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Different Histories,
Shared Futures
Dialogues on
Australia-China
Edited by
Mobo Gao · Justin O’Connor · Baohui Xie ·
Jack Butcher
Different Histories, Shared Futures
“A timely, wide ranging and well informed contribution to the currently vexed
and turbulent relationship between Australia and China. This collection presents
the balanced but forcefully argued views of some of the best qualified scholars
on this issue at a moment when such a book is crucial. An essential primer.”
—Kerry Brown, Professor, King’s College
“If you just want fast food off the China threat production assembly line,
this is not the book for you. What this book delivers is that extremely rare
commodity: a patient, dispassionate, cool-headed analysis drawing on insights
from the authors’ life-long, dedicated research on China. If you want to see
Australia-China relations improve, and if Australia’s public debate is to have
any hope of going beyond media headlines and think-tank reports, this book is
essential reading.”
—Wanning Sun, Professor, University of Technology Sydney
“As the world seems to be spiralling toward a new Cold War with China, this
edited volume offers a useful corrective to what has been, at times, a hysterical
over-reaction to the growth of Chinese global power. Featuring a number of
Australia’s leading China specialists discussing the two country’s relations, this
volume could not be more timely or more necessary.”
—Michael Dutton, Professor, University of London
Different Histories,
Shared Futures
Dialogues on Australia-China
Editors
Mobo Gao Justin O’Connor
Department of Asian Studies Creative Industries
University of Adelaide University of South Australia
Adelaide, SA, Australia Magill, SA, Australia
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
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189721, Singapore
Acknowledgements
v
Contents
vii
viii CONTENTS
Index 287
Notes on Contributors
ix
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Different Histories
This book is the direct outcome of an online conference held jointly
by the University of Adelaide and the University of South Australia in
Kingdom (UK) and now the United States (US). On the other hand,
China has had territorial disputes with most of its neighbours. Although
settling land disputes with 13 of its 14 neighbours, except for India,
China still has maritime disputes with several countries. Furthermore, the
Taiwan issue, in particular, unsettles China.
Traditionally, China was not a nation-state in the sense that originated
in the West. The China that was between and around the Yellow River
and Yangtze River basins has been fluid in size, bigger or smaller both
in population and land, depending on outcomes of brutal and constant
tribal warfare, with different ethnic groups intermingling while fighting
against each other. While the Confucian-influenced Chinese were later
called the Han Chinese (because of the name of the Han Dynasty), Han
was never meant to be ethnic or national. The two biggest empires in
Chinese history were the so-called Yuan Dynasty and Qing Dynasty, the
former established by the Mongolians from the north and the latter by
the Manchus from the northeast, who invaded and conquered China
proper. Whether those two empires can be categorised as Chinese dynas-
ties might be debatable, but the fact that they became Chinese, even
though the Mongolians were not as thoroughly as the Manchus, is less
under dispute. When the Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1911, the Republic of
China, established in 1912, inherited its territories. And when the Kuom-
intang (KMT), headed by Chiang Kai-shek, took the Republic of China
government to Taiwan after his defeat at the hands of the communists
led by Mao Zedong, the CCP established the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) and took over the Republic of China’s territories, without much
of an internationally recognised and legalised demarcation of its borders.
After years of give-and-take negotiations, the PRC has settled its disputes
with most of its land-based neighbours and has accepted a territorial size
smaller than what the Republic of China in Taiwan would entertain.
Nevertheless, China does not feel secure. Memories of colonial occu-
pation by Western powers and Japanese invasions and occupations linger
vividly, particularly images of war-time atrocities, such as the Nanking
Massacre and the Japanese 731 Unit Chemical warfare experiment.
Furthermore, looking at the map to locate how many US military bases
surround China in its periphery, it is not hard to imagine that a Chinese
leader would always have sleepless nights. It may surprise many Australians
that the Chinese, like them, do not feel secure. China’s fear is even worse
because China does not have anyone to fall back on for protection.
4 M. GAO ET AL.
It is not just the fear of war and violence but there is also the fear
of hunger and starvation. Although China has improved greatly in terms
of feeding its people, the food/land and water resources versus people
ratio is still precarious, even after such brutal and inhumane population
control imposed by the Chinese on themselves for a couple of decades.
The two most recent famines occurred in 1942 under the Republic of
China regime during the Japanese occupation and 1958 upon the after-
math of the Great Leap Forward. On the other hand, though much of
the land in Australia is barren desert, there is enough arable land to feed
not only a smaller population in Australia but with surplus to export, to
China for instance.
So far, we have only presented an outline of some of the differences
and one commonality between China and Australia. There are more,
of course, stereotypical differences, perhaps as a result of their different
histories. Australians are laid back and fun-loving, keen and good at
sports, who would like to indulge in the myths of larrikinism and mate-
ship, while the Chinese are much more reserved and serious in worldly
pursuit, perhaps precisely because of the scarcity of it. Let us repeat the
scenario of all the Australians multiplied by two or three living on the
small island of Tasmania: it would be hard to imagine then that if you
took your children to a park, there would be a swing available for them
to jump on. It would also be hard to imagine there would be ovals here
and there with large expanses of green grass for sports.
