Housing wealth, fertility intentions and

fertility Kadir Atalay

Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/housing-wealth-fertility-intentions-and-fertility-kadir-at
alay/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Fertility, Pregnancy, and Wellness Diana Vaamonde

https://ebookmass.com/product/fertility-pregnancy-and-wellness-
diana-vaamonde/

Mycorrhizal Mediation of Soil. Fertility, Structure,

and Carbon Storage 1st Edition Edition Nancy Collins
Johnson

https://ebookmass.com/product/mycorrhizal-mediation-of-soil-
fertility-structure-and-carbon-storage-1st-edition-edition-nancy-
collins-johnson/

The Time-Travelling Economist : Why Education,

Electricity and Fertility Are Key to Escaping Poverty
Charlie Robertson

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-time-travelling-economist-why-
education-electricity-and-fertility-are-key-to-escaping-poverty-
charlie-robertson/

GIS and Housing: Principles and Practices 1st Edition

Laxmi Ramasubramanian

https://ebookmass.com/product/gis-and-housing-principles-and-
practices-1st-edition-laxmi-ramasubramanian/
Twisted Intentions Series: Books 1-4 Savannah Rylan

https://ebookmass.com/product/twisted-intentions-series-
books-1-4-savannah-rylan/

Urban Private Housing in Nigeria: Understanding

Residential Quality and Housing Preference Dynamics in
Metropolitan Lagos 1st Edition Ibrahim Rotimi Aliu

https://ebookmass.com/product/urban-private-housing-in-nigeria-
understanding-residential-quality-and-housing-preference-
dynamics-in-metropolitan-lagos-1st-edition-ibrahim-rotimi-aliu/

Wicked Intentions (The Bobrov Bratva Book 1) Shandi

Boyes

https://ebookmass.com/product/wicked-intentions-the-bobrov-
bratva-book-1-shandi-boyes/

Multifamily Housing Development Handbook (Development

Handbook series)

https://ebookmass.com/product/multifamily-housing-development-
handbook-development-handbook-series/

Common Wealth Dividends : History and Theory 1st

Edition Brent Ranalli

https://ebookmass.com/product/common-wealth-dividends-history-
and-theory-1st-edition-brent-ranalli/
 Journal of Housing Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Housing Economics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jhec

Housing wealth, fertility intentions and fertility

Kadir Atalay a, *, Ang Li b, Stephen Whelan a
a
School of Economics, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
b
NHMRC Centre of Research Excellence in Healthy Housing, Centre for Health Policy, Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, The University of Melbourne,
Melbourne, Australia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

JEL code: There is increasing evidence that housing and housing markets impact a variety of behaviors and outcomes.
J130 Using a rich panel of Australian microlevel data, we estimated the effect of housing price changes on both
D120 fertility intentions and fertility outcomes. The analysis indicates that the likelihood of having a child among
Keywords: homeowners is positively related to an increase in housing wealth. The positive housing wealth effect has the
Fertility outcomes greatest impact on the fertility and fertility intentions of Australian homeowners who are young and mortgage
Fertility intentions
holders. In comparison, there is evidence that increases in housing prices decrease the fertility intentions of
House prices
Housing wealth
private renters with children.

1. Introduction
The large and sustained increase in housing prices and housing
wealth across a range of developed countries has initiated interest in the
behavioural implications of such developments. A series of studies have
examined how such changes have impacted the well-being and behavior
of individuals across several dimensions, including household con­
sumption and divorce.1 Given that housing potentially constitutes a
major cost of raising a child, one aspect of behavior that has received
increasing attention is fertility. The interest in the relationship between
housing prices and fertility is motivated in part by large declines in
fertility experienced across a range of developed countries over the past
three decades. In Australia, for example, the total fertility rate has been
below the replacement rate since the late 1970s, while the real price of
housing has more than tripled during the same period (OECD 2018a,
2018b). In this paper, we investigate this relationship by considering the
impact of housing prices on fertility intentions and outcomes and the
potential heterogeneity in behavior across households.
The analysis in this paper is grounded in the economic approach to
fertility introduced by Becker (1960). In that study, the notion of a
quality-quantity trade-off is developed, and such a framework is useful
for understanding why fertility rates may have declined across
developed countries over the past few decades. If children are normal
goods and the income elasticity of demand for quality exceeds the in­
come elasticity for the number of children, higher income will be asso­
ciated with substitution away from quantity in favor of child quality.
The literature also highlights how the cost of children may impact
fertility choices. These costs include the opportunity cost of children,
which may be affected by economic conditions such as unemployment,
along with the explicit costs of raising children (Becker 1965; Mincer
1963). One component of the cost associated with raising children that
has attracted attention is that of housing (Aksoy 2016; Clark and Ferrer
2016; Dettling and Kearney 2014; Lovenheim and Mumford 2013).
Australian (Henman 2007) and international (Lino 2014) evidence in­
dicates that housing costs represent one of the largest, if not the largest,
components associated with raising children, and this relationship is
considered in this paper.
This paper contributes to the existing international literature that
seeks to identify the nature of the nexus between housing markets and
fertility-related decisions. Existing research has considered evidence
from the United Kingdom (Aksoy 2016), Canada (Clark and Ferrer 2016)
and the United States (Dettling and Kearney 2014; Lovenheim and
Mumford 2013). Using a rich longitudinal dataset from Australia, we
exploit temporal and geographic variation in housing prices to examine

