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REFORM AND TRANSITION
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Series Editor: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis

THE ARAB
UPRISINGS IN EGYPT,
JORDAN AND TUNISIA
Social, Political and
Economic Transformations

Andrea Teti,
Pamela Abbott and
Francesco Cavatorta
Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean

Series editor
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis
Bilkent University
Ankara, Turkey
The series of political and economic crises that befell many countries in the
Mediterranean region starting in 2009 has raised emphatically questions
of reform and transition. While the sovereign debt crisis of Southern
European states and the “Arab Spring” appear prima facie unrelated, some
common roots can be identified: low levels of social capital and trust, high
incidence of corruption, and poor institutional performance. This series
provides a venue for the comparative study of reform and transition in the
Mediterranean within and across the political, cultural, and religious
boundaries that crisscross the region. Defining the Mediterranean as the
region that encompasses the countries of Southern Europe, the Levant,
and North Africa, the series contributes to a better understanding of the
agents and the structures that have brought reform and transition to the
forefront. It invites (but is not limited to) interdisciplinary approaches that
draw on political science, history, sociology, economics, anthropology,
area studies, and cultural studies. Bringing together case studies of indi-
vidual countries with broader comparative analyses, the series provides a
home for timely and cutting-edge scholarship that addresses the structural
requirements of reform and transition; the interrelations between politics,
history and culture; and the strategic importance of the Mediterranean for
the EU, the USA, Russia, and emerging powers.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/series/14513
 Andrea Teti • Pamela Abbott
Francesco Cavatorta

The Arab Uprisings in

Egypt, Jordan and
Tunisia
Social, Political and Economic Transformations
Andrea Teti Pamela Abbott
University of Aberdeen University of Aberdeen
Aberdeen, United Kingdom Aberdeen, United Kingdom

Francesco Cavatorta
Laval University
Québec, Québec, Canada

Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean

ISBN 978-3-319-69043-8    ISBN 978-3-319-69044-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69044-5

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017956116

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-
lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu-
tional affiliations.

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Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Foreword

This valuable study adds a critical dimension usually missing from analyses
of the varying trajectories of the Arab Uprising, namely how citizen atti-
tudes help explain the Uprising, how variations in them matter for regime
trajectories, and how outcomes have, in turn, altered mass attitudes. The
study is based on surveys in Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan administered in
four years—2011 and 2013–2015—combined with a wealth of informa-
tion from pre-existing data bases, permitting the authors to make system-
atic comparisons across countries and time.
The work makes several important contributions to our understandings
of the Uprisings. First, the findings challenge the conventional narrative
that the Uprisings were essentially about democracy: if that had been the
overwhelming demand of the mobilised masses, why has been so little
democratisation? Did the agency of the people not matter compared to
elite interests and external constraints? The book’s findings help us get
beyond this dilemma, demonstrating that the main demand of the protes-
tors was not for purely procedural liberal democracy (competitive elec-
tions, political rights) and that majorities wanted, rather, substantive
democracy—socio-economic rights. Moreover, substantial numbers believed
their country was not ready for democracy or preferred an Islamist regime
or, when a trade-off between democracy and order was perceived, chose
order.
For protestors, the priorities were lack of economic opportunity and
unacceptable levels of corruption, and the protests against regimes were
for breaking the populist social contract under the widespread turn to
neo-liberalism and crony capitalism in the region. The study confirms the

v
vi FOREWORD

widespread impression that the activists driving regime change tended to

be educated youth but also that supporters were more likely to be those
with inadequate income (but not the very poorest) - that is, those who
had probably suffered the most from regimes’ policies and were most con-
scious of them.
The study also provides evidence on how citizen attitudes matter for
outcomes. First, variations in attitudes can be directly linked to differences
in regime trajectories: thus, opposition to the regime was overwhelming
in Tunisia and in Egypt, where presidents were overthrown, but not in
Jordan, were there was no regime change. In Tunisia alone was there high
support for political democracy: it is no accident that only in Tunisia was
there a successful democratic transition.
Second, while in the immediate aftermath of the Uprisings there were
high expectations of positive change, by 2014 disillusionment had set in as
governments continued with neo-liberal policies. A multitude of attitudi-
nal changes indicate political de-mobilisation: in 2014, only minorities
thought the Uprising had been positive for their country and most thought
the economic and security situation had deteriorated significantly com-
pared to 2009. Perceptions of economic decline were worse than objective
indicators showed. In parallel, expectations had drastically declined: peo-
ple now believed reform had to come gradually, not via further revolution.
Security had become a much more salient concern, to the point where the
formerly hated police were now valued, and regimes in Jordan and Egypt
enjoyed support for sparing their countries the violent chaos that had
enveloped neighbouring countries. These changes in attitudes much
reduced pressure on elites to deliver political reform and even re-­legitimised
authoritarian governance. Third, attitudes suggest Tunisia’s democratic
transition is in jeopardy. Its government, although the most democratic,
was not highly rated by citizens; political rights might have improved but
substantive democracy—social rights—had not, while Tunisia now faced a
terrorist threat non-existent before the Uprising.
This study offers a fascinating insight into why the Arab Uprising did
not become a democratic revolution.

International Relations and Middle East Politics Ray Hinnebusch

University of St Andrews,
St Andrews, Scotland
 Preface

This book analyses political, economic and social changes in Egypt, Jordan
and Tunisia since the 2010–2011 Uprisings against the backdrop of pre-­
Uprisings trajectories by integrating survey and non-survey data, both
quantitative and qualitative. In doing so, it shows that there is a need to
reflect on the conception of democracy at the heart of academic analysis
and to take seriously the challenge that collective preferences provide clues
to help address the limitations of existing analytical and policy toolkits. It
is necessary to reconsider the significance of socio-economic rights—as
well as juridical equality in civil and political rights—as non-negotiable
dimensions of a democratic society and of transitions towards it, but also
to re-evaluate the stability of authoritarian regimes in the region.

