The British Society for the Philosophy of Science

A Critical Evaluation of Certain Basic Psycho-Analytical Conceptions

Author(s): W. Ronald D. Fairbairn
Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7, No. 25, Sigmund Freud
Centenary (May, 1956), pp. 49-60
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of
Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/685935
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 A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF CERTAIN BASIC
PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CONCEPTIONS

W. RONALD D. FAIRBAIRN

i Introduction
follows an attemptis made to evaluatecriticallycertainbasic
IN WHAT
psycho-analyticalconceptions which were originally formulated by
Freud, and which have hitherto been accepted by psycho-analysts
more or less without criticism. The conceptions in question are
(I) Freud'slibido-theory, (2) his theory of instincts,and (3) his theory
of the mental constitutionframed in terms of the id, the ego, and the
super-ego. Some preliminarycriticismof the reductive method em-
ployed by psycho-analysisis also offered. Whilst the approach of
the writeris essentiallypsycho-analytical,it is hoped that the attempted
evaluation will not be without relevancefrom the standpointof the
philosophy of science.

2 ReductiveMethod
At the outset it is perhapsworth drawing attentionto the anomaly
involved in any attempt to assess the validity of psycho-analytical
conceptionsfrom a philosophicalstandpoint. Historically,it has been
the accepted function of philosophy to offer an explanation of the
nature and meaning of the Universe in ultimate terms; and it has
thus fallenwithin its province to evaluateand relateto one anotherthe
conclusions of all the other intellectual disciplines, among which
psycho-analysishas latterly assumed a place. Yet, whilst the tradi-
tional claim of philosophy to the status of an ultimate evaluatory
discipline can hardly be said to have been abandoneddespite recent
changes of outlook engenderedby the growth of the scientificspirit,
psycho-analysishas lodged a rival claim to provide an explanationof
the motivation of all human activities, including that representedby
philosophy itself. Thus the characteristicpsycho-analyticalapproach
to philosophy was succinctly described by Freud when he wrote,
' We venture . . . to transform metaphysicsinto metapsychology'.1
1 S. Freud, The
of EverydayLife, London, 1914, p.
Psychopathology 309
D 49
 W. R. D. FAIRBAIRN
Fromthe classicpsycho-analytical standpoint,of course,it is not
only metaphysics that becomes transformed into metapsychology,
but also religion,morals,art, and all such culturalinstitutionsand
achievementsas are generallyconsideredto embody the 'higher'
values-suchvaluesbeinginterpreted psycho-analyticallyas essentially
derived valuesrepresenting sublimations of primitivelibidinalvalues,
andin particular thosedetermined by the aimsof the erotogeniczones.
Thus,accordingto Wisdom,1Berkeley'simmaterialist philosophywas
the
largely product of a conflict this
attending philosopher's analpre-
occupation with faeces. Similarly,religion and morals have been
interpreted by Freud as, in the main, sublimated of
expressions genital
aims subjectedto the conflictsinvolved in the Oedipussituation.
Reductiveexplanationsof this type possessthe great disadvantage
of simply explainingaway what they seek to explain. Whatever
light theymaythrowuponthe basicmotivationsof culturalactivities,
they makea minimumcontributionto an understanding of the values
involvedin theseactivitiesthemselves-asis perhapsmostconveniently
illustratedwithin the artisticfield. Thus, quite apartfrom their
failureto explainwhy the motivationsof an artistshouldleadhim to
becomean artistratherthan,e.g. a philosopher,andwhat determines
the degreeof an artist'sgreatness,suchexplanations, as HerbertRead
has pointed out,2 completely fail to explain what determines the
specificallyaestheticvalueof a work of art,andcharacteristically
pro-
vide no clueto anyscaleof aestheticvalues.
Hereit becomesrelevantto recallthat,whilstFreudregardedall
culturalphenomenaas involvingthe sublimation or desexualisation
of
libidinalimpulsesof instinctiveorigin,it was specificallyin termsof
the Oedipussituationmediatedby the super-egothat he soughtan
explanationfor both religionandmorals. We thusfind two distinct
explanatory principlesbeingappliedby Freudto the samephenomena
-one conceivedin terms of a psychologyof impulse (the libido-
theory),and the otherin termsof a psychologyof object-relations
(the Oedipussituation). Both of theseexplanatoryprincipleshave
becomeacceptedfeaturesof classicpsycho-analytical theory; but the
question which now is
arises how far they can be consistentlycom-
bined. At this point, therefore,it would appearthat, however
1J. 0. Wisdom, The UnconsciousOrigin of Berkeley'sPhilosophy,London, 1953,
pp. I45-I49
2 H. Read, ' Psycho-Analysisand the Problem of Aesthetic Value ', International
Journal of Psycho-Analysis, I951, 32, Part 2, pp. 73-82
50
 PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CONCEPTIONS