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

* Corresponding author: Kadir Atalay. School of Economics A02, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia.
E-mail address: kadir.atalay@sydney.edu.au (K. Atalay).
1
The outcome variables considered in these studies are diverse and include household consumption and saving (Campbell and Cocco 2007); labor supply (Zhao
and Burge 2017); indebtedness (Hurst and Stafford 2004); educational choices (Lovenheim and Reynolds 2013); health (Fichera and Gathergood 2016; Atalay et al.
2017), demand for long-term care insurance (Davidoff 2010), and divorce (Farnham et al. 2011).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2021.101787
Received 4 March 2019; Received in revised form 21 June 2021; Accepted 21 June 2021
Available online 25 June 2021
1051-1377/Crown Copyright © 2021 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Kadir Atalay, Journal of Housing Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2021.101787
K. Atalay et al.
how fertility decisions are related to changes in housing wealth using a
similar approach to that of Lovenheim and Mumford (2013). This paper
adds to the existing research in several dimensions. Notably, we examine
not only realized fertility but also how fertility intentions respond to
changes in house prices. Understanding fertility intentions is important
for at least two reasons. First, such an analysis has the advantage of
capturing the long-term planning of fertility events (Vidal et al., 2017),
and second, fertility intentions can be less susceptible to external factors
such as miscarriages and unplanned pregnancies (Risse 2010). To our
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effect of housing prices
on fertility intentions. The analysis also provides insight into the
Australian context, where housing costs are likely to be important for
fertility decisions due to their relative salience and the central role of
housing in the tax and transfer system.
The empirical results indicate that an AUD$100,000 increase in
housing wealth among homeowners is associated with an 18 percent
increase in the probability of having a child. In contrast, private renters
with children report lower fertility intentions in response to house price
inflation in the local housing market. Furthermore, there is evidence of
heterogeneity in the housing price effect according to marital status,
parental status, family income, homeownership status, and the nature of
liquidity constraints faced by households.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, a brief review of the theoretical and empirical literature that
examines the relationship between housing markets and fertility de­
cisions is presented. A discussion of the Australian institutional envi­
ronment is presented to provide some context to the analysis. The data
used in the analysis are described in section three, followed by the
empirical specifications in section four. Section five contains the esti­
mation results, including the main effects, robustness assessments. A
concluding section summarizes the key findings.
2. Literature review
Assuming that children and housing are both normal goods and are
complementary, the economic model of fertility posits that changes in
housing prices may have both a substitution effect and an income or
wealth effect (Dettling and Kearney 2014). Substitution effects occur
because when housing is complementary to children, an increase in the
price of housing increases the relative cost of children. Income or wealth
effects are more nuanced and depend on household circumstances. For
existing homeowners who intend to remain in situ, higher house prices
that are perceived to be permanent will raise (perceived) lifetime wealth
and, therefore, the demand for children. For households that are credit
constrained and can access equity in owner-occupied housing, increased
housing prices may create an opportunity to change the timing of and/or
lifetime fertility. Dettling and Kearney (2014) characterize this as a
‘home-equity effect’ rather than a wealth or income effect. Conversely,
for households that are currently renting and planning to purchase
owner-occupied housing in the future, higher house prices raise the cost
of children and reduce lifetime wealth. Such households may reduce or
delay fertility, as the higher cost of housing induces a negative substi­
tution and a negative income or wealth effect; specifically, the
complementarity between children and housing implies an unambigu­
ously lower demand for children in response to higher housing prices
among that group of private renters.
A range of empirical studies have examined the housing-fertility
nexus. Early studies centered on the association between family
growth and the demand for housing tenure (including type, size and
location). Many of those studies relied on cross-sectional analysis (Clark
et al., 1984, 1994; Deurloo et al., 1994; Dieleman and Everaers 1994;
Kendig 1984; Mulder and Hooimeijer 1995; Murphy and Sullivan 1985;
Weinberg 1979). One limitation of a cross-sectional approach is the
potential selection effect if families that desire a greater number of
children tend to move to less expensive locales. In this case, empirical
estimates will capture a true price effect and a selection effect leading to
2
Journal of Housing Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
biased estimates.
Several recent empirical studies have employed aggregated, cross-
sectional data on house prices and birth rates to study the relationship
between housing markets and fertility. In general, such studies identify a
positive relationship between housing price changes and fertility among
owners and a negative or insignificant response among nonowners
(Aksoy 2016; Clark and Ferrer 2016; Dettling and Kearney 2014; Laeven
and Popov 2017). The aggregate-level price measures used in such
studies vary, with Dettling and Kearney (2014) using MSA-level price
data for the United States to investigate fertility outcomes over the
period 1990 to 2007. That study identified a decline in birth rates among
non-homeowners and a net increase among homeowners following in­
creases in house prices. Clark and Ferrer (2016) present similar evidence
for Canada using a regional measure of housing prices, while for the
United Kingdom, Aksoy (2016) uses county-level data and identifies a
robust positive impact on fertility for homeowners and a negative
impact for renters.
The approach in this paper is most similar to that used by Lovenheim
and Mumford (2013), who use individual-level panel data on
self-reported house prices and births. In that study, Lovenheim and
Mumford (2013) exploit the geographic variation in the size and timing
of housing price changes in the United States for the period 1985–2007.
The analysis indicates that a US$100,000 increase in housing wealth is
associated with a 17.8 percent higher probability of having a child for
homeowners. The methodology in this paper is similar to that used by
Lovenheim and Mumford (2013), supplemented with the use of fertility
intentions to identify how an exogenous change in house prices impacts
fertility-related choices.
Indeed, a novel aspect of the analysis in this paper is that it considers
the relationship between housing prices and fertility intentions. Infor­
mation on fertility intentions is informative, as it is more likely to reflect
latent demand for fertility compared with realized fertility outcomes
(Dettling and Kearney 2014). A range of studies have highlighted the
predictability and reliability of fertility intention measures for informing
actual fertility outcomes (Ajzen and Klobas 2013; Miller and Pasta 1995;
Morgan and Rackin 2010; Rindfuss et al. 1988; Schoen et al., 1999;
Thompson 1997; Westoff and Ryder 1977).2 Fertility intentions have
also been adopted in studies examining actual and planned residential
mobility (Ermisch and Steele 2016; Vidal et al., 2017). For these reasons,
the analysis of fertility intentions is likely to provide additional insight
into the role of housing markets on fertility outcomes.
2.1. The Australian context
An examination of the Australian evidence regarding the nexus be­
tween housing and fertility is useful for several reasons. Most impor­
tantly, the characteristics of the housing market and household balance
sheets imply that the impact of housing price changes is likely to be
particularly salient among Australian households. Approximately two-
thirds of households reside in owner-occupied housing, and homeown­
ership is a critical feature of retirement planning and maintenance of
living standards during retirement in the Australian context (Andrews
and Caldera Sánchez 2011; Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2016b).
While homeownership rates have historically been relatively high,
they have declined over the past two decades at the same time that
house prices have increased rapidly. Like Canada and New Zealand,
Australia has experienced a rapid increase in house prices in real terms
and relative to incomes over the past two decades. Moreover, Australian
households carry even higher levels of debt than households in similar
2
In Australia, calculations from the HILDA data show that among partnered
women aged 25-44 reporting a likelihood of having children in the future of
above six on a scale of 0-10 in year “t”, 70.8 percent gave birth in the next year,
81.8 percent gave birth in the following two years and 96.0 percent gave birth
in the following five years.
K. Atalay et al.
countries, and much of that debt is in the form of adjustable-rate
mortgages (Badarinza et al., 2016). Australian households show a
higher marginal propensity to consume their illiquid assets than
households in countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom
(Aron et al., 2012). The incidence of housing equity withdrawal
increased from 13 percent in 2001 to 18 percent in 2010 in Australia,
and the majority of these incidents occurred through mortgage equity
withdrawal (Ong et al., 2015). At the same time, renters in large cities in
Australia commit nearly 40 percent of their earnings to rent (SGS Eco­
nomics and Planning 2017). Together, these features of the Australian
context imply that the impact of substantial temporal and spatial vari­
ations in housing prices, with rapid housing price increases in some
periods, is likely to be particularly salient to Australian households.
Since the early 1960s, there has been a decline in total fertility rates
in Australia from over 3.5 to less than 1.8 in 2018, punctuated by a small
increase in the early 2000s. This decline in the total fertility rate below
the replacement rate has been experienced in other developed econo­
mies and is attributed to an array of social and economic developments.
Importantly, it poses significant fiscal challenges for governments as the
population ages. Accordingly, there has been increasing discussion and
action regarding pro-natalist policies, including subsidization and the
availability of childcare, maternity leave, tax concessions for families
with dependent children and direct monetary payments following the
birth of children.3 The increase in fertility among females aged over 30
years during the early 2000s was attributed to such policy measures
along with other developmental factors, such as social expectations
around parenting and greater flexibility in employment arrangements
for parents (Australian Treasury 2015). Along with specific policies such
as the broad-based introduction of paid parental leave, over time, there
has been a gradual expansion of public spending on family benefits,
increasing from less than 1.0 percent of the gross domestic product
(GDP) in 1980 to over 2.0 percent in 2018. To date, however, there is
little or no evidence regarding how the cost of housing affects fertility
decisions.
Our empirical methodology exploits significant and exogenous
variation in housing prices in Australia over the period 2001 to 2017 to
estimate the effect of variations in housing wealth and prices on fertility-
related decisions. Similar to the approach of Lovenheim and Mumford
(2013), our identifying assumption is that the geographic variation in
the scale and timing of housing price movements are conditionally
exogenous to fertility decisions. In the next section, we present evidence
that highlights the significant growth in house prices and the geographic
and temporal variation exhibited over the study period.
3. Data
The data used for the analysis are drawn from the first eighteen
waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia
(HILDA) survey collected between 2001 and 2018.4 The HILDA survey is
a household-based panel survey with a nationally representative sample
of Australian households. Commencing in 2001, the HILDA survey
covers a broad range of socioeconomic domains, focusing particularly
on family and household formation, income and work. Participating
households and individual household members are interviewed at
3
In 2004, the Australian government instituted a universal payment of AUD
$3000 (subsequently increased to AUD$5000), termed the ‘Baby Bonus’, to
parents for the birth of a child. Similarly, from 2007-08 and 2016-17,
Commonwealth government expenditure on childcare increased by over 130
percent in real terms (Baxter et al. 2019).
4
The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey
was initiated and is funded by the Australian Department of Social Services
(DSS), and it is managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and
Social Research (Melbourne Institute). The findings and views based on these
data should not be attributed to either the DSS or the Melbourne Institute.
3
Journal of Housing Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
intervals of approximately one year. The interviews are administered to
all members of the responding households aged 15 years and over,
including the original residents and all new residents who reside with
the original household members.
The sample used in the empirical analysis consists of females aged
between 25 and 45 years during the 2001–2018 period. Existing evi­
dence suggests that fertility rates fall significantly after age 45, and the
sample traverses the prime period of fertility planning and childbearing
(ABS 2016a). The sample includes those who were married or cohab­
itating, defined, respectively, as couples in a registered marriage or
living with someone in a relationship if not married. Restricting the
sample to females who report being partnered when we first observed
them allows the analysis to focus on decision-making related to child­
bearing rather than partnership formation. To capture changes in
housing prices, the sample used in the analysis includes females who
remained in the same residence and remained an owner-occupant or
renter-occupant for at least three consecutive waves of the HILDA sur­
vey. Such an approach allows measures of changes in house prices to be
constructed in a consistent manner. As noted, the analysis used
self-reported housing prices, and we excluded individuals whose
two-year changes in this measure are in the 1st and 99th percentiles. The
final sample used in the analysis consisted of 10,336 and 1589
person-year observations for homeowners and private renters,
respectively.
3.1. Fertility information
HILDA survey respondents are asked a series of detailed questions
about their past and future fertility, including the total number of chil­
dren they ever had and their future fertility intentions. These two
questions are used to establish measures of realized fertility and fertility
intentions.
Fertility outcomes are measured by changes in the total number of
children, which is assigned a value of one if the total number of children
increased relative to the previous wave and zero otherwise. Fertility
intentions are measured using responses to the question ‘(H)ow likely are
you to have a child/more children in the future?’. All respondents aged
between 18 and 55 years of age are asked to respond to this question on a
scale of 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely). The question does not
specify the timing of future children or the parity of children. For the
purpose of the empirical analysis, self-reported intention is treated as a
continuous variable in the main estimation reported below. A similar
approach is adopted by Drago et al. (2009) and Bassford and Fisher
(2016). To assess the robustness of the results, specifications that treat
fertility intentions as a categorical variable and are estimated using an
ordered probit model generate similar results to those reported in sec­
tion five.
3.2. House prices
An important feature of the HILDA dataset for the purpose of the
analysis is that those who reside in an owner-occupied dwelling are
asked in each wave about the value of their place of residence. This
provides a consistent measure of self-assessed property values and ob­
viates the need to rely on the housing prices measured at the regional or
aggregate level as used in previous studies, such as Campbell and Cocco
(2007), Clark (2012), Dettling and Kearney (2014), and Clark and Ferrer
(2019). Nonetheless, there are some important considerations associ­
ated with using self-reported housing prices. First, self-reported home
value changes may reflect home upgrading or renovation and, therefore,
would be endogenous to child-bearing decisions. For example, in­
dividuals who are anticipating having additional children may invest in
home improvements and be more optimistic about the market value of
their home. Furthermore, self-reported house prices may suffer from
measurement error (Agarwal 2007; Benítez et al. 2015. To mitigate
these concerns, we instrument changes in the self-reported housing price
K. Atalay et al. Journal of Housing Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

