22:00 the surgeons had carried out 21 surgical
operations and were looking after 62 British and 29 German or Italian patients.[44] At 18:30, in the
darkness, Lathbury led the remainder of his men to join the 2nd Parachute Battalion.[45]

During the night of 14–15 June, the Italians mounted several counterattacks with an armoured car squadron
(under Captain Paradisi Romolo) reinforced with Blackshirt Commandos aboard the motorized column
penetrating the British sector and in a suicidal raid very nearly overran the headquarters of 9th Battalion, the
Durham Light Infantry.[46][47] Another column of armoured cars crossed Primasole Bridge and attacked the
98th Field Regiment Royal Artillery that had only recently having arrived in the area but the Italians were
defeated at the intersection of the Lentini and Scordia roads[48] and Semoventes from the 4th Self-Propelled
Artillery Battalion, truck-borne infantry and supporting motorcycle companies from Gruppo Tattico
Carmito (under Lieutenant-Colonel Francesco Tropea)[49] attacked the British 124th Field Artillery
Regiment but were unable to repeat their success obtained at Malati Bridge against No. 3 Commando
(under Lieutenant Colonel John Durnford-Slater) and suffered a crushing defeat.[50] British war
correspondent Evelyn Aubrey Montague reported that several Italians units had indeed fought hard for
Primosole Bridge, "While some dropped behind enemy lines and rounded up a large number of Italian
prisoners ... the main body captured the bridge and held it all yesterday against tremendous odds. For nearly
24 hours, they were shelled, under mortar fire, strafed from the air, and attacked on the ground by seven
Italian battalions. There were less than 200 of them to resist this continuous onslaught, but they held out
stubbornly, knowing that behind them our infantry were fighting, furiously to come to their aid."[51]

By dawn, the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division had only managed to advance 10 miles (16 km), and
were still 8 miles (13 km) from No. 3 Commando at the Melati bridge and 15 miles (24 km) from Primosole
Bridge.[52] It was not until 17:00 that the 5th Battalion, East Yorkshire Regiment, part of the 69th Infantry
Brigade, eventually reached Malati Bridge, although by now the commandos had been forced to
withdraw[53] after being overwhelmed during what proved to be largely an Italian counterattack[54] from
Gruppo Tattico Carmito comprising the 4th Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion (under Lieutenant-Colonel
Francesco Tropea),[55] the 553rd (under Captain Giovanni Sartor) and 554th (under Captain Fausto
Clementi) Motorcycle Companies[56] on 13 July. The bridge was quickly captured; the commandos had
dismantled the demolition charges so that it could not be demolished. With their first objective secured, the
British infantry continued their advance on foot towards the parachute brigade.[52] The tanks and small
amount of motor transport belonging to the 4th Armoured Brigade had been held up even further back.
They had been stopped in Carlentini by a destroyed bridge, and the 4th Armoured Brigade did not start
moving again until after 19:00.[52]

The 50th (Northumbrian) Division eventually reached Lentini, about halfway from their start point to
Primosole Bridge, in the afternoon. Here the streets were blocked by debris, covered by snipers and
machine gunners left as a rearguard by the retreating Germans.[39] By nightfall only one of the 50th
(Northumbrian) Division's infantry battalions, the 6th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry, of 151st Infantry
Brigade, with some tanks in support, had reached a position 1 mile (1.6 km) from Johnny II. Despite their
orders to advance at all speed, they halted for the night.[57]