justifiedmay be the claim of psycho-analysis to explainthe basic

motivationswhich give rise to philosophy,there is at least equal
justificationfor expectingpsycho-analysts to be willing to submit
theirconceptsfor evaluationby the philosophyof science.

3 TheLibidoTheoryandthe Theoryof Instincts

In the opinion of the writer,the two explanatoryprinciplesto
which referencehasjust beenmadearenot reallyconsistent,and the
overcomeif thepsychologyof im-
canonlybesatisfactorily
inconsistency
pulseis in
abandoned favourof anexplicitpsychologyof object-relations.
Sucha stepwould, of course,involve a revisionof Freud'slibido-theory
and of all aspectsof psycho-analyticaltheory which depend upon it.
The libido-theory as conceived by Freudis essentiallyhedonistic;
for he describedlibido as primarilypleasure-seeking. In view of the
supremeimportancewhich he attachesto the Oedipus situationalone
it would, of course, be quite untrue to say that he is oblivious of the
importanceof object-relations. At the same time, it is implicit in the
libido-theory that the object only becomes significantin so far as it is
found to provide a means of forwarding the pleasure-seekingaim.
In conformity with this conception, Freuddescribedthe first stage in
the processof libido-developmentas' auto-erotic' ; and he considered
that it was only after passing through an intermediate'narcissistic'
stage of self-love that the individual finally reached the 'allo-erotic'
stage of object-love. The essentialprocessinvolved in this transition
was also describedby Freud in another referenceas the substitution
of tle reality principle for the pleasureprinciple as a determinantof
behaviour. It is a further feature of the libido theory that pleasure-
seeking is conceived as the expression of a need to relieve bodily
tension accumulatingin the erotogenic zones as the result of physio-
logical changes,and thus to restorethe equilibriumdisturbedby these
changes. This conception, it will be noted, involves a mixing of
psychological and physiological principles of explanation, which is
methodologically questionable. To continue, however-the restora-
tion of equilibriumis regardedas being effectedthrough the discharge
of impulses which express themselves in behaviour; and it is thus
that the psychology of behaviour arising out of the libido-theory is
essentiallya psychology of impulse. It was on the basisof this psycho-
logy of impulse that Freud developed his dualistictheory of instincts
which, in its final version, assumed the form of a dualism of 'the
life instincts' and 'the death instincts'. Such a classification of
5I
 W. R. D. FAIRBAIRN
instinctsdiffersfrommost classifications in thatit is not conceivedin
termsof outwardbehaviour,butin termsof states(' life ' and' death')
representing the goalsof innerstrivings;butthisis, of course,in com-
pleteconformitywith the hedonisticnatureof Freud'slibido-theory.
Psychologicalhedonismhas for long appearedto the writer to
providean unsatisfactory basisfor psycho-analytical theory because
it relegatesobject-relationships to a secondaryplace. Indeed,it in-
volves the implicitassumptionthat man is not by naturea social
animal(qoaEL7TroAXiKtKov Sov) as Aristotledescribed him,1andthat,
accordingly, social behaviour is an acquired characteristic. This as-
sumptionwould appearto be in completecontradiction of the facts
of animalpsychology. Forthroughoutthe animalworldsocial(viz.
object-seeking)behaviouris in generalexhibitedfrom birth; and
recentstudiesof the phenomenonof'imprinting' in young animals
wouldseemto implyaninherentorientationtowardsobjects.Further,
it would appearthatthe instinctivebehaviourof animals,in view of
its high degreeof specificityand adaptationto environmental con-
ditions, is determined by the realityprinciple rather than by the
pleasureprinciple,however limited the appreciation realityin-
of
volved may be; andindeedit would seem on this accountactually
to involve a hereditarily transmitted internalisation of outer reality.
The formationof the super-egoin the humanchildmay be regarded
as an analogous,but acquired, internalisationof outerreality,andthus
in itself quite a realisticprocedure. Be this as it may, it seems a
reasonableassumptionthat an analogymay legitimatelybe drawn
betweenthe behaviourof animalsand the basicbehaviourof human
beings; and, on this assumptionalone, it seemsjustifiableto infer
boththatmanis by natureobject-seeking ratherthanpleasure-seeking,
and thathis basicbehaviouris determined,as in the caseof animals,
by the realityprincipleratherthanby the pleasureprinciple. Such
a conclusionby no meansinvolvesan abandonment of the concept
of the pleasureprinciple,but onlya re-interpretation of it in thesense
that it representsa deterioration of behaviourinvolving failureof
adaptationto conditionsin outerreality. It mustbe recognised,of
course,that the instinctivebehaviourof animalsmay becomecom-
pletelyunrealistic in faceof a changein the environmental conditions
to whichtheyhavebecomeadapted; andsimilarlyhumanbehaviour
characteristically becomesdeterminedby the pleasureprinciplein-
stead of by the reality principlein proportionas environmental
1 Aristote,PoliticsI, 2, 9
52
 PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CONCEPTIONS
conditionsbecometoo difficultfor the individualconcerned,as for
example in psychopathological cases. Similarly,whilst behaviour
influencedby the super-egoas an internalised parent-figuremay be
quite in
realistic the child,it may become completelyunrealistic under
the alteredconditionsof adultlife.
In the light of such considerations,it would appearthat psycho-
analyticalthinking has been in no small measureobscuredowing to
the fact that attentionhas been focused almost exclusivelyupon
humanbehaviourand little, if any, accounthas been taken of the
behaviourof animals. Admittedly,humanbehaviourdiffersfrom
animalbehaviourin thatit follows a less rigidlyspecificpatternand
is thereforecapableof a greaterdegree of modification,whether
realisticandadaptiveor pleasure-seeking ; but it is difficultto believe
that the basicinstinctivebehaviour humanbeings differsfunda-
of
mentallyfrom the instinctivebehaviourof animals.
As regardsFreud'stheory of instinctsitself, it seems to the writer
that, whilst it is meaningfulto describebasicbehaviouras ' instinctive',
the conception of separate 'instincts' representsno more than a
hypostatisation of trends manifesting themselves in instinctive be-
haviour. In this connectionit is not without significancethat ' libido '
is customarilyreferredto as' thelibido ' in psycho-analyticalliterature.
Even if a similarusageis not appliedto 'aggression', therestill remains
a tendency among psycho-analyticalwritersto referto both libido and
aggressionin sucha way asto imply that they exist apartfrom the struc-
tures which they energise. More obvious perhapsis the tendency to
treatthe 'part instincts' as if they were separateentities; and here we
have an example of the atomism which from the first constitutedone
currentin Freud'sthought. Such atomismis implicit in Freud'sview
that the adultsexualattitudeis the productof a processof development
wherebythevariouspartinstinctsbecomeorganisedunderthesupremacy
of the genital impulse.l It is to be noted, however, that physical de-
velopment is characterised,not by the gradualintegrationof a number
of separatelyfunctioningorgans,but by the gradualdifferentiationof a
unifiedfunctioningstructure; and it would seem reasonableto assume
that mental development is characterisedby a similarprocess.

4 The Id, theEgo, andthe Super-ego

At this point it may occur to the readerthat at any rate Freud's
conception of the differentiationof the ego out of the id is not an
S. Freud,ThreeContributions
to the Theoryof Sex, New York,I925, p. 58
53
 W. R. D. FAIRBAIRN