Acknowledgements
The Arab Transformations Project, Political and Social Transformations in
the Arab World, was funded under the European Commission’s FP7
Framework Grant agreement no: 320214. The Project was coordinated
by the University of Aberdeen (UK) and included: Dublin City University
(DCU), Dublin, Ireland; Análisis Sociológicos Económicos y Políticos
(ASEP), Madrid, Spain; Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale
(ISPI), Milan, Italy; Universität Graz (UNI GRAZ), Graz, Austria;
Societatea Pentru Methodologia Sondajelor Concluzia-Prim (Concluzia),
Chisinau, Moldova; Centre de Recherche en Économie Appliquée pour le
Développement (CREAD), Algiers, Algeria; Egyptian Centre for Public
Opinion Research (BASEERA), Cairo, Egypt; Independent Institute for

vii
viii PREFACE

Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS), Amman, Jordan;

University of Jordan (JU), Amman, Jordan; MEDA Solutions (MEDAS),
Casablanca, Morocco; Association Forum Des Sciences Sociales Appliquées
(ASSF), Tunis, Tunisia.

Disclaimer
The authors alone remain responsible for the content of this book. It can-
not be taken as necessarily representing the views of the EU, the Court of
the University of Aberdeen or any of the project partners.

Aberdeen, UK Andrea Teti

 Contents

1 Introduction and Background   1

2 Understanding the Context: Hopes and Challenges

in 2011  27

3 Political Challenges: Expectations and Changes 2011–2014  55

4 Unmet Challenges and Frustrated Expectations: Economic

Security and Quality of Life 2011–2014  81

5 Employment Creation, Corruption and Gender Equality

2011–2014 103

6 Conclusions: Resilient Authoritarianism and Frustrated

Expectations 123

Index 141

ix
 Acronyms and Abbreviations

AB Arab Barometer
ADI Arab Democracy Index
AfB AfroBarometer
ATS Arab Transformations Survey
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CSOs Civil Society Organisations
FSI Fragile State Index
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GGI Gender Gap Index
HDI Human Development Index
IFIs International Financial Institutions
NEET Not in Employment Education or Training
NGOs Non-governmental Organisations
UN United Nations
WDIs World Development Indicators
WGIs Worldwide Governance Indicators
WGP World Gallup Poll

xi
 List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Percentage mentioning economic factors, corruption and/or

political rights as one of the two main reasons that sparked the
Uprisings42
Fig. 2.2 Main challenges facing the country in 2011 (%) 44
Fig. 3.1 The separation of religion and socio-political life (% disagreeing
with religious influence), 2011 and 2014 74
Fig. 4.1 MENA economic growth index: present economic performance
and future enabling conditions (scores out of 100) 89
Fig. 4.2 Concerns about security in 2014 (%) 94
Fig. 4.3 Economic situation of household and country good or very
good in 2009 and 2014 (%) 98
Fig. 5.1 Percentage who say they are satisfied or very satisfied with
government performance in 2014 109

xiii
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 Taxonomies and approaches to transformations 21

Table 2.1 Support for and participation in the uprisings by category, age
18 and over in 2011, % 37
Table 2.2 Confident that the 2011 Uprisings will succeed in achieving
political and economic transformation, % 50
Table 3.1 Agree that political and civil rights are guaranteed in 2011 and
2013, % 63
Table 3.2 Negative effects of democracy, % 69
Table 3.3 ‘Type of political regime suitable/very suitable for my
country’ in 2011 and 2014, % 69
Table 3.4 Two most important characteristics of democracy 71
Table 4.1 Major challenges facing country in 2011 and 2014, %
nominating as one of two 91
Table 5.1 Trust in institutions in 2011 and 2014: political, legal,
religious, civil society and the media, % 107
Table 5.2 Agreeing/strongly greeting on propositions relating to gender
equality in 2014, % 118

xv
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Background

Abstract The Arab Uprisings were events of rare intensity in Middle

Eastern history as mass, popular and largely non-violent revolts which
threatened and toppled supposedly stable autocracies. Branded them the
region’s ‘1989 moment’, when counter-revolution followed revolution,
artificial expectations gave way to equally misplaced disaffection, still fails
to recognise the Uprisings’ originality and diversity. Focusing on three
cases epitomising different post-Uprising trajectories—Tunisia, Jordan and
Egypt—this chapter explores how the Uprisings have been analysed.
Explanations for the Uprisings fall into three categories, over-emphasising
in turn chances for democratisation, cultural or material obstacles to
democracy, or the stability of ‘hybrid regimes’. The chapter contextualises
events leading to the Uprisings in each country and examines strengths and
weaknesses of the toolkit through which the Uprisings have been viewed.

Keywords Arab Uprisings • Modernisation • Political transformation •

Democratisation • Authoritarianism • Authoritarian resilience

© The Author(s) 2018 1

A. Teti et al., The Arab Uprisings in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia,
Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69044-5_1
2 A. TETI ET AL.