Recapture of the bridge

After the parachute brigade withdrew, the Axis forces gathered at the bridge. They now comprised the
remnants of the 372nd Coastal Battalion (under Major Nino Bolla[58]) in the form of two fire support
companies and one rifle company[59] and one Blackshirt Commando Battalion[60](under Major Vito
Marciano[61]) and gunners from the 29th Artillery Battalion that arrived from Catania as much needed
riflemen for Major Bolla,[62] with this Italian force fighting alongside the German 1st Fallschirmjäger
Machine Gun Battalion and Captain Stangenberg's Battle Group. The German High Command was aware
of the importance of holding the bridge, and overnight they dispatched reinforcements who arrived by
parachute. These came from the 1st Fallschirmjäger Division, and consisted of the 1st Fallschirmjäger
Engineer Battalion, the 1st Battalion, 4th Fallschirmjäger Regiment and a battalion of the 1st
Fallschirmjäger Artillery Regiment.[45][63] The Fallschirmjäger engineers started to form a defensive line to
the north of the bridge, and a smaller one on the southern bank.[45]
Early on 15 July, the 1st Parachute Brigade heard tank fire to the
south of their position. Brigadier Lathbury sent out a patrol to
investigate, which located the tanks and infantry of XIII Corps that
had halted just south of them the previous night.[57] The 1st
Parachute Brigade and 50th (Northumbrian) Division now moved
forward together. The main dressing station, which had continued
to operate after being captured, was liberated by the 2nd Parachute
Battalion.[4] In an attempt to recapture Primosole Bridge the 9th
Battalion, Durham Light Infantry, supported by the 44th Royal
Tank Regiment, carried out a number of costly assaults in the face
of withering fire from the German and Italian defenders resulting in
100 British casualties, including 34 killed.[60] At one stage they Royal Engineers repairing the bridge
after it was captured by the British
managed to cross the bridge, but three Sherman tanks
for the second time.
accompanying them were knocked out by the German 88s, and
with no armoured support the infantry were forced to withdraw.
However, an error in communication caused the Fallschirmjäger Engineer Battalion to withdraw to the
north bank of the river, and this allowed the Durhams to establish a position at the southern end of the
bridge.[45] At the main dressing station the surgeons had operated on another 14 wounded by the time
ambulances arrived from XIII Corps at 17:00 to evacuate the wounded.[4] At 18:00 the Main Dressing
Station was closed and the men moved to Johnny I. During the time the main dressing station had been
active, the surgeons had completed 31 operations, and the medics had treated 109 wounded.[64]

The Germans were aware that the British paratroopers had dismantled the explosive charges attached to
Primosole Bridge, and now attempted to destroy it by driving trucks laden with explosives onto it. This was
unsuccessful.[65]

During the night the 9th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry continued trying to capture the bridge. Their
attacks also provided a distraction for the Germans[4] while Lieutenant Colonel Pearson of the 1st Parachute
Battalion led two companies of the 8th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry across the Simeto River using a
small ford to establish another bridgehead on the northern bank. During the day's battle both the British and
Germans suffered heavy casualties, but the bridge was eventually retaken by the British infantry.[45]

The remaining machine-gunners, mortar-men and protecting rifle teams from the 372nd Coastal Battalion
and the reinforcements from the 29th Artillery Battalion sent to their assistance, held their ground until
Major Bolla discovered that the neighbouring Fallschirmjäger unit had retreated without informing them of
the planned German withdrawal.[66] Bolla was nevertheless able to extricate his forces and escape the
British encirclement. Leaving the British Eighth Army to continue their advance, at 07:00 16 July the 1st
Parachute Brigade were transported in trucks to Syracuse, where they embarked on a LST. Here they
remained overnight, sitting through a two-hour air raid, and sailed for Valletta at 12:00 on 17 July.[4] In
Operation Fustian they had suffered around 141 dead, and 168 missing or wounded.[7][67][nb 3]

Aftermath
The operation was successful in the end; though narrow in victory in part because of the uncoordinated and
ill-controlled friendly anti-aircraft fire. Only forty percent of the 5,000 paratroopers dropped had landed
near their assigned drop zones.[68] The recapture of Primosole Bridge did not result in the rapid advance
over the Catania plain envisioned by Montgomery. The by now exhausted 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry
Division was holding a position based on the bridge. The 5th Infantry Division took over the lead, but after
a number of attacks could not make any further progress. Its 13th Infantry Brigade had to establish another
bridgehead across the Simeto,[69] but the Germans had brought in more troops and prepared defensive
positions, and after hard fighting it was not until 5 August 1943 that the Eighth Army entered the city of
Catania itself.[57] Further hard fighting followed, and they entered Messina just after the United States
Seventh Army on 17 August 1943.[7]

After an enquiry into the problems with the airborne missions in Sicily, the British Army and Royal Air
Force submitted some recommendations.[70] Aircrew had to be trained in parachute and glider operations,
and pathfinders landing before the main force had to have enough time to set out their beacons.[70] The
landing plan was simplified, with complete brigades landing on one drop zone instead of the smaller
battalion landing areas used in Sicily.[70] Gliders were no longer released at night while still over water and
their landing zones would be large enough to accommodate the aircraft with room to spare.[71] Following
the friendly-fire incident over the convoy, more training was given to ships' crews in aircraft recognition and
Allied aircraft were painted with three large white stripes on their wings.[72] Training for pilots belonging to
the Glider Pilot Regiment was increased and improvements to the gliders were implemented, including
better inter-aircraft communication.[73]

For transporting paratroops, to avoid relying solely on American aircraft and pilots, No. 38 Wing Royal Air
Force was expanded, becoming No. 38 Group with its Halifax squadrons, now supported by four
squadrons of Albemarles and four squadrons of Stirlings.[74] To provide another method of delivering jeeps
and artillery guns by air, the air force started experiments on parachuting them into combat, carrying the
jeeps and guns in the aircraft's large bomb bays.[74] A second Royal Air Force transport group, No. 46
Group, was formed, and was equipped solely with Dakotas, instead of the mixture of aircraft in No. 38
Group.[75] After these changes, the Royal Air Force groups could supply 88 Albemarles, 88 Stirlings, 36
Halifaxes and 150 Dakotas, a total of 362 planes, in addition to aircraft held as reserves.

Lessons were learned from the near-disastrous parachute drops on Sicily and paved the way for larger and
more successful operations in Italy, Normandy and Southern France.[68]

Notes
Footnotes

1. The troop casualties are for the parachute brigade only, the aircrew losses are not known.
2. It is noteworthy that the British paratroopers caught in the branches of the fruit trees, were not
killed out of hand, but were allowed to surrender.[25]
3. Reynolds only gives the total casualties for the British 1st Airborne Division in Sicily, while
Mitcham only gives the casualties during Operation Ladbroke. This casualty figure has been
achieved by subtracting one figure from the other.

Citations

1. Molony, C. J. C.; Flynn, F. C.; Davies, H. L.; Gleave, T. P. (1973). The Mediterranean and
Middle East (https://archive.org/details/mediterranean-middle-east-vol-5/mode/2up). Vol. 5:
The Campaign in Sicily 1943 and the Campaign in Italy, 3rd September 1943 to 31st March
1944. London: H.M. Stationary Office. p. 95 (https://archive.org/details/mediterranean-middle-
east-vol-5/page/95/mode/2up). OCLC 59086129 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59086129).
 Retrieved 12 July 2024. "Anti-aircraft fire accounted for 11 aircraft and in all 14 aircraft were
lost."
2. Weeks, John (2013). Assault from the Sky: The History of Airborne Warfare 1939–1980s
(ebook ed.). London: Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 9781782006091. OCLC 1021809924 (ht
tps://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1021809924). "Of the 1,900 men who took off only 295 arrived
according to plan; 39 planes dropped men on the planned drop zones, 48 dropped theirs up
to 10 miles away, 29 did not find any drop zone and 11 were shot down."
3. Tugwell, p.156
4. Cole, p.49
5. Reynolds, p.36
6. Tugwell, p.159
7. Reynolds, p.37
8. Tugwell, p.162
9. Reynolds, p.47
10. Cole, p.35
11. Carman, p.23
12. Reynolds, pp.30–32
13. Reynolds, p.34
14. Guard, p.37
15. Peters and Buist, p.55
16. Mrazek, p.83
17. Mitcham, p.150
18. Tugwell, p.163
19. Ferguson, p.12
20. Cole, p.45
21. Tugwell, p.164
22. Mitcham, p.335
23. Mitcham, p.154
24. Mitcham, p.82
25. Mitcham, p.152
26. Jowett, p.6
27. Mitcham, p.72
28. Mitcham, pp.150–151
29. Mitcham, p.151
30. Mitcham, p.149
31. Mitcham, pp.157–158
32. Mitcham, p.148
33. Mrazek, p.82
34. Mrazek, p.84
35. Cole, p.47
36. Cole, p.46
37. Cole, pp.47–48
38. Mitcham, p.153
39. Mitcham, p.156
40. D'Este, p.363
41. Mitcham, p.158
42. Mitcham, p.157
43. "Catania – La Battaglia Del Ponte Di Primosole E Il Sacrificio Degli Arditi Del Ii Battaglione
Del X" (https://www.ecodegliblei.it/CATANIA-LA-BATTAGLIA-DEL-PONTE-DI-PRIMOSOLE-
E-IL-SACRIFICIO-DEGLI-ARDITI-DEL-II-BATTAGLIONE-DEL-X.htm). Archived (https://web.
archive.org/web/20210518073229/https://www.ecodegliblei.it/CATANIA-LA-BATTAGLIA-DE
L-PONTE-DI-PRIMOSOLE-E-IL-SACRIFICIO-DEGLI-ARDITI-DEL-II-BATTAGLIONE-DEL-
X.htm) from the original on 18 May 2021. Retrieved 9 February 2020.
44. Cole, p.48
45. Quarrie, p.77
46. "Both the 8th and 9th Battalions tried to snatch a few hours rest during the night. The 6th
Battalion was still some way behind, after clearing up at Solarino, and did not arrive till later
on the 15th. But at 4 a.m. the 9th Battalion was attacked by some Italian armoured cars
which penetrated as far as Battalion Headquarters before being halted." The D.L.I. at War:
The History of the Durham Light Infantry 1939–1945, David Rissik, p. 123, Andrews UK
Limited, 2012
47. “Un paio di camionette del II° btg Arditi, con comando ad Acireale, al comando del STen.
Donìa si trovava in perlustrazione già alle 21,30 sulle rive del fiume Simeto. Il reparto
godeva di una certa fama presso i tedeschi, che chiesero così a Donìa di aiutarli a
riprendere il ponte. Donìa chiamato per radio il magg. Marcianò che lasció subito il comando
di battaglione si diresse su Primosole alla testa di 3 pattuglie della 113° compagnia, ognuna
con 2 camionette ed un totale di 56 uomini armati di mitragliatrici e coraggio da vendere. Alle
01,45 le 6 camionette (al comando del cap Paradisi) imboccarono il ponte a tutta velocità
percorrendolo in un baleno e raggiungendo l’altra parte dove stava l’avanguardia inglese,
che in preda al panico si diede alla fuga verso il Bivio Jazzotto (dove stava il grosso della
brigata). La reazione inglese peró non tardó ad arrivare e fu particolarmente violenta a colpi
di mortaio, riuscendo cosi a distruggere 4 delle 6 camionette. Gli Arditi, circondati, non
smisero mai di sparare all’impazzata, quindi a bordo delle 2 camionette superstiti tornarono
verso le proprie retrovie. L’azione duró 1 ora e 40 min, procuró al nemico numerose perdite
assicurando al battaglione tedesco la ripresa del ponte di Primosle, infatti gli inglesi furono
ricacciati in dietro a bivio Jazzotto. Il bilancio di quell’azione fu di 5 Arditi morti, 4 feriti e 16
dispersi.” Assalto a Tre Ponti: Da Cassibile al Simeto nel Luglio 1943, Tullio Marcon, p. ?,
Ediprint 1993
48. “At 3am on 15th July eight Italian armoured cars had crossed Primasole Bridge and reached
the junction of the Lentini and Scordia roads (later known as ‘Dead Horse Corner’) before
they could be stopped. Hit by the fire of Gunner Chandler’s Browning, one of them crashed,
blazing, into Captain Pike’s tank which had hastily driven across the road to form a block,
and the OP party had to stand by andwatch their tank and all their kit go up in flames." The
Surrey & Sussex Yeomanry in the Second World War, T.B. Davis, p. 61, Ditchling Press,
1980
49. "Si trattava del gruppo tattico di Carmito , al comando del ten. col. Tropea ( IV btg. semoventi
Div. Livorno e 53 ° Compagnia motociclisti)..." L' Invasione della Sicilia (1943), Gaetano
Zingali, p. 294, G. Crisafulli, 1962
50. “In a ... night action 124th Field Artillery Regiment RA east of Carlentini was attacked ... by
the 4th Battalion Contracarro Semoventi ... By 0100 hours 200 prisoners, twelve ... S47/32
tanks, fifty motor cycles, six lorries and much else were in the bag!" Monty's Northern
Legions: 50th Northumbrian and 15th Scottish Divisions at War 1939–1945, Patrick
Delaforce, p. ?, Fonthill Media, 2017
51. Stern Fight for a Bridge on Catania Plain, The Glasgow Herald, 19 July 1943 (https://news.g
oogle.com/newspapers?nid=2507&dat=19430719&id=nzlAAAAAIBAJ&sjid=V1kMAAAAIB
AJ&pg=3663,4177583&hl=en)
52. Mitcham, p.155
53. D'Este, p.360
54. Molony, C. J. C.; Flynn, F. C.; Davies, H. L.; Gleave, T. P. (1973). The Mediterranean and
Middle East (https://archive.org/details/mediterranean-middle-east-vol-5/mode/2up). Vol. 5:
The Campaign in Sicily 1943 and the Campaign in Italy, 3rd September 1943 to 31st March
1944. London: H.M. Stationary Office. p. 95 (https://archive.org/details/mediterranean-middle-
east-vol-5/page/95/mode/2up). OCLC 59086129 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59086129).
Retrieved 12 July 2024. "Soon, however, Italian troops (probably an anti-tank battalion and a
company of motor-cyclists) counter-attacked ... There were no sign of the expected British
force from Lentini, and casualties were mounting. Colonel Durnford-Slater therefore broke off
the action, and his unit withdrew, commando-style, in separate groups southward."
55. "Si trattava del gruppo tattico di Carmito, al comando del ten. col. Tropea ( IV btg. semoventi
Div. Livorno e 53 ° Compagnia motociclisti) che a col con. corso di tre carri armati tedeschi
riuscì a respingere il commando verso la costa e ad obbligarlo a reimbarcarsi." L'invasione
della Sicilia (1943), Gaetano Zingali, p. 294, G. Crisafulli, 1962
56. UNIONE NAZIONALE UFFICIALI IN CONGEDO D'ITALIA: RIVISTA DI CULTURA
MILITARE FONDATA NEL 1927 (https://www.unuci.org/images/documenti/rivista/Rivista_20
11/Unuci_01_02_2011.pdf)
57. Tugwell, p.165
58. "Major Nino Bolla had been sent by his divisional commander General Carlo Gotti from
headquarters 213 Coastal Division to take over command of 372 Coastal Battalion." Sicily,
Hugh Pond, 137, W. Kimber, 1962
59. "The remains of his battalion he found on the downstream side of Primosole Bridge, much
depleted in strength, but still holding with machine guns and mortars." Sicily, Hugh Pond, p.
138, W. Kimber, 1962
60. “They never had a chance. The Durhams were cut down by machine-gun fire as they
approached the bridge, and most of them halted. One platoon managed to ford the river, but
was met by paratroopers from Adolff's 2nd Company and the Italian Blackshirt Commando
battalion. A hail of machinegun and mortar fire struck the Durhams ... The 9th Durhams
retreated out of range after suffering 100 casualties, including 34 killed." The Battle of Sicily:
How the Allies Lost Their Chance for Total Victory, Samuel W. Mitcham Jr., Friedrich von
Stauffenberg, p. ?, Stackpole Books, 2007
61. Patrick Cloutier. Regio Esercito: The Italian Royal Army in Mussolini's Wars, 1935–1943.
Lulu Press, 2013. p. 193
62. "Il maggiore Nino Bolla che fu uno dei protagonisti della disperata difesa di Catania, quella
sera si trovava ... di Catania mandò nel settore del Ponte di Primosole le poche forze che
aveva disponibili assieme al XXIX gruppo 105 / 28..." Sicilia senza Italia, Luglio-Agosto
1943, Sandro Attanasio, p 151, Mursia, 1976
63. Mitchum, p.159
64. Cole, p.50
65. D'Este, p.392
66. "He spoke to a junior officer, who volunteered the information that his Commanding Officer,
Major Heggert, had told him to remain until he returned. Somewhat disconsolately, he went
back to his lines with the news; his officers were not surprised : "They buggered us like this
in Russia ... retreating without telling us." Sicily, Hugh Pond, p. 150, W. Kimber, 1962
67. Mitcham, p.78
68. Shrader p. 69
69. D'Este, p.404
70. Tugwell, p.167
71. Mrazek, p.85
72. Nigl, p.68
73. Nigl, p.69
74. Lake, p.81
75. Tugwell, p.202

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External links
Pegasus Archive pictures of area (http://www.pegasusarchive.org/sicily/pFustian.htm)
 Personal account by Major Kessel at Para Data (https://web.archive.org/web/201203181713
37/http://www.paradata.org.uk/people/alexander-w-lipmann-kessel)

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