using changes in the local government area (LGA)-level median housing Table 2.
prices. The LGA is the smallest administrative district and the third tier Summary statistics for homeowners and private renters.
of government in Australia.5 As an individual household should not Homeowner Renter
influence the local housing market, variation in LGA house prices is Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
plausibly exogenous to an individual’s fertility choices. Table 1 presents Probability of a birth 0.088 0.283 0.088 0.284
the first-stage estimates of 2SLS used in the main estimation (see Eq. (1)) Fertility intention 2.298 3.528 3.445 3.95
and indicates a high correlation between changes in the self-reported Home value ($1000) 596.7 306.2 – –
house values from HILDA and LGA-level house prices. LGA level Home Value 511.6 262 554.5 294.9
Family income ($1000) 147.4 86.74 112.7 57.15
A measure of housing prices for renters is generated by averaging the Employment status 0.795 0.404 0.704 0.457
instrumented housing prices of homeowners in the sample in the same Partner’s employment status 0.959 0.199 0.925 0.263
LGA and survey year. Substantial temporal and spatial variations in Number of children 1.889 1.153 1.674 1.35
house prices over the period of analysis are central to the identification Age (years) 37.9 5.1 35.4 5.5
Years of education 13.1 2.2 12.5 2.2
of a causal impact of housing wealth on fertility-related decisions. Over
Outright owner 0.197 0.439 – –
the analysis period, Australian housing markets exhibited two important Owner with mortgage 0.813 0.393 – –
features. First, there was a secular trend of increasing housing prices LGA-level unemployment (%) 5.542 1.93 5.742 2.047
over time. Second, the increase in housing prices was punctuated by Log (LGA-level average income) 10.92 0.165 10.957 0.18
periods when the housing prices increased or decreased rapidly in Notes: All monetary values are adjusted to constant 2015 dollars in the analysis.
particular geographic areas. For example, housing markets such as
Perth, Sydney and Melbourne experienced rapid increases in prices in
general, demographic and socioeconomic characteristics reflect life-
excess of 10 percent per annum in some years. In Perth during the mid-
course events and the typical housing careers of Australian couples.
2000s, the housing price growth exceeded 25 percent per annum,
Homeowners have higher incomes, are older, have more education and
spurred by the natural resource boom (Yates 2011). Given the signifi­
report having given birth to more children than renters.
cant heterogeneity in property price changes across geographic regions
Further descriptive evidence is presented in Appendix Figure 2,
observed in the sample, many owner-occupiers experienced substantial
which presents the correlation between LGA-level two-year instru­
changes in housing wealth. Among homeowners in our sample, the
mented housing price changes and LGA-level fertility outcomes. Plots of
average self-reported value of residential property is approximately
both birth rates and fertility intentions were generated using the HILDA
AUD$600,000, and the two-year home value change has a mean of AUD
survey. The scatter plots indicate a positive relationship between house
$47,000.6 Figure 1 in the Appendix displays the average two-year
prices and fertility-related outcomes. In the next section, we explore
growth rate of house prices in Australia during the 2001–2018 period
these associations separately for homeowners and renters while con­
across LGAs and highlights the significant temporal and spatial varia­
trolling for potentially confounding factors.
tions in the house prices that are present across the sample.
4. Methodology
3.3. Summary statistics
To identify the causal effect of housing wealth on fertility intentions
Summary statistics for the sample of homeowners and renters used in
and outcomes, the empirical analysis relates the likelihood of the birth of
the empirical analysis are presented in Table 2. While females in the a child in the past year (or the intention to have a child/more children in
private rental sector and owner-occupiers have a similar propensity to
the future) to changes in instrumented home prices over the previous
give birth to a child in any given year (0.088), renters report a signifi­ two-year period. The relationships between house price changes and
cantly higher intention to have children than owner-occupiers when
fertility outcomes (or intentions) are estimated separately for home­
measured on a 0–10-point scale (3.445 and 2.298, respectively). In owners and private renters. Following Lovenheim and Mumford (2013),
the relationship between fertility outcomes (1) and fertility intentions
Table 1. (2) are captured as follows:
Instrumenting self-reported house price changes (First Stage of 2SLS).
∑
t
2-year self-reported home value Birthiat = β0 + β1 ΔPiat + βj Xiaj + θa + γ t + uiat (1)
change ($100,000) j=t− 2
2-year change in LGA level median house 0.543
price ($100,000) (0.089)
∑
t

Controls Yes Intentioniat = β0 + β1 ΔPiat + βj Xiat + θa + γt + uiat (2)

LGA and year fixed effects Yes j=t− 2

Observations 10,336
R2 0.306
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 820
Notes: The sample consists of partnered women homeowners aged 25–45 who
remained at the same address in three consecutives waves last three years. Full
results are reported in the Appendix Table A1.
Controls include number of bedrooms, LGA level unemployment and de­
mographic controls. Table 3 contains the full list of control variables. Standard
errors are clustered at the LGA level.
5
Median housing price data are provided by the RP Data historical housing
price dataset. This dataset contains monthly median house and unit sale prices
at the LGA level across Australia since January 2000. These monthly price series
are converted into annual price series and matched to the HILDA survey using
geographic identifiers for the LGA of residence.
6
Observations with extreme house price changes are excluded from the
analysis reported in section 5.
where i indexes the individual, a indexes the LGA, and t indexes the
survey year. The variable Piat represents the instrumented house prices;
Xiαt is a vector of the observable characteristics of females and of LGA-
level macroeconomic conditions; θa is the LGA fixed effect; γt is the
year fixed effects; and uiat are the stochastic errors. As described in
Section 3, the housing wealth change measure ΔPiat is determined as the
difference in instrumented home values. Homeowner equations are
estimated by 2SLS, and standard errors are clustered at the LGA level. In
the first stage, we instrument changes in the self-reported housing price
using changes in the LGA-level median housing prices. For renters, a
measure of changes in house prices is constructed using the average
value of the instrumented house price changes in the LGA in which they
reside for each survey year. Both specifications (1) and (2) are estimated
using ordinary least square.
Specifications (1) and (2) include a range of demographic and so­
cioeconomic characteristics that the literature has identified as being

