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COMBINED
OPERATIONS
An Official History of Amphibious
Warfare Against Hitler’s Third Reich,
1940-1945
Introduced by
John Grehan
COMBINED OPERATIONS
An Official History of Amphibious Warfare Against Hitler’s Third Reich, 1940-1945
Based on file reference DEFE 2/1773, from a series of records from the Directorate of Military
Intelligence, at The National Archives, Kew and licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
ISBN: 978-1-39904-022-8
EPUB ISBN: 978-1-39904-024-2
MOBI ISBN: 978-1-39904-024-2
No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system,
without permission from the Publisher in writing.
Pen & Sword Books Ltd incorporates the imprints of Pen & Sword Archaeology, Air World Books,
Atlas, Aviation, Battleground, Discovery, Family History, History, Maritime, Military, Naval,
Politics, Social History, Transport, True Crime, Claymore Press, Frontline Books, Praetorian Press,
Seaforth Publishing and White Owl
or
Foreword
Glossary
Introduction by John Grehan
Part I
The History of the Combined Operations Headquarters 1940-1945
Chapter 1 Early History and the Years Prior to the Outbreak of the Second World War
Chapter 6 The Switch to the Mediterranean, North African and Sicily Campaigns
Chapter 11 The Story of Some Operations Affecting Development of Command and Control
Chapter 12 Training and Training Establishments
Chapter 13 The Landing Craft and Bases Organisation
Chapter 14 Commandos in Combined Operations
Chapter 15 Royal Marines in Combined Operations
Chapter 16 Close Support and Combined Operations Bombardment Units
Close Support
Combined Operations Bombardment Units
Reorganisation to Prepare for the War in the Far East, October 1943 to the end of
the War
Chapter 21 The Development of Material and Resources other than Ships and Craft
Bridging the Water-Gap
Mines, Beach Obstacles and their Clearance; Craft and Vehicle Recovery
Miscellaneous Projects in Preparation for Operation “Overlord”
Appendices
This book is intended primarily for students of history, for use at staff
colleges and similar establishments, and for the benefit of those interested
in ministerial machinery for the direction of war.
It is a record of the activities of Combined Operations Command, its
origins and functions, its ramifications in overseas theatres and, above all,
its contribution towards winning the war. It is a record of solid material
achievement and of significant advances in amphibious technique.
Combined Operations Headquarters was a novel element introduced into
the British military organisation. It was begun and developed largely
through the genius of Sir Winston Churchill and the outstanding ability and
forcefulness of Admiral Mountbatten. The work it did to make amphibious
operations possible and its value as a continuing contribution to our national
defence organisation are set out for all to read. Even if we cannot anticipate
the final verdict of history, we must try to establish the facts on which
judgement should be based so that the distinctive contribution of Combined
Operations will stand out with incontestable validity.
The main story is told in Chapters 1 to 10; the later chapters, which
advisedly incorporate some repetition, may be regarded as supplementary to
these and describe the varied activities in more detail.
Inevitably, the story of Combined Operations is largely an account of the
efforts of Admiral Mountbatten and his team; his personal example and
drive gave impetus to all and everything. The measure of achievement by
him personally and by Combined Operations Headquarters can be gathered
from the signal made to him which is recorded in Sir Winston Churchill’s
book Triumph and Tragedy:
“Today we visited the British and American armies on the soil of France.
We sailed through vast fleets of ships with landing craft of many types
pouring more and more men and vehicles ashore. We saw clearly the
manoeuvre in process of rapid development. We have shared all secrets in
common and helped each other all we could. We wish to tell you at this
moment, in your arduous campaign, that we realise that much of this
remarkable technique and therefore the success of the venture has its origin
in developments effected by you and your Staff of Combined Operations.
Arnold, Brooke, Churchill, King, Marshall, Smuts.”
Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, 1956
GLOSSARY
On 4 June 1940, as the last of the troops that had been rescued from
Dunkirk were disembarking at Dover after being chased out of France and
Belgium by Hitler’s blitzkrieg, Britain’s new prime minister, Winston
Churchill, dictated a note to his military secretary, General ‘Pug’ Ismay:
“The completely defensive habit of mind which has ruined the French must
not be allowed to ruin all our initiative, 2 insisted Churchill. “It is of the
highest consequence to keep the largest numbers of German forces all along
the coasts of the countries they have conquered, and we should immediately
set to work to organise raiding forces on these coasts where the populations
are friendly. Such forces might be composed of self-contained, thoroughly
equipped units of say one thousand up to not more than ten thousand when
combined. Surprise would be ensured by the fact that the destinations
would be concealed until the last moment.”1
With that simple memorandum the concept of what would eventually be
known as the Commandos was conceived, and they would be the main
troops who would engage in the early Combined Operations.
