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Leibniz on the Problem of Evil
Leibniz on the Problem
of Evil
Paul Rateau
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Acknowledgments vii
List of Abbreviations ix
Introduction 1
1. The Existence of Evil 1
2. Evil Considered in Relation to Justice 5
3. A Vocation: To Defend God’s Justice 10
1. Difficulties Concerning the Justification of God in the Years
Prior to 1673 18
1.1. Early Reading and the Relation of Justice to Power 18
1.2. A Just God, Who Is Nevertheless The Author of Sin? 32
2. The Confession of a Philosopher: Divine Justice and the Necessity
of Sin 54
2.1. God as Ground, but Not Author of Evil 54
2.2. Permission of Evil and the Distinction of Two Kinds of
Necessity: A Limited Rehabilitation 66
3. Theoretical Changes After the Confession of a Philosopher: Toward
a New Conception of God, the Possible, and Divine Concurrence
with Evil 88
3.1. A Revised Theology and Metaphysics 89
3.2. The Origin of Evil and God’s Physical Concurrence 108
3.3. God’s Moral Concurrence with Evil and the Relation of
Part to Whole 119
4. The Genesis of Theodicy: Its Scientific and Apologetic Aims 142
4.1. From the Project of “Theodicies” to the Composition of the Essays
of Theodicy: Systematic Necessity and Occasional Cause 143
4.2. Theodicy as Defense: Ignorance of Detail, Presumptions,
and Probabilities 160
5. The Best of All Possible Worlds and Divine Permission of Evil 183
5.1. The Thesis of the Best of All Possible Worlds 184
(v)
( vi ) Contents
Bibliography 351
Index 359
AC K N O W L E D GM E N T S
I would like to express my deep gratitude to Todd Ryan for his very careful
translation, helpful advice, and comments. This work would not have been
possible without his continuing commitment and friendly support.
I would also like to thank Mark Kulstad who first had the idea for this
project and Samuel Newlands who warmly welcomed and supported it.
Finally, I am grateful to the John Templeton Foundation who generously
granted their financial support.
( vii )
A B B R EV I AT ION S
( ix )
(x) List of Abbreviations
Bayle
Descartes
Hobbes
Luther
Let it be said from the outset: for Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716),
evil is not an enigma or an “unparalleled challenge” threatening to put an
end to philosophy and rational theology. Far from posing an unsolvable
theoretical problem,1 evil does not defy rational investigation. Nor does
this examination lead to the denial of the reality of evil in the world—al-
though Leibniz refuses to exaggerate its extent, with the result that he has
sometimes appeared to commentators as lacking a “dramatic sense of sin”2
and as shrugging off the “tragedy of human existence.”3 On the contrary,
for Leibniz, the fact of evil is undeniable:
[O]ne cannot deny that there is in the world physical evil (that is, suffering) and
moral evil (that is, crime) and even that physical evil is not always distributed
here on earth according to the proportion of moral evil, as it seems that justice
demands.4
Evil is not a mere appearance that results from our partial under-
standing of things and vanishes altogether when we regard the universe
from the correct point of view. Although, metaphysically speaking, evil is
merely a privation, it is not a pure nothing, but that which limits perfection
and being and so resists and impedes the good. The forms that evil takes
(flaws, disorders, natural calamities, monsters, errors, ignorance, sin, vice
and pain) are as varied as the good it limits, even if it is reduced at Theodicy
§21 to three fundamental kinds (metaphysical, physical, and moral evil).
(1)
(2) Leibniz on the Problem of Evil
Leibniz neither questions nor seeks to minimize either the effects them-
selves or their pervasiveness— indeed, prosperity— in the world. In
thinking about evil, Leibniz does not ignore experience, even if he refutes
objections against providence based solely on its evidence.
Leibniz is not unaware of the evils and misfortunes of his time. On the
contrary, his philosophical investigation is undertaken from a practical
perspective. As Donald Rutherford has convincingly argued,5 Leibniz’s
Theodicy and metaphysics are indissolubly linked to moral concerns and
are wholly oriented toward the improvement of the human condition
through the exercise of reason. However, his goal is not exclusively moral
in the strict sense of the term, for it is also, more broadly, political and re-
ligious. In keeping with his well-known motto, Theoria cum praxi (“Theory
with Practice”), Leibniz’s philosophical reflection on evil is accompanied by
a constant and relentless struggle against the concrete forms in which evil
appears in the world. The various undertakings and projects he pursued
during the course of his life—however various and disparate they may
appear—were all born of a desire to work for the perfection and happi-
ness of human beings, including at the material level, by relieving their
misery. These efforts included attempts at reunification of the churches
(both among the Protestant churches and with Rome); scientific projects
(an encyclopedia of human knowledge, plans for the foundation of
academies and learned societies); mathematical and technical inventions;
support for the arts and literature; research relating to demographics and
the economy (especially the idea of founding insurance funds and creating
public storehouses permanently stocked with primary goods); proposals
to reform the law and contemporary judicial procedures; and political and
diplomatic missions. All of these projects and undertakings illustrate his
firm conviction that intellectual activity ought not to be separated from ac-
tion and “engagement” in the world in the service of neighbor and society.
