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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN
EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS
Series Editors: Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent
and William E. Paterson
Riccardo Alcaro
Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics
Series Editors
Michelle Egan
American University
Washington, DC, USA
Neill Nugent
Manchester Metropolitan University
Manchester, UK
William E. Paterson
Aston University
Birmingham, UK
Following on the sustained success of the acclaimed European Union
Series, which essentially publishes research-based textbooks, Palgrave
Studies in European Union Politics publishes cutting edge research-driven
monographs. The remit of the series is broadly defined, both in terms of
subject and academic discipline. All topics of significance concerning the
nature and operation of the European Union potentially fall within the
scope of the series. The series is multidisciplinary to reflect the growing
importance of the European Union as a political, economic and social
phenomenon.
This book is the culmination of many years of work. It all started in 2008,
when I was awarded a grant by the European Foreign and Security Policy
Studies (EFSPS) programme to carry out a research project on Europe’s
role in the Iranian nuclear crisis. Several people helped me throughout this
period. My thanks go first to Prof. Thomas Diez from the University of
Tübingen, and his never ending patience. His advice was instrumental in
supporting me when my research seemed to have lost direction and in
making that research more solid and coherent, both in its theory and
empirical parts. My thanks also go to Nathalie Tocci, a friend and long-
time colleague at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome—and
now its director. Nathalie’s sharp mind and deep grasp of how EU foreign
policy works helped me fill the gaps in the early versions of my work.
There are many other people among IAI’s team to whom I owe my grati-
tude: Daniela Huber, who took the time to read the book and gave me
invaluable suggestions on how to improve the theory chapter; Alessandra
Bertino, IAI’s irreplaceable librarian, who never failed to find the source
materials I desperately needed; and Ettore Greco, IAI’s former director,
who granted me the opportunity to dedicate part of my working time to
writing this book. The many officials from France, Germany, Italy, the UK
and EU institutions whom I interviewed deserve a special mention.
Without their insights this book would have never been possible. Finally,
I am indebted to the team at Palgrave Macmillan, in particular Imogen
Gordon Clark and Ambra Finotello, for their patience and assistance, as
well as to the anonymous reviewer for the pointed, but always pertinent
and constructive, remarks.
v
Contents
vii
viii Contents
Bibliography 253
Index 281
Abbreviations
ix
x Abbreviations
xi
CHAPTER 1
For the best part of the 2000s and 2010s, Iran’s nuclear programme was
a major source of international concern. In spite of Iran’s insistence that it
sought the capability to use atomic energy for electricity production,
policy-makers and experts in America, Europe and elsewhere feared that
the Islamic Republic could in fact be after the technological and industrial
capacity to build nuclear weapons.
A nuclear-capable Iran was associated with a number of threats. One
was that the antagonism between Iran and Israel would reach the boiling
point. The Israelis feared that a nuclear Iran would diminish their military
edge and jeopardise their regional monopoly over nuclear arms. Many in
Israel—the government included—depicted a nuclear Iran as nothing less
than an existential threat. The Sunni Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), especially Saudi Arabia, were concerned that, sheltered
by a nuclear deterrent, the Islamic Republic would pursue a more aggres-
sive foreign policy. A further risk was that an Iranian nuclear weapons
capacity could engender a desire for emulation in Saudi Arabia, but also
countries that saw themselves as critical regional players such as Egypt or
Turkey. A nuclear arms race would not only plunge the region into further
instability but also deal a fatal blow to the nuclear non-proliferation
regime.
Iran’s nuclear plans did pose, then, a real and multifaceted challenge to
international security. A coalition of six world powers—China, France,
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US),
along with the European Union (EU)—determined to bring Iran to agree
to verifiable guarantees of the solely peaceful nature of its nuclear pro-
gramme. Thanks to a combination of diplomacy and sanctions, their
efforts were eventually successful. On 14 July 2015, after marathon talks
in Vienna, the group and Iran struck a landmark deal that removed the
prospect of an Iranian nuclear breakout for an extended period of time.
The agreement created a complex system of temporary limits to the
ability of Iran to carry out key nuclear and nuclear-related activities, and
gave the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the nuclear watch-
dog of the United Nations (UN), the authority to conduct intrusive
inspections to detect improper, suspicious or illicit behaviour. In return,
the six powers and the European Union agreed to lift or suspend the wide-
ranging sanctions regime that they had imposed on Iran for defying inter-
national demands for more cooperation and transparency.
The agreement did not meet with universal acclaim. Its critics, numer-
ous in the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia, complained that it was
at best a transitory framework. They pointed out that, once the most
restrictive provisions of the deal would expire between 10 and 15 years
after its inception, Iran would be entitled to develop a full-fledged nuclear
industry that it could then try to divert to military uses. Supporters
retorted that critics had failed to provide workable alternatives. In addi-
tion, they contended that a deal in which all parties had invested so much
political capital would create strong incentives for Iran not to pursue the
military option after the expiration date of the deal (at least stronger incen-
tives than it would have been the case absent any agreement). Neither
party could pretend to have a definitive argument invalidating the oppo-
site one. Nonetheless, the lack of any viable alternative to the final deal and
the plausibility of Iran being less willing to risk again confrontation with
the international community were strong reasons to conclude that, all
considered, the deal was worth striking.