atomisticconception. This is certainlytrue; but the concepts of the

ego and the id involve furtherconsideration. The id is conceived by
Freud as the source of instinctive impulses; and the impressioncon-
veyed by his descriptionis that it consists,not of organisedinstinctive
tendencies, but of inchoate impulses seeking discharge. It is the
human psyche, of course, that Freudis considering. But it is difficult
to believe that man differs fundamentally from the animal world
where the more primitive aspects of his mentality are concerned;
and Freud'sdescriptionof the id as the source of instinctive impulses
seems singularly out of keeping with the instinctive endowment of
animals, which, as we have seen, is highly specific and highly orien-
tated towards outer reality. According to Freud,the id is indifferent
to outer reality, and the adaptationof impulses to outer reality only
becomespossiblethroughthe differentiationof the ego from the surface
of the id.1 The ego is, of course, conceived by Freudas a structure;
but the id is describedin a mannerwhich implies that it is essentially
structurelessand is merely a reservoirof instinctiveenergy. The func-
tion ascribedto the ego is that of selecting and regulatingid-impulses
in such a manneras to renderbehaviouradaptedto outer conditions.
It thus performsa function which in the case of animalsis performed
by the instinctive endowment itself. From this point of view, the
concept of a separateego might appearto be superfluous. It is im-
possible,however, to dismissFreud'sdistinctionbetween the ego and
the id so lightly-its justificationbeing that it arisesout of an attempt
to explain mental conflict,which is such a distinctivefeatureof human
psychology. According to Freud, mental conflict is essentially a
conflictbetween the ego and id-impulses,albeitthis conflictis regarded
as mainly due to the pressureexerted by the super-ego upon the ego.
Freud'sconception of mental conflict may, therefore,be describedin
general terms as a conflict between mental structure (the ego) and
mental energy (id-impulse). Stated in this form, the conception
presents somewhat of an anomaly; for it is difficult to see how a
structurecan participatein conflict unless it is endowed with energy,
or how it can be in conflictwith energy unlessthis energy is embodied
in a structure. It is owing to such considerationsthat the writer has
been led to formulate the concept of 'dynamic structure' ;2 and,
once the concept of dynamic structurehas been adopted, it becomes
1 S. Freud, The
Ego andthe Id, London, I927, pp. 28-30
2W. R. D. Fairbairn,PsychoanalyticStudies of the Personality,London, 1952,
pp. I48-150
54
 PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CONCEPTIONS

impossibleto remaincontentwith Freud'sformulationsof' the id'

and' the ego'.
Anotherfeatureof Freud'sdescriptionof the conflictbetweenthe
ego and the id is that it revealsa subtle,and doubtlessunwitting,
changeof ground,which may be described,in termsborrowedfrom
epistemology,as a transitionfrom the standpointof Empiricismto
that of Rationalism.It is essentiallyfrom an empiricalstandpoint
that Freuddescribedthe origin of the ego; for, accordingto his
description,the ego arisesas a meansof ensuringthe satisfactionof
pleasure-seekingid-impulsesby regulating them in such a manneras
to conformto the conditionsof satisfaction imposedby outerreality.
When, however,he introducedthe conceptof the super-egoas the
instigatorof repression,the functionof the ego becameone of con-
id-impulsesin sucha manneras to leadto theirrepression,
trolling and
thusto precludetheirsatisfaction on an extensivescale-a conception
conformingto the rationaliststandpoint. This changeof standpoint
is one whichit would have been difficultfor Freudto avoidin view
of the basichedonismof his libido-theory; for, in introducingthe
conceptof the super-ego(to which he ascribedthe functionsof an
unconsciousconscience),he was enteringupona fieldinvolvingcon-
siderationof the moral aspectof behaviour. This is an aspectof
behaviourwhich has proved a stumbling-blockfor hedonismever
sincethe daysof the Epicureans;but the inherentdilemmaof hedon-
ism findsits bestillustrationin John StuartMill'sattemptto effecta
passagefrompsychologicalto philosophical hedonism.1 Adoptingas
his starting-pointthe principlethat all behaviouris determinedby a
searchformaximumpleasure,he foundhimselffacedwiththeproblem
of definingthe natureof the specificpleasurewhich it is the aim of
moral behaviourto achieve-the pleasurewhich 'ought' to be
sought. It was, of course,in the principleof the greatesthappiness
of the greatestnumberthat he found his solutionof the problem;
butthiswasa solutionthatreallyinvolvedanabandonment of psycho-
logical hedonism, which concerns only the pleasureof the separate
individual. What is here significantis thatit was when confronted
with the phenomenaof sociallife, viz. object-relationships,
thatMill's
hedonismprovedinadequateas an explanatoryprinciple. The same
may be saidof Freud'shedonism; for, just as it was considerations
of ' duty' whichled Millto introducethe non-hedonistic principleof
the greatesthappinessof the greatestnumber,so wasit considerations
1J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism,
chaps.3 and4
55
 W. R. D. FAIRBAIRN
of 'guilt' that led Freudto introducethe concept of the super-
ego as a determinantof behaviour. The guilt in questionis, of
course,the guilt engenderedby the Oedipussituation-anessentially
socialsituation. It was thus the paradoxof Freud'shedonism,as it
was previouslythe paradoxof Mill's,that,when it cameto the con-
siderationof social phenomena,explanationsin terms of pleasure-
seekinghadto be replacedby explanations in termsof object-seeking.
At the sametime,behaviourdetermined by the super-egois character-
ised,not simplyby object-seeking, but alsoby repression, whichmay
be regardedas the very antithesisof pleasure-seeking.Repression is,
of course,a processinvolvingthe directionof aggressioninwards;
and,accordingto Freud,the aggressionin questionis directedagainst
libidinalid-impulses,and representsa manifestationof the death
instincts. However,therecanbe no doubtthat,in the settingof the
Oedipussituation,this aggressionis directedagainstobjectsbeforeit
takesa self-destructive turn. It is such considerations that have led
the writerto formulatethe view thatrepression is a processdirected,
not againstid-impulses,but primarilyagainstinternalisedobjects,
andsecondarily againstpartsof the ego whichcathectthe internalised
objectsin question.' This view incidentallyinvolvesthe principle
that aggressionno less than libido is primarilyorientedtowards
objects.
Accordingto Freud,of course,aggressionis a manifestationof
the deathinstincts,andrepresents anextemalisation of deathimpulses.2
Thereare, however,many analystswho preferto regardaggression
itself as the counterpartof libido, and interpretthe death-seeking
tendency as a manifestationof intured aggression. This con-
ceptionseemsmore in accordwith psychologicalfactsthan that of
the deathinstincts; for it is beyondquestionthat,in its originaland
presumablymost 'instinctive' form, aggressionmanifestsitself
in an outgoingdirection. Actually,the conception
characteristically
of the death instinctsis a philosophical ratherthan a psychological
conception. Yet it is in completeconformitywith the hedonismof
Freud'slibido theory; for (i) it is formulated(as alreadynoted)
in termsof a state (death)representingthe goal of inner strivings,
and (2) the stateof deathin questionis conceivedas representing
the final establishmentof an equilibriumwhich is partiallyand
'W. R. D. Fairbairn,PsychoanalyticStudies of the Personality,London, I952,
pp. 89-90
2 S.
Freud, Beyondthe PleasurePrinciple,London, 1922, pp. 68-69
56
 PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CONCEPTIONS

temporarily established during life by the discharge of libidinal

tension.1
As regards Freud's theory of instincts in general, it would seem
desirable,with a view to avoiding all risk of hypostatisation,to regard
both libido and aggressionas basic 'factors' in behaviour, ratherthan
as 'instincts' ; and on a previous occasion the writer has described
them respectively as 'the libidinal factor' and 'the antilibidinal
factor '.2 The description of aggression as ' the antilibidinal factor ' is,
it will be noted, in complete conformity with the phenomena of re-
sistance,upon Freud'srecognitionof which the whole theory of psycho-
analysisis based; for resistanceis nothing if not antilibidinal. The
aggressioninvolved in resistanceis, of course, not only directed in-
wardsin its active expression,but also manifestedpassivelyin outward
behaviour towards the analyst; and one of the advantagesof the
term 'antilibidinal factor' is that it covers both outwardly and in-
wardly directedaggression.
It may here be recalledthat, although Freudconceived repression
as a function of the ego, he regardedthis function as being only as-
sumed by the ego at the instance of pressureexerted upon it by the
super-ego3-the super-ego thus becoming the effective agent of the
antilibidinalfactor. That Freud should have thought it necessaryto
invoke the agency of the super-ego in order to account for repression
is a highly significantfact; for it shows that he found it impossible
to explainrepressionin the absenceof an endopsychicstructurecapable
of setting this process in motion; and, since the repressivefunction
of the ego is extremely active, it follows that the super-egois likewise
an extremely active structure. Both the ego and the super-ego are,
therefore,seen to constitute endopsychicstructureswhich are at least
functionallydynamic; and thus, in his descriptionof these structures,
we find Freud approachingthe concept of dynamic structure. Ac-
cording to his conception of the mental constitution, however, the
energy involved in the activity of both the ego and the super-ego is
derived ultimately from the id as the source of all instinctive energy.
Yet, if the analogy between human and animal psychology is valid,
the id must be regardednot simply as a source of instinctive energy,
but an inherently dynamic structure;for the instinctive behaviour of
1 S. Freud,
Beyondthe PleasurePrinciple,London, 1922, p. 71
2 W. R. D. Fairbairn,' Theoreticaland ExperimentalAspectsof Psycho-Analysis',
British Journal of Medical Psychology, I952, 25, Parts 2 and 3, I22-I27
3 S. Freud, The
Ego andthe Id, London, 1927, p. 75
57
 W. R. D. FAIRBAIRN