4
K. Atalay et al.
closely associated with fertility decisions. In particular, the vector Xiaj
includes age, age squared, formal marital status, years of education,
family income, number of resident children and regional macroeco­
nomic conditions measured using local unemployment rates in the LGA.
The covariates entered in (1) include values in the current year, values
lagged by one year, and values lagged by two years. The inclusion of
lagged measures at years t, (t − 1) and (t − 2) accounts for the relevant
and comprehensive information on a household’s economic condition
prior to a birth that is available in HILDA and incorporates information
spanning a sufficient time horizon over which fertility decisions are
formed.
In a manner similar to the approach of Lovenheim and Mumford
(2013), the change in housing wealth ΔPiat is identified by the temporal
and spatial variations in house prices that affect homeowners and
renters differentially across localities and over time. The empirical
model focuses on recent individual-level changes rather than contem­
poraneous price levels. As noted by Lovenheim and Mumford (2013),
individual house price changes are capitalized into housing wealth,
making price changes a more accurate measure of wealth than the home
price level. Identification relies on the substantial temporal and spatial
variations in housing prices being exogenous with respect to fertility
decisions after controlling for a range of time-invariant and time-varying
covariates. It is important to emphasize that the increases in real housing
prices in Australia in the early 2000s in particular were considerably
greater than those experienced previously, and those increases did not
appear to be a function of fundamentals (André, 2010), which suggests
that they were unanticipated. The inclusion of regional economic con­
ditions along with LGA and year fixed effects controls for regional and
time-varying influences on fertility decisions. Those location and year
fixed effects are included to allow for common unobserved factors
within the locality and year that may be associated with fertility de­
cisions, such as the selection of families into school districts or the
introduction of childcare and family support policies.
One concern from an empirical perspective is that households may
select to live in specific areas based on actual or planned fertility, and
this selection may be related to housing price dynamics. To address this
concern, following Lovenheim and Mumford (2013), we required in­
dividuals to have remained in their current residence for three consec­
utive years.
Table 3.
Estimates of the effect of housing prices on fertility outcomes and intentions.
Fertility outcomes Fertility intentions
Owner (1) Renter (2) Owner (3) Renter (4)
2-year home price 0.0165 − 0.0061 0.186 − 0.258
change ($100,000) (0.0075) (0.0198) (0.0912) (0.234)
LGA and year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Observations 10,336 1589 9429 1500
Estimator 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Cragg-Donald Wald F 820 747
statistic
Notes: The sample comprises partnered women aged 25–45 who did not change
their address in the last three years. Fertility outcomes is a binary variable that
takes the value of one if a woman gave birth in the previous year. Fertility in­
tentions is a variable with a value between 0 and 10. All estimates include LGA
and year fixed effects, marital status, number of children, age in quadratic terms,
family income, years of education, LGA-level unemployment rate. The number
of children at year “t” is excluded from the controls in the fertility outcome
regressions. First stage results are presented in the appendix Table 1. Standard
errors are clustered at the LGA level.
5
Journal of Housing Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
5. Results
5.1. Fertility decisions for homeowners and private renters
The results from specifications (1) and (2) are reported in Table 3.
Columns (1) and (2) present the results from the specification that
captures realized fertility (specification (1)), and columns (3) and (4)
report the results from specifications that examine fertility intentions
(specification (2)). The results are presented separately for homeowners
and private renters.7
The result from Eq. (1) (Table 3, column (1)) indicates a positive and
sizeable housing wealth effect on fertility among homeowners. In
particular, a $100,000 increase in two-year home prices is associated
with an approximately 0.017 percentage point increase in the likelihood
of having a child in the past year, which is statistically significant at the
five percent level. Relative to the mean birth rate of 0.09 for female
homeowners aged 25–45 in the sample, this finding suggests that a
$100,000 increase in housing wealth increases the likelihood of giving
birth by approximately 18 percent. Column (3) reports the result of
estimating the responsiveness of fertility intentions among homeowners
(specification (2)). The estimated coefficient of 0.18 (significant at the
five percent level) suggests that fertility intentions among homeowners
are positively related to changes in housing prices.
Among private renters, the estimated effect of housing price changes
on the likelihood of having a child is negative and insignificant (Table 3,
column (2)). Moreover, the result in column (4) indicates that an in­
crease in local property prices leads to a decrease of 0.25 points in the
intention of renters to have children; however, the effect is insignificant.
Among renters, the negative estimate of housing price changes suggests
that women who experience increasing local house prices decrease their
intentions to start a family or increase their family size. This finding is
consistent with the theoretical prediction of the negative effect of
housing prices on fertility among this group. The result also alleviates
concerns regarding the impact of common macroeconomic trends that
can drive up both fertility and housing prices, such as increases in pro­
ductivity over time.
The results in Appendix Table A2 highlight that demographic and
socioeconomic factors are important for fertility decisions. For example,
as expected, fertility decisions are positively correlated with family in­
come among homeowners and negatively correlated with the number of
children for both homeowners and private renters. Women who are
employed exhibit a lower likelihood of childbirth and have lower
fertility intentions.
5.2. Response heterogeneity
5.2.1. Response heterogeneity by parity, marital status and age
In Tables 4-6, we explore the potential heterogeneity in the fertility
responses across a range of demographic and socioeconomic charac­
teristics. In Table 4, we focus on demographic characteristics and
examine responses by marital status, parental status and age. Table 6
outlines the economic characteristics, including family income, home­
ownership status, and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, among homeowners.
Each specification uses the same set of covariates as those reported in
Table 3. Individuals are classified into subgroups based on their char­
acteristics at time (t − 2) to avoid potential endogeneity issues.
As a first step, we consider whether the effects of housing wealth on
fertility decisions differ across married and common-law or de facto
couples (panel A of Table 4). Note that notwithstanding an increased
number of births outside registered marriages in Australia over the past
three decades, the majority of births still occur within formal marriages
(ABS, 2016a). The analysis indicates a positive housing wealth effect on
7
The working paper version of the paper presents results from specifications
that use self-reported and LGA-level prices.
K. Atalay et al. Journal of Housing Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx

Table 4 fertility among married homeowners, with a $100,000 increase in home

Response Heterogeneity: By Martial, Parental Status and Age Groups. prices associated with a 0.0159 percentage point or an approximately 18
Fertility outcomes Fertility intentions percent increase in the probability of having a child. Consistent with the
Owner Renter Owner Renter birth outcome estimates, an increase in housing prices of $100,000 leads
(1) (2) (3) (4) to an increase of 0.18 points in the intention of married couples to have
A – Marital Married 0.0159 − 0.0615 0.1998 − 0.2860 children in the future (significant at the 5 percent level). In comparison,
statust-2 (0.0079) (0.0271) (0.0886) (0.2692) there is no evidence that cohabitating couples respond to changes in
De facto 0.0181 0.0685 0.0925 0.1081 home values.
(0.0237) (0.0339) (0.2750) (0.3771)
B – Parental status No children 0.0373 0.0353 0.7162 − 0.2423
The results in panel B (parental status) highlight the benefit of
t-2 (0.0291) (0.0385) (0.2225) (0.5259) considering the role of house prices on fertility intentions. Among
Have 0.0122 − 0.0318 0.0772 − 0.4313 homeowners with no children, an increase in house prices is associated
children (0.0067) (0.0264) (0.0818) (0.2937) with a large and significant increase in the intention to have a child in
C – Age Groups t-2 25–35 0.0360 0.0187 0.3770 − 0.3792
the future. Such a result is consistent with a large income effect relative
(0.0134) (0.0275) (0.1712) (0.3962)
36–45 0.0028 − 0.0484 0.0023 − 0.0209 to the substitution effect when house prices rise. In comparison, house
(0.0061) (0.0328) (0.0621) (0.3597) price changes negatively affect the fertility intentions of female renters
with children. Recall that among renters who desire to move into owner-
Notes: The sample includes women aged 25–45 who remain at the same address
over three consecutive years of the survey. Fertility outcomes is a binary variable
occupied housing in the future, the income and substitution effects
that takes the value of one if a woman gave birth in the previous year. Fertility associated with an increase in house prices reinforce each other and tend
intentions is a variable with a value between 0 and 10. All regressions include to reduce fertility.
the controls used in Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the LGA level. In panel C, we report estimates of the effect of home price changes on
fertility decisions for two age groups, namely, women aged 25 to 35 and
those aged 36 to 45 years. Among owners, the results indicate a positive
Table 5. response by women in both age groups to an increase in home price
The effect of current and lagged housing price changes on fertility. changes, with the largest percentage change in birth probability occur­
Fertility outcomes of homeowners ring for the younger group. Notably, only young homeowners’ fertility
Having a Total no. of kids Fertility intentions are significantly positively associated with house price
birth (1) born (2) Intentions (3)
changes. Older homeowners are more likely to not have additional
Instrumented House children, and the analysis suggests that the wealth effect associated with
Price Changes an increase in house prices does not result in additional births. For
(Pt − Pt− 2 ) 0.0158 0.0218 0.2404
(0.0077) (0.0182) (0.0843)
renters, house price changes are negatively associated with births
(Pt− 1 − Pt− 3 ) − 0.0005 − 0.0135 − 0.1411 among females aged 36 to 45 years. Together, these results suggest that
(0.0064) (0.0194) (0.0864) the fertility response to changes in house prices is not simply driven by
Notes: Regressions include the controls used in Table 3. Standard errors are
younger females.
clustered at the LGA level. One question that arises is whether changes in house prices affect
overall fertility or simply the timing of fertility. To examine this issue,
we adopt the approach in Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) and
Table 6 re-estimate Eqs. (1) and (2) with both the two-year home price change
Response heterogeneity by financial circumstances. (Pt − Pt− 2 ) and the change in house prices between (t − 1) and (t − 3), i.
Fertility outcome Fertility intentions e., (Pt− 1 − Pt− 3 ). If the increased probability of birth identified previ­
Owner Renter Owner Renter ously simply reflected a shift in timing, we would expect to see a
A – Ownership Status decrease in the probability of birth in the years after the initial response
(Outright owners)t-2 0.0236 – 0.285 – to the change in house prices. Table 5 indicates that this is not the case.
(0.0237) (0.170) The lagged two-year change has no effect on the probability of birth,
(Mortgaged owners)t-2 0.0154 – 0.129 – while the parameter estimate for the current two-year change is similar
(0.0087) (0.0933)
B - Loan to value ratio
to those from the baseline specifications (column (1)). As shown in
0 ≤ LTVt− 2 ≤ 0.25 − 0.0004 – 0.337 – column 2, the number of children born over the previous two years is
(0.0208) (0.223) used rather than a birth indicator as the dependent variable. While the
0.25 < LTVt− 2 ≤ 0.50 0.0039 – 0.103 – parameter of the two-year changes in house prices is similar in magni­
(0.0124) (0.140)
tude to the earlier estimates (albeit insignificant), the parameter esti­
0.50 < LTVt− 2 ≤ 0.75 0.0233 – − 0.0275 –
(0.0172) (0.168) mate of the lagged two-year change (Pt− 1 − Pt− 3 ) is negative, small in
0.75 < LTVt− 2 ≤ 0.90 0.0408 – 0.533 – magnitude and not statistically significant. In the final column, similar
(0.0352) (0.337) patterns of fertility intentions can be observed. Together, these results
LTVt− 2 ≥ 0.90 0.0707 – 0.212 – from Tables 3 and 5 suggest that changes in house prices induce changes
(0.0555) (0.398)
in total or completed fertility rather than simply timing.
C - Income quintile
Bottom 20% of Income t-2 − 0.0134 − 0.0317 0.0681 − 0.497
(0.0196) (0.0506) (0.261) (0.674) 5.2.2. Response heterogeneity according to financial circumstances
Quintile 2 − 0.0124 − 0.117 − 0.0377 − 0.871 There is extensive literature that examines the impact of house prices
(0.0202) (0.0934) (0.257) (1.246)
on household consumption, savings and labor supply. Those analyses
Quintile 3 0.0049 − 0.0243 0.0375 − 0.954
(0.0217) (0.0499) (0.258) (0.703) are generally grounded in the life cycle model of consumption and
Quintile 4 0.0475 − 0.0197 0.303 0.179 highlight the mechanisms through which house prices impact household
(0.0189) (0.0666) (0.235) (0.919) consumption. First, an unanticipated increase in house prices leads
Top 20% of Income t-2 0.0021 − 0.0119 0.4940 0.241 directly to an increase in consumption, often termed the direct wealth
(0.0098) (0.0384) (0.8570) (0.451)
effect (Muellbauer and Murphy 1990; Campbell and Cocco 2007). This
Notes: Regressions include the controls used in Table 3. Standard errors are wealth effect is generally characterized as being stronger for outright
clustered at the LGA level. owners, especially those characterized as being “long” in housing.
Furthermore, a collateral effect may arise if increases in house prices