Australians love animals and probably have more pet animals per capita
than anywhere else in the world. Some would like to proudly claim that
it is because we Australians are humane and civilised towards animals,
unlike the cruel Chinese. But imagine how difficult it would be even to
walk your dog if you had to live in a flat on the fiftieth floor among what
seems like a forest of high-rise apartment blocks.
Common Interests
Despite all the differences, Australians and Chinese have been living
together quite nicely since 1972 and until recently, let’s say before the
US elected Donald Trump as its president in 2016. In fact, the very
differences between the two countries meant that one could complement
the other. For example, China could supply Australia with manufactured
goods at throwaway prices while Australia could supply China with its
excellent agricultural goods such as fruit, wheat, barley, beef, wine and,
1 DIFFERENT PASTS: THE PANDA AND THE KANGAROO 5
The three most prominent programmes or policies that are more or less
definitely pushed by Xi Jinping are the stronger and more thorough anti-
corruption campaign within the CCP and the Chinese government, the
Made in China initiative to upgrade China’s value chain of production and
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, if one examines carefully,
none of them were really Xi Jinping’s original ideas. Anti-corruption was a
consistent issue within the CCP for years on end. The difference, if there
is any, is that Xi has had the guts to tackle corrupted officials at the very
top partly because of his princeling credentials.
Upgrading the value chain of production is almost as natural as
day turning into night. With the increased development of technology,
coupled with heightened demand for higher salaries against the back-
ground of decreased labour supply, industries of lower technological value
in China have started to move to countries that have been lately catching
up, just like those industries that moved from Hong Kong, Taiwan and
the West to China during the 1980s and 1990s. China has moved towards
a direction of development with or without Xi Jinping, just as Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan have.
The BRI looks like a signature programme by Xi Jinping to project
China’s power and influence. But, again, this may not be what it appears.
The geographical differences and developmental gaps between the south-
east coasts and inland provinces have always been an issue for modern
Chinese governments, not just since the PRC was established in 1949.
For the description of this regional disparity, there is a standard refer-
ence of the first-tier cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and provinces of Jiangsu
and Zhejiang, Fujian, second-tier cities like Xi’an, Taiyuan, Zhengzhou,
Nanchang or Chengdu and provinces like Anhui and Jiangxi and Sichuan
and third tier provinces further to the west, and northwest of China.
During the era of Mao, when China felt threatened by the US/Taiwan
from the south and the former USSR from the north, Mao designed a
strategy called the “Third Front”, in which a massive amount of invest-
ment and human resources were mobilised to set up industries in the
second and third tier areas to avoid military attacks.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, regional gaps were even
more keenly felt. As a result of this perception and necessity, there
emerged a programme of developing the “west” before Xi came to power.
For the Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao, there was already a focus on
Tibet and Xinjiang. China could not leave the “west” underdeveloped
for geopolitical reasons. Moreover, Chinese policymakers felt increasingly
8 M. GAO ET AL.
cited argument is that it is not the Chinese people we are up against but
the Chinese government that is ruled by a communist party.
What is referred to as Chinese in what is called China consists of 20% of
humanity. The Chinese might argue that they have the right to develop,
including cutting-edge technology and the right to have a higher standard
of living. The Chinese might also argue that based on their own experi-
ence, the development of infrastructure through the BRI would lead to
economic growth that is good for everyone, even though the BRI is not
without China’s self-interest in supplying manufactured commodities and
demanding raw materials. At least China provides a suitable alternative
for the formerly colonised countries. Surely, if Fox News, the BBC, the
VOA, the Murdoch press, Reuters and all the dominating Western media
could spread the soft power of the West, China can also do some of its
own, the Chinese would think.
Yes, but no. To start with the media, Western media cannot get into
China because it blocks them. There is no freedom of speech in China.
There is no level field for competition with China regarding tech devel-
opment because the Chinese state directs its big companies. There is
no transparency in how Chinese enterprises operate, and they are not
rule-based commercial operations. The US could vote Trump out by an
election, and so did Australians with Scott Morrison, but you could not
do that in China. What is worst of all, China practices forced labour and
even “genocide” against the Uighurs in Xinjiang. So the story goes.
It was hoped, as often touted, that with the opening up of China to
Western values and ways of life, which are universally accepted as the best
in any possible world, China would change. But China has not. Worse
still, Xi came along who completely ruined any hope for change in China
because Xi is less hesitant, more assertive, more articulate and more in
control. To the outrage of those who wished for China to change, Xi
even abolished limitations on presidential terms, meaning that Xi wants
to rule for life.