1.1   Introduction
The Arab Uprisings represented a series of events of rare intensity in the
history of the Middle East, as mass, popular and largely non-violent revolts
took place, starting in December 2010 in Tunisia and reverberating
throughout the region. These protests threatened—and in four cases
resulted in the overthrow of—apparently stable autocratic regimes. The
nature and the extensive domestic, regional and international impact of
the Uprisings merit attention in and of themselves, but coming hard on
the heels of a global financial crisis and given the resonance of the Arab
Uprisings with protest movements beyond the region they appear all the
more significant. The relevance of the Uprisings is not just academic: the
Middle East is one of the most frequently conflictual regions in the world;
it is central to the global political economy as a source of hydrocarbons
and a global logistical nexus; it is a source of and transit point for migra-
tory flows towards Europe; and many of its autocracies have been sup-
ported as key allies by Western governments.
The Arab Uprisings in 2010/11 caught people, governments and many
academics by surprise (Gause 2011). Participants and observers both
within the region and beyond were surprised at the apparent ease with
which mass mobilisation wrong-footed supposedly resilient authoritarian
regimes, galvanising protesters, dismaying regime supporters, and leaving
Western governments’ policies in disarray. In Western capitals and media,
great hopes of swift democratisation were pinned on the Arab Uprisings
and they were quickly branded the Middle Eastern equivalent to the fall of
the Berlin Wall and the domino-like collapse of Soviet bloc dictatorships
in 1989 (Kaldor 2011). However, few significant democratic transforma-
tions have taken place, with only Tunisia formally qualifying as a democ-
racy by 2017 and substantive progress towards democracy often shaky
even there. Other countries in which Uprisings took place have experi-
enced the survival of authoritarian rule through repression (e.g. Bahrain),
counter-revolution (Egypt), civil war and the collapse of state structures
(Libya, Syria), or processes of reform and ‘façade democratisation’
(Morocco, Jordan) designed to maintain the substance of authoritarian
regimes untouched (Malmvig 2014). Both change and continuity have
characterised the post-Uprisings period (Hinnebusch ed. 2015; Rivetti
and Di Peri 2015), and in this book we outline and discuss what public
opinion survey data can tell us about the ways in which ordinary Arab citi-
zens perceive the socio-economic and political changes or lack thereof in
 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 3

the wake of the Uprisings. We do so by looking at three cases that are

generally taken as epitomising the different trajectories of post-Uprising
countries—Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt—and for which relatively more
information is available.
In Jordan, protesters demonstrated for changes in governance but not
for the toppling of the king and there was no regime change. King
Abdullah II responded to protests with political and economic conces-
sions, but these left the political system substantively unchanged. In the
Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions between December 2010 and February
2011, relatively peaceful demonstrations led to the overthrow of authori-
tarian regimes and embryonic moves towards democracy. It should be
emphasised that although regime collapse was more pronounced in
Tunisia than in Egypt—where the armed forces took power—large parts
of the regime remained intact (Anderson 2011). While reforms are ongo-
ing in Tunisia (Marzouki 2015) and democracy remains a possibility in
principle, in Egypt ruling elites struggled against each other but resisted
any substantive change: the first freely elected post-Mubarak executive and
legislature ignored popular demands and were overthrown by a military
coup in 2013, with a new constitution agreed and a former army chief,
Abdul Fattah El-Sisi, elected President in 2014. While Islamist parties
were elected to power after the first post-Uprisings election in Tunisia and
Egypt, in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood ruled thanks to support from
the Salafist Nour alliance, while in Tunisia the more moderate Ennahda
party agreed to resign in favour of a national unity government in 2013
following mass demonstrations. Their experience in power had been con-
troversial due to their own failures and to the polarised environment
within which they operated.
In Tunisia, the rise of Salafism (Marks 2013) soon after the revolution
endangered the transition because Salafists wanted the implementation of
an ultra-conservative version of Islamic law, which forced Ennahda to dis-
tance itself from them. There were also protests in 2012 against moves by
the ‘Troika’, the Islamist-led government, to revise women’s rights in the
proposed new constitution. All this polarised Tunisian society, with large
sectors of the population holding on to the secular heritage of the previous
regime. Ultimately, Ennahda resigned and a technocratic government
replaced the ‘Troika’, leading to the consensual adoption of a new consti-
tution. The successful 2014 legislative and presidential elections placed
the country on the path of democratic consolidation. In Egypt, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi was elected President in June 2012
4 A. TETI ET AL.

with a paper-thin majority, but by December a Brotherhood-Salafi alliance

in Parliament and in the Constitutional Assembly alienated non-Islamist
forces by driving through a new Constitution giving a significant role to
Islam, restricting freedom of speech, association and protest, and granting
significant concessions to an already powerful military. Although the new
Constitution was easily approved in a referendum, the Brotherhood-Salafi
alliance—content to ignore non-Islamists forces while cuddling up to the
military—was met with increasingly forceful opposition on the streets.
Popular demonstrations grew into widespread protest in June 2013, of
which the army took advantage to overthrow Morsi and impose military
rule. In December 2013 the Brotherhood was declared a terrorist group,
and in January 2015 the new Constitution banned religious political
parties.
Explanations for the Uprisings abound in the literature, including com-
parative work examining larger regional trends and individual case studies
where events and developments are examined in great detail. While all
these works focus on both structural factors and agency by identifying the
crucial actors involved in the Uprisings and their aftermath, there is very
little understanding of how the socio-economic and political transforma-
tions which the Uprisings generated—or lack thereof—influenced ordi-
nary citizens. This book focuses on two broad areas which responses to
public opinion surveys have identified as of central concern for the popula-
tions of countries in the Arab world: socio-economic cohesion/disloca-
tion and political voice/exclusion. Our findings suggest that these issues,
which drove people to demonstrate in 2010/11, are far from being
resolved and that populations continue to have little confidence in their
governments in general and in their ability to deliver on concrete issues
that matter to people, whether in the social, economic or political sphere.
On the contrary, people’s expectations have largely been ignored or have
gone unfulfilled on a range of issues from social security to still-endemic
unemployment; trust in governments has declined drastically; the econ-
omy remains the single largest challenge (and cause of migration); corrup-
tion remains pervasive, political reforms have been either cosmetic or
reversed (or, in Tunisia’s case, they remain shaky) and people have little
faith that things will change. Neither national governments nor their
international counterparts have been able or willing to address this poten-
tially toxic mix of factors. Indeed, international financial institutions (IFIs)
and Western governments (Hanieh 2015) quickly recast the Uprisings as
a struggle merely for formal democracy and the overthrow of autocracy,
 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 5

while neglecting the profound socio-economic malaise that decades of

neo-liberal reforms had inflicted. This made it possible to stress the need
for an orderly transition to democracy while continuing the very economic
policies which ordinary citizens blamed for the increasingly precarious
lives they were leading.