The just man must consider everything he does and everything for which
he labors from the perspective of the “general good” and the glory of God.
Leibniz well understood the contemporary situation in Germany, which
had been exhausted by the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). He describes
the suffering of this war, which saw German princes tear each other apart,
and whose effects continued to be felt long after the signing of the Treaty
of Westphalia.6 In various pamphlets and manifestos, Leibniz took excep-
tion to the expansionist politics of France and denounced the disastrous
consequences of the wars instigated by Louis XIV.7 In a letter to Marshal
Villars (May 1704), Leibniz expresses outrage at the terrible repression
of the Protestants of Cevennes carried out by Villars under orders from
Louis XIV and accuses Villars of becoming “the infamous minister of his
Introduction (3)
[the king’s] fury and the cruel executioner of his innocent compatriots.”8
When reading these pages in which Leibniz vigorously denounces the
injustices committed by France in Europe, and the inhumanity, cruelty,
and barbarism of Marshal Villars, one can almost wonder whether this is
the same man who defends the existence of the best of all possible worlds!
André Robinet has rightly wondered, “What is the meaning of the Theodicy,
if Leibniz was so familiar with the existence of real and concrete evil?”9
Is there a gap between Leibniz the metaphysician and Leibniz the pam-
phleteer and politician? The thesis of the best of all possible worlds does
not imply the perfection of every one of its parts. In no way is this thesis
the result of blindness, ignorance, or indifference to worldly affairs. It
does not amount to a legitimization of the present state of things on the
grounds that they cannot fail to be good, since they belong to the best of all
possible worlds. Nor should it lead to resignation or inaction. On the con-
trary, the task of the just man is to work tirelessly for the good, despite all
obstacles and setbacks, and to make the future better to the utmost of his
ability by altering those things that need reform.
Thus, Leibniz is perfectly aware of the weight of evil in the world and
of its consequences at every level: moral, religious (confessional divisions,
intolerance), social, economic (poverty, famine), and political (war and
its attendant evils). For Leibniz, the sole source of evil is man. For this
reason, “it is only the will that men lack to deliver themselves from an in-
finity of evils.”10 Indeed, the will of some few would often suffice to bring
relief to entire nations. Man is “one of the most powerful creatures and
one of the most capable of causing evil.” The faculty of reason with which
he is endowed makes him capable of causing much evil, for which reason
“one single Caligula, one Nero, has caused more evil than an earthquake.
An evil man takes pleasure in causing suffering and destruction, for which
there are only too many opportunities.”11 Here, forty-five years prior to the
Lisbon earthquake (1755), is Leibniz’s response to those who would accuse
God of all the disorders of the world: no natural evil can compare to what
human beings do and are capable of doing to one another.
Must we then conclude that Leibniz held a rather dim view of human
beings and that behind his metaphysical “optimism” lies a certain anthro-
pological “pessimism”? Certain texts can give this impression.12 However,
Leibniz generally avoids excessively dramatizing evil and exaggerating
human misery in the manner of Augustine, Luther, or Pascal. For Leibniz,
even if human beings cannot be saved without Christ, it does not follow
that pagan virtue is a false virtue and that of necessity all of their actions
are sinful.13 Leibniz has little regard for those authors who take pleasure
in portraying humans as wicked and contemptible, hypocritical and
(4) Leibniz on the Problem of Evil
this [moral] evil is not even so great in men as it is declared to be. It is only
people of a malicious disposition or those who have become somewhat misan-
thropic through misfortunes, like Lucian’s Timon, who find wickedness eve-
rywhere, and who poison the best actions by the interpretations they give to
them.16
It is only want of attention that diminishes our good, and this attention must be
given to us through some admixture of evils. If we were usually sick and seldom
in good health, we should be wonderfully sensible of that great good and we
should be less sensible of our evils. But is it not better, notwithstanding, that
health should be usual and sickness the exception?19
Thus, our sense that evils are greater and more numerous than goods does
not prove that they really are so. On the contrary, it shows that they are
not, since we notice only what is rare and pay no attention to the ordinary
and habitual: “evil arouses our attention rather than good: but this same
reason proves that evil is more rare.”20
Paradoxically, the tendency to exaggerate evil can be found among
theologians as well as skeptics and atheists—although for exactly opposite
reasons. Evil serves as an argument for apologists as well as critics. In the
case of the former, the omnipresence of evil in the world shows the need
Introduction (5)
for a redeemer, the Christ. In the case of the latter, it calls into question
either the existence of God or his unity and consequently his power (ac-
cording to the Manichean hypothesis popularized by Pierre Bayle) or his
justice. Leibniz seems to adopt a more measured approach. He does not
dismiss the experience of evil; however, he treats it with caution in light of
our natural tendency to exaggerate it. For Leibniz, evil cannot serve as the
basis for a serious objection to the existence of God or to monotheism. On
the other hand, it unquestionably poses a problem with regard to justice,
which is an attribute traditionally ascribed to God. It is for this reason that
a doctrine of God’s justice, that is, a théo-dicée in the literal sense of the
term, is necessary.21 It is within the framework of this doctrine that the
theoretical difficulties raised by the existence of evil can be resolved.
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