animalsis suchas to imply thattheirinstinctiveendowmentis highly

structuralised.This being so, it would seem more satisfactoryto
regardthe id, the ego, and the super-egoas all representingdynamic
structures in theirown right.
Sucha conceptionwould necessarily involve a drasticrevisionof
Freud'stheoryof the mentalconstitution. For,if we adoptthe view
thatboth the ego andthe id areinherentlydynamicstructures, the id
will inevitablyassumethe form of an ego-structure to
comparable the
ego itself. At thispointtheconceptof the super-egois seento present
a difficulty. For, since the super-egowas conceivedby Freudas
essentiallyan internalisedobject, it would seem out of balanceif,
insteadof consistingof a sourceof energy,an ego-structure, and an
internalised object,the mentalconstitutionturnedout to consistof a
single internalised object in association with two ego-structures.
Here,however,it will be recalledthat therearepassagesin TheEgo
andIdin whichFreudspeaksof the super-egoasif it werealmostpart
of the ego.l It would, therefore,seemin the interestsof consistency
if the super-egowere regardedas an ego-structure no lessthanthe id
andthe ego. In actualfact,thisis substantially the standpointwhich
thepresentwriteradopted2 whenhe formulatedtheview that,during
the courseof development,an originalunitaryego becomessplitinto
three separateego-structures, viz. 'the centralego', 'the libidinal
ego ' and ' the ego ' (corresponding
antilibidinal respectivelyto Freud's
'ego ', 'id' and ' super-ego').
Considerationof such a theory immediatelyraisesthe question
whatplaceis to be foundin it for thatimportantaspectof the super-
ego which led Freudto regardit as primarilyan internalised object.
Obviouslythe conceptof interalisedobjectsis one whichno psycho-
analyticaltheoryof the mentalconstitutioncanaffordto ignore-and
not leastbecauseMelanieKlein'ssystematicdevelopmentof the con-
cept has made it the growing-pointof psycho-analytical theory in
recentyears. One of the distinctivefeaturesof MelanieKlein'scon-
tributionis that, whereasFreudonly describeda singleinternalised
object (the super-ego),she has recognisedthe existenceof a multi-
plicity of internalobjects,both good and bad. Accordingto her
view, it is out of this multiplicity of internal objects that, in
1 S. Freud, The Ego andthe Id, London, 1927, p. 44
2 W. R. D. Fairbairn,
PsychoanalyticStudies of the Personality,London, I952,
p. Io5; and 'Observations on the Nature of Hysterical States', BritishJournalof
MedicalPsychology,I954, 27, Part 3, Io8
58
 PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CONCEPTIONS

proportion as development proceeds favourably, the super-ego is

elaborated.1 Although differingfrom Melanie Klein's conception of
the resultingsuper-ego, the writer has adaptedher conception of the
multiplicity of internal objects to his threefold conception of ego-
structuresby assigning to each of the ego-structuresan appropriate
internalobject. The endopsychicsituationwhich arisesin the course
of developmentis thus conceived as one consistingof three groupings
of relationshipsas follows: (I) 'a central ego' cathecting 'an ideal
object', (2) 'a libidinal ego' cathecting 'an exciting object' and
(3) ' an antilibidinalego ' cathecting'a rejectingobject .2 The active
process to which the establishmentof this endopsychic situation is
attributedis one conceived, from one point of view in terms of' split-
ting ', and from anotherpoint of view in terms of' repression'. The
details of the process may be briefly summarisedin the following
account:
The firstdefenceof the originalunitaryego againsta relationshipwhich
is not wholly satisfyingis internalisation of the object. The next
defensivereactionof the ego is to splitoff from the interalised object
two disturbingelements,viz. the excitingelementand the rejecting
element. The splittingprocess,which is also a repressingprocess,
constitutesthesetwo elementsinto separate,repressedobjects-the ex-
citing objectand the rejectingobject. The remainingnucleusof the
originalobject,being ego-syntonic,remainscathectedby the ego and
becomesthe idealobject. Since,however,the two repressedobjects
retainan ego-cathexiswhile in processof repression,their repression
involvesa splitting-off,from the substanceof the ego, of two portions
representingtheircathexis; and this phenomenonresolvesitself into
a repressionof two partsof the ego, the libidinalego and the anti-
libidinalego, by the centralego. Sincethe antilibidinal ego has aims
inherentlyhostile to those of the libidinalego, it implementsthis
hostility by subjectingthe latter to a sustainedaggressiveand per-
secutoryattack,which supportsthe directrepressionexercisedagainst
it by the centralego and which may be appropriatelydescribedas
indirect repression.3
A certain general correspondencewill be observed between the
conception of the endopsychic situation describedabove and Freud's
threefold conception of the mental constitution; but, in the former,
1M. Klein, Contributions
to Psycho-Analysis,London, 1948, pp. 282 and 388
2 W. R. D. ' Observationson the Nature of States British
Fairbair, Hysterical ',
Journal of Medical Psychology, I954, 27, Part 3, io8
3
Ibid., o07-o09
59
 W. R. D. FAIRBAIRN
the id is replacedby the combination'libidinalego/excitingobject',
the ego by the combination'centralego/idealobject', andthe super-
ego largelyby the combination' antilibidinalego/rejectingobject'.
Sucha conceptionappearsto have certainadvantagesover Freud's:
(I) It explicitlyembodiesthe principlesof dynamicstructureand
object-relations in a mannerwhich Freud'sdoesnot. (2) It resolves
the difficultywhich confrontedFreudwhen he raisedthe questions
(a) why the super-egois unconscious,and (b) whetherthisinstigator
of repressionis not itself repressed-questions to which he never
provideda satisfactory answer; for the antilibidinal ego and its as-
sociatedrejectingobject (whichin their conjunctionlargelycorres-
pondsto Freud'ssuper-ego)areconceivedas repressed by the central
ego; (3) the conjunction of the antilibidinal
ego and the rejecting
object resolves the anomaly involved in Freud'sdescriptionof the
super-ego asboth an internalisedobjectanda partof theego. (4) The
conceptof theidealobjectasaninternalobjectcathectedby the central
ego andindependentof the combination' anti-libidinal ego/rejecting
object' makesit possibleto overcomethe difficultypresentedby
Freud'sdescriptionof the super-egoas simultaneously playing the
discordant rolesof ego-idealandinternalpersecutor. (5) Thesplitting
of the originalinternalobjectinto the excitingobject,the idealobject
andthe rejectingobjectmakesit possibleto avoidthe anomalycreated
by Freud'sdescriptionof the super-egoas at once ' a depositleft by
the earliestobject-choicesof the id ' and' anenergeticreaction-forma-
tion againstthose choices '.2
The spacedevoted to a descriptionof views which the writer
hascome to adoptwould seemto demandsomeapology; but, since
theseviews were adoptedwith a view to overcomingwhat appears
to be certainlimitationsin the conceptualsystemoriginatedby Freud
andperpetuated in currentpsycho-analyticaltheory,sucha description
appearedto providethe best meansof drawingattentionto these
limitations,and in particularto the inconsistenciesinvolvedin the
classicconceptof the super-ego.
Institute of Psycho-Analysis & 18 Grosvenor Crescent
London, W. I. Edinburgh 12

1
S, Freud, TheEgoandtheId, London, 1927, p. 75 2 Ibid. p. 44

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