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Becky Vartabedian
MULTIPLICITY
AND
ONTOLOGY
IN
DELEUZE
AND
BADIOU
Multiplicity and Ontology in Deleuze and Badiou
Becky Vartabedian
Multiplicity and
Ontology in Deleuze
and Badiou
Becky Vartabedian
Regis University
Denver, CO, USA
vii
viii Acknowledgements
I benefit from regular care and feeding from the Case, Ketelsen,
Vartabedian, and González families. Thanks to Chipper and Meggy,
Patric, Kerry, Eric, Avery, Maya, and Simone; Betty and Mike, Matt,
Jen, Emmett, and Maeve; and Gina, Oscar, and Pilar. I regularly care for
and feed the greatest of canine companions, Lilly and Luke Vartabedian,
whose requests for pets or a run outside are always well-timed. I miss
my grandparents, Dariel and Nancy Case and Ed and Sue Simokat, terri-
bly, and remain deeply grateful for the intellectual and interpersonal gifts
they gave so freely.
It is a photograph of Andrew Vartabedian’s that appears on this
book’s cover, and I’m delighted that this occasions some of our work to
be presented together. He is the original reader of Deleuze and Guattari
in our house, having introduced me to the notion of a rhizome on an
evening walk many years ago. Andrew’s curiosity propels our partnership
in unexpected directions, and the intensity of his friendship is a unique
pleasure. It is the greatest honor of my life to share it with him. Thank
you, my dear; you’re the best.
Contents
xi
xii Contents
5 Re-engagements 137
Subtractive Analysis: n − 1 and a ‘General Subtraction’
in Badiou 139
Special and General: Ontology, Subtraction 140
Limitations and Liabilities in Badiou’s Meta-ontological
Subtraction 147
Summary 155
Contents xiii
Index 185
Abbreviations
xv
xvi Abbreviations
xvii
CHAPTER 1
Orientations
The initiating provocation for this text is found in a different conversation,
begun by the father–son team of Ricardo L. and David Nirenberg. Their
2011 article, “Badiou’s Number: A Critique of Mathematics as Ontology,”
objects to the so-called “radical thesis” Badiou proposes in Being
and Event, which appears in shorthand as “mathematics = ontology”
(BE xiii). The Nirenbergs challenge the contention that mathemati-
cal ontology, in general, and especially that proposed by Badiou, pro-
duces the sorts of things it claims to; for example, they insist that
Badiou’s particular—and by their lights, peculiar—use of set theory is
selective in its deployment and its consequences. The Nirenbergs claim
that set theory cannot be used to justify the philosophical or political
1 INTRODUCTION: LOWER LAYERS 3
conjectures Badiou draws in Being and Event, and further that the iden-
tity of ontology and mathematics Badiou proposes precludes the possibility
for “pathic” elements, namely human thought, to emerge from the mathe-
matical system (Nirenberg and Nirenberg 2011, 606–612). This approach,
they insist, “will entail such a drastic loss of life and experience that the
result can never amount to an ontology in any humanly meaningful sense”
(Nirenberg and Nirenberg 2011, 586). The Nirenbergs operate according
to the view that ontology is an inquiry into being and questions related to
existence as these pertain to humans; they laud the resources of phenome-
nology, for example, insofar as this method derives conclusions of what it is
“to be” from lived experience. By emptying ontology of these resources—
a traditionally human center and the lived experience that accrues to it—
the Nirenbergs see Badiou’s use of set theory to be so reckless as to endan-
ger an entire tradition of thought.
The Nirenbergs’ claims occasion replies from A.J. Bartlett, Justin
Clemens, and Badiou himself. In a subsequent volume of Critical
Inquiry, the discussion unfolds with accusations that one camp has fun-
damentally misunderstood the other. Bartlett and Clemens insist that the
Nirenbergs have not read Badiou’s oeuvre carefully; the Nirenbergs fail
to understand that ontology as mathematics, for Badiou, really functions
as a “figure of philosophical fiction” (Bartlett and Clemens 2012, 368).
Badiou, explaining that Bartlett and Clemens respond to the Nirenbergs
with “polite irony,” calls the criticism raised by the Nirenbergs “stupid”
(2012, 363–364). While significant points both in defense and critique
of Badiou’s program are raised in these pages, the interlocutors seem
largely to talk past one another; the insights are, unfortunately, lost in
the polemical nature of the interchange.
As I was reading this exchange, however, I felt like the conversation
was missing something crucial, both as an opportunity for inquiry and a
chance for defense. A closer look at the “radical thesis” Badiou proposes
in Being and Event situates “mathematics is ontology” as the consequent
of a preliminary claim: “Insofar as being, qua being, is nothing other
than pure multiplicity, it is legitimate to say that ontology, the science
of being qua being, is nothing other than mathematics itself ” (BE xiii).
Badiou spends the first five meditations of Being and Event arguing for
the antecedent claim that being qua being is multiplicity. This claim is
not mentioned in the Nirenberg–Bartlett–Clemens–Badiou contretemps;
it is neither a matter of common sense nor established fact, and it led me
4 B. Vartabedian
to ask a further question following this debate: What does Badiou mean
when he claims being qua being is pure multiplicity?