For sure, the agreement is not perfect. Its value would amount to little
if the parties failed to implement its terms or withdrew from it altogether—
a prospect that cannot be ruled out, not least given US President Donald
Trump’s view that the deal is deeply flawed. And even if all parties did
comply with the agreement, the question of how to make sure that Iran
would not go nuclear after the deal’s expiration would remain. In these
terms, the Vienna agreement did not put an end to Iran’s nuclear issue. It
INTRODUCTION: THE E3/EU IRAN GROUP 3
was the end of Iran’s nuclear crisis, however, in the sense that it turned a
dynamic of confrontation into one of rules-based interaction.
At the time of writing, the endurance of the deal is imperilled by
President Trump’s decision to disavow it. The potential US-induced col-
lapse of the deal would usher in a new phase in Iran’s nuclear issue and
probably an even graver crisis than the one before 2015. This new crisis
would be different in nature because its proliferation dimension would be
entirely subordinated to the more volatile dynamics of US-Iranian antago-
nism. The way the pre-2015 crisis was resolved, however, would contrib-
ute to shaping the contours of the new crisis and would constrain the
policy choices of all involved players. The US administration—as much as
Iran—would find it impossible to neglect entirely the rules-based interac-
tion mechanisms created by the deal. Iran and the other signatories of the
deal, for their part, would react to US policies including by drawing heav-
ily on those mechanisms, if only to lend legitimacy to their position.
The nuclear deal, in a word, would continue to have an effect even if
one of its two most important parties, the United States (the other being
Iran), were to distance itself from it. Studying the process that resulted in
the deal, even with a narrow focus on the role played by an important but
secondary actor as Europe (as this book does), retains value thus both in
academic research a policy-relevant terms.
even essential, role. This book assumes that the Europeans were such sup-
porting actors and that the part they had in Iran’s nuclear crisis was indeed
essential.
Initially the Europeans even occupied the driver’s seat, as the process
that eventually resulted in the nuclear agreement originated from a tripar-
tite initiative by France, Germany and the United Kingdom. It was the
three European countries (the E3) that first engaged the Iranians in
nuclear talks in 2003, with a wary United States remaining on the sidelines
for about two years. The Americans entered the stage only after the
E3-Iran talks collapsed, but even then they did so by joining the diplo-
matic framework created by the Europeans—as China and Russia did.
Even while the United States gradually became the main driver of the
negotiation, the Europeans continued to contribute to the process, includ-
ing by having an EU official, the High Representative (HR) for Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), act as chief interlocutor of Iran on
behalf of the six powers. Besides, a series of increasingly harsh restrictions
enacted by the European Union inflicted serious harm on Iran’s public
finances and economy, making the overall sanctions regime both compre-
hensive and pervasive. No analysis of Iran’s nuclear crisis would therefore
be complete or accurate if it overlooked the European part in it.
The E3’s bold initiative to reach out to Iran in spite of US wariness in
the early 2000s soon captured the attention of scholars and experts, who
analysed and assessed the early E3-Iran engagement (Kile 2005a; Quille
and Keane 2005: 111–119; Denza 2005; Perthes 2005a, b; Zammit
Borda 2005; International Crisis Group 2004, 2006: 6–13; Martellini and
Redaelli 2006; Posch 2006). The issue continued to generate expert and
scholarly interest in the following years. Scholars dissected the negotiating
tactics of the E3 (Roudsari 2007; Sauer 2007, 2008; Harnisch 2007b;
Dupont 2009; Alcaro 2010) and deconstructed the European discourse
on Iran to trace the origin of the E3’s policy (Hanau Santini 2010; Kienzle
2013). Alternatively, they analysed the European initiative in the context
of wider EU policies on non-proliferation (Kile 2005b; Bergenäs 2010),
multilateralism (Harnisch 2007a), human rights (Kaussler 2008; Kienzle
2012) and transatlantic relations (Alcaro 2011; Ërastö 2011), or tried to
establish a connection between the initiative on Iran and the global role of
the European Union (Dryburgh 2008). Some studies focused exclusively
on sanctions, which became increasingly salient in the European
Union’s Iran policy (Makinsky 2009; Bassiri Tabrizi and Hanau Santini
2012; Van de Graaf 2013). Finally, as a diplomatic breakthrough came in
INTRODUCTION: THE E3/EU IRAN GROUP 5
the former were representing the latter (some authors disagreed, however:
see Onderco 2015). After all, with the E3 being the most influential EU
member states, the HR taking part in the nuclear talks with Iran and the EU
Council following the E3/EU’s policy line, the distinction between the lead
group and the Union as a separate entity seemed to have little practical con-
sequence. In addition, the E3/EU group was hardly a novelty. As discussed
below, other instances of lead groups both preceded and followed it.
This work does not dispute the assumption that lead groups are an EU
foreign policy practice—on the contrary, it shares it. Yet it contests the
notion that this assumption, which is empirical in nature, can be taken at
face value. After all, the action on Iran’s nuclear issue could equally and
apparently more properly be seen as an instance of national foreign poli-
cies—the E3 leading, the other member states following—rather than EU
foreign policy. The same applies to all other cases of lead groups. The
relationship between lead groups and EU foreign policy is thus problem-
atic, as it raises a number of questions regarding the relationship between
national foreign policies and EU foreign policy.
policy and their inability to equip the Union with the capabilities actually
needed to fulfil those expectations (Hill 1993). This mismatch is itself the
result of the contrast between two logics, one of convergence and the
other of diversity, that run through the EU acquis politique (Hill 1998:
35–39).
A certain degree of tension between multilateral and national dynamics
is then inherent to EU foreign policy-making. This tension is reflected in
the multiple patterns of action along which EU foreign policy unfolds,
patterns that can be traced back both to actors (member states and EU
institutions) and decision-making methods (consensus in CFSP and quali-
fied majority voting in communitarised policy areas). EU foreign policy
emerges, in Hill’s words, as a complex or ‘system’ involving different
actors and operating on multiple levels (Hill 1993, 1998). While such a
system may lack an in-built mechanism to ensure intra-EU unity of pur-
pose in all instances, it is sufficiently elastic to incorporate the foreign poli-
cies of individual member states (Hill 1998: 46–48).
Hill drew a “picture of a continuing dialectical relationship between
centripetal and centrifugal forces in the making of foreign policy in Europe,
where assuming a victory for either side would be to commit the crassest
of teleological errors” (Hill 1996, emphasis added; see also Hill 1998:
48). Some years later, Brian White attempted to systematise this argument
by stating that, due to the combined effect of decades of institutional inte-
gration and elites interaction in the European Union, national foreign
policies could be regarded as ‘subsystems’ of European foreign policy
alongside policies carried out by EU institutions in both communitarised
and intergovernmental areas (White 2004: 51–54, 60–61).
Conceptualising EU foreign policy as a multi-vector and multidimen-
sional system, following Hill, White and others, has the important
implication of shifting the analytical focus from the narrow remit of deci-
sion-making to the broader field of (foreign) policy-making. This expanded
outlook involves an understanding of the nexus between national foreign
policies and EU foreign policy as one of reciprocal influence and even
constitution.
In a 2000 survey of the foreign policies of EU member states, Ian
Manners and Richard Whitman concluded that “the complex system of
collective European policy-making necessitates an analytical approach
encompassing the transformational context, process, and actions of the
national foreign policy of EU member states” (Manners and Whitman
2000: 246). Not dissimilarly, White argued that “the nature of the
[European foreign] policy process is affected by the identity of the actors
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more remarkable is that in his poetry he seems to feel the influence
of women mystically. I shall have to discuss this topic in another
place. It is enough here to say that, with very few exceptions, we
remain in doubt whether he is addressing a woman at all. There are
none of those spontaneous utterances by which a man involuntarily
expresses the outgoings of his heart to a beloved object, the throb of
irresistible emotion, the physical ache, the sense of wanting, the joys
and pains, the hopes and fears, which belong to genuine passion....
Michelangelo’s ‘donna’ might just as well be a man; and indeed, the
poems he addressed to men, though they have nothing sensual
about them, reveal a finer touch in the emotion of the writer.”
(Life, vol. i, c. vi, 8. See vol. ii, pp. 381-5.)
The reasons for the limitation which may have prevented
Michelangelo from adequately representing the sensuous aspect of
womanhood, should be sought in the character of his plastic genius.
So far as the power of appreciation is concerned, and especially in
regard to the spirit of the verse, the opinion of Mr. Symonds appears
to me to reverse the fact. The nature of the artist may be pronounced
especially sensitive to the physical influence of woman. If, in the
extant poetry, this sentiment appears in chastened form, such
calmness may be set down solely to the period of life. Yet even in
these later compositions, extreme impressibility is revealed in every
line. Mr. Symonds’s error has prevented him from entering into the
spirit of the sonnets, and also constitutes a deficiency in his
instructive biography. (See note to sonnet No. 13 [xxx].)
7 [xxii] The verse, direct and passionate, though doubtless of a
later date, still bears the character of pieces which must be
pronounced relatively early. Observable is the use of theologic
metaphor, employed only for the sake of poetic coloring, and not yet
sublimed to pure thought.
[XXXI]
A CHE PIÙ DEBB’IO MAI L’INTENSA VOGLIA
[XVIII]
[XXXV]
[XXXVIII]
[L]
[XLI]
[LXII]
[LI]
[VI]
[VII]