6
K. Atalay et al.
lead to higher equity holdings, which provides an opportunity for
households to increase borrowing as credit constraints are relaxed
(Iacoviello 2004; Campbell and Cocco 2007; Attanasio et al., 2009;
Disney et al., 2010; Atalay et al., 2015).8 Table 6 presents the hetero­
geneity in fertility responses among households that differ in their
ownership and leverage status measured by LVT ratios.
Panel A of Table 6 distinguishes between outright homeowners and
mortgaged owners. In terms of realized fertility, mortgage owners
exhibit positive and significant responses to a change in house prices.
Note, however, that among this age group, only approximately 15
percent of females report being outright owners, so the estimates re­
ported in Table 6 may reflect the relatively low number of observations
among that group. Conversely, it is the outright owners whose fertility
intentions are found to be positively (and significantly) related to
changes in house prices.
The significant impact of higher house prices on the realized fertility
of mortgaged owner-occupiers may reflect either a direct wealth effect
or a collateral effect associated with the increase in housing prices. As
noted, for those households, housing price growth potentially increases
net wealth or relaxes credit constraints and, thus, enhances the capacity
of the household to borrow, ceteris paribus Campbell and Cocco 2007. An
examination of the response among homeowners with varying LTV ra­
tios (Table 6, Panel B) shows that households with high LTV ratios
exhibit larger responses (albeit insignificantly different than zero) in
both fertility and fertility intentions to changes in housing wealth ;9
specifically, households that are more likely to be credit constrained
exhibit more pronounced fertility responses. The results are consistent
with existing evidence that lower mortgage interest rates, financial
innovation and house price inflation have increased the capacity of
Australian households to extract equity from their housing assets to fund
consumption, including child-related expenditures(Atalay et al., 2020,
Schwartz et al., 2010).
In panel C (Table 6), the relationship between changes in house
prices and fertility stratified by household income prior to conception is
considered. The housing wealth effect is smaller among the lower in­
come groups since lending criteria in the mortgage market limit the
borrowing capacity of households with lower income (Iacoviello, 2004).
The empirical results indicate that homeowners in the upper part of the
income distribution exhibit a positive fertility response to changes in
house prices. In comparison, the fertility intentions of renters in the
lower part of the income distribution are negatively associated with
house price changes, albeit they are insignificantly different than zero.
These findings are similar to those reported inLovenheim and Mumford
(2013) and highlight the need to understand the heterogeneity in the
response among different groups that may be constrained by financial
considerations.
5.3. Robustness checks
When examining the relationship between house prices and fertility,
there are several potential threats to identification. First, selection bias
may arise if house price changes prompt individuals to change location
or tenure status, and such behaviors were associated with fertility de­
cisions. We addressed this threat in several ways. First, as noted, we
restricted our sample to those respondents who remained at the same
residence for at least three consecutive waves of the HILDA survey. As a
8
The literature also discusses other mechanisms that may account for the
observed correlation of house prices and household consumption, namely,
productivity growth and financial liberalizations. See Atalay et al. (2020) for a
discussion of these mechanisms in Australia.
9 10
LTV is constructed by dividing the value of the outstanding mortgage by the
self-reported home value of the homeowners. In Australia, households are
generally allowed to take on a mortgage loan up to an LTV of 80 percent
without being required to purchase mortgage insurance.
7
Journal of Housing Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
robustness check to take into account decisions regarding mobility and
tenure status, an additional specification is run, namely, the initial
homeownership status of females in the first wave in which the indi­
vidual is observed is used. House price changes at this location, rather
than contemporaneous housing tenure, should eliminate housing tenure
changes that may cause selection bias associated with mobility.
Furthermore, we use initial homeownership status and house prices at
the initial location as instruments for contemporaneous housing tenure
and house price changes in the current location assuming that initial
homeownership status is exogenous.10 The results from these specifi­
cations indicate that our main results are robust to these checks.
It is also the case that preferences regarding fertility are influenced
by relatively permanent characteristics and traits such as the in­
dividual’s discount rate, attitudes toward risk and other attributes. To
take this into account, additional specifications were considered with
individual fixed effects to take into account unobserved preferences
regarding fertility at the individual level. Together, the individual and
LGA fixed effects control for differences in the effects of area- and
person-specific characteristics that are time invariant, including family
background, predisposition, and genetics. The results indicate that these
specifications provide estimates consistent with those from the main
estimation. The main estimates indicate that a $100,000 increase in two-
year home prices is associated with an approximately 0.02 percentage
point increase in the likelihood of having had a child in the past year.
A series of other specifications are utilized to assess the robustness of
the results, including the use of explanatory covariates at years t, (t − 1)
and (t − 2), to allow fertility decisions to be based on economic condi­
tions and employment status at different time points. The results from
these specifications are similar to those presented in Table 3. Estimates
using self-reported housing prices also yield results consistent with those
reported in Table 3.
6. Conclusion
This paper examined the fertility response of Australian women to
housing price fluctuations. The empirical results indicate that housing
price growth increases fertility intentions and realized fertility for
homeowners while reducing fertility intentions for renters. Heteroge­
neous responses are observed across marital status, parental status,
family income, homeownership status, and liquidity constraints. The
results are supported by recent findings from the United Kingdom
(Aksoy 2016), the United States (Lovenheim and Mumford 2013) and
Canada (Clark and Ferrer, 2016). This analysis contributes to the liter­
ature by drawing on rich microdata that contain information on
self-assessed home values, fertility outcomes, fertility intentions, and
family characteristics over various time points around childbirth.
Interestingly, there is some evidence that an increase in house prices
reduces the intention of female renters to have children (or more chil­
dren) in the future. Understanding the dynamics of this behavior and
whether those renters eventually move into owner-occupied housing
would be a useful extension of the analysis in this paper. Moreover,
understanding this process could be valuable for policy purposes in light
of the various pro-natalist policies that have been enacted over the past
two decades. These policies often focus on measures such as income
transfers or tax concessions for families with dependent children, sub­
sidization of childcare and the availability of parental leave. This paper
and the related literature highlight that dwelling costs also play a crucial
role in actual and planned fertility and, as a result, provide an additional
mechanism by which policy makers may influence fertility.
Furthermore, in Australia over the past decade, there has been an
This strategy effectively assigns the wealth change in the initial location to
women who moved. The validity of this instrument requires the assumption
that the past house price at origin affects the fertility of movers only through
the changes in house prices and not via other channels.
K. Atalay et al.
increasing discussion about housing affordability among policy makers
and others. Specifically, the rapid increase in housing prices has led to
concerns regarding its impact on the house ownership of younger Aus­
tralians and the potential for increasing polarization across generations.
This analysis suggests that such developments may also have important
implications for fertility-related decisions and outcomes. In an envi­
ronment in which Australia and other countries face an aging popula­
tion, the empirical results indicate an additional challenge for policy
makers. The increase in housing costs may directly impact fertility,
which may have significant fiscal implications over the long term.
Acknowledgements
Author order is alphabetical. We thank participants at the 31st ESPE
Conference (Glasgow, 2017), 29th EALE Conference (St.Gallen, 2017),
University of Sydney for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.
Atalay acknowledges the support of the SOAR 2020 and Australian
Research Council (Grant #DP150101718).
Supplementary materials
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.jhe.2021.101787.
References
ABS, 2016a. Births. Australian Bureau of Statistics cat. no.3301.0.
ABS, 2016b. Census of Population and Housing. Australian Bureau of Statistics cat. no.
2071.0.
Agarwal, S., 2007. The impact of homeowners’ housing wealth misestimation on
consumption and saving decisions. Real Estate Econ. 35 (2), 135–154.
Ajzen, I., Klobas, J., 2013. Fertility intentions: an approach based on the theory of
planned behavior. Demogr Res 29, 203.
Aksoy, C.G., 2016. Short-term Effects of House Prices on Birth Rates. European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, London. EBRD Working Paper, No. 192.
Andrews, D., Caldera Sánchez, A., 2011. The evolution of homeownership rates in
selected OECD countries: demographic and public policy influences. OECD J.: Econ.
Stud. Vol. 2011/1.
André, C., 2010. A Bird’s Eye View of OECD Housing Markets. OECD Economic
Department Working Papers.
Aron, J., Duca, J.V., Muellbauer, J., Murata, K., Murphy, A., 2012. Credit, housing
collateral, and consumption: evidence from Japan, the UK, and the US. Rev. Income
Wealth 58 (3), 397–423.
Atalay, K., Barrett, G., Edwards, R., 2015. House prices, mortgage debt and labour
supply: evidence from Australian households. AHURI Positioning Paper No.167,
Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Limited.
Atalay, K., Barrett, G., Edwards, R., Yu, C., 2020. House price shocks, credit constraints
and household indebtedness. Oxf Econ Pap 72 (3), 780–803.
Atalay, K., Edwards, R., Liu, B., 2017. Effects of house prices on health: new evidence
from Australia. Soc. Sci. Med. 192, 36–48.
Attanasio, O., Blow, L., Hamilton, R., Leicester, A, 2009. Booms and busts: consumption,
house prices and expectations. Economica 76 (301), 20–50.
Australian Treasury, 2015. 2015 Intergenerational Report, Australia in 2055. Australian
Treasury. Canberra.
Badarinza, C., Campbell, J.Y., Ramadorai, T., 2016. International comparative household
finance. Annu Rev Econom 8 (1), 111–144.
Bassford, M., Fisher, H., 2016. Bonus babies? The impact of paid parental leave on
fertility intentions. Life Course Centre Working Paper Series, 2016-02.
Baxter, J., Bray, J.R., Carroll, M., Hand, K., Gray, M., Katz, I., Budinski, M., Rogers, C.,
Smart, J., Skattebol, J., Blaxland, M., 2019. Child Care Package Evaluation: Early
Monitoring Report (Research Report). Australian Institute of Family Studies,
Melbourne.
Becker, G.S., 1960. ‘An economic analysis of fertility’ in Demographic and Economic
Change in Developed Countries, Columbia University Press. Columbia University
Press.
Becker, G.S., 1965. A theory of the allocation of time. Econ. J. 75 (299), 493–517.
Benítez-Silva, H., Eren, S., Heiland, F., Jiménez-Martín, S., 2015. How well do
individuals predict the selling prices of their homes? J Hous Econ 29, 12–25.
Campbell, J.Y., Cocco, J.F., 2007. How do house prices affect consumption? Evidence
from micro data. J Monet Econ 54 (3), 591–621.
Clark, J., Ferrer, A., 2016. The Effect of House Prices on Fertility: Evidence from Canada.
Department of Economics and Finance, College of Business and Economics,
University of Canterbury.
Clark, W.A., 2012. Do women delay family formation in expensive housing markets?
Demogr Res 27 (1), 1–24.
8
Journal of Housing Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
Clark, W.A., Deurloo, M.C., Dieleman, F.M., 1984. Housing consumption and residential
mobility. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geographers 74 (1), 29–43.
Clark, W.A., Deurloo, M.C., Dieleman, F.M., 1994. Tenure changes in the context of
micro-level family and macro-level economic shifts. Urban Stud. 31 (1), 137–154.
Clark, J., Ferrer, A., 2019. The Effect of House Prices on Fertility: Evidence from
CanadaEcon. Open-Access, Open-Assessm. E-J 13 (2019-38), 1–32.
Davidoff, T., 2010. Home equity commitment and long-term care insurance demand.
J Public Econ 94 (1–2), 44–49.
Dettling, L.J., Kearney, M.S., 2014. House prices and birth rates: the impact of the real
estate market on the decision to have a baby. J Public Econ 110, 82–100.
Deurloo, M.C., Clark, W.A., Dieleman, F.M., 1994. The move to housing ownership in
temporal and regional contexts. Environ. Plann. A 26 (11), 1659–1670.
Dieleman, F.M., Everaers, P.C., 1994. From renting to owning: life course and housing
market circumstances. Hous Stud 9 (1), 11–25.
Disney, R., Gathergood, J., Henley, A., 2010. House price shocks, negative equity and
household consumption in the United Kingdom. J Eur Econ Assoc 8 (6), 1179–1207.
Drago, R., Sawyer, K., Shreffler, K.M., Warren, D., Wooden, M., 2009. Did Australia’s
Baby Bonus increase the Fertility Rate? WP2009n01 Melbourne Institute of Applied
Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
Ermisch, J., Steele, F., 2016. Fertility expectations and residential mobility in Britain.
Demogr Res 35, 1561–1584.
Farnham, M., Schmidt, L., Sevak, P., 2011. House prices and marital stability. Am. Econ.
Rev. 101 (3), 615–619.
Fichera, E., Gathergood, J., 2016. Do wealth shocks affect health? New evidence from the
housing boom. Health Econ 25 (supp. 2), 57–69.
Henman, P.aul, 2007. Updated costs of children using Australian budget standards. In:
Costs of Children: research commissioned by the Ministerial Taskforce on Child
Support. Occasional Paper No. 18.
Hurst, E., Stafford, F.P., 2004. Home is where the equity is: mortgage refinancing and
household consumption. J Money Credit Bank 36 (6), 985–1014.
Iacoviello, M.atteo, 2004. Consumption, house prices, and collateral constraints: a
structural econometric analysis. J Hous Econ 13, 304–320.
Kendig, H.L., 1984. Housing careers, life cycle and residential mobility: implications for
the housing market. Urban Studies 21 (3), 271–283.
Laeven, L., Popov, A., 2017. Waking up from the American dream: on the experience of
young Americans during the housing boom of the 2000s. J.Money, Credit Banking 49
(5), 861–895.
Lino, M., 2014. Expenditures on children by families, 2013. In: U.S. Department of
agriculture, center for nutrition policy and promotion. Miscellaneous Publication no.
1528.
Lovenheim, M.F., Mumford, K.J., 2013. Do family wealth shocks affect fertility choices?
Evidence from the housing market. Rev. Econ. Stat. 95 (2), 464–475.
Lovenheim, M.F., Reynolds, C.L., 2013. The effect of housing wealth on college choice:
evidence from the housing boom. J. Hum. Resources 48, 1–35.
Miller, W.B., Pasta, D.J., 1995. Behavioral intentions: which ones predict fertility
behavior in married couples? J Appl Soc Psychol 25 (6), 530–555.
Mincer, J., 1963. Market prices, opportunity costs, and income effects. Meas. Econ. 1,
67–82.
Morgan, S.P., Rackin, H., 2010. The correspondence between fertility intentions and
behavior in the United States. Popul Dev Rev 36 (1), 91–118.
Mulder, C.H., Hooimeijer, P., 1995. Moving into owner-occupation: compositional and
contextual effects on the propensity to become a homeowner. J. Housing Built
Environ. 10 (1), 5–25.
Muellbauer, J., Murphy, A., 1990. Is the UK balance of payments sustainable? Econ.
Policy 5 (2), 347–395.
Murphy, M.J., Sullivan, O., 1985. Housing tenure and family formation in contemporary
Britain. Eur Sociol Rev 1 (3), 230–243.
OECD, 2018a. Fertility Rates (indicator). https://doi.org/10.1787/8272fb01-en
(Accessed on 16 January 2018).
OECD, 2018b. Housing (indicator). https://doi.org/10.1787/63008438-en (Accessed on
16 January 2018).
Ong, R., Wood, G.A., Austen, S., Jefferson, T., Haffner, M.E., 2015. Housing equity
withdrawal in Australia: prevalence, patterns and motivations in mid-to-late life.
Hous Stud 30 (7), 1158–1181.
Risse, L., 2010. … And one for the country’ The effect of the baby bonus on Australian
women’s childbearing intentions. J Popul Res 27 (3), 213–240.
Schoen, R., Astone, N.M., Kim, Y.J., Nathanson, C.A., Fields, J.M., 1999. Do fertility
intentions affect fertility behavior? J Marriage Fam 61 (3), 790–799.
Schwartz, C., Hampton, T., Lewis, C., Norman, D, 2006. A survey of housing equity
withdrawal and injection in Australia. RBA Research Discussion Paper No 2006-08.
147–175.
SGS Economics and Planning (2017), ‘Rental affordability index’, May 2017 release.
Vidal, S., Huinink, J., Feldhaus, M., 2017. Fertility intentions and residential relocations.
Demography 54 (4), 1305–1330.
Weinberg, D.H., 1979. The determinants of intra-urban household mobility. Reg Sci
Urban Econ 9 (2–3), 219–246.
Westoff, C.F., Ryder, N.B., 1977. The predictive validity of reproductive intentions.
Demography 14 (4), 431–453.
Yates, J., 2011. Housing in Australia in the 2000s: on the agenda too late? The Australian
Economy in the 2000. Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, pp. 261–296.
Zhao, L., Burge, G., 2017. Housing wealth, property taxes, and labor supply among the
elderly. J Labor Econ 35 (1), 227–263.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 CHAPTER XIII.
A STRUGGLE IN THE DARK.