1.2   Background
The Arab Uprisings began in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid as a protest
against the police’s arbitrary treatment of Muhammad Bouazizi, who
committed suicide by setting himself on fire outside the town’s police sta-
tion in desperation at police harassment. These protests quickly snow-
balled into increasingly broad-based nationwide demonstrations, despite
government attempts to repress them and prevent awareness of them
spreading. The protests moved from countryside towns towards the capi-
tal, thanks in part to social media’s ability to bypass discredited state-­
controlled national media. An increasingly desperate regime asked the
armed forces to fire upon peaceful protesters; the Army’s refusal effectively
forced President Ben Ali out of office. These events gripped not only
Tunisia but the entire Arab region and increasingly caught world atten-
tion. Opponents of autocracies across the Middle East watched the
Tunisian regime—infamous for the extensive reach of domestic security
services in its ‘soft’ autocracy—in disarray in the face of widespread peace-
ful popular mobilisation. In early 2011, protests then took place across the
region but most notably in Yemen, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya and Syria. The
most significant of these in terms of scale and regional impact were pro-
tests in Egypt starting on January 25 and sparking nationwide protests on
January 28. By February 12 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had been
forced to step down.
Governments reacted quickly, and where Tunisian, Egyptian and
Yemeni regimes had trodden relatively carefully in the hope of survival,
the Libyan and Syrian regimes swiftly resorted to violent repression to
maintain their grip on power. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) govern-
ments, particularly Saudi Arabia, propped up their regional counterparts,
helping Bahrain’s rulers quash protests, pressuring Western governments
not to support the Uprisings and even offering Jordan and Morocco GCC
membership. Qatar sought to ride the wave of Egypt’s protests, aligning
itself with the Muslim Brotherhood in an attempt to distance themselves
from Saudi regional hegemony. Meanwhile, Western governments were
6 A. TETI ET AL.

caught in a bind. While they had spent at least two decades espousing a
rhetoric supportive of democracy and human rights as ‘fundamental val-
ues’, they had also wedded themselves to autocratic regimes on ‘prag-
matic’ grounds, espousing those regimes’ narratives that democratisation
should be a ‘gradual’ transition because their citizens were unable to
understand—never mind practise—democracy.
Initially protesters won significant victories. Tunisian President Ben Ali
resigned on January 14, Egyptian President Mubarak stepped down on
February 11 and protests flared in Libya and Bahrain on February 14 and
Syria on the 15th, with smaller protests in Iraq (albeit these were less
related to the Arab Uprisings themselves and more to ongoing strife) and
in Morocco, Mauritania and Jordan. For all the assumed resilience of these
authoritarian regimes, conventional instruments of repression and co-­
option appeared ineffective, betraying both the regimes’ lack of support
domestically and the precarious nature of the altar of stability upon which
Western allies had sacrificed the pursuit of democracy.
By mid-2011, Tunisia and Egypt appeared to be struggling for transi-
tions away from authoritarianism, Libya and Syria had descended into
conflict, Bahrain’s protests had been bloodily repressed with the support
of Saudi forces, Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies had promised
reforms without significant reduction of the monarchs’ power, and Saudi
Arabia and its Gulf allies were shoring up authoritarian regimes through
massive increases in public spending. Algeria alone appeared not to have
experienced significant protests. By late 2011, Syria and Yemen were
mired in conflict, the Libyan conflict had been brought to an apparent end
with Gaddafi’s assassination and foreign intervention, with only renewed
protests stalling—however temporarily—Egypt’s counter-revolution.
Many observers began to describe events either as a conflict-ridden ‘Arab
Winter’ or as an ‘Islamist Winter’, where Islamist parties hijacked popular
uprisings translating them into electoral advantage, as in Tunisia and
Egypt, and where Islamist groups with at best dubious ‘revolutionary cre-
dentials’ suppressed embryonic democracy.
By mid-2014, when the main public opinion survey on which we draw
in this book was conducted, the dreams of a democratic and peaceful tran-
sition of the region away from authoritarianism and conflict had ended.
The civil war continued to rage in Syria and Libya, Iraq was being invaded
by the so-called Islamic State, and Egypt’s military coup had overthrown
the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood government. While much
has been written about the reasons behind the ‘failure’ of the Arab
 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 7

Uprisings, the descent into civil unrest and retrenched authoritarian rule,
very little attention has been paid to how ordinary citizens have reacted to
all of this. The case studies selected for this book attempt to provide a first
portrait of what public opinion survey data can tell us about how individu-
als have contended with the events described above and the influence the
latter had on values and beliefs. It is too early to pronounce a definitive
judgement on the legacy of the Arab Uprisings, but understanding where
ordinary citizens stand on a number of significant socio-economic and
political issues can be beneficial in appraising recent regional develop-
ments and where they might lead next.

1.3   Country Context

1.3.1  
Egypt
Egypt is one of the most strategically and culturally significant countries of
the Arab world; events here reverberate well beyond the region. The fall
of Mubarak and its aftermath are no exception. Egypt’s political and insti-
tutional landscape has changed several times during the post-Mubarak
period and remains ill-defined. Although the Muslim Brotherhood had
initially opposed the Uprisings, in 2012 free elections returned a
Brotherhood-led government with Mohammed Morsi as President, and
the Brotherhood’s alliance with the Salafist Nour party provided a
Parliamentary majority bypassing political forces which had supported the
revolution. The Brotherhood also attempted to pacify the military with
constitutional protection of its political influence and its vast economic
empire. However, following anti-government protests in 2013 the mili-
tary ousted Morsi, imposed military rule and eventually dissolved parlia-
ment. The May 2014 Presidential elections sanctioned the Army’s renewed
grip on power with the election of El-Sisi as President, followed by elec-
tions for the House of Representatives in 2015. In a post-coup constitu-
tion approved by popular referendum in 2014, the Army obtained
strengthened constitutional guarantees that their independence would
remain unchecked by civilian oversight, including their vast budget.
Although the Constitution guarantees basic political and civil rights, Egypt
remains an authoritarian state, probably even more so than at any time
under Mubarak (Shenker 2017). The government has not only outlawed
the Muslim Brotherhood; it also cracked down on press freedom, non-­
Islamist opposition activism and youth protests (Holmes 2017). On the
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 Akto V.
Sceno 1.—Antaŭ la grotĉambro de Prospero.
(Venas Prospero magie vestita, kaj Arielo).
Prospero.
Nun mia plano venas al finiĝo.
Spiritoj magipove min obeis
Oportunege. Horo nun kioma?
Arielo.
La sesa proksimiĝas. Vi promesis
Ke tiam ĉesos nia laborado.
Prospero.
Promeson mian certe mi plenumos,
Ĉar bone vi min servis. Diru kien
La Reĝon kaj sekvantojn vi kondukis.
Arielo.
Sub l’ ombrodona via tiliaro,
Malliberuloj, kune ili staras
Terure timigitaj; en la stato
Por ilin puni de vi preparita,
Ne povas ili ŝanĝi ĝis vi volos.
La Reĝo, lia frato, kaj la via
Triope staras strange konsternitaj,
Dum la ceteraj ploras apud ili,—
Precipe l’ bona maljunul’ Gonzalo,
Sur kies blankan barbon larmoj falas
Simile al malvarmaj vintraj gutoj
De kana tegmentrando. Via povo
Ĉagrenas ilin nun interne tiel
Ke ilin vidi tuŝus vian koron.
Prospero.
Ĉu vi, spirito, tion vere pensas?
Arielo.
Min tuŝus tio se mi estus homa.
Prospero.
Min tuŝu ĝi do, ĉar mi homo estas.
Ĉu vi, aero nur, kompatas homojn,
Dum, similul’ ilia, mi ne sentos
Pli ol vi kompatema?—Kiel ili
Ĉu ĝojon, ĉu ĉagrenon mi ne havas?
Malbone kvankam ili kun mi agis,
Kaj vundis min profunde, mi forpelos
Koleron mian propran: grandanimo
Ol venĝo estas virto pli laŭdinda.
Pentantajn ilin povas mi pardoni,
Eĉ sen sulkiĝo. Iru, Arielo,
Kaj ilin liberigu. Magiaĵon
Tuj rompos mi, al ĉiu por redoni
Sentemon ĝustan.
Arielo.
Tuj mi iros, Mastro. (Foriras).
Prospero.
Koboldoj riveretaj kaj montetaj,
Lagamistetoj, arbarvizitistoj;
Vi, sur la sablo kiuj l’ ondon sekvas,
Kaj ride antaŭkuras for l’ alfluon;
Duonestaĵoj, kiuj sub la luno,
Elfaras la maldolĉajn herbrondaĵojn
Maĉeblajn tute ne de la ŝafino;
Vi, fungfaristoj, kiuj nokte ludas,
Kaj ĝoje aŭdas vespersonoradon—
Per vi, malfortaj kvankam estaĵetoj,
Tagmezan povis mi nubigi sunon,
Eĉ leviĝigi ventojn ribelantajn,
Eĉ verdan maron kun ĉielo blua
Interbatigi muĝe; mi fulmigis
Tra laŭtkrakanta tondro; fajre fendis
La Jupiteran kverkon per difulmo.
Mi skuis promontoran fundamenton,
Elradikigis cedron kaj pinarbon;
Eĉ tomboj vekis siajn endormantojn
Kaj malfermiĝis ilin por forsendi,
Per mira povo mia.—Sed nun ĉesu
La magiarto, de mi forĵurita;
Ĉar, poste iom da muziko dolĉa,
(Tuj de mi dezirata por ke baldaŭ
Pentuloj sentojn siajn ree havu)
Korege rompos mi bastonon mian
Kaj teren ĝin enfosos multajn futojn,
Kaj, pli profunde eĉ ol ajn sondilon,
La libron mi dronigos!
(Solena Muziko).
(Revenas Arielo; lin sekvas Alonzo kun freneza mieno, kune
kun Gonzalo; Sebastiano kaj Antonio, sammaniere, kune