Ten days later, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee appointed Lieutenant-
General Alan Bourne RM to the post of ‘Commander of Raiding Operations
on coasts in enemy occupation, and Adviser to the Chiefs of Staff on
Combined Operations’. From this small beginning grew the vast
organisation that, on 6 June 1944, almost exactly four years to the day after
Churchill’s memo, launched the greatest amphibious operation of all time.
Combined Operations and Commando raids were to play a key role in
Britain’s war strategy. Britain intended to mount a war of attrition by
blockading enemy ports, undertaking a heavy air offensive and engaging in
every form of propaganda or deception that would confuse the enemy and
undermine morale.2 The Commandos’ part was to strike at enemy-occupied
posts and positions, anywhere, at any time, tying down disproportionately
large numbers of enemy troops and further weakening enemy morale.
The new body, No.11 Independent Company, was raised on 14 June and
ten days later it was engaged in its first operation, codenamed “Collar”. On
the night of 24/25 June, 115 men were landed from four boats on the French
coast south of Boulogne-sur-Mer and Le Touquet. Their objective,
officially, was to discover the nature of the German defences, and to bring
back prisoners. In reality, it mattered little what they accomplished. It was
the fact that British troops could land and attack the Germans which really
counted, showing Hitler that Britain was far from beaten.
The men did in fact make contact with German troops. One group
became embroiled in a firefight with five of the enemy, and a second group
killed two German sentries at a point to the south of Le Touquet.
Though a minuscule affair in terms of the war at large, it enabled the
Ministry of Information to issue a highly encouraging communique: “Naval
and military raiders, in cooperation with the RAF, carried out successful
reconnaissances of the enemy coastline; landings were effected at a number
of points and contacts made with German troops. Casualties were inflicted
on the enemy, but no British casualties occurred, and much useful
information was obtained.”3
There was but a little pause before the next raid was mounted, this time
against Guernsey on the night of 14/15 July. German forces had occupied
the Channel Islands at the end of June, and as early as 2 July, Churchill
demanded that “plans should be studied to land secretly by night on the
Islands and kill or capture the invaders”. This was exactly the kind of
exploit for which Combined Operations was created.4
Of the three groups which departed Devonport, one failed to reach land,
another landed on the wrong island and the third, which reached the correct
beach on time, failed to achieve any of its objectives of killing Germans,
and destroying enemy aircraft and facilities at Guernsey airport. Heavy seas
meant that the boats could not keep close inshore and when the men
returned to the beach to reembark, they had to swim some 100 yards to
reach the boats. Three of the men could not swim and had to be left behind.
In total, four men were captured by the Germans.
Churchill was far from impressed with this botched affair, and two days
later Bourne was replaced by Admiral of the Fleet, Roger Keyes, in the
newly named post of Director of Combined Operations.
This new force quickly began to take shape. Recruits were drawn from
the Army, almost entirely men who had volunteered for undisclosed
‘Special Duty’ all of whom underwent rigorous physical and combat
training. By March 1941 the Commandos were ready and the first large-
scale Combined Operations raid of the war was undertaken against a small
archipelago beyond the Arctic Circle and some 900 miles from Britain – the
Lofoten Islands.
Complete surprise was achieved, and the Commandos destroyed
important glycerine factories and military installations (resulting in the
burning of an estimated 800,000 gallons of oil and petrol) and eleven ships
were sunk. The Commandos returned to the UK with 315 volunteers for the
Norwegian Navy and Merchant Marine, sixty Quislings and some 228
German prisoners.5
Further small operations were carried out, but the very limited nature and
uneven achievements of the Commandos prompted criticism from Regular
Army generals who claimed that they were largely a “waste of effort” and
“could have been better done by a unit of the Field Army”. The Army
chiefs had never been very supportive of the independent nature of the
Commandos, complaining that many of their best men were being lost to
the Commandos. They believed that every division should be capable of
mounting commando-style operations, not just specially organised units,
and had already begun training regular battalions (including, incidentally,
my father’s battalion) at Inveraray in Scotland in amphibious operations.
Their arguments eventually received some backing from Churchill, and
no operation could thereafter be mounted from the UK without the consent
of General Sir Alan Brooke, Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces. Admiral
Keyes did not like this one bit and so, on 27 October 1941, he was replaced
as head of Combined Operations by Lord Louis Mountbatten.
Mountbatten intended to raise the raids to a much higher level and in
December 1941, the first of Mountbatten’s more ambitious enterprises,
Operation “Archery”, was undertaken. This was a raid on the Norwegian
islands of Vågsøy (spelt Vaagso in the text that follows) and Måløy, which
included more than 500 Commandos, a cruiser and four destroyers and, for
the first time, the RAF. It was a genuine combined services operation. The
main purpose of “Archery” was to destroy the stores of fish-oil production
facilities as the oil was used by the Germans in the manufacture of high
explosives. At the same time a diversionary raid was undertaken against the
Lofoten Islands by 300 men from No.12 Commando. Both missions
included Norwegian troops.