The further Frank went along the cavern wall, the more fearful he
became that he would not be able to find Barney again.
This was most dismaying and the young inventor’s heart sank.
But he set his lips firmly.
“I must find him,” he muttered, resolutely. “Separation will be fatal.”
In vain he called.
No answer came back.
The Celt, wherever he was, was certainly beyond hearing.
In this quandary and a state of mind most indescribable, Frank
strove to make his way along in the darkness.
He kept on, at intervals shouting for his companion.
But ever that same oppressive death-like stillness reigned.
Finally Frank was forced to abandon all hope of finding Barney.
He next turned his attention to the problem of finding his way out
of the place himself.
Once he should succeed in doing this and in joining his friends
there was no doubt but that he could devise a way to return and
make a successful quest for Barney.
With this resolution uppermost in his breast he kept on.
Suddenly a strange sound burst upon his hearing.
 It was a distant sound like the mumbling of voices and gave Frank
a queer thrill of comprehension.
In an instant he realized that he had reached a point in close
proximity to those who were searching for him.
With this belief Frank cautiously came to a halt.
As he did so he heard a slight crunching noise in his rear.
Involuntarily he turned about.
The next moment he felt a clutch upon his shoulder and then talon
fingers closed about his windpipe.
Not a word did his assailant speak. Who or what he was Frank
could only conjecture.
Naturally he believed him to be one of the greasers.
But if this was the case, somewhat singularly the fellow made no
effort to cry out for his companions.
His purpose seemed to overcome Frank without an outcry.
But the young inventor had no idea of submitting without a
struggle.
He grappled with him and a struggle followed which baffles
description.
Backward and forward they swayed and reeled. Now one held the
advantage and now the other.
In this manner the struggle continued for some time.
In vain Frank tried to throw his adversary.
“Who are you?” he finally panted, nigh overcome with exertion.
“That’s nothin’ to you,” gritted the other, huskily. “I’m after yer scalp
an’ I’m goin’ ter have it.”
 “Not if I can prevent,” retorted Frank.
“Ye can’t help yerself.”
“Perhaps not.”
“Ye’d better give in at onct. If ye’ll surrender now I’ll spare yer life
an’ take ye down to Costello.”
“I have no intention of surrendering to you.”
“Ye don’t, eh?”
“No.”
“Curse ye, then I’ll kill ye!”
“If you can.”
“Wall, I kin.”
“Look here!” said Frank, sharply. “I want to know what sort of a
chap you are. I can tell by your talk that you are not a greaser.”
The fellow laughed.
“In course I ain’t,” he replied. “But what of that?”
“Well, you must be a miserable wretch to mix up with them.”
“That’s nothin’ to you.”
“Of course not. Yet I would give one of my own countrymen credit
for better sense than that.”
“Wall, I don’t ax any odds of you nor nobody else. Let go of my
wrist or I’ll stick this knife atwixt yer ribs.”
“I have no idea of it.”
“Ye haven’t, eh?”
“No.”
 “Wall, I’ll show ye.”
With a curse the villain strove to carry out his threat; but Frank
hung on to his grip well.
Backward and forward they swayed in a severe test of muscular
strength.
Frank Reade, Jr., was not a heavy man, but extremely quick and
muscular. He managed to hold his own.
Suddenly voices were heard in the distance, and lights flashed.
Frank knew at once that the greasers were coming that way, and
he understood well the result.
If they should come up while in struggle thus, his fate would be
sealed.
They would no doubt kill him on the spot.
This filled him with desperate resolution, and he made a reckless
attempt to end the struggle then and there.
Exerting all his strength, he swung his adversary against the wall
of the passage.
With such force did the villain strike the wall that he was for a
moment stunned.
It was Frank’s chance.
Quick as a flash he severed his hold with the foe and darted away
in the darkness.
When the fellow recovered an instant later, his would-be victim
was missing.
His wrath is not easily depicted in words or with the pen.
Yelling oaths and fierce imprecations he started in pursuit.
 But Frank had got a good start, and went flying down the dark
shaft like a meteor.
On he kept at full speed, taking the chances of falling into a hole.
In a few moments he had distanced his pursuer. He came to a halt
somewhat out of breath.
There was no doubt but that the villain had taken another corridor
and was far astray.
The lights and the sound of voices had disappeared.
For the nonce Frank knew that he was safe, and he felt relieved.
He sank down upon the damp floor of the mine passage to recover
his breath and strength.
Every muscle in his body was aching from his experience with the
villain.
It had been a hard tussle and he came off victorious only at a
great expense of muscular power.
For some moments Frank rested in this manner.
Then he once more regained his feet.
He knew the great importance of escaping from the place. He
thought of Barney, and at that moment a singular sound came to his
hearing.
It was like the yawn of a waking person. The next moment a
familiar voice in a muttering key broke the air:
“Bejabers, I’ve been ashleep, an’ more’s the shame to me.
Phwativer will Misther Frank think, whin I tell him of it? But shure I
was that tired I could niver kape me eyes open at all, at all.”
Frank gave a start of joy.
How familiar were those tones to him. It was Barney.
 Impulsively he cried:
“Hullo, Barney! Thank Heaven we are reunited.”
“Misther Frank!” cried the Celt, with wildest joy. “Shure is that yez,
sor?”
“It’s nobody else.”
“Begorra, I’m that glad to see yez that I cud sthand on me head.”
The next moment the faithful Celt was by Frank’s side, wringing
his hand.
That was an affectionate meeting between master and servant.
One was scarcely less glad than the other. Both were overjoyed.
Then they recounted experiences.
It seemed that Barney had wandered into another passage and
completely lost his way.
The thickness of the separate walls had prevented Frank’s voice
from reaching him or his voice from reaching Frank.
However, they had been brought together again by good fortune.
It was now determined not to get into another such a scrape.
“Bejabers, I’ll kape close enough to yez now, Misther
Frank,“declared Barney, vigorously. “Not a minnit will I lave yez,
shure.”
“It will be the safest way,” agreed Frank. “We will have to look
sharp to avoid the foe. Ah!”
The exclamation was caused by the distant flashing of a light.
“They are coming this way,” cried Frank, hurriedly.
“Shure ye’re right sor.”
 “We must get out of the way.”
“Begorra, it’s roight yez are.”
“Come on!”
“I’ll folly yez, sor.”
Frank darted into another passage and Barney followed him.
Suddenly, as they were forging along, light was seen ahead.
“What is it?” cried Frank. “As I live I believe it is daylight!”
“Bejabers, sor, it’s not the roight color for that!” cried Barney.
“I guess you’re right.”
“Shure, it’s back into the main mine we be comin’, sor.”
It was certainly a fact that at last they had found their way into a
passage leading into the main body of the mine.
Imbued with new hope, Frank kept on at a rapid pace.
Soon the light grew stronger, and they became certain that they
were coming back to the very point they had started from.
Nearer every moment they drew to the entrance to the shaft.
Nothing was seen or heard of the greasers now. They were
doubtless exploring the passages yet in pursuit of the fugitives.
“Shure, it’s a nice slip we gave them intoirely,” declared Barney,
with a chuckle.
“You are right,” agreed Frank. “Now, if fortune favors us, we will be
able to escape from this den.”
“Shure, I hope so, sor.”
At length they reached the end of the passage and once more
came out into the gallery of the mine.
 There were none of the greasers in the gallery, but venturing to
look down into the pit below Frank saw that there were fully as many
of them yet gathered about the fire.
It was now a serious question as to what it was best to do.
To attempt to pass through the main part of the mine unobserved
was utterly out of the question.
They would be sure to be spotted by the foe, but Frank had
decided upon a move and started to creep along down the gallery,
when a startling thing occurred.
Frank heard a rasping sound almost at his shoulder and then a
whisper came, shrill and clear:
“Whist! are you friends to me?”
Frank turned with utter amazement.
 CHAPTER XIV.
THE END.