kun Adriano kaj Francisko.—Ili ĉiuj enpaŝis la rondon, kiun
Prospero estis antaŭpretiginta: tie ili staras magie senmovaj;
tion vidante, Prospero parolas:)
Ari’ solena, taŭga kuracado,
Nun senutilan vian tutan cerbon
Rekonsciigu, en kranio via:
Cetere vi en magipovo staras.—
Gonzalo! virta, honorinda viro,
Okuloj miaj simpatie ploras
Kun viaj; falas de mi frataj larmoj . . .
—Magio nun rapide malaperos,
Kaj, kiel la maten’ svenigas nokton,
Iliaj sentoj la nebulan staton
Forigos tuj, kaj ree sin ekvekos.—
Gonzalo! bona vir’, savinto mia,
Subul’ al via Reĝo tre fidela,
Noblanimulo, estos viaj servoj
Pagitaj hejme, voĉe, kaj per agoj!
Alonzo, tre kruele vi agadis
Kun mi kaj kara infanino mia,
Kaj tiu via frato krime helpis,—
—Sebastian’ interne tion sentas—
Eĉ vi, ho frato! karno, sango mia,
Mortigis, ambicie, natursentojn,
Sebastianon puŝis al perfido . . .
—Duoble li pro tio nun suferas!—
La Reĝon ambaŭ vi mortigi volus . . .
Sed al vi mi pardonas, Antonio.
—Ilia komprenado ekrevenas:
Idealfluo sane replenigos
Pensrandon magiŝlime nun kovritan.
El ili tamen min neniu konus,
Eĉ se min ili vidus.—Arielo,
Alportu mian glavon kaj ĉapelon.
(Foriras Arielo).
Nun tute magiveston mi deprenu,
Kaj kiel dukon de Milan’ min montru.
(Al Arielo kiu revenas kaj helpas vesti lin).
Spirit’, rapidu! Vi tuj liberiĝos!
Arielo kantas:
Ĉe l’ abel’ kunsuĉos mi,
En primolo kuŝos ni,
Tie ni ripozos, dum
La strigo vokos en mallum’.
Sur vesperto rajdos mi
 Post la somer’, gaje, ho!
Gaje tre! gaje, ho! vivos mi nun,
Sub arba flor’ varmigata de l’ sun’.
Gaje, ho! vivos mi, gaje tre, nun,
Varmigos min la brila sun’,
Sub arba floro mi vivos nun!
Prospero.
Ĉarmege! Al mi, Ariel’, vi mankos;
Sed vi libera estos aerido.
Ĉi tien de la Reĝa ŝip’ venigu
Ŝipestron kaj subestron ĉiam viglajn,
Maristojn ankaŭ sub ferdek’ dormantajn.
Tuj iru.
Arielo.
Mastro, mi l’ aeron glutos:
Eĉ antaŭ du pulsbatoj mi revenos.
(Foriras Arielo).
Gonzalo.
Turmento, peno, miro kaj mirego
Ĉi tie loĝas: ke ĉiela povo
Konduku nin el la insul’ terura!
Prospero.
La suferintan dukon de Milano,
Prosperon, nun rigardu, moŝta Reĝo!
Por pli ĉertigi ke vivanto princa
Al vi parolas, mi vin ĉirkaŭprenas:
Ĉar al vi kaj sekvantoj mi deziras
Bonvenon, kore!
Alonzo.
Ĉu Prosper’ vi estas,
Aŭ sorĉapero por min malinformi,
Ne povus nun mi diri: via pulso
Tre home batas certe: mi ekpensas
Ke, de l’ intervidiĝo nia lasta
Ĝis nun, posedas min frenezo ia. . . .
Ĉu ne postulas ĉio ĉi klarigon,
Rakonton strangan?—La dukecon vian
Forlasas mi, de vi nun peteganto!
Pardonu mian kulpon!—Sed, Prospero!
Ĉi tie kiel staras li—kaj vivas?
Prospero.
Unue, nobla maljunul’ Gonzalo,
Ke mi vin respektege ĉirkaŭprenu:
Honoro via estas netaksebla,
Eĉ senegala.
Gonzalo.
Ĉu ĉi tio estas?
Ĉu ne? Mi ne komprenas. . . .
Prospero.
Strangaĵecon
Insulnaskitan, vi ankoraŭ sentas;
Ĝi ne permesas al vi veron vidi.
Bonvenon koran al amikoj miaj!—
(Flanken al Sebastiano kaj Antonio).
Se tamen volus mi, kortega paro,
Malkaŝi perfidaĵon vian, vere
Sur vin sulkiĝus tuj la Reĝa brovo;
Sed mi silentos.
Sebastiano (flanken).
Li diable prava!
Prospero (al Antonio).
Vi, malbonulo, kiun frato’ nomi
Eĉ buŝon malpurigus, mi pardonas
Kulpegojn viajn tute, postulante
Ke al mi tuj duklandon vi redonu—
Sed tion nepre vi devige faros—
Alonzo.
Se estas vi Prosper’, al ni rakontu
Detale vian ĝis nun konserviĝon;
Klarigu tiun ĉi interrenkonton—
Ĉar de tri horoj nur, ni marirante
Suferis ŝippereon sur ŝtonbordo,
Kaj tie mi (kruela penso!) perdis
Karegan filon!
Prospero.
Tre mi vin kompatas!
Alonzo.
Neriparebla perdo! Pacienco
Kuraci ĝin ne povas.
Prospero.
Sed mi pensas
Ke vi ne tute petas ĝian helpon:
Al mi, por sama perdo, pacienco
Fariĝas kontenteco konsolanta.
Alonzo.
Ĉu vi ĵus dirus, “sama perdo”?
Prospero.
Sama,
Kaj ankaŭ tute nova. Elportebla
Por fari ĝin mi havas nur rimedojn
Ol viaj pli malfortajn, ĉar filinon
Ne antaŭ longe perdis mi.
 Alonzo.
Filinon?
Ĉielo! kial, Reĝo kaj Reĝino,
En Neapolo nun ne estas ili?
Por okazigi tion, tre volonte,
Anstataŭ filo mia, sur marfundo
Mi kore enŝlimiĝus. Nu, filinon,
Ŝin kiam perdis vi?
Prospero.
En la Ventego,
Samtempe kiam vi la filon perdis.
Mi vidas ke tre miras vi, sinjoroj,
Pri tiu ĉi okaz’; vi preskaŭ dubas
L’ ateston de okuloj kaj oreloj;
Sed, kiel ajn vi provizore perdis
De l’ sentoj uzon, sciu nun ke certe
Prosper’ mi estas, mi la rajta duko,
Mi, kiu, forpelita el Milano
Atingis poste la insulon kies
Ĉefviro estas mi, sur kies bordo
Okazis via propra ŝippereo.
Sed tian ĉiutagan historion
Nek povus mi rakonti en kunsido,
Nek dum tagmanĝo. Nu! bonvenon, Reĝo,
Al la grotĉambro nur kortego mia.
Interne sekvantar’ nenia staras,
Ekstere ne subuloj: nun, rigardu!
Tuj, pro duklando kiun vi redonas,
Mi pagos vin per multa plibonaĵo:
Almenaŭ kontentigos vin la vido
Eĉ pli ol min duklando.
(La grotĉambro malfermiĝas kaj montras Ferdinandon kaj
Mirandon ŝakludantajn).
Mirando.
 Vi friponas,
Karulo—
Ferdinando.
Ne, amata koro mia,
Por tuta mond’ ne volus mi falsludi.
Mirando.
Falsludi povus vi, por dudek regnoj,
Eĉ tiam dirus mi ke vi bonludas.
Alonzo.
Se estas tio nur insulapero
Karegan filon mi dufoje perdos.
Sebastiano.
Mirakl’ altega!
Ferdinando.
Kvankam muĝas l’ ondoj,
Kompaton havis ili: mi neprave
Malbenis ilin.
(Genufleksas al Alonzo).
Alonzo.
Ke plenkoraj benoj
De ĝoja patro vin ĉirkaŭu tute:
Leviĝu. Kiel vi ĉi tien venis?
Mirando.
Ho! miro! kiom da kreitoj belaj
Nun staras tie ĉi! homaro nobla!
Belega, nova!
Prospero.
Nova por vi, kara.
 Alonzo (al Ferdinando).
Ŝin, kiu kun vi ĵus interŝakludis,
Al mi konigu—kvankam reciproke
Nur estas vi trihoraj gekonatoj—
Ĉu estas ŝi diin’ nin disiginta
Por nin reunuigi?
Ferdinando.
Ne, sinjoro;
Mortema ŝi; sed, per nemorta Povo,
Ŝi mia estas, de mi elektita
En tempo, kiam nek de vi permeson
Mi peti povis, nek vin pensis viva;
Filino de Milana fama duko—
—Tre ofte jam lin aŭdis mi laŭdatan,
De mi, ĝis nun, lin tamen nekonatan—
De kiu novan vivon mi ricevis:
Per kara fianĉino li fariĝas
Nun dua patro mia.
Alonzo.
Patro ŝia
Fariĝas mi.—Sed kiel strange ŝajnas
Pardonon peti de l’ infano mia!
Prospero.
Sinjoro, haltu tie: ni ne ŝarĝu
Memoron nian per la malbonaĵo
Feliĉe nun pasinta.
Gonzalo.
Mi interne
Ĵus tiel ĝoje ploris, ke pli frue
Ne povis mi paroli . . . Dioj povaj!
Rigardu, benu per duobla krono
Geprincojn niajn! Ĉar vi markis vojon
Por la interrenkonto!
Alonzo.
Amen! Estu!
Gonzalo.
Ĉu el Milan’ Prospero forpeliĝis
Por ke l’ idaro lia reĝe sidu
Sur Neapola trono? Estu ĝojaj!
Plej ĝojaj kiel eble! Tion skribu
En orleteroj sur kolonoj daŭraj.
Vojaĝo mira! edzon en Tuniso
Akiris Klaribel’; per ŝippereo
Edzinon ŝia frato Ferdinando
Feliĉe trovis; eĉ Prosper’ duklandon,
Kaj ĉiu el ni sin mem—jam perditan—
En insulet’ retrovas.
Alonzo (al Ferdinando kaj Mirando).
Viajn manojn
Al mi nun donu: doloriĝu koro
Ne deziranta al vi ĝojon.
Gonzalo.
Amen!
(Revenas Arielo kun ŝipestro kaj subestro tute miregante
sekvantaj lin).
Sinjoro! nun rigardu, el ni vivas
Pli multaj ol eĉ povus ni esperi!
Ĉu en la ŝipo mi ne antaŭdiris
Ke tia maltaŭgulo ne droniĝos
Se estas pendigilo apud bordo?
Marblasfemulo, tute vi silentas:
Ĉu landnovaĵon vi ne povas ĵuri?
Subestro.
Ke ni revidas Reĝon kaj sekvantojn,
Novaĵo la plej bona certe estas:
Nur tri sabloŝutiloj malpleniĝis
De l’ ŝipfendiĝo ĝis la nunminuto,
Sed, tute ŝnurarmita, nia ŝipo
Nun estas bele taŭga por mariri,
Kaj tia kia ĝi antaŭe estis.
Arielo (flanken al Prospero).
Sinjoro, mi plenumis tiun servon
Dum forestado mia.
Prospero (flanken al Arielo).
Mirestaĵo!
Alonzo.
Okazoj tiaj ne naturaj estas:
Eĉ ili pli kaj pli strangiĝas. Diru,
Ĉi tien kiel ambaŭ el vi venis?
Subestro.
Sinjoro, se mi nun ne malspritiĝos
Volonte al Vi mi sciigos tion . . .
Ni ĉiuj morte sentis nin dormemaj,
Kaj sub ferdek’ kuŝantaj . . . Bruegaĵo
Katena, bleka, muĝa, kaj kriega
El tiu loko nin terure vekis . . .
Liberaj tiam, ni mirege vidis
La reĝan, bonan, bravan ŝipon nian,
Ŝnuraĵigita kaj de nove taŭga.
Ŝipestro nia vigle, gaje kuris
Por ĝin rigardi—Sed, dum palpebrumo,
Nubiĝaj, sonĝe, ĉiujn ni forlasis . . .
Kaj tien ĉi veniĝis . . .
Arielo (flanken al Prospero).
Ĉu mi bone
Elfaris vian volon?
Prospero (flanken al Arielo).
Diligente!
Tuj estos vi libera!
Alonzo.
Labirinton
Similan viro ajn neniam paŝis;
Gvidil’ mirega, ol natur’ pli alta,
La tuton antaŭplanis. Orakolo
Nur povus ĝin klarigi.
Prospero.
Reĝa Moŝto,
Plu ne turmentu nun spiriton vian
Pri tiuj ĉi strangaĵoj . . . Libertempe.
Ne longe de nun, poste mi klarigos
Okazojn, kiujn eble vi aprobos:
Ĝis tiam, estu ĝoja, mi petegas.
(Flanken al Arielo) Spirito, venu: tuj nun liberigu