Badiou’s Multiplicities
Badiou’s claim that being is pure multiplicity situates his project in the
debate persisting since Parmenides as to whether being is One or many.
Badiou’s opening salvo in Meditation One of Being and Event is to show
this debate as having stagnated:
For if being is one, then one must posit that what is not one, the multiple,
is not. But this is unacceptable for thought, because what is presented is
multiple and one cannot see how there could be an access to being out-
side all presentation … On the other hand, if presentation is, then the
multiple necessarily is. It follows that being is no longer reciprocal with
one and thus it is no longer necessary to consider as one what presents
itself, inasmuch as it is. This conclusion is equally unacceptable to thought
because presentation is only this multiple inasmuch as what it presents can
be counted as one; and so on. (BE 23)
I.
La nuova riforma dello assetto politico dello Stato, che, iniziata sotto
Diocleziano, ebbe a consolidarsi definitivamente con Costantino, e la
fondazione di una seconda capitale in Oriente, la quale veniva ad
accrescere il lustro e le esigenze di quest’altra vasta porzione
dell’impero, sono le due grandi determinanti di quel meraviglioso
progresso delle sorti dell’istruzione pubblica, di cui il primo
imperatore cristiano si rese benemerito nella storia della civiltà.
Queste due condizioni bastarono perchè quest’uomo, che consacrò
la nuova fede con la più solenne delle approvazioni, dovesse poi, in
tutta la sua vita, in tutta la pratica di ogni giorno, negarne il principio
fondamentale: il regno degli uomini non essere di questo mondo, e il
regno di questo mondo volesse adorno di tutte le grazie più
squisitamente pagane.
Già avvertimmo che la nuova e macchinosa burocrazia, le cui sorti
andavano strettamente connesse alle recenti riforme politiche,
richiedeva, in modo indispensabile, un più diretto e palese intervento
dello Stato nelle cose dell’istruzione pubblica. Il governo ormai, per
funzionare, aveva bisogno di uomini, che sapessero, e potessero,
starne a capo [522]; meglio ancora, aveva bisogno di produrli. La
responsabilità di questa produzione come del funzionamento dello
Stato, era passata, da un’anonima classe sociale, nella persona
stessa del dirigente supremo. Onde tutta quella serie di
insegnamenti, che, fin allora, parevano risolversi soltanto nell’utile di
privati, e di cui solo i più chiaroveggenti scorgevano l’intimo rapporto
con la vita pubblica e sociale, diventavano ora insegnamenti
professionali di prima necessità. E fra essi il posto di onore doveva
toccare all’insegnamento indispensabile per dei buoni
amministratori: la giurisprudenza. Tutto ciò — ripetiamo — maturava
da tempo, senza aver potuto determinare una crisi risolutiva di
effetti; ma ecco, avvenire con Costantino, la fondazione della nuova
città, che doveva essere anche la città capitale. Tutto quanto in
Roma, od altrove, l’opera dei secoli aveva lentamente formato,
dovea quivi essere creazione immediata del governo centrale. Onde,
come tutto il resto, bisognava — e bisognò — suscitare nella nuova
metropoli, sin dai più elementari, tutti gli organi della pubblica
istruzione; il che bastava a far sì che questa creazione ex novo non
fosse ritardata dalla tradizione, ma si adattasse immediatamente ai
sopravvenuti bisogni, alle sopravvenute influenze dell’ambiente
sociale.
Ma il fatto stesso della nuova città, che si fondava, si popolava e si
abbelliva, richiese tutta un’altra serie di cure per altri ordini di
insegnamenti, esclusivamente professionali, a cui, fino a quel giorno,
quasi nessun imperatore aveva pensato. Bisognò all’uopo evocare
tutte le energie delle industrie del tempo; e questo, Costantino, nei
limiti delle sue forze, e a seconda delle circostanze, non esitò a
tentare gloriosamente.
I nuovi rivolgimenti dovevano provocare altri effetti sull’equilibrio
della cultura nell’impero romano. Ed essi furono gli stessi, che,
nell’ordine politico, avrebbe arrecato la fondazione di Costantinopoli
e la residenza, che ivi, stabilmente, fisseranno, gl’imperatori. Il
mondo civile avrà ora due soli, uno, pallido, del tramonto, l’altro,
luminoso e fulgido, dell’oriente; ed esso si volgerà con preferenza a
quest’ultimo. In Costantinopoli, e non più in Roma, preferiranno d’ora
innanzi accorrere i più illustri dottori del tempo; in Costantinopoli,
dove essi, sotto gli occhi imperiali, potranno più facilmente sperare
onori e ricompense. Ma il danno, che per ciò stesso ne consegue
all’antica metropoli, torna eziandio a vantaggio di altre città di
provincia. L’incantesimo del suo monopolio intellettuale è rotto, e la
nuova capitale irradia della sua luce anche altri centri di cultura. Gli
studii, fino ad ora ristretti e raccolti in una sola città, si spargono
intorno. I dotti non disdegnano rimanere nella breve patria
provinciale; onde, insieme con la decadenza di una città, si assiste
allo spettacolo di altri fari luminosi, che le si accendono intorno — da
presso e da lungi — effetti imprevisti di cause inconsapevoli e di atti
compiuti con intendimenti diversi.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.