Both attacks were a success, with much damage being done. They
prompted the Germans to strengthen their garrisons in Norway, thus
reducing the number of soldiers fighting on the critical Eastern Front
against the Soviet Union.
Buoyed by these achievements, Mountbatten continued to plan. One of
the next raids was undertaken in response to a request from the Air
Ministry’s Scientific Information Branch for a mission to be undertaken to
seize as much instrumentation as could be carried back to the UK of a new
machine at the German radar station at Bruneval, a small village on the
French coast near Le Havre. The site was close to the cliff edge from which
a path led down to an easily accessible beach. The raid was approved by
Mountbatten and scheduled for late February.
Rather than launch the assault from the sea, Operation “Biting” was to
see a radar specialist and 120 men of ‘C’ Company, 2nd Battalion The
Parachute Regiment, dropped onto the cliffs close to the radar site. On the
night of 27/28 February 1942, the small force landed between 1 and 2 miles
from the installation. The Paras moved swiftly towards the radar station,
encountering fire from German positions in a wooded enclosure some 300
yards to the north. But the radar operators fled. Using screwdrivers,
crowbars and brute force, the British team ripped out or dismantled every
important component. Flashlight photographs of the mechanism were taken,
and notes and hurried drawings made.
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new leader, whose heart was not so easily moulded as that of
Montezuma. Respect for the emperor, the Spaniards replied, had
made them hitherto lenient toward his people, but if they remained
obstinate no further mercy would be shown, and not one Mexican
would be spared. “Two days hence not one Spaniard will be alive!”
was the retort.
Hostilities were thereupon resumed, and Cortés did not delay the
prearranged attempt to complete the capture of the approach to
Tlacopan. The presence of the imperial corpse had either a retarding
influence on the movements of the enemy, or else the Spaniards
sallied unexpectedly and fought with greater energy, for the four
remaining bridges were gained with little difficulty, and twenty
horsemen passed on to the shore, while the infantry and allies took
possession of the route, and began filling in the channels with débris,
so as to form a solid path, or to repair the bridges at the deeper
places. At this time a messenger arrived with the announcement
from the chiefs who were directing the siege of the fort that they
were willing to treat for peace. Leaving the forces in charge of
Velazquez, Cortés hurried with some horsemen to answer the
welcome summons. The chiefs proposed that if pardon was granted
them for past offences they would raise the siege, repair the bridges
and causeways, and return to peaceful intercourse. In order to
arrange the conditions they demanded the liberation of the captured
high-priest. This was at once agreed to, and after some discussion
messengers were despatched to different parts of the city, bearing
orders, it was said, to stay hostilities.
It is somewhat singular that the astute Cortés should have given
such ready credence to proposals so advantageous to himself. Yet
this appears to have been the case. Delighted with the happy
adjustment of affairs, he ordered prepared a grand supper; but he
had hardly seated himself at table before tidings reached him that
the Mexicans had returned to the attack on the causeway, largely
reinforced by land and water, and were regaining the bridges taken
that day. The conference had been a ruse to throw the Spaniards off
their guard, to obtain the release of the high-priest, from whom
besides much information was expected about the condition of the
besieged, and to gain time for bringing up reinforcements.[813]
Fearful that his retreat would yet be cut off, Cortés galloped back to
the causeway, threw himself on the enemy, recovered the bridges,
and was soon in hot pursuit of the flying Mexicans. He had not
proceeded far, however, when the Indians, who had rushed for
safety into the lake and the canals, were encouraged to return to the
attack and cut off the cavalry. With furious charges they drove the
guard from the bridges, and began to destroy them and remove the
filling.[814] The causeway swarmed again with foes, and the water
round it was alive with canoes, whence myriads of missiles were
directed against the horsemen as they pushed their way back. On
reaching the last causeway breach, nearest the city, the riders feared
they would be overwhelmed, for here the enemy was gathered in
masses and had destroyed the passage. Nothing was left for them
but to take to the water, midst a storm of stones and darts, while
lines of spears and javelins pressed against them from the land and
from canoes. The party was thrown in disorder, and one rider was
pitched from his saddle during the mêlée, obstructing the passage to
the rest.[815] Cortés remained the last to cover the retreat, and
single-handed now and then turned on the swarming warriors,
striking with the energy of despair. Eager to secure the great
general, the enemy pressed heavily upon him, and but for the stout
armor protecting himself and the horse he would certainly have
perished. As it was, he received two severe wounds in the knee,
besides many scratches. The last Spaniard having left the bank,
Cortés rang loud his San Pedro cry, and clearing the way he leaped
his heavily laden horse across the chasm, six feet in width, and
quickly left behind him the discomfited crowd. “Had not God helped
me,” he writes, “that moment would have been my last.” Indeed, it
was already rumored in the city that he was dead. It being found
impossible to hold the causeway bridges, a guard was left only at the
others, while the remainder of the troops returned to the fort, worn-
out and demoralized.[816]
Long since it had been agreed among the Spaniards that the city
must be evacuated; time and method were the only questions. The
former of these was now resolved on by the council: it should be this
very night. It was safer to meet the issue now than later. The enemy
was hourly reinforced. Perilous indeed was the undertaking to pass
with luggage, war stores, prisoners, and women over the broken
causeway in the darkness; but to remain was death. Botello, the
astrologer, had declared for this time, and so it was determined. For
Botello was wise and prudent, knowing Latin and the stars; he had
foretold the greatness of Cortés, and had recommended his night
attack on Narvaez, and general and soldiers believed in him.[817]
Had he lived a century or two later his words might have been
employed as the vox stellarum by the almanac makers. The
Mexicans had said that they would make it a time of sore distress,
any attempted escape of the intruders, a time when men must
struggle, and women would pray and weep; and if so, it were no
worse for the fugitives that black night should fling her mantle over
the bloody scene.
Since the Indians were supposed to have destroyed the crossing
at the causeway channels, a portable bridge was made with which to
effect the passage. Two more would probably have been made had
time and convenience permitted, but misfortune willed it otherwise. It
was agreed that a large portion of the effects must be left behind in
order not to encumber the march, but the gold demanded special
care. The royal officials, Mejía and Ávila, were charged to secure it,
and for this purpose a number of carriers were assigned, the general
giving also one of his own mares. Their convoy was intrusted to a
body of infantry, under Alonso de Escobar.[818] The secretary,
Hernandez, and the royal notaries were called to testify that all had
been done that was possible. There still remained a large quantity of
the bulky jewels belonging to the king, besides a mass of
unappropriated treasure, which could not be intrusted to carriers, or
for which no carriers were found, and rather than leave them to the
‘Indian dogs’ Cortés announced that the soldiers might take all they
wished—after permitting his favorites the first selection. He warned
them, however, that the more they took the more their safety would
be endangered. The adherents of Cortés do not appear to have
been eager to encumber themselves, and Bernal Diaz shared this
prudence in taking only four chalchiuite stones. The men of Narvaez
practised less restraint, and many loaded themselves with the metal.
Cortés was afterward charged with having appropriated a
considerable share of the wealth thus thrown open; he certainly had
funds with which to send for horses, war material, and supplies.[819]
Sandoval was appointed to lead the van, with two hundred
infantry and twenty horsemen, assisted by Ordaz, Andrés de Tapia,
and others. With him went fifty men under Captain Magarino to carry
the bridge. They were pledged to remain at their post to the last, and
were escorted by a select body of infantry and allies. For the middle
were destined the baggage and treasure, the prisoners and the sick,
under a large escort, supervised by Cortés himself, who, with Olid,
Morla, Ávila, and other captains, and a special force of one hundred
men, were to render aid where needed. The artillery was intrusted to
two hundred and fifty Tlascaltecs and fifty soldiers, and the rear was
placed in charge of Alvarado and Velazquez, with thirty horsemen
and about one hundred adherents of Cortés, with most of the men of
Narvaez. The allied forces, of whom a number appear to have
returned home during the inaction of Montezuma’s captivity, and who
had suffered greatly during the siege, must still have numbered
nearly six thousand men, including carriers, distributed among the
three divisions.[820] Among the prisoners Cortés enumerates the
legitimate son of Montezuma, and two of his daughters, probably
those bestowed on the general in marriage, King Cacama and his
younger brother and successor, and several other high personages.
[821] The sick were to be carried in hammocks and behind riders.
FOOTNOTES
[808] According to the version of the rabid Duran, based on native paintings and
narratives, the bodies of the prisoners were found in the fort after its evacuation,
that of Montezuma with five stabs in the breast. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 477-9. Acosta
seems rather to favor the story, improbable as several of its points are. Hist. Ind.,
524. To some extent it rests on the statement repeated by Ixtlilxochitl, which
assumes that Cacama, who had made himself particularly obnoxious to the
Spaniards, was killed with 47 stabs before the fort was evacuated. Hist. Chich.,
301. A more severe account is found in a manuscript fragment in Ramirez’
collection, written by a Tezcucan, wherein it is related that a sword was thrust into
the intestines, ‘por la parte baxa.’ The body was thereupon taken to the roof, as if
to address the people. A stone struck the head, and now the Spaniards
proclaimed that this had caused the death. Soc. Mex. Geog., Boletin, x. 362. This
is substantially repeated in Ixtlilxochitl, Rel., 457. A stronger testimony, however,
comes from Sahagun, who states that Cortés recommended to his followers the
murder of the prisoners in order to terrify the natives and to assume the mastery.
‘Y lo primero que hicieron, fue dàr Garrote à Motecuhçuma, y à Itzquauhtzin,
Señor de Tlatelolco, y à otros.’ Version in Torquemada, i. 498, and in Sahagun,
Hist. Conq. [ed. 1840], 113. The issue, modified by the censor, merely states that
the bodies were found near a stone, Teoaioc, outside the fort. Id. [ed. 1829], 31.
This account has received its chief support in the quasi admission of Torquemada;
and when he, the otherwise zealous champion of the conquerors, takes such a
view, others may be pardoned for accepting it. ‘Y que esto aia sido asi, puede ser
posible, pues para tenerse por seguros, le avian prendido; y viendo agora, que no
bastaba la prision, vsarian de este vltimo medio, para vèr si le aplacaban, y
atemoriçaban estos Mexicanos.’ i. 498-9. Brasseur de Bourbourg accepts the
version, and adds that Montezuma was told of his fate and urged to accept
baptism. ‘On répandit aussitôt la nouvelle de sa mort comme s’il eût expiré
naturellement.’ Hence even the soldiers did not know of the murder. Hist. Nat. Civ.,
iv. 330-1. Bustamante, of course, adopts anything Sahagun may say against the
Spaniards; and Carbajal takes Torquemada’s view, Hist. Mex., ii. 375, as does
Beltrami, eager for any sensation. Mex., ii. 145. Vetancurt seeks to reconcile
conflicting opinions by assuming that when Montezuma died Itzquauhtzin and
several other prisoners were murdered and cast out together with the emperor’s
body, in order to terrify the Mexicans and occupy their attention while the
Spaniards hurried away. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 142. ‘Io non posso persuadermi,’ says
Clavigero, ‘che gli Spagnuoli si risolvessero a toglier la vita ad un Re, a cui
doveano tanti beni, e dalla cui morte non potevano aspettarsi, se non molti mali.’
Storia Mess., iii. 131. Solis cannot believe Cortés guilty of an act so bad and
reckless. Hist. Mex., ii. 150-1. Prescott disposes of the charge as an ‘absurdity’
and a ‘monstrous imputation.’ Hist. Mex., ii. 321. It must be considered, however,
that the Spaniards did seek to profit by the death; and scruples about ‘killing a dog
of an Indian,’ as they had so lately termed him, could not have weighed with such
men when their interests were concerned; how much less when their lives were at
stake? The whole argument, then, may be said to depend on the question whether
Montezuma was more valuable as captive or as corpse. If the people manifested
little respect for the living ruler, the Spaniards could have had no reason to expect
more for the dead. His death would only have loosened the bond which still
restrained a vast number, whether of kindred or of mere subjects, and given the
hostile leaders fresh motives and strength for their operations. Besides,
Montezuma must have retained a great influence outside the city, which a fugitive
army would have found of service. The recognition of this influence is shown by
the efforts made to save the imperial children, as noticed even by the most rabid
accusers of the Spaniards. It may be mentioned that no charge is brought forward
in the residencias either against Cortés or Alvarado.
[809] Apanecatl, according to Brasseur de Bourbourg, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 332.
Bernal Diaz sends these men to carry the news of the death, and following them
were six high personages and most of the captive priests, carrying the body. Hist.
Verdad., 105.
[810] Stones were thrown upon the cortege, and it was driven from quarter to
quarter. Finally Apanecatl took refuge in the palace where Cuitlahuatzin held forth,
and appealed to him, only to be repulsed by his courtiers. The body was
nevertheless secured by a friendly party. Manuscrit Nahuatl, 1576, in Brasseur de
Bourbourg, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 333.
[811] ‘Hicieron todas las solemnidades que solian hacer ... Mocthecuzoma lo
enterraron en México ... algunos decian mal de Mocthecuzoma porque habia sido
muy cruel.’ Hist. Conq., 31. ‘Vimos q̄ hizierõ muy gran llanto, q̄ biẽ oimos las
gritas, y aullidos q̄ por èl dauan.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 105. ‘Hizieron muy
gran llanto, para enterrar al rey en Chapultepec.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 154.
Herrera combines these two authorities in saying ‘le deuieron de enterrar en el
monte de Chapultepèque, porque alli se oyò vn gran llanto.’ dec. ii. lib. x. cap. x.
He forgets that Chapultepec lay three miles off. Torquemada corrects Herrera, and
insists that the ‘Copalco’ was the place. He gives specimens of the insults offered
during the cremation, i. 499. ‘Estaban indignados contra él.’ Ixtlilxochitl, Hist.
Chich., 301. It has been asserted by some, says Duran, that the ashes were
scattered to the winds, as unworthy of preservation. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 479. Acosta
attempts a modification by stating that the body being contemptuously rejected, a
servant burned it, ‘y puso sus cenizas dõde pudo en lugar harto desechado.’ Hist.
Ind., 524. The burial-place has certainly not been pointed out to posterity.
According to Sahagun, the body of Itzquauhtzin was ‘cast forth’ from the quarters,
together with that of Montezuma, and was taken in charge by his subjects of
Tlatelulco, by whom he was greatly beloved and mourned. ubi sup. To ‘cast forth’
the bodies could have been only a needless insult, which Cortés was too prudent
to inflict on the people.
[812] ‘Que alçassen a su primo del Monteçuma, que con nosotros estaua, por
Rey.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 105. ‘Dixo Cortes ... el se queria hallar a sus
honras.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. x.
[813] Prescott, following Clavigero, assumes that the whole was an artifice to
liberate the two captive priests, one of whom was indispensable in the event of a
coronation. Mex., ii. 338. Brasseur de Bourbourg supposes that the parley was
conducted by the party favorable to the Spaniards, and duped by the stronger
faction, which never intended to adhere to the arrangement. Hist. Nat. Civ., 321.
[814] ‘Como los peones estaban cansados y heridos y atemorizados; ... ninguno
me siguió. A cuya causa, después de pasadas yo las puentes ... las hallé
tomadas.’ Cortés, Cartas, 134. Where had he left his prudence?
[815] ‘Hallé á todos los de caballo que conmigo iban, caidos en ella, y un caballo
suelto.’ Id.
[816] With a loss of over twenty men. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 105. This author
places all the fighting on the causeway on one day, a Thursday, the day of
evacuating Mexico, and the day following the surrender of Montezuma’s body.
Herrera, who is far more confused, has a sally on this day in three directions, one
being the Tlacopan road; but the operations on the latter route are only partially
told, and the rest referred to the third day of the siege. There are also several
contradictions to aid in confusing the many who follow him. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x.
cap. xi. Prescott abandons himself to the guidance of Clavigero for the
occurrences of these days, but embellishes the narrative with some incidents
belonging to the siege of Alvarado.
[817] ‘Botello ... afirmò que ... supiessen que moriria el o su hermano, y algunos
de la cõpañia, y qui se saluaria el Capitan, y otros muchos, y ninguno si salian de
dia.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xi. ‘Hora lo creyesen, hora no.’ Gomara, Hist.
Mex., 159. ‘Anteponendo le vane osservazioni di quel meschino Soldato alla luce
della prudenza militare,’ is the indignant comment of Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii.
135. But there is no doubt that ‘military prudence’ had more weight in the matter
than Botello’s words, and that the result was not due to his advice. Solis casts the
blame of crediting the ‘ignorant charlatan’ Botello chiefly on the majority of the
council, to whom Cortés yielded. Hist. Mex., ii. 171-2. In order to lull any
suspicions among the Mexicans, says Bernal Diaz, a leading priest and some
other captives were sent to the Mexican camp with a proposal to surrender all the
gold if the Spaniards were allowed to leave in peace eight days later. Hist.
Verdad., 105.
[818] Lejalde, Segunda Prob., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 424. For carrying the
royal treasures ‘les dió siete cauallos heridos, y cojos, y vna yegua, y muchos
Indios Tlascaltecas, que segun dixeron, fueron mas de ochenta.’ Bernal Diaz,
Hist. Verdad., 106.
[819] Bernal Diaz, for instance, states that he had hardly taken the four
chalchiuites for his share, from a collection in a mat, when Cortés gave orders to
his mayordomo to secure it. loc. cit. His penchant for appropriating large shares to
himself is well known. Greed of gold was not now his motive, however, but rather a
prudential care to secure means for his plans, and he could hardly neglect them
when taking so great care of the royal portion. Martyr, Gomara, and Herrera
estimate the treasure at 700,000 ducats, chiefly in bulky jewels according to
Gomara. Bernal Diaz reckons in pesos, which may mean pesos de oro. Peter
Martyr assumes it to have been the general fund, from which the royal fifth had
been set apart only at the last moment, but not apportioned. dec. v. cap. vi. Solis
assumes that 700,000 pesos remained after the king’s portion had been deducted.
Hist. Mex., 174-5. One witness estimates that over 2,000,000 pesos were lost
during that night. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 414. The Carta del Ejército reduces the
loss to 400,000 pesos de oro. Another witness states that 300,000 castellanos
remained when the soldiers were told to help themselves; afterward the general
compelled them to surrender what had been thus given, only to keep it for himself.
Cortés, Residencia, i. 241-2. ‘Lo demás ... lo dimos y repartimos por los españoles
para que lo sacasen,’ says Cortés, Cartas, 135, which may be interpreted as
either giving or intrusting. Whatever may have been left after the Spaniards had
taken their loads was gleaned by the allies. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 159.
[820] Bernal Diaz gives Sandoval 100 young unmarried soldiers, with Francisco de
Acevedo, the dandy, Ordaz, Tapia, and eight or nine of Narvaez’ men, captains on
his staff. To Cortés he gives 50 men, and adds B. V. de Tapia to his staff. Hist.
Verdad., 105. This author is contradictory, however. Herrera places Antonio de
Quiñones as Sandoval’s chief aid, and Olid and Ordaz in the rear. dec. ii. lib. x.
cap. xi.; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 160; Cortés, Cartas, 134; Ramirez, Proceso contra
Alvarado, 30 et seq.
[821] Herrera adds a brother of Montezuma, and Sahagun names two sons. Hist.
Conq., 33. So does Vetancurt, although he assumes that one was saved. Teatro
Mex., pt. iii. 142-3. Ixtlilxochitl gives a longer list, including two sons of
Montezuma, and two sons and four daughters of Nezahualpilli, of Tezcuco. One of
the daughters escaped, but it was not the beloved of Cortés, who had been
baptized and named Juana. Cacama is not included in the list, because he is
assumed to have been stabbed to death before the fort was evacuated. Hist.
Chich., 302; Relaciones, 390. With the prisoners’ division went Marina, the
interpreter, the Tlascaltec princesses Luisa and Elvira, and some other women,
protected, says Bernal Diaz, by 30 soldiers and 300 Tlascaltecs.
[822] This date is based on Cortés’ letter, wherein he places the arrival on
Tlascala’s border on Sunday, July 8th, after giving a clear account of the
intermediate days. Any doubt about this date is removed by the testimony in
Lejalde, Segunda Probanza, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 423, wherein the leading
captains state that the siege lasted six days. This testimony also clears up the only
doubtful point in Cortés’ account of the siege operations, where he disposes of the
wounding and death of Montezuma in one sentence, and then resumes the
description of the fighting in a manner that has assisted to mislead Gomara and
many others into extending the stay in Mexico till July 10th. Ixtlilxochitl adopts this
date, yet in the Relaciones, 390, 412-13, he states that the siege lasted only
seven days. Bernal Diaz places the eve of the departure on a Thursday, July 10th
[with Cortés it is Saturday], yet he dates the battle of Otumba just one week later
than Cortés. Hist. Verdad., 105, 108. This latter date induces Zamacois to change
the date of flight to July 8th. Hist. Méj., iii. 406-7. ‘La notte del 1 Luglio,’ says
Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 135, but his reasons for the date are wrong, and the
term he uses may apply also to the night following that adopted in the text.
[823] The Spaniards recognized this as a favoring shield direct from God, says
Duran, Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 473-4.
[824] Ojeda was instructed to see that no somnolent or sick person was left. He
found one man asleep on the roof and roused him. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xi.
Gomara takes the trouble to deny the statement of Cano that 270 men, ignorant of
Cortés’ departure, were left behind to perish. Oviedo, iii. 551. A later note will
explain the cause of this rumor.
[825] The ravaging sallies of the preceding days, which had involved the
destruction of houses in the vicinity and along the approaches to Tlacopan, had
evidently obliged the enemy to retire from these streets and seek shelter
elsewhere for the night. Oviedo assumes that Cortés led the way, but Diaz and
Herrera let him advance only when the first troops are guided into Tlacopan.
[826] ‘Pasaron cuatro acequias, y antes que pasasen las demas salió vna muger
á tomar agua y viólos.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 32. ‘A devil, without doubt,’ adds
Camargo, who describes her as a keeper of an eating-house, and indicates
exactly the location of her house. Hist. Tlax., 167. Cortés states that the alarm was
given by the guard at the first breach held by the Mexicans, where the portable
bridge was laid down. Cartas, 136.
[827] Sahagun names this Mictlantonco, and the next two Tlantecayocan and
Petlacalco. In another place he names the first Tecpantzinco, and the second or
third Tolteacali. Hist. Conq., loc. cit., and [ed. 1840] 121-2. Torquemada gives the
second breach of the causeway the latter name. The names should probably be
written Tecpantzinco, Tolteca-Acalulco, and Petlacalco.
[828] This native rumor, as recorded in the manuscripts used by Duran, Hist. Ind.,
MS., ii. 476-7, is probably the foundation for Cano’s statement, that Cortés
abandoned 270 men in the fort. Herrera reduces them to 100. ‘Que se boluieron a
la torre del templo, adonde se hizieron fuertes tres dias.’ dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xii.
[829] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 106, assumes that the enemy bore it down before
the baggage train had crossed, and that the channel was filled in consequence
with artillery, baggage, and dead bodies. Gomara gets the bridge across the
second breach. Both must be mistaken, however.
[830] Camargo relates the incidents of the passage in detail, and says that Cortés
fell into a hole as the enemy pounced upon him. The two deliverers disputed the
honor of having rescued the general. Hist. Tlax., 169.
[831] ‘El foso se hinchó hasta arriba; ... y los de la retroguardia pasaron sobre los
muertos. Los españoles que aquí quedaron muertos fueron trescientos, y de los
tlaxcaltecas y otros indios amigos fueron mas de dos mil.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq.
(ed. 1840), 122.
[834] Bernal Diaz formed one of a band of 50, who were repeatedly attacked with
arms and midst insults. He quotes some of the low expressions used. Hist.
Verdad., 106.
[835] One authority states that Cortés was nearing Tlacopan, when Olid and
others called out to him that the fugitives were accusing the captains of
abandoning them, and urged that they should turn back. ‘It is a miracle to have
escaped,’ was his reply, ‘and fewer will be left if we return.’ Saying this he headed
a dozen horsemen and a few foot-soldiers and galloped back. Bernal Diaz, Hist.
Verdad., 106. But Cortés was not the man to wait in such a case till entreaty came.
‘Yo con tres ó cuatro de caballo,’ he says, ‘y hasta veinte peones, que osaron
quedar conmigo, me fuí en la rezaga.’ Cartas, 135. He takes the palm from all
American conquerors, exclaims Oviedo, iii. 326.
[837] Among the soldiers contributed in later times by Garay’s expedition was one
Ocampo, who, fond of scandal and pasquinades, libelled many of the captains,
among them Alvarado, declaring that he had left Velazquez with over 200 men to
die. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 106-7. The charge came forward in the residencia,
but Alvarado brought witnesses to prove that he had lost all control over the men,
and could do nothing else than to save himself, wounded and unhorsed as he
was. There were other witnesses who did all they could to blacken his fame, and
to attribute to his neglect of duty a great portion of the loss sustained during that
sad night. Ramirez, Proceso, 4, 38, 53, 68, and 288. Ramirez decides against the
accused. But Alvarado was admittedly brave, recklessly so, and it must be
regarded rather as his misfortune that a panic seized the men. Perhaps, as
commander intrusted with this section, he should have remained longer at his
post. This signified death, and such men as then comprised his command he
regarded as hardly worth dying for. He chose to save life at the expense of a
blemish on his honor. More it never amounted to, for the court absolved him. He
redeemed the fault afterward by brave achievements.
[838] Camargo intimates that several Tlascalan chiefs of the expedition testified to
the feat. Hist. Tlax., 168; and Gomara adds that several followers tried to imitate it,
but failed, and were drowned. Hist. Mex., 160. Contradictory as Bernal Diaz is
about the incidents of the night, he strenuously insists that the channel was
examined during the following siege and found to be too wide and too deep to
allow of such a leap. Hist. Verdad., 107. This solitary denial of a story which has
been adopted by almost every writer, from Oviedo to Prescott, finds support in
testimony during the hero’s residencia, wherein it is distinctly stated that he
crossed the channel on a fixed beam. His own testimony gives assent to the
charge so formulated, although hitherto he had no doubt allowed the other version
to be believed. Ramirez, Proceso, 4, 53, 68 et seq.
[839] Seven Spaniards and eight Tlascaltecs, all badly wounded. Bernal Diaz,
Hist. Verdad., 106.
[840] ‘Durò poco este nombre, pues tampoco les convenia à los muertos, que iban
cargados de Oro.’ Monarq. Ind., i. 504. Zamacois describes the site as he found it
not long ago. Hist. Méj., iii. 421-3. Bernal Diaz implies that the ‘martyr’ name was
given in honor of those captured and sacrificed during the siege, a year later. Hist.
Verdad., 153.
[842] Alvarado said that only the dead remained behind, but Olid insisted that a
number were still fighting the enemy. Cortés accordingly went back again and
rescued several more. Castañeda, in Id., 44. Bernal Diaz also states that Cortés
returned as far as the bridges. Hist. Verdad., 106.
[843] The same who sprang into the sea, off Yucatan, to replace the rudder of his
vessel, unshipped during the storm.
[844] La Noche Triste, as it has ever since been called. Amid so much that is
romantic the tendency to further romance is often uncontrollable. The truth of this
statement is open to grave doubts. ‘Llegó [Alvarado] á Cortés, que estaba ençima
de unas gradas de un qü, sentado diçiendo muchas lástimas.’ Oviedo, iii. 514.
Zamacois describes the enormous tree, yet standing, which shaded the stone and
bears the name of ‘Arbol de la Noche Triste.’ Hist. Méj., iii. 424. Prescott improves
the occasion by allowing the army to file past in sad dilapidation, regardless of the
fact that the army was already gathered in Tlacopan. Mex., ii. 371-2. Testimony
confirms the statement of Cortés that ‘fuí en la rezaga, peleando con los indios
hasta llegar á una ciudad que se dice Tacuba’ [Tlacopan]. Cartas, 135-6.
CHAPTER XXVII.
RETREAT TO TLASCALA.
July, 1520.