Eĉ Kalibanon kaj kunulojn liajn.
(Foriras Arielo).
Mi petas vin, ho Reĝo, kontentiĝu.
Ankoraŭ mankas kelke da sekvantoj,
Sed ilin vi kredeble ne memoras.
(Revenas Arielo enpuŝanta Kalibanon, Stefanon, kaj
Trinkulon, kiuj portas la ŝtelitan vestaĵon).
Stefano.
Ĉiu homo elturniĝu por la ceteraj, kaj neniu estu singardema, ĉar ĉio
estas nur ŝanco. Kuraĝe! monstregulo! kuraĝe!
Trinkulo.
Se kredindaj estas la spioniloj kiujn mi portas vizaĝe, jen estas bela
vidaĵo!
Kalibano.
Setebos! estas jen spiritoj gloraj!
Kaj kiel bela estas mia mastro!
Mi timas ke li min severe punos.
Sebastiano.
Ha, ha! sinjoro mia, Antonio,
Objektoj tiaj, diru, kiaj estas?
Ĉu aĉeteblaj?
Antonio.
Ili? Kompreneble,
Ĉar unu estas fiŝo, kaj vendebla.
Prospero.
La montron de la trio bone notu,
Sinjoroj. Ĉu honestaj ili ŝajnas?
De tiu malbelulo la patrino
Potenca sorĉistino tiel estis,
Ke ŝi la lunon povis eĉ kontroli,
Alfluon kaj forfluon vole fari,
Eĉ kontraŭ la lunpovo—Nun, triope,
Vestaĵon tiun ili de mi ŝtelis—
La duondiablido min mortigi,
Per helpo de kunuloj, jam intencis;
Du el maltaŭganaro vi mem konas:
Ĉi tiu mallumaĵo estas mia.
Kalibano.
Min morte pinĉos li!
Alonzo.
Kelisto mia,
Ĉu li drinkema estas ne Stefano?
 Sebastiano.
Ebria nun, li kie ŝtelis vinon?
Alonzo.
Trinkulo mem de vino ŝanceliĝas:
El kie prenis ili la likvoron
Maturiĝantan en la maltaŭguloj?
Peklaĵon tian kio kaŭzis? Diru!
Trinkulo.
De l’ tempo de mia lasta renkonto kun Vi, mi troviĝis en tia peklaĵo,
ke kredeble ĝi neniam foriros el miaj ostoj: mi ne timos
muŝovĝermiĝon!
Sebastiano.
Nu! kion vi diras, Stefano?
Stefano.
Ne tuŝu min! Mi jam ne estas Stefano, sed nur streĉego!
Prospero.
Vi volus esti Reĝo de l’ insulo?
Stefano.
Doloran Reĝon havus do l’ insulo.
Alonzo (montrante Kalibanon).
Strangaĵon tian mi ĝis nun ne vidis!
Prospero.
Malbonkonduta estas li, Sinjoro,
Eĉ tiel kiel estas li malbela—
Vi tri, tuj iru en grotĉambron mian
Kaj bele ĝin balau kaj ornamu,
Pardonon mian se vi gajni volas.
 Kalibano.
Mi certe volas. En la estonteco
Pli saĝa tute estos mi, kaj penos
Pardonon de la mastro por ricevi.
Ho triobleduobla mi azeno!
Por dio mi trinkulon tian prenis
Kaj malspritulon mi adoris!
Prospero.
Iru!
Alonzo.
For de ĉi tie kaj pakaĵon portu
Al ĝia loko—
Sebastiano.
Kie ĝin vi ŝtelis.
(Foriras Kalibano, Stefano, kaj Trinkulo).
Prospero.
Nun, Via Reĝa Moŝto, kaj sekvantoj,
Bonvolu tuj akcepti la gastamon
De simpla groto, kie vi ripozos
Ĉi tiun noktodaŭron. Tre rapide
La tempon ni pasigos: mi rakontos
Al vi la mian vivon, de l’ momento
En kiu la insulon mi atingis.
Matene morgaŭ vin mi kunkondukos
En vian ŝipon, poste Neapolon,
Ĉefurbon kie mi esperas vidi
De niaj gekaruloj la edziĝon,
Kaj fine, en Milano mia, vivos
Min pretiĝante por la tombo.
Alonzo.
Vere,
Mi tre deziras aŭdi la rakonton
De viaj aventuroj en l’ insulo:
Tre stranga devus esti.
Prospero.
Vi ĝin aŭdos:
Mi ĉion diros; mi al vi promesas
Kvietajn ondojn, tre facilajn ventojn,
Eĉ tian marveturon ke vi trafos
Ŝiparon vian kvankam malproksiman—
(Al Arielo) Vi, Arielo, tion tuj elfaros,
Birdeto kara, tiam, liberiĝu!
Adiaŭ, Ariel’!—(Al Alonzo kaj aliaj) Kun mi nun venu!
(Ĉiuj foriras).
 Epilogo
parolata de Prospero
Nun magio plu ne estas:
Sola mi malforta restas.
Dum tri horoj, estas vere
Ke vi agis ne severe
Kun mi, duko de Milano
Kiun timis Kalibano.
Kiam ĉiujn mi pardonis,
Al mi vi aprobon donis:
Spite je la uzurpulo
Me ne restos en l’ insulo.
Neapolon tuj nin sendu;
Ne prokrastu, ne atendu.
Kun remmanoj de aplaŭdo,
Ankaŭ kun voĉventa laŭdo,
Brave helpu nin elfari
Nian celon sen erari.
Se petanta mi eĉ pekos,
Mi pardonon en vi vekos.
Preĝu por ni, ho popolo!
Ke ĉi tie eĉ ne colo
De malamo sin vidigu,
Nin, gefratoj, liberigu.

1623-1903
Nubkronaj Turoj
Sesparta Kanto de R.J. Stevens
El “La Ventego”
Adagio ne troa.
Nub-kronaj turoj, kaj luksaj pa-lacoj solen-aj sankte-joj Eĉ la
granda terglobo kaj ĝi-a tuten-havo
kaj luksaj pa-lac-oj solen-aj sanktejoj Eĉ la granda ter-globo kaj
ĝi-a tuten-havo
Nub-kronaj turoj, kaj luksaj pa-lac-oj solen-aj sanktejoj Eĉ la
granda terglobo kaj ĝi-a tuten-havo

mala-peros, si-mile al lud-sceno ne substanca, Ne lasos ili

strekon, ian strekon lasos ne!
mala-peros, si-mile al lud-sceno ne substanca, ian strekon lasos
ne!
mala-peros, si-mile al lud-sceno ne substanca, ian strekon lasos
ne!