Set in the wall of the gallery was a door heavily barred with iron.
A white face was pressed against it, and as Frank looked up he
barely repressed a loud cry of amazement.
“Heavens!” he gasped, “Harvey Montaine!”
“My soul!” came back in a thrilled whisper. “Is that you Frank
Reade, Jr.?”
“It is nobody else.”
“God be praised!”
“I have found you.”
“My prayers are answered.”
“But I fear we are in as bad a position as you,” said Frank.
“How so?” asked Montaine.
“We are alone and unaided here. We escaped into this place from
an old shaft near here into which we had been cast to die.”
“Heaven is with you!” cried Montaine, feverishly. “The Almighty has
sent you to effect my rescue. Oh, Frank, I cannot tell you what I have
suffered in the last month.”
“You have my sympathy,” replied Frank, warmly. “And if it lies
within my power I mean to wrest you from the power of Miguel
Costello.”
“Then you got my message asking for succor?”
 “I did.”
“I knew that you would answer it.”
“Of course I would. I can imagine what you have suffered, dear
friend. But this fiend—Costello—what was his purpose?”
“Partly revenge, and partly a scheme to defraud me of my legal
claim to the mine.”
“Is this the mine?”
“Oh, no; the claim is a richer one and a full two miles from here.
This is an old, disused Spanish mine, worked by the early
Spaniards.”
“Ah! then this is simply a rendezvous for the greasers?”
“Exactly.”
“But Costello—does he spend most of his time here?”
“I think he is sinking a shaft at my mine. He comes here only to
taunt and deride me in my helplessness.”
“The scoundrel!” exclaimed Frank; “but how are we to get you out
of there?”
“Oh, Heaven help you to succeed!” exclaimed the prisoner. “These
bars are too strong to break. But I think it is a simple matter to raise
the barriers which are below. There is no lock, and no key is used.
Simply steel bars are shot into their sockets. They should be easily
opened from the outside.”
“Of course,” replied Frank, eagerly. “It is as you say. Have patience
for a brief moment, and you shall come out of your cell.”
It required but a few moments’ work for Frank to lift the bars, and
then the cell door swung back.
Montaine came staggering out.
 He was a tall, finely formed man with an intelligent cast of
features.
He was but a trifle older than Frank, and much after his type. The
two friends embraced warmly.
“Oh, God, you cannot know what a joy it is to be relieved from that
cursed cell,” said Montaine, fervidly. “It is like entering upon an
entirely new life.”
“I can imagine it well,” replied Frank, “but the danger is not over.
We are still in the lion’s den.”
“Right, my friend,” said Montaine. “But we must find a way out.”
He went to the railing of the gallery and looked over.
There was a light of despair in his fine eyes as he turned back.
“Ah, I fear that we will never see daylight again,” he whispered,
hopelessly. “There is but one entrance to this place that I know of
and that is securely guarded as you see.”
“But we must find a way to escape,” said Frank.
The words, however, had barely left his lips when a thrilling thing
occurred.
Up the stone steps came the sound of feet.
Three of the greasers suddenly appeared not ten feet below. They
saw the escaped prisoners and a cry of alarm escaped their lips.
“My soul! we are lost!” cried Montaine.
But Frank Reade, Jr., was seized with a mighty desperation.
Weapons they had none, save the shovel and the iron bar which
they had brought with them from the old shaft.
But Frank raised the bar and hurled it with all his might at the foe.
It struck one of the greasers fair across the breast.
 He went down like a shot.
The other greasers retreated, giving yells of alarm.
Frank recovered the iron bar and Montaine secured a couple of
pistols from the fallen greaser.
The heroic little trio meant to die game if the foe should venture up
the stairway again.
But they did not.
Circumstances occurred to prevent this contingency. Loud shouts
went up from below, and great excitement seemed to ensue.
Then the distant exchange of rifle shots was heard.
Frank exchanged startled glances with Montaine, and a sudden
inspiration seized him.
“My soul!” he cried. “Do you believe it possible that Silver Sam and
his men have whipped the greasers and have penetrated to this
place?”
“Begorra, there’s a fight goin’ on out there phwativer it
manes!“cried Barney.
“Yes, and a hot one,” added Montaine.
This was true.
The report of rifle shots were now rapid and near at hand. The
yells and cries of the contestants could be plainly heard.
The amphitheater had been cleared of greasers in a twinkling.
It seemed to the prisoners a good opportunity to make an attempt
to escape.
So they rushed down into the place, but scarcely had their feet
touched the cavern floor when half a dozen armed men burst into the
cavern.
 At first Frank thought they might be some of the greasers returned,
and consequently foes.
But a loud cry of joy went up the next moment.
“Hooray!” shouted a hearty voice, “however did you come here,
Mr. Reade?”
It was Silver Sam and five of the hardy miners in his employ.
“We are saved!” cried Frank, joyfully. “Your men have the best of it,
Sam?”
“Cert,” replied the sport, readily. “We scattered them like chaff. Oh,
I tell ye, one good man can whip three greasers any time.”
It was the truth.
The prospectors had given the greasers a tremendous defeat.
Miguel Costello fell at the head of his men.
After his fall, the band became demoralized and was easily broken
up.
The mine and the whole mountain was quickly in the possession
of the miners.
Montaine was surrounded by a legion of his friends.
Frank Reade, Jr., turned to Barney and said:
“Our mission is ended, Barney. Now let us return to Readestown
the quickest way.”
“All roight Misther Frank. I suppose the fust thing is to find the
naygur and the Steam Man.”
“Yes, if Pomp is still in the place where we left him all will be well.”
But at that hour it was not deemed safe to venture down the
mountain side.
But daylight was close at hand and they decided to wait for it.
 A sort of jubilee was held in the old Spanish mine that night.
The miners celebrated their victory in royal good shape.
Harvey Montaine was in high spirits.
He gripped Frank’s hand warmly, saying:
“I can never fully repay you, Frank, old friend. But for you I might
never have seen daylight again.”
“I was glad to be able to help you,” said Frank, sincerely.
“I knew that you would do it, so I sent for you. The time may come
when I can return the favor.”
“Do not speak of it,” said Frank, warmly. “It is all right.”
“I have a very rich claim upon the other side of the mountain. I
shall make a large fortune out of it.”
“I hope you will.”
“You shall see that I will not forget you, old friend.”
When daylight came not a greaser was to be found in the hills.
The gang was thoroughly broken up with the death of Costello,
and they dispersed to the settlements a hundred miles south.
No further trouble in working the gold claims was to be
apprehended.
The prospectors from Saint’s Repose at once staked out their
claims and began to sink a shaft.
Harvey Montaine had no trouble in finding plenty of men who were
willing to take hold with him in opening up his own claim.
His predictions proved true, and he eventually reaped a large
fortune from his claim.
 Frank and Barney were escorted down the pass to the place
where they had left Pomp and the Steam Man by Silver Sam,
Diamond Jake and a party of the prospectors.
Pomp, as we have seen in a preceding chapter, had released
himself from his bonds after being captured by the greasers, had got
aboard the Steam Man and taken to the plain for safety.
All that night he kept on the move in the vicinity, taking care to
guard against a second surprise.
But he was not attacked again, and some time after daylight he
ventured to return to the spot where Barney and Frank upon
returning would expect to find him.
He had hardly done so when they appeared accompanied by
Silver Sam and his crowd.
Of course an exchange of experiences followed and then Frank
and Barney boarded the Steam Man.
“Three cheers for Frank Reade, Jr., and the Steam Man, boys,”
cried Silver Sam, heartily.
They were given with a will. Frank replied with several sharp notes
from the whistle and then the Man was off.
Soon the Los Pueblos Mountains faded away in the distance.
For days the Steam Man kept on over wide plains until at length
Laredo was reached again. Then once more the Steam Man was put
aboard the cars.
The great quest was ended.
Harvey Montaine did not forget the favor done him, for two years
later he sent Frank’s wife a valuable solitaire diamond worth many
thousand of dollars from the mines of South America.
And so ends the story of hot work among the greasers, but it does
not conclude the experiences of the Steam Man, a further account of
which may be found in No. 6, of the Frank Reade Library, entitled:
“FRANK READE, JR., WITH HIS NEW STEAM MAN CHASING A
GANG OF ’RUSTLERS;’ or,
Wild Adventures in Montana.”

