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i
T H E I D E A O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L
H U M A N R I G H T S L AW
ii
iii
1
iv
1
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© Steven Wheatley 2019
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v
Preface
Having taught and written on international human rights law for two decades and
seen it emerge as an academic subject in its own right, it was notable that, in the
twenty-first century, heated and sometimes bad tempered, debates on the nature
of ‘human rights’ emerged in a variety of academic disciplines, including law, phil-
osophy, sociology, politics, international relations, and history. I was particularly
interested in the philosophical writings of authors as diverse as Allen Buchanan,
Charles Beitz, Costas Douzinas, James Griffin, and Gunther Teubner, although
reading the literature, it seemed clear that, however impressive the intellectual ar-
guments, much of the work was disconnected from actual legal practice and the
principal objective often seemed to be to explain the muddle-headed thinking of
international lawyers on human rights. Also, in the new millennium, international
human rights lawyers found themselves assailed as ‘human rightists’ by the keepers
of the faith of the purity of general international law. The complaint being that
human rights scholars and practitioners too often let their hearts rule their heads,
and, as a consequence, they are poor international lawyers.
At the same time as I began reflecting on the nature of international human rights
law, I became interested in complexity theory. Whilst, in previous work, I had relied
on the closed systems theory of autopoiesis to explain the emergence of law sys-
tems beyond the state,1 the open systems theory of complexity seemed to offer the
possibility of making sense of the influence of the moral concept of human rights
on the legal practice by directing us to examine both system-level patterns of com-
munications and the actions and interactions of those international law actors that
produced the patterns of communications on human rights.
The starling murmuration on the front cover of this book is an example of a
complex system. The murmuration is the result of the actions and interactions of
individual birds. The murmuration will change as individual birds respond to ex-
ternal factors, like the appearance of a hawk, but in ways that cannot be predicted
in advance because of the multitudinous possibilities of action and reaction. The
argument here is that we can think of international law as a complex system, the
emergent property of the actions and interactions of states and non-state actors.
Doing so will enable us to make sense of the emergence and evolution of legal rules,
as international law actors respond to new information, and a central claim in the
book is that the body of international human rights law, as opposed to the moral
concept of human rights, only emerged after the Sharpeville Massacre of 21 March
1960, when United Nations Member States introduced a series of measures to deal
with the problem of apartheid in South Africa—and crucially justified their inter-
vention in terms of the protection of human rights.
viii Preface
The key insight for me in the literature on generalized, or transdisciplinary, com-
plexity theory was the importance of emergence: the notion that a system can be
more than the sum of its parts, and at the same time the system can influence the
parts. A complex system emerges from the actions and interactions of the compo-
nent agents in the system, with the system having characteristics not found in the
component agents. The complex system then influences the same component agents
that brought it into being in the first place. All of this seemed familiar to someone
researching and writing on international law, a paradigmatic complex system, which
emerges and evolves without the requirement for a controlling sovereign power—
although the insights from complexity can also be applied to law systems more
generally.2
In many ways this is a book about how a philosophy of emergence can help inter-
national lawyers make sense of the ways international law norms emerge through
the actions and interactions of states, along with certain non-state actors, and how
a consensus on ‘the law’ can emerge through the communications of scholars and
practitioners within an interpretive community. The work also shows how the ‘idea’
of human rights developed from the communication acts of states and human rights
bodies, allowing us to say that torture is objectively (morally) ‘wrong’.
There seemed an obvious way for complexity theory to be used to model and
make sense of the legal practice of human rights—in the United Nations system,
the core human rights treaties, and customary international law—by describing the
characteristics of the emergent system and examining the changing behaviours of
states and human rights bodies to give an account of the emergence and evolution
of human rights law. The challenge remained to explain the influence of the moral
concept of human rights on legal human rights.
There are no shortages of works giving an account of the moral or political no-
tion of human rights. Whilst most certainly illuminated my thinking on the sub-
ject, none seemed to fully capture the way I, as an international lawyer, understood
human rights and it is certainly the case that there is no one dominant approach in
the literature. Moreover, most of the philosophical work focuses, if only implicitly,
on explaining the existence of human rights within the state. This is not, however,
the case with the interventionist accounts, associated primarily with the works of
Charles Beitz and Joseph Raz, which suggest a different approach, one that looks
to explain human rights by the practice of intervention. The problem, as any inter-
national lawyer knows, is that humanitarian intervention is only one small part of
the practice of human rights—if indeed it is part of the legal practice of human
rights at all, but the conceit that we should try and make sense of the term ‘human
rights’ by its use in the international legal community seemed a good place to start.
The final piece of the jigsaw fell into place when I read, for a second time, John
Searle’s Making the Social World (2010). I was familiar with his earlier work on the
way emergence can be used to explain the relationship between the brain and the
2 See Jamie Murray, Tom Webb, and Steven Wheatley, ‘Encountering Law’s Complexity’ in Jamie
Murray, Tom Webb, and Steven Wheatley (eds), Complexity Theory & Law: Mapping an Emergent
Jurisprudence (Routledge 2018) 3.
ix
Preface ix
mind, but here Searle was showing how people can create concrete entities and ab-
stract notions with (what he calls, rather unhelpfully) deontic powers, the ability to
allocate rights and obligations. His standard example is money, with my £20 note
(a piece of paper with no intrinsic value) giving me the right to pay for goods that
are of demonstrable worth in any society (food, for example). Searle shows how we
literally speak into being the social fact of ‘money’ and no one says that belief in the
reality of money is a foolish thing. It is a short step, then, to make the argument that
the moral concept of human rights is the result of the communication acts of states
and human rights bodies, who literally speak ‘human rights’ into existence.
Working out what I think about the nature of International Human Rights Law
and, more importantly, figuring out how I should go about working out what I think,
has involved a long intellectual journey that would not have been possible without
the support and encouragement of others. I have benefitted from two periods of
study leave at Lancaster University and I want to thank staff in the Law School for
their help in making that possible. I have also had the advantage of long conver-
sations with colleagues at Lancaster (a hub of research excellence on complexity
theory), both within and outside the School, especially Tom Webb, Jamie Murray,
(the late) John Urry, Rob Geyer, and Sylvia Walby. Other academics who have en-
couraged me to think there might be something worth pursuing here included Jean
D’Aspremont, Amanda Cahill-Ripley, Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Ming Du, Agata
Fijalkowski, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olivier de Frouville, Susan Marks, Christopher
McCrudden, Dominic McGoldrick, Richard Nobles, Anna Peters, David Sugarman,
Stephen Tierney, and Valentina Vadi, as well as the participants at a conference on ‘A
Jurisprudence of Complexity?’ at Lancaster University in September 2015 and those
attending a staff seminar at Queen Mary University of London in April 2016 where
I presented my early thoughts on the issue. My gratitude also to Oxford University
Press for their interest in the project, in particular Kimberly Marsh, Merel Alstein,
Emma Andean-Mills, Jack McNichol, and John Louth, along with the various an-
onymous reviewers and readers, and copyeditor Nick Bromley. I would also like to
thank my undergraduate and postgraduate students over the past few years, who
have helped me clarify my thinking on International Human Rights Law.
No research project can be completed without the support, encouragement, and
general displays of interest from family and friends, and, in this case, I am grateful
to Michael Doherty, Anthony McNamara, Andrea McCulloch, Michael Wheatley,
Rosleen Wheatley, and Simon Wheatley. Special mention to my wife, Katherine,
for her continued love and support, as well as the grown-up children, Francesca and
Ben and, of course, my English Pointer, Pixie, for helping to clear my head by taking
me for a walk every day—although frankly she has shown very little interest in the
project itself.
x
xi
Contents
Introduction 1
Complexity Theory 4
Complexity Theory and Law 6
Complexity as a Methodology in International Law 8
The Argument from Complexity 10
The Structure of the Book 12
xii Contents
Evolution in the Charter System 73
The Four Phases of UN Regulation on Human Rights 75
Phase 1. Setting Standards: A Declaration on Human Rights 76
Phase 2. Targeting Apartheid in Southern Africa 81
Phase 3. Responding to ‘Gross and Systematic’ Violations Everywhere 85
Phase 4. The Human Rights Council and ‘All Human Rights for All’ 89
Conclusion 93
4. The Core UN Human Rights Treaty Systems 95
The Core UN Human Rights Treaties 96
The Human Rights Treaty Systems 98
The Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties 107
The Pro Homine Approach to Interpretation 108
Changes in the Treaty Over Time 112
Who is ‘Master’ of the UN Human Rights Treaties? 123
Conclusion 126
Contents xiii
Introduction
In the past twenty years, International Human Rights Law has established itself as
a distinct academic discipline, with University courses and the publication of text-
books and specialist academic journals. Before this, the subject of human rights was
taught as one part of Public International Law and the international law textbooks
invariably include a chapter on the topic. There is, though, widespread belief that
international human rights law is different from, albeit related to, general inter-
national law. Dinah Shelton expresses the point this way: ‘Clearly, human rights
law does have some differences from other areas of international law[.]At the same
time, human rights law is part of general international law.’1 Areas where human
rights law is said to differ include the processes of rule-creation,2 the law on reserva-
tions,3 state succession,4 and the rules for the interpretation of treaties.5 The diver-
gence in practice is often explained in terms of the fragmentation of international
law, which results from the fact that, in the words of Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi
Leino, human rights ‘comes with a political ethos—what Alain Pellet has labelled
“droit de l’hommisme”—that not only deviates from but rejects aspects of general
international law’.6
‘Human rightism’, Pellet contends, bears the same relationship to international
law ‘as theology or rather faith does to law in general: a virtue perhaps, but one that
is alien to its object’.7 His argument is that certain prominent international lawyers,
1 Dinah Shelton, ‘Introduction’ in Dinah Shelton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of International
Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 1, 5.
2 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Nature of Obligations’ in Daniel Moeckli et al. (eds), International Human Rights
Law (2nd edn, OUP 2010) 96, 97 (whilst international law is ‘the slow maturing of ancient customary
practice’, human rights ‘emerges from the proclamation of rights, usually in declaration[,]with a strong
principled component’).
3 Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘The International Court of Justice and Human Rights’ in Sarah Joseph
and Adam McBeth (eds), Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law (Edward Elgar 2010)
299, 314.
4 Menno T. Kamminga, ‘Impact on State Succession in Respect of Treaties’ in Menno T. Kamminga
and Martin Scheinin (eds), The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (OUP 2009)
99, 109.
5 Scott Sheeran, ‘The Relationship of International Human Rights Law and General International
Law: Hermeneutic Constraint, or Pushing the Boundaries?’ in Scott Sheeran and Nigel Rodley (eds),
Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Routledge 2013) 79, 101.
6 Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’
(2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 553, 569.
7 Alain Pellet, ‘ “Human Rightism” and International Law’, Gilberto Amado Memorial Lecture
(2000) 2 alainpellet.eu/bibliography/articles accessed 26 January 2018, 2.
The Idea of International Human Rights Law. Steven Wheatley. © Steven Wheatley 2019. Published in
2019 by Oxford University Press.
2
Introduction 3
pace Friedrich Nietzsche. At the same time, scholars have observed a disjuncture
between the philosophy of human rights and the practice of human rights, with the
inclusion of the right to periodic holidays with pay in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights given as the standard example of a legal right, which is not, according
to the standard philosophical accounts, a human right, properly so-called.14 There
has also been a recognition of the importance of theorizing about the practice to en-
sure the fidelity of theory with the human rights project. Finally, it is clear there is no
agreement on the subject, thus opening a space for intellectual enquiry. The moral
philosopher, James Griffin, explains, for example, that he felt compelled to write his
book On Human Rights ‘by the not uncommon belief that we do not yet have a clear
enough idea of what human rights are’.15
The existing philosophical literature on human rights can be divided into four
broad streams of thought. Explanations of the rights we have simply ‘by virtue of
being human’; a focus on the political function of human rights in establishing the
proper relationship between the state and the individual; accounts that concentrate
on the interactions between the state and secondary agents of justice; and a recogni-
tion of the importance of international law to making sense of the moral concept of
human rights. Whilst the various contributions all claim to be speaking about the
same thing and indeed use an identical term (‘human rights’), it is evident they are
not always concerned with the same subject. This might be explained by the fact that
different writers are addressing contrasting conceptions and seeking to define the
intellectual terrain on their own terms; that human rights is an empty signifier, with
no agreed definition, or an essentially contested concept, without a shared under-
standing of its meaning; or that scholars are examining different aspects of human
rights, such as its ontological basis, political function, or the legal practice.
The irreconcilable differences in the philosophical writings have led a number
of scholars to conclude that a more productive route would be to define the idea of
human rights by reference to the practice of human rights, or some idealized version
of the practice. The political theorist Charles Beitz argues, for example, that it is
wrong to think about human rights as if it had an autonomous meaning in the moral
order unrelated to the practice of human rights, which ‘constrains our conception of
a human right from the start’.16
This work sits within this new practice-based tradition and looks to explain
the idea of human rights by examining the practice in the United Nations, the
core human rights treaties, and customary international law. The reason for this is
straightforward: from the invention of the term ‘human rights’ to the explanation
of its meaning in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the adoption of reso-
lutions and law-making treaties by the UN General Assembly, to the work of the
treaty bodies and Universal Periodic Review, the practice of human rights has—for
the most part—been the legal practice, with other forms of practice, including, for
14 See for example, Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in
International Law, trans. Jonathan Huston (CUP 2016) 439.
15 James Griffin, On Human Rights (OUP 2008) 1.
16 Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (OUP 2009) 103.
4
Complexity Theory
The argument here is that we should look to complexity theory to develop a more
complete understanding of the international law system and that, by doing so, we
will be able to make better sense of the influence of the moral concept of human
rights on general international law. Complexity is concerned with finding and ex-
plaining patterns in the actions and interactions of component agents to explain the
17 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, ‘Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights
Enforcement Problem’ (2008) 62 International Organization 689, 689.
18 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap 2010) 219.
19 For a good introduction to international law methodologies, see Andrea Bianchi, International
Law Theories: An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking (OUP 2016).
20 See, generally, Lyndel V. Prott, ‘Argumentation in International Law’ (1991) 5(3) Argumentation
299, 299.
5
Introduction 5
Oh, that last embrace! I dare not dwell upon it! It was too
much for Amice, who fell back fainting. I called Mother
Gertrude, who was already astir, and together we revived
her. Then Mother Gertrude, seeing, I suppose, by my looks,
how much I was overcome, gave me a composing drink and
sent me to bed. I was long in falling asleep, but I did at
last, and when I waked all was over. I heard afterward how
it was. Seeing that Amice was clearly near her end, the
Sisters were assembled in her room, as usual, for the last
rite.
Then she spoke with a clear and plain voice, declaring that
having had her mind enlightened by Holy Scripture, and as
she believed also by light from on high, she did utterly
contemn and repudiate all worship and honor of images and
pictures, all prayers to our Lady and the Saints, and all trust
whatever for salvation in forms and ceremonies, in
penances, indulgences, or any such toys; placing her hopes
of salvation upon Christ alone. Having said which, (but
mentioning naught of Magdalen Jewell's escape,) she
repeated in a clear voice and with (as Sister Placida told
me,) a countenance more like a beatified Saint than a dying
heretic, these words from the Psalm: "Into thy hands I
commend my spirit, for thou hast redeemed me, O Lord,
thou God of truth."
And then sinking back and clasping her hands, she yielded
up the ghost.
I had just waked from my long and heavy sleep, and was
striving to collect my thoughts and calm my throbbing head,
when Sister Catherine burst in on me with the news that
Amice was gone; and after recounting the manner of her
death, added that now one might see what came of
favoritism and book-learning, and court preferment; and
thanking the Saints, as usual, for her lowly station and for
the grace of humility which they had vouchsafed to obtain
for her. She added, that as the bosom friend and confident
of that lost heretic, I should doubtless be severely dealt by,
and adjured me to make a full confession and recantation,
as in that case I might be let off with perpetual
imprisonment.
I was very much better, and able to sit up some hours and
work a little, when, one day, I was aware of a somewhat
unusual bustle in the house, and by-and-by Mother Superior
and Mother Placida came to me.
"I will leave you together!" said Mother Superior's voice, still
sounding as in a dream. Then came a warm hand laid on
mine and a kiss pressed on my forehead. At last I opened
mine eyes. They fell on a very pleasant object—a lady of
about my own mother's age, but perhaps handsomer,
though in a different way—somewhat dark, with a beautiful
color, bright brown eyes and well-marked eyebrows—the
whole visage bearing the marks of a keen, clear-sighted but
withal kindly disposition. The dress was rich, but sober and
matronly. I looked long and as it were in a kind of
bewilderment, till with a kindly smile, "Well, child, take a
good look at me!" she said. "Do I look like a monster, or the
cruel step-dames in the ballads?"
"I see—I see!" she interrupted. "Did you not know, then?
Your father sent letters more than two weeks before us."
"Why, that's well," said he; then changing his tone, "but
what have they been doing to you, child? Why, you are but
the ghost of yourself!"
"I have been very ill, dear father," I answered. "I have had
a long fever which lasted many weeks, and from which
nobody thought I would rise again."
"And are you then so ready to leave old friends for new,
Rosamond?" said Mother Superior, reproachfully. "Your
mother who gave you to this holy house would hardly have
approved such readiness to leave it."
I saw Mother Superior's eye kindle, for she too hath a spark
of temper, and I dreaded some unpleasant debate, but my
step-dame interposed, and by I know not what gentle and
honeyed words of courtesy, she managed to avert the
storm. She urged my evidently failing health, her own want
of my assistance, and the need of my seeing somewhat of
the world before making my profession; and finally, I hardly
know how, 'twas settled that I should go home for a while.
I could have sung for joy. True, I felt it would be a trial for
me to see a strange lady, be she ever so well conditioned,
in my dear mother's place, and ruling where she ruled; and
I had also some fears as to how Harry would take the
change, and I foresaw trouble with Mrs. Prudence. But all
was swallowed up in the overwhelming joy of going home.
Ever since Amice died, the house hath seemed to me like a
prison, as if I had no space to move and no air to breathe.
We were to leave that afternoon and travel by short stages,
as my weakness would permit. Before I left, I had a long
audience with Mother Superior, who mourned over me as
over a tender lamb going forth in the midst of wolves. She
gave me much council as to how I should behave—how I
should seclude myself as far as possible from all worldly
society, specially men's society, and, above all, I should
keep aloof from my cousin if any chance threw him in my
way. I was to remember always that I was the same as a
vowed and cloistered nun, and to observe always the rules
of my Heavenly Bridegroom's house, recollecting the
examples of those saints who had set at naught father and
mother, friends and children, for the sake of a religious life;
and she told me of a lady, formerly a nun in this house, who
being a widow with three children, left them to whoever
would care for them, and betook herself to the convent; and
when the eldest son, a lad of some twelve years, threw
himself across the threshold of the door with tears and
besought her not to leave them, she just stepped over his
prostrate body and went her way.
I saw but little of the process, being taken down with a new
access of my fever, which lasted two or three weeks. Harry
told me afterward she had no trouble with anybody but
Prudence and Alice. Alice thought her dignity as a matron,
and the prospects of the baby were injured, by my father's
presuming to take a second wife. She thought he ought to
remain single for the sake of his children; though I don't
think she ever thought of remaining single for his sake.
However, she thinks that is different, and perhaps it may
be, a little.
Harry is thoroughly pleased, and when I hear from him how
matters went on—how Prue tyrannized, and the maids
rebelled, and how uncomfortable the whole household was
made, especially my father, I do not wonder. My Lady being
just what she is, I can honestly say, I am heartily glad of
her coming among us, though I can't but speculate what it
might be if my father had fancied a different kind of woman
—somebody like Sister Catherine, for instance.
[So I did; but before that time came she had passed
through many strange mutations of fortune, having become
first a widow, then a Queen, then a widow again, and at last
a most unhappy wife, when she married Sir Thomas
Seymor, Lord High Admiral, and died in child-bed not long
after. She wrote many excellent pieces, both in prose and
verse, two of which, "The Complaint of a Penitent Sinner,"
and "Prayers and Meditations," I had a present from this
godly and afflicted lady's own hand.]
I have heard not a word from the convent since I left, and
my father will by no means hear of my going back at
present. I am glad of it, for I am very happy at home, and
after what has passed, it does not seem as though I could
ever breathe under that roof again. This home life is so
sweet! I do not see how any vocation can be higher than
that of a wife and mother, blessing and profiting all about
her, as certainly my Lady does. But all homes are not like
mine, I know very well—and then that promise!
CHAPTER XXII.
April 23.
OUR people have come home, with a fine budget of news,
to be sure. First the Pope hath sent a Cardinal named
Campeggio, or some such name, to join with Cardinal
Wolsey, in a commission to try the lawfulness of the King's
marriage with the Queen, and there is to be a court held for
that purpose. Then the Cardinal's favor with the court is
said to be decidedly waning, while that of Mrs. Anne Bullen
is constantly growing. She is now made Marchioness of
Pembroke, forsooth, and her levees are attended by the
nobles of the court, as if she were already queen; and
nobody has any doubt that she will be made queen if the
marriage with her Grace can be dissolved. The viper! I
remember well the mocking tone in which she besought her
Grace not to betray her to the King! My poor, dear mistress!
No wonder she brought her troubles to the shrine of St.
Ethelburga, where I fear, however, she found little comfort.
I will never believe that was the true book of the Gospel
which Mistress Anne gave Amice. It was some work of the
devil, meant to deceive and destroy souls. And yet, when I
recall that last night with my friend, can I think all that
courage, and peace, and assurance, and triumphant joy was
the work of the devil? And if so, who is safe? And where is
Amice now? I dare not think of it! Whichever way I turn all
is confusion, doubt and dread!
The last piece of news is, that my Lord is coming home next
week, and of course Richard with him. It seems a long, and
weary journey for my Lady, with her young son, and the
roads are terribly unsafe. They must be well on their way
now. I must say an additional Hail Mary every day for their
safe arrival. It would be such a terrible misfortune if any
harm should happen to my Lady and her boy.
Besides, I know just what she would say. She does not like
to think or speak of my being a nun, and indeed I think my
father is coming to mislike the notion. I believe I will let
matters take their course. Perhaps if Dick has grown the
fine court Squire that Mistress Bullen said, he will not care
to pay me any attention. I do not believe it any the more
for her saying so.
"I know it will be hard for you, my child," said she, "but
think what your mother would wish in the matter."
All was just as it was left the day of her funeral; even the
flowers I had gathered, lay dried, and cobwebbed on her
toilet-table.
"And where does this door lead?" asked my lady, after we
had unbarred the shutters, and opened the windows.
And I found the key where I knew she kept it, in a box on
the chimney. We opened the door of the little turret room,
not without difficulty, for the lock was rusted and moved
stiffly, but open it we did at last. It was but a small place.
There was an altar and crucifix, of course, and before them
on the floor lay a rough hard mat, rough enough of itself,
and strewed with sharp flints to make it the harder. On the
step lay a discipline of knotted cords, mingled with wire,
and stained here and there, as if by blood. I had never
thought of my dear mother as using such penances, and my
blood ran cold at the sight of these things. I glanced at my
step-dame, and saw her face full of indignation and pity.
"Woe unto them, for they have made sorrowful the souls of
the righteous, whom God hath not made sorrowful!" she
murmured, as if she had forgotten my presence. "Woe to
the false shepherds who oppress the sheep! 'Lord, how
long, how long shall the ungodly triumph?'" Then seeming
to remember me—"Rosamond, we will leave these things as
they are, for the present, at least. Let the moles and bats
prey on them, if they will. The day may come, when we will
clear them away."
"You say your mother loved roses?" she said, after I had
admired them. "We will lay one of these in her drawers, and
you shall have the other. And now tell me, Rosamond,
would you like to have this room for your own? I have
spoken on the matter to your father, and he says you may,
if you choose."