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The Virtue of Agency
The Virtue of Agency
Sôphrosunê and Self-Constitution in
Classical Greece
CHRISTOPHER MOORE
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197663509.001.0001
σωφρονεστάτη
Nor do not saw the air
too much with your hand, thus, but use all gently;
for in the very torrent, tempest, and, as I may say,
the whirlwind of passion, you must acquire and beget
a temperance that may give it smoothness.
—Hamlet
Your constitution is what gives you the kind of volitional unity you
need to be the author of your actions. And it is the person who acts
in accordance with the best constitution, the most unified consti-
tution, who is most truly the author of her actions. For Kant as for
Plato, integrity is the metaphysical essence of morality.
—Christine Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Selected Abbreviations and Editions xi
1. Debating a Virtue 1
2. The Early History of Sôphrosunê 27
3. Heraclitus, Self-Knowledge, and the Greatest Virtue 54
4. Tragic Sôphrosunê in Two Plays of Euripides 75
5. The Late Fifth Century 100
6. The Figure of Socrates 133
7. Xenophon on Sôphrosunê and Enkrateia 157
8. Plato 1—Sôphrosunê and the Capacity for Action 185
9. Plato 2—Two Formulations of Agency 212
10. Plato 3—Sôphrosunê with Wisdom in Two Late Dialogues 236
11. Aristotle and the Later Fourth Century 257
12. Pythagorean Sôphrosunê 281
13. Sôphrosunê for Later Greek Women 307
Aristox. Aristoxenus
Pyth. pr. Pythagorean Precepts: Huffman, C., ed., Aristoxenus of Tarentum: The
Pythagorean Precepts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
VA Life of Archytas: Huffman, C., ed., Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean,
Philosopher, and Mathematician King (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005).
Bacchyl. Bacchylides: Snell, B. and H. Maehler, eds., Bacchylides. Carmina cum
fragmentis, 10th ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970).
BNJ Worthington, I., ed., Brill’s New Jacoby. 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2018–).
CEG Hansen, P. A., ed., Carmina epigraphica Graeca, 2 vols. (Berlin: De Gruyter,
1983–89).
Democr. Democritus (in LM)
Diss. Log. Dissoi Logoi (in LM)
DK Diels, H., and W. Kranz, eds., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed.
(Berlin: Weidmann, 1951).
DL Diogenes Laertius: Dorandi, T., ed., Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent
Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
DPhA Goulet, R. ed., Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques (Paris: CNRS
Éditions, 1989–2003).
Eur. Euripides: Diggle, J., ed., Euripides Fabulae, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1981–94).
Bacch. Bacchae
Cycl. Cyclops
Hipp. Hippolytus
IA Iphigenia at Aulis
Med. Medea
Or. Orestes
fr. fragments (in TrGF)
Hdt. Herodotus: Wilson, N. G., ed., Herodoti Historiae, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015).
Hes. Hesiod: Most, G. W., ed., Hesiod, rev. ed., 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
WD Works and Days
Th. Theogony
Hom. Homer
Il. Iliad: West, M. L., ed., Homeri Ilias, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1998–2000).
Od. Odyssey: West, M. L., ed., Homerus: Odyssea (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017).
Iambl. Iamblichus of Chalcis
Protr. Protreptic: Pistelli, E., ed., Iamblichi Protrepticus (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1967).
VP On the Pythagorean Way of Life: Nauck, A., ed., Iamblichi De vita
Pythagorica (St. Petersburg: Eggers, 1884).
Ibyc. Ibycus (in PMG)
Isoc. Isocrates: Mandilaras, B. G., ed., Isocrates: Opera Omnia, 3 vols. (Munich:
Teubner/Saur, 2003).
LM Laks, A., and G. Most, eds., Early Greek Philosophy, 9 vols., Loeb Classical
Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).
Selected Abbreviations and Editions xiii
LSJ Liddell, H. G., R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925–40).
Lys. Lysias: Carey, C., ed., Lysiae Orationes cum Fragmentis (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007).
OCD Hornblower, S., A. Spawforth, and E. Eidinow, eds., Oxford Classical
Dictionary, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
PCG Kassel, R., and C. Austin, eds., Poetai Comici Graeci, 8 vols. (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 1983–95).
Pind. Pindar: Race, W. H., ed., Pindar, rev. ed., 2 vols., Loeb Classical Library
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
Isthm. Isthmian Odes
Nem. Nemean Odes
Ol. Olympian Odes
Pyth. Pythian Odes
fr. fragment
Paeans Rutherford, I., Pindar’s Paeans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Pl. Plato: Burnet, J., ed., Platonis Opera (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1900–1907).
Alc. Alcibiades
Chrm. Charmides
Crat. Cratylus
Euthd. Euthydemus
Grg. Gorgias
La. Laches
Phd. Phaedo
Phdr. Phaedrus
Phlb. Philebus
Pol. Statesman, Politicus
Prot. Protagoras
Rep. Republic: Slings, S. R., ed., Platonis Rempublicam (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
Symp. Symposium
Tim. Timaeus
Plut. Plutarch: Nachstädt, W., W. Sieveking, and J. B. Titchener, eds., Plutarchi
Moralia, 7 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1966–71).
PMG Davies, M., and D. L. Page, eds., Poetarum Melicorum Graecorum Fragmenta,
vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
Σ Scholiast
SEP Zalta, E., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research
Laboratory, Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, 2022. Online.
Soph. Sophocles: Lloyd-Jones, H., and N. G. Wilson, eds., Sophoclis Fablulae
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
Aj. Ajax
Ant. Antigone
El. Electra
xiv Selected Abbreviations and Editions
OC Oedipus at Colonus
OT Oedipus Tyrannos
Ph. Philoctetes
fr. fragment (in TrGF)
SSR Giannantoni, G., ed., Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae (Naples:
Bibliopolis, 1991).
Stob. Stobaeus: Wachsmuth, C., and O. Hense, eds., Joannis Stobaei
Anthologium, 5 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884–1912).
Thg. Theognis: West, M. L., ed., Iambi et Elegi Graeci, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989–92).
Thuc. Thucydides: Jones, H. S., and J. E. Powell, eds., Thucydidis Historiae,
2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942).
TrGF Snell, B., R. Kannicht, and S. Radt, eds., Tragicorum Graecorum
Fragmenta, 6 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1971–2004).
Xen. Xenophon: Marchant, E. C., ed., Xenophontis Opera Omnia, 2nd ed.,
5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921).
Anab. Anabasis
Ap. Apology of Socrates
Cyn. Cynegeticus (On Hunting with Dogs)
Cyr. Cyropedia
Hell. Hellenika (History of Greece)
Hipparch. Hipparchus (On the Cavalry Commander)
Lac. Pol. Constitution of the Spartans
Mem. Memorabilia (Memoirs of Socrates)
Oec. Oeconomicus (On Estate Management)
Symp. Symposium (Banquet)
The text of ancient writings by and about the early Greek writers eventually
called “philosophers” comes from LM, unless noted, and is cited by both DK and
LM number, if available. In DK, “A” precedes testimonia, “B” precedes fragments.
In LM, “P” precedes information about the philosopher, “D” precedes fragments
or doctrinal statements, and “R” precedes later reception of the philosophers’
thought (according to the editors’ judgment).
1
Debating a Virtue
This book tells a story about the Greek virtue sôphrosunê (σωφροσύνη) during
the classical era.1 It is a story of a virtue coming to increased attention and es-
teem, the queries and debates that followed, and the theories put forward to re-
solve those puzzles and disagreements.
By the fifth century sôphrosunê was becoming canonical—one among three
or four other virtue-terms which, together, name the competences of the wholly
good person. By the fourth century, this canon generally included, besides
sôphrosunê, wisdom (σοφία), courage (ἀνδρεία), justice (δικαιοσύνη), and some-
times piety (εὐσέβεια). All are familiar, but sôphrosunê least so. Accordingly, the
descriptive purpose of this book is to show how writers in the classical period
used the term, and especially what they said about it, how they esteemed it,
what they contended over, and how the philosophically minded of them sought
to clarify or articulate or redefine the term in response to those contentions.
Without surveying usages exhaustively or taxonomizing every variety, the goal
is to reconstruct how these authors understood sôphrosunê as a fundamental
human excellence.
Hardly separable from the descriptive purpose of this book is its interpreta-
tive purpose. It seeks to answer questions that may not have been asked in such
explicit terms by the Greeks themselves: Why was sôphrosunê so esteemed? Why
did it merit such disagreement? Why did fourth-century writers include it in
their quadripartite or other-sized canons of virtues? Why was it sometimes even
treated as the condition for the other virtues? In brief: What fundamental aspect
of human excellence did the term sôphrosunê actually point to?
sophrosyne), soe-froe-SUE-nay, as though the Greek accent over the υ serves as a stress marker; some
others pronounce it suh-FRAH-zoo-nay, preferring the English pattern of stressing the antepenult
and giving the omicron a broader sound. I always transliterate the term (for discussion of English
translations of the term, see the epilogue) and usually use the abstract nominal form as a stand-in
for the other main parts of speech (unless the form is important or English grammar prefers an-
other part of speech): sôphronein (verb), sôphrôn (adjective), sôphronôs (adverb). Other forms in-
clude sôphronizein (verb: “to cause to be sôphrôn”), sôphronismos (noun: “result of sôphronizein”),
and sôphronikos (adjective: “sôphrôn-like”).
The Virtue of Agency. Christopher Moore, Oxford University Press. © Christopher Moore 2023.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197663509.003.0001
2 The Virtue of Agency
Despite the range of contexts in which Greek authors used the term
sôphrosunê, their divergent sensibilities and judgments about it, and their dis-
tinctive elaborations on the virtue’s nature, we come to see that they shared a
basic assumption. Sôphrosunê is the capacity to act well in the face of a distinctive
human challenge: the conflicting heterogeneity of our ends. Given our range of
interests, relationships, and needs, we may simultaneously feel several opposed
inclinations to act, and often the one we feel most strongly is not the one we
should act on now. Sôphrosunê allows us to choose our action on grounds in-
dependent of the phenomenological quality of our inclinations—their strength
or noisiness or urgency—when that quality does not actually convey practical
wisdom. This capacity for a more deliberative and hopefully more successful ac-
tion may be formulated in various ways, depending on one’s preferred moral-
psychological formulations—as the capacity to act only on certain desires, to
pursue only certain goals, to acknowledge only certain norms, to accept only cer-
tain reasons. However we put it, we need sôphrosunê because we sometimes feel
like doing things that, outside the cramped experience of that feeling, differ from
what we can realize we should do.
The other virtues can be seen as solutions to human challenges: justice to
our living among others who have rights and interests; courage to the fact that
defending our rights and interests causes risk of harm to ourselves; piety to the
invisible and aloof gods who may nevertheless demand our fealty; wisdom to the
obscurity of practical problems and the uncertainty of future outcomes. These are
not exclusive, sharply delineated, or equal-sized domains; their scope and reach
depend on the conception of the situation. For instance, wisdom might assess
who has which rights and interests and the best way to respect them; it may take
courage to respect those rights that seem contrary to tradition. Because of these
overlapping domains, sôphrosunê can sometimes seem a particular capacity—
the capacity to deal with desiderative plurality—but also the general term for
every other virtue. Analyzing courage as the competition between the desire for
safety and the desire for honor turns it into a class of sôphrosunê; so, too, justice
as wanting to respect others but also to keep one’s money, or piety as the wish to
benefit the gods but also to keep to human affairs. Hence sôphrosunê’s distinctive
association with those conflicted desires less readily found in martial, political,
or religious contexts, such as those for bodily pleasure or self-aggrandizement.
Still, the solution sôphrosunê provides has a general character.
The problem with having multiple simultaneous desires or goals or action-
guiding principles is plain: they cannot all be satisfied, they may not be equally
good, and one’s appraisal of them at one moment may not match one’s appraisal
at other moments. Though one may experience a given desire as supremely ur-
gent, it may not warrant so much attention. What feels like an emergency may
be no such thing. Indeed, satisfying a dominating desire may prevent satisfying
Debating a Virtue 3
desires that, with a few moments’ distance, would reveal themselves to be more
valuable from the long-term perspective or otherwise more deserving of sat-
isfaction. Further, if one acts only as the seemingly strongest desire demands,
and the relative strength of desires fluctuates for physiological or psycholog-
ical reasons, one may keep switching actions, and many of the most important
actions need prolonged and stable engagement. And sometimes there is not even
a single strongest desire, so something else is needed to decide what to do. These
three problems—false alarms, mercuriality, and indeterminacy—represent the
sorts of problems that sôphrosunê addresses.
Sôphrosunê is a power of practical discrimination, but it is also one of self-
constitution. You observe that you have many inclinations to do one thing or
another, but you commit yourself to acting only on those that advance what you,
as an ongoing and farsighted being, really want to be doing. Not every inclina-
tion does so equally. You deem some of those inclinations as less representative
of yourself, as alien or adventitious or merely bodily or from a less authoritative
part of the soul. Others you deem more representative and identify with them,
so to speak, saying, “This is what I want,” and, in committing yourself to them,
incorporating them, you become them and they become you. Sôphrosunê is thus
the virtue that makes each of us count as a “self,” something or someone that has
practical integrity through time. The alternative is being a mere site of desire-
satisfaction and desire-frustration. A self originates actions for which it takes full
responsibility. Adult human individuals do not merely embody movements or
behaviors, as do animals and babies, and they do not merely carry out actions for
somebody else, as do tools, robots, and, in a qualified way, slaves. They are agents.
As agents, they act rather than simply move; it is they, rather than physiological
energies or social pressures, who do the acting.
The achievement of the agency that comes from self-constitution is the goal
of nearly every regimen of maturation, what parents hope for their children and
good societies hope for their citizens. A person may not in every instance strive
to act independently of her potent feelings. But we do expect people to attain
some degree of agency, some authority over the desires that prompt them to ac-
tion. Only in this way does a person’s actions belong to that person, and not just
to the impulses and habits imputed by nature, society, or happenstance.
Yet is sôphrosunê just an executive virtue of prudence and rationality, of an
enlightened self-interest, concerned with being an even-keeled captain of one’s
actions, whatever they are? Is it not also an ethical virtue, concerned with doing
the right thing toward others? The answer depends on the desires that we should
act on, the goals to which we should strive, the norms that should guide us. It
depends on the correspondence between what I really want or value, what I iden-
tify with as most properly my desire or goal or self-defining ruling, and the norms
we might take as objective: what the gods deserve, what justice demands, what
4 The Virtue of Agency
the laws of reason require. That correspondence is controversial. One might sup-
pose that they do correspond: we are supremely vulnerable to the gods, and so
we do ideally desire to furnish them with what they deserve; personal well-being
depends on civic comity, and so we do ideally desire to meet the demands of
justice; hard practical or theoretical problems do not get solved through sloppy
thinking, and so we do ideally desire to think carefully and well. Or the ethical
life is for some other reason supremely valuable and desirable, or even already
valued and desired. But one might equally doubt that the norms of pious, just,
and reasonable action are really one’s own self-constituting norms, and deny that
they reflect one’s deepest, most stable, and most internally consistent desires.
They might seem merely distant and alien authorities. By desiring to propitiate
some mysterious gods, or following the decrees of a hyperventilating democratic
assembly, or obeying a logician’s parameters for valid inference, am I not in fact
abdicating from or alienating my agency, submitting myself to someone else’s
will, being mastered rather than mastering myself? This doubter might go on
to expand his criticism. Might not any standard deployed to judge between my
desires involve something external to those desires and thus external to myself?
Isn’t agency simply the capacity to satisfy the desires that I happen to have? Isn’t
sôphrosunê, in seeking to separate myself from my desires, precisely the virtue
that undermines agency?
The drama to be found in our story of sôphrosunê in classical Greece comes
from the discovery of these questions and the refinements and response they
prompted. The apologists for the virtue must show how ignoring or neutralizing
some of one’s desires, and adopting what may appear an external regime of value,
can constitute oneself as a self, an agent, an effective and responsible actor. The
critics of the virtue must show how a life meritorious even in one’s own terms can
unfold without any selection between and consequent commitment to the ends
or guidelines or desires that motivate or guide one’s actions.
The story is not so simple as pro and con, however; there are alternative
formulations, inchoate presentiments, idiosyncratic takes, and rabbit holes of
one depth or another. But its significance should be clear. Greek discourse about
sôphrosunê is to be seen as discourse about the ideal of agency: How do we be-
come people who act for ourselves?
The term sôphrosunê appears in the Homeric epics, where it denotes the admi-
rable capacity not to blurt or act out in situations where doing so, no matter how
natural or satisfying, would be contrary to one’s broader goals or commitments.
This rational self-discipline becomes thematic a century later, in the sympotic
Debating a Virtue 5
Language: English
AND
CLARENCE J. WEST
Major, C. W. S. Reserve Corps, U. S. A.
National Research Council
First Edition
Amos A. Fries,
Clarence J. West.
Aug. 1, 1921.
FOREWORD
After all peaceful means of settling disputes between nations
have been resorted to and have failed, war is often declared by one
of the disputants for the purpose of imposing its will upon the other
by force. In order to accomplish this, a superiority must be
established over the adversary in trained men and in implements of
war.
Men are nothing in modern war unless they are equipped with the
most effective devices for killing and maiming the enemy’s soldiers
and thoroughly trained in the use of such implements.
History proves that an effective implement of war has never been
discarded until it becomes obsolete.
It is impossible to humanize the act of killing and maiming the
enemy’s soldiers, and there is no logical grounds on which to
condemn an appliance so long as its application can be so confined.
Experiments in this and other countries during the World War
completely established the fact that gas can be so confined. The
range of gas clouds is no greater than that of artillery and the
population in the area behind the front line must, if they remain in
such range, take their chance. The danger area in the future will be
known to all.
As the first Director of the Chemical Warfare Service, U. S. Army,
I speak with some experience when I say that there is no field in
which the future possibilities are greater than in chemical warfare,
and no field in which neglect to keep abreast of the times in research
and training would be more disastrous.
Notwithstanding the fact that gas was used in the World War two
years before the United States entered the fray, practically nothing
was done in this country before April, 1917, towards the
development of any chemical warfare appliances, offensive or
defensive, and had it not been for the ability of an ally to supply our
troops with such appliances, they would have been as defenseless
as the Canadians were at Ypres when the Germans sent over their
first gas cloud.
This book recites the troubles and successes of this new service
under the stress of war for which it was unprepared and I trust that
its perusal will create a public opinion that will insist upon chemical
preparation for war.
I feel that this book will show that the genius and patriotism
displayed by the chemists and chemical engineers of the country
were not surpassed in any other branch of war work and that to fail
to utilize in peace times this talent would be a crime.
William L. Sibert,
Major General, United States Army,
Retired.
CONTENTS
page
Preface vii
Foreword ix
chapter
I. The History of Poison Gases 1
Modern Development of Gas
II. 10
Warfare
III. Development of the
Chemical Warfare Service 31
The Chemical Warfare Service in
IV. 72
France
V. Chlorine 116
VI. Phosgene 126
VII. Lachrymators 137
VIII. Chloropicrin 144
IX. Dichloroethylsulfide (Mustard Gas) 150
X. Arsenic Derivatives 180
XI. Carbon Monoxide 190
XII. Development of the Gas Mask 195
XIII. Absorbents 237
XIV. Testing Absorbents and Gas Masks 259
XV. Other Defensive Measures 272
XVI. Screening Smokes 285
XVII. Toxic Smokes 313
XVIII. Smoke Filters 322
XIX. Signal Smokes 330
XX. Incendiary Materials 336
XXI. The Pharmacology of War Gases 353
XXII. Chemical Warfare in Relation to
Strategy and Tactics 363
XXIII. The Offensive Use of Gas 385
XXIV. Defense against Gas 405
XXV. Peace Time Uses of Gas 427
XXVI. The Future of Chemical Warfare 435
Index 440
CHEMICAL WARFARE
CHAPTER I
THE HISTORY OF POISON GASES [1]
“‘(Enclosure)
“‘Brief Preliminary Observations
“‘It was observed when viewing the Sulphur
Kilns, in July, 1811, that the fumes which escaped in
the rude process of extracting the material, though
first elevated by heat, soon fell to the ground,
destroying all vegetation, and endangering animal
life to a great distance, and it was asserted that an
ordinance existed prohibiting persons from sleeping
within the distance of three miles during the melting
season.
“‘An application of these facts was immediately
made to Military and Naval purposes, and after
mature consideration, a Memorial was presented on
the subject to His Royal Highness the Prince
Regent on the 12th of April, 1812, who was
graciously pleased to lay it before a Commission,
consisting of Lord Keith, Lord Exmouth and General
and Colonel Congreve (afterwards Sir William), by
whom a favorable report having been given, His
Royal Highness was pleased to order that secrecy
should be maintained by all parties.
“‘(Signed) Dundonald
“‘7th August, 1855’
“‘Memorandum
“‘Materials required for the expulsion of the
Russians from Sebastopol: Experimental trials have
shown that about five parts of coke effectually
vaporize one part of sulphur. Mixtures for land
service, where weight is of importance, may,
however, probably be suggested by Professor
Faraday, as to operations on shore I have paid little
attention. Four or five hundred tons of sulphur and
two thousand tons of coke would be sufficient.
“‘Besides these materials, it would be necessary
to have, say, as much bituminous coal, and a couple
of thousand barrels of gas or other tar, for the
purpose of masking fortifications to be attacked, or
others that flank the assailing positions.
“‘A quantity of dry firewood, chips, shavings,
straw, hay or other such combustible materials,
would also be requisite quickly to kindle the fires,
which ought to be kept in readiness for the first
favourable and steady breeze.
“‘Dundonald
“‘7th August, 1855’