HOW TO PLAY GAMES.—A complete and useful little book,

containing the rules and regulations of Billiards, Bagatelle,
Backgammon, Croquet, Dominoes, etc. Price 10 cents. For sale
by all newsdealers in the United States and Canada, or sent to
your address, postage free, on receipt of price. Frank Tousey,
publisher, 34 and 36 North Moore street, New York. Box 2730.
HOW TO BECOME A MAGICIAN.—Containing the grandest
assortment of magical illusions ever placed before the public.
Also, tricks with cards, incantations, etc. Price 10 cents. For sale
by all newsdealers, or sent to your address, postage free, upon
receipt of price. Frank Tousey, publisher, 34 and 36 North Moore
street, New York. P. O. Box 2730.
 “NONAME’S” Latest and Best Stories
—— ABOUT—-
Frank Reade and Frank Reade, Jr., ARE PUBLISHED
WEEKLY IN
FRANK READE LIBRARY.

Price 5 Cents Per Copy.

The Following Have Already Been Published:

1. Frank Reade, Jr., and His New Steam Man; or, The Young By
Inventor’s Trip to the Far West, “Noname.”
2. Frank Reade, Jr., With His New Steam Man in No Man’s Land; or, By
On a Mysterious Trail, “Noname.”
By
3. Frank Reade, Jr., With His New Steam Man in Central America,
“Noname.”
4. Frank Reade, Jr., With His New Steam Man in Texas; or, Chasing By
the Train Robbers, “Noname.”
5. Frank Reade, Jr., With His New Steam Man in Mexico; or, Hot Work By
Among the Greasers, “Noname.”
6. Frank Reade, Jr., With His New Steam Man Chasing a Gang of By
“Rustlers;” or, Wild Adventures in Montana, “Noname.”
7. Frank Reade, Jr., and His New Steam Horse; or, The Search for a By
Million Dollars. A Story of Wild Life in Mexico, “Noname.”

If You Want to Have a Good Laugh,

BUY A COPY OF
The 5 Cent Comic Library.
ISSUED EVERY SATURDAY.
 The Following VERY FUNNY Stories Have Already Been
Published:
By Tom
1. Two Dandies of New York; or, The Funny Side of Everything,
Teaser
2. Cheeky Jim, the Boy From Chicago; or, Nothing Too Good for By Sam
Him, Smiley
By Tom
3. Gymnastic Joe; or, Not a Bit Like His Uncle,
Teaser
4. Shorty; or, Kicked Into Good Luck, By Peter Pad

For sale by all newsdealers in the United States and Canada, or sent to your address,
post-paid, on receipt of price. Address

Box 2730. FRANK TOUSEY, Publisher, 34 & 36 North Moore

Street, New York.
 *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FRANK
READE, JR., WITH HIS NEW STEAM MAN IN MEXICO ***

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
be renamed.

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright in
these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it
in the United States without permission and without paying copyright
royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of
this license, apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept
and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and
may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following the
terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use of
the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very
easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as
creation of derivative works, reports, performances and research.
Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given
away—you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with
eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject
to the trademark license, especially commercial redistribution.

START: FULL